DIFFERENTIATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: RETURNING
TO DURKHEIM FOR A UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE
by
BRADLEY W. CARTER, B.A.
A THESIS
IN
SOCIOLOGY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
August, 2000
Copyright 2000, Bradley W. Carter
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
One of the challenges of any scholariy endeavor is to credit all of the individuals
who have made contributions to the final product. And though I have devoted
considerable time and effort toward that end, such a task is utteriy impossible. Brief
encounters in the hallways, dialectics in the classroom, and discussion over coffee are but
a few of the venues that have given birth to ideas too numerous to trace. However, there
are several individuals I wish to openly acknowledge for their contributions to this thesis.
Dr. Charles Peek has not only been an invaluable chairperson, he has also been an
extraordinary combination of mentor, scholar, colleague, and friend. I also thank my other
committee members. Dr. Charlotte Dunham and Dr. Charles Chandler for their, insights,
and guidance throughout the process of producing this thesis.
Beyond my committee, I owe gratitude to Dr. Craig Crabtree, Anita Hunter,
M.S.W., and Dr. Paul Johnson who each made significant contributions with their
thoughtfiil insights based on earlier drafts. I also thank Dr. Evans Curry for his guidance
in theory construction. Finally, I thank Dr. Margaret Elbow for the numerous exchanges
of ideas and her unique perspectives that helped to expand the horizons of this work.
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ii
CHAPTER
I AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITARY THEORY
OF DEVIANCE
1
Durkheim on Deviance
2
Preview of Thesis
6
II MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND MODERN
SOCIETIES: A CRITIQUE OF DURKHEIM'S
THEORY OF SOCIETAL EVOLUTION
8
Durkheim on the Division of Labor and Solidarity
8
Durkheim on the Problems with Linking Organic
Solidarity to Modern Societies
12
Organic Solidarity via Differentiation: Durkheim's
Critics
19
Conclusion
25
III DIFFERENTIATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND
DEVIANT LABELING
26
Differentiation and Weakened Cohesion
27
The Deviance/Cohesion Link in Sociology
33
Fleeting Cohesion
35
111
IV SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A
UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE
Recapping the Unitary Theory of Deviance
Three Implications for a Unitary Theory
REFERENCES
IV
47
47
49
54
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE
Of all the classical sociologists, Emile Durkheim is perhaps the most influential in
the field of deviance. Innovations from his work undergird two competing theoretical
approaches to explaining deviance today. Durkheim's arguments in The Division of
iMbour in Society (1933) and Suicide (1966) about how variations in the collective
conscience and anomie produce deviant conduct contribute to the basis for several
theoretical developments that offer explanations for why people violate norms. These
developments, which stemfi-omafianctional/consensusparadigm include strain, cultural
deviance, social control, and social disorganization theories. On the other hand, his
recognition that deviance often enhances social cohesion provides the foundation for
theories that examine why deviant labeling occurs. His observations not only anchor
conflict labeling theory (Void, Bernard, and Snipes 1998:124-125), but they also
undergird historical and contemporary explanations for why the labeling process seems to
have its own rhythmic ebb and flow (Erickson 1966; Lusane 1977).
Durkheim's contributions to deviance theory, however, emerge in different works
as distinct and even competing theories. Throughout the literature, social differentiation,
or the increasing division of labor, drives variations in the collective conscience and
anomie, which ultimately provide explanations for deviant behavior. On the other hand,
the topic of social differentiation is not to be found in Durkheim's consideration of how
labeling has an impact on social solidarity because these considerations only apply to his
"primitive societies." How is it, then, that labeling theory has borrowed from a construct
that applies to Durkheim's primitive societies in various efforts to explain deviance
labeling in highly differentiated, contemporary societies?
I propose that these seemingly distinct theoretical perspectives that provide
answers to conflicting questions mask a single, unitary theory of deviance that can be
drawn from Durkheim's work. This theory can explain how differentiation ultimately
produces not only deviant conduct, but also deviant labeling in today's highly
differentiated societies.
After examining the two separate theoretical perspectives in the remainder of this
chapter. Chapter II provides a critique of Durkheim's assertion that mechanical solidarity
becomes increasingly less important as a source of social cohesion as societies
differentiate. This critique provides the foundation for developing a unitary theory in
which differentiation can ultimately explain deviant labeling. I close this thesis by offering
three implications for a unitary theory of deviance.
Durkheim on Deviance
Durkheim on Deviant Conduct
Durkheim identified two ways in which the progression of the division of labor
could alter the collective conscience and produce deviance. First, rapid differentiation
which sufficiently weakens the collective conscience can bring about anomie or a state of
relative normlessness (Durkheim 1933:335-368). The concept of anomie provoked two
theoretical traditions in explaining deviant conduct. One tradition explores how the
newness and unfamiliarity with behavioral guidelines and social anchors place people
under considerable strain that ultimately leads to deviant conduct. This idea is at the
foundation of modem strain theoryfi-omMerton's (1957:121-194) social structure and
anomie and its application to gang membership (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955) to
more recent renditions of general strain theory (Agnew 1992). Another theoretical
tradition influenced By Durkheim's concept of anomie is social disorganization theory.
From the early work Shaw and McKay (1942) to more current explorations (Bursik 1988;
Sampson and Groves 1989; Rose and Clear 1988), this theory argues that lack of
consensus on values and norms, the very essence of anomie, finstrates attempts at
community control (Komhauser 1959), and thus permits a wide range of deviant behavior.
The second way that social differentiation can lead to norm violating conduct is by
affecting the values of the collective conscience. That these values may encourage or
discourage deviance is an assumption which runs through Durkheim's treatment of
anomie, particularly in his analysis of Suicide (1966). For example, a collective
conscience which emphasizes individualism and individual achievement recruits people to
new positions created by a rapidly increasing and more hierarchical division of labor.
However, intense pursuit of such values can promote egoistic suicide by isolating people
from the support of groups during times of crises. This idea resonates with modem
cultural deviance theory which has at its core the notion that some strongly held cultural
ideas can provide motivation for violating other cultural norms. Durkheim's emphasis on
intemalized culture as a predictor of deviance appears in theories of how mainstream
culture (Matza 1961, Messner and Rosenfield 1994) and some subcultures (Cohen 1955;
Miller 1958; Bemard 1990) can generate deviant conduct. The notion that cultural ideas
can generate deviant behavior also plays a key role in theories which focus on the process
of leamingthis culture (Sutheriand 1939; Akers 1977).
Durkheim on Deviant Labeling
The roots of contemporary labeling theory, which focus on why people and
behaviors acquire deviant labels, are located in Durkheim's Rules of the Sociological
Method (\93%), and The Division of Labour in Society (1933). Durkheim argues that
publicly recognized and punished deviance is normal in societies with a less developed
division of labor because it serves as a focal point for cohesion in that it reinforces the
commitment to collective sentiments. In such societies, cohesion is based on mechanical
solidarity—a sense of similarity or social likeness coming from the collective conscience.
By departing from the demands of the collective conscience, a smaller group of criminals
and their crimes ironically help to sustain this solidarity. When publicly recognized (i.e.,
labeled), norm violators trigger a sense of moral outrage among the substantially larger
majority who adhere to these demands, subsequent punishment reinforces allegiance of the
majority to the society and its collective conscience.
By underscoring the overall importance of labeling deviance to societies, this
argument provides "the basis for social reaction views" of deviance (Void, Bernard and
Snipes 1998:124), exemplified in the works of theorists such as Lemert (1952), Becker
(1963), Erickson (1966) and Schur (1972). These theories tend to locate deviance in the
reaction of the audience as opposed to simply viewing it as an objective fact.
Two Separate Theories or One?
Although these two sets of ideas have heavily influenced the field of deviance, they
are universally treated as separate and distinct theories of deviance. One concerns
deviance in modern societies characterized by highly developed divisions of labor and the
accompanying organic solidarity. The other examines deviance in what Durkheim called
primitive societies marked by lesser divisions of labor and mechanical solidarity. The
former explores forces that cause deviance, the latter focuses on the causes of deviant
labeling. How, then, is it possible that they are part of a single unitary theory of deviance
yet to be pulled from Durkheim's work?
The answer may rest with a key flaw in Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society
(1933). Durkheim insists (although not without some misgivings as I later show) in his
theory of societal evolution that as societies change from "primitive" with less developed
divisions of labor to "modem" with highly developed divisions of labor, organic solidarity
(cohesion based on interdependence) replaces mechanical solidarity (cohesion based on
likeness) as the main source of cohesion. Durkheim's view that mechanical solidarity is
an unimportant source of cohesion in highly differentiated societies conceals a unitary
theory of deviance that is otherwise implicit in his work. It does so by eliminating
consideration of how increasing differentiation may drive deviant labeling as well as
deviant conduct in modern societies. If deviant labeling, as Durkheim suggests, is usefial
primarily in sustaining the mechanical solidarity of less developed societies, then this
theory of deviant labeling is hardly relevant to highly differentiated societies. Thus, this
view leads us away from considering the possibility that increased differentiation may have
as much impact on deviant labeling as it does on deviant conduct in modem societies.
Preview of Thesis
Chapter II begins the recasting of Durkheim's two theories of deviance into one by
exploring the flaw in his theory that cloaks the single but implicit unitary theory. It
examines his theory of social evolution, focusing on his contention that organic solidarity
replaces mechanical solidarity as societies become more differentiated and develop a high
division of labor. After laying out Durkheim's thinking on this matter. Chapter II
considers criticisms and problems with his contention. It concludes by positing that
mechanical solidarity is not only pervasive in contemporary societies, but is an important
component of their social organization.
Chapter III draws from two bodies of research to show how correction of this flaw
opens a window to a general theory of deviance in Durkheim's work: General
investigations of the deviance/cohesion association and works on the cyclical nature of
normative control. By treating mechanical solidarity as a critical cohesive force in
modem, highly differentiated societies. Chapter III provides a theoretical explanation for
how differentiation and subsequent social change decrease cohesion and trigger the social
construction of deviance in these societies. Differentiation, then, not only underlies
explanations for the causes of deviant conduct, but it is also a critical factor in explaining
the process of deviant labeling.
Chapter IV recaps the unitary theory of deviance. It then concludes the thesis by
considering the implications this theory holds for the integration of consensus and
conflict perspectives, a better understanding of the United States criminal justice system,
and a new appreciation for Durkheim and his contributions to deviance theory.
CHAPTER II
MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND MODERN SOCIETIES: A
CRITIQUE OF DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF SOCIETAL EVOLUTION
In The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim explores the glue that holds
societies together. It is his argument that the nature of solidarity changes as societies
evolve from the primitive to the advanced (differentiated) forms. According to Durkheim,
primitive societies are held together by the likeness of individuals. He refers to this as
"mechanical solidarity" (Durkheim 1933:70-110). As societies become more
differentiated through the division of labor, individuals are held together increasingly by
interdependence created through their differences or "organic solidarity" (Durkheim
1933:111-132). After describing Durkheim's argument and exploring problems from his
perspective and those of his critics, this chapter concludes that modem societies with an
advanced division of labor are more heavily dependent on mechanical solidarity as the
anchor for cohesion than Durkheim's argument suggests.
Durkheim on the Division of Labor and Solidarity
Low Division of Labor and Mechanical
Solidarity
According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is most visible in primitive societies
with low divisions of labor such as those belonging to the shepherd and hunter (Durkheim,
1933:258). Durkheim calls this type of solidarity mechanical because expected behavior
8
comes about somewhat automatically through recognition of a few, highly internalized
norms bom of the similarities of tasks among individuals. Since society members tend to
engage in similar, overiapping roles, the accompanying solidarity results from the
commonality between individuals (Durkheim, 1933:106). The mainstay of mechanical
solidarity is the collective conscience (Durkheim 1933):
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of
the same society forms a determinate system which has a life of its own;
one may call it the collective or common conscience. No doubt, it has not
a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach
of society. Nevertheless it has specific characteristics which make it a
distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in
which individuals are placed; they pass on and it remains. It is the same in
the North and in the South, in great cities and in small, in different
professions. Moreover, it does not change with each generation, but, on
the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another, (pp. 7980)
For Durkheim, two consciences exist in all individuals. "The first represent only
our individual personality and constitute it; the second represent the collective type"
(Durkheim 1933:105). It is the latter that links the individual to the society and serves as
a constant reminder of the norms, values and beliefs of the group.
Crime and punishment in the primitive society. Durkheim (1933) sees the criminal
code as evidence of mechanical solidarity in primitive societies. Because violation of this
code is met with swift punishment that is often more harsh than is necessary to deter the
activity, Durkheim reasoned that such punishment must serve some larger flinction than
deterrence in primitive societies (1933):
The difficulty resolves itself easily if we notice that, wherever a
directive power is established, its primary and principlefianctionis to create
respect for beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that is, to defend the
common conscience against all enemies within and without. It thus
becomes its symbol, its living expression in the eyes of all. (pp. 79-80)
Crime is not defined as something that is harmful to the individuals that make up
the society. Instead, crime is an offense against the collective, and criminal justice is a
response to actions that show a lack of respect for deeply felt traditions (Durkheim,
1933:72-80). Durkheim adds that this collective morality has religious origins. Often
times, activities that were considered high crimes posed little if any threat to society.
Offenses against the Gods were met with vengeance. Additionally, offenses against the
Gods were offenses against society. In other words, religion was the key expression of
the common conscience. In both ancient Judea and India, the law was considered revealed
of God. In Egypt, the criminal law could be found in the 10 books of Hermes. Finally, in
Greece, justice was the domain of Zeus (Durkheim 1933:92). Solidarity through likeness,
then, is nourished by the act of punishing those who break with deeply felt norms that are
rooted in a religious tradition. For through such punishment, the boundaries are
maintained as respect for the law is enhanced (Durkheim 1933):
We only have to notice what happens, particularly in a small town,
when some moral scandal has just been committed. They stop each other
on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to talk of
the event and to wax indignant in common. From all the similar
impressions which are exchanged, for all the temper which gets itself
expressed, there emerges a unique temper— which is everybody's without
being anybody's in particular. That is the public temper, (p. 102)
Erickson, (1966) makes a similar argument based on the above passage.
The deviant individual violates mles of conduct which the rest of
the community holds in high respect; and when these people come together
to express their outrage over the offense and to bear witness against the
offender, they develop a tighter bond of solidarity than existed eariier. The
10
excitement generated by the crime, in other words, quickens the tempo of
interaction in the group and creates a climate in which the private
sentiments of many separate persons are fused together in a common sense
of morality, (p. 4)
Mechanical solidarity, then, exists when societies are held together by a common
conscience that represents a strong code of ethics. Violation of this code is met with
harsh punishment. This punishment serves not only as a deterrent to crime, but also as a
focal point for cohesion. It can be said, therefore, that crime is nourishing if not necessary
to solidarity in primitive societies as described by Durkheim.
High Division of Labor and Organic Solidarity
As work in societies becomes more specialized, greater efficiency in providing for
the basic needs of people stimulates population growth, which, in tum, demands
increasingly higher levels of efficiency (Durkheim 1933:256-260). Increasing
specialization and population growth foster greater diversity because people begin to have
dissimilar work experiences and fill increasingly differentiated, distinct community niches.
As this diversity decreases the common bonds between individuals, mechanical solidarity
progressively becomes less a source of social cohesion as it is replaced by a more complex
type of cohesion based on interdependence. Durkheim (1933:130-131) calls this organic
solidarity because it is akin to the harmonious division of function within a living being,
where each organ of the body is dependent on the others and has its own unique function
which is necessary to the maintenance of health.
11
Penal sanctions versus restitutive sanctions. To illustrate organic solidarity,
Durkheim again turns to the operation of criminal law. With organic solidarity, law is
mostly comprised of restitutive sanctions (Durkheim 1933:111) as opposed to the harsh
punishments that correlate to mechanical solidarity. The primary purpose of sanctions is
to restore things to their rightful state; harsh punishment plays no role in restitutive law
which is more akin to our modem-day civil courts (Durkheim 1933:111). Organic
solidarity, then, is maintained by regulatory law that exists to resolve disputes that might
otherwise disrupt societal harmony. Moreover, unlike repressive law, regulatory or
restitutive mles (law) are not established between the individual and society, "but between
restricted, special parties in society with whom they bind" (Durkheim 1933:115). This,
however, is not to say that society is not involved (Durkheim 1933):
But, since society is not absent, it must be more or less directly
interested, it must feel the repercussions. Thus, according to the force with
which society feels them, it intervenes more or less concomitantly and more
or less actively, through the intermediary of special organs charged with
representing it. (p. 115)
This relationship, then, is more complex than that of mechanical solidarity where no
intermediary exists. In primitive societies, the individual conscience is attached directly to
the collective conscience without third-party mediation (Durkheim).
Durkheim on the Problems with Linking Organic
Solidarity to Modem Societies
One might be tempted to conclude that organic solidarity is the simple opposite of
mechanical solidarity. However, Durkheim's argument is much more complex. He views
12
organic solidarity as dependent upon, coexisting with, and even blurring into mechanical
solidarity. First, he insists that mechanical solidarity is necessary for organic solidarity to
emerge. Second, with his discussion of anomie, he argues that the defining characteristic
of mechanical solidarity, the collective conscience, is necessary for the regulation of
organic solidarity. Moreover, the collective conscience is posited as the defining
difference between organic solidarity and Spencer's contractual solidarity. Finally,
Durkheim's discussion of negative and positive solidarity leaves the distinction between
organic and mechanical solidarity in a state of ambiguity.
Organic Solidarity Emerges from Mechanical Solidarity.
For the division of labor to emerge, there must exist an environment in which
"there are more individuals sufficiently in contact to be able to act upon one another"
(Durkheim 1933:257). He refers to this relationship as "dynamic density." Durkheim also
uses the modifiers "moral" and "emotional" to illustrate that this type of density involves
more intimate relations between previously divided communities, families or "clans." The
higher the level of dynamic density, the greater the progress of the division of labor.
However, dynamic density can only come about as the result of physical density.
Durkheim argues that as simple societies (such as that belonging to the shepherd) become
more populated and dense, differentiation of task becomes necessary in order to avoid
open conflict between individuals engaged in similar occupations. Due to competition,
some shepherds become hunters, and then hunters become farmers. When too many
13
farmers exist, towns emerge in which individuals fill niches that serve farmers, hunters and
so forth (Durkheim 1933).
Durkheim sees two keys to the emergence of organic solidarity from the process of
differentiation; both assume the existence of the collective conscience. The first key is
communication (Durkheim 1933):
The division of labor, then, must come about of itself and
progressively. Consequently, under these conditions, for a flinction to be
divided into two exactly complimentary parts, as the nature of the division
of labor demands, it is indispensable that the two specializing parts be in
constant communication during all the time that this dissociation lasts, (p.
276).
Durkheim's second key is contractual law that is needed to govem the emerging
differentiation and to link people in symbiotic ties. "Contracts are possible only where a
juridical regulation and, consequently, a society already exists" (Durkheim 1933: 277).
Both communication and contractual law proceed from common, similar understandings
characteristic of the collective conscience.
Anomie and the Need for Collective Norms.
Durkheim theorized that the spontaneous division of labor is only possible because
of regulatory norms produced by the collective conscience. Expanding regulation is
necessary to govern the growing complexity of relations between individuals. However,
he conceded that the pace of industrial development can outmn a society's ability to
regulate. This, in turn, can create a condition in which individuals feel isolated in their
tasks due to weakened social norms. Such a condition is dubbed anomie (Durkheim
14
1933:353-368). In the remarks below, Durkheim (1933) reemphasizes organic solidarity's
need for strong collective regulation
Since the body of mles is the definite form which spontaneously
established relations between social flinctions take in the course of time, we
can say, a priori, that the state of anomy [sic] is impossible wherever
solidary organs are sufficiently in contact or sufficiently prolonged. In
effect, being contiguous, they are effectively warned, in each circumstance,
of the need which they have of each other, and, consequently, they have a
lively and continuous sentiment of their mutual dependence, (p. 368)
Durkheim's argument implies that the collective conscience plays a significant role
in highly differentiated societies. Organic solidarity generates shared norms that are born
of close interaction of individuals as society differentiates. These shared norms clearly
represent the collective sentiments which are required to establish regulations for an
expanding division of labor. Furthermore, Durkheim insists that anomie can only exist in
an environment where relations between individuals are limited a priori. This environment
could not have the regulations in place that produce a state of equilibrium between the
various individuals and their tasks. Such an environment, it follows, could not be
govemed by the collective conscience. Therefore, Durkheim's theory suggests that the
degree of organic solidarity covarys with the strength of the collective conscience and that
the collective conscience is just as important to organic as it is to mechanical solidarity.
Organic Versus Contractual Solidarity.
Once again, Durkheim illustrates how organic solidarity is heavily dependent on the
collective conscience by contrasting it with simple differentiation advocated by Spencer
15
and the economists. Differentiation of tasks and contracts between individuals do not add
up to Durkheim's organic solidarity. On the contrary, Herbert Spencer put forward the
idea of industrial solidarity which has no need of an intervening societal code (collective
values) to produce solidarity between individuals (Durkheim 1933):
Since it is spontaneous, it does not require any coercive force either
to produce it or maintain it. Society does not have to intervene to assure
the harmony which is self established. Spencer says that each man can
maintain himself through his work, can exchange his produce for the goods
of another, can lend assistance and receive payment, can enter into some
association for pursuing some enterprise, small or large, without obeying
the direction of society in its totality, (p. 200)
Durkheim insists that if it were as simple as Spencer suggests, there would be nothing
social about exchange. Moreover, the supposed harmony resulting from individual
exchange would be dismpted by conflict due to the nature of individual interests. "There
is nothing less constant than interests. Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make
me your enemy" (Durkheim 1933:204). Spencer believed, according to Durkheim, that
the sphere of social activity becomes smaller as individual freedom expands and flourishes.
However, Durkheim insists that interaction of this kind would consist of simple contractual
solidarity. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, requires a growing regulatory sphere
(Durkheim 1933:204). It is the regulation, then, which stems from the collective
conscience, that differentiates organic solidarity from contractual solidarity or simple
differentiation.
16
The Blurred Distinctions Between Mechanical and Organic Solidarity.
With his discussion of positive and negative solidarity, Durkheim clouds the
distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. Durkheim divides any kind of
solidarity (mechanical or organic) into two parts. Negative solidarity might be best
understood as that place from which property rights originate. These rights link the person
to the thing, but they do not link persons to persons (Durkheim 1933):
Thus we see what this real solidarity consists of; it directly links
things to persons, but not persons among themselves. In a strict sense, one
can exercise a real right by thinking one is alone in the worid, without
reference to other men. Consequently, since it is only through the medium
of persons that things are integrated in society, the solidarity resulting from
this integration is wholly negative, (p. 116)
For Durkheim, negative solidarity is the order of the society, the determinant of real rights
or property rights. Negative solidarity has nothing to do with links between people.
Positive solidarity can be thought of as that from which negative solidarity (property
rights) descends (Durkheim 1933):
In reality, for men to recognize and mutually guarantee rights, they
must, first of all, love each other, they must, for some reason, depend upon
each other and on the same society of which they are a part. Justice is full
of charity, or, to employ our expressions, negative solidarity is only an
emanation from some other solidarity whose nature is positive. It is the
repercussion in the sphere of real rights of social sentiments which come
from another source. There is nothing specific about it, but it is the
necessary accompaniment of every solidarity. It is met with forcefully
wherever men live a common life, and that comes from the division of
social labor or from the attraction of like for like. (pp. 121-122)
This passage is particularly problematic for Durkheim because it clouds the
difference between organic and mechanical solidarity. Durkheim clearly believes that
organic solidarity must ultimately be regulated by a higher moral authority. For this to
17
occur, then, some sort of collective unity must exist within organic solidarity. Durkheim
attempts to resolve this dilemma in the following passage (Durkheim 1933):
It is necessary, then, that the collective conscience leave open a part
of the individual conscience in order that special functions may be
established there, functions which it [the individual conscience] cannot
regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion
which results from this [organic] solidarity. In effect, on the one hand, each
one depends as much more strictly on society as labor is more divided; and,
on the other, the activity of each is as much more personal as it is more
specialized, (p. 131)
Organic-type societies are only able to thrive via differentiation because they are regulated
by the moral authority of the collective conscience.
Durkheim saw the division of labor as a natural reality or social fact accepted by
the masses with something less than total commitment (Durkheim 1933):
Generally, the maxim ordering us to specialize is reflited by the
contradictory maxim commanding us all to realize the same ideal, and the
latter is still far from having lost all its authority. Doubtless, in principal,
this conflict ought to occasion no surprise. The moral life, as that of body
and mind, answers different and even contradictory needs; it is thus natural
that it be made up, in part, of antagonistic elements limiting and balancing
each other, (pp. 43-44)
The "latter" Durkheim refers to here is most certainly the collective conscience.
On the one hand, then, he sees specialization and interdependence as the source of
cohesion in societies v^th a high division of labor. On the other hand, the collective
conscience, which implies common norms, values and beliefs, is needed to regulate the
division of labor.
8
Organic Solidarity via Differentiation:
Durkheim's Critics
Critics of Durkheim's idea that organic solidarity is the "normal" or ideal state of
highly differentiated societies identify three problems with this theory. First and foremost,
Durkheim tends to underestimate how differentiation often undermines organic solidarity,
which leaves the door ajar for mechanical solidarity. Second, the existence of an
expanding penal code and overly punitive sanctions in the United States seems more
reflective of mechanical solidarity than organic solidarity. Finally, critics of Durkheim's
argument for unilnear development of two distinct forms of solidarity suggest that
mechanical and organic solidarity may both be necessary to the maintenance of cohesion in
all societies with high and low divisions of labor.
Differentiation as an Impediment to Social Solidarity
While increasing differentiation certainly curtails mechanical solidarity, it may also
inhibit the emergence of organic solidarity for two reasons. First, the process of task
speciaHzations tends to undermine the close contact Durkheim (1933) insists is necessary
to organic solidarity. Second, task specialization often produces competing interests that
counter social solidarity to the degree that they pit the desires of the individuals against the
needs of the group.
Kemper (1972) calls attention to the first problem of differentiation. In the
specialization of tasks, there is an accompanying specialization of actor. In other words, as
labor becomes more differentiated and specialized, individual productivity becomes
19
increasingly focused on a single task. Paul Morgan Baker (1981) shows how this actor
specialization necessarily leads to the kind of isolation that causes Durkheim's anomie if
the situation is left to resolve itself
While task specialization promotes interdependence and implies
greater cohesion, actor specialization tends to increase the isolation of each
member and should have a negative impact on the level of cohesion in the
group. Actor specialization is most appropriately defined at the individual
level and is simply the extent to which an individual spends his or her time
working on a single task, (pp. 101-102)
This is in agreement with Durkheim's (1933) point that individuals must remain in
close contact vsrith each other throughout the differentiation process in order to maintain
organic solidarity. Actor specialization, it follows, should have a negative impact on the
differentiation process. Baker (1981) adds that as the population expands and
specialization increases, isolation becomes more probable.
Durkheim recognized this problem as well, and he attempted to resolve it via
professional associations that would prevent differentiation from undermining organic
solidarity (Baker 1981). However, these professional associations seem to be expressions
of mechanical solidarity carried over from the primitive society in an attempt to rescue
organic solidarity that has been weakened by differentiation. Baker (1981), who says
organic solidarity "may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for societal integration"
(103) concludes that groups must form a collective identity based on common interests
and interact regularly in order to maintain cohesion.
The division of labor further impedes organic solidarity to the degree that it
produces differentiated interests that compete with each other. Durkheim (1933:204)
20
recognized that "there is nothing less constant than interests." While these different and
competing needs create a need for interdependence, they also undermine interdependence
by breeding distmst and greed. On the one hand, the farmer, the merchant and the banker
are interdependent. The banker loans money to the farmer who then buys seed from the
merchant. The farmer sells his crop and pays off the banker vdth interest. The same
relationship, however, creates diverse interests and a degree of distmst. The banker may
want to charge 15% interest, but the farmer would rather pay 6%. Similarly, the farmer
would prefer to pay a lower price for his seed than the merchant would wish to charge. In
these cases, power differentiation rather than interdependence shapes transactions. Since
conflict over issues such as price and interest rates will inevitably arise, people will
naturally attempt to keep their dependence on others to a minimum. This ultimately results
in utilitarian individualism (Tipton 1982) which forever competes with organic solidarity as
individuals look after their own interests.
Clearly, Durkheim (1933) recognizes that individualism plays a major role within
organic solidarity. However, he tends to underestimate the degree to which solidarity is
undermined by individualization. Utilitarian individualism is quite clear about which acts
are right: those that produce the greatest amount of good consequences. It is less clear
about what consequences are good, usually taking wants or interests as given or selfevident in a way that suggests notions like happiness, pleasure, or self-preservation to
define what is good in itself (Tipton 1982). What separates utilitarian individualism from
the kind of individualism Durkheim saw as healthy is the fact that the utilitarians have no
21
need for common values. For Durkheim, utilitarianism, was the way of Spencer and social
contracts (Durkheim 1973):
In order to prosecute individualism more easily, they confuse it with
the strict utilitarianism and the utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the
economists. But that is to make the contest too easy. It is indeed an easy
game to denounce as an ideal without grandeur this crass commercialism
which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production
and exchange. For it is exceedingly clear that all communal life is
impossible without the existence of interests superior to those of the
individual, (p. 44)
This statement is but a small piece of a lengthy diatribe from Society and Morality in
which Durkheim separates himself from Spencer. Durkheim sees utilitarian individualism
as far removed from organic solidarity which is regulated by the collective conscience. In
the same paragraph, Durkheim (1973) indicts the philosophy of Spencer (unregulated
social contracts) in even stronger terms. "The practical philosophy of Spencer is so
morally impoverished that it can hardly claim any adherents anymore" (44).
The absence of a goveming set of norms or lack of regulation on the societal level
would limit solidarity because of competition between individuals with differing, selfserving agendas. The problem for Durkheim is that pursuing his ideal of organic solidarity
opens the doors to the utilitarian-style ethic. Specialization places an increasing premium
on individual production, skill, and capital formation as societies become more
differentiated and specialized. When individual aspirations supercede societal goals and
values, organic solidarity is weakened.
22
Repressive Criminal Sanctions: Evidence of Mechanical
Solidarity
Recall that Durkheim (1933) predicts that as organic solidarity gradually overtakes
mechanical solidarity, punitive sanctions born of collective values gradually give way to
restitutive regulation akin to our modem-day civil courts. Heavy use of repressive
sanctions and an expanding criminal justice code in America (Reiman 1998) hardly suggest
a preponderance of organic solidarity. Such sanctions fail to restore people and their
property within an interdependent network. Moreover, these sanctions undermine organic
solidarity by removing individuals from their networks. On the other hand, these
repressive laws reflect the emphasis on retribution, outrage and indignation that Durkheim
(1933) associates with mechanical solidarity.
Gus Schattenberg (1981) argues that cohesion via affirmation of public sentiments
is yet strong in modem societies. However, whereas public punishment serves as the focal
point for cohesion in primitive societies, mythical accounts of crime and punishment in the
mass media serve the same function in the modern world. Fictional or romanticized stories
on television in which evil is always brought to justice provides a symbolic replacement for
the social reality of our modem criminal justice system (Schattenberg 1981):
Television depictions of crime are like the parade for the convicted
felon through the village streets to the block or scaffold. Both contain
essential elements of ritual, in the sense that each audience has seen
virtually identical performances and outcomes before. The continuity
between traditional and modern societies thus emerges in the content of
such popular entertainments, (pp. 76-77)
Schattenberg (1981:76) also notes that the facts of "low clearance rates, bargained
justice, and overcrowded courts and penal institutions could undermine confidence in the
23
underlying political and social stmcture." Imaginary depictions of vengeance and
retribution mark the social boundaries and provide a focal point for mechanical cohesion
based on common values. Thus, America's thirst for tougher laws (Reiman 1998)
combined with media depictions of swift, sure justice reflect, if anything, a primal need for
the kind of collective affirmation of values associated with Durkheim's (1933) mechanical
solidarity.
Mechanical Solidarity. Organic Solidarity, or Coexistence?
Durkheim (1933) is clear that the collective conscience provides moral leadership
and regulation to the division of labor. However, Merton (1994:17-25) points out some
inconsistencies in Durkheim's argument for "unilinear development" of organic and
mechanical solidarity. Durkheim's assumption that mechanical solidarity belongs only to
primitive societies is of particular interest to this discussion. "In affirming the
preponderance of organic solidarity in modern societies, Durkheim tends to depreciate
unduly the persistent factor of community of interest. This bias warps his analysis of the
elements of social cohesion" (Merton 1994).
Merton (1994) accuses Durkheim of ignoring "group integrative factors" (21) such
as honor and putting one's country first in times of war . Cohesion bom of an appeal to
these kinds of collective sentiments must certainly be described as mechanical solidarity
that has nothing to do with either restitutive sanctions that mark organic solidarity or
repressive law that belongs to the former. According to this reasoning, then, mechanical
24
solidarity, as evidenced by phenomena Durkheim tends to ignore, plays a significant role in
modem societies despite differentiation.
Conclusion
Durkheim (1933) never says that societies will eventually evolve beyond the need
for a collective conscience. Instead, he gives it the somewhat ambiguous role of regulator
of collective sentiments within organic solidarity. His critics, however, contend that these
collective sentiments are evidence of pervasive mechanical solidarity that is necessary to
social cohesion in highly differentiated societies. The primary reason for the persistence of
mechanical solidarity stems from the fact that differentiation is a two-edged sword. On
the one hand, it creates the specialization and diversity necessary to the interdependence of
organic solidarity. On the other hand, differentiation undermines solidarity to the degree
that it isolates individuals and creates competing interests, which, in turn, breed distmst
and utilitarianism.
Because differentiation both encourages and inhibits the development of organic
solidarity, mechanical solidarity never drifts too far away and remains an important part of
social organization in modern societies. The next chapter examines the implications of this
conclusion for deviance theory.
25
CHAPTER III
DIFFERENTIATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND
DEVIANT LABELING
In Chapter II, I argued that Durkheim underestimated the need for homogeneity
found in mechanical solidarity as a source of cohesion in highly differentiated sociefies.
This chapter focuses on how correction of this error paves the way for a unitary theory of
deviance in contemporary societies by showing that a causal connection between
differentiation and deviant labeling accompanies the aforementioned link of differentiation
to deviant behavior
This chapter offers a theory that explains how differentiation ultimately causes
deviant labeling. I begin by suggesting two ways in which differentiation creates the need
for increasing mechanical solidarity. First, because it encourages utilitarian individualism
and intergroup exchange, differentiation erodes the boundaries of normative behavior.
Second, I argue that this condition of boundary ambiguity breeds a sense of insecurity
among individual group members. I then argue that this insecurity provides the catalyst
for the social constmction of deviance. Concerned that groups with which they identify
and from which they gain support may be disintegrating, individuals initiate efforts to
reestablish a sense of commonality and cohesion. The public labeling of deviance is one of
the devices for accomplishing this goal. However, the increase in cohesion produced by
labeling deviance is often fleeting and soon dissipates, so the process through which
differentiation provokes labeled deviance continually repeats itself Illustration of this
26
argument with several historical and contemporary examples of moral panics and a general
discussion of the social constmction process concludes this chapter.
Differentiation and Weakened Cohesion
As discussed in Chapter II, Durkheim certainly provides a strong general argument
as to why increasingly high levels of differentiation decrease commonalities among people
and weaken the collective conscience. More recent literature has detailed two additional
ways in which differentiation may undermine mechanical solidarity. Because technological
advances have generated almost unbridled differentiation in the twentieth century, this
period offers a good opportunity to observe the consequences of utilitarian individualism
and intergroup exchange in the context of a rapidly differentiating society.
Utilitarian Individualism
The twentieth century had all the ingredients for solidarity based on
interdependence. It presented an extremely high level of differentiation, an enormous
stmcture of juridical law, and virtually no limit to functions an individual might choose to
perform (Durkheim 1933:277). However, as I argued in Chapter II, differentiation lends
itself to a utilitarian style ethic which undermines organic solidarity in two ways. First, the
division of labor encourages self reliance (the opposite of interdependence) due to
competing interests. Second, the more self reliant individuals become, the less these
individuals perceive a need for communion with each other. Steven Tipton (1982) shows
that utilitarianism, a product of diflferentiation, can also undermine mechanical solidarity.
27
In his book. Getting Savedfrom the Sixties, Steven Tipton explores what became
of a generation bom to utilitarian parents. He argues that Protestant Christianity has
evolved from a primitive, collective-type religion to one that makes each person an
individual. The twentieth century Protestant is a person of reason who "chooses" to do
the "right thing" according to God's commands. This individual has more freedom than
that offered by more primitive religions, but this freedom exists within an authoritative
framework that imposes limits. The Protestant ethic encourages individuals to reason
their way to the tmth of a matter as long as that reasoning is based in scripture. "God
commands an act because it is right" (Tipton 1982:5).
The utilitarian, argues Tipton, also places the individual at the helm. However,
"where Biblical religion begins with an absolute God, utilitarianism begins with the
individual person as an agent seeking to satisfy his own wants or interests" (Tipton
1982:6-7). There is no conscience to provide for moral guidance; the utilitarian seeks only
to make choices that are in the individual's best interest over the long haul.
Tipton (1982) argues that at least some of the sixties youth viewed their parents as
people who gave lip service to Biblical religion, while they, in reality, behaved in a totally
self-serving (utilitarian) manner. The counterculture that sprang out of the sixties rejected
both Biblical religion and utilitarian individualism. Instead, the children of the sixties
opted for what seems like a rational compromise. From the utilitarians, they borrowed the
ideal that one should make choices that produce the best consequences. To add a moral
compass, religion in a sense, they adopted a "just love" philosophy because "all is one"
(Tipton 1982:14-15).
28
Because the counterculture was fueled by a civil rights movement and a
controversial war, the movement generated at least some measure of solidarity. The
sixties youth saw themselves as players in a cultural revolution that would make things
right with the world. Many dropped everything from careers to graduate school so that
they could join history in the making. However, as the Vietnam War and the draft
disappeared, and President Johnson's "Great Society" ran out of money, the
"conventional constraints of adulthood" put an end to revolufionary ideals (Tipton
1982:29). The counterculture had poured most if not all of themselves into the social
revolution. But as reality set in, many found themselves out of school, out of work, and
addicted to dmgs. Somehow the moral philosophy of "just love" could not provide the
cohesion needed to hold this group together (Tipton 1982). Some managed to find their
way back to mainstream society, but others sought out sources of collective morality in
various religious sects. Utilitarianism, moreover, took its toll on the counterculture and
the parent generation as it weakened consensus and decimated any sense of community.
(Tipton 1982):
but a profound change did occur as a result of the cultural conflict
of the 1960s^the delegitimization of the utilitarian culture, and with it, the
stripping away of moral authority from major American social institutions:
govemment, law, business, religion, marriage, and the family. The conflict
between utilitarian culture and counterculture left both sides of the
battlefield strewn with expired dreams and ideological wreckage, (p. 30)
29
Intergroup Exchange
Tipton's description of what can happen when societies lack strong, collective
values echos certain elements of Durkheim's theory of anomie. James Hawdon (1996), on
the other hand, offers an explanation that suggests there exists a natural ebb and flow
between integration and anomie. He contends that periods of increased social mobility
create an environment conducive to "normative ambiguity" resulting from increased
intergroup exchange. The argument here is that differentiation contributes to rapid social
change creating an intermixing of various groups which intermpts the homogeneity of any
one group. In the process, norms become ambiguous as each group becomes more
heterogenous. Individuals have more opportunity to engage in what would have once
been considered deviant behavior. Conversely, as social mobility slows, and intergroup
exchange slows with it, group boundaries are contracted and more clearly defined. In
Hawdon's view, "boundary crises" occur as the result cyclical periods of intergroup
exchange in which norms are diluted. As sources of intergroup exchange, he cites
immigration as well as stmctural changes resulting from industrialization (Hawdon 1996).
Both are effects of an increasing division of labor, but this division is marked by an ebb
and flow rather than unilinear development.
Although Hawdon's intent is to show how sociologists might be able to predict
when a boundary crises might occur, his ideas are of interest to this discussion in that they
illuminate the importance of homogeneity to group cohesion. Tipton (1966) paints the
utilitarians of the sixties as a heterogenous mass that scarcely even resembles a group.
Thus, the post-WW II economic expansion and heightened physical mobility of American
30
families (Hawdon 1966) might serve as an explanation for heightened individualism
leading to anomie, the rise of the counterculture as a product of normlessness, and
subsequent boundary contraction (mechanical solidarity) marked by the rise of the
religious right (Tipton 1966).
Group Cohesion And Individual Needs
A common theme expressed by Durkheim, Tipton, and Hawdon is the idea that
individuals need some level of regulated group membership. For Durkheim (1933),
differentiation without regulatory law would ultimately destroy the interdependence which
makes social organization possible. Without social organization, there can be no
guarantor of individual rights. Tipton argues that utilitarian individualism (unregulated
differentiation) strips society of the moral compass that is necessary to social organizafion.
On the other hand, the kind of regulation proposed by elements of the religious right is an
attempt to retum to a more primitive collective morality which stifles individual interests.
Hawdon adds that normative ambiguity that results from increased social mobility and
intergroup exchange is enough to trigger a boundary crises in which regulation becomes
more heavily emphasized. Through a synthesis of these three perspectives, two major
themes emerge. On the one hand, utilitarianism taken to its extreme leads to total chaos
or the complete absence of social organization which serves as guarantor of individual
rights. On the other hand, regulation taken to its extreme would lead to the complete
control of individual rights (at least for some), the very things social organization exists to
protect. From this perspective, moreover, the regulation that is born of interaction is
31
meant to fill the needs of individuals. Ultimately, it is the individual and not the group that
needs some level of integration or cohesion that can protect his or her rights.
Establishing a basis for individual needs. It is not enough to say that regulation
that can only come from interaction serves as a "guarantor" of individual rights. One must
look further for the basic needs of individuals in order to discover what relationship those
needs have with social organization. Humanist psychologist, Abraham Maslow (1954)
insists that identifiable needs drive human behavior. The most basic of these needs include
nourishment and protection from the environment. He then moves up a level to needs
such as safety. A child, for example, needs the safety and security provided by the
immediate environment. All individuals need to feel safe from an emergency or disaster
such as a fire or riot. Once these needs have been met, individuals need a sense of
belonging and acceptance. From there, the individual needs to achieve and gain
recognition from others. Ultimately, according to Maslow, the individual is driven toward
"self actualization" or the fiill realization of human potential. Note that, especially within
a highly differentiated community, meeting these needs requires some degree of social
stmcture. On the other hand, as Maslow (1954) points out, it is that same social stmcture
that also has the potential to limit or even deny thefiilfillmentof individual needs. With
this in mind, I now turn to an explanation of how the individual's need for a cohesive
social stmcture is directly linked to deviant labeling.
32
The Deviance/Cohesion Link in Sociology
That labeling deviance is an important way of shoring up decreasing group
cohesion has not been lost on sociologists. Several works have directly addressed this
link. This section describes recent major works on this topic and considers an important
criticism of these works.
Erickson (1966) lays out his "boundary maintenance" theory suggesting that the
labeling of deviant behavior may contribute to maintaining, restoring, or recreating moral
boundaries during a crises. He cites historical records from Puritan New England
(covered later in this chapter) as evidence that, one, deviance resides more in the audience
than in the behavior and, two, deviant conduct in one context might be normative behavior
in another.
Laurdedale (1976) presents a more precise theoretical model that says moral
boundaries contract whenever an outside agent threatens group solidarity. The
subsequent rejection of intragroup deviants helps to prepare the community to reject the
outside enemy (deviant). In this view, deviance clearly exists, at least in part, because it
serves the vital function of restoring group solidarity whenever the system is under assault.
Lauderdale tested this theory via the creation of two experimental conditions. When faced
with an outside threat and an intemal deviant confederate, groups tended to show a
temporary deterioration of group solidarity. Furthermore, these groups reportedly
exhibited higher levels of intolerance toward deviant members as compared to groups that
experienced no outside threat but had a confederate deviant within.
33
Inverarity (1976) made a similar argument in his study of populism and lynching
during the populist revolt in Louisiana. He argued that the Populist revolt could be
considered a boundary crises because it threatened the solidarity of White southerners.
This led to repressive justice (lynching) which, in tum, restored group solidarity.
All of these works use "functionalist" style models that attempt to show deviance
as being both produced by and necessary to social cohesion. Jensen (1988:3) is highly
critical of such conclusions, viewing them as tautological in that they "imply a causal
model in which recurrent phenomena are explained by their consequences for adaption or
survival of a social system." My efforts in this chapter avoid the tautological trap Jensen
describes. Here I only try to demonstrate a several-step causal process in which each
force produces the next one. It begins with (1) differentiation reducing cohesion based on
commonalities (mechanical solidarity), which then (2) creates concern among individual
group members about breakdown of social stmcture that meets individual needs. This
concern (3) promotes cohesion through the public labeling of deviance and redefinition of
common sentiments which then (4) further strengthens cohesion as insiders are pitted
against outsiders. My agreement with Durkheim, Erickson and others that deviance and
crime are "normal" or even "functional" in some sense should not be misconstmed as an
argument that these phenomena exist so that a group may also exist or flourish. Instead, I
suggest that the preponderance of historical data will show that individuals consistently
and vigorously pursue higher levels of commonality with others whenever their individual
needs (many of which are filled by social organization) are threatened. Moreover, as the
literature will suggest, activities that may seem beneficial for some group members are
34
attempt to become winners by gaining enough power so that they can avoid subsequent
deviant labels and perhaps even label their labelers as deviant. The vdnners, those who
successfully accomplish the labeling, attempt to remain in power. As a conflict process,
then, the labeling of deviance may soon disable the very cohesion it initially increased by
putting different group members at odds with each other. An irony comprises the final
reason this cohesion is fleeting: The deviant labeling which may initially increase cohesion
ultimately erodes it by creating even greater differentiation among group members. Some
are now in new deviant statuses, others are not; some hold new positions created to deal
with this deviance, others do not; some group members take one view of this deviance,
others commit to an opposing view. Moreover, within a differentiating society, it
becomes increasingly difficult to form any lasting consensus as to which behaviors
constitute deviance.
Realization that increases in cohesion produced by deviant labeling are fleeting
helps us to understand why labeling episodes repeatedly recur as societies become more
and more complex. These solidarity surges provoked by labeling are temporary, with the
receding wake of cohesion at some point triggering more labeling. They also generate
even greater differentiation and conflict, a breeding ground for further labeling. Consider
the following illustrations.
The Social Constmction of Deviance: Selected Research on
Moral Panics
Facts have been curiously missing from the debate about crime in
America, and the facts, once uncovered, are startling: There is no crime
36
wave in the United States. Criminal victimization has been steadily and
drastically declining for the past two decades. The American crime wave is
a myth. (Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter 1996:34)
In his book. Wayward Puritans, Kai Erickson (1966) chronicles three
Massachusetts Bay "crime waves," and argues that relatively benign behavior was
effectively demonized in order to promote cohesion by creating outside enemies. I should
mention too that the sudden upsurges in cohesion cited here do not represent some
attempt to retum to a "homeostatic condition" (Jensen 1988). Instead, these episodes
seem to represent a temporary reaction to a perceived crises brought about by some sense
of boundary "ambiguity" (Hawdon 1996) or what Durkheim (1933) might call anomie.
Erickson (1966) makes a similar argument.
Whenever a community is confronted by a significant relocation of
boundaries, a shift in its territorial position, it is likely to experience a
change in the kinds of behavior handled by its various agencies of control.
The occasion which triggers this boundary crises may take several
forms—a realignment of power within the group, for example, or the
appearance of new adversaries outside it. (p. 68)
The Quaker persecutions. According to Erickson, by the time the Quakers arrived
in Massachusetts Bay, the Puritan Separatists had lost much of their reason for existence.
They had hoped to serve as a model for the Puritan Church in England. However, the
English Puritans lost interest in the New England experiment in favor of a more tolerant,
open model (Erickson 1966). The Quakers, then, provided the perfect target for a
community suffering from an identity crises. The arrests of Quakers began in about 1656
and lasted for about ten years (Erickson 1966). During this period, several new laws
appeared on the books; most of these were for violations such as "being a Quaker (or
37
more correctly for acting like one!)" (Erickson 1966:116). These laws were accompanied
by new, severe punishments including beatings and executions. Despite the fact that the
Puritan legal system had been built almost entirely upon Biblical teachings, the collective
assault on Quakers seemed to have little to do with religion (Erickson 1966):
Literature from the period fairly crackles with angry denunciations
of the Quakers, but for all the heat generated by this verbal attack it seems
that the authorities neither knew very much nor cared what theories lay
behind the Quaker cmsade. Indeed, the people of Massachusetts Bay were
so pooriy informed about Quaker beliefs that they could not even identify
their opponents on that basis. The major distinguishing traits used by the
Puritans to pick Quakers out of the crowd (and this was as tme in courts of
law as in ordinary conversations) had nothing whatever to do with creeds
or doctrines, (p. 127)
Quakers were distinguished by their use of words such as "thee" and "thou" and
the manner in which they dressed (Erickson 1966: 127). Because the fundamental
differences between the two groups were so inconsequential, the Quakers were singled
out and formally labeled deviant on the basis of clothing and speech. Furthermore,
literature from the period indicates that the biggest sin of the Quakers was that they failed
to share in the collective spirit of the group (Erickson 1966).
In the end, the Puritans lost their battle with the Quakers as England forced the
colony to be more tolerant of religious diversity. Erickson (1966) views the Quaker
episode as the final battle in the colony's desperate attempt to maintain its identity as the
"city on the hill," oflfering a better way than the one left behind in England.
Witches in New England. To the outsider, Salem of 1665 might have looked look
like a young colony going through normal grovs1;h and diversification. However, to many
of the Puritan residents, it seemed like the beginning of the end of their New Worid
38
experiment. In the wake of the Quaker invasion, sermons were increasingly filled with
"dreadful prophecy" as the Puritans gradually lost their political hold on New England
(Erickson 1966:137). It was in this climate that the "witch hysteria" took hold (Erickson
1966).
The first of the accused witches of 1692 was a slave named Tibuta who "enjoyed a
reputation in the neighborhood for her skills in the magic arts" (Erickson 1966:141). As
Erickson tells the story, a couple of the girls who spent afternoons with Tibuta began
suffering from an "affliction." Symptoms included "screaming" and "convulsions." Worst
of all, this "disease" was contagious and quickly spread throughout Salem Village
(Erickson 1966:142). Soon afterward, the previously ignored Tibuta was dragged into
court along with two other suspects who seemed to fit the description of "witch"
(Erickson 1966:143).
Three better candidates could not have been found if all the gossips
in New England had met to make the nominations. The first,
understandably, was Tibuta herself, a woman who had grown up among
the rich colors and imaginative legends of Barbados. The second, Sarah
Good, was a proper hag of a witch if Salem ever knew one. With a pipe
clinched in her leathery face she wandered around the countryside
neglecting her children and begging from others, and on more than one
occasion the old crone had been overheard muttering threats against her
neighbors when she was in an unusually sour humor. Sarah Osbume, the
third suspect, had a higher social standing than either of her alleged
accomplices, but she had been involved in a local scandal a year or two
eariier when a man moved into her house some nine months before
becoming her husband, (p. 143)
In a preliminary hearing that was meant to put a quick end to the matter, the two
originally "afflicted" giris were brought in to bring evidence against the three accused.
The giris performed before the courts, demonstrating how they suffered in the presence of
39
the "witches," and then, surprisingly, Tibuta confessed. Furthermore, she implicated the
other two suspects and sparked a full-fledged witch hunt (Erickson 1966:144). As the
witch hysteria reached a feverish pitch, all manner of persons who were once considered
normal or at least harmless came under the scmtiny of the Salem justice system. "Warts,
moles, scars or any other imperfections" (Erickson 1966:151) were among the kinds of
evidences accepted by the court. By the time people began to question their collective
insanity, "there were 150 persons in custody and some 200 others who had been accused"
(Erickson 1966:152). In less than a year from the time the hysteria began, the witch trials
were over.
One can make the argument, of course, that the kind of deviance creation
documented in Puritan literature belongs to a primitive, collective sort of society that is far
removed from the highly differentiated America that rose from the industrial revolution.
However, the following twentieth-century examples of deviance creation bear a striking
resemblance to the Quaker persecutions and witch hunts of the 1600s.
The evolution of dmg laws in America. Shortly after the Civil War ended,
America embarked on a massive expansion of railways. In the west, Chinese immigration
filled the need for railroad constmction. The Chinese not only brought opium to the
United States, they also profited from its sale. The latter part of the nineteenth century,
however, ushered in two major economic downtums. It was in this environment, which
included increased hostilities between American and Chinese workers, that opium became
a "threat" to American society. Laws were subsequently passed prohibiting the Chinese
from distributing and consuming opium (Musto 1997).
40
Similarly, in the early part of the twentieth century, the use of cocaine was linked
to Black musicians (Lusane 1997). In 1910, Dr. Hamilton Wright released the Report on
the International Opium commission (Lusane 1997). Based more in prejudice than fact,
this report painted cocaine as the dmg that drove Black men to rape White women.
Wright further suggested that Blacks gained super-human strength and were driven to
madness from use of this dmg. Rumors surrounding the use of cocaine reached even
more ridiculous proportions. One such mmor suggested that cocaine rendered Blacks
invincible to .32-caliber weapons. Ironically, no evidenced exists that suggests a higher
proportion of Blacks than Whites used cocaine during this time frame (Lusane 1997).
Hysteria similar to that of Salem Village broke out in parts of the south. Some sheriffs
sv^tched from .32-caliber to .38-caliber weapons in response to the scare (Lusane 1997).
In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Act, the first national effort toward dmg control
(Goode 1996).
In the 1930s, Mexican-Americans were branded as heavy users of marijuana
(Goode 1993):
Mexican-Americans were thought to be major consumers of the dmg, and,
it was suspected, acted in a dangerous fashion under its influence. In
addition, they are presumed to menace the white community by spreading
the use of marijuana, especially to school children. Moreover, it was
thought that they took jobs away from native-born whites, (p. 59)
Like their Blacks counterparts, Mexican Americans were often seen as crazed
consumers of the "killer weed" that increased tendencies toward violence and inflated the
user's sex drive. It was in this environment that America began passing legislation
restricting the sale and use of marijuana (Goode 1993:59).
41
As recently as 1986, crack, a crystalline form of cocaine, became "the scariest dmg
of the latter part of the twentieth century" (Akers 1990:9, 12). This moral panic gained
credibility because it was supported by popular individuals such as Nancy Reagan, Bob
Hope, and Jesse Jackson (Goode 1993). Ironically, dmg use in general had been declining
during the period in which the moral panic empted (Johnston, O'Malley and Buchman
1987). Why all the concem? Crack became a cheap substitute for the more expensive
powder cocaine and was, therefore, found predominantly in the inner cities where the
majority of the residents could not as easily afford powder cocaine, a major focus of
President Reagan's dmg war. Media concentration in the inner cities combined with
tragedies such as the cocaine-related death of Maryland basketball star, Len Bias caused
America to define dmg use as the number one social problem in America (Goode 1993).
By the late 1980s, the term "crack babies" had become vogue. Much of this panic
stemmed from preliminary studies showing that babies bom to mothers who were exposed
to crack were more likely to have lower birth weights, smaller head size, seizures, genital
and urinary tract abnormalities, problems with motor ability, brain lesions, and behavioral
disorders (Chasnoflfet al. 1989). This, of course, added to the national media feeding
frenzy and a growing consensus among the public in favor of heavier penal sanctions.
However, most of these early studies failed to control for other potential causal factors
such as alcohol, tobacco, sexually transmitted diseases, and lack of quality prenatal care.
By the early 1990s, subsequent medical evidence revealed that the crack baby was more of
a mythical social constmct than an objective reality (Goode 1993).
42
Much like the cocaine scare of the early twentieth century, the "crack epidemic"
targeted Black males. Although African-Americans represent only about 14% of the
population, they make up "90% of those convicted of federal crack offenses." Moreover,
federal sentencing guidelines emerging from the moral panic mandated stiffer sentences for
crack users [more often Black] as opposed to cocaine users [more often White]" (Reiman,
1998:122).
Moral panics in general. J. S. Victor (1994) argues that "collective behavior can
lead to the social constmction of deviance" (p. 307). He references a trend in
fundamentalist Christianity to provide an illustration. (Victor 1994):
The moral cmsade against Satanism can be seen as one aspect of the larger
fundamentalist moral protest movement against perceived threats to
traditional family values. Satanic cult stories in mmors, allegations, and
moral propaganda focus on threats to children: the kidnaping of children
for human sacrifice; the use of aborted fetuses in cannibalistic rituals; the
infiltration of child care centers by satanic cult child abusers; the incestuous
ritual sexual abuse of children to brainwash them into becoming future
Satanist; the recmitment of teenagers into satanic cults; and the subversive
attempts to spread satanic influences among children through rock music,
school books, and Dungeons and Dragons-type role-playing games. These
bizarre stories are taken seriously by so many people because they are a
part of a symbolic cmsade aimed at affirming threatened traditional moral
values in the family institution. These family values condemn premarital
sex, abortion, divorce, homosexual behavior, and the portrayals of
sexuality in the media and disapprove of modernist gender roles, (p. 316)
The argument here is that cmsaders will cry "witchcraft" where none exists in an
attempt to demonize certain behaviors and ideologies they wish to destroy. These
cmsaders are buoyed by community perceptions that these activities threaten traditional
family values. Victor (1994) further argues that the moral cmsade is a well-organized
"Satan hunt" (p. 317) designed to alarm local communities and draw attention to the
43
larger, fundamentalist agenda. These cmsaders have power because they are represented
by clergymen, police, child protection workers, mental health professionals and anti cult
organizations. Local media (but seldom large-city newspapers) will tout these individuals
as experts which further elevates the standing of the cmsade.
In order to illustrate the inroads these modern-day witch hunters have created,
Victor (1994) cites several nationally recognized personalities who have mastered the
moral cmsade. James Dobson and Bob Larson are among the best known cmsaders.
Dobson lends a high level of legitimacy to the anti-Satan movement because he is best
known for his more main-stream Focus on the Family and Tough Love. However, Focus
on the Family also heads a national campaign against Impressions, an elementary school
reading series. Through his 300,000 subscribers of a magazine entitled Citizen, Dobson
fliels the "Satan Hunt" as he accuses Impressions readers of being Satan worshipers—
despite the fact that Impressions is subscribed to by numerous school districts (Victor
1994:320).
In a related argument, Eric Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994) illustrate
how "moral panics always leave an informal, and often institutional, legacy" (p. 149).
They propose a constmctionist view in which "extremely harmful conditions may not be
regarded as serious social problems, while relatively benign ones are" (Goode and BenYehuda 1994:153). In other words, objectivity plays no role in defining what is and what
is not a social problem. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994:156), "the moral
panic is defined by at least five cmcial elements or criteria." There must be first, a
heightened level of concern; second, an increased level of hostility toward the "problem";
44
third, there must exist a minimal level of consensus within the population or segments of
the population that the threat is "real"; fourth, it can only be considered a moral panic if
the concem is out of proportion to the threat; finally, moral panics empt and subside
rather abmptly (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:156-158).
Similar to the moral cmsade theory, Goode and Ben-Yehuda propose a
compromise between a grassroots model and interest group theory as an explanation for
the existence of moral panics. However, they argue that a level of general apprehension
must exist in a society before any interest group can create a moral panic. More
importantly, although moral panics can be brief in nature, the legacy is often long lasting.
The dmg panic of the 1980s left a legacy of legislation and a vastly increased federal
budget. In the same manner, a "satanic ritual abuse scare reaffirms the moral correctness
for the fundamentalist Christian way of life" (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:169).
These brief episodes of mechanical solidarity are important because of the longterm implications they leave in their wake. As Erickson (1966) points out, these
phenomena can result in dramatic changes in a community's criminal justice system.
When the Quakers first arrived in New England, "there were as yet no laws in the bay area
prohibiting Quaker activities" (Erickson 1966:116). Within two years of the Quaker
invasion, however, the penalties for "Quaker disorders" which could include even simple
mannerisms included banishment "upon pain of death" (Erickson 1966:118). These laws,
which were largely passed between 1656 and 1658, remained on the books until well into
the next decade, and, according to Erickson (1966), the laws were reluctantly repealed
only via the insistence of the King of England. Fleeting as it may be, the group cohesion
45
brought about by a moral panic has the power to redefine the boundaries of deviant
behavior for comparatively lengthy periods of time.
46
CHAPTER IV
SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A
UNITARY THEORY OF DEVIANCE
After summarizing the unitary theory of deviance derived from Durkheim's work,
this chapter considers three implications for this theory. First, I suggest how this theory
provides a basis for integrating consensus and conflict perspectives by illustrating how the
two paradigms play off each other in explaining deviant labeling and deviant conduct.
Second, I discuss how this theory provides an explanation for what some would argue is
an overiy aggressive criminal justice system in the United States. I conclude by arguing
that this theory provides a stronger appreciation of Durkheim's contributions to the study
of deviance, particularly with his discussion of differentiation and his concepts of anomie
and the collective conscience.
Recapping the Unitary Theory of Deviance
In Chapter I, I suggest that by revisiting Durkheim's ideas on societal evolution,
one could find the underpinnings (in his notion of differentiation) of a theory that could
explain both deviant behavior and deviant labeling in modem societies. Since Durkheim's
thought conceming differentiation as the root of deviant behavior is widely known, this
thesis focuses on how differentiation may also lead to deviant labeling, ultimately arguing
that Durkheim's work lays the foundation for a unitary theory of deviance in which
differentiation is the source of deviant behavior and deviant labeling in modem societies.
47
Chapter II begins the consideration of how differentiation may provoke deviant
labeling. It provides a critique of The Division of Labour in Society and presents the
argument that Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, which he insists belongs more to his
primitive societies, is equally important to social cohesion in modern societies with an
advanced division of labor. Central to my argument is the assertion that differentiation is a
two-edged sword that creates interdependence on the one hand and competing interests,
distmst, and utilitarian individualism on the other.
Chapter III posits differentiation as a key cause of deviant labeling. It contends
that diflferentiation marked by intergroup exchange, cultural plurality, and increased
individualism reduces cohesion based on commonalities. The accompanying breakdown
of social stmcture threatens individuals who depend on these stmctures to meet their
needs. In response, group members promote cohesion through increased emphasis and
redefinition of common sentiments and the public labeling of deviance. Mechanical
solidarity led by the collective conscience feeds off the labeling of deviants and deviant
behavior as it seeks to clearly separate that which is acceptable from that which is not.
The process is cyclical in nature because much of the labeling may seem unconvincing and
irrational over time, thus bringing a tmce to the conflict. On the other hand, this tmce is
short-lived because differentiation continues on its way, constantly threatening any
newfound sense of consensus and stability and pushing at the boundaries of normative
behavior. I now turn to some key implications for a unitary theory of deviance.
48
Three Implications for a Unitary Theory
A Theoretical Bridge Between Consensus and Conflict.
This theory exposes several links between the consensus and conflict theoretical
approaches to deviance, thus providing some starting points for integrating the two. With
the process of differentiation as a common denominator, this theory provides an answer to
the key questions of each approach: The consensus theorist asks, "Why do individuals
violate established norms?" The conflict theorist asks, "Why are certain individuals and
behaviors labeled deviant?" This theory provides answers to both questions by detailing
how the processes of conflict and consensus act interdependently in producing both
deviant conduct and deviant labeling. As illustrated in Chapter II, differentiation erodes
consensus by creating diverse interests and conflict between competing interests. When
individuals feel threatened by the perceived deteriorating sense of groupness and social
stmcture, the increased emphasis on normative boundaries provides escalating motivation
for deviance on the part of some which fijrther erodes cohesion based on commonalities.
The augmented motivation for deviance and falling cohesion, in tum, trigger more conflict
via the process of labeling individuals and behaviors as deviant. As more group members
exhibit agreement on key norms and values, this process may increase cohesion which then
decreases pressure to label deviance and perhaps deviant conduct as well. However, since
differentiation is an ongoing, cyclical process, thefleeting naturQ of increased cohesion
restarts this sequence of events again and again. The competing views of Erickson (19
66) and Chambliss (1976) with respect to the same data provide an illustration.
49
One of Erickson's (1966) conclusions in his book. Wayward Puritans is that three
crime waves were created by the community in an effort to shore up sagging cohesion.
Chambliss (1976) scoffs at this notion for two reasons. First, Erickson's data seem to
show that "each crime wave failed miserably as a source of community consensus and
cohesion" (Chambliss 1976:11). Chambliss backs up this charge by suggesting that crime
wave after crime wave is an indicator of ever-present conflict rather than social cohesion.
Second, the fact that the settlement was Puritan controlled "makes it very clear that they
[crime waves] were not precipitated by crises of morality in the community but by power
stmggles between those who mled and those who were mled" (Chambliss 1976:11). A
unitary theory allows us to embrace (at least somewhat) the arguments of both Erickson
and Chambliss. As the New England colony became more culturally diverse (a product of
social differentiation), the boundaries of normative behavior were stretched. This, in tum,
threatened the Puritan way of life that had been somewhat stable. In each of three cases,
the Puritan leaders reacted to flagging cohesion by emphasizing the boundaries of
normative behavior which spawned a conflict/labeling process. The labeling ultimately
failed because it fueled the conflict among community members. However, the
crackdowns themselves were evidence of increased cohesion among the Puritans and the
Quakers. For example, Erickson's data show that the Quakers responded to deviant
labeling by proudly wearing the label and challenging the status quo. The fact that the
crime waves failed in the long mn is evidence that the new sense of cohesion among the
Puritans was fleeting because consensus and conflict give life to each other.
50
Fleeting Cohesion and the Criminal Justice System.
A unitary theory of deviance with its concept of fleeting cohesion also has
implications for better understanding what some would argue is an overactive criminal
justice system in America. In 1992-93, the U.S. incarceration rate was 519 per 100,000
persons. This rate was more than four times that of Canada, five times that of England and
Wales, six times that of Germany, and near ten times that of the Netherlands (Reiman
1998:19). This placed the U.S. rates as third highest in the world. However, by 1995, the
U.S. incarceration rate of 600 per 100,000 had surpassed the Union of South Africa and
the former Soviet Union to lead the world. This represents of a near tripling of
incarceration rates since President Reagan took office and embarked on a war on dmgs in
1980 (Reiman 1998:20).
Chapter III illustrates how moral panics (Erickson 1966; Lusane 1997; Goode
1996; Victor 1994) and the accompanying fleeting cohesion are often accompanied by
increased criminal justice activity. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) took this a step fijrther
by suggesting that although a moral panic may be brief, it often leaves a somewhat more
permanent legacy in its wake. By further examining the evolution of dmg laws, one can
find numerous historical examples (as illustrated in Chapter HI) of how moral panics
marked by fleeting cohesion lead to a long-term expansion of criminal justice activity. In
other words, because much of the expanded penal code in the United States was brought
about by broad-based consensus bom of panic rather than sober thought, such expansion
has been frequently rooted in fiction instead of fact. What often remains over the long
term is just enough consensus (or at least lack of motive for change) to keep the laws on
51
the books despite the fact that the basis for the consensus has dissipated. Moreover, in
some cases consensus is rejuvenated by finding new justifications for maintaining or even
expanding the criminal justice code with respect to particular behaviors. Consider the
following example. Chapter III discussed how the fiction-based panic over Blacks and
cocaine use led to the national criminalization of dmg use. Though the panic abated, the
laws have remained. In fact, as earlier discussed, the 1980s were marked by an expansion
of the criminal justice code with respect to illicit dmg use.
Although fleeting social cohesion that is the mainstay off any moral panic seems to
have its own rhythmic ebb and flow, the resulting institutional changes are far more
pervasive. For though the diluted logic and outpouring of emotion of the 1980s has
diminished to a large extent, the obsession with and overreaction to illicit dmg use in the
1980s has had a lasting impact on the criminal justice system of the United States. Since
1982, our incarceration rates have increased dramatically, and the percentage of federal
inmates serving time for dmg related crimes has increased from about 22% to 70%. One
third of these are "non- violent, low level offenders with no criminal record" (Kappler,
Blumberg and Potter 1996:179).
The Contributions of Durkheim to Contemporary Deviance
Theory
A final implication for a unitary theory of Deviance is a greater appreciation for
Durkheim and his contributions to deviance theory. Ironically, it is through criticism of his
notion that mechanical solidarity increasingly recedes within the normal development of
52
the division of labor that this thesis is able excavate a unitary theory that can explain
deviant labeling. Although Durkheim underestimated the persistence of mechanical
soHdarity in modem societies, his exploration into the causes of social cohesion gave birth
to constmcts that are cmcial to the understanding of deviance in contemporary America.
For example, his concept of the collective conscience and the cohesion it engenders is of
particular value for sociologists who want to better understand social constmction, moral
panics, and the labeling process in general. Additionally, his concept of anomie is cmcial
to the understanding of why individuals violate norms. Underlying both is his notion of
differentiation which provides the basis for the fusion of two seemingly disparate
theoretical traditions into one, unitary theory.
53
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