Contrary or Contradictory?
Autocracies and Democracies between Dichotomy and Gradation
Paper prepared for the 6th ECPR General Conference,
Reykjavik, University of Iceland, 26.08.2011
Johannes Gerschewski / Alexander Schmotz 1
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
and Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
1
The authors appear in alphabetical order and contributed equally to this paper. The paper was written in the
framework of a larger project at the WZB on “Critical Junctures and the Survival of Autocracies”, funded by the
German Research Foundation.
1
Abstract
The ongoing debate about appropriate regime typology resembles trench warfare. Since the
demise of the concept of totalitarianism, by and large there is agreement on the two polar
types: liberal democracy and some form of “closed” authoritarianism. Approaches of how to
organize the space in between, however, are largely irreconcilable. The classical dichotomous
understanding of democracy and autocracy as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
entities is challenged by vows for more fine grained gradation that either introduces
intermediate categories - hybrid regimes - or follows the idea of a regime continuum. In this
paper, the two perspectives of a dichotomous versus a gradual approach are confronted. Do
autocracies and democracies follow an inherent logic that – as Sartori famously put it – turns
them into contradictions that exclude a third? Is the inclusion of hybrid regimes a conceptual
step backwards leading to a loss of analytical rigor? Or, in contrast, does the separation of the
political map of the world in two camps – and two camps only – fail to do justice to complex
political realities? Do we not miss out on the fine but crucial dynamics of the grey zone if we
insist the world is black and white? We first elaborate on the general logic of typology
building. We then critically review strategies of concept formation and typology construction
on both sides of the trench. Following Collier’s and Adcock’s (1999) magisterial article on the
topic, we go on to discuss the usefulness and effects of dichotomy and trichotomy. Before we
show that choice of concepts seriously affects the results of comparative study, we lay out
what we call the ‘Sartorian dilemma’: the irreconcilability of his idea of bounded wholes,
contradictory relationships between autocracy and democracy as well his general advice of
joint exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity.
Key words: democracy, autocracy, political methodology, typology, comparative politics,
2
1. The debate about hybrid regimes – A new 1964?
In 1964 Juan Linz challenged in his path-breaking article on the Francoist Spain the
dichotomous classification between totalitarian and democratic regimes that had long
dominated the realm of political science. Instead, he wanted to stress the distinctiveness of
what he called authoritarian regimes and argued that the introduction of this intermediate type
would be an analytical progress:
“Unless we examine the features unique to them [authoritarian regimes], the
conditions under which they emerge, the conceptions of power held by those who
shape them, regimes which are not clearly either democratic or totalitarian will be
treated merely as deviations from these ideal types and not be studied systematically
and comparatively” (Linz 1964: 294).”
He rejected the idea that it would be fruitful to include some autocratic regimes like Spain and
pre-1945 Japan under the rubric of totalitarianism. In his eyes, these regimes did not just fail
to reach either the democratic pole (e.g. due to socioeconomic backwardness or traditionalist
political culture) or the totalitarian pole (e.g. due to inefficient administration or deficient
control over the economy), but were to be considered as types on their own. He delineated the
authoritarian regime type both from democratic and totalitarian counterparts (also Linz 1975).
From today’s viewpoint, his article on establishing authoritarianism as a distinct regime type
was a major breakthrough, even more so as the concept of totalitarianism experienced a major
demise in the following years. Being too static, being (ab-)used both in politics and political
science as a polemic and mostly pejorative term, and having almost “lost” empirical relevance
in today’s political systems, the majority of today’s researchers in comparative politics would
agree that authoritarianism has crowded out totalitarianism in terms of analytic usefulness.
The introduction of an intermediate regime type has proven its value.
Does this hold true also for the introduction of so-called hybrid regimes that are placed
between authoritarian and democratic regimes? Do we face now a new 1964? How valid is
the analogy that hybrid regimes are today’s authoritarian regimes? It was already in 1995
when Terry Karl coined this new phenomenon as “hybrid regimes”. She reacted in her work
to the growing disillusionment with democratization processes. The initial optimism in the
third wave of democratizations after the end of the Soviet Union (O’Donell/Schmitter 1986,
Przeworski 1991, Huntington 1991) had ebbed away and this tendency has peaked in the
3
announcement of the end of the “transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002). Although this
criticism was exaggerated as most of the scholars have repeatedly pointed to the difficulties
and contingencies in transition processes, the overall picture was telling: Scholars and policymakers realized that some regimes have just stopped to be in transition to democracy, they
have been somehow stuck in the middle. And they have remained stable besides Huntington’s
(1991: 174-175) famous claim that “liberal authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the
halfway house doesn’t stand”. In the following research has taken the claim of hybrid regimes
seriously and have investigated more on the emergence and durability of these regimes.
The empirical evidence of these regimes is undisputed. Various scholars have found that a
proliferation of ambiguous regimes is one of the principal outcomes of Huntington’s (1991)
“Third Wave of Democratization” (see, among many more, Karl 1995; Diamond 1996;
Zakaria 1997; Croissant 2002; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Levitsky/Way 2002, 2010;
Munck/Snyder 2004; Roessler/Howard 2009; Merkel 2010).
Ambiguous regimes exist, they are potentially becoming more important, and they need to be
taken care of. However, the fundamental disagreement concerns the strategy to be applied in
their appropriate categorization. Two positions seem to be opposing one another: dichotomy
versus trichotomy. Or to ask slightly differently: Are democracies and autocracies in a
contradictory relationship leaving no room for a third intermediate category like hybrid
regimes or are they to be seen as ‘mere’ contraries, as Sartori (1987) has famously put it?
Proponents of a dichotomy have captured the phenomenon in terms of diminished subtypes of
either democracy or autocracy. Democracies or, more recently, autocracies with adjectives are
democratic or autocratic in essence, but they display certain shortcomings that turn them into
a lesser form of their respective root type.2 This way, the dichotomous differentiation between
democracy and autocracy remains essentially in effect. A second, albeit smaller camp of
scholars engages in the construction of genuinely intermediate regime categories, thereby
creating a regime trichotomy (e.g. Wigell 2008).
In the following, we clarify first what a typology actually is and demonstrate its utility before
we spell out the difference between the tow forms of opposites, contradiction and contrary.
Based on this differentiation, we put forward arguments in favour and against regime
2
Examples of democracies with adjectives include O’Donnell’s 1994 delegative democracy; Zakaria’s 1997
illiberal democracy; and Merkel’s defective democracies (Merkel 1999, 2004, 2006). Examples of autocracies
with adjectives include Levitsky and Way’s (2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010) competitive authoritarianism;
Ottaway’s 2003 semi-authoritarianism; and Schedler’s (2006, 2002) electoral authoritarianism.
4
dichotomies, trichotomies and gradation. In this context, we highlight what we call the
Sartorian dilemma: The troubles occurring when attempting to reconcile his claims about
bounded wholes, contradictory relationship between autocracy and democracy, and general
advices in concept-formation. In the last step, we show that the introduction of hybrid regimes
matters. By making use of the underutilized Polity IV component variables, we demonstrate
the difference the concepts make with regard to regime’s persistence.
2. Why to typologize?
What is a typology? Before answering this question, one need to take a step back and asks
what classification actually comprises. (Hierarchical) classification comes in three different
variants. Firstly, “intensional classification” (Marradi 1990: 131) is based on the conceptual
level. Here, the higher-ranked concepts (genus) will be decomposed into its smaller units at a
lower level of generality (species). Ideally, this is done in a way that the concepts on both
levels of generality have the same intension, i.e. the selection of attributes, except of one
aspect, the fundamentum divisionis as the base of the distinction. By doing so, new concepts
are being formed or modified. Sartori (1970) has called this the “unpacking” of a concept.
Secondly, “extensional classification” (Marradi 1990: 135) refers to an operation that groups
cases to several subsets on the basis of a perceived similarity. The aim is then to form these
groups such as the homogeneity of cases within one class and the heterogeneity of cases
between classes is maximized. Thirdly, cases can be assigned to classes that have been
defined prior to classification operations.
Table 1: Classificatory Operations
Classification
Procedure
Intensional Classification
“Unpacking” of a concept
Extensional Classification
Creation of a class due to similarity of cases
Classing
Assignment of cases to prior defined classes
5
Against this backdrop, classificatory operations can have different results: classificatory
schemes, typologies, and taxonomies. These forms need to be distinguished. To begin with, a
classificatory scheme emerges out of the usage of one and only one fundamentum divisionis.
In such schemes, all types are classified along one dimension. Sometimes this is called a onedimensional typology which is in our eyes somehow misleading, as a typology includes more
than one dimension. A typology is the result of the simultaneous combination of several
fundamenta divisionis and can be pursued on the basis of either intensional or extensional
classifications. Therefore, David Collier and his collaborators are right if they define a
typology as the “coordinated set of categories” and that this set “establishes theoretically
important distinctions” (Collier/LaPorte/Seawright 2008), but one need to add that this
coordination needs to be fulfilled at the same time (see also Capecchi 1968). The order of the
classificatory principles is not important. Types that emerge out of a typology are then to be
seen as clusters or as “special compounds of attributes” (Lazarsfeld 1992 [1972]: 158; Barton
1955: 50). A type is a “concept whose intension is the intersection (in set-theoretical sense) of
the n classes which are combined to form it” (Marradi 1990: 134). What distinguishes
typologies from taxonomies is exactly the question of simultaneity and succession.
Taxonomies also result from intensional and extensional classification and comprise more
than one fundamenta divisionis, but these classificatory principles are applied not at the same
time, but succeeding each other. We come back to this distinction later.
Figure 1: Classification Schemes, Typologies and Taxonomy
Number of fundamentum divisionis
1
Classification Scheme
>1
simultaneous successive
Typology
Taxonomy
Typologies have been used for descriptive and explanatory purposes. For the former, the types
that result by cross-tabulating two or more dimensions are used as “data-containing
6
reservoirs” (Nowotny 1971: 5) and can clarify what a type actually is and how it is best
characterized. Typologies with explanatory aims can be on the one hand on explicit
theoretical ground and are a fruitful device in assessing the internal consistency and the causal
claim by systematically comparing the theoretical implications on the dependent and
independent variables (Elman 2005, Bennett/Elman 2006). On the other hand, typologies can
follow a more ‘modest’ explanatory profile. They might only mark the first step in a causal
claim (Munck 2004): types are expected to develop causal homogeneity. This means that we
assume that a type is then distinctive from other types and is theoretically of relevance if cases
of this type behave similar in similar contexts. Referring to the main question of the article,
we ask as to whether the introduction of hybrid regimes makes today as much sense as the
introduction of authoritarianism in the 1960s. Do hybrid regimes develop this causal
homogeneity? Are they distinct from autocracies and democracies? Before we inquire more
into this question, however, we need to clarify what we are actually classifying?
3. How to typologize?
The “overarching concept” (Collier/LaPorte/Seawright 2008:156) of the classification effort
are political regimes. Routinely, they are defined as a set of formal and informal rules and
norms that regulates who has access to power and how this power is exercised (e.g. Munck
1996). But how can we come to terms with this set of rules? Does it imply that these rules are
interdependent or independent? And are these rules exclusive, i.e. forming something like
“bounded wholes characterized by constitutive mechanisms and principles” (Sartori 1987:
184). Or can these mechanisms overlap and can be identified to a lesser extent across all
regimes? That autocracies and democracies are opposites is undisputed, but what kind of
opposite do they represent? The distinction is between contradictions and contraries.
To illustrate this distinction, one refers in classical logics to the so called logical cube (cf.
among numerous Tugendhat/Wolf 1983: 66-75). A contradiction occurs if one term or
assertion is the negation of the other and would be represented if P∧⌐P are true. In a
contradictory relationship, both cannot be true simultaneously. A general positive assertion
(“All students are lazy”) and a specific negative assertion (“Some students are not lazy”) are
contradictory. The world cannot be round and not round at the same time. Moreover, if P is
true, one can conclude that Non-P is not true and vice versa. For contradictions, the Law of
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the Excluded Middle (tertium non datur) applies. P∨⌐P always holds; a third possibility that
lies in the middle is excluded. For our purpose, a regime is then either democratic or nondemocratic, i.e. autocratic. In a contrary relationship both P and ⌐P cannot be true
simultaneously, but both can be false. A general positive assertion (“All students are lazy”)
and a general negative assertion (“All students are not lazy”) are contraries. Logically, it
would be possible that they are either lazy or not lazy or neither nor, maybe intelligent or any
other attribute.3 Here the Law of the Excluded Middle does not apply, a third category can be
allowed. Referring to the regime type question, a regime can be either democratic or
autocratic or neither nor. This would leave open the possibility of a third category, in our case
hybrid regimes that are distinct from autocracies and democracies.4 Against this logical
distinction we elaborate in the following on arguments in favour of contradictions that ask for
a dichotomous approach or of contraries that would ‘allow’ a trichotomy of political regimes.
3.1.
Dichotomy
Bounded wholes: One of the strongest arguments for a dichotomous approach is usually the
idea of political systems as “bounded wholes” (Sartori 1987: 184) that follow a distinct logic.
Sartori (ibid.) argues prominently against what he calls “degreeism” or “continuism” and in
favour of clear-cut dichotomies when it comes to regime types. In his eyes, there are only
minor problems occurring when asking how democratic a democracy might be as you then
inquire into the quality of a democracy, assuming that they perform differently and that these
differences are measurable along certain categories. To measure the democraticness across all
political regimes, however, as a purely gradual approach would do, is for him highly ridden
with implicit prerequisites. Such an approach assumes that we can find a traces of democracy
in all regime types (Elkins 2000; Bollen/ Jackman 1989), being autocratic or democratic. And,
moreover, these differences are all measurable as a difference in degree – ruling out the
3
In technical terms: the relationship between (∀x)Sx→Fx and (∃x)Sx∧⌐Fx is contradictory (in a two-valued
logical system and for simple categorical assertions), whereas the relationship between (∀x)Sx→Fx and
(∀x)Sx→⌐Fx is contrary.
4
The problem here, however, could be that often hybrids are not defined in their own, but as a mere mixture
between democratic and autocratic principles. Is it then still true that hybrids are not simultaneously P and ⌐P?
8
possibility of a difference in kind. Here, the criticism sets in: political systems are
qualitatively different and follow different working mechanism so that the obvious (rather)
polemic question of scholars favouring a difference in kind approach would be: How much
sense does it make that we compare the appleness (democraticness) of pears (autocracies),
granting that both are fruits (regimes)? Wouldn’t it make more sense to conceptualize a
democracy and an autocracy in its own, identifying the different constitutive mechanisms that
form an inner functional logic of the different regime types?
Contradictory relationship – and what are ‘good’ opposites? The line of reasoning embarks
on a standpoint that both regime types should be seen as contradictories. The above
mentioned Rule of the Excluded Middle that applies then leaves no space for any kind of
hybrid regime as a middle category. All political regimes are either democratic or nondemocratic, following either one or the other functional logic (Sartori 1987, see also
Collier/Adcock 1999: 548). But then, how to (intensionally and extensionally)
conceptionalize the opposites of autocracies and democracies?
There are plenty of suggestions for unpacking the democratic pole. Among the most
prominent is the minimal conception along the Schumpeterian modus procedendi, the
competition for votes (e.g. Prezworski 1991). By doing so, Przeworski and his colleagues
follow what we have called at the beginning an “intensional classification”. The concept of
‘regime’ forms the genus and the ‘degree of competition for votes’ serves as the fundamentum
divisionis to establish the distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes (species).
This parsimonious concept emphasizes the (absence or presence of) elections as the
constitutive mechanism for a regime type. In Sartori’s terms, following this principle would
constitute the core of a bounded whole. As we discuss later in more detail, the Przeworski
way of classification is not to be mistaken as a typology as only one fundamentum divisionis
is involved. The result is rather a classificatory scheme. “Thicker” concepts of democracy on
the other side include more than just one dimension. The usual suspects in this context are the
granting of political rights and civil liberties, the rule of law, as well as horizontal and vertical
accountability (e.g. Diamond 1999, Morlino 2004, Merkel 2004). These dimensions – put
together as a whole – form an inherent democratic logic. This inner logic might get disturbed
in case that some of the defining characteristics are missing, resulting in “diminished
9
subtypes” (Collier/Levitsky 1997) or “radial subtypes” (Collier/Mahon 1993). Examples for
democracies with adjectives are numerous. 5
Against the variety of conceptions of democracy, the autocratic opposite seems to be
underspecified. Besides more historical terms like tyranny, absolutism, feudalism, or
despotism, totalitarianism seemed to be the dominant opposite of democracy in political
science until the 1970s. And indeed, totalitarianism was long conceived as the full and
exhaustive negation of democracy, making itself a proper candidate for being the
contradictions of democracy. Beginning with the more social philosophical approach by
Hannah Arendt (1951) who highlighted the atomism of society, the isolation from social
bonds and the prominent role of repression and ideology, it was especially Carl Joachim
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956) who have set the standard (until today) in
totalitarianism. They have identified six interdependent characteristics of totalitarian rule that
also form a bounded whole: all-encompassing ideology, mass party, terror system, monopoly
of mass communication, monopoly of force, and state-led economy with the last two being
the most controversial. These features are thought as occurring together and constituting an
inner logic. Although a “second generation” (Brooker 2000: 16) of theorists on totalitarianism
like Juan Linz (1975) and Leonard Schapiro (1972) had chosen slightly different features to
classify regimes, they would most probably agree on the idea of a bounded whole.
However, what is common in the approaches is the distinctiveness of these systems from
older forms of non-democratic rule. It was seen as a totally new phenomenon. They have been
regarded as political systems sui generis. And it is this genuineness that makes it from today’s
viewpoint more difficult to see totalitarianism as a ‘good’ and analytically fruitful opposite to
democracy: It seems a too special case of non-democracy. When embarking on extensional
classification on the one hand and trying to identify similarities between cases and grouping
them accordingly to one class, the sheer empirical scarcity, both today and in history, is a case
in point. On the other hand, intensional classification, i.e. the breaking up of a higher-ranked
concept into smaller ones and thereby forming new classes, totalitarianism is too idiosyncratic
to serve as a “good” opposite either. So, besides the frequent criticism of statism and usage as
a pejorative catchword, there is also some conceptual scepticism in place. Authoritarianism
which has crowded out totalitarianism hinges on the conceptual problem of being derived
from the totalitarian pole. This becomes clear when reviewing the classical Linz (1964, 1975)
definition of limited pluralism, mentality instead of ideology and less mobilization. Forms
5
For an inventory of diminished subtypes see, for example Croissant 2002.
10
like “closed authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006) that might be closer to the totalitarian pole has
been criticized of blurring exactly the theoretically important distinction between
authoritarianism and totalitarianism (Snyder 2006). A second argument is put in place by
Sartori (1987: 185-190) himself when he rejects authoritarianism as the contradictory pole of
democracy due to etymological troubles with ‘authority’. Instead, he favours the more neutral
and encompassing term of ‘autocracy’ as the adequate contradictory pole: “The advantage of
the concept of autocracy […] is that it points directly to a constitutive ‘principle’. The (one)
fundamentum divisionis is “the method of creation of the power holder with respect to the
legitimacy basis of power.” (Sartori 1987: 205). In democracies, the power does not belong to
someone and therefore democracies are perfect non-autocracies while the autocratic principle
is that power is the property of someone constituting a non-democracy. In his view,
autocracies and democracies are to be seen as perfect contradictions – and not ‘just’
contraries.
What is the constitutive mechanism of hybrid regimes? We might not need to put too heavy
emphasis on the ontological question if democracies and autocracies are contraries or
contradictories and might therefore ‘lowers’ the (often also implicit normative) standard.
Instead, the importance of careful concept-building is undisputed. Collier and Adcock (1999:
542-543) are right in a very important point: concept-formation as the assignment of meaning
to a concept and the question of dichotomization, trichotomization, or gradualism need to be
disentangled. Sartori’s famous advice that concept formation comes prior to any form of
quantification still holds true and is valuable as otherwise operationalization and measurement
would gain no traction in reality. However, the allegation against “degreeism” that they
prematurely rush to the measurement of the democratic traces in non-democracies, blurs the
line between adequate concept-building and finding thresholds or cut-points. Depending on
the concepts, it might be reasonable to measure democratic traces in autocracies and also to
introduce hybrid regimes as an intermediate category.
But then one key question needs to be answered: what are the principles and constitutive
mechanisms of ‘hybrid regimes’ that would justify an own regime type? What makes it
distinct from others? In classical logics, the usual advice is: definitio fit per genus proximum
et differentia specifica. A definition fits by its higher-ranked genus and its specific difference.
This specific difference needs to develop enough discriminating power, it needs to be sharp
enough against other concepts, and it is still open to debate what this specific difference
would be. So, to classify intensionally, what is the fundamentum divisionis of hybrids? The
obvious answer would be: it is exactly the mixture of democratic and autocratic principles.
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But is this a satisfactory response, does this really have enough discriminating power? The
criticism would be that almost all political regimes are mixtures and that pure autocracies or
democracies are hardly to identify.
Figure 2: Difference between two fundamenta divisionis (form and size) vs. Mix between the two
fundamenta divisionis: Where is the similarity?
Moreover, the analogy with Juan Linz who established authoritarianism holds only until a
certain point. He has clearly seen authoritarianism as a form of non-democratic rule while
‘hybrid’ regimes literally are mixtures between autocracies and democracies. So, is the
mixture between two opposing constitutive mechanism a new one, justifying the
distinctiveness. Might it not be more appropriate to say that a regime follows either more the
autocratic logic than the democratic one? The procedure would be to first classify a regime as
either democratic or autocratic, then qualify it with an adequate attribute, resulting in a
democracy or autocracy with adjectives and then engage in further measurement. So, we
would suggest expanding Sartori’s famous advice: first classification, then qualification, then
quantification. By doing so, the respective reference point is then clarified. The crux is as to
whether making explicit the reference point is better then referring to a third category that
might blur more than it reveals. To just say it is grey might be an analytical step backward
than to say the greyness tends more towards black or towards white.
Taking the other route of classificatory operations, the extensional classification, one would
need to group cases to classes according to similarities. Here, the burden of empirical proof
would lie in exactly showing this. Are hybrid regimes reacting towards new challenges and
problems in a similar way – and distinct from democracies and autocracies? We will try to
12
tackle this question later, but before doing so, briefly review some of the arguments in favour
of a trichotomy.
3.2.
Trichotomy
Trichotomy is not gradation. To begin with, a frequent misunderstanding needs to be
corrected: Trichotomy does not equate gradation. In the most extreme perception, gradation
implies a continuum of more or less “democraticness” or “autocraticness” that should not be
interrupted by any categories or thresholds (Bollen 1980, 1991, Bollen/Jackman 1989).
Gradation implies an ordinal arrangement and succession of regime types that are “more” or
“less” democratic (or autocratic, for that matter). As was rightly pointed out by Sartori and
others, however, autocratic regimes are not less democratic than democracies – they are
simply not democratic at all. Democracy and autocracy are hence best understood as nominal
categories without a hierarchy of any sort. The introduction of a third, hybrid category does
not necessarily alter this non-ordinal procession of regime types. The indication
“intermediate” regime type is in this sense somewhat misleading. Hybrid regimes are not
necessarily in between democracy and autocracy. They can well be right next to them.
Consequently, introducing a hybrid category does not alter the level of measurement.
Measurement remains on the lowest level, a nominal in scale (as opposed to ordinal, interval
and ratio scales). A dichotomous nominal scale has two categories; a trichotomous nominal
scale has three.
Having said that, what follows are a number of arguments in favour of trichotomous rather
than dichotomous categorizations. As in 1964, many of the arguments for trichotomy are
arguments against dichotomy. Why would a trichotomy be preferable to a dichotomy?
Challenging the bounded whole and outdated contradictions. The strongest claim for
dichotomy results from a combination of two of Sartori’s arguments (see section 3.1 of this
paper): First, democracy and autocracy are bounded wholes. Second, they are contradictions
rather than contraries: they are not just both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive for all
political regimes, but they also exclude third categories. First, we address the idea of the
bounded whole.
13
As discussed above, democracy as a “bounded whole” or an “object concept” means that it
features certain ontological elements. And these elements inherently belong together and form
an inner logic that finally defines democracy. The same holds true for autocracy. (It will be
shown shortly, that considering both democracy and autocracy as bounded wholes is not
without conceptual friction.)
From a procedural point of view, however, this notion is hard to comply with. Democracy is
defined by a specific combination of procedural institutional elements, for example elections
and horizontal control of power. If these two elements inherently belong together, one cannot
occur without the other. Conceptually, however, a regime in which elections are present and
control of power is not is well imaginable. Empirically, elections seem to occur quite
frequently without proper horizontal accountability. In a procedural perspective, there is no
such thing as a democratic or autocratic logic of politics. Hybrid regimes come in when
features do not occur together that are expected to do so. Furthermore with Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s (1984) idea of “family resemblance” the classic hierarchical definitional
analyses have come under mounting critique. By analysing the different features of ‘games’,
he concludes that we should not embark on saying that all different types of games have
something in common – otherwise they would not be called ‘games – but should observe
instead. Then, we will not find an aspect that is common to all, but instead we will find
similarities: “a complicated net of similarities that overlap and cross” (Wittgenstein 1984:
278).6 This might come closer to classify regimes in today’s comparative politics.
Collier and Adcock (1999: 544) are also right in warning about the danger of reification: on
the one hand, the belief that there is a “correct” name for real world phenomena may lead to
the uncritical assumption of bounded wholes where there actually are none. In the second
chapter of this paper we have differentiated between three different ways of classification.
The third one, assigning cases to prior defined concepts, is especially in danger of reification.
It is, however, a widely common operation in comparative politics and often impedes
conceptual innovations – although concepts like democracies are “essentially contested
concepts” (Gallie 1956). But changing (social) reality, shifting definitions, and evolving
theory and empirics may render (dichotomous) conceptualizations outdated.
6
“Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. […] Ich kann
diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort ‘Familienähnlichkeit’.” (Wittgenstein 1984:
278).
14
Classification before measurement is one of the most famous of Sartori’s paraphrases
(1970:1036). Even if one leaves aside his questionable cognitive psychological foundation7 of
this sharp distinction, this view has frequently been challenged. Munck (2006: 29) argues that
every level of measurement entails the establishment of similarity-difference relations (see
also Collier/Adcock 1999: 541–543). The fundamental choice between dichotomy and
gradation is hence not at all necessary.
Problems with diminished subtypes. Genuine trichotomies are rare.8 Most accounts capture the
grey zone in terms of diminished subtypes of either democracy or autocracy. The construction
of diminished subtypes is an attempt to maintain the dichotomy and still live up to the
empirical proliferation of ambiguous regimes. Diminished subtypes are of great value to
assess and analyze the variation among democratic and autocratic regimes, they have greatly
contributed to a more differentiated view on these archetypes of political regimes.
However, the closer a regime is located to the great trench dividing democracy and autocracy,
the more questionable it becomes whether it can still be characterized as a form of autocracy
or democracy without committing the fallacy of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970: 1041).
How competitive may an autocracy be in order to still count as an autocracy? How much
defects are tolerable before a democracy exits the democratic category? Diminished subtypes
hinge on carefully designed minimal conditions of their respective root types in order to
define a clear threshold between intact and deficient regimes. Especially in the case of
autocracies, these minimum conditions are often times dramatically underspecified.
On the other hand: When exactly does a defective democracy turn into a competitive
authoritarian regime? Regimes on both sides of the distinction line may actually be more
similar to one another than to their respective root types. It would thus be consequent to
combine these regimes in one category, rather than to artificially align them with full-fledge
democracies and autocracies, with which they don’t share much but a minimal standard.
A third category then reduces the margin of error in the case of misspecification. When it
comes to operationalization, the boundaries between regime types are to some extent always
arbitrary. That is the case in dichotomies and trichotomies. Even if the boundaries are
7
Sartori 1970 prematurely argued that it was in the nature of human thinking to classify first and gradate
thereafter. The same logic of classification before measurement should hence also be introduced in to the
sciences. In the meantime, however, this argument has been refuted by cognitive psychology and linguistics
(Collier/Adcock 1999: 541–543). Humans tend to not discriminate between classificatory and gradual distinction
and cognitively apply both strategies in the same right.
8
Examples include Mainwaring et al. 2001; Rüb 2002; Wigell 2008; Schmotz 2010 or Gilbert/Mohseni 2011.
15
consistently defined in theory, problems of valid measurement make misspecification a
common problem. However, the smaller the number of categories, the more dramatic are the
effects of misspecification. Taking for a democracy what is actually autocratic is a more far
reaching mistake than taking for a hybrid what is still a democracy.
Gerardo Munck (1996: 13) argues that whenever a diminished subtype is constructed, one
already engages in the “hybridization” of different regime types. Diminishing democracy
means to introduce a feature that is genuinely foreign to the root concept. Competition does
not belong to autocracy, yet there is something called competitive authoritarianism.
Democracies are not illiberal, yet illiberal democracies seem to spread over the face of the
world. If the first step towards hybrid regimes is made also by proponents of dichotomy, why
not go all the way?
Three categories transport more information than two. A frequent argument for a gradual
conception of political regimes is the loss of information that goes along with a dichotomy
(Mainwaring et al. 2001: 52; Bollen 1980, 1991). Indeed, if there is only 1 or 0, variations and
differences among democracies and autocracies are tossed over. However, this allegation does
not hold as soon as diminished subtypes are introduced. Diminished subtypes do exactly that,
they do capture variance within categories of the dichotomy. Hardly any advocate of a
dichotomy would argue that all democracies and all autocracies are the same. But
measurement, Sartori argues, comes after classification (Sartori 1970: 1036). However, if
diminished subtypes and their specifics are stressed in the way they are recently – then we are
actually not talking about a dichotomy anymore. Democracies and autocracies with adjectives
establish a regime typology four rather than two types. The distinction between full instances
and diminished types must be drawn as carefully as between superordinate root types.
4. The Sartorian Dilemma: Bounded Wholes, Contradictories, and Multidimensional Regime
Typology
The struggle of regime typology is often characterized in terms of the threshold problem.
Where to draw the line between autocracies and democracies? Or, even worse, autocracies,
democracies and hybrid regimes? The threshold problem, however, is the litmus test of
regime typology only in as much the typology hinges on one sole dimension, or aggregates
16
multi-facetted regime concepts into a single regime scale. If political regimes, for example,
are differentiated exclusively by the degree of competitiveness of the access to power via
elections9, the question is how competitive a regime needs to be in order to still qualify as a
democracy. Whether the scale of competitiveness is split up into two or three partitions is
largely a matter of taste. Or rather, it is a question of appropriateness for a specific research
question (Collier/Adcock 1999). The result is a classificatory scheme in which regimes could
rightly be separated into competitive and non-competitive ones, or into the categories
competitive, moderately competitive, and non-competitive. Similarly, an aggregated regime
scale could be divided into two, three, or more sections with arguments in favour or again
contradictory or contrary relationships between the regime types.10
Problems occur if we go beyond uni-dimensionality.11 This is to say, problems occur when
moving from classification schemes to typologies. Multidimensionality brings particularly the
question of mixed regime types to the fore, and dramatically gets the dichotomous
understanding of democracy and autocracy into distress. In the following we emphasize the
troubles in reconciling Sartori’s idea of (1) contradictory relationship, (2) the idea of bounded
wholes (Sartori 1987), (3) and the more general advice of (3a) jointly exhaustive and (3b)
mutually exclusive categories (Sartori 1970; 1984). This is what we call the Sartorian
Dilemma.
Regime dichotomies usually depart from a concept of democracy.12 In a first step democracy
is defined. Then, everything that does not meet the conceptual standards of democracy is
labelled autocratic subsequently. Autocracy is captured as non-democracy. Mostly,
9
Adam Przworski and a prominent group of researchers in his surroundings Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworski et
al. 2000; Przeworksi/Gandhi 2007; Przeworksi 2003; Gandhi/Przeworksi 2007; Cheibub et al. 2009, for
example, base their dichotomy of regimes exclusively on the recruitment of leading personnel by elections. Most
typologies including hybrid categories differentiate between autocratic, hybrid and democratic regimes solely on
the basis of the degree of competitiveness of elections and only afterward apply additional dimensions (see, for
example Diamond 2002; Reich 2002; Roessler/Howard 2009).
10
This strategy is pursued, for example, by the widely received Polity IV Marshall et al. 2010 and Freedom
House regime indices Freedom House 2010.
11
Uni-dimensional categorization of regimes is frequently targeted by sharp criticism (for example Munck 2006;
Snyder 2004, 2006). Munck (2006: 36–37) argues that the aggregation of multiple dimension of a regime
concept into a single scale (of whatever scale level) is not necessarily desirable. The question is whether the
resulting loss of information is tolerable. If two dimensions highly correlate, that is, if the score on one
dimension is confidently predictable by the score of the other, the loss of information by aggregating both
dimensions is bearable. If, in turn, the empirical observation do not approximate an angle bisector of the two
dimensions, the loss of information is higher and an aggregation to be seen more critical. Consequently, multidimensional typologies – the only categorizations qualifying as typologies in the strict sense (see section 2) –
might often be preferable in the social sciences (Collier et al. 2008).
12
See the before mentioned Przeworski and collaborators, but also Boix/Rosato 2001 or Ulfelder/Lustik 2007.
17
democracy is conceptionalized by intensional or extensional classification approaches and
comprise several individually necessary and jointly sufficient constitutive elements. For
example, for the concept of democracy to be realized, elections and horizontal control of
power must be meaningfully present in a political regime. This understanding is implicitly
entailed in Giovanni Sartori’s (1987) notion of democracy as a bounded whole. Following the
logic of the bounded whole, the constitutive elements have to occur jointly for a regime to
earn the label democratic.
Deriving a dichotomy from a concept of democracy as constructed in the above described
manner results in a conceptualization of autocracy ex negativo. If democracy is characterized
by the presence of elections and horizontal control, and everything that is not a democracy is
an autocracy, then autocracy is characterized by the lack of either elections or control.
Figure 3: Two-Dimensional Regime Dichotomy Departing From Democratic Minimum Conditions
Horizontal Control
Democracy
Autocracy / Non-Democracy
Competitiveness
Consequently, there is no necessary condition for autocracy.13 Autocracy is characterized by
the absence of either elections or horizontal control. Autocracy in this vein turns out to be a
residual category including all regimes that are non-democratic. In the absence of an
autocratic minimum, it is hardly possible to speak of autocracy as a bounded whole that
13
The constitutive elements of the concept of autocracy are conceptually combined more in the logic of “family
resemblance”. See Goertz (2006) contrasting the different logics of concept formation using either necessary and
sufficient conditions or family resemblance to aggregate constitutive elements.
18
follows a specific inner logic. What is the “constitutive mechanism” (Sartori 1987) then of an
autocracy?
If, in turn, an autocratic minimum is introduced, mixed categories become conceptually
inevitable. Establishing an autocratic minimum implies the definition of a set of (individually)
necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions, mirroring the ones applied in the
conceptualization of democracy. A multidimensional typology with specified democratic and
autocratic minimum conditions necessarily includes mixed – hybrid – regime types. The
hybrid category is populated by those regimes which neither meet the minimum criteria of
democracy or autocracy.
Figure 4: Two-Dimensional Regime Typology Departing From Democratic and Autocratic Minimum
Conditions
Horizontal Control
Democracy
Hybrid Regimes
Autocracy
Competitiveness
Regimes are located within a feature space, in which only the corners are populated by
“consistent” or ideal types. An early invaluable contribution ordering political regimes in a
two dimensional feature space is of course to be found in Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy (Dahl
1971: 7). It is too often forgotten that Dahl, besides the concept of polyarchy that has become
the paramount foundation of modern, procedurally oriented democracy research, also gave
consideration to three other regime types – two of which being hybrids. While polyarchy is
characterized by contestation and participation, closed hegemonies lack both criteria;
19
competitive oligarchies, in turn, display contestation without participation; inclusive
hegemonies let citizens participate without being truly contested.14
The characteristic of hybrid regimes is precisely the mix of institutional features that allegedly
used to belong to either the democratic or the autocratic “realm” in one and the same polity
(see also Rüb 2002). The mixture of features as a defining criterion strongly opposes the idea
of political regimes as bounded wholes which precludes such a mixture. Instead, political
regimes are characterized by a specific combination of institutional features. Whether some
features go well together and some don’t is in this understanding a question to be clarified
empirically, and not an ex ante proclamation.
It is here where Sartori’s urge to understand democracy and autocracy as bounded wholes
irreconcilably collides with his claim of them being contradictory, excluding a third category.
If, however, minimum conditions of both autocracy and democracy are specified as illustrated
in Figure 4, the two types can not be exhaustive anymore and we violate the general advice on
how to craft categories. If one strives for exhaustiveness, the idea of the bounded whole is no
longer adequate. Figure 5 shows a conceptual way to regain exhaustiveness by relaxing the
restrictiveness of the minimum conditions of autocracy and democracy.
Figure 5: Corresponding Minimum Conditions of Autocracy and Democracy
Horizontal Control
Democracy
Autocracy
Competitiveness
14
A special case of a typology specifying minimum conditions in a feature space is one in which the two
constitutive dimensions are understood as being dichotomous. Following this assumption, graphically the
typology results in a four-field matrix (see Wigell 2008). We rather follow Dahl’s special pattern here.
20
As the diagonal distinction line implies, however, there are no fixed minima of
competitiveness and constraints in this conceptualization. Rather, the minimum condition on
one dimension hinges on the value scored on the other. Jointly, the two dimensions do form a
democratic and autocratic minimum. Individually, there are particular scores on one
dimension that can belong to both, democracy or autocracy – dependent on the value of the
second dimension. Except for the far right area of Figure 5, there is not level of
competitiveness that guarantees the democratic nature of a regime. For a regime to be counted
as democratic, a minimum score of competitiveness must be met by a minimum score of
control. There are scores for both dimensions that are jointly sufficient for a democracy.
However, the respective scores on the two dimensions are interdependent: The score
delivering democratic sufficiency on one dimension depends on the score on the other. The
more competitive a regime is, the less control it needs to assert to still count as democratic.
In constituting the respective regime types, the two dimensions are dependent on one another.
This interdependence of constitutive elements makes arguments in favour of the bounded
whole particularly problematic. There are, in fact, differing logics of the combination of
ontological elements within one regime type. The coherence required for the concept of the
bounded whole is lost.
There is a fundamental dilemma between the idea of democracy and autocracy as bounded
wholes and the idea of democracy and autocracy as contradictions that grant exhaustiveness
of political regimes. Sartori’s three major claims don’t go well together. However, there might
be a way out of the dilemma. In order to maintain the building blocs of Sartori’s regime
conceptualization, two things are at task: First, the logic of categorization needs to be shifted
from one of typology to one of (quasi-)taxonomy; second, the exclusiveness requirement,
stressed by Sartori as well, must be relaxed – albeit only on the sub-conceptual secondary
dimension of constitutive elements.
As emphasized above, taxonomies include – like typologies – more than one fundamenta
divisionis. In contrast to typologies, however, these classificatory principles are applied not
simultaneously, but in succession. We need to distinguish between a primary and secondary
phenomena when distinguishing regimes. We would propose to use elections or the degree of
competitiveness as a primary classificatory principle. Secondary principles could be
repression for autocracies and participation for democracies.15 These secondary principles
15
It is also to think of aggregate indices for the democratic and autocratic pole.
21
indicate the membership of the respective case in the autocracy or democracy pole
respectively. They display the coherence of the regime with further democratic or autocratic
principles. Goertz and Mahoney (forthcoming) have emphasized that this might be an
alternative route to classify regimes.16 If we proceed like this, then a case gets three scores,
firstly along the x-axis (competitiveness) and two y-values for memberships in the secondary
democratic or autocratic principle. Sartori’s dilemma is not solved completely as the
exclusivity principle needs to be relaxed. In terms of bounded wholes as an inherent logic and
in terms of contradictory relationships, we come close to Sartori’s ideas: we could argue that
in all political regimes besides one exception there is one functional logic dominant over the
other. And it is this dominant logic that determines if the regime follows either a democratic
or autocratic logic. Only the intersection is a point of maximal ambiguity in which we have a
‘complete’ and undecidable mixed regime. Moreover, the closer the cases come to this
intersection, the more the idea of a bounded whole gets weakened. Nevertheless, the (quasi-)
taxonomic way of classifying regimes provides with the advantage to grant the empirical
reality of more and more hybrid regime forms that cannot be placed to either the autocratic or
democratic corner while simultaneously highlighting dominant inner logics.
Autocracy
Democracy
Membership Criterion: Participation
Membership Criterion: Repressiveness
Figure 6: A Quasi-Taxonomic Categorization with Primary and Secondary Dimensions
Competitiveness
16
We would like to thank Gary Goertz for sharing his ideas with us.
22
5.
Does it make a difference?
Yes, it does. To operationalize the different regime conceptualizations, we resort to the
underutilized Polity IV component variables (Marshall/Jaggers 2009: 20). The six component
variables comprise measures of three institutional dimensions of political regimes: the
recruitment of the executive, the institutional control of the executive, and the political
participation of the society. To approximate the essential dimensions of political regimes
identified by Gerardo Munck (1996)17, we first apply two of the six component variables: The
competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP), and the extent of institutional
constraints the executive faces when taking publicly binding decisions (XCONST).18
XRCOMP comprises three categories of executive recruitment: Selection (1), transitional (2),
and election (3). XCONST comprises four categories of institutional constraints on the
executive: Unlimited (1), moderate (2), substantial (3), and parity (4).
Figure 7 illustrates the frequencies in which the possible combinations of values of
XRCOMP and XCONST occur in the period from 1945 to 2009. The density of dots in the
individual fields – and hence the “shading” – represents the number of country years for
which the respective combination of XRCOMP and XCONST has been recorded in the Polity
IV dataset.19
17
In revision of regime concepts in comparative research, Gerardo Munck 1996 identifies two dimensions of
political regimes: a procedural dimension and a behavioural dimension. Procedurally, a regime is marked by “1)
the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to the principal governmental positions, 2) the
methods of access to such positions, and 3) the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding
decisions” (Munck 1996: 6). We understand the first two points to be best captured by the competitiveness of the
access to power. The third point we consider adequately indicated by the institutional constraints on the exercise
of power (see Schmotz 2010).
18
We recoded the XRCOMP variable form four into three, the XCONST variable from seven into four
categories. First, we collapsed the categories of the XRCOMP variable from four into three by combining the
categories 0 and 1. While the category 1 stands for “selection” of the executive, 0 stands for an entirely noninstitutionalized succession process. A scenario in which executive positions can literally only be gained by the
use of force can confidently be labelled non-competitive in an institutionalized sense.
Likewise, we recoded the XCONST variable from seven to four categories: The original categorization includes
three categories labelled “intermediate” (categories 2, 4, and 6) in between the substantially described categories
1, 3, 5, and 7. These intermediate categories prove to be only rarely assigned. Apparently, coders preferred the
substantial neighbouring categories to the intermediate ones. Consequently, we combined them with their
respective lower neighbours.
19
A table with the exact frequencies of country years is given in Annex I.
23
3
2
1
Constraints on Executive (XCONST)
4
Figure 7: Frequency of combinations of XRCOMP AND XCONST, 1918 – 2009
1
2
3
Executive Recruitment Competitiveness (XRCOMP)
XRCOM categories: 1 = Selection
XCONST categories: 1 = Unlimited
2 = Transitional
2 = Moderate
3 = Elections
3 = Substantial
4 = Parity
The illustration reveals a first clear cluster of observations combining elections with a high
standard of institutional constraints on the executive – the upper right corner. A second cluster
is located in the lower left corner, representing regimes in which executives are selected from
within the ruling elite, and institutional constraints are practically absent. These areas in the
figure comply with what Sartori would call a bounded whole: The scores or the two
constitutive dimensions of democracy and autocracy correspond; high levels of
competitiveness are accompanied by high levels of constraints, and vice versa. However, the
two clusters are not exhaustive of all regimes. There is a degree of variation of constraints on
all levels of competitiveness (or, for that matter, a degree of variation of competitiveness on
all levels of constraints). It is theses areas that the question about the grey zone is dealing
with. Which fields should be assigned to which regime category? The different
conceptualizations of regime types explicated above give different answers to this question.
Figure 8 shows our operationalization of the four discussed options to conceptualize
autocracy, democracy and hybrid regimes, via the recoded Polity IV component variables
XRCOMP and XCONST.
24
Figure 8: Operationalizations of Regimes using Polity IV’s XRCOMP and XCONST component
variables
Operationalization 2:
4
Democ.
3
2
Autoc.
1
2
3
1
3
Autoc.
1
2
3
Access Competitiveness
Operationalization 4:
Operationalization 3:
Democ.
4
Exercise Constraints
Exercise Constraints
Hybrid
2
Access Competitiveness
3
2
1
Democ.
4
Autoc.
1
2
Access Competitiveness
3
5
4
4
3
Autoc.
Democ.
3
2
2
Participation
1
Exercise Constraints
Exercise Constraints
Operationalization 1:
1
1
1
2
3
Access Competitiveness
In Operationalization 1, cases with an XRCOMP score of 3 and an XCONST score of at least
3 are coded democratic; all other combinations of XRCOMP and XCONST are coded
autocratic. In Operationalization 2, cases with an XRCOMP score of 3 and an XCONST score
of at least 3 are coded democratic (as in Operationalization 1); cases with an XRCOMP score
of 1 and an XCONST score of no more than 2 are coded autocratic; all other combinations of
XRCOMP and XCONST are coded hybrid regimes. In Operationalization 3, cases are coded
democratic if the either have an XRREG score of 3; or an XRREG score of 2 and an
XCONST score of at least 2; all other combinations of XRCOMP and XCONST are coded
autocratic.
[INCOMPLETE: OPERATIONALIZATION 4 PENDING…]
For the observed period, Operationalization 1 results in 2908 democratic and 5108 autocratic
country years. Operationalization 2 results in 2908 democratic, 1046 hybrid, and 4062
autocratic country years. Operationalization 3 results in 5033 democratic and 2983 autocratic
country years.
25
To (tentatively) asses the consequences of the different conceptualizations and
operationalizations on substantial research questions, we compare the regime persistence of
the different regime types according to different operationalizations. Figures 9 and 10 show
Kaplan-Meier survival time estimates20 for the respective operationalizations of democracy
and autocracy. Survival rates depict the likelihood of a regime to survive for longer than a
given age. This is identical to saying: Survival rates give the share of regimes to outlive a
certain duration. They hence give an insight into the stability of the units of observation. (See
Annex II for an illustration of the survival of all regime types of one typology
operationalization.)
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.4
Democracy 1 and 2
Democracy 3
0.0
Regime Survival Since 1918
1.0
Figure 9: Democracy Operationalizations by Coding Scheme 1 and 2
0
20
40
60
80
Regime Duration
Dark green: democracies as in operationalization 1 and 2; light green: democracies as in operationalization 3.
Figure 9 shows the survival rates for democratic regimes according to operationalization 1
and 2 (which do not differ) and operationalization 3. As can be seen, the two understandings
of democracy perform quite similar until shortly after their twentieth birthday, with a slight
stability advantage of democracies operationalized according to the first (and second)
conceptualization. The median survival times of the two operationalizations – the time after
which half of the democracies initially recorded are estimated to have deceased – is 17 years
in the first and 15 years in the second operationalization. However, from around twenty years
20
For an introduction to survival analysis see Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2005.
26
of democratic persistence onwards, one would get different impressions from the two
measurements. Whereas democracy in terms of the very restrictive understanding of the first
operationalization largely seems to have abandoned the risk of breakdown, the more
permissively operationalized democracies appear to face a continuing danger of collapse.
While almost forty per cent of the “strict democracies” could be labelled “consolidated” after
around fifty years of existence, the wider concept results in a shrinking share of democratic
regimes until well after seventy years. In the end, only about twenty per cent of these
democracies survive their seventieth anniversary.
Figure 10 compares the different measurements of autocracy. Here, we can compare three
operationalizations, since the regimes counted as autocratic are different ones in all three
operationalizations conducted so far. As Figure 10 reveals, autocratic resistance is decreasing
throughout the three operationalizations. Autocracy appears to most stable when it is
conceptualized as a catch-all category following the first operationalization. Autocracies
median survival here is 24 years. With 17 years, autocratic median survival time is
considerably lower in the second operationalization. Finally, a median survival time of only
11 years proves autocracy to appear most vulnerable when its conceptualization is least
restrictive, following operationalization 3.
0.8
0.6
0.4
Autocracy 2
0.2
Autocracy 1
Autocracy 3
0.0
Regime Survival Since 1918
1.0
Figure 10: Survival Rates of Autocracy Operationalizations by Coding Scheme 1, 2, and 3
0
20
40
60
80
Regime Duration
Dark red: autocracies as in operationalization 1; red: autocracies as in operationalization 2; orange: autocracies
as in operationalization 3.
27
The diverging images resulting from different conceptualizations and operationalizations of
democracies and autocracies prove to be particularly consequential if the stability of the two
regime types is compared to one another.21 According to the first operationalization – and in
opposition to what many empirical studies find – autocracy is more resilient than democracy
for a considerable number of years. As was mentioned before, median survival time of
autocracy here is 24 years, with a mere 17 years median survival of democracy. This ratio
only switches after almost thirty years of age, when democracies survival outpaces that of
autocracy. In the second operationalization, however, with an identical median survival time
of 17 years, democracies and autocracies perform practically the same, until democracy faces
a reduced risk of breakdown after about 20 years. In the only operationalization of hybrid
regimes, they prove to be the most volatile of regime types, with a median survival time of
only 7 years. The third and last operationalization, that had the least restrictive criteria for
both regimes, draws a seemingly familiar picture: Here, democracy is constantly more stable
than autocracy – a suggestion that might in fact be misleading.
This finding concurs, however, with much of the literature out there. We might actually
overestimate democracies stability, due to inadequate operationalizations. Most large-n
studies uncritically apply the composite indices of Polity IV or Freedom House. These
additive indices produce regime categorizations that are most similar to our last
operationalization. We have shown that, considering the idea of bounded wholes and
minimum requirements for autocracy and democracy, this operationalization is conceptually
least adequate.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we addressed the classical question of how to typologize political regimes, one
of the longest traditions in political science. With the emergence of hybrid regimes and the
shifting scholarly and practical attention towards these regimes, the question raised by Juan
Linz in 1964 as to whether the time might be ripe to introduce a third category is paralleled.
Are hybrid regimes today to be seen as distinct regime types? Starting point of our analysis
was Sartori’s famous claim that autocracies and democracies are rather to be seen as
contradictions than as contraries, leaving no space for third types as in contradictions tertium
non datur. Or should we relax this claim and treat them as contraries? And is then the
functional logic of mixedness of democratic and autocratic principles sufficient for a distinct
21
Survival rates for the respective typologies, showing all three, respectively two, regime types of one
operationalization in the same graph, are given in Annex II.
28
type? Or is it rather an analytical step backward? Furthermore, does the mixedness of
principles have enough discriminating power? And do these regimes develop causal
homogeneity, i.e. do they behave similar in similar contexts? We have tried to tackle these
conceptual questions and have shown arguments in favour or against the respective positions.
Based on this analysis, we have taken Sartori’s claims serious and have shown what we call
the Sartorian dilemma: When going beyond one-dimensional classificatory schemes and
engaging in typology-building, it is hard to reconcile (1) his idea of bounded wholes, (2) a
contradictory relationship, and (3) the joint exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness of
categories and types. One of the conditions seems always to be in trouble. That it actually
makes a difference to use dichotomies and trichotomies and that it is not just a question of
taste is shown in the last step. Particularly when comparing the persistence of democracies
vis-à-vis autocracies, it has been shown that we tend to overestimate the stability of the
former in our analyses. This is a case in point for carefully crafting concepts and thoroughly
thinking what different regime types are the most adequate for the respective research design.
29
7. Annexes
Annex I
Table 2: Cross Tabulation of Polity IV Component Variables XRCOMP and XCONST, 1945 – 2009
Selection
Transitional
Election
Sum
Parity
74
112
2693
2879
Substantial
97
438
723
1258
Moderate
1926
258
281
2465
Unlimited
2964
30
18
3012
Sum
5061
838
3715
9614
Annex II
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.4
Democracy
Autocracy
0.0
Regime Survival Since 1918
1.0
Figure 11: Survival Rates of Operationalizations 1
0
20
40
60
80
Regime Duration
Figure 12: Survival Rates of Operationalization 2
30
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Autocracy
Hybrid
0.0
Regime Survival Since 1918
Democracy
0
20
40
60
80
Regime Duration
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Democracy
Autocracy
0.0
Regime Survival Since 1918
1.0
Figure 13: Survival Rates of Operationalization 3
0
20
40
60
80
Regime Duration
31
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