DIFFERENTIATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: RETURNING TO DURKHEIM FOR A UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE by BRADLEY W. CARTER, B.A. A THESIS IN SOCIOLOGY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS August, 2000 Copyright 2000, Bradley W. Carter ACKNOWLEDGMENTS One of the challenges of any scholariy endeavor is to credit all of the individuals who have made contributions to the final product. And though I have devoted considerable time and effort toward that end, such a task is utteriy impossible. Brief encounters in the hallways, dialectics in the classroom, and discussion over coffee are but a few of the venues that have given birth to ideas too numerous to trace. However, there are several individuals I wish to openly acknowledge for their contributions to this thesis. Dr. Charles Peek has not only been an invaluable chairperson, he has also been an extraordinary combination of mentor, scholar, colleague, and friend. I also thank my other committee members. Dr. Charlotte Dunham and Dr. Charles Chandler for their, insights, and guidance throughout the process of producing this thesis. Beyond my committee, I owe gratitude to Dr. Craig Crabtree, Anita Hunter, M.S.W., and Dr. Paul Johnson who each made significant contributions with their thoughtfiil insights based on earlier drafts. I also thank Dr. Evans Curry for his guidance in theory construction. Finally, I thank Dr. Margaret Elbow for the numerous exchanges of ideas and her unique perspectives that helped to expand the horizons of this work. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii CHAPTER I AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE 1 Durkheim on Deviance 2 Preview of Thesis 6 II MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND MODERN SOCIETIES: A CRITIQUE OF DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF SOCIETAL EVOLUTION 8 Durkheim on the Division of Labor and Solidarity 8 Durkheim on the Problems with Linking Organic Solidarity to Modern Societies 12 Organic Solidarity via Differentiation: Durkheim's Critics 19 Conclusion 25 III DIFFERENTIATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND DEVIANT LABELING 26 Differentiation and Weakened Cohesion 27 The Deviance/Cohesion Link in Sociology 33 Fleeting Cohesion 35 111 IV SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE Recapping the Unitary Theory of Deviance Three Implications for a Unitary Theory REFERENCES IV 47 47 49 54 CHAPTER I AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE Of all the classical sociologists, Emile Durkheim is perhaps the most influential in the field of deviance. Innovations from his work undergird two competing theoretical approaches to explaining deviance today. Durkheim's arguments in The Division of iMbour in Society (1933) and Suicide (1966) about how variations in the collective conscience and anomie produce deviant conduct contribute to the basis for several theoretical developments that offer explanations for why people violate norms. These developments, which stemfi-omafianctional/consensusparadigm include strain, cultural deviance, social control, and social disorganization theories. On the other hand, his recognition that deviance often enhances social cohesion provides the foundation for theories that examine why deviant labeling occurs. His observations not only anchor conflict labeling theory (Void, Bernard, and Snipes 1998:124-125), but they also undergird historical and contemporary explanations for why the labeling process seems to have its own rhythmic ebb and flow (Erickson 1966; Lusane 1977). Durkheim's contributions to deviance theory, however, emerge in different works as distinct and even competing theories. Throughout the literature, social differentiation, or the increasing division of labor, drives variations in the collective conscience and anomie, which ultimately provide explanations for deviant behavior. On the other hand, the topic of social differentiation is not to be found in Durkheim's consideration of how labeling has an impact on social solidarity because these considerations only apply to his "primitive societies." How is it, then, that labeling theory has borrowed from a construct that applies to Durkheim's primitive societies in various efforts to explain deviance labeling in highly differentiated, contemporary societies? I propose that these seemingly distinct theoretical perspectives that provide answers to conflicting questions mask a single, unitary theory of deviance that can be drawn from Durkheim's work. This theory can explain how differentiation ultimately produces not only deviant conduct, but also deviant labeling in today's highly differentiated societies. After examining the two separate theoretical perspectives in the remainder of this chapter. Chapter II provides a critique of Durkheim's assertion that mechanical solidarity becomes increasingly less important as a source of social cohesion as societies differentiate. This critique provides the foundation for developing a unitary theory in which differentiation can ultimately explain deviant labeling. I close this thesis by offering three implications for a unitary theory of deviance. Durkheim on Deviance Durkheim on Deviant Conduct Durkheim identified two ways in which the progression of the division of labor could alter the collective conscience and produce deviance. First, rapid differentiation which sufficiently weakens the collective conscience can bring about anomie or a state of relative normlessness (Durkheim 1933:335-368). The concept of anomie provoked two theoretical traditions in explaining deviant conduct. One tradition explores how the newness and unfamiliarity with behavioral guidelines and social anchors place people under considerable strain that ultimately leads to deviant conduct. This idea is at the foundation of modem strain theoryfi-omMerton's (1957:121-194) social structure and anomie and its application to gang membership (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955) to more recent renditions of general strain theory (Agnew 1992). Another theoretical tradition influenced By Durkheim's concept of anomie is social disorganization theory. From the early work Shaw and McKay (1942) to more current explorations (Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989; Rose and Clear 1988), this theory argues that lack of consensus on values and norms, the very essence of anomie, finstrates attempts at community control (Komhauser 1959), and thus permits a wide range of deviant behavior. The second way that social differentiation can lead to norm violating conduct is by affecting the values of the collective conscience. That these values may encourage or discourage deviance is an assumption which runs through Durkheim's treatment of anomie, particularly in his analysis of Suicide (1966). For example, a collective conscience which emphasizes individualism and individual achievement recruits people to new positions created by a rapidly increasing and more hierarchical division of labor. However, intense pursuit of such values can promote egoistic suicide by isolating people from the support of groups during times of crises. This idea resonates with modem cultural deviance theory which has at its core the notion that some strongly held cultural ideas can provide motivation for violating other cultural norms. Durkheim's emphasis on intemalized culture as a predictor of deviance appears in theories of how mainstream culture (Matza 1961, Messner and Rosenfield 1994) and some subcultures (Cohen 1955; Miller 1958; Bemard 1990) can generate deviant conduct. The notion that cultural ideas can generate deviant behavior also plays a key role in theories which focus on the process of leamingthis culture (Sutheriand 1939; Akers 1977). Durkheim on Deviant Labeling The roots of contemporary labeling theory, which focus on why people and behaviors acquire deviant labels, are located in Durkheim's Rules of the Sociological Method (\93%), and The Division of Labour in Society (1933). Durkheim argues that publicly recognized and punished deviance is normal in societies with a less developed division of labor because it serves as a focal point for cohesion in that it reinforces the commitment to collective sentiments. In such societies, cohesion is based on mechanical solidarity—a sense of similarity or social likeness coming from the collective conscience. By departing from the demands of the collective conscience, a smaller group of criminals and their crimes ironically help to sustain this solidarity. When publicly recognized (i.e., labeled), norm violators trigger a sense of moral outrage among the substantially larger majority who adhere to these demands, subsequent punishment reinforces allegiance of the majority to the society and its collective conscience. By underscoring the overall importance of labeling deviance to societies, this argument provides "the basis for social reaction views" of deviance (Void, Bernard and Snipes 1998:124), exemplified in the works of theorists such as Lemert (1952), Becker (1963), Erickson (1966) and Schur (1972). These theories tend to locate deviance in the reaction of the audience as opposed to simply viewing it as an objective fact. Two Separate Theories or One? Although these two sets of ideas have heavily influenced the field of deviance, they are universally treated as separate and distinct theories of deviance. One concerns deviance in modern societies characterized by highly developed divisions of labor and the accompanying organic solidarity. The other examines deviance in what Durkheim called primitive societies marked by lesser divisions of labor and mechanical solidarity. The former explores forces that cause deviance, the latter focuses on the causes of deviant labeling. How, then, is it possible that they are part of a single unitary theory of deviance yet to be pulled from Durkheim's work? The answer may rest with a key flaw in Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society (1933). Durkheim insists (although not without some misgivings as I later show) in his theory of societal evolution that as societies change from "primitive" with less developed divisions of labor to "modem" with highly developed divisions of labor, organic solidarity (cohesion based on interdependence) replaces mechanical solidarity (cohesion based on likeness) as the main source of cohesion. Durkheim's view that mechanical solidarity is an unimportant source of cohesion in highly differentiated societies conceals a unitary theory of deviance that is otherwise implicit in his work. It does so by eliminating consideration of how increasing differentiation may drive deviant labeling as well as deviant conduct in modern societies. If deviant labeling, as Durkheim suggests, is usefial primarily in sustaining the mechanical solidarity of less developed societies, then this theory of deviant labeling is hardly relevant to highly differentiated societies. Thus, this view leads us away from considering the possibility that increased differentiation may have as much impact on deviant labeling as it does on deviant conduct in modem societies. Preview of Thesis Chapter II begins the recasting of Durkheim's two theories of deviance into one by exploring the flaw in his theory that cloaks the single but implicit unitary theory. It examines his theory of social evolution, focusing on his contention that organic solidarity replaces mechanical solidarity as societies become more differentiated and develop a high division of labor. After laying out Durkheim's thinking on this matter. Chapter II considers criticisms and problems with his contention. It concludes by positing that mechanical solidarity is not only pervasive in contemporary societies, but is an important component of their social organization. Chapter III draws from two bodies of research to show how correction of this flaw opens a window to a general theory of deviance in Durkheim's work: General investigations of the deviance/cohesion association and works on the cyclical nature of normative control. By treating mechanical solidarity as a critical cohesive force in modem, highly differentiated societies. Chapter III provides a theoretical explanation for how differentiation and subsequent social change decrease cohesion and trigger the social construction of deviance in these societies. Differentiation, then, not only underlies explanations for the causes of deviant conduct, but it is also a critical factor in explaining the process of deviant labeling. Chapter IV recaps the unitary theory of deviance. It then concludes the thesis by considering the implications this theory holds for the integration of consensus and conflict perspectives, a better understanding of the United States criminal justice system, and a new appreciation for Durkheim and his contributions to deviance theory. CHAPTER II MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND MODERN SOCIETIES: A CRITIQUE OF DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF SOCIETAL EVOLUTION In The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim explores the glue that holds societies together. It is his argument that the nature of solidarity changes as societies evolve from the primitive to the advanced (differentiated) forms. According to Durkheim, primitive societies are held together by the likeness of individuals. He refers to this as "mechanical solidarity" (Durkheim 1933:70-110). As societies become more differentiated through the division of labor, individuals are held together increasingly by interdependence created through their differences or "organic solidarity" (Durkheim 1933:111-132). After describing Durkheim's argument and exploring problems from his perspective and those of his critics, this chapter concludes that modem societies with an advanced division of labor are more heavily dependent on mechanical solidarity as the anchor for cohesion than Durkheim's argument suggests. Durkheim on the Division of Labor and Solidarity Low Division of Labor and Mechanical Solidarity According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is most visible in primitive societies with low divisions of labor such as those belonging to the shepherd and hunter (Durkheim, 1933:258). Durkheim calls this type of solidarity mechanical because expected behavior 8 comes about somewhat automatically through recognition of a few, highly internalized norms bom of the similarities of tasks among individuals. Since society members tend to engage in similar, overiapping roles, the accompanying solidarity results from the commonality between individuals (Durkheim, 1933:106). The mainstay of mechanical solidarity is the collective conscience (Durkheim 1933): The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has a life of its own; one may call it the collective or common conscience. No doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless it has specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed; they pass on and it remains. It is the same in the North and in the South, in great cities and in small, in different professions. Moreover, it does not change with each generation, but, on the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another, (pp. 7980) For Durkheim, two consciences exist in all individuals. "The first represent only our individual personality and constitute it; the second represent the collective type" (Durkheim 1933:105). It is the latter that links the individual to the society and serves as a constant reminder of the norms, values and beliefs of the group. Crime and punishment in the primitive society. Durkheim (1933) sees the criminal code as evidence of mechanical solidarity in primitive societies. Because violation of this code is met with swift punishment that is often more harsh than is necessary to deter the activity, Durkheim reasoned that such punishment must serve some larger flinction than deterrence in primitive societies (1933): The difficulty resolves itself easily if we notice that, wherever a directive power is established, its primary and principlefianctionis to create respect for beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that is, to defend the common conscience against all enemies within and without. It thus becomes its symbol, its living expression in the eyes of all. (pp. 79-80) Crime is not defined as something that is harmful to the individuals that make up the society. Instead, crime is an offense against the collective, and criminal justice is a response to actions that show a lack of respect for deeply felt traditions (Durkheim, 1933:72-80). Durkheim adds that this collective morality has religious origins. Often times, activities that were considered high crimes posed little if any threat to society. Offenses against the Gods were met with vengeance. Additionally, offenses against the Gods were offenses against society. In other words, religion was the key expression of the common conscience. In both ancient Judea and India, the law was considered revealed of God. In Egypt, the criminal law could be found in the 10 books of Hermes. Finally, in Greece, justice was the domain of Zeus (Durkheim 1933:92). Solidarity through likeness, then, is nourished by the act of punishing those who break with deeply felt norms that are rooted in a religious tradition. For through such punishment, the boundaries are maintained as respect for the law is enhanced (Durkheim 1933): We only have to notice what happens, particularly in a small town, when some moral scandal has just been committed. They stop each other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to talk of the event and to wax indignant in common. From all the similar impressions which are exchanged, for all the temper which gets itself expressed, there emerges a unique temper— which is everybody's without being anybody's in particular. That is the public temper, (p. 102) Erickson, (1966) makes a similar argument based on the above passage. The deviant individual violates mles of conduct which the rest of the community holds in high respect; and when these people come together to express their outrage over the offense and to bear witness against the offender, they develop a tighter bond of solidarity than existed eariier. The 10 excitement generated by the crime, in other words, quickens the tempo of interaction in the group and creates a climate in which the private sentiments of many separate persons are fused together in a common sense of morality, (p. 4) Mechanical solidarity, then, exists when societies are held together by a common conscience that represents a strong code of ethics. Violation of this code is met with harsh punishment. This punishment serves not only as a deterrent to crime, but also as a focal point for cohesion. It can be said, therefore, that crime is nourishing if not necessary to solidarity in primitive societies as described by Durkheim. High Division of Labor and Organic Solidarity As work in societies becomes more specialized, greater efficiency in providing for the basic needs of people stimulates population growth, which, in tum, demands increasingly higher levels of efficiency (Durkheim 1933:256-260). Increasing specialization and population growth foster greater diversity because people begin to have dissimilar work experiences and fill increasingly differentiated, distinct community niches. As this diversity decreases the common bonds between individuals, mechanical solidarity progressively becomes less a source of social cohesion as it is replaced by a more complex type of cohesion based on interdependence. Durkheim (1933:130-131) calls this organic solidarity because it is akin to the harmonious division of function within a living being, where each organ of the body is dependent on the others and has its own unique function which is necessary to the maintenance of health. 11 Penal sanctions versus restitutive sanctions. To illustrate organic solidarity, Durkheim again turns to the operation of criminal law. With organic solidarity, law is mostly comprised of restitutive sanctions (Durkheim 1933:111) as opposed to the harsh punishments that correlate to mechanical solidarity. The primary purpose of sanctions is to restore things to their rightful state; harsh punishment plays no role in restitutive law which is more akin to our modem-day civil courts (Durkheim 1933:111). Organic solidarity, then, is maintained by regulatory law that exists to resolve disputes that might otherwise disrupt societal harmony. Moreover, unlike repressive law, regulatory or restitutive mles (law) are not established between the individual and society, "but between restricted, special parties in society with whom they bind" (Durkheim 1933:115). This, however, is not to say that society is not involved (Durkheim 1933): But, since society is not absent, it must be more or less directly interested, it must feel the repercussions. Thus, according to the force with which society feels them, it intervenes more or less concomitantly and more or less actively, through the intermediary of special organs charged with representing it. (p. 115) This relationship, then, is more complex than that of mechanical solidarity where no intermediary exists. In primitive societies, the individual conscience is attached directly to the collective conscience without third-party mediation (Durkheim). Durkheim on the Problems with Linking Organic Solidarity to Modem Societies One might be tempted to conclude that organic solidarity is the simple opposite of mechanical solidarity. However, Durkheim's argument is much more complex. He views 12 organic solidarity as dependent upon, coexisting with, and even blurring into mechanical solidarity. First, he insists that mechanical solidarity is necessary for organic solidarity to emerge. Second, with his discussion of anomie, he argues that the defining characteristic of mechanical solidarity, the collective conscience, is necessary for the regulation of organic solidarity. Moreover, the collective conscience is posited as the defining difference between organic solidarity and Spencer's contractual solidarity. Finally, Durkheim's discussion of negative and positive solidarity leaves the distinction between organic and mechanical solidarity in a state of ambiguity. Organic Solidarity Emerges from Mechanical Solidarity. For the division of labor to emerge, there must exist an environment in which "there are more individuals sufficiently in contact to be able to act upon one another" (Durkheim 1933:257). He refers to this relationship as "dynamic density." Durkheim also uses the modifiers "moral" and "emotional" to illustrate that this type of density involves more intimate relations between previously divided communities, families or "clans." The higher the level of dynamic density, the greater the progress of the division of labor. However, dynamic density can only come about as the result of physical density. Durkheim argues that as simple societies (such as that belonging to the shepherd) become more populated and dense, differentiation of task becomes necessary in order to avoid open conflict between individuals engaged in similar occupations. Due to competition, some shepherds become hunters, and then hunters become farmers. When too many 13 farmers exist, towns emerge in which individuals fill niches that serve farmers, hunters and so forth (Durkheim 1933). Durkheim sees two keys to the emergence of organic solidarity from the process of differentiation; both assume the existence of the collective conscience. The first key is communication (Durkheim 1933): The division of labor, then, must come about of itself and progressively. Consequently, under these conditions, for a flinction to be divided into two exactly complimentary parts, as the nature of the division of labor demands, it is indispensable that the two specializing parts be in constant communication during all the time that this dissociation lasts, (p. 276). Durkheim's second key is contractual law that is needed to govem the emerging differentiation and to link people in symbiotic ties. "Contracts are possible only where a juridical regulation and, consequently, a society already exists" (Durkheim 1933: 277). Both communication and contractual law proceed from common, similar understandings characteristic of the collective conscience. Anomie and the Need for Collective Norms. Durkheim theorized that the spontaneous division of labor is only possible because of regulatory norms produced by the collective conscience. Expanding regulation is necessary to govern the growing complexity of relations between individuals. However, he conceded that the pace of industrial development can outmn a society's ability to regulate. This, in turn, can create a condition in which individuals feel isolated in their tasks due to weakened social norms. Such a condition is dubbed anomie (Durkheim 14 1933:353-368). In the remarks below, Durkheim (1933) reemphasizes organic solidarity's need for strong collective regulation Since the body of mles is the definite form which spontaneously established relations between social flinctions take in the course of time, we can say, a priori, that the state of anomy [sic] is impossible wherever solidary organs are sufficiently in contact or sufficiently prolonged. In effect, being contiguous, they are effectively warned, in each circumstance, of the need which they have of each other, and, consequently, they have a lively and continuous sentiment of their mutual dependence, (p. 368) Durkheim's argument implies that the collective conscience plays a significant role in highly differentiated societies. Organic solidarity generates shared norms that are born of close interaction of individuals as society differentiates. These shared norms clearly represent the collective sentiments which are required to establish regulations for an expanding division of labor. Furthermore, Durkheim insists that anomie can only exist in an environment where relations between individuals are limited a priori. This environment could not have the regulations in place that produce a state of equilibrium between the various individuals and their tasks. Such an environment, it follows, could not be govemed by the collective conscience. Therefore, Durkheim's theory suggests that the degree of organic solidarity covarys with the strength of the collective conscience and that the collective conscience is just as important to organic as it is to mechanical solidarity. Organic Versus Contractual Solidarity. Once again, Durkheim illustrates how organic solidarity is heavily dependent on the collective conscience by contrasting it with simple differentiation advocated by Spencer 15 and the economists. Differentiation of tasks and contracts between individuals do not add up to Durkheim's organic solidarity. On the contrary, Herbert Spencer put forward the idea of industrial solidarity which has no need of an intervening societal code (collective values) to produce solidarity between individuals (Durkheim 1933): Since it is spontaneous, it does not require any coercive force either to produce it or maintain it. Society does not have to intervene to assure the harmony which is self established. Spencer says that each man can maintain himself through his work, can exchange his produce for the goods of another, can lend assistance and receive payment, can enter into some association for pursuing some enterprise, small or large, without obeying the direction of society in its totality, (p. 200) Durkheim insists that if it were as simple as Spencer suggests, there would be nothing social about exchange. Moreover, the supposed harmony resulting from individual exchange would be dismpted by conflict due to the nature of individual interests. "There is nothing less constant than interests. Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make me your enemy" (Durkheim 1933:204). Spencer believed, according to Durkheim, that the sphere of social activity becomes smaller as individual freedom expands and flourishes. However, Durkheim insists that interaction of this kind would consist of simple contractual solidarity. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, requires a growing regulatory sphere (Durkheim 1933:204). It is the regulation, then, which stems from the collective conscience, that differentiates organic solidarity from contractual solidarity or simple differentiation. 16 The Blurred Distinctions Between Mechanical and Organic Solidarity. With his discussion of positive and negative solidarity, Durkheim clouds the distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. Durkheim divides any kind of solidarity (mechanical or organic) into two parts. Negative solidarity might be best understood as that place from which property rights originate. These rights link the person to the thing, but they do not link persons to persons (Durkheim 1933): Thus we see what this real solidarity consists of; it directly links things to persons, but not persons among themselves. In a strict sense, one can exercise a real right by thinking one is alone in the worid, without reference to other men. Consequently, since it is only through the medium of persons that things are integrated in society, the solidarity resulting from this integration is wholly negative, (p. 116) For Durkheim, negative solidarity is the order of the society, the determinant of real rights or property rights. Negative solidarity has nothing to do with links between people. Positive solidarity can be thought of as that from which negative solidarity (property rights) descends (Durkheim 1933): In reality, for men to recognize and mutually guarantee rights, they must, first of all, love each other, they must, for some reason, depend upon each other and on the same society of which they are a part. Justice is full of charity, or, to employ our expressions, negative solidarity is only an emanation from some other solidarity whose nature is positive. It is the repercussion in the sphere of real rights of social sentiments which come from another source. There is nothing specific about it, but it is the necessary accompaniment of every solidarity. It is met with forcefully wherever men live a common life, and that comes from the division of social labor or from the attraction of like for like. (pp. 121-122) This passage is particularly problematic for Durkheim because it clouds the difference between organic and mechanical solidarity. Durkheim clearly believes that organic solidarity must ultimately be regulated by a higher moral authority. For this to 17 occur, then, some sort of collective unity must exist within organic solidarity. Durkheim attempts to resolve this dilemma in the following passage (Durkheim 1933): It is necessary, then, that the collective conscience leave open a part of the individual conscience in order that special functions may be established there, functions which it [the individual conscience] cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this [organic] solidarity. In effect, on the one hand, each one depends as much more strictly on society as labor is more divided; and, on the other, the activity of each is as much more personal as it is more specialized, (p. 131) Organic-type societies are only able to thrive via differentiation because they are regulated by the moral authority of the collective conscience. Durkheim saw the division of labor as a natural reality or social fact accepted by the masses with something less than total commitment (Durkheim 1933): Generally, the maxim ordering us to specialize is reflited by the contradictory maxim commanding us all to realize the same ideal, and the latter is still far from having lost all its authority. Doubtless, in principal, this conflict ought to occasion no surprise. The moral life, as that of body and mind, answers different and even contradictory needs; it is thus natural that it be made up, in part, of antagonistic elements limiting and balancing each other, (pp. 43-44) The "latter" Durkheim refers to here is most certainly the collective conscience. On the one hand, then, he sees specialization and interdependence as the source of cohesion in societies v^th a high division of labor. On the other hand, the collective conscience, which implies common norms, values and beliefs, is needed to regulate the division of labor. 8 Organic Solidarity via Differentiation: Durkheim's Critics Critics of Durkheim's idea that organic solidarity is the "normal" or ideal state of highly differentiated societies identify three problems with this theory. First and foremost, Durkheim tends to underestimate how differentiation often undermines organic solidarity, which leaves the door ajar for mechanical solidarity. Second, the existence of an expanding penal code and overly punitive sanctions in the United States seems more reflective of mechanical solidarity than organic solidarity. Finally, critics of Durkheim's argument for unilnear development of two distinct forms of solidarity suggest that mechanical and organic solidarity may both be necessary to the maintenance of cohesion in all societies with high and low divisions of labor. Differentiation as an Impediment to Social Solidarity While increasing differentiation certainly curtails mechanical solidarity, it may also inhibit the emergence of organic solidarity for two reasons. First, the process of task speciaHzations tends to undermine the close contact Durkheim (1933) insists is necessary to organic solidarity. Second, task specialization often produces competing interests that counter social solidarity to the degree that they pit the desires of the individuals against the needs of the group. Kemper (1972) calls attention to the first problem of differentiation. In the specialization of tasks, there is an accompanying specialization of actor. In other words, as labor becomes more differentiated and specialized, individual productivity becomes 19 increasingly focused on a single task. Paul Morgan Baker (1981) shows how this actor specialization necessarily leads to the kind of isolation that causes Durkheim's anomie if the situation is left to resolve itself While task specialization promotes interdependence and implies greater cohesion, actor specialization tends to increase the isolation of each member and should have a negative impact on the level of cohesion in the group. Actor specialization is most appropriately defined at the individual level and is simply the extent to which an individual spends his or her time working on a single task, (pp. 101-102) This is in agreement with Durkheim's (1933) point that individuals must remain in close contact vsrith each other throughout the differentiation process in order to maintain organic solidarity. Actor specialization, it follows, should have a negative impact on the differentiation process. Baker (1981) adds that as the population expands and specialization increases, isolation becomes more probable. Durkheim recognized this problem as well, and he attempted to resolve it via professional associations that would prevent differentiation from undermining organic solidarity (Baker 1981). However, these professional associations seem to be expressions of mechanical solidarity carried over from the primitive society in an attempt to rescue organic solidarity that has been weakened by differentiation. Baker (1981), who says organic solidarity "may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for societal integration" (103) concludes that groups must form a collective identity based on common interests and interact regularly in order to maintain cohesion. The division of labor further impedes organic solidarity to the degree that it produces differentiated interests that compete with each other. Durkheim (1933:204) 20 recognized that "there is nothing less constant than interests." While these different and competing needs create a need for interdependence, they also undermine interdependence by breeding distmst and greed. On the one hand, the farmer, the merchant and the banker are interdependent. The banker loans money to the farmer who then buys seed from the merchant. The farmer sells his crop and pays off the banker vdth interest. The same relationship, however, creates diverse interests and a degree of distmst. The banker may want to charge 15% interest, but the farmer would rather pay 6%. Similarly, the farmer would prefer to pay a lower price for his seed than the merchant would wish to charge. In these cases, power differentiation rather than interdependence shapes transactions. Since conflict over issues such as price and interest rates will inevitably arise, people will naturally attempt to keep their dependence on others to a minimum. This ultimately results in utilitarian individualism (Tipton 1982) which forever competes with organic solidarity as individuals look after their own interests. Clearly, Durkheim (1933) recognizes that individualism plays a major role within organic solidarity. However, he tends to underestimate the degree to which solidarity is undermined by individualization. Utilitarian individualism is quite clear about which acts are right: those that produce the greatest amount of good consequences. It is less clear about what consequences are good, usually taking wants or interests as given or selfevident in a way that suggests notions like happiness, pleasure, or self-preservation to define what is good in itself (Tipton 1982). What separates utilitarian individualism from the kind of individualism Durkheim saw as healthy is the fact that the utilitarians have no 21 need for common values. For Durkheim, utilitarianism, was the way of Spencer and social contracts (Durkheim 1973): In order to prosecute individualism more easily, they confuse it with the strict utilitarianism and the utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists. But that is to make the contest too easy. It is indeed an easy game to denounce as an ideal without grandeur this crass commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange. For it is exceedingly clear that all communal life is impossible without the existence of interests superior to those of the individual, (p. 44) This statement is but a small piece of a lengthy diatribe from Society and Morality in which Durkheim separates himself from Spencer. Durkheim sees utilitarian individualism as far removed from organic solidarity which is regulated by the collective conscience. In the same paragraph, Durkheim (1973) indicts the philosophy of Spencer (unregulated social contracts) in even stronger terms. "The practical philosophy of Spencer is so morally impoverished that it can hardly claim any adherents anymore" (44). The absence of a goveming set of norms or lack of regulation on the societal level would limit solidarity because of competition between individuals with differing, selfserving agendas. The problem for Durkheim is that pursuing his ideal of organic solidarity opens the doors to the utilitarian-style ethic. Specialization places an increasing premium on individual production, skill, and capital formation as societies become more differentiated and specialized. When individual aspirations supercede societal goals and values, organic solidarity is weakened. 22 Repressive Criminal Sanctions: Evidence of Mechanical Solidarity Recall that Durkheim (1933) predicts that as organic solidarity gradually overtakes mechanical solidarity, punitive sanctions born of collective values gradually give way to restitutive regulation akin to our modem-day civil courts. Heavy use of repressive sanctions and an expanding criminal justice code in America (Reiman 1998) hardly suggest a preponderance of organic solidarity. Such sanctions fail to restore people and their property within an interdependent network. Moreover, these sanctions undermine organic solidarity by removing individuals from their networks. On the other hand, these repressive laws reflect the emphasis on retribution, outrage and indignation that Durkheim (1933) associates with mechanical solidarity. Gus Schattenberg (1981) argues that cohesion via affirmation of public sentiments is yet strong in modem societies. However, whereas public punishment serves as the focal point for cohesion in primitive societies, mythical accounts of crime and punishment in the mass media serve the same function in the modern world. Fictional or romanticized stories on television in which evil is always brought to justice provides a symbolic replacement for the social reality of our modem criminal justice system (Schattenberg 1981): Television depictions of crime are like the parade for the convicted felon through the village streets to the block or scaffold. Both contain essential elements of ritual, in the sense that each audience has seen virtually identical performances and outcomes before. The continuity between traditional and modern societies thus emerges in the content of such popular entertainments, (pp. 76-77) Schattenberg (1981:76) also notes that the facts of "low clearance rates, bargained justice, and overcrowded courts and penal institutions could undermine confidence in the 23 underlying political and social stmcture." Imaginary depictions of vengeance and retribution mark the social boundaries and provide a focal point for mechanical cohesion based on common values. Thus, America's thirst for tougher laws (Reiman 1998) combined with media depictions of swift, sure justice reflect, if anything, a primal need for the kind of collective affirmation of values associated with Durkheim's (1933) mechanical solidarity. Mechanical Solidarity. Organic Solidarity, or Coexistence? Durkheim (1933) is clear that the collective conscience provides moral leadership and regulation to the division of labor. However, Merton (1994:17-25) points out some inconsistencies in Durkheim's argument for "unilinear development" of organic and mechanical solidarity. Durkheim's assumption that mechanical solidarity belongs only to primitive societies is of particular interest to this discussion. "In affirming the preponderance of organic solidarity in modern societies, Durkheim tends to depreciate unduly the persistent factor of community of interest. This bias warps his analysis of the elements of social cohesion" (Merton 1994). Merton (1994) accuses Durkheim of ignoring "group integrative factors" (21) such as honor and putting one's country first in times of war . Cohesion bom of an appeal to these kinds of collective sentiments must certainly be described as mechanical solidarity that has nothing to do with either restitutive sanctions that mark organic solidarity or repressive law that belongs to the former. According to this reasoning, then, mechanical 24 solidarity, as evidenced by phenomena Durkheim tends to ignore, plays a significant role in modem societies despite differentiation. Conclusion Durkheim (1933) never says that societies will eventually evolve beyond the need for a collective conscience. Instead, he gives it the somewhat ambiguous role of regulator of collective sentiments within organic solidarity. His critics, however, contend that these collective sentiments are evidence of pervasive mechanical solidarity that is necessary to social cohesion in highly differentiated societies. The primary reason for the persistence of mechanical solidarity stems from the fact that differentiation is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it creates the specialization and diversity necessary to the interdependence of organic solidarity. On the other hand, differentiation undermines solidarity to the degree that it isolates individuals and creates competing interests, which, in turn, breed distmst and utilitarianism. Because differentiation both encourages and inhibits the development of organic solidarity, mechanical solidarity never drifts too far away and remains an important part of social organization in modern societies. The next chapter examines the implications of this conclusion for deviance theory. 25 CHAPTER III DIFFERENTIATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND DEVIANT LABELING In Chapter II, I argued that Durkheim underestimated the need for homogeneity found in mechanical solidarity as a source of cohesion in highly differentiated sociefies. This chapter focuses on how correction of this error paves the way for a unitary theory of deviance in contemporary societies by showing that a causal connection between differentiation and deviant labeling accompanies the aforementioned link of differentiation to deviant behavior This chapter offers a theory that explains how differentiation ultimately causes deviant labeling. I begin by suggesting two ways in which differentiation creates the need for increasing mechanical solidarity. First, because it encourages utilitarian individualism and intergroup exchange, differentiation erodes the boundaries of normative behavior. Second, I argue that this condition of boundary ambiguity breeds a sense of insecurity among individual group members. I then argue that this insecurity provides the catalyst for the social constmction of deviance. Concerned that groups with which they identify and from which they gain support may be disintegrating, individuals initiate efforts to reestablish a sense of commonality and cohesion. The public labeling of deviance is one of the devices for accomplishing this goal. However, the increase in cohesion produced by labeling deviance is often fleeting and soon dissipates, so the process through which differentiation provokes labeled deviance continually repeats itself Illustration of this 26 argument with several historical and contemporary examples of moral panics and a general discussion of the social constmction process concludes this chapter. Differentiation and Weakened Cohesion As discussed in Chapter II, Durkheim certainly provides a strong general argument as to why increasingly high levels of differentiation decrease commonalities among people and weaken the collective conscience. More recent literature has detailed two additional ways in which differentiation may undermine mechanical solidarity. Because technological advances have generated almost unbridled differentiation in the twentieth century, this period offers a good opportunity to observe the consequences of utilitarian individualism and intergroup exchange in the context of a rapidly differentiating society. Utilitarian Individualism The twentieth century had all the ingredients for solidarity based on interdependence. It presented an extremely high level of differentiation, an enormous stmcture of juridical law, and virtually no limit to functions an individual might choose to perform (Durkheim 1933:277). However, as I argued in Chapter II, differentiation lends itself to a utilitarian style ethic which undermines organic solidarity in two ways. First, the division of labor encourages self reliance (the opposite of interdependence) due to competing interests. Second, the more self reliant individuals become, the less these individuals perceive a need for communion with each other. Steven Tipton (1982) shows that utilitarianism, a product of diflferentiation, can also undermine mechanical solidarity. 27 In his book. Getting Savedfrom the Sixties, Steven Tipton explores what became of a generation bom to utilitarian parents. He argues that Protestant Christianity has evolved from a primitive, collective-type religion to one that makes each person an individual. The twentieth century Protestant is a person of reason who "chooses" to do the "right thing" according to God's commands. This individual has more freedom than that offered by more primitive religions, but this freedom exists within an authoritative framework that imposes limits. The Protestant ethic encourages individuals to reason their way to the tmth of a matter as long as that reasoning is based in scripture. "God commands an act because it is right" (Tipton 1982:5). The utilitarian, argues Tipton, also places the individual at the helm. However, "where Biblical religion begins with an absolute God, utilitarianism begins with the individual person as an agent seeking to satisfy his own wants or interests" (Tipton 1982:6-7). There is no conscience to provide for moral guidance; the utilitarian seeks only to make choices that are in the individual's best interest over the long haul. Tipton (1982) argues that at least some of the sixties youth viewed their parents as people who gave lip service to Biblical religion, while they, in reality, behaved in a totally self-serving (utilitarian) manner. The counterculture that sprang out of the sixties rejected both Biblical religion and utilitarian individualism. Instead, the children of the sixties opted for what seems like a rational compromise. From the utilitarians, they borrowed the ideal that one should make choices that produce the best consequences. To add a moral compass, religion in a sense, they adopted a "just love" philosophy because "all is one" (Tipton 1982:14-15). 28 Because the counterculture was fueled by a civil rights movement and a controversial war, the movement generated at least some measure of solidarity. The sixties youth saw themselves as players in a cultural revolution that would make things right with the world. Many dropped everything from careers to graduate school so that they could join history in the making. However, as the Vietnam War and the draft disappeared, and President Johnson's "Great Society" ran out of money, the "conventional constraints of adulthood" put an end to revolufionary ideals (Tipton 1982:29). The counterculture had poured most if not all of themselves into the social revolution. But as reality set in, many found themselves out of school, out of work, and addicted to dmgs. Somehow the moral philosophy of "just love" could not provide the cohesion needed to hold this group together (Tipton 1982). Some managed to find their way back to mainstream society, but others sought out sources of collective morality in various religious sects. Utilitarianism, moreover, took its toll on the counterculture and the parent generation as it weakened consensus and decimated any sense of community. (Tipton 1982): but a profound change did occur as a result of the cultural conflict of the 1960s^the delegitimization of the utilitarian culture, and with it, the stripping away of moral authority from major American social institutions: govemment, law, business, religion, marriage, and the family. The conflict between utilitarian culture and counterculture left both sides of the battlefield strewn with expired dreams and ideological wreckage, (p. 30) 29 Intergroup Exchange Tipton's description of what can happen when societies lack strong, collective values echos certain elements of Durkheim's theory of anomie. James Hawdon (1996), on the other hand, offers an explanation that suggests there exists a natural ebb and flow between integration and anomie. He contends that periods of increased social mobility create an environment conducive to "normative ambiguity" resulting from increased intergroup exchange. The argument here is that differentiation contributes to rapid social change creating an intermixing of various groups which intermpts the homogeneity of any one group. In the process, norms become ambiguous as each group becomes more heterogenous. Individuals have more opportunity to engage in what would have once been considered deviant behavior. Conversely, as social mobility slows, and intergroup exchange slows with it, group boundaries are contracted and more clearly defined. In Hawdon's view, "boundary crises" occur as the result cyclical periods of intergroup exchange in which norms are diluted. As sources of intergroup exchange, he cites immigration as well as stmctural changes resulting from industrialization (Hawdon 1996). Both are effects of an increasing division of labor, but this division is marked by an ebb and flow rather than unilinear development. Although Hawdon's intent is to show how sociologists might be able to predict when a boundary crises might occur, his ideas are of interest to this discussion in that they illuminate the importance of homogeneity to group cohesion. Tipton (1966) paints the utilitarians of the sixties as a heterogenous mass that scarcely even resembles a group. Thus, the post-WW II economic expansion and heightened physical mobility of American 30 families (Hawdon 1966) might serve as an explanation for heightened individualism leading to anomie, the rise of the counterculture as a product of normlessness, and subsequent boundary contraction (mechanical solidarity) marked by the rise of the religious right (Tipton 1966). Group Cohesion And Individual Needs A common theme expressed by Durkheim, Tipton, and Hawdon is the idea that individuals need some level of regulated group membership. For Durkheim (1933), differentiation without regulatory law would ultimately destroy the interdependence which makes social organization possible. Without social organization, there can be no guarantor of individual rights. Tipton argues that utilitarian individualism (unregulated differentiation) strips society of the moral compass that is necessary to social organizafion. On the other hand, the kind of regulation proposed by elements of the religious right is an attempt to retum to a more primitive collective morality which stifles individual interests. Hawdon adds that normative ambiguity that results from increased social mobility and intergroup exchange is enough to trigger a boundary crises in which regulation becomes more heavily emphasized. Through a synthesis of these three perspectives, two major themes emerge. On the one hand, utilitarianism taken to its extreme leads to total chaos or the complete absence of social organization which serves as guarantor of individual rights. On the other hand, regulation taken to its extreme would lead to the complete control of individual rights (at least for some), the very things social organization exists to protect. From this perspective, moreover, the regulation that is born of interaction is 31 meant to fill the needs of individuals. Ultimately, it is the individual and not the group that needs some level of integration or cohesion that can protect his or her rights. Establishing a basis for individual needs. It is not enough to say that regulation that can only come from interaction serves as a "guarantor" of individual rights. One must look further for the basic needs of individuals in order to discover what relationship those needs have with social organization. Humanist psychologist, Abraham Maslow (1954) insists that identifiable needs drive human behavior. The most basic of these needs include nourishment and protection from the environment. He then moves up a level to needs such as safety. A child, for example, needs the safety and security provided by the immediate environment. All individuals need to feel safe from an emergency or disaster such as a fire or riot. Once these needs have been met, individuals need a sense of belonging and acceptance. From there, the individual needs to achieve and gain recognition from others. Ultimately, according to Maslow, the individual is driven toward "self actualization" or the fiill realization of human potential. Note that, especially within a highly differentiated community, meeting these needs requires some degree of social stmcture. On the other hand, as Maslow (1954) points out, it is that same social stmcture that also has the potential to limit or even deny thefiilfillmentof individual needs. With this in mind, I now turn to an explanation of how the individual's need for a cohesive social stmcture is directly linked to deviant labeling. 32 The Deviance/Cohesion Link in Sociology That labeling deviance is an important way of shoring up decreasing group cohesion has not been lost on sociologists. Several works have directly addressed this link. This section describes recent major works on this topic and considers an important criticism of these works. Erickson (1966) lays out his "boundary maintenance" theory suggesting that the labeling of deviant behavior may contribute to maintaining, restoring, or recreating moral boundaries during a crises. He cites historical records from Puritan New England (covered later in this chapter) as evidence that, one, deviance resides more in the audience than in the behavior and, two, deviant conduct in one context might be normative behavior in another. Laurdedale (1976) presents a more precise theoretical model that says moral boundaries contract whenever an outside agent threatens group solidarity. The subsequent rejection of intragroup deviants helps to prepare the community to reject the outside enemy (deviant). In this view, deviance clearly exists, at least in part, because it serves the vital function of restoring group solidarity whenever the system is under assault. Lauderdale tested this theory via the creation of two experimental conditions. When faced with an outside threat and an intemal deviant confederate, groups tended to show a temporary deterioration of group solidarity. Furthermore, these groups reportedly exhibited higher levels of intolerance toward deviant members as compared to groups that experienced no outside threat but had a confederate deviant within. 33 Inverarity (1976) made a similar argument in his study of populism and lynching during the populist revolt in Louisiana. He argued that the Populist revolt could be considered a boundary crises because it threatened the solidarity of White southerners. This led to repressive justice (lynching) which, in tum, restored group solidarity. All of these works use "functionalist" style models that attempt to show deviance as being both produced by and necessary to social cohesion. Jensen (1988:3) is highly critical of such conclusions, viewing them as tautological in that they "imply a causal model in which recurrent phenomena are explained by their consequences for adaption or survival of a social system." My efforts in this chapter avoid the tautological trap Jensen describes. Here I only try to demonstrate a several-step causal process in which each force produces the next one. It begins with (1) differentiation reducing cohesion based on commonalities (mechanical solidarity), which then (2) creates concern among individual group members about breakdown of social stmcture that meets individual needs. This concern (3) promotes cohesion through the public labeling of deviance and redefinition of common sentiments which then (4) further strengthens cohesion as insiders are pitted against outsiders. My agreement with Durkheim, Erickson and others that deviance and crime are "normal" or even "functional" in some sense should not be misconstmed as an argument that these phenomena exist so that a group may also exist or flourish. Instead, I suggest that the preponderance of historical data will show that individuals consistently and vigorously pursue higher levels of commonality with others whenever their individual needs (many of which are filled by social organization) are threatened. Moreover, as the literature will suggest, activities that may seem beneficial for some group members are 34 attempt to become winners by gaining enough power so that they can avoid subsequent deviant labels and perhaps even label their labelers as deviant. The vdnners, those who successfully accomplish the labeling, attempt to remain in power. As a conflict process, then, the labeling of deviance may soon disable the very cohesion it initially increased by putting different group members at odds with each other. An irony comprises the final reason this cohesion is fleeting: The deviant labeling which may initially increase cohesion ultimately erodes it by creating even greater differentiation among group members. Some are now in new deviant statuses, others are not; some hold new positions created to deal with this deviance, others do not; some group members take one view of this deviance, others commit to an opposing view. Moreover, within a differentiating society, it becomes increasingly difficult to form any lasting consensus as to which behaviors constitute deviance. Realization that increases in cohesion produced by deviant labeling are fleeting helps us to understand why labeling episodes repeatedly recur as societies become more and more complex. These solidarity surges provoked by labeling are temporary, with the receding wake of cohesion at some point triggering more labeling. They also generate even greater differentiation and conflict, a breeding ground for further labeling. Consider the following illustrations. The Social Constmction of Deviance: Selected Research on Moral Panics Facts have been curiously missing from the debate about crime in America, and the facts, once uncovered, are startling: There is no crime 36 wave in the United States. Criminal victimization has been steadily and drastically declining for the past two decades. The American crime wave is a myth. (Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter 1996:34) In his book. Wayward Puritans, Kai Erickson (1966) chronicles three Massachusetts Bay "crime waves," and argues that relatively benign behavior was effectively demonized in order to promote cohesion by creating outside enemies. I should mention too that the sudden upsurges in cohesion cited here do not represent some attempt to retum to a "homeostatic condition" (Jensen 1988). Instead, these episodes seem to represent a temporary reaction to a perceived crises brought about by some sense of boundary "ambiguity" (Hawdon 1996) or what Durkheim (1933) might call anomie. Erickson (1966) makes a similar argument. Whenever a community is confronted by a significant relocation of boundaries, a shift in its territorial position, it is likely to experience a change in the kinds of behavior handled by its various agencies of control. The occasion which triggers this boundary crises may take several forms—a realignment of power within the group, for example, or the appearance of new adversaries outside it. (p. 68) The Quaker persecutions. According to Erickson, by the time the Quakers arrived in Massachusetts Bay, the Puritan Separatists had lost much of their reason for existence. They had hoped to serve as a model for the Puritan Church in England. However, the English Puritans lost interest in the New England experiment in favor of a more tolerant, open model (Erickson 1966). The Quakers, then, provided the perfect target for a community suffering from an identity crises. The arrests of Quakers began in about 1656 and lasted for about ten years (Erickson 1966). During this period, several new laws appeared on the books; most of these were for violations such as "being a Quaker (or 37 more correctly for acting like one!)" (Erickson 1966:116). These laws were accompanied by new, severe punishments including beatings and executions. Despite the fact that the Puritan legal system had been built almost entirely upon Biblical teachings, the collective assault on Quakers seemed to have little to do with religion (Erickson 1966): Literature from the period fairly crackles with angry denunciations of the Quakers, but for all the heat generated by this verbal attack it seems that the authorities neither knew very much nor cared what theories lay behind the Quaker cmsade. Indeed, the people of Massachusetts Bay were so pooriy informed about Quaker beliefs that they could not even identify their opponents on that basis. The major distinguishing traits used by the Puritans to pick Quakers out of the crowd (and this was as tme in courts of law as in ordinary conversations) had nothing whatever to do with creeds or doctrines, (p. 127) Quakers were distinguished by their use of words such as "thee" and "thou" and the manner in which they dressed (Erickson 1966: 127). Because the fundamental differences between the two groups were so inconsequential, the Quakers were singled out and formally labeled deviant on the basis of clothing and speech. Furthermore, literature from the period indicates that the biggest sin of the Quakers was that they failed to share in the collective spirit of the group (Erickson 1966). In the end, the Puritans lost their battle with the Quakers as England forced the colony to be more tolerant of religious diversity. Erickson (1966) views the Quaker episode as the final battle in the colony's desperate attempt to maintain its identity as the "city on the hill," oflfering a better way than the one left behind in England. Witches in New England. To the outsider, Salem of 1665 might have looked look like a young colony going through normal grovs1;h and diversification. However, to many of the Puritan residents, it seemed like the beginning of the end of their New Worid 38 experiment. In the wake of the Quaker invasion, sermons were increasingly filled with "dreadful prophecy" as the Puritans gradually lost their political hold on New England (Erickson 1966:137). It was in this climate that the "witch hysteria" took hold (Erickson 1966). The first of the accused witches of 1692 was a slave named Tibuta who "enjoyed a reputation in the neighborhood for her skills in the magic arts" (Erickson 1966:141). As Erickson tells the story, a couple of the girls who spent afternoons with Tibuta began suffering from an "affliction." Symptoms included "screaming" and "convulsions." Worst of all, this "disease" was contagious and quickly spread throughout Salem Village (Erickson 1966:142). Soon afterward, the previously ignored Tibuta was dragged into court along with two other suspects who seemed to fit the description of "witch" (Erickson 1966:143). Three better candidates could not have been found if all the gossips in New England had met to make the nominations. The first, understandably, was Tibuta herself, a woman who had grown up among the rich colors and imaginative legends of Barbados. The second, Sarah Good, was a proper hag of a witch if Salem ever knew one. With a pipe clinched in her leathery face she wandered around the countryside neglecting her children and begging from others, and on more than one occasion the old crone had been overheard muttering threats against her neighbors when she was in an unusually sour humor. Sarah Osbume, the third suspect, had a higher social standing than either of her alleged accomplices, but she had been involved in a local scandal a year or two eariier when a man moved into her house some nine months before becoming her husband, (p. 143) In a preliminary hearing that was meant to put a quick end to the matter, the two originally "afflicted" giris were brought in to bring evidence against the three accused. The giris performed before the courts, demonstrating how they suffered in the presence of 39 the "witches," and then, surprisingly, Tibuta confessed. Furthermore, she implicated the other two suspects and sparked a full-fledged witch hunt (Erickson 1966:144). As the witch hysteria reached a feverish pitch, all manner of persons who were once considered normal or at least harmless came under the scmtiny of the Salem justice system. "Warts, moles, scars or any other imperfections" (Erickson 1966:151) were among the kinds of evidences accepted by the court. By the time people began to question their collective insanity, "there were 150 persons in custody and some 200 others who had been accused" (Erickson 1966:152). In less than a year from the time the hysteria began, the witch trials were over. One can make the argument, of course, that the kind of deviance creation documented in Puritan literature belongs to a primitive, collective sort of society that is far removed from the highly differentiated America that rose from the industrial revolution. However, the following twentieth-century examples of deviance creation bear a striking resemblance to the Quaker persecutions and witch hunts of the 1600s. The evolution of dmg laws in America. Shortly after the Civil War ended, America embarked on a massive expansion of railways. In the west, Chinese immigration filled the need for railroad constmction. The Chinese not only brought opium to the United States, they also profited from its sale. The latter part of the nineteenth century, however, ushered in two major economic downtums. It was in this environment, which included increased hostilities between American and Chinese workers, that opium became a "threat" to American society. Laws were subsequently passed prohibiting the Chinese from distributing and consuming opium (Musto 1997). 40 Similarly, in the early part of the twentieth century, the use of cocaine was linked to Black musicians (Lusane 1997). In 1910, Dr. Hamilton Wright released the Report on the International Opium commission (Lusane 1997). Based more in prejudice than fact, this report painted cocaine as the dmg that drove Black men to rape White women. Wright further suggested that Blacks gained super-human strength and were driven to madness from use of this dmg. Rumors surrounding the use of cocaine reached even more ridiculous proportions. One such mmor suggested that cocaine rendered Blacks invincible to .32-caliber weapons. Ironically, no evidenced exists that suggests a higher proportion of Blacks than Whites used cocaine during this time frame (Lusane 1997). Hysteria similar to that of Salem Village broke out in parts of the south. Some sheriffs sv^tched from .32-caliber to .38-caliber weapons in response to the scare (Lusane 1997). In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Act, the first national effort toward dmg control (Goode 1996). In the 1930s, Mexican-Americans were branded as heavy users of marijuana (Goode 1993): Mexican-Americans were thought to be major consumers of the dmg, and, it was suspected, acted in a dangerous fashion under its influence. In addition, they are presumed to menace the white community by spreading the use of marijuana, especially to school children. Moreover, it was thought that they took jobs away from native-born whites, (p. 59) Like their Blacks counterparts, Mexican Americans were often seen as crazed consumers of the "killer weed" that increased tendencies toward violence and inflated the user's sex drive. It was in this environment that America began passing legislation restricting the sale and use of marijuana (Goode 1993:59). 41 As recently as 1986, crack, a crystalline form of cocaine, became "the scariest dmg of the latter part of the twentieth century" (Akers 1990:9, 12). This moral panic gained credibility because it was supported by popular individuals such as Nancy Reagan, Bob Hope, and Jesse Jackson (Goode 1993). Ironically, dmg use in general had been declining during the period in which the moral panic empted (Johnston, O'Malley and Buchman 1987). Why all the concem? Crack became a cheap substitute for the more expensive powder cocaine and was, therefore, found predominantly in the inner cities where the majority of the residents could not as easily afford powder cocaine, a major focus of President Reagan's dmg war. Media concentration in the inner cities combined with tragedies such as the cocaine-related death of Maryland basketball star, Len Bias caused America to define dmg use as the number one social problem in America (Goode 1993). By the late 1980s, the term "crack babies" had become vogue. Much of this panic stemmed from preliminary studies showing that babies bom to mothers who were exposed to crack were more likely to have lower birth weights, smaller head size, seizures, genital and urinary tract abnormalities, problems with motor ability, brain lesions, and behavioral disorders (Chasnoflfet al. 1989). This, of course, added to the national media feeding frenzy and a growing consensus among the public in favor of heavier penal sanctions. However, most of these early studies failed to control for other potential causal factors such as alcohol, tobacco, sexually transmitted diseases, and lack of quality prenatal care. By the early 1990s, subsequent medical evidence revealed that the crack baby was more of a mythical social constmct than an objective reality (Goode 1993). 42 Much like the cocaine scare of the early twentieth century, the "crack epidemic" targeted Black males. Although African-Americans represent only about 14% of the population, they make up "90% of those convicted of federal crack offenses." Moreover, federal sentencing guidelines emerging from the moral panic mandated stiffer sentences for crack users [more often Black] as opposed to cocaine users [more often White]" (Reiman, 1998:122). Moral panics in general. J. S. Victor (1994) argues that "collective behavior can lead to the social constmction of deviance" (p. 307). He references a trend in fundamentalist Christianity to provide an illustration. (Victor 1994): The moral cmsade against Satanism can be seen as one aspect of the larger fundamentalist moral protest movement against perceived threats to traditional family values. Satanic cult stories in mmors, allegations, and moral propaganda focus on threats to children: the kidnaping of children for human sacrifice; the use of aborted fetuses in cannibalistic rituals; the infiltration of child care centers by satanic cult child abusers; the incestuous ritual sexual abuse of children to brainwash them into becoming future Satanist; the recmitment of teenagers into satanic cults; and the subversive attempts to spread satanic influences among children through rock music, school books, and Dungeons and Dragons-type role-playing games. These bizarre stories are taken seriously by so many people because they are a part of a symbolic cmsade aimed at affirming threatened traditional moral values in the family institution. These family values condemn premarital sex, abortion, divorce, homosexual behavior, and the portrayals of sexuality in the media and disapprove of modernist gender roles, (p. 316) The argument here is that cmsaders will cry "witchcraft" where none exists in an attempt to demonize certain behaviors and ideologies they wish to destroy. These cmsaders are buoyed by community perceptions that these activities threaten traditional family values. Victor (1994) further argues that the moral cmsade is a well-organized "Satan hunt" (p. 317) designed to alarm local communities and draw attention to the 43 larger, fundamentalist agenda. These cmsaders have power because they are represented by clergymen, police, child protection workers, mental health professionals and anti cult organizations. Local media (but seldom large-city newspapers) will tout these individuals as experts which further elevates the standing of the cmsade. In order to illustrate the inroads these modern-day witch hunters have created, Victor (1994) cites several nationally recognized personalities who have mastered the moral cmsade. James Dobson and Bob Larson are among the best known cmsaders. Dobson lends a high level of legitimacy to the anti-Satan movement because he is best known for his more main-stream Focus on the Family and Tough Love. However, Focus on the Family also heads a national campaign against Impressions, an elementary school reading series. Through his 300,000 subscribers of a magazine entitled Citizen, Dobson fliels the "Satan Hunt" as he accuses Impressions readers of being Satan worshipers— despite the fact that Impressions is subscribed to by numerous school districts (Victor 1994:320). In a related argument, Eric Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994) illustrate how "moral panics always leave an informal, and often institutional, legacy" (p. 149). They propose a constmctionist view in which "extremely harmful conditions may not be regarded as serious social problems, while relatively benign ones are" (Goode and BenYehuda 1994:153). In other words, objectivity plays no role in defining what is and what is not a social problem. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994:156), "the moral panic is defined by at least five cmcial elements or criteria." There must be first, a heightened level of concern; second, an increased level of hostility toward the "problem"; 44 third, there must exist a minimal level of consensus within the population or segments of the population that the threat is "real"; fourth, it can only be considered a moral panic if the concem is out of proportion to the threat; finally, moral panics empt and subside rather abmptly (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:156-158). Similar to the moral cmsade theory, Goode and Ben-Yehuda propose a compromise between a grassroots model and interest group theory as an explanation for the existence of moral panics. However, they argue that a level of general apprehension must exist in a society before any interest group can create a moral panic. More importantly, although moral panics can be brief in nature, the legacy is often long lasting. The dmg panic of the 1980s left a legacy of legislation and a vastly increased federal budget. In the same manner, a "satanic ritual abuse scare reaffirms the moral correctness for the fundamentalist Christian way of life" (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:169). These brief episodes of mechanical solidarity are important because of the longterm implications they leave in their wake. As Erickson (1966) points out, these phenomena can result in dramatic changes in a community's criminal justice system. When the Quakers first arrived in New England, "there were as yet no laws in the bay area prohibiting Quaker activities" (Erickson 1966:116). Within two years of the Quaker invasion, however, the penalties for "Quaker disorders" which could include even simple mannerisms included banishment "upon pain of death" (Erickson 1966:118). These laws, which were largely passed between 1656 and 1658, remained on the books until well into the next decade, and, according to Erickson (1966), the laws were reluctantly repealed only via the insistence of the King of England. Fleeting as it may be, the group cohesion 45 brought about by a moral panic has the power to redefine the boundaries of deviant behavior for comparatively lengthy periods of time. 46 CHAPTER IV SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE After summarizing the unitary theory of deviance derived from Durkheim's work, this chapter considers three implications for this theory. First, I suggest how this theory provides a basis for integrating consensus and conflict perspectives by illustrating how the two paradigms play off each other in explaining deviant labeling and deviant conduct. Second, I discuss how this theory provides an explanation for what some would argue is an overiy aggressive criminal justice system in the United States. I conclude by arguing that this theory provides a stronger appreciation of Durkheim's contributions to the study of deviance, particularly with his discussion of differentiation and his concepts of anomie and the collective conscience. Recapping the Unitary Theory of Deviance In Chapter I, I suggest that by revisiting Durkheim's ideas on societal evolution, one could find the underpinnings (in his notion of differentiation) of a theory that could explain both deviant behavior and deviant labeling in modem societies. Since Durkheim's thought conceming differentiation as the root of deviant behavior is widely known, this thesis focuses on how differentiation may also lead to deviant labeling, ultimately arguing that Durkheim's work lays the foundation for a unitary theory of deviance in which differentiation is the source of deviant behavior and deviant labeling in modem societies. 47 Chapter II begins the consideration of how differentiation may provoke deviant labeling. It provides a critique of The Division of Labour in Society and presents the argument that Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, which he insists belongs more to his primitive societies, is equally important to social cohesion in modern societies with an advanced division of labor. Central to my argument is the assertion that differentiation is a two-edged sword that creates interdependence on the one hand and competing interests, distmst, and utilitarian individualism on the other. Chapter III posits differentiation as a key cause of deviant labeling. It contends that diflferentiation marked by intergroup exchange, cultural plurality, and increased individualism reduces cohesion based on commonalities. The accompanying breakdown of social stmcture threatens individuals who depend on these stmctures to meet their needs. In response, group members promote cohesion through increased emphasis and redefinition of common sentiments and the public labeling of deviance. Mechanical solidarity led by the collective conscience feeds off the labeling of deviants and deviant behavior as it seeks to clearly separate that which is acceptable from that which is not. The process is cyclical in nature because much of the labeling may seem unconvincing and irrational over time, thus bringing a tmce to the conflict. On the other hand, this tmce is short-lived because differentiation continues on its way, constantly threatening any newfound sense of consensus and stability and pushing at the boundaries of normative behavior. I now turn to some key implications for a unitary theory of deviance. 48 Three Implications for a Unitary Theory A Theoretical Bridge Between Consensus and Conflict. This theory exposes several links between the consensus and conflict theoretical approaches to deviance, thus providing some starting points for integrating the two. With the process of differentiation as a common denominator, this theory provides an answer to the key questions of each approach: The consensus theorist asks, "Why do individuals violate established norms?" The conflict theorist asks, "Why are certain individuals and behaviors labeled deviant?" This theory provides answers to both questions by detailing how the processes of conflict and consensus act interdependently in producing both deviant conduct and deviant labeling. As illustrated in Chapter II, differentiation erodes consensus by creating diverse interests and conflict between competing interests. When individuals feel threatened by the perceived deteriorating sense of groupness and social stmcture, the increased emphasis on normative boundaries provides escalating motivation for deviance on the part of some which fijrther erodes cohesion based on commonalities. The augmented motivation for deviance and falling cohesion, in tum, trigger more conflict via the process of labeling individuals and behaviors as deviant. As more group members exhibit agreement on key norms and values, this process may increase cohesion which then decreases pressure to label deviance and perhaps deviant conduct as well. However, since differentiation is an ongoing, cyclical process, thefleeting naturQ of increased cohesion restarts this sequence of events again and again. The competing views of Erickson (19 66) and Chambliss (1976) with respect to the same data provide an illustration. 49 One of Erickson's (1966) conclusions in his book. Wayward Puritans is that three crime waves were created by the community in an effort to shore up sagging cohesion. Chambliss (1976) scoffs at this notion for two reasons. First, Erickson's data seem to show that "each crime wave failed miserably as a source of community consensus and cohesion" (Chambliss 1976:11). Chambliss backs up this charge by suggesting that crime wave after crime wave is an indicator of ever-present conflict rather than social cohesion. Second, the fact that the settlement was Puritan controlled "makes it very clear that they [crime waves] were not precipitated by crises of morality in the community but by power stmggles between those who mled and those who were mled" (Chambliss 1976:11). A unitary theory allows us to embrace (at least somewhat) the arguments of both Erickson and Chambliss. As the New England colony became more culturally diverse (a product of social differentiation), the boundaries of normative behavior were stretched. This, in tum, threatened the Puritan way of life that had been somewhat stable. In each of three cases, the Puritan leaders reacted to flagging cohesion by emphasizing the boundaries of normative behavior which spawned a conflict/labeling process. The labeling ultimately failed because it fueled the conflict among community members. However, the crackdowns themselves were evidence of increased cohesion among the Puritans and the Quakers. For example, Erickson's data show that the Quakers responded to deviant labeling by proudly wearing the label and challenging the status quo. The fact that the crime waves failed in the long mn is evidence that the new sense of cohesion among the Puritans was fleeting because consensus and conflict give life to each other. 50 Fleeting Cohesion and the Criminal Justice System. A unitary theory of deviance with its concept of fleeting cohesion also has implications for better understanding what some would argue is an overactive criminal justice system in America. In 1992-93, the U.S. incarceration rate was 519 per 100,000 persons. This rate was more than four times that of Canada, five times that of England and Wales, six times that of Germany, and near ten times that of the Netherlands (Reiman 1998:19). This placed the U.S. rates as third highest in the world. However, by 1995, the U.S. incarceration rate of 600 per 100,000 had surpassed the Union of South Africa and the former Soviet Union to lead the world. This represents of a near tripling of incarceration rates since President Reagan took office and embarked on a war on dmgs in 1980 (Reiman 1998:20). Chapter III illustrates how moral panics (Erickson 1966; Lusane 1997; Goode 1996; Victor 1994) and the accompanying fleeting cohesion are often accompanied by increased criminal justice activity. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) took this a step fijrther by suggesting that although a moral panic may be brief, it often leaves a somewhat more permanent legacy in its wake. By further examining the evolution of dmg laws, one can find numerous historical examples (as illustrated in Chapter HI) of how moral panics marked by fleeting cohesion lead to a long-term expansion of criminal justice activity. In other words, because much of the expanded penal code in the United States was brought about by broad-based consensus bom of panic rather than sober thought, such expansion has been frequently rooted in fiction instead of fact. What often remains over the long term is just enough consensus (or at least lack of motive for change) to keep the laws on 51 the books despite the fact that the basis for the consensus has dissipated. Moreover, in some cases consensus is rejuvenated by finding new justifications for maintaining or even expanding the criminal justice code with respect to particular behaviors. Consider the following example. Chapter III discussed how the fiction-based panic over Blacks and cocaine use led to the national criminalization of dmg use. Though the panic abated, the laws have remained. In fact, as earlier discussed, the 1980s were marked by an expansion of the criminal justice code with respect to illicit dmg use. Although fleeting social cohesion that is the mainstay off any moral panic seems to have its own rhythmic ebb and flow, the resulting institutional changes are far more pervasive. For though the diluted logic and outpouring of emotion of the 1980s has diminished to a large extent, the obsession with and overreaction to illicit dmg use in the 1980s has had a lasting impact on the criminal justice system of the United States. Since 1982, our incarceration rates have increased dramatically, and the percentage of federal inmates serving time for dmg related crimes has increased from about 22% to 70%. One third of these are "non- violent, low level offenders with no criminal record" (Kappler, Blumberg and Potter 1996:179). The Contributions of Durkheim to Contemporary Deviance Theory A final implication for a unitary theory of Deviance is a greater appreciation for Durkheim and his contributions to deviance theory. Ironically, it is through criticism of his notion that mechanical solidarity increasingly recedes within the normal development of 52 the division of labor that this thesis is able excavate a unitary theory that can explain deviant labeling. Although Durkheim underestimated the persistence of mechanical soHdarity in modem societies, his exploration into the causes of social cohesion gave birth to constmcts that are cmcial to the understanding of deviance in contemporary America. For example, his concept of the collective conscience and the cohesion it engenders is of particular value for sociologists who want to better understand social constmction, moral panics, and the labeling process in general. Additionally, his concept of anomie is cmcial to the understanding of why individuals violate norms. 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