Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Managing a large scale crisis often presents a substantial challenge for an organization that may even threaten its survival. However, we argue that organizations can embrace such challenges to learn from crises. Through examining how organizations learn from the process of crisis management, we offer new implications for organization theory and management practice. We do so through conducting a longitudinal case analysis of how organizations learned from a series of similar natural disasters. We examine how organizations learn from the management of crises and develop a three-stage approach to organizational learning in crisis management. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for theory and practice.
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Crises are one-of-a-kind events for which organizations generally cannot plan (Carley & Harrald,
1997). They may take a variety of forms (e.g. natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and fires), and.some crises are even human-induced, such as bribery, corruption, major product defects, scandal, and terrorist attack (Mitroff, 1988; Wang, 2008). While much research has considered the negative impact of crises on organizations (Burke, 2005; Yu, Sengul & Lester,
2008; Hartman & Mahesh, 2008), few studies have examined how organizations can embrace such challenges and learn from crises. Since organizational learning is a dynamic process that occurs over time and across levels of the organization, and creates a tension between exploration and exploitation, crises may present a unique opportunity for organizational learning (Crossan,
Lane & White, 1999). However, during a crisis, learning curves are steep, organizations may not have the benefit of prior knowledge or time, and information about firm’s operations, and environment, may have little or no time lag between occurrence and reporting (Eisenhardt,
1989). Under these unique circumstances, the question arises: How can organizations learn from the external uncertainties created by crisis situations ?
Crises create a window of opportunity during which organizations are more motivated to change. After this widow closes, change is less likely to be possible or to occur. Therefore, organizations managing crises learn in leaps -- crisis by crisis -- rather than smoothly over time
(Carley & Harrald, 1997). Unfortunately, a crisis is unanticipated by the organization, threatens high-priority values, and presents a restricted amount of time in which the organization can respond (Hermann, 1963). Considering these factors, in this paper we examine how organizations learn from the management of crises and develops a three-stage approach to organizational learning in crisis management. In the first stage, we explore how an organization
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning adapts during an initial crisis event to an extreme situation, and how they learn during the event.
In the second stage, we examine how an organization adjusts its established plans and procedures to achieve a desired outcome during an extreme situation, and how they learn from the event. In the third stage, we examine how an organization develops a new course of action to achieve a desired outcome before, during, or after an extreme situation, and how they learn from the event.
We then use longitudinal data to create a detailed case study of several devastating natural disasters (Katrina & Gustav/Ike), which we analyze as two unique crisis events. We present the data using a ‘Narrative’ analysis synchronized with a detailed ‘Cause & Effect’ analysis to illustrate how the organization learns through different stages of the crisis.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review prior work on theoretical and contextual issues related to the crisis management and disaster response contexts to develop our three-stage model of organizational learning in crisis management. Then we examine our model through a longitudinal analysis of cases of crisis management during sequential response by the same organization to similar natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, and Ike).
We then conclude with a detailed discussion of the implications of our analysis for theory and practice.
The primary goal of a theory is to answer the questions of how, when, and why (Bacharach,
1989). In the process of answering these questions in relation to organizational learning, several authors have contributed models that assist in crisis management. Argyris and Schon (1974 &
1978) were among the first to propose models that facilitate organizational learning. They distinguish between single-loop and double-loop learning.
Further, a crisis can consist of as
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351069

Crisis Management & Organizational Learning many as four stages: prodromal crisis stage, acute crisis stage, chronic crisis stage, and crisis resolution stage (Fink, 1986). Others identified three stages of crisis in which opportunities for learning may arise; these include a pre-event—crisis of management, the focal—operational crisis and finally a post—crisis of legitimation (Smith, 1990 & 2007). Also, drawing upon
Argyris and Schon’s (1974 & 1978) notion of single and double-loop learning, Smith (2002 &
2007) introduced first and second-order learning, which occurs during their second stage of an operational crisis. We leverage this prior work and build upon it to develop a three stage crisis management model that facilitates the mitigation of extreme crisis events, utilization of standard operating procedures, and detailed planning procedures before, during, and after crisis events.
We develop this model to assist in improving operational performance and organizational learning during a crisis event. In the remainder of this section we discuss some of the foundations for this model.
Developing a 3-stage Model of Organizational Learning in Crisis Management
During crisis management, organizations have to process vast amounts of information and apply it in a timely fashion. They must develop systems, which enable them to execute tasks rapidly.
This paper proposes that during extreme situations, organizational learning occurs during three distinct stages: Stage I, adaptive learning, organizations are responding to situations as they occur; Stage II, single-loop learning, organizations modify their actions according to the difference between expected and obtained outcomes; and Stage III, double-loop learning, organizations modify the events based on prior events, experience, and training to develop a new course of action or SOP (see Figure I). We can apply all three stages of this model to the context of natural disasters and several other recent extreme events (i.e., the terrorist attacks in India and the current financial crisis in the U.S). These events are significantly different in comparison to
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning each other, but the process of mitigating events, applying SOPs or detail planning is generalizable. In the following model (depicted in Figure I) we illustrate how a crisis response team may react to a rare extreme event by applying the three stages.
Rare
Extreme
Event
In-Action - + Stage I
Adaptive
- + +
-
Event
Escalation
SOPs
Event
Mitigation
- + + +
+
Double-loop
Stage II
Single-loop
Figure I: Illustrates how the three stages are applied during a rare extreme event
Adaptive Learning
In the first stage of a crisis event, organizations respond to situations as they occur. The crisis event may be beyond their current capabilities or knowledge base, which will require them to adapt and learn as the situation develops (see Figure I). Adaptation is the ability to make incremental adjustments because of environmental changes, goal structure changes, or other changes (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Adaptive models of organizational learning are typically based on the notion of bounded rationality, according to which individual agents have limited ability to
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning process information in uncertain and rapidly changing environments (Lomi et al, 1997). Other models contribute to the foundation of an organizational learning perspective by explicitly adding environmental dimensions to the adaptive learning perspective (Eisner, 2003).
Unfortunately, in extreme and unpredictable situations, organizations may have to adapt a trialand-error approach. Wherein, routines and beliefs change in response to direct organizational experience through two major mechanisms: the first is trial-and-error experimentation; and the second mechanism is organizational search (Levitt & March, 1988). Furthermore, in-action during an extreme event may escalate the effects of the event, however making situational decisions based on training and experience may mitigate the event. Through effective mitigation of the crisis response teams can transition to Stage II—single-loop learning (Figure I).
Single-loop Learning
In the second stage of a crisis event, organizations monitor situations that experience, training, and prior events have established known general outcomes (see Figure I). However, the organizations may have to adjust the established course of action or standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to achieve the desired outcome. In single-loop learning, individuals, groups, or organizations modify their actions according to the difference between expected and obtained outcomes (Argyris & Schon, 1974; 1978). Events may occur that are similar to other crises events in the past, crisis managers are able to monitor and directly manipulate the event insuring a positive outcome. The implementation of supporting methods of organizational learning is used in various forms. Lower-level learning is focused learning that may be mere repetition of past behaviors—usually short term, surface, temporary, but with associations being formed; captures only a certain element—adjustments in part of what the organization does (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Others believe that related ideas are implicit in the notion that the ability to
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning assimilate information is a function of the richness of the preexisting knowledge structure: learning is cumulative, and learning performance is greatest when the object of learning relates to what the organization already knows (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Through effective adjustments of plans and SOPs crisis response teams can transition to Stage III—double-loop learning (see Figure I).
Double-loop Learning
In the third stage of a crisis event, organizations analyze recent and past events to determine where standard operating procedures failed to achieve the desired outcome. Thru stringent analysis, the organizations will modify the current SOPs or develop a new course of action (see
Figure I). In double-loop learning, the entities (individuals, groups, or organization) question the values, assumptions, and policies that led to the actions in the first place. If they are able to view and modify those, then second-order or double-loop learning has taken place (Argyris et al.,
1974 & 1978). Fortunately, technology has advanced enough in the field of crisis management that high-tech computer systems are capable of assisting organization in the planning process.
Due to the flexibility of the three stage model, it’s possible for well trained organizations to implement more than one or all three stages at once during an extreme situation. For example, during disaster response search and rescue teams adapt to unique rescue operations (Stage I), law enforcement agencies adjust planned security procedures (Stage II), and state & federal agencies were develop response plans (Stage III). This process represents another unique feature of double-loop learning. However, applying Stage III during a crisis can have a positive or negative effective, such as in the time it takes to develop a large scale plan the crisis event may escalate, which is a negative effect. In the following model (depicted in Figure II), we propose how
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning organizational learning occurs during the three stages and improved operational performance before and after a crisis.
Crisis Event
+
Organizational Learning
Stage I
(Adaptive)
+
Stage II
(Single-Loop)
+
Improvement
Stage III
+
(Double-Loop)
Figure II: Illustrates how organizations learn and improve performance
Operational Improvement
In-order for organizations to improve performance or correct errors, they have to actively seek and incorporate operational improvements. We define operational improvement in the context of natural disasters as, improving readiness, search and rescue techniques, communications, integration of military capabilities, logistics & evacuation, and public safety & security; there are other variables that may apply depending on the event. Operational improvement projects deal with making changes to the existing system seeking performance; they range from continuous
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning improvement to reengineering projects depending on their characteristics and complexities (Jung and Lim, 2007). Organizations that are well trained and organized should focus of continuous improvement; and newly formed organizations should focus on reengineering or developing operational and command & control structures.
Crisis Management
Crisis Management consists of skills and techniques required to assess, understand, and cope with any serious situation, from Stage I to Stage III. Organizational crisis management effectiveness is evidenced when potential crisis are averted or when key stakeholders believe that the success outcomes of short and long-range impacts of crisis outweigh the failure outcomes
(Pearson & Clair, 1998). Furthermore, environmental crisis, such as natural disaster is the consequence of a natural hazard (e.g. hurricane, volcanic eruption, and earthquake) which leads to financial, structural, and human losses. For instance, once the organization has passed from the prodromal (stage 1) to the acute crisis stage (stage 2), management can rarely recover the lost ground and the crisis will start causing damage, the extent of which depends on the preparedness of the organization and the effectiveness of its crisis response (Paraskevas, 2006). These events can create psychological stress at the individual, team, and organizational level.
From the psychological perspective, by sharing information about the causes, consequence, and coping strategies regarding a crisis, an organization may facilitate reconstruction of individuals’ shattered assumptions by reducing self-blame and reversing fears of helplessness (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Furthermore, there are indications that crisis decision makers cope with their high consequence, high pressure environment by rapidly cycling through the evaluation of independent solution alternatives (Hale et al., 2006). There are also indicators that organizational preparation, functionality, response, and recovery to natural disaster events at
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning colleges/universities reflect the same stressors and coping strategies as experienced by private business enterprises and workplace setting (Piotrowski and Vodanovich, 2008).
The purpose of the following case study, which involves two crisis events, is to illustrate how organizations can learn during, after, and before extreme events. In general, we know that
“important scientific propositions have the form of universals, and a universal can be falsified by a single counterinstance.” Thus, a single well designed case study can provide a major challenge to a theory and provide a source of new hypothesis and constructs simultaneously (Cooper &
Schindler, 2003 pg 150). Hurricane Katrina is the first crisis event, which we use to illustrate adaptive, single loop, and limited double loop learning. We review the findings of a U.S. government report on Katrina to present specific events in which organizational learning occurred. Hurricanes Gustav and Ike are the second crisis event. We present them as one event because the two hurricanes overlapped. The overlapping time-frame of the two hurricanes once again extended the limited resources of government agencies along the Gulf Coastal areas of two large states (Louisiana and Texas). Crisis II presents a unique opportunity to compare the performance of local and federal agencies during Katrina to their performance three years later during Gustav/Ike. We present the reports of local/national media and FEMA on event two, which will once again illustrate detailed doubled-loop learning after crisis I and before crisis II where organizational learning occurred. We present detailed results of the case study analysis in
Table 1 (Cause and Effect Analysis Matrix between Crisis I and II).
Crisis I – Hurricane Katrina
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
The following is a detailed step by step accounting of events leading up to the landfall of hurricane Katrina. On August 24, 2005 a tropical depression strengthened into a tropical storm and the national weather station named it Katrina. August 25 th
, Katrina was upgraded to a category 1 hurricane as it approached the southeastern coast of Florida. August 26 th
, Katrina weakened to a tropical storm as it passed over Florida, and once again intensified as it took a westward heading strengthen first to a category 1 and then to a category 2 hurricane. The
Louisiana and Mississippi state officials mobilized their National Guard while the Joint Forces
Headquarters-Louisiana National Guard activated its’ Joint Operations Center (JOC). A reason for creating Joint Operations Center is that team members have different responsibilities and authority, and an effective response to a crisis may span multiple agencies (Drnevich et al.,
2009). The National Hurricane Center forecasted that Katrina would make its’ second landfall as a category 4 or 5 storm near the city of New Orleans. In hindsight, Federal, State, and Local officials were given approximately fifty-six hours advance notice of the track of the hurricane.
A catastrophic hurricane striking Southeast Louisiana has been considered a worst-case scenario that the region and many experts had known and feared for years. August 27 th
, Katrina strengthened to a category 4 storm, nearly doubling in size (160 miles from the storms center), and pushing a powerful storm surge ahead of its path. Louisiana and Mississippi established their
Traffic Center (TCC) and implemented the State’s contra-flow plan. New Orleans Mayor recommended evacuations of Algiers, the Lower Ninth Ward and low-lying areas of the city.
August 28 th
, Katrina strengthened to a category 5 storm, 12 hours before hitting the coast. Mayor
Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. The New Orleans superdome now sheltered 10,000 to 12,000 people, including 300-500 special needs evacuees. August 29 th
,
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Katrina made landfall as a powerful category 3 storm at 6:10 am in Plaquemines Parish,
Louisiana, preceded by a twenty-seven feet storm surge.
The U.S. Government (Katrina)
The U.S. government focused on the following 17 categories of lessons learned from Katrina: national preparedness; integrated use of military capabilities; communications; logistics and evacuation; search and rescue; public safety and security; public health and medical support; human services; mass care and housing; public communications; critical infrastructure and impact assessment; environmental hazards and debris removal; foreign assistance; nongovernmental aid; training, exercises, and lessons learned; homeland security professional development and education; and citizen and community preparedness. For the purposes of this case study, we will focus on lessons learned that could have decreased human suffering or lessen loss of life. The following is the US government official statement on Crisis I:
The United States Government Official Report on Hurricane Katrina (2006): On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical storm off the coast of the Bahamas. Over the next seven days, the tropical storm grew into a catastrophic hurricane that made landfall first in Florida and then along the Gulf Coast in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, leaving a trail of heartbreaking devastation and human suffering. Katrina wreaked staggering physical destruction along its path, flooded the historic city of New
Orleans, ultimately killed over 1,300 people, and became the most destructive natural disaster in American history.
National Preparedness Lessons Learned
Hurricane Katrina is an excellent example of a single catastrophic event that can test the leadership, readiness, and adaptability of federal, state, and local government. The integration of government agencies during crisis events is crucial to establishing synergy with all subordinate elements. The need for combined readiness and training exercises with all critical elements is significant, because discovering that a critical system is inoperable during a crisis could escalate the negative effects of an event. Unfortunately, Katrina is crisis event I, so the type of training
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning and readiness exercises that should have occurred before it will not be evaluated. The following is the US government statement on national preparedness lessons learned:
The Federal government should work with its homeland security partners in revising existing plans, ensuring a functional operational structure—including within regions—and establishing a clear, accountable process for all National preparedness efforts.
Unfortunately, once certain decisions are made they can’t be undone, but they provide excellent Stage III organizational learning tools. For instance, developing specific mandatory guidelines for when high-risk areas should be evacuated. Eisenhardt (1989) research explored the speed of strategic velocity environment. Such environments are particularly challenging because information is poor, mistakes are costly, and recovery from missed opportunities is difficult.
Search and Rescue Lessons Learned
Federal search and rescue assets from the Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue
(US&R) task forces, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Army National Guard and other federal agencies rescued over 40,000 people off roofs, out of trees, and from the water. Despite these successes, search and rescue efforts revealed the need for greater coordination between agencies to facility command & control and coordinate maritime, aeronautical, and land rescues.
In the absence of coordination, some teams demonstrated initiative to fill the gap in unified command, determining their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and locations to drop off the people they rescued. Unfortunately, in some cases, rescuers were forced to leave people on highways where they were exposed to the elements and in continuing need of transportation, food, and water. The following is the US government statement on search and rescue coordination lessons learned:
The Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of all Federal search and rescue assets during disaster response.
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
The search and rescue teams abilities to adapt to an extreme situation, which was absent of civilian command & control and coordination between agencies is an excellent example of
Stage I organizational learning (Figure II). Their initiative to determine rescue priorities, areas to search, and casualty drop sites created a chain reaction forcing other evacuation agencies to adapt to unplanned scenarios. In an extreme environment, it’s the training and skills of units and agencies that have the ability to adapt that determine whether or not lives are saved or lost.
Communications Lessons Learned
In retrospect, the single most significant event in the early stage was the order to evacuate critical areas. On the 27 th
of august, officials recommended evacuation and on the 28 th
mandatory evacuations were ordered. However, on the 26 th
of August the hurricane was forecasted to be a category 4 or 5, and the track was forecast to make landfall near New Orleans giving officials 56 hours advance notice. Mandatory evacuation of critical areas on the 26 th
would have been significant. Perhaps, the second most significant event was a break in communications on all levels, which led to a significant breach in command and control over security, search and rescue teams, and etc. New Orleans mayor operated out of a hotel for several days unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for nearly 48 hrs. In addition, the state of
Louisiana’s 800 MHz radio system designed to be the backbone of mutual aid communications, ceased functioning, and repairs were delayed for several days. The following is the US government statement on communication lesson learned:
The Department of Homeland Security should review our current laws, policies, plans, and strategies relevant to communications. Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland Security Council, with support from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, should develop a National Emergency
Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability.
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
The local, state, and federal agencies were unable to adapt to communication failures during Stage I of the crisis. However, the local and state government did have a plan in place: as primary, local landlines and cell phone services (due to environmental factors they both failed); as a secondary, the Louisiana’s 800 MHz radio system that also failed. These events initiated
Stage II organizational learning (Figure II), in which the local and state agencies adjusted their plans to incorporate federal communication assets (MERS, MCI, AT&T and USNORTHCOM mobile communications assets). The systems hadn’t been tested in unison so there were compatibility issues, but they were able to reestablish command and control.
Integrated use of Military Capabilities Lessons Learned
Active duty military and National Guard personnel provided critical emergency response and security support to the Gulf Coast during the height of the crisis. State active duty and Title 2
National Guard forces that deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi operated under the command of their respective governors. Title 10 active duty forces, on the other hand, fell under the command of the president and had more limited civil response authority. By September 2 nd
over
14,000 active duty and 22,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen had deployed to the region.
Once forces arrived in the joint operations area, they fell under separate command structures, rather than one single command. Military units and civilian leadership experienced interoperability challenges at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment. The following is the US government statement on integrated use of military capabilities lesson learned:
The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense should jointly plan for the Department of Defense’s support of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the Federal response. In addition, the Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on increased integration with active duty forces for homeland security plans and activities.
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Local and state agencies are equipment to deal with regional National Guard forces, but when they have to incorporate over 65,000 active and National Guard forces, command and control can be daunting. Fortunately, the situation provides another opportunity for Stage III organizational learning (Figure II), which would require that local, state, and federal agencies develop a unified plan for command and control. The agencies were able to achieve limited synergy during the end stage of the crisis event, but it wasn’t efficient enough to rapidly integrate force during the initial crisis response.
Logistics and Evacuation Lessons Learned
Since neither the Louisiana nor the New Orleans evacuation plans addressed evacuation protocols for post-landfall, state, and local officials worked with FEMA, DOD, and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct the post landfall evacuation. Large numbers of people gathered or were deposited by search and rescue teams atop raised surfaces, such as the I-
10 cloverleaf downtown. Large crowds gathered at the Convention Center even though city officials had never intended it to be a shelter. DOT began assembling a bus fleet of over 1,100 vehicles, equal in size to some of the largest transit agencies in the Nation to evacuate thousands of persons from the superdome and other parts of New Orleans. In addition to ground operations, a joint DHS, DOT, and DOD airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people, constituting the largest domestic civilian airlift on U.S. soil in history. Buses and flights of evacuees were sometimes diverted, while en route, to new destinations without the knowledge of officials at either the original or the new destinations. In addition, some passengers reported that they had not been informed of their destinations when they boarded the evacuating flights and had no idea where they were when their flights landed. The following is the US government statement on logistics and evacuation lessons learned:
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with State and local governments and the private sector, should develop a modern, flexible, and transparent logistics system. This system should be based on established contracts for stockpiling commodities at the local level for emergencies and the provision of goods and services during emergencies. The Federal government must develop the capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical systems by leveraging resources within both the public sector and the private sector. The Department of Transportation, in coordination with other appropriate departments of the Executive Branch, must also be prepared to conduct mass evacuation operations when disasters overwhelm or incapacitate State and local governments.
Local and state agencies evacuation plans didn’t address post-landfall evacuation.
However, due to mass power outages, contaminated water source, and limited operational medical facilities, agencies were forced to develop a mass evacuation plan. Once again, Stage III organizational learning (Figure II) would be implemented, except this time, it would require rapid in mass coordination to prevent farther loss of life. Local and state agencies worked with and followed the lead of federal agencies (DHS, DOT and DOD), and despite short falls in the operation, they achieved the mission under extreme conditions.
Public Safety and Security Lessons Learned
New Orleans Police Department reported that about 147 officers abandoned their positions during the storm; this also falls into the category of significant. Take into consideration, that many of the officers were securing the safety of their own families. In the absence of a sufficient number of officers in uniform, civilians begin looting and committing violent crimes against law enforcement officers and other emergency response personnel. Security problems along the Gulf
Coast, both actual and perceived, obstructed the speed and efficiency of the federal response and in some cases temporarily halted relief efforts. On August 31 st
, most of New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue missions to respond to the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving lives. Eight day after landfall, there were more than 1,600 federal law enforcement officers in New Orleans from the Department of Homeland Security and
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Department of Justice. The following is the US government statement on public safety and security lessons learned:
The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, should examine Federal responsibilities for support to State and local law enforcement and criminal justice systems during emergencies and then build operational plans, procedures, and policies to ensure an effective Federal law enforcement response.
During a crisis response, the presence of officers in uniform provides a security blanket for both the average citizen and agencies providing crisis assistance. The inability of local and state law-enforcement officers to provide these services; provided us with another example of
Stage II organizational learning (Figure II). The remaining officers in the major crisis areas were implementing their security plans, however due to the extreme circumstances, the security plans had to be drastically adjusted. Insufficient manpower was the major issue, but with the influx of officers from multiple federal agencies, they were able to expand the security plan to cover evacuation sites, the city, the airport, and major routes.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (Katrina)
FEMA exists primarily to coordinate other Federal agencies and departments during emergency response and recovery; they task departments such as the Departments of Health and Human
Services, Defense, and Transportation, as well as the American Red Cross. FEMA operates ten regional and two area divisions that work directly with states in planning for disasters; during
Katrina region IV and VI conducted responses for Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.
The following is FEMA director’s official statement on Crisis I:
FEMA director David Paulison (2006): Hurricane Katrina marked a paradigm shift in the way the federal Emergency Management Agency will approach its role in emergency management. Traditionally, state and local officials have had primary responsibility during disasters.
When their resources are overwhelmed, they seek federal assistance. That’s too late.
FEMA is responsible for establishing the Regional Response Coordination Center
(RRCC) and administering the operational teams, such as Urban Search and Rescue (USAR),
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) and
Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS), which provides communications, operational and logistical support. The following table illustrates the lessons learned during Crisis I and the operational improvements that occur in Crisis II.
Table 1: Cause and Effect Analysis matrix between Crisis I and II
Cause and Effect Analysis Matrix
Lessons Learned
Crisis I Organizational
(Katrina) Learning
Crisis II
(Gustav / Ike)
Organizational
Learning
Operational
Improvement
National
Preparedness
Search and
Rescue
N/A
Successful
Rescue
Operations
N/A
By Presidential order National training/readiness programs instituted
Success:
Stage III
Success Stage I
Successful Rescue
Operations N/A
Communications
Integrated use of
Military
Capabilities
Logistics and
Evacuation
Public Safety and
Security
Late Evacuation
Order
Failure to establish and maintain command & control
Significant
Failure Stage I
Significant
Mandatory Evac orders of critical area given early
Purchase
Success:
Stage III
Partial
Success:
Stage III
Interoperability
Equipment
Failure
Success Stage II
Failure Stage I
& II
Partial Success
Stage III
Equipment
National Guard included in Prior landfall planning
Coordination
Failures
No Post-landfall
Evacuation Plan
Failure Local and
State Police
Force
N/A Stage I & II Partial Registration
Partial Success
Stage III
Timeline, land & air, route and area evacuation planning
Significant
Failure Stage I
Federal Law
Agencies
Partial Success
Stage II
Military deployed prior to crisis:
Security and Safety
Success:
Stage III
Partial
Success:
Stage II
Success:
Stage III
Success:
Stage III
Significant
Improvement
N/A
Significant
Improvement
Improvement
Significant
Improvement
Improvement
Significant
Improvement
Significant
Improvement
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
Crisis II Hurricanes Gustav and Ike
The following is a detailed step by step accounting of events leading up to the landfall of hurricanes Gustav and Ike. On August 25, 2008, a tropical depression strengthened into a tropical storm and was given the name Gustav. On August 31 st
, Gustav entered the Gulf of
Mexico with maximum sustained winds of 135 mph. Hurricane Gustav was expected to make landfall near New Orleans almost three years after Hurricane Katrina struck the same region. On
September 1 st
, the center of Gustav made U.S. landfall along the Louisiana coast near Cocodrie as a strong category 2 hurricane—1 mph below a category 3. While federal and state resources where being utilized to mitigate the effects of Gustav, another tropical depression was forming in the Atlantic Ocean. On September 2 nd
, tropical depression nine strengthened into a tropical storm and was given the name Ike, one day after the landfall of hurricane Gustav. By early morning hours of September 5 th
, Ike was a category 4 hurricane, with maximum sustained winds of 145 mph. On September 11 th
, forecasting models began to show Ike making landfall just south of Galveston. Ike made U.S. landfall at Galveston, Texas, on September 13 th
, as a category 2 hurricane with winds of 110 mph. Hurricane Ike was the third most destructive hurricane to ever hit the United States. The combination of the two hurricanes once again extended the resources of federal, state, and local organizations to their capacity.
National Preparedness Operational Improvement
The president of the United States announced that he would not be attending the republican convention and was headings to Texas to monitor the scene as soon as possible. Secretary
Chertoff and FEMA Administrator Paulison reported that the federal government has prepositioned teams of emergency managers, doctors, ambulances, search-and-rescue teams,
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning aircraft, and commodities throughout the region. The following is the secretary of homeland security statement from CNN transcripts on preparations for Crisis II:
Michael Chertoff, the secretary of homeland security, so many people remember the enormous blunders three years ago in advance of Hurricane Katrina; they are desperately trying now to avoid similar blunders right now. Well, I think there’s no question that we’re doing much better than we did in Katrina. If you look at the evacuation, it began 24 to 36 hours earlier than Katrina.
The crucial requirement to have national leadership, readiness training, and assets in place prior to crisis events was a crucial lesson learned from Crisis I. The significances of the president of the U.S., the secretary of homeland security, and FEMA’s administrator initiative to support state and local officials prior to landfall was crucial. Local, state, and federal agencies ability to plan and emplace all crucial agencies and assets prior to landfall illustrates significant
Stage III organizational learning and operational improvements (Table 1). As opposed to
Katrina, when several crucial assets and the authority to utilize them were not emplaced until events had escalated to the point of significant human suffering and lose of life.
Search and Rescue Operational Improvement
Search and rescue operations were perhaps the most successful phase of both Crisis I and Crisis
II. Fortunately, since there were vast improvements in readiness, communications, and evacuation procedures the demand for search and rescue teams were significantly less prevalent during Crisis II. The implementation of earlier mandatory evacuation and dusk-to-dawn curfews vastly reduced the number of people at risk. However, the cost of evacuating close to two million people has a negative effect on the local economy, but when weighed against the potential loss of life and human suffering the cost becomes insignificant. Therefore, the success of search and
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning rescue operations in Crisis II should be attributed to the overall ability of all the agencies to learn.
Communications Operational Improvement
FEMA Director David Paulison, stated that during Katrina, the level of communication—not the radio communication, per se, but just being able to talk to each other, being on the same page— simply did not happen in Katrina. They put in place the National Incident Management System.
Every afternoon at noontime, they have video conferences with state level officials, the
Department of Defense and all the federal agencies are a part of the videoconference. The following is the secretary of homeland security statement from CNN transcripts on command and control for Crisis II:
Michael Chertoff, the secretary of homeland security, we do have a unified command and control. We are embedded with the state. The state is embedded with us. There’s been no disconnect in terms of the ability to work together. When we have hitches—and we’ve had some hitches—we’ve been able to recover and adapt. We are going to have to adapt to unforeseen emerging circumstances . That’s what an emergency is.
The ability to communicate and exert command and control over all agencies was a crucial element learned from Crisis I.
The planned execution of mandatory evacuation orders 24 to 36 hours earlier than during Katrina, the planned incorporation of the national incident management system, and the planned activation of National Guard assets several days prior to landfall were all crucial to efficient command and control. The purchase and incorporation of radio systems that are compatible among all agencies also improved efficiency. These specific measures illustrate significant Stage III organizational learning and operational improvements
(Table 1).
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Integrated use of Military Capabilities Operational Improvement
The ability to integrate National Guard and active duty military assets in a timely fashion was a crucial element learned from Crisis I. On August 29 th
, Louisiana’s governor activated between
3,000 and 8,000 members of the Louisiana National Guard; Texas’s governor activated 5,000 members of the Texas Military Forces; and Alabama’s National Guard was mobilized to assist evacuees from the other states. The planned activation of military forces to function as security, search and rescue, civil engineers, and evacuation assets prior to landfall illustrates significant
Stage III organizational learning and operational improvements (Table 1). The role the military played in crisis management during Crisis II also illustrates the level of efficiency that can be achieved when properly integrating multiple agencies.
Logistics and Evacuation Operational Improvement
Officials finalized evacuation plans as early as August 29 th
, which proposed assisted evacuations and contraflow lane reversal on all major highways, and 700 buses to help move evacuees. The
Canadian government sent a C-117 and two C-130 Hercules airlift planes with medical teams to assist in the evacuation of New Orleans. New Orleans mayor ordered the mandatory evacuation of the whole of the city commencing on the morning of August 31 st
calling Gustav “the storm of the century…the mother of all storms. New Orleans officials designated 17 sites for people without transportation to board buses to take them to the terminal, where they were moved to shelters outside the city. However, scores of residents went directly to the terminal, prompting confusion, as did a glitch in the computer system being used to register people. Louisiana governor suspended registration at the terminal and instructed people to register at the shelters.
By that afternoon, 1.9 million people had evacuated southern Louisiana, 200,000 being residents of New Orleans alone, making it the largest evacuation in the history of Louisiana. FEMA had
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning estimated there were only 10,000 people left in New Orleans on September 1 st
. The following is the FEMA director statement from CNN transcripts on evacuations planning for Crisis II:
FEMA Director David Paulison stated that, we have a tremendous amount of aircraft and the Department of
Defense flying people out. All of these things were put in place prior to the storm as opposed to Katrina that came in after the storm.
The requirement to have mass evacuation plans for coastal areas established prior to crisis events was a crucial lesson learned from Crisis I. The development of established evacuation route and area plans, preplanned mandatory evacuation time lines, preplanned contracts with civilian bus and train transportation assets, and preplanned air evacuations with civilian, U.S. and foreign military assets post Katrina illustrates significant Stage III organizational learning and operational improvements (Table 1). Minor problems developed in which the organization was able to make Stage II adjustments to plans, such as, glitches in registration at transportation sites.
Public Safety and Security Operational Improvement
On August 31 st
, New Orleans mayor ordered a dusk-to-dawn curfew and the cessation of city assistance in evacuation plans by the afternoon. They implemented a dusk-to-dawn curfew starting at sunset. They doubled the number of police and the National Guard forces that were available during the initial phase of Katrina; with the establishment of dependable security, other agencies were able to perform their mission more efficiently. The following is the mayor of New
Orleans statement from CNN transcripts on security in New Orleans for Crisis II:
Mayor Nagin stated that looters will go directly to jail. You will not get out—you will not get a pass this time. In fact, anybody who is caught looting in the city of New Orleans will go directly to Angola, directly to the big house in general population.
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning
The ability to maintain law and order was lost during the early phase of hurricane Katrina establishing safety and security as a crucial lesson learned from Crisis I. Officials were able to resolve these issues by activating additional National Guard security forces and instituting duskto-dawn curfews prior to landfall of hurricanes Gustav/Ike during Crisis II. These specific measures illustrate significant Stage III organizational learning and operational improvements
(Table 1).
Our analysis indicates that organizations can learn in three ways from crisis situations. First, organizations can learn by adapting to extreme events, as they occur, which leads to mitigation of the crisis events. The mitigation of extreme circumstances prevents the situation from escalating and creating additional financial loses, physical property loses, or worst case loses of life. Second, organizations can use established SOPs and adjust them using single-loop learning to achieve the desired outcome. Our observations also are in line with findings of Hale, Hale &
Dulek, (2006), who argued that in the presence of a written crisis management plan, even one created for a dissimilar event, aids in quickly identifying feasible actions. Without such a plan, organizations function less efficiently and may spend precious time attempting to create solutions that they cannot identify (Hale et al, 2006). Third, organizations can create new SOPs based on lessons learned from a crisis situation. Double-loop learning enables organizations to analysis adaptive and single-loop learning that occurred during a crisis event. For example, operational improvements during Crisis II connect directly to lessons learned during Crisis I
(Table 1), such as, presidential directed national training and readiness programs. As illustrated
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Crisis Management & Organizational Learning through the application of the three stage model and in the cause and effect matrix analysis, organizations can learn and apply lessons learned from the management of crisis situations.
We can apply the process of how organizations learn from crisis management to multiple types of organizations operating in a dynamic or uncertain environment. Operational improvement from Crisis I to Crisis II illustrates how multiple civilian and military organizations can integrate resources and capabilities to achieve a common goal. We believe the model we introduced in this paper will facilitate operational improvement and organizational learning in crisis management.
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