CIVIL LAW
The Law on Persons and Family Relations
Course Outline
I.
Preliminary Title; Human Relations; Personality; Domicile;
Art. 2 NCC; Art.5 Labor Code; Sec. 3(1) & 4, Ch. 2, Book VII,
Administrative Code of 1987; BSP Circular 799
Effects and application of law
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the
said date, subject to the requirement of publication. The clause “unless
otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not the to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Basa vs Mercado, 61 Phil 632
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published
for the dissemination of local news and general information, that it has
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published
at regular intervals.
PASEI vs. Torres, G.R. NO. 101279,Aug. 06, 1992 212 SCRA 298
Although the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police power
as delegated to the executive branch of Government, they are legally
invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1)
and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
Rep. vs. Extelcom, G.R. NO. 147096,Jan. 15, 2002 373 SCRA 316
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect. There is nothing in the Administrative Code
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of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center
is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov. 27,2012 686 SCRA
472
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco AG.R.eement by
reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact
terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof attached to
the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
AG.R.eement the status of a law.
NMSMI vs. DND,G.R. NO. 187587,June 5, 2013 697 SCRA 359 –
The Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term “laws” do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because
lawyers in the active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in
advanced reports and the SCRA.
Arts.3, 4, 5, 6, 7 NCC; Arts. 105, 256 Family Code; Vested Rights;
Substantive & Procedural Laws; Retroactive Application; Express
and Implied Repeal; Effect of declaration of Unconstitutionality
Marcella-Bobis vs Bobis, 336 SCRA 747 (2000)
The accused is prosecuted for the crime of bigamy for not obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into
another marriage. Ignorance of the existence of article 40 of the Family
Code canno enve be successfully invoked as an excuse.
Bernabe v. Alejo G.R. NO. 140500, Jan. 21, 2002 374 SCRA 180
An illegitimate child filed an action for recognition pursuant to article
285 of the NCC during the effectivity of the Family Code. illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the
right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period
of up to four years from attaining majority age and this vested right was
not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Rep. v. Miller G.R. NO. 125932, Apr. 21, 1999 306 SCRA 183
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Whether or not, an alien, who is qualified to adopt at the time of filing
the petition, can be disqualified by the new provisions of the family code.
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
a new law disqualifying him. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Atienza vs. Brillantes, AM MTJ 92-706, Mar. 29,1995 243 SCRA 32
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions.
Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity
of the New Civil Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights.
Compare the case of TY vs CA and Atienza vs Brillantes
Systems Factors Corp vs NLRC, 346 SCRA 149 (2000)
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach nor arise from procedural
laws.
Agujetas vs CA, 261 SCRA 17 (1996)
Implied repeals are not to be favored because they rest only on the
presumption that because the old and the new laws are incompatible
with each other, there is an intention to repeal the old. There must be a
plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy between the two.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA, 251 SCRA 42 (1995)
When there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the
special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion.
De Agbayani vs PNB, 38 SCRA 429
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The Supreme Court declared the moratorium law unconstitutional but it
did not allow to toll the prescriptive period of the right to foreclose the
mortgage. The court adopted the view that before an act is declared
unconstitutional it is an operative fact which can be the source of rights
and duties.
Article 8. Stare Decisis; Case Law; See also Article 36, FC; article 9,
10, 11, 12 , 13, 14 NCC
Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. NO. 166562, Mar. 31, 2009 582 SCRA 694
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible, whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit
Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985
The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a
law is part of the law as of the date of its enactment since the court’s
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Mendiola vs CA, 258 SCRA 492
Equity, which has been described as “justice outside legality” is applied
only in the absence of, and never against statutory law or judicial rules
of procedure.
Articles 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (New Civil Code); Article 26, Family Code
Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985 139 SCRA
139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
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which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989 174 SCRA
652
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001 366 SCRA 437
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized
in the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Roehr v. Rodriguez,G.R. NO. 142820 ,Jun. 30, 2003 404 SCRA 495
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 2004 422 SCRA 376
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage. (Pro hac vice case)
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472 SCRA 114 –
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
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Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA
266
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Human Relations; Abuse of Rights, Unjust Enrichment; Malicious
Prosecution; Independent Civil Action; Arts. 1724; 2142; 2154;
2164; 2176, NCC
Amonoy vs Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 (2001)
One who merely exercises one;s rights does no actionable injury and
cannot be held liable for damages.
Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs CA,217 SCRA 18 (1993)
The elements of an abuse of right under article 19are the following: 1.
There is a legal right or duty; 2. Which is exercised in bad faith; 3. For
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)
Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his
feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected his
business as well as because other people have come to know of said
defamatory words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent
to Dionela.
Constantino vs Mendez 209 SCRA 18 (1992)
Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire.
Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)
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Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21
of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
Figueroa vs. Barranco, SBC Case NO. 519. July 31, 1997 276 5CRA
445 - His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000 325
SCRA 805
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade
but was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school,
for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.
UP v. Philab, G.R. NO. 152411, Sept. 29, 2004 439 SCRA 467
Whether or not UP is liable to pay PHILAB considering that it is only a
donee of FEMF, FEMF being the one which funded the project, and
despite being a donee, unjust enrichment still applies to UP. In order
that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff
has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without
just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. NO. 195670, Dec. 03, 2012 686 SCRA 770
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
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Padalhin vs. Laviña, G.R. NO. 183026,Nov. 14, 2012 685 SCRA 549
Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of
Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor
violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's
residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed
benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Civil Personality; Birth; Death; Arts 37, 38, 39 40, 41, 42; 390, 391,
712, 777 NCC; Art. 41, 96 &124, 99 & 126, 142 FC
Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961
It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the abortion of
appellee’s wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal
and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to severely condemned;
and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal
basis.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided under article 40 of the civil code.
Continental Steel v. Montaño, G.R. NO. 182836 , Oct.13, 2009 603
SCRA 621
Whether or not, a death of a fetus is considered a death of a dependent of
the parent. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Domicile; Arts 50 & 51 NCC; Arts. 68 & 69, FC; Residence v.
Domicile; Annulment or Nullity of Marriages – AM 02-11-10 SC;
Settlement of Estate
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Marriage
Definition, Marriage as contract and social institution, Presumption
of Marriage, Proof of Marriage,Offer of Marriage
Tuazon vs CA, 256 SCRA 158
Our Family Law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
Perido vs Perido, 63 SCRA 97
It is the union (and inviolable social institution) of one man with one
woman for the reciprocal blessings of a domestic home life, and for the
birth, rearing, and education of children. In one case, the Supreme Court
ruled that marriage is also a new relation in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested.
People v. Casao, 220 SCRA 362
The offer of the accused to marry the victim establishes his guilt. As a
rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an admission of guilt
People vs. Borromeo,133 SCRA 106, 109 (1984)
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law.
People v. Ignacio, 81 SCAD 138 (1997)
Appellant’s own admission that she was married to the victim was a
confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption
that a man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife
had verily acted into a lawful contract of marriage.
Proof of Marriage; Marriage Certificate v. Presumption of Marriage;
Torrens Title Entry “Single, Civil Status’’;
Villanueva vs. CA, 198 SCRA 472 (1991)
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The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract. A
marriage contract renders unnecessary the presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.
Balogbog vs. CA, 269 SCRA 259, 266 (1997)
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not, however, proof that no marriage took
place, as other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106, 110 (1984)
The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration
thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy
of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849, 855 (1962)
The defendants questioned the marriage of plaintiff by presenting the
records of the municipality of Rosario, Cavite to show that there is no
record of the alleged marriage. The court admitted evidence consisting of
the testimonies of witnesses.
Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 289 SCRA 188 (1998)
The Supreme Court held that the following may be presented as proof of
marriage: (a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; (b) the couple’s
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock; (c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during
such union; and (d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
Hernandez vs. CA, 320 SCRA 76.
The law favors the validity of marriage because the State is interested in
the preservation of the family and sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon the party seeking its nullity
Añonuevo v. Estate of Jalandoni G.R. NO. 178221, Dec. 1, 2010 636
SCRA 420
10
The birth certificate of Sylvia was presented to prove the marriage
between Isabel and John despite the absence of the marriage certificate.
The court held that the birth certificate may serve as evidence to prove
the marriage between Isabel and John , as it contains the following
notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. NO. 6622 676 SCRA 37
A lawyer was married three times, while the first marriage was still
subsisting, his marriage contracts as certified by the NSO was presented
in the disbarment proceeding to prove his subsequent marriages. For
purposes of disbarment proceeding, these marriage contracts bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that
he committed bigamy.
Compare the case of Añonuevo v. Estate of Jalandoni and Villatuya
v. Tabalingcos A.C. NO. 6622 676 SCRA 37
Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of
marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license.
Requirements of Marriage
Essential requisite
Legal Capacity and Consent
Formal Requisite
Marriage License ; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of
Civil Registrar;
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA
446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a
non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties,
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
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considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. NO. 183896 , Jan. 30, 2013 689 SCRA 636
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search
of the records of her office.
Compare the case of Abbas v. Abbas and Alcantara v. Alcantara
Sy v. CA, G.R. NO. 127263 , Apr. 12, 2000 330 SCRA 550
In this case the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974,
almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.
Marriages Exempted from the License Requirement Art. 27 – 34 FC
Cruz v. Catandes, C.A., 39 O.G. NO. 18, p. 324
In a marriage in articulo mortis, while it is advisable that a witness to the
marriage should sign the dying party’s signature if the latter be
physically unable to do so, still if upon order of the solemnizing official,
another person should so sign, the marriage is still valid. The law as
much as possible intends to give legal effect to a marriage. As a matter of
fact, no particular form for a marriage celebration is prescribed.
Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958
The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from
the marriage license. Even if there is failure on the part of the
solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit, such irregularity
will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of
the parties.
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246
No judicial notice can be taken of Mohammedan rites and customs for
marriage. They must be alleged and proved in court.
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Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, 5 (2001)
The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.
Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day because their cohabitation is not
exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated under said
provisions must be in the “nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract” and “characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird party was
involved at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken.
Marriage Ceremony
Morigo vs People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004)
Petitioner and Lucia Barrette merely signed the marriage contract on
their own. The mere act of signing a marriage contract by the contracting
parties without the presence of the solemnizing officer will not result to
marriage.
Infante vs Arenas, June 29, 1951
The failure of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties whether they take
each other as husband and wife cannot be regarded as a fatal omission if
the parties nonetheless signed the marriage contract in the presence of
the solemnizing officer. A declaration of word of mouth of what the
parties and already stated in writing would be a mere repetition, so that
its omission should not be regarded as fatal.
People v. Opeña, L-34954, Feb. 20, 1981
If a man and a woman deport themselves as if they were husband and
wife, they are presumed to be validly and legally married to each other
and this presumption is not rebutted by a mere denial by the man (or
woman) of the fact of marriage.
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Persons who may solemnize Marriages
Arañes v. Occiano, A.M. 02-1390 , April 11, 2002 380 SCRA 402
The respondent Judge solemnized marriage without the requisite
marriage license. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
OCA vs. J. Necessario et al, A.M. NO. 07-1691,April 2, 2013 695
SCRA
The court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that
the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the
scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are
glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly
observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a
marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face.
Compare the ruling of the court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño and
OCA vs. J. Necessario et al as to the duty of the solemnizing officer
to examine the validity of marriage license.
Marriage in good faith
Effect of Absence of Essential and Formal requisite
Arts. 15-17,50-5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino; Foreigner;
Parenting; Children, Property Rights; Succession rights]; Declaratory
Relief; Rule 108;; Art. 412 NCC
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472 SCRA 114 –
Whether or not, a Filipino spouse of an alien, who is a Filipino at the
time of marriage, remarry after the latter acquires a foreign divorce that
allows her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA
266
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
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the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decree’s registration.
Classification of Marriages, Relationships. Parties In Interest;
NCC;FC;AM 02-11-10 SC
Valid
Voidable
Void
Terminable
Others Classifications
Legal Separation
Separation in Fact
Common Law Relationship
Void Marriages vs Voidable Marriages
Suntay vs. Conjuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760, 770 (1998)
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that
a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all and cannot be
the source of rights. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment
Declaration of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil Code and
Muslim Code [PD 1083]
Proper party to petition for nullity of marriage; AM 02-11-10 SC
Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 158298 , Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether
Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court,
for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
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Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646
SCRA 637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated
in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
Procedure in declaration of nullity of marriage
Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. NO. 179922 , Dec. 16, 2008 574 SCRA 116
Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. NO. 186400 , Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 429
Whether or not A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC “RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES” is applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of Family Code. NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003
Article 36, FC; AM 02-11-10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68-71, 220-221
& 225 FC
Psychological Incapacity –Definition
Salita vs Hon. Magtolis ,June 13, 1994
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.”
Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity
16
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of
“psychological incapacity” as a ground for declaration of nullity of the
marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36; AM
02-11-10 SC
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268
SCRA 198, 212 (1997)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano, 428 SCRA 735 (2004).
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos
do not apply here because the present case involves a ‘mixed marriage,’
the husband being a Japanese national. The court held that in proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse
and a Filipino spouse.
Failure to comply with the Essential Marital Obligations
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their
marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Marable v. Marable G.R. NO. 178741, Jan. 17, 2011 639 SCRA 557
The appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to
explain the root cause of petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that
17
petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there
was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially
deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of
many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s
alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
Yambao v. REP., G.R. NO. 184063 , Jan. 24, 2011 640 SCRA 355
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.
Rep. v. Galang G.R. NO. 168335 , Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 524
In like manner, Juvy’s acts of falsifying the respondent’s signature to
encash a check, of stealing the respondent’s ATM, and of squandering a
huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her,
while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these
were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts.
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. NO. 175367 , Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 561
Whether or not a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity may be dismiss for failure to comply with the
guidelines set forth in the Molina Ruling. Let it be remembered that each
case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. NO. 166357 , Sept 19, 2011 657 SCRA 822
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Sexual
18
infidelity per se is a G.R.ound for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Toring v. Toring, G.R. NO. 165321 , Aug. 03, 2010 626 SCRA 389
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in
considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived
solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the
nullity of the marriage.
Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No 173138 , Dec, 1, 2010 636 SCRA 350
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient
to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after
their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
Agraviador v. Agraviador G.R.NO.170729 , Dec. 08, 2010 637 SCRA
519
In the present case, the petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the
respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality
rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent
had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that
the respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16
Here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not
identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity
because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before
completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and
opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not
establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of
Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the
inception of the marriage.
19
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. NO. 170022 , Jan. 9, 2013 688 SCRA 215
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these
are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented
the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Evidentiary requirement
Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)
If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Award of Moral Damages
Buenaventura vs CA, 454 SCRA 261 (2005)
By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated.
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act
of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same.
Prescription
Niñal v. Bayadog G.R. NO. 133778=, Mar. 14, 2000 328 SCRA 122
The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
Declaration of Nullity; Art.40; Prejudicial Question- Section 7, Rule
117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Arts.35 (4) & 41, FC; Art.349
RPC; Civil & Criminal Bigamy; Art. 83, NCC
Judicial Declaration of nullity of marriages
Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 158298 , Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27
20
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32,35 (1995)
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage.
Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 (2000)
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before
a subsequent one can be legally contracted and that one who enters into
a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration
is guilty of bigamy.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226, Feb. 06, 2004 422 SCRA 376
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
Jarillo v.People, G.R. NO.164435 , Sept. 29, 2009 601 SCRA 236
Whether or not the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity is a defense for the crime of
bigamy. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration
that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272
Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the G.R.ound of PI
is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity.
Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. NO.183824, Dec. 08, 2010 637 SCRA 615
21
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way
of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations
in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.
Teves v. People, G.R. NO. 188775 , Aug 24, 2011 656 SCRA 307
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001
when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27
June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous
marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the
bigamous marriage.
Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that
"[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized
not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply." Thus, regardless of his professed religion,
Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. NO. 6622 , July 10, 2012 676 SCRA 37
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that deG.R.ee of morality
required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage,
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Subsequent Bigamous Marriage under art. 41
Arts. 41- 44, 49 FC; Art.83 (2) NCC;
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. NO.136467, Apr. 06, 2000 330 SCRA 201
Whether or not, the rule under the FC, that a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse is necessary before the present
spouse can remarry, has a retroactive effect. A judicial declaration of
absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article
22
83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court."
Requisites for declaration of presumptive Death
Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or
well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San
Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Retroactive application of Art. 41
Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. To
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner
to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation
of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
Effects of Declaration of Presumptive Death
Effects of Recording of Affidavit of Reapperance
Procedural rules of declaration of Presumptive Death
Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
Navarro v. Domogtoy, A.M. NO.MTJ-96-1088, Jul. 19, 1996 259
SCRA 129
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
23
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449
SCRA 57
Although the result of the Court of Appeals’ denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the
supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and
executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former,
the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry
of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still
raise the matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC
judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the final
pronouncement.
Rep. v. Granada, G.R. NO. 187512, June 13, 2012 672 SCRA 432
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an agG.R.ieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Terminable Marriage; Art. 43 – 44 FC
Effects of termination of subsequent marriage
Effects of Bad Faith
Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. NO.136467, Apr. 06, 2000 330 SCRA 201
Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
Voidable Marriages; Art. 45- 49 FC
Definition
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760, 771 (1998)
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action
for annulment. The terms “annul” and “null and void” have different legal
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; to
nullify; to abolish; to do away with; whereas, null and void is something
that does not exist from the beginning.
24
Characteristics of Voidable Marriages
Proper party to file annulment of Marriage
G.R.ounds
Ratification and prescription –
Procedural rules of annulment of marriage and declaration of nullity
Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996)
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment (or declaration of nullity of marriages) through
the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.
Effects of judicial declaration of nullity of Marriage ; Art. 50-54
Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION (Articles 55-67)
Concept
Distinction of annulment and absolute divorce
G.R.ounds
Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206 , Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
De facto Separation vs. Legal Separation,Article 63
Manzano vs. Sanchez, A.M. NO.00-1329, Mar. 08, 2001 354 SCRA 1
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of
the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed.
SSS v. Aguas, G.R. NO. 165546 , Feb. 27, 2006 483 SCRA 383
25
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a
primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse
dependent for support from the employee, whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown;
it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. The obvious
conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Defenses in Legal Separation Art. 56- 57
Cooling off period; Art. 58 – 59
Pacete vs. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. NO. L-53880, March 17, 1994.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta, Jr., G.R. NO. L-34132, July 29,1972
During this period, the court where the action is pending shall remain
passive and is precluded from hearing the suit.
Rule of Procedure on Legal Separation (A.M. NO. 02-11-11 SC);
Rule on Provisional Orders (AM 02-11-12 SC);
Bañez vs. Bañez, G.R. NO. 132592 , Jan. 23, 2002 374 SCRA 340
The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately,
dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of
legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be
resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree
of legal separation.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal
separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of nonappearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. NO.176556 , July 4, 2012 675 SCRA 642
26
When the trial court issued its order dated November 8, 2006, it held
that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."
Title III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE
(Arts 68-73)
Ilusorio v. Bildner, G.R. NO. 139789 , May 12, 200 332 SCRA 169
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not
be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. With his full
mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Go vs. CA G.R. NO.114791, May 29, 1997 272 SCRA 752
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code),
the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are
convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the
contract with private respondent.
Family expenses and management of the household
TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BET. HUSBAND & WIFE (Articles
74- 148)
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS;
(Articles 74-81, FC; Art. 119, NCC)
Pre-nuptial
Agreement;
Concept
Property regime by default
Marriage settlement
Parties to Marriage settlement
Laws governing Property Relations
CHAPTER 2. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (Articles 8287)
Donation Propter Nuptias
Serrano vs. Solomon, G.R. NO. L-12093, June 29, 1959
27
The following donations are not donations propter nuptias: (1) those made
in favor of the spouses after the celebration of marriage; (2) those
executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of the
marriage; and (3) those Ggranted to persons other than the spouses even
though they may be founded on the marriage
Rules governing Donation propter nuptias
Heirs of Segunda Maningding vs. CA, 276 SCRA 601 (1997)
Even if the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with
formal requisites, it could still constitute as legal basis for adverse
possession.
Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. NO. 122134, Oct. 3, 200 412 SCRA 600
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In
other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough
to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Donation between the parties
Donation of future properties
Revocation of Donation Propter Nuptias
Donation between Spouses
Agapay vs. Palang, G.R. NO. 116668 , Jul. 28, 1997 276 SCRA 340
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
28
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)
Section 2. What constitutes Community Property (Articles 91-93)
Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute Community
(Articles 94-95)
Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87
Rules governing ACP
Commencement of the ACP
Prohibition on waiver of Rights, Interest, Shares and Effects
Abalos vs Macatangay Jr., 439 SCRA 649, 662-663 (2004).
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen
into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)
Section 2. What constitutes Community Property (Articles 91-93)
Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute Community
(Articles 94-95)
29
Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87
Concept
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283, 290
(2005)
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance.
Rules governing CPG
Commencement of CPG
Prohibition on waiver of Rights, Interest, Shares and Effects
Quiao vs. Quiao G.R. NO. 176556 , July 4, 2012 675 SCRA 642
In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution."
General Provisions
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the
wife alone does not destroy this presumption.
De Leon v. De Leon G.R. NO. 185063 , Jul. 23, 2009 593 SCRA 768 –
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and
covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only
30
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. Evidently, title to
the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid
the purchase price on June 22, 1970.
Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Articles 109-115)
Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership
of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are
transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the
redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that
property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the
spouses redeeming the property.
Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 116-120); Article
160 NCC
Presumption in Favor of Conjugality
Tan vs. CA, 273 SCRA 229, 236 (1997)
For the presumption to apply, it is not even necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. In fact, even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear, the
presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
Imani v. MBTC, G.R. NO.187023,Nov. 17, 2010 635 SCRA 357
The party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of
the conjugal partnership.
Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. NO. 132803 , Aug. 31, 1999
313 SCRA 384
The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Petra Unating's status
at the time the lot was awarded and registered in her name. Since Petra
Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in
1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her children, Felix
and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar.
31
Improvement on Separate Property
Determination of Ownership
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570
The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership
of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the ownerspouse.
Section 4.Charges Upon & Oblig.of the Conjugal Partnership (Articles
121-123)
Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 134100, Sept. 29, 2000.
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim
in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Homeowner’s Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283 (2005)
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
as such.
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 272 (1998)
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ching vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642 , Feb. 23, 2004 423 SCRA 356
The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of
the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitionerhusband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
Carlos vs. Abelardo, G.R. NO. 146504 , Apr. 09, 2002 380 SCRA 361
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the
defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
32
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. NO. 143382 , Nov. 29, 2006 508
SCRA 419
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern
of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits
the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ros v. PNB Laoag Br., G.R. NO.170166, Apr. 06, 2011 647 SCRA 334
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered
to the business or profession of the husband.
Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687
SCRA 414
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."
No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
(Articles 124-125)
Joint Administration of CPG
Disposition or Encumbrance of CPG
Rules under the Civil Code
Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, Sr., NO. L- 45418, October 30, 1980, 100
SCRA 619.
A husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal partnership even
without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big
conjugal liability which might endanger the family’s economic standing.
33
This is one instance where the wife’s consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Spouses Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172. June 26,
1998,
Under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real
property by the husband absent the wife’s consent, is voidable and not
void.
Roxas vs. CA G.R. NO. 92245, Jun. 26, 1991 198 SCRA 541
The joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of
conjugal realty which does not exceed one year in duration, is required in
a lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such a lease
being considered a conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions
of the Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by
which real property is conveyed or encumbered
Guiang vs. CA, G.R. NO. 125172, Jun. 26, 1998 291 SCRA 372
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband
and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and
void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the
latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa, G.R. NO. 147978, Jan. 23, 2002 374
SCRA 498
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent
to the sale. Even G.R.anting that respondent Norma actively participated
in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the
contracts to sell.
Rules under the Family Code
Uy vs. CA, G.R. NO. 10955, Nov. 29, 2000 346 SCRA 246
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family
Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or
separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non34
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In
this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose.
Ravina v. Villa Abrille G.R. NO. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 604 SCRA
120
Just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such
sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval
of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable
at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
De la Cruz v. Segovia, G.R. NO. 149801, Jun. 26, 2008 555 SCRA
453
While Florinda’s husband did not affix his signature to the abovementioned Agreement, we find no ground to disturb the uniform findings
of the trial court and appellate court that Renato, by his actuations,
agreed and gave his conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts
below, Renato’s consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that
he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters and their
witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him
for his signature, although he did not sign the same because his wife
Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband;
Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned
savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the
purchase price of the properties in question in the total amount of
P180,000.00.
Section 6. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime (Articles
126-128)
MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the
Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before
such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and
after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
Diño v. Diño, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
35
has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Espinosa v. Omaña, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving
the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.
The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against
public policy.
Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets &
Liabilities (Articles 129-133);
Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. NO. 177099, Jun. 8, 2011 651 SCRA 455
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties
are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin.
Go v. Servacio, G.R. NO. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 10
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property
relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and
the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
CHAPTER 5.SEPARATION OF PROP. OF THE SPOUSES &
ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE
DURING THE MARRIAGE (Arts 134-142)
CHAPTER 6. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY (Articles 143146)
Grounds
36
Voluntary Separation of Property
Maquilan v. Maquilan, G.R. NO. 155409, Jun. 08, 2007 524 SCRA
166 –
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval.
The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law.
Effects of Decree Granting Separation of Property
CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE
(Articles 147-148)
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260
SCRA 221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and
129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, G.R. NO. 136803, Jun. 16, 2000 333 SCRA
628 –
The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
Diño v. Diño, G.R. NO. 178044,Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
Petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
37
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition may be made by
aG.R.eement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Lacbayan v. Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427, Mar. 21, 2011 645 SCRA 677
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition AG.R.eement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to
whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership
over the said properties.
Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code
TITLE V. THE FAMILY HOME
CHAPTER 1. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION (Articles 149-151)
38
Tuason vs. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996)
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
Hontiveros vs. RTC Iloilo City, G.R. NO. 125465, Jun. 29, 1999 309
SCRA 340
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros,
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the
Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104 (1970)
The enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as member of the same family
does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brother-inlaw") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family.
Magbaleta vs. Gonong, 76 SCRA 511
Efforts to compromis are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party
thereto, whether as necessary or indispensable one.
Tiggangay v. Wacas, AM OCA 09-3243, April 1, 2013 694 SCRA 264
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and
the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his
wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity
between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister; this is called
affinitas affinitatis."
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162)
Taneo, Jr. vs. CA, CA, 304 SCRA 308
Family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
39
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it
and his heirs.
Taneo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 108562, Mar. 09, 1999 304
SCRA 308
By the very definition of the law that the “family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated,” it is understood that the house should be constructed on a
land not belonging to another.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides
but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which
it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises,
it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law
Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. NO. 170829, November 20, 2006.
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family.
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. NO. 180587, Mar. 20, 2009 582 SCRA 172
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established
40
on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and
partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
latter.
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA
40
The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The
petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop
them from later claiming the said exemption.
Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
TITLE VI. PATERNITY & FILIATION
Chapter I Legitimate Children
Types of Filiation
Status of Children
Distinction between Paternity and Filiation
Laws governing Paternity and Filiation
Presumption of Legitimacy
How to impugn Child’s Legitimacy
Benitez-Badua vs. CA G.R. NO. 105625, Jan. 24, 1994 229 SCRA 468
Article 170 of the Family Code is inapplicable to this case because this is
not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
the decedent's child at all.
41
Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao,G.R. NO. 138961, Mar. 07, 2002 378 SCRA
563
The grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262
of the Civil Code.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73
In this case the husband and the wife continued to live in the same
province after their alleged separation, the Court did not discount the
possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to
each other and considering further that the wife still visited and
recuperated in her mother’s house where her spouse resided with their
children.
Andal vs. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165
The court held that just because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does
not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There
are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal
act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to
be more inclined to sexual intercourse.
Tison vs CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
CHAPTER 2. PROOF OF FILIATION (Articles 172-174)
Solinap vs. Locsin Jr. G.R. NO. 146737 , Dec. 10, 2001 371 SCRA
711
Whether or not the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as presented by the
respondent, including the photograph showing that he and his mother
attended the deceased funeral, is sufficient to proof filiation of the
42
petitioner to the deceased. A birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. NO.159785, Apr. 27, 2007 522 SCRA 518
The court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required
De Asis vs CA, 303 SCRA 176
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be
judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence.
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. NO. 85723, Jun. 19, 1995 245 SCRA 150
When a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other
parent may be revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA, G.R. NO. 106314-15,Oct. 08, 1999 316 SCRA
338
A baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not
a conclusive proof of filiation.
Cenido vs. Apacionado, G.R .NO. 132474, Nov. 19, 1999 318 SCRA
688
Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, or
if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock.
43
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. NO. 174680, Mar. 24, 2008 549 SCRA 68
Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondent’s successional
rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged
and recognized as an illegitimate child. Respondent in this case had not
been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had
been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing
on affirmative defenses.
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA
585
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person.
Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. NO. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012 678 SCRA 436
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pediG.R.ee, admission
by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.
Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R . NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
44
CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176)
Rights of Illegitimate Children
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as
the controlling factor, the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile,
the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Guy v. CA, G.R. NO. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 502 SCRA 151
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the
same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet.
De La Cruz v. Gracia G.R. NO. 177728, Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 648
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent.
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Uy v. Chu, G.R. NO. 183965, Sept. 18, 2009 600 SCRA 806
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation
of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or aG.R.eement of the parties.
CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177-182);
45
See RA 9858
Legitimation
Concept and Definition
Who can be Legitimated
Procedure and effects of Legitimation
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249
SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal
impediment to marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a
judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage
to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran.
TITLE VII. ADOPTION
Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA 8552)
as amended by RA 9523 (March 2009)
A.M. NO. 02-6-02-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic Adoption
Inter country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
Amended IRR on Inter-Country Adoption (January 8, 2004)
Definition and concept of Adoption
Domestic Adoption and Inter country Adoption
Law governing Domestic Adoption
Who are qualified to adopt and to be adopted
Effects of Adoption
Rescission of Adoption
Procedure under ICA and DAA
Republic vs. Vergara, G.R. NO. 95551, Mar. 20, 1997 270 SCRA 206
The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
46
by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.
Rosalina Dye cannot, on her own, adopt her brother and sister for the
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions.
Republic vs. Miller, G.R. NO.125932, Apr. 21, 1999 306 5CRA 183
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
a new law disqualifying him.
Republic vs. Toledano, G.R. NO.94147, Jun. 08, 1994 233 SCRA 9
The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife
"must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory
Cang vs. CA, G.R. NO.105308, Sept. 25, 1998 296 SCRA 128
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children.
In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May
21, 2009 588 SCRA 98
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required.
Republic vs. CA & Bobiles, G.R. NO.92326, Jan. 24, 1992 205 SCRA
356
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the
right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her
47
husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law.
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. NO. 143989, July 14, 2003
R.A. NO. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where
the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable.
TITLE VIII. SUPPORT
Concept of Support
G.R.ounds for Action for Support
Right to support
Order of liability for support
Contractual support vs Legal Support
Mangonon v. CA, G.R. NO. 125041 , June.30, 2006 494 SCRA 1
The grandparents are liable to support their grandchildren if the parent
cannot give support or sufficient support.
Lim v. Lim, G.R. NO. 163209, Oct. 30, 2009 604 SCRA 691
The inability of the parents to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both
in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite
pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176
Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child
and the putative father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in
order to claim support, filiation and,or paternity must first be shown
between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or
the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established
and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence.
TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (Articles 209-215)
48
Concept
Effects of Parental Authority
Santos Sr. v. CA, G.R. NO. 113054, Mar. 16, 1995 242 SCRA 407
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Parents who exercises Parental Authority
Joint Parental Authority
Rule in case of Separation of Parents
Perez v. CA, G.R. NO. 118870, Mar. 29, 1996 255 SCRA 661
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding
the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as
her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following
grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA
296
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of
his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or
mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody
the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The
need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes
imperative.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr. AM NO. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013 689
SCRA 494
In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor
child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata. Now to
another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a
minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age
49
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Arts
216-219)
Parental Preference Rule
Concept
Who may exercise Substitute Parental Authority
Liability of persons exercising special Parental Authority
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
376 SCRA 473
The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE
PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN
Right to Child’s Custody
Sagala-Eslao vs. CA, 266 SCRA 317, 323 (1997).
It is a rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
Cang vs. CA, 296 SCRA 128 (1998).
Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural
parent.
Duty to Provide Support
Duty of Representation
Obedencio vs. Murillo, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1753. Feb. 5, 2004 422
SCRA 21
50
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22, 2001, when
she was presented before respondent’s sala to affirm the execution of her
affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have
been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not
validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is
incompetent to execute such an instrument.
Liability of Parents for damages caused by their minor children
CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE
PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN
(Articles 225-227)
Lindain v. CA, G.R. NO. 95305 , Aug. 20, 199 212 SCRA 725
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished
from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children,
does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said
children without judicial approval.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683
SCRA 253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any
act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority,
does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter
CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION
AUTHORITY (Arts 228-233)
OR
TERMINATION
OF
PARENTAL
G.R.ounds for termination and suspension of parental authority
Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy, G.R. NO. 140817, Dec. 07, 2001 371 SCRA
64
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
51
Cang vs CA,296 SCRA 128
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY; See RA 6809;
2176 & 2180 NCC
Concept
Effects of Emancipation
Title XI SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW
Family Courts Act and SC AM Orders and Circulars
CHAPTER 1. SCOPE OF APPLICATION (Article 238)
CHAPTER 2. SEPARATION IN FACT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
(Articles 239-248)
See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC])
and Implementing Rules &
Regulations
CHAPTER 3. INCIDENTS
(Articles 249-252)
INVOLVING
PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) &
IRR
A.M. NO. 02-11-12-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Provisional Orders
(March 4, 2003)
A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Guardianship of Minors
(April 1, 2003)
A.M. NO. 03-04-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (April 30, 2003)
CHAPTER 4. OTHER MATTERS
PROCEEDINGS (Article 253)
SUBJECT
TO
SUMMARY
52
Uy (Jardeleza) vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109557, Nov. 29, 2000 346 SCRA
246
Rule 95 of the ROC, not the Rule on Summary Proceedings in the Family
Code, shall apply in a sale of a conjugal property where one spouse is is
an incompetent. A comatose spouse is incompetent.
Republic v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062, Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449 SCRA
5
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
Title X. FUNERAL (Articles 305 -310, NCC)
Title XII. CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN (Articles 356 – 363,
NCC)
PD 603 – “The Child and Youth Welfare Code”
RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) and
IRR; RA 9523
Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC)
RA 9255 – “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father (Amending Art.
53
176 of the Family Code)”; IRR of 9255; Passport Law (RA 8239)
Title XIV. ABSENCE (Articles 381-396, NCC);
See Article 41 FC; Rules (Section 4) 73, 74,107, Revised Rules of
Court;
Arts.774 & 777; Art. 1456; Arts 22, 2142-2175; Wills & Succession
Chapter 1. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence
Chapter 2. Declaration of Absence
Chapter 3. Administration of the Property of the Absentee
Chapter 4. Presumption of Death
Chapter 5. Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent Rights of the
Absentee
TITLE XII FINAL PROVISIONS (Articles 254-257)
PROPERTY
Title I. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Concept of Property
Classification of Property
Immovable vs Movable Properties
Laurel vs. Abrogar,
G.R. NO. 155076,
Jan.
13,
2009
International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders,
the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of
providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article
308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid
international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business
is contrary to the letter and intent of the law.
54
The words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory
definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule
is that, only movable properties which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft.
Kinds of Immovable Properties
Bicerra vs. Teneza, 6 SCRA 649, 651 (1962).
A house (or a building) is classified as immovable property by reason of
its adherence to the soil on which it is built. Thus, a building which is
merely superimposed on the soil is not a real property.
Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 331 (1983)
A building treated separately from the land on which it stood is
immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem
to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood
in no wise changed its character as immovable property.
Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as “Real
Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,” instead of just “Real Estate
Mortgage” if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included
therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
“LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT”. These facts, taken together,
evince the conclusion that the parties’ intention is to treat these units of
machinery as chattels.
Caltex Phils.,
Inc.,
vs.
CBAA, May
31,
1982
SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of
the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and
which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site
or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs.
CBAA,
May
31,
1982
55
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may,
nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its
utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some deG.R.ee of permanence as
receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
Rights as property
MBTC v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812, 819 (2001)
A real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.
Chapter 2 Movable Property
Concept
Kinds of Movable Property
Chapter 3 Property in Relation to the Person to whom it belongs
Public Dominion vs Private Ownership
Classification of Property depending on ownership
Constitutional basis of State Ownership – Jura Regalia
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 415 SCRA 403 (2003)
Submerged lands are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources
and classified as property of public dominion.
Republic v.
144
Santos, G.R. NO. 180027,July
18, 2012 677 SCRA
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all
lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus,
pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those
acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether
express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such
land is presumed to belong to the State
Public ownership vs State Ownership
56
Public Service vs Public Use
Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110, 115 2004
Public use” means “use which is not confined to privileged individuals,
but is open to the indefinite public.
Characteristics of Properties of Public Dominion
Menchavez vs Teves, Jr, 449 SCRA 380
Properties of public dominion may not be alienated but may be subject to
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with private individuals
or corporations for their exploration, development and utilization.
Dacanay vs Asistio,Jr 208 SCRA 404
Properties of public dominion is outside the commerce of mend and it
cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of
contracts.
Manila Lodge 761 vs CA, 73 SCRA 162
An intention to devote it to public use or to public service is sufficient
and it is not necessary that it must actually be used as such.
Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514
Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation
and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot
be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a
torrents title.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
Tufexis v. Olaguera 32 Phil. 654.
The usufruct of the public market was not subject to attachment on
account of its being of a public character.
57
Kinds of Properties of Public Dominion
Santos vs Moreno, 21 SCRA 1141
Canals constructed by private persons within their private lands and
devoted exclusively for private use are of private ownership.
Almagro vs.
Kwan, G.R. NO. 175806, Oct.
20,
2010
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to
the flow of the tide. The land's proximity to the waters alone does not
automatically make it a foreshore land.
Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 384 (1991)
The buyer did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by the sellers since the sellers “could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.”
Hilario vs City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, April 27, 1967
The phrase “banks of a river” is understood to be those “lateral strips
orzones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such
highfloods as do not cause inundations.” In other words, the banks refer
to the lateral lines or strips reached by the waters when the river is at
high tide.
Manila International Airport Authority vs. CA, 495 SCRA 591
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in
Article 420 of the Civil Code, like ‘roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,’ are owned by the State. The term
‘ports’ includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings constitute a ‘port’ constructed by the State.
Reclaimed Properties
Republic vs.
Parañaque, G.R. NO. 191109,July 18, 2012
677 SCRA 246
The subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain,
owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real
estate taxes.
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands,
58
specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of
the public domain.
Patrimonial Property of the State
Conversion of Property of Public Dominion to Patrimonial Property
Yu Chang v. Republic, G.R. NO. 171726. Feb. 23, 2011
The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. The
fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is
being used for residential and commercial purposes does not serve to
convert the subject parcels of land into aG.R.icultural land. It is
fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest
G.R.oup and converted into alienable or disposable land for
aG.R.icultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government.
Laurel v. Garcia,187 SCRA 797
Any conveyance of a real property falling under the patrimonial property
of the State must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
ConG.R.ess.
Property for public use of Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities
Patrimonial Property of Political Subdivision
Title II Ownership
Ownership in General
Concept of Ownership
Attributes of Ownership
Recovery of Property
Accion Reinvindicatoria; Ejectment
Del Fierro v. Seguiran G.R. NO. 152141,Aug. 8, 2011 –The first
requisite in an accion reinvindicatoria requires that the person who
59
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity
of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the
disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only
over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed.
Del
Rosario
NO. 170575,June
8,
v. Roxas
2011
Foundation,
G.R.
In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only
issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession
is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in
actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of
the defendant's right to continue in possession.
Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No 169380, Nov. 26, 2012
Acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person
to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or
benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury
or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy.
Barrientos v.Rapal, G.R. NO. 169594,July
20,
2011
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.
Doctrine of Self Help
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession, and not when possession has already been
lost.
Right to Enclose or Fence
Limitations on Ownership
60
Right to sub-surface and airspace
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228
Rights to the sub-surface or sub-soil are indivisible, and, consequently,
require a definitive and categorical classification.
National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, 526 SCRA 149 (2007)
The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is
possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is
extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest
protected by law. In this case, the landowners could have dug upon their
property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the
authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the
tunnels underneath the surface of their property.
Right to Hidden Treasure
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P--‐07--‐2399, Jun. 18, 2008 - When
a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and
does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such
custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to
its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his
officemates that he found something.
Right to Airspace
Chapter 2 Right of Accession
General Provision
Accession
Definition
Kinds of Accession
Right of Accession with respect to what is produced by property
Accession Discreta
61
Kinds of Fruits
Right of Accession with respect to immovable property
Accession Continua
Fundamental rules
Industrial Accession
Building, Planting, and Sowing (BPS)
Rules in BPS in the presence of good faith and bad faith
Concept of Good Faith
Rules governing BPS
Floreza v. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130
The rule under article 448 of the NCC applies only when the builder,
planter or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow
because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a claim of
title.
Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts
title to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a
possessor in concept of owner and that he be unaware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Bulacanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498, 502 (1983)
Article 448 applies only to a case where one builds on land in the belief
that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply where one’s only
interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract.
PNB vs De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel
instead the owner of the building or improvement to remove it from the
land.
Javier v. Concepcion, Jr 94 SCRA 212 (1979)
62
The value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits,
bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong materials based on the
market value of the said improvements.
Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by
the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to
guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual
possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by
the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property)
for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on
the things possessed.
Ballatan v. Court of Appeals 304 SCRA 37 (1999)- In the event the
landowner elects to sell the land to the builder in good faith, the price
must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. In
the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land, after the owner
thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder’s right of retention
provided in Article 546 is also lost.
Natural Accession
Kinds of Natural Accession
Alluvion
Rules governing Alluvion
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC, 268 SCRA 74, 85 (1997)
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from owners, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lakes or other
tidal waters.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust
by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art.
457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408.
63
The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to the accretion
which they receive by virtue of the action of the waters of the river is ipso
jure and there is no need of an action of the owner of the bank to possess
the new addition since it belongs to him by the very fact of the addition.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription.
Avulsion
Definition
Avulsion vs Alluvion
Rules Governing Avulsion
Change of course of River
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of
acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership
of the owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof
will be considered as a trespasser.
Formation of Island
Right of Accession with respect to Movable Property
Adjunction or Conjunction
Rules governing Adjunction or Conjunction
Presence and absence of badfaith
Commixtion or Confusion
Specification
64
Chapter 3 Quieting of Title
Action to Quiet Title
Requisites
Chung Jr. vs. Mondragon, G.R. 179754,Nov.
21,
2012
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff
need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and
that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."
Baha’is v.
Pascual, G.R. 169272,July
11,
2012
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.
In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because
petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the
lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been
settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the
Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on
appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
ownership of the lots.
Vda.de Aviles v. CA, 264 SCRA 473
‘An action for quieting of title may not be brought for the purpose of
settling a boundary dispute.
65
Title III- Co-ownership
Definition
Requisites
Nature of Co-ownership
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 548, Sept. 17, 1998
Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.
Sources of Co-ownership
Rules Governing Co-ownership
De Guia v. CA, 413 SCRA 114, 124 (2003).
A co-owner of an undivided thing or right is an owner of the whole and
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion.
Bailon-Casilao v. CA, 160 SCRA 738, 745, April 15, 1988
The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were
not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of
the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for partition
under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Gapacan v. Omipet, 387 SCRA 383.
A state of co-ownership exists only because there is unity of the object or
property and plurality of subjects.
Extinguishment of Co-ownership
Adille v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455, Jan. 29, 1988.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the redemption by one co-heir or coowner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it
since redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
66
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners
is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375, 382, Oct. 17, 1988
If the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion
over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he
can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive
period.
Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon 475 SCRA 731,
Nov. 22, 2005
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription
where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the coowners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
Delima v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 641, Sept. 24, 1991
From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership
Maritegui v. Court of Appeals 205 SCRA 337,
When a co-owner or co-heir registered the properties in his name in
fraud of other co-owners or co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to
have commenced from the time the latter discovered the former’s act of
defraudation.
Lacbayan v.
Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427,
Mar.
21,
2011
The first phase of a partition and,or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary aG.R.eement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited.
67
Cruz v.
Catapang G.R. 164110,
Feb.
12,
2008
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an
act of dominion.
Santos
v.
Heirs
of
Lustre,
G.R.
NO.
151016,
Aug.
06,
2008 - any adverse ruling in the earlier
case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if
such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an
action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a coheir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior
judgment.
Title V Possession
Concept of Possession
Elements of Possession
Kinds of Possession
Possession in Good Faith and Bad Faith
PNB v. De Jesus, G.R. NO. 149295, September 23, 2003 - One is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006 - One whose interest
is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary,
is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.
Abalos
v.
Heirs
of
Torio,
G.R.
NO. 175444,
Dec.
14,
2011 - Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate
for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to
use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start
the running of the period of prescription.
Chapter 2 Acquisition of Possession
68
Bunyi v.
Factor, G.R. NO.
591 SCRA 350
172547,
Jun.
30,
2009
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or
physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.
Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by
the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, possession
can be acquired by juridical acts.
People v.
Peñaflorida, G.R. NO.
175604,
Apr.
10,
2008
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts
cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its
perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case
basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of
the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Soledad v. People, G.R. NO.
184274,
Feb
23,
2011 - The
acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the
material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to
possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or
determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each
case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Chua--‐Bruce
v.
CA, G.R. NO.
109595,
Apr.
27,
2000 –
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a
right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner.In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily
responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to
the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees
Effects of Possession
EDCA Publ.
184 SCRA
V.
614
Santos, G.R. NO.
80298,
Apr.
26,
1990
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
69
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
BPI Family
v.
Franco, G.R. NO.
123498,
Nov.
23,
2007
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. We have held that it is a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
Title VI Usufruct
Characteristics and Nature
Rights and Obligations of the Parties
Title VII. Easements or Servitude
Different kind of Easement
Restrictive Covenant
Fajardo v. Freedom
to Build, G.R. NO.
134692, Aug. 1, 2000
While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of
land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon
may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can also be
contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in
which one may use his own property, do not result in true easements,
but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative
easements or reciprocal negative easements.
Abellana v. CA, G.R. NO.
97039, Apr.24, 1992
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of
man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over
somebody else's land.
Bicol Agro--‐Ind
v.
Obias, G.R. NO.
172077,
Oct.
09,
2009 - The easement of right of way – the privilege of persons or a
particular class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually through
one particular path or linen – is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man.
70
Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
Quintanilla v.
Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong
materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another
right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to
make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis for setting up a compulsory easement.
Quimen v.
CA, G.R. NO.
112331,
May
29,
1996
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way
which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down,
the second alternative should be preferred.
Unisource
v.
Chung, G.R. NO.
173252,
Jul.
17,
2009
Registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without
the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish
the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient
estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement,
which extinguishes the easement.
Title VIII Nuisance
Classification of Nuisance
Remedies
Telmo v.
Bustamante, G.R. NO.
182567,
Jul.
13,
2009
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner
did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties,
which would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement.
Gancayco v.
Quezon
City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct
11,
2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety
of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a
structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
71
Perez v.
Madrona G.R. NO. 184478,
Mar.
21,
2012 Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built
primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders
from entering it.
Donation
Nature of Donations
Classification of Donations
Persons who may giver or receive a Donation
Formalities of Donation
Effects and limitation of Donation
Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show
the acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in
a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the
deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during
my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two
aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she
reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of
land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.
Central Philippines University vs. CA, G.R. No. 112127 July 17,
1995
If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, the donation
may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it
shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
Insular
Life
v.
Ebrado, G.R. NO.
44059,
Oct.
28,
1977
72
In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation
insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same
consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the
premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the
beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance.
Zamboanga
v.
Plagata, G.R. NO. 148433,
Sept.
30,
2008
Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or
public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that
stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed
of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid
subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be
merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory
act.
Quijada vs.
CA, G.R. NO.
126444,
Dec.
4,
1998.
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee
comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he
has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only
then - when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought
to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated property
reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the
deed of donation.
PRESCRIPTION
OBLIGATIONS
I. DEFINITION
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 138814, April 16,
2009
73
Respondent used the terms "right and obligation" in his Petition from
which he concluded that that such Petition sufficiently states a cause of
action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning;
A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law, while an obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a
juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do and in the words of Arias
Ramos "An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the
creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of
a determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of
breach, may demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter."
II. ELEMENTS OF AN OBLIGATION
DEGAÑOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826,
October 14, 2013
Degaños claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated
his contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his
liability from criminal to civil. The incompatibility in novation must take
place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object,
cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be
merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original
obligation.
ASUNCION vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109125, December 2, 1994
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156,
Civil Code) and is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential
elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the
efficient cause established by the various sources of obligations (law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which
is the prestation or conduct; required to be observed (to give, to do or not
to do); and (c) the subject-persons who, viewed from the demandability of
the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
III. DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESTATIONS
SSS vs MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 73345. April 7, 1993.
For failure to pay on time the amortization, SSS imposed the 12%
penalty contained in the penal clause of the contract entered into
between the parties. Inpositive obligations, (to give and to do), the
74
penalty is demandable when the debtor is in mora; hence, the necessity
of demand by the debtor unless the same is excused.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 153827
April 25, 2006
The [petitioner] may have experienced financial difficulties because of the
"1997 economic crisis" that ensued in Asia, however, the same does not
constitute a valid justification for the [petitioner] to renege on its
obligations to the [respondent], and [petitioner] cannot even find solace
in Articles 1266 and 1267 of the New Civil Code, since it is applicable
only to obligations "to do," and not obligations "to give." An obligation "to
do" includes all kinds of work or service; while an obligation "to give" is a
prestation which consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable
thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for
its simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS
AS TO BASIS AND ENFORCEABILITY
1.NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960
Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint praying for a
20% Christmas bonus, contending that there exists a cause of action in
their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in
brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their
performance, while Natural obligations, not being based on positive law
but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".
DBP vs. CONFESSOR, G.R. NO. L-48889 May 11, 1989
Appellee refuses to pay his obligation despite his execution of a new
promissory note in consideration of a previous promissory note which
remained unpaid even after the lapse of 10 years on the ground of
prescription. When a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be
75
enforced by the creditor but a new contract recognizing and assuming
the prescribed debt with full knowledge of the prescription would be valid
and enforceable and he thereby waives the benefit of prescription.
2. CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
ANSAY vs. NDC, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by
law as a natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies
obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to
compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on
positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action
to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the
obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or
rendered by reason thereof".
V. SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS
ABS-CBN vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 133347
April 23, 2010
Petitioner asserts that a criminal complaint may continue and be
prosecuted as an independent civil action. The claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) law. b)
contracts. c) quasi-contracts. d) xxx xxx xxx. e) quasi-delicts.
1. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM LAW
SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960
Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son
Dante arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil
liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is a necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
76
educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" .
2. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CONTRACTS
SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008
Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a case for
damages against it after he was shot by one of the security guards on
duty at the school premises. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is a established contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with but which FEU failed to perform when it did not provide a safe and
secure environment to its students.
MERALCO vs RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
The respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract for the latter's discontinuance of its
service to respondents. In culpa contractual the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief from law, recognizing the obligatory
force of contracts, the law will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or
a contravention of the tenor thereof.
3. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM QUASI CONTRACT
CRUZ vs.TUASON, G.R. NO. L-23749 April 29, 1977
Cruz alleged that Tuason had been enriched at the expense of Cruz by
virtue of an agreement made by Cruz and the Deudors in the clearing,
improving, subdividing and selling the large tract of land for the reasons
that said improvements are being used and enjoyed by Tuason. A
presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the
subject matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with
another party.
A. NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
77
ADILLE vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-44546 January 29, 1988
Petitioner claims exclusive ownership on a land after exercising his right
of repurchase to the prejudice of the co owners. The redemption by one
co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it but the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so
either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for
his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as
trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article
1456.
B. SOLUTIO INDEBITI
ANDRES vs. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER & TRUST CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 82670 September 15, 1989
Petitioner refuses to return the second remittance to the respondent
bank when the respondent bank mistakenly remitted a certain amount
for a specific transaction twice on behalf of the buyer on the premise that
the buyer still owes the petitioner money. For quasi-contract of solutio
indebiti to apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who
paid was not under obligation to do so; and, (2) that payment was made
by reason of an essential mistake of fact", hence petitioner must return
to the bank the amount which was mistakenly remitted for it is the buyer
not the respondent bank who has the obligation to the petitioner and not
the bank.
PUYAT & SONS, INC. vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-17447, April
30, 1963
The City Treasurer of Manila refused to refund the retail dealer's tax
erroneously paid by the petitioner on it's belief that it was not exempted
from such, on the ground that the tax was voluntarily paid and not
under protest which was a condition sine qua non in order that a legal
basis may arise. Voluntariness is incompatible with mistake being a
case of solutio indebiti, protest is not required as a condition sine qua
non for its application.
4. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM DELICT
78
CINCO vs. CANONOY, G.R. NO. L-33171, May 31, 1979
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he upheld
the Decision of the Lower court suspending the civil action based on a
quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
5. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM QUASI DELICT
NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124378, March 8, 2005
The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of
water in its dams has been satisfactorily and extensively established. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages,
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of and it is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
NAPOCOR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
124378. March 8, 2005
NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its dam
brought damages to defendants but asserts that the damages, if any,
were due to the heavy rains and should be regarded as a fortuitous
event.
Negligence or imprudence is human factor which makes the
whole occurrence humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 71049, May 29, 1987
Respondent alleged that it is the Asiatic Integrated Corporation that is
managing the public market. Hence, it cannot be liable for the injuries
sustained by the petitioner when he fell into an open drainage hole. The
City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, respondent City having retained control and supervision over
the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic
79
Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 71049, May 29, 1987
Petitioner fell into the open drainage holes, causing him physical
injuries, in a public market being managed by Asiatic Integrated
Corporation but such public market is still under the control and
supervision of the City of Manila. As a defense against liability on the
basis of a quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
VI. NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATION
A. OBLIGATION TO GIVE A DETERMINATE THING vs A GENERIC
THING
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the option under
consideration, "defendant agreed and committed to sell" and "the plaintiff
agreed and committed to buy" the land described in the option, hence,
plaintiff maintains that the promise contained in the contract is
"reciprocally demandable. "A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing
for a price certain is reciprocally demandable and an accepted unilateral
promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding
upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price.
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, G.R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
Petitioner’s argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts
because the fire is a fortuitous event. If the obligation is generic in the
sense that the object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus
without any particular designation or physical segregation from all others
of the same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind
even without the debtor’s fault and before he has incurred in delay will
not have the effect of extinguishing the obligation, based on the principle
that the genus of a thing can never perish, (Genus nunquan perit) and
an obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by
fortuitous loss of any specific property of the debtor.
80
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, G. R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
Petitioner’s argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts
because the fire is a fortuitous event. The rule that an obligor should be
held exempt from liability when the loss occurs thru a fortuitous event
only holds true when the obligation consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing and there is no stipulation holding him liable even in
case of fortuitous event and it does not apply when the obligation is
pecuniary in nature.
B. FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE
ART 1170
ARRIETA vs. NARIC, G.R. NO. L-15645, January 31, 1964
It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
cancellation of the allocation of rice contracted by the appellee herein in
Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit to be opened by NARIC
within the contemplated period which resulted in the consequent
damage. Every debtor who fails in performance of his obligations due to
fraud, negligence, or delay is bound to indemnify for the losses and
damages caused thereby.
TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a
fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message
overseas by telegram but which petitioner did not do, despite
performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the
required charges. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
C. DELAY
1. MORA SOLVENDI
ART 11
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., vs. SANTOS, G.R.
NO. 153004, November 5, 2004
81
When respondents wrote a demand letter to petitioner, the obligation was
already due and demandable, and when the petitioner failed to pay its
due obligation after the demand was made, it incurred delay. Delay as
used in this article is synonymous to default or mora solvendi which
means delay in the fulfillment of obligations with respect to time and in
order for the debtor to be in default, it is necessary that the following
requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially.
2. MORA ACCIPIENDI
MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469
July 25, 1991
Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The
failure of the owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are
not valid defenses, since consignation under such circumstances, is
necessary, and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance
with the specific requirements of the law therefor.
3. COMPENSATIO MORAE
CORTES vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126083, July 12, 2006
Cortes’ admission agreed that the Corporation’s full payment of the sum
would depend upon his delivery of the TCTs of the three lots.
Considering that their obligation was reciprocal, performance thereof
must be simultaneous and the mutual inaction of Cortes and the
Corporation therefore gave rise to a compensation morae or default on
the part of both parties because neither has completed their part in their
reciprocal obligation.
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON,
G.R. NO. 149338, July 28, 2008
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents’ failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
82
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
D. NEGLIGENCE
1. DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
SICAM vs. JORGE, G.R. NO. 159617, August 8, 2007
Sicam exempts himself from liability on the ground that the robbery of
his pawnshop is a fortuitous event which is by definition is an
extraordinary event not foreseeable or avoidable. In order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss and
robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event for it does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
The respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract for the latter's discontinuance of its
service to respondents. Article 1173 also provides that the fault or
negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place, hence, as a
public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions
with utmost care and diligence.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. vs.
PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,MCGEE & CO.,
INC., G.R. NO. 162467, May 8, 2009
Mindanao Terminal was required to observe ordinary diligence only in
loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte Produce aboard M,V
Mistrau since there is nothing in the contract which requires a higher
degree of diligence. If the law or contract does not state the degree of
83
diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation
then that which is expected of a good father of a family or ordinary
diligence shall be required.
2. FORTUITOUS EVENT
NAKPIL & SONS v. CA, G.R. NO. L-47851 April 15, 1988
There was an earthquake which caused the building heavy damage but
the other nearby structures had less damages as compared to the said
building, the architects, engineers and contractors are claiming
fortuitous event as a defense. To be exempt from liability due to an act of
God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or agG.R.avation of the
industry to the creditor.
3. EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION
ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING,G.R.NO.150806, January 28,
2008
The lower court denied petitioner’s right to pass on to respondent the
burden of paying the VAT and their right to collect the demanded
increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation
as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Extraordinary
inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing
power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the
common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or
decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment
of the obligation.
4. BREACH FOR RESCISSION
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L-29155
May 13, 1970
84
Respondent patentee was dismissed as the permanent chief chemist of
the corporation without any fault or negligence on his part after the
execution of the Bill of Assignment, prompting him to rescind the
contract. The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and
fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement.
VII. KINDS OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
A. PURE OBLIGATIONS
ART 1179
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R.
NO. 178610 November 17, 2010
Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to
pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, which were
suppose to be paid through salary deduction, to the petitioner because of
their dismissal. Loans secured by their future retirement benefits to
which they are no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil
obligations and the absence of a period within which to pay the
obligation, the fulfillment of which is demandable at once.
PAY vs. PALANCA, G.R. NO. L-29900June 28, 1974
Oppositor-appellee alleged that the rights of the petitioner-creditor had
already prescribed when the action based on a dated promissory note
was filed 15 years after. The wordings of the promissory note being "upon
demand," the obligation was immediately due and had prescribed upon
the lapse of ten years from the date on the promissory note.
B. CONDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS
SUSPENSIVE CONDITION
183 SCRA 171
Art. 1181
JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and
effectivity can take place only if and when the event which constitutes
the condition happens or is fulfilled, and if the suspensive condition does
85
not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation
had never existed.
HEIRS OF PAULINO ATIENZA vs. ESPIDOL, G.R. NO. 180665
First, since Espidol failed to pay the installment on a day certain
fixed in their agreement, the Atienzas can afterwards validly cancel and
ignore the contract to sell because their obligation to sell under it did not
arise. Since the suspensive condition did not arise, the parties stood as
if the conditional obligation had never existed.
Second, it was not a pure suspensive condition in the sense that
the Atienzas made no undertaking while the installments were not yet
due. Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras gave a fitting example of suspensive
condition: “I’ll buy your land for P1,000.00 if you pass the last bar
examinations.” This he said was suspensive for the bar examinations
results will be awaited. Meantime the buyer is placed under no
immediate obligation to the person who took the examinations.
Here, however, although the Atienzas had no obligation as yet to
turn over title pending the occurrence of the suspensive condition, it was
implicit that they were under immediate obligation not to sell the land to
another in the meantime. When Espidol failed to pay within the period
provided in their agreement, the Atienzas were relieved of any obligation
to hold the property in reserve for him.
REYES vs. TUPARAN, G.R. NO. 188064, June 1, 2011
The petitioner was rescinding the subject Deed of Conditional Sale
pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code because of the respondent’s
failure,refusal to pay the balance of the total purchase price of the
petitioner’s properties within the stipulated period. The full payment of
the purchase price is the positive suspensive condition, the failure of
which is not a breach of contract, but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
SPS. SANTOS vs. CA, G.R. NO. 120820, August 1, 2000
In view of our finding in the present case that the aG.R.eement between
the parties is a contract to sell, it follows that the appellate court erred
when it decreed that a judicial rescission of said aG.R.eement was
necessary. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition and failure to pay the price agreed upon is
86
not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
CONDITION PRECEDENT
PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926
Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in
the donation and the same not having been complied with, the donation
never became effective. The characteristic of a condition precedent is
that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not
complied with or is not deemed complied with, consequently, when a
condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except
when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition
precedent but a condition subsequent.
RESOLUTORY CONDITION
ART 1181
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY vs. CA, G.R. NO. 112230. July
17, 1995
Petitioner failed to comply to build a school on the donated land given by
the private respondent, which prompted the private respondent to
rescind the donation. On conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights
as well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend
upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition, thus,
when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one and if there
was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant
case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may
have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
C. OBLIGATIONS WITH A PERIOD
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. Spouses DEL ROSARIO, G.R.
NO. 138739. July 6, 2000
87
Petitioner claimed that respondents are liable for the whole amount of
their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly
installments, due to acceleration clause therein. Respondents, on the
other hand, countered that the installments were not yet due and
demandable, evidenced by the blank space left for the date on which the
installments should have commenced and theorized that fulfillment of
the obligation is dependent on the sole will of the debtor, hence proper
court should first fix a period for payment. The act of leaving blank the
due date of the first installment did not necessarily mean that the
debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could, since the presence
of an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, showed the
intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite
date, this is an obligation with a period.
LIM vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-34338 November
21, 1984
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the lower court which
convicted her of the crime of Estafa when she failed to give the proceeds
of the sale of the tobacco in accordance with their agreement which says
that ''...payment should be given as soon as the tobaccos are sold...'' and
contended that the court should first fix the period. It is clear in the
aG.R.eement, that the obligation was immediately demandable as soon
as the tobacco was disposed of hence, Article 1197 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that the courts may fix the duration of the obligation if it
does not fix a period, does not apply.
ART 1197
ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558
May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side
streets on the sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to the
presence of squatters, questions the decision of the lower court ordering
him to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a
two-step process, the Court must first determine that "the obligation
does not fix a period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, because courts can not fix a period
merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the
complaint not having sought that the court should set a period, but must
set the time that the parties are shown to have intended.
88
4. OBLIGATIONS WITH A PENAL CLAUSE
SSS vs. MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 73345, April 7, 1993.
Is the penalty demandable even after the extinguishment of the principal
obligation? For all purposes the principal obligation of defendantappellee was deemed extinguished as well as the accessory obligation of
real estate mortgage, the penal clause which is also an accessory
obligation must also be deemed extinguished, it would be otherwise, if
the demand for the payment of the penalty was made prior to the
extinguishment of the obligation because by then the debtor would be in
mora and therefore liable for the penalty.
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. L-28497
November 6, 1928
Defendant alleged that the decision of the lower court to pay 25 percent
of the amount of the trucks in addition to the amount of the trucks plus
12 per cent per annum is unconscionable and exceeds the rate fixed by
law. The penalty agreed upon does not include the interest, and which
may be demanded separetely and the penalty is not to be added to the
interest for the determination of whether the interest exceeds the rate
fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed only for the interest.
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
CFI, G.R. NO. L-41093, October 30, 1978
Petitioner corporation questions the award for nominal damages and
attorney's fee since the contract agreed upon indicated an interest at 4%
per annum of the total amount to be paid which should be considered as
penalty clause for failure to comply with the obligation hence, the vendee
cannot recover more than what is agreed upon. Those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages and nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of
loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded.
5. RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION
AGCAOILI vs. GSIS, G.R. NO. L-30056, August 30, 1988
89
GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to immediately occupy it
under pain of cancellation of the sale, but Agcaoili found out that the
house was uninhabitable hence payment was suspended which
prompted GSIS to cancel the sale. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon
him."
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON,
G.R. NO. 149338, July 28, 2008
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents’ failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
AGCAOILI vs. GSIS, G.R. NO. L-30056, August 30, 1988
GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to immediately occupy it
under pain of cancellation of the sale, but Agcaoili found out that the
house was uninhabitable hence payment was suspended which
prompted GSIS to cancel the sale. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon
him."
VIII. JOINT AND SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
SOLIDARY OBLIGATION
INIMACO vs. NLRC, G.R. NO. 101723, May 11, 2000
90
The absence of the word "solidary" in the dispositive portion of the
Decision, renders the liability joint. Well-entrenched is the rule that
solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred, and there is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
PNB vs. INDEPENDENT PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. NO.L28046.
May 16, 1983
PNB assails the order of dismissal of the lower court dismissing its
complaint against several solidary debtors on the gr.ound that one of the
defendants died during the pendency of the case and therefore the
complaint, being a money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted
in the testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection and in case of the
death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing
a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
JOINT OBLIGATIONS
TOPIC: JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984
Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in a
collection case praying for the "execution of the decision in its entirety
against all defendants, jointly and severally." In the absence of a finding
of facts that the defendants made themselves individually liable for the
debt incurred they are each liable only for one-fourth of said amount, the
obligation being described as "individually and jointly".
JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
CALANG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190696
August 3, 2010
Philtranco Bus has been held solidarily liable with its bus driver, Calang,
when Calang accidentally collided with a jeepney killing a bystander and
91
two jeepney passengers while other passengers were seriously injured.
Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, Philtranco
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasidelict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code which pertain to
the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee
has committed.
IX. EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
MODES OF EXTINGUISHING OBLIGATIONS
SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968
April 27, 1972
RFC turned down the request of Saura, Inc. for an additional loan which
prompted Saura, Inc. to ask that the mortgage be cancelled, which was
done. The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature mutual
desistance — what Manresa terms "mutuo disenso" — which is a mode of
extinguishing obligations, a concept that derives from the principle that
since mutual aG.R.eement can create a contract, mutual disaG.R.eement
by the parties can cause its extinguishment.
A. EXTINGUISHMENT BY PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE
AZCONA vs. JAMANDRE, G.R. NO. L-30597, SCRA, June 30, 1987
The rental stipulated therein was P7,200.00 but payment being
acknowledged in the receipt was P7,000.00 only, yet no mention was
made in the receipt of the discrepancy and, on the contrary, the payment
was acknowledged "as per contract". When the obligee accepts the
performance, knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without
expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed fully
complied with.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Javier, NO. L-28569, February 27, 1970
Apart from the initial installment of P396.12, paid upon the execution of
the contract, the defendant religiously satisfied the monthly installments
accruing thereafter, for a period of almost eight (8) years and although
the principal obligation under the contract was P3,691.20, the total
payments made by the defendant
including stipulated interest,
aggregated P4,134.08.
92
If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the
obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
ART 1240
TO WHOM PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE
SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11,
2012
Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not
made to the creditors themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a
certain Losloso who was the authorized agent of petitioners.
Respondent’s obligation consists of payment of a sum of money, and in
general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation,
must be made to the proper person, thus, payment must be made to the
obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent
authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual
authority had been given for its receipt. If payment is made to one who
by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as a discharge.
ARANAS vs. TUTAAN, 127 SCRA 828
All dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of judgment
belonged to Aranas but UTEX paid the co-defendants despite its
knowledge and understanding of the final judgment. It is elementary
that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot
extinguish the obligation of such debtor to its creditor.
PAYMENT NOT IN PHIL CURRENCY
HYDRO RESOURCES vs. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. NO. 160215, November 10, 2004
The contract between NIA and Hydro is an internationally tendered
contract considering that it was funded by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). As a contract funded by an
international organization, particularly one recognized by the
Philippines,3 the contract is exempt from the provisions of R.A. No. 529,
as amended by. R.A. No. 4100 (Act To Assure Uniform Value to
Philippine Coin And Currency).
PONCE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-49494
May 31, 1979
93
The promissory note in question provided on its face for payment of the
obligation in Philippine currency, but the aG.R.eement between the
parties originally involved a dollar transaction.
If there is any agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than
Philippine legal tender, the same is null and void as contrary to public
policy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 529, and the most that could be
demanded is to pay said obligation in Philippine currency, hence, a
creditor herein cannot oblige the debtor to pay him in dollars, even if the
loan were given in said currency.
KALALO vs. LUZ, G.R. NO. L-27782, July 31, 1970
Appellant claims that lower court erred in declaring and holding that the
balance owing from defendant-appellant to plaintiff-appellee on the IRRI
Project should be paid on the basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S.
dollar to the Philippine peso at the time of payment of judgment. Even if
the obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a sum of
money expressed in American currency, the indemnity to be allowed
should be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at the
time of judgment rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the
date of defendant's breach.
LEGAL TENDER
TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993
Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and
their acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at
the option of the creditor.
ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.
NO. 72110. November 16, 1990.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not
money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not
legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid
tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
PAPA vs. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 105188, January 23, 1998
Petitioner received the payment partly in cash and partly in check but
was not able to encash the check, and now questions the said payment
94
after 10 years. Respondents, on the other hand, want the petitioner to
deliver to them the owner’s duplicate of the title and the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the lot in question.
The geneal rule is delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only
when it is cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the Civil Code. The rule does
not apply, however, if
the debtor is prejudiced by the creditor’s
unreasonable delay in the presentment of the check. Acceptance of a
check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for
payment, and if he from whom it is received sustains loss by want of
such diligence, it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or
obligation for which it was given.
B. CONSIGNATION
ART 1257
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
Defendant authorized the Commercial Bank and Trust Company to issue
checks to the plaintiff for the payment of rentals, but the plaintiff refused
to accept them. In view of such refusal, defendant instructed said bank
to make consignation with the Clerk of Court of the City Court, but the
bank did not send notice to Soco that the checks will be deposited in
consignation with the Clerk of Court.
The purpose of the notice, which is essential to the validity of the
consignation, is in order to give the creditor an opportunity to reconsider
his unjustified refusal and to accept payment thereby avoiding
consignation and the subsequent litigation, hence, failure to give such
notice renders the consignation void.
DALTON vs. FG.R. and DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. NO. 172577
January 19, 2011
The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was subject to
the express reservation of assailing the validity of the consignation. In
such case, the creditor is not deemed to have waived the claims he
reserved against his debtor. When the amount consigned does not cover
the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the
balance.
ART 1258
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
95
If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without
just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by
consignation which is the act of depositing the thing due with the court
or judicial authorities but it generally requires a prior tender of payment.
ART 1259
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
Defendant contended that payments of rental thru checks were made to
the plaintiff but the latter refused to accept them, hence defendant
authorized the bank to make consignation with the Clerk of Court. In
order to be valid, the tender of payment must be made in lawful
currency, but payment in check by the debtor may be acceptable as
valid, if no prompt objection to said payment is made.
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
The decision subject of the present petition for review holds the view that
there was substantial compliance with the requisites of consignation and
so ruled in favor of private respondent. Substantial compliance is not
enough and the essential requisites of a valid consignation, under
Articles 1256 to 1261 of the New Civil Code must be complied with fully
and strictly in accordance with the law and must be accorded a
mandatory construction.
Immaculata vs. Navarro, G.R. NO.L-42230, April 15, 1988
Respondents alleged that the offer to redeem was not sincere, because
there was no consignation. The right to redeem is a RIGHT, not an
obligation, therefore, there is no consignation required to preserve the
right to redeem.
TENDER OF PAYMENT
SPOUSES CACAYORIN vs. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL
BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. NO.171298, April 15, 2013
Petitioner alleged that the lack of prior tender of payment to their
consignation case is because they were at a loss as to which between the
two the Rural Bank or AFPMBAI was entitled to such a tender of
payment. Article 1256 authorizes consignation alone, without need of
prior tender of payment, where the ground for consignation is that the
creditor is unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; or is
96
incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; or when,
without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; or when two or more
persons claim the same right to collect; or when the title of the obligation
has been lost.
SPOUSES TEOFILO vs. REYES, G.R. NO. 150913, February 20, 2003
Petitioners failed to (a) offer a valid and unconditional tender of payment;
(b) notify respondents of the intention to deposit the amount with the
court; and (c) show the acceptance by the creditor of the amount
deposited as full settlement of the obligation, or in the alternative, a
declaration by the court of the validity of the consignation.
In order that consignation may be effective the debtor must show that (a)
there was a debt due; (b) the consignation of the obligation had been
made because the creditor to whom a valid tender of payment was made
refused to accept it; (c) previous notice of the consignation had been
given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (d)
the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and, (e) after the
consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof.
SPOUSES CACAYORIN vs. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL
BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. NO.171298 : April 15, 2013
Petitioner alleged that the lack of prior tender of payment to their
consignation case was because they were at a loss as to which between
the two the Rural Bank or AFPMBAI was entitled to such a tender of
payment.
Article 1256 authorizes consignation alone, without need of prior tender
of payment, where the ground for consignation is that the creditor is
unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; or is incapacitated
to receive the payment at the time it is due; or when, without just cause,
he refuses to give a receipt; or when two or more persons claim the same
right to collect; or when the title of the obligation has been lost.
C. DACION EN PAGO
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., vs. CA, G.R. NO. 72703, November 13,
1992
Dation in payment does not necessarily mean total extinguishment of the
obligation but only up to the value of the thing given and the obligation is
97
totally extinguished only when the parties, by aG.R.eement, express or
implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation.
PNB vs. PINEDA, G.R. NO. L-46658 May 13, 1991
Dation in payment is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a
thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the
performance of the obligation. The repossession of the machinery and
equipment in question was merely to secure the payment of TCC's loan
obligation and not for the purpose of transferring ownership thereof to
PNB in satisfaction of said loan.
FILINVEST vs PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE, G.R. NO. L-50449 January
30, 1982
In the absence of clear consent of appellee to the proferred special mode
of payment, there can be no transfer of ownership from appellant to
appellee by mere delivery to and acceptance by him of the vehicle and
should not be construed as actual payment or more specifically, dacion
en pago.
CITIZENS SURETY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48958 June
28, 1988
In opposing the money claim, Respondent alleged that the surety bonds
and the indemnity agreements had been extinguished by the execution of
the deed of assignment, because this amounted to dation in payment
whereby the former is considered to have alienated his property in favor
of the latter in satisfaction of a monetary debt (Artide 1245).
The
transaction could not be dation in payment because the deed of
assignment was executed on December 4, 1959, the obligation of the
assignor to refund the assignee had not yet arisen, hence, there was no
obligation yet on the part of the petitioner.
D. COMPENSATION
SOLINAP vs. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-50638 July 25, 1983
For compensation to take place, it is required that the amount involved
be certain and liquidated. Compensation cannot take place where one's
claim against the other is still the subject of court litigation.
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ART 1980
BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007
Petitioner, as a collecting agent, debited Salazar's account. The account
was different from the original account to which the proceeds of the
check were credited but both accounts belonged to Salazar. The debited
account was the account of the sole proprietorship she owns. The other
account was her personal account.
A bank generally has a right of set-off over the deposits therein for the
payment of any withdrawals on the part of a depositor, because fixed,
savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions
are governed by the provisions concerning simple loan, hence, the
relationship between banks and depositors is that of creditor and debtor.
Legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code may take place
when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present.
GAN TION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-22490, May 21,
1969
The award for attorney's fees is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, hence, it is the litigant, not his counsel, who is the judgment
creditor and who may enforce the judgment by execution, such credit,
therefore, may properly be the subject of legal compensation.
ART 1278
PNB vs VDA. DE ONG ACERO, G.R. NO. L-69255, February 27, 1987
PNB's main thesis is that when it opened a savings account for ISABELA,
it (PNB) became indebted to ISABELA, so that when ISABELA itself
subsequently came to be indebted to it on account of ISABELA's breach
of the terms of the Credit Agreement, ISABELA and PNB became at the
same time creditors and debtors of each other, thus compensation
automatically took place between them, in accordance with Article 1278
of the Civil Code.
Compensation shall take when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other and that compensation may transpire
by operation of law, as when all the requisites therefor, set out in Article
1279, are present. Nonetheless these legal provisions can not apply if it
has not proven by competent evidence that PNB is a creditor of ISABELA.
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FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988
Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal
compensation and claims that the government owed him when a portion
of his land was expropriated, hence, his tax obligation had been set-off
by operation of law.
The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no
set-off admissible against demands for taxes levied for general or local
governmental purposes because taxes are not in the nature of contracts
between the party and party but grow out of duty to, and are the positive
acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the
personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required.
SYCIP vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-38711,
January 31, 1985
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
applying the provisions on compensation or setting-off debts despite
evidence showing that Lapuz, an agent of Albert Smith and/or Dr.
Dwight Dill, owed him. Compensation takes place only when two persons
in their own right are creditors and debtors of each other, and that each
one of the obligors is bound principally and is at the same time a
principal creditor of the other.
MINDANAO PORTLAND CEMENT CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. L62169, February 28, 1983
It is clear from the record that both corporations, petitioner Mindanao
Portland Cement Corporation (appellant) and respondent Pacweld Steel
Corporation (appellee), were creditors and debtors of each other, their
debts to each other consisting in final and executory judgments of the
Court of First Instance in two (2) separate cases, ordering the payment to
each other of the sum of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. The two
(2) obligations, therefore, respectively offset each other, compensation
having taken effect by operation of law and extinguished both debts to
the concurrent amount of P10,000.00, pursuant to the provisions of
Arts. 1278, 1279 and 1290 of the Civil Code, since all the requisites
provided in Art. 1279 of the said Code for automatic compensation "even
though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation"
were duly present.
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK INC. vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L69560 June 30, 1988
100
Petitioner contended that, after extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage,
private respondent still owes the former an amount, by way of deficiency.
Petitioner also claimed that it has the right to apply or set off private
respondent's money market claim despite the fact that the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and petitioner's claim for deficiency are still
in question.
Article 1279 of the Civil Code requires among others, that in order that
legal compensation shall take place, "the two debts be due" and "they be
liquidated and demandable", because compensation is not proper where
the claim of the person asserting the set-off against the other is not clear
nor liquidated.
MONDRAGON vs. SOLA, JR., G.R. NO. 174882 January 21, 2013
Respondent reneged on his promise to pay petitioner. Petitioner
thereafter withheld the payment of respondent's service fees and applied
the same as partial payments of the debt by way of compensation.
Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the
obligations of persons who in their own right and as principals are
reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other. Legal compensation
takes place by operation of law when all the requisites are present, as
opposed to conventional compensation which takes place when the
parties aG.R.ee to compensate their mutual obligations even in the
absence of some requisites.
MONTEMAYOR vs. MILLORA, G.R. NO. 168251.
July 27, 2011
Jesus contends that offsetting cannot be made because the judgment of
the RTC failed to specify the amount of attorney’s fees and maintains
that for offsetting to apply, the two debts must be liquidated or
ascertainable and the trial court merely awarded to Vicente attorney’s
fees based on quantum meruit without specifying the exact amount
thereof. A debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed
already in definite figures which do not require verification, but also
when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple
arithmetical operation.
E. NOVATION
LBP vs. ONG, , G.R. NO. 190755, November 24, 2010
Land Bank faults the CA for finding that novation given that substitution
of debtors was made without its consent, thus, it was not bound to
recognize the substitution under the rules on novation. Novation which
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consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one,
may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter,
but not without the consent of the creditor.
BOYSAW vs. INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, G.R. NO. L-22590, March 20,
1987
The assignment and transfer, first to Araneta, and subsequently, to
appellant Yulo, Jr., of the managerial rights over Boysaw is without the
knowledge or consent of Interphil. The consent of the creditor to the
change of debtors, whether in expromision or delegacion is an,
indispensable requirement , since substitution of one debtor for another
may delay or prevent the fulfillment of the obligation by reason of the
inability or insolvency of the new debtor, hence, the creditor should agree
to accept the substitution in order that it may be binding on him.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
G.R. NO. 147950. December 11, 2003
There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the
restructuring agreement since it merely provided for a new schedule of
payments and additional security giving Delta authority to take over the
management and operations of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay
installments equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a
sum of money, this Court has consistently applied the well-settled rule
that the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly
recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, and adds other
obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or where the new contract
merely supplements the old one.
AJAX MARKETING vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118585
September 14, 1995
In their interrelated first and second assignment of errors, petitioners
argue that a novation occurred when their three (3) loans, which are all
secured by the same real estate property were consolidated into a single
loan of P1 million under Promissory Note, thereby extinguishing their
monetary obligations and releasing the mortgaged property from liability.
The well settled rule is that novation is never presumed and it will not be
allowed unless it is clearly shown by express agreement, or by acts of
equal import, thus, to effect an objective novation it is imperative that
the new obligation expressly declare that the old obligation is thereby
extinguished, or that the new obligation be on every point incompatible
with the new one.
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F. RESCISSION
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-29155, May 13,
1970
Respondent patentee was dismissed as the permanent chief chemist of
the corporation without any fault or negligence on his part after the
execution of the Bill of Assignment, prompting him to rescind the
contract. The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and
fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement.
ART 1191
DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA vs. SPOUSES NAGUIAT, G.R. NO.
137909, December 11, 2003
In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the
purchase price within ten years from the execution of the Deed did not
amount to a substantial breach. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of the
reciprocity between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of
them however, rescission is allowed only where the breach is substantial
and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.
, PALAY vs. CLAVE , G.R. NO. L-56076 September 21, 1983
The contract agreed upon by the parties provided for automatic
extrajudicial rescission upon default in payment without need of notice
and with forfeiture of all installments paid. Upon default of the
respondent, petitioner rescinded the contract. Respondent questioned
the validity of the rescission. The judicial action for the rescission of a
contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be
revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions,
however there should be at least a written notice sent to the defaulter
informing him of the rescission.
ART 1169,1191
103
SOLAR HARVEST, INC., vs DAVAO CORRUGATED
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 176868.
July 26, 2010
CARTON
The CA added that even assuming that the agreement was for
respondent to deliver the boxes, respondent would not be liable for
breach of contract as petitioner had not yet demanded from it the
delivery of the boxes. Without a previous demand for the fulfillment of
the obligation, petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission
against respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach of
its contractual obligation, since the right to rescind a contract arises
once the other party defaults in the performance of his obligation.
OSMEÑA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007
The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this
recourse, and the Invitation to Bid sent out to implement said
resolutions, all have a common subject: the Shares – the 187.84 Million
EPCIB common shares, which, as a necessary consequence of the BDOEPCIB merger which saw EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO,
have been transferred to BDO and converted into BDO common shares
under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As
thus converted, the subject Shares are no longer equity security
issuances of the now defunct EPCIB, but those of BDO-EPCI, which,
needless to stress, is a totally separate and distinct entity from what
used to be EPCIB.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a
determinate thing is extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of
the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the Civil Code, a thing is considered
lost when it perishes or disappears in such a way that it cannot be
recovered.
VILLAMAR vs. MANGAOIL, G.R. NO. 188661 : April 11, 2012
Petitioner alleged that the absence of stipulations in the aG.R.eement
and absolute deed of sale entered into by Petitioner and Respondent
expressly indicating the consequences of the former's failure to deliver
the physical possession of the subject property and the certificate of title
covering the same, the Respondent is not entitled to demand for the
rescission of their contract pursuant to Article 1191 of the NCC.
The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one
of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him",
104
this remains true notwithstanding the absence of express stipulations in
the agreement indicating the consequences of breaches which the parties
may commit.
AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984
Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff
having chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot now seek
rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to
rescind the obligation has prescribed. The rule that the injured party
can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and
cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if
the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured
party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment.
ART 1234
ANGELES, ET AL vs. CALASANZ, G.R. NO. L-42283, March 18, 1985
The breach of the contract adverted to by the defendants-appellants is so
slight and casual when we consider that apart from the initial
downpayment of P392.00 the plaintiffs-appellees had already paid the
monthly installments for a period of almost nine (9) years. If the
obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor
may recover as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment,
less damages suffered by the obligee.
UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29,
In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the
"Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon
default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP) has "the right and the
power to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as rescinded without the
necessity of any judicial suit."
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it
proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the
corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the
action taken was or was not correct in law.
G. RESTITUTION
105
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
MAGDALO V. FRANCISCO, SR., and VICTORIANO N. FRANCISCO,
G.R. NO. L-29155, May 13, 1970
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
corporation to return to the respondents the trademark and formula for
Mafran sauce. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things
which were the object of the contract.
C O N T R A C T S
I. A. DEFINITION
SPOUSES BALILA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-68477 October 29, 1987
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself with respect to the other to give something or render some
service, the Central Bank of the Philippines in the exercise of its
Administrative power did not create any contractual obligations.
B. CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF OBLIGATIONS
BATCHELDER vs. THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
NO. L-25071, July 29, 1972
Obligations arise from 1) law; 2) contracts; 3) quasi-contracts; 4) acts or
omissions punished by law and 5) quasi-delicts, the circular issued by
the Central Bank has the force and effect of the law. Obligations arising
from law, however, is never presumed.
II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT
SPOUSES TONGSON
vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R.
167874.
January 15, 2010
A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential
elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
106
In the present case, there is no question that the subject matter of the
sale is the 364-square meter Davao lot owned by the Spouses Tongson
and the selling price agreed upon by the parties is P3,000,000, but the
existence of the remaining element, which is consent of the contracting
parties, to sell the property, claiming that their consent was vitiated by
fraud, renders the contract of sale void.
A. CONSENT
LAND BANK vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES SORIANO, G.R. NO. 178312.
January 30, 2012
Pending resolution of the case, both parties freely and voluntarily entered
into an agreement for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this
case. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent,
however, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the
parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the
court and reduced to a judgment.
LAGUNZAD vs. VDA. DE GONZALES, G.R. NO. L-32066 August 6,
1979
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the
Agreement because of private respondent's demand, for payment for the
"exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call
a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a
hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television
and that they were going to Court to stop the picture." It is necessary to
distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present when
one gives his consent reluctantly because a contract is valid even though
one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires, or
even against his better judgment.
VELASCO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-31018
June 29, 1973
The material averments of petitioners' complaint disclose lack of
complete "agreement in regard to the manner of payment" of the lot in
question. A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the
purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and
enforceable contract of sale.
PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002
107
Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellee’s letter-offer of a parcel
of land but appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered
amounts within two years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the
offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not
qualify the terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer and such acceptance
is not sufficient to generate consent.
B. CAUSE OF CONTRACTS
ART 1354
LAW vs. OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO., G.R. NO. L-30771, May 28, 1984
The defendants admitted the principal obligation but claimed that the
additional amount constituted usurious interest. Under Article 1354 of
the Civil Code, the agreement of the parties relative to the additional
amount is presumed to exist and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary. Since no evidentiary hearing had been held, the defendants
therefore had not proven that the obligation was illegal.
C. CONSIDERATION
ART. 1354
PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. MAHINAY, G.R.
NO. 171736, July 5, 2010
As proof of lack of consideration, respondent (a) denied under oath that
he owed petitioner a single centavo, (b) represented that he did not apply
for a loan and (c) said that when he signed the promissory notes, they
were all blank forms thus rendering the notes ineffective.
It is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful unless the debtor
proves the contrary and the presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare, uncorroborated and
self-serving assertion of respondent that it has no consideration.
HEIRS OF URETA, SR. vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO URETA, G.R. NO.
165748.
September 14, 2011
Although the contract states that the purchase price of ₱2,000.00 was
paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been
108
proven that no such payment was made. It is well-settled that where a
deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration.
III. FORMALITIES
ART 1724
DUE OBSERVANCE OF PRESCRIBED FORMALITIES
WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L-35721 October 12, 1987
There was no written agreement on the additional price to be paid for
said "extra works," hence, private respondent claims that the contractor
aG.R.eed to make the additions without additional cost.
In the absence of a written authority by the owner for the changes in the
plans and specifications of the building and of a written agreement
between the parties on the additional price to be paid to the contractor,
as required by Article 1724, the claim for the cost of additional works
must be denied.
LAO SOK vs. SABAYSABAY, G.R. NO. L-61898 August 9, 1985
Petitioner Lao Sok promised to give his employees their separation pay,
as soon as he receives the insurance proceeds for his burned building,
but contends that the contract was orally made hence unenforceable
since it does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Contracts in
whatever form they may have been entered into are binding on the
parties unless form is essential for the validity and enforceability of that
particular contract.
ART 1356
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987
The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be
considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of
sale of a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System.
The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are
obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the
109
essential requisites for their validity are present, except when the law so
requires requiring a contract to be in some form for validity or
enforceability.
IV. STAGES , PERFECTION
Bugatti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138113. October 17, 2000
A contract undergoes three distinct stages – preparation or negotiation,
its perfection, and finally, its consummation. Negotiation begins from
the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the
contract and ends at the moment of agreement of the parties. The
perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree
upon the essential elements of the contract. The last stage is the
consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or perform the
terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in the extinguishment
thereof.
ART 1315 , 1319
TONG BROTHERS CO., vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 73918 December 21, 1987
From the exchange of telegrams between the two parties, there was not
yet a meeting of the minds as to the cause of the contract. The cause of a
contract has been defined "as the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into it (8 Manresa, 5th Edition, p. 450). In
other words, the cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason
which justifies the creation of an obligation thru the will of the
contracting parties (3 Castan, 4th Edition, p. 347)." (General Enterprises,
Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., 11 SCRA 733, 739). For the private
respondent, the cause of the contract was the repair of its vessel
Zamboanga-J while for the petitioner the cause would be its commitment
to repair the vessel and make it seaworthy. The telegrams dated January
17, January 20, and January 28, 1975 sent by the petitioner to the
private respondent, however, indicate that the former had not accepted
the repair of Zamboanga-J, the reason being that the extent of the repair
to be made necessitated a major expense so that the petitioner insisted
on the presence of the private respondent for evaluation before it
accepted the repair of the wooden vessel. That the petitioner had not yet
consented to the contract is evident when on January 28, 1975, it sent a
telegram stating: "... NO AGREEMENT AS TO THE EX TENT OF REPAIRS
AND PAYMENT WILL UNDOCK VESSEL." The fact that the private
respondent who received this telegram ignored it, confirms that there
was no perfected contract to repair Zamboanga-J.
110
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration,
the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly,
withdraw it, and pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise
partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted,
results in a perfected contract of sale.
V. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
CITIZENS SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48958 June 28, 1988
It is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contract that if
the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulations shall
control but when the words appear contrary to the evident intention of
the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former and in order to judge
the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
ART 1375 , 1377
LIM YHI LUYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40258 September
11, 1980
Words which may have different significations shall be understood in
that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract
and in the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract
shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
VI. DEFECTIVE CONTRACTS
A. VOID CONTRACTS
ART 1411, 1420
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable
interest are contrary to morals, if not against the law for these contracts
are inexistent and void from the beginning.
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ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs.
SPOUSES G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable
for being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely
deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement
clause in petitioner’s contract of employment was reasonable and needed
since her job gave her access to the company’s confidential marketing
strategies. A non-involvement clause is not necessarily void for being in
restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time,
trade, and place.
CARIÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-47661, July 31, 1987
Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the
price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact never been paid by the
vendee to the vendor.
TOPIC: SIMULATED CONTRACTS
URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011 -Lacking in
an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid
and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to
another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control
of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in
this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation
purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject
lands.
RUBIAS vs. BATILLER, G.R. NO. L-35702 May 29, 1973
The lower court held that the purchase by a lawyer of the property in
litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491,
paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, and that consequently,
plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client was void
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and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7)
of our Civil Code. Contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by
law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified, neither
can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived."
ART 1410
TONGOY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L45645 June 28, 1983
The issue in this case is whether or not the rights of herein respondents
over subject properties, which were the subjects of simulated or fictitious
transactions, have already prescribed. A void or inexistent contract is one
which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never
been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or by
ratification.
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement,
commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns
motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the
petitioner prays that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner
for whatever amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of
in pari delicto that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal
contract, but will leave them both where it finds them.
ARSENAL vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-66696 July 14, 1986
Petitioner questions the validity of the sale between the respondent and
Suralta but the lower court held that the benefit of said prohibition in the
Public Land Act against the disposal of any land granted to a citizen
under that law does not inure to any third party. The right to set up the
nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in
the case of annulable or voidable contracts. The right to set up the
nullity of a void or non-existent contract is extended to third persons
who are directly affected by the contract.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. L-45038 April 30, 1987
Don Legarda sold the paraphernal property of Dona Clara to the
respondent. It was sold three months after he was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting. The sale between
Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the
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former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property,
and the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the probate
court.
PORTUGAL vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 73564 March 25, 1988
Respondent, through fraudulent means was able to transfer the lot from
his parents to himself without consideration or cause through a
purported deed of The IAC held that the action had already prescribed
because an action to annul a contract based on fraud prescribes in four
years. The SC, however, held that the alleged contract of sale is vitiated
by the total absence of a valid cause or consideration which is an
indispensable requisite for the existence of a valid contract. Thus, Article
1410 of the Civil Code provides that '(T)he action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. LUI SHE, G.R. NO. L17587, September 12, 1967
The illicit purpose becomes the illegal causa rendering the contracts void.
TEJA MARKETING vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-65510 March 9, 1987
The parties operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the
"kabit system" whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to
operate under such franchise for a fee.
Although not outrightly
penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably recognized
as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and in existent and
it is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to
enforce an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds then.
B. VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
ART 1327
FRANCISCO vs. HERRERA, G.R. NO. 139982, November 21, 2002
The vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement with petitioner, but that
the former’s capacity to consent was vitiated by senile dementia. Insane
or demented persons cannot give consent to a contract, but if an insane
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or demented person does enter into a contract, the legal effect is that the
contract is voidable or annullable.
CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069, February 7, 2003
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals
ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are
considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by
their mother. Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him ,
hence, an alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act
of ratification on their part.
C. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981
Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements of
perfection of a contract are present in a contract which involves payment
in installments, the Statute of Frauds would no longer apply as long as
the total price or consideration is mentioned in some note or
memorandum and there is no need of any indication of the manner in
which such total price is to be paid. In any sale of real property on
installments, the Statute of Frauds read together with the perfection
requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and
applied in the sense that the idea of payment on installments must be in
the requisite of a note or memorandum therein contemplated.
BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., vs. SANCHEZ, G.R. NO.
74623 August 31, 1987
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Atty. Adolfo Amor was entrusted,
as receiver, with the administration of BISTRANCO and it business, but
the act of entering into a contract is one which requires the authorization
of the court which appointed him receiver. The questioned contracts can
rightfully be classified as unenforceable for having been entered into by
one who had acted beyond his powers, due to Receiver Amor's failure to
secure the court's approval of said Contracts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AINZA vs. SPOUSES PADUA, G.R. NO. 165420, June 30, 2005
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The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by
a receipt signed by Eugenia. The verbal contract of sale between did not
violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds because when a verbal
contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its
enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies
only to an executory agreement, thus, where one party has performed his
obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.
ORDUÑA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29, 2010
Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the
purchase price payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared
to have been a recipient of some partial payments but after his death, his
son questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita,
and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with
the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a
contract for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be
unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal
contract of sale, however, has been partially executed through the partial
payments made by one party duly received by the vendor, as in the
present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute.
HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-41132 April 27,
1988
Both courts were of the view essentially that the evidence did not bear
out the claim of fraud; that under the Statute of Frauds, the parties'
covenant as to their properties' metes and bounds was unenforceable
since it was not reduced to writing. Not every agreement "affecting land"
must be put in writing to attain enforceability, under the Statute of
Frauds, Article 1403(2) (e) of the Civil Code, such formality is only
required of contracts involving leases for longer than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein.
D. RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS
CABALIW vs. SADORRA, G.R. NO. L-25650 June 11, 1975
The conveyances made by Sadorra in favor of his son-in-law were
fraudulent since about seven months after a judgment was rendered
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against him in and without paying any part of that judgment, Sadorra
sold the only two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership to
his son-in-law. Contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates
property by gratuitous title or alienations by onerous title when made by
persons against whom some judgment has been rendered in any
instance or some writ of attachment has been issued, are presumed to be
made in fraud of creditors, and the decision or attachment need not refer
to the property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission.
AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234
June 30, 1995
Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the
ground of unsatisfied judgment against respondents and It likewise
moved to declare the sale to a third party of a parcel of land in the name
of the private respondent as one in fraud of creditors which was granted
by the lower court. Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain
legally effective until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title,
and an action for rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary
proceeding through a motion, but in an independent civil action and only
after a full-blown trial.
VII. EFFECT OF CONTRACTS
DOCTRINES , PRINCIPLES
1. CONSENSUALITY OF CONTRACTS
ART 1306 , 1336 , 1337
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PLDT G.R. NO. L-18841
January 27, 1969
,
The Republic commenced suit against the PLDT commanding the PLDT
to execute a contract with it for the use of the facilities of latter's
telephone system throughout the Philippines. Parties can not be coerced
to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to
the principal terms and conditions of the contract since freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be
annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles
1306, 1336, 1337).
2. AUTONOMY OF CONTRACTS
ART 1306
WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs.
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PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 142830
March 24, 2006
The provision in the construction contract providing for defects liability
period was not shown as contrary to law, morals, good customs, pubic
order or public policy, and by the nature of the obligation in such
contract, the provision limiting liability for defects and fixing specific
guaranty periods was not only fair and equitable but was also necessary.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement
clause in petitioner’s contract of employment was reasonable and needed
since her job gave her access to the company’s confidential marketing
strategies. A non-involvement clause is not necessarily void for being in
restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time,
trade, and place.
LEAL vs.IAC, G.R. NO. L-65425 November 5, 1987
It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not sell to
others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his
heirs or successors" is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots
described in the "Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to the
contract. Parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA vs. SPOUSES NAGUIAT, G.R. NO.
137909. December 11, 2003
In the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment could be made even
after ten years from the execution of the Contract, provided the vendee
paid percent interest. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law
between the parties; thus, courts have no alternative but to enforce them
as aG.R.eed upon and written.
MARIMPERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40234 December
14, 1987
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A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is
nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
ART 1159
OCCENA vs. HON. JABSON, G.R. NO. L-44349, October 29, 1976
Respondent's complaint seeks that the court "render judgment modifying
the terms and Conditions of the Contract by fixing the proper shares that
should pertain to the herein parties out of the gross proceeds from the
sales of subdivided lots of subject subdivision", citing ART 1267 of the
New Civil Code. The cited article does not grant the courts this authority
to remake, modify or revise the contract between the parties as
contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties, so as
to substitute its own terms for those covenanted by the parties
themselves.
CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013
Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing additional
compensation for easement fee, the CA ruled that Cabahug's attempt to
collect further sums by way of additional easement fee and,or just
compensation is violative of said contract. It is settled that a contract
constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations
which, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied
according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot supply material
stipulations, which contradict the intent of the parties.
3. MUTUALITY OF CONTRACTS
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. NAVARRO, G.R. NO. L-46591, July 28,
1987
Escalation clauses to be valid should specifically provide: (1) that there
can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary
Board; and (2) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must include a
provision for reduction of the stipulated interest "in the event that the
applicable maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the
Monetary Board" in order to be valid which is known as deescalation
clause.
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SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771
December 17, 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based
on their essential equality, hence, a contract containing a condition
which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled
will of one of the contracting parties, is void.
ART 1308
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN, G.R. NO.
164549
September 18, 2009
The spouses Rocamora posit that their loan would not have bloated to
more than double the original amount if PNB had not increased the
interest rates and had it immediately foreclosed the mortgages. Any
increase in the rate of interest made pursuant to an escalation clause
must not be left solely to the will of one of the parties, but must be the
result of a mutual agreement between the parties, hence, a de-escalation
clause that would authorize a reduction in the interest rates
corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the Monetary
Board must be included, otherwise, the change carries no binding effect.
4. RELATIVITY , PRIVITY OF CONTRACTS
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
118248
April 5, 2000
Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the
deceased, hence, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)
provision of law.
METROPOLITAN BANK vs. REYNADO, G.R. NO. 164538, August 9,
2010
Respondents are not parties to the agreement, nor assigns or heirs of
either of the parties but who rely on the debt settlement agreement
petitioner and Universal to preclude prosecution of the offense of estafa
or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the criminal
offense. The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that
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"contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot
favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and
has acted with knowledge thereof."
PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ABASOLO, G.R. NO.
186738, September 27, 2010
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
and if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon the third person.
VIII. KINDS OF CONTRACTS
A. INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
ART 1307
CORPUS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40424 June 30, 1980
There was no express contract between the parties for the payment of
attorney's fees, but the respondent rendered legal services to petitioner.
The payment of attorney's fees to respondent may be justified by virtue of
the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based
on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another" and under Article 1307 such contracts shall be regulated by
the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of
obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous
nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people.
B. DIVISIBLE CONTRACTS
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
According to the appellants, a usurious loan is void due to illegality of
cause or object, the rule of pari delicto applies, so that neither party can
bring action against each other. A contract of loan with usurious
interest consists of two stipulations which are divisible in the sense that
the former can still stand without the latter, the principal and the
accessory stipulations; the principal one is to pay the debt; the accessory
stipulation is to pay interest thereon, and in case of a divisible contract,
if the illegal terms can be separated from the legal ones, the latter may be
enforced."
C. CONTRACT OF ADHESION
ART 1750
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ONG YIU vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40597
June 29, 1979
Petitioner contends that respondent Court committed grave error when it
limited PAL's carriage liability to the amount of P100.00 as stipulated at
the back of the ticket and argues that he had not actually entered into a
contract with PAL limiting the latter's liability for loss or delay of the
baggage of its passengers. While it may be true that petitioner had not
signed the plane ticket he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof
it being a contract of "adhesion", wherein one party imposes a ready
made form of contract on the other and the one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely, but if he adheres, he gives
his consent.
ART 1326
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. MENOR, G.R. NO. L-28360
January 27, 1983
Advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and
the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless
the contrary appears.
ART 1332
TANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48563 May 25, 1979
It is the position of the petitioner that because Lee See Guat was illiterate
and spoke only Chinese, she could not be held guilty of concealment of
her health history because the applications for insurance were in English
and the insurer has not proved that the terms thereof had been fully
explained to her. The obligation to show that the terms of the contract
had been fully explained to the party who is unable to read or
understand the language of the contract, when fraud or mistake is
alleged, devolves on the party seeking to enforce it.
BUENAVENTURA ANGELES, ET AL. vs. URSULA TORRES CALASANZ,
ET AL., G.R. NO. L-42283
March 18, 1985
The plaintiffs-appellees, eager to acquire a lot upon which they could
build a home, affixed their signatures and assented to the terms and
conditions of the contract and they had no opportunity to question nor
change any of the terms of the agreement since it was offered to them on
a "take it or leave it" basis. Such contracts are called contracts of
adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the signing of his
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signature or his "adhesion" thereto hence must be construed against the
party causing it.
IX.
STIPULATION POR AUTRUI
BONIFACIO BROS., INC., ET AL., vs. MORA, ET AL., G.R. NO. L20853
May 29, 1967
The appellants seek to recover the insurance proceeds, relying upon the
insurance contract executed by and between the State Bonding &
Insurance Company, Inc. and Mora. Contracts take effect only between
the parties thereto, except where the contract contains some
stipulations, known as stipulations por atrui, in favor of a third person,
who is allowed to avail himself of a benefit granted to him by the terms of
the contract, provided that the contracting parties have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon such person, however such third
person not a party to the contract has no action zagainst the parties
thereto, and cannot generally demand the enforcement of the same, if he
did not communicate his acceptance thereto to the obligor before the
revocation.
FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September
30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and
intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient
that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
G.R. NO. 120554 September 21, 1999
SO PING BUN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise
at the expense of respondent corporation. Although petitioner took
interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it,
nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party, lack of malice, however,
precludes damages.
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