1933-1940
Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933, provided the Hitler
Youth with a powerful, official umbrella under which Baldur von Schirach and his aggressive co-workers embarked on a massive drive to organize Germany's youth. Unencumbered by elitist ideology and specialized tasks, the HJ aimed at incorporating and organizing the existing youth groups and the unorganized younger generation. But the juvenile version of the Gleichschaltung, like the adult counterpart, was difficult to achieve and remained incomplete until 1936.
The Hitler Youth Law of that year stamped the imprimatur of the state on the party youth organization and made it responsible for the education of all
German youth between the ages of ten and eighteen, "outside of family and

school." Although opposition groups existed within the organization and outside of it, the Hitler Youth was able to collect the great majority of German teenagers, claiming a membership often million by the beginning of the war,
This army of young Germans was compressed in a tightly structured, hierarchical organization, which permitted little freedom for individual initiative or behavioral deviation. A corps of "professional', Youth Leaders gradually evolved to guide, indoctrinate and control the rank and file teenagers. Aside from the legal sanctions provided by the state, the Hitler Youth leadership initiated a fascinating variety of economic, social, cultural, political and physical activities, which attracted the youthful masses. For most HJ recruits the advent of Nazism, therefore, meant the revolution of youth against senility and boredom.
DEMAND FOR TOTALITY
The "demand for totality" (Totalitätsanspruch) was a driving force behind most
Hitler Youth activities, propagandistic declarations and organizational schemes from 1933 to 1936, and to a lesser degree thereafter. Gottfried Neesse, rapidly establishing himself as the most competent HJ ideologist and commentator, wrote in 1936 that "unification of German youth" had been the "precondition" for "comprehensive youth work." The concept of youthful autonomy demanded total organization of the younger generation, The National Youth Directorate, if it was to survive, had to embark on a two-fold program of "synchronization and exclusion," according to Neese. Von Schirach made totality into the raison d'etre of his official position. "Unification of youth," he preached relentlessly
"could never follow from an external coalition of partially conflicting groups, but only through an ideological idea, which the young generation had to perceive as a new law of life. Only the Hitler Youth was the carrier of this idea." The Hitler

Youth did not consider caste or religious profession--only Germany. Those who gave assent to the new Germany uncompromisingly, automatically became
"enemies of every religious precept in state organizations." Critics, even if they sat in "ministerial chairs," were painted with the brush of treason against the
"tragic German struggle for freedom." 1
The unity of youth was identified with the unity of the nation. Discord had been the "basic weakness and evil, of German history from the Thirty-Years War to the Revolution of 1918 and the HJ was now bestowed with the opportunity to end this struggle. The Hitler Youth envisaged itself as the crusading enemy of the ironic and tragic German Vereinsmeierei, which had brought Germany to the brink of destruction. Such dire and presumptions premonitions led to the core of the "demand for totality":
Knowing the threatening danger of disintegration and being conscious of responsibility, which German youth carries before history, we demand the destruction and dissolution of all still existing youth groups and associations and the comprehension of the entire German youth in that organization, which has risked its goods and blood day and night for the resurrection and rebirth of its people--in that organization, which alone represents the youthful following of the people's leader, Adolf Hitler--in the Hitler Youth.
2
It was to be an uncompromising battle, no quarter was asked and none was given--not even to those groups which professed sympathy for National
Socialism and Hitler* The great and good ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft justified every coercive method. This ideal, though vague and misleading, was nevertheless a powerful magnet, as Melita Maschmann has demonstrated persuasively. In its name many otherwise perceptive and intelligent young people joined the Nazi revolution. In the early days of the regime the Hitler
Youth wanted to make a permanent revolution. This meant not only a coordination of concurrent youth organizations, but also a "synchronization of

character," an extirpation of liberal individualism. In Germany Hitler and youth were building a new society and state. The Movement, which was the motor of this process, may have had "irrational elements in its dynamics," but its goal and method were considered to be "rational" and "logical." That goal was to educate "a young National Socialist Germany, so that every young boy and girl felt and acted instinctively Nazi. It was not a matter of producing "miniature
Nazis" or "SA recruits." The aim was broader and more pervasive. "He who wants to educate youth," wrote an HJ leader, "does not wrap them in cotton and put them in a glass case, but rolls rocks in its path, so that they receive black eyes and bloody noses and thereby learn independence .11 The demand for totality no matter how idealistically it was perceived in the days of revolutionary enthusiasm, had only one overriding goal, as HJ leaders realized clearly enough "The giant marches and mass demonstrations of 1933 were not the product of delirium, rapture or victorious intoxication, but clearly and soberly conceived to achieve the total incorporation of German Youth." 3
The full significance of this demand did not penetrate the consciousness of most youth groups until the end of 1933. The HJ with its 110,000 members in
1933 was still a small minority at the time of Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship. Von Schirach, although a member of the Reichstag, was relatively unknown. He made his national debut on March 21, 1933, as official radio commentator for the ceremonies in the old Garrison Church of Potsdam, opening the newly elected Reichstag, which voted Hitler dictatorial powers two days later. When the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act, the Communist Party had already been banned on the strength of Hindenburg's "Emergency Decree," stemming from the Reichstag fire in February. The Communist Youth
Association of Germany had gone underground along with its adult sponsor. It

was a token of things to come. The HJ benefited by the dissolution--either voluntary or forced--of opposing political parties. Von Schirach's claim that the
HJ found it difficult to cope with the onrushing flood of new converts after
January 30, 1933, is correct, but gives the wrong impression about the character of the sudden influx. The motivation of those who came was not as sincere as the HJ would have liked to believe. Many of the newcomers had never before been members of a youth organization. For them a bandwagon psychology had obviously triumphed, as it had for those thousands of members who had belonged to existing groups. Many youth associations tried to attach themselves to Hitler's victorious movement as a closed body, thus threatening von Schirach's emerging authority and empire. There was also the apparent possibility that Franz Seldte, leader of the Stahlhelm, member of Hitler's coalition cabinet and Reich Commissioner of the Labor Service, or Colonel Walter von Reichenau of the National Defense Ministry, might attempt to organize an agency for preliminary training of all German youth.
4
The ambitious twenty-six-year-old von Schirach saw his situation clearly. On
March 8, 1933, he wrote a frenzied letter to party leaders (Amtsleiter),' warning them about infiltrators from the Bünde, bourgeois youth groups which sprang up in the early twenties. It seems that several leaders of these groups had established "personal contacts" with some party leaders. Von Schirach wanted to "clarify" that he "saw all Bünde (with the exception of those already incorporated in the Hitler Youth) as enemies of National Socialism. It was immaterial whether one or another party member was active in such associations. Adolf Hitler had once told him, "He who is not prepared to carry my name as a Hitler youth, cannot be recognized as a friend of National
Socialism," If certain party leaders were to adopt a "liberal attitude" towards

these "insane Bünde and grouplets of the youth movement, with their "arrogant elitism," it could prove to be "disastrous for the struggle of the HJ." The Hitler
Youth had a persuasive "fact," according to von Schirach, with which to confront the pretensions of the bourgeois Bünde, 180,000 of its 300,000 members were "young workers." As for the military officers who "called themselves youth leaders," they sought to serve themselves, not youth and were unqualified to lead young people, von Schirach charged. In conclusion he asserted that a National Socialist recognized no youth group except the Hitler
Youth and asked to have every written overture by bündisch youth leaders passed on to himself. Von Schirach was eager to build his image in the party as a political infighter, virtues by which status in the party hierarchy were measured. He singled out certain youth groups, especially those around Karl
Paetel and the Geussen, and denounced them as Strasserite conspirators, while the agrarian-minded Artamanen were praised as forerunners of the Nazi ideology.
5 This carrot and stick tactic, which characterized von Schirach's campaign throughout 1933 and 1934, already began to appear.
Von Schirach, however, despite his verbal bombast, seemed to be satisfied with propaganda and intrigue, while his impatient co-workers demanded their pound of flesh. They were not to be deprived of their own
"seizure of power." On April 4, 1933, von Schirach assembled his entourage in
Munich to plan a program of action. His associates persuaded him to take forceful action against the National Commission of German Youth Associations, the semi-official executive of German youth associations, headquartered in
Berlin. Consequently, on the morning of the next day there occurred a tragicomedy which typified so much of Hitler Youth activity and even that of adult Nazi organization during the so-called revolution. Fifty Hitler Youth boys,

one of them carrying an old carbine, led by Obergebietsführer Karl Nabersberg, himself only twenty-five, descended on the offices of the National Commission and demanded to see the director. The five bemused ladies* constituting the staff, explained that the part-time members of the organization's governing board kept irregular hours and were not present, Nabersberg angrily insisted that the business manager, Hermann Maass, be summoned immediately. When
Maass, a former member of the Socialist Working Youth, appeared, he was met by accusations, threats and the rude command to "go home. Meanwhile,
Nabersberg and his commando rifled the files and confiscated what they considered to be valuable material, while one fidgeting HJ boy was stationed to guard the office manager, Frau Helene Gehse. The "investigation" took some time, so Frau Gehse and her aids were ordered to take a three-day leave. Upon her return Nabersberg summoned Frau Gehse to his office, slapped his pistol on the table and asked if she were prepared to continue her work under his direction. With the advice of Hermann Maass she agreed to do so.
6
Meanwhile, from the safe distance of the Adler Hotel in Munich, where the HJ-
Reichsleitung was still located, von Schirach declared himself leader of the
National Commission and deputized Nabersberg to run its affairs for him.
General Ludwig Vogt, the honorary head of the commission and Maass appealed to the Ministry of the Interior, requesting state intervention against the illegal actions of the Hitler Youth. Interior Minister Frick refused, pleading that the state could not interfere in the internal affairs of a free organization, even if it were partially supported by the state. Vogt soon became active in the premilitary training programs of the Hitler Youth, having earned von Schirach's grateful praise by his easy submission. Maass later became active in the resistance and was executed after the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944.

The National Commission of German Youth Associations had its origin in the
"Committee for Youth Welfare" of the Center for Popular Welfare (Zentralstelle far Volkswohlfahrt), which disbanded in 19200 when newly-formed government agencies began to concern themselves with youth problems. However, youth groups subsequently found it necessary to create a private national organization, which could represent them in dealing with state agencies. The
National Commission was eventually constituted in 1926 as a "semi-private" body, supported and encouraged by the Weimar government, and administered by a governing board with representatives from various youth associations. At the time of its seizure by the HJ it had approximately five million members, scattered among ninety-seven different youth organizations. Of these organized youngsters 20.56 per cent were members of Catholic youth groups, 11.58 per cent came from evangelical organizations, 8.5 per cent from Marxist associations and 1 per cent belonged to the middle-class Bünde, without any political or religious affiliation.
7 The Hitler Youth had been a member since 1932, although its publicists tried to deny this temporary falling into democratic sin.
The National Commission did not contain all of Germany's youth organizations, since there actually existed 477 recognizable groups, but it enjoyed the allegiance of the largest and most important registered societies. It was an extremely loose-structured organization, since it could not otherwise have survived in the prevailing atmosphere of political and social polarization that characterized the late Weimar Republic. Its charter left the independence of member organizations intact and recognized no particular viewpoint or ideological orientation. All major questions were resolved by unanimous vote in the "General Assembly," which also elected the director, the governing board, treasurer and business manager. The Board was composed of representatives from eight groups of youth associations evangelical, Catholic, socialist,

bündische, occupational, sport, national-civic (volksbürgerliche) and statepolitical (staatspolitische) associations. The official organ of the National
Commission was Das Junge Deutschland, which the National Youth Directorate took over in April 1933. On the national level and in the provinces, where the
Commission maintained sub-units, there seems to have been considerable communication with state agencies in which the Commission played the role of lobbyist for juvenile interests and welfare, The HJ claim that the efforts of the
Commission were fruitless is not entirely correct. It influenced the passage of several beneficial youth laws and helped to raise state and local appropriations for youth welfare.
8
When the Ministry of the Interior refused to revoke the illegal seizure of the
National Commission, the HJ was encouraged to pursue its coercive quest for totality, On April 10, 1933, Karl Nabersberg and Hartmann Lauterbacher led another youthful commando into the offices of the National Association for
German Youth Hostels in Hildenbach, Westphalia and made a similar search of the premises. The two HJ leaders dismissed the recruiting officer of the
Association, Hermann Forschepiepe, and declared themselves to be the new leadership in the name of the HJ-Reichsleitung. Two days later von Schirach and
Richard Schulman, founder and chairman of the organization, held a conference, whereupon Schirrman resigned and accepted von Schirach's appointment as
"honorary chairman. Von Schirach then assumed the actual chairmanship and appointed Johannes Rodatz, a friend from student days, as business manager.
On April 11, 1933, the Center of German Youth in Europe (Mittelstelle deutscher Jugend in Europa), associated with the National Commission of
German Youth Associations also fell under von Schirach's chairmanship.

Soon after these illegal events, officially sanctioned by the inaction of the
Interior Ministry and the connivance of the police, von Schirach expelled the
Socialist and Jewish associations from the National Commission. The Governing
Board accepted these irregularities as unavoidable side effects of "German renewal, and promised "glad cooperation" with the new leadership, while warning its members that resistance would "probably be fought brutally." Von
Schirach declared that the political leadership of German youth had already been in the possession of the Hitler Youth and suggested that the seizure of the
National Commission was a mere afterthought. He promised that the autonomy of individual movements would not be interfered with, but any resistance to the
"goals of the new government" would be "unconditionally suppressed." 9
While many individual members of organized youth groups and nonorganized young people streamed into HJ ranks, confessional groups and most of the Bünde remained adamantly unaffected by the seemingly victorious march of the Nazi phalanx. Some of the larger Bünde finally coalesced and formed the
"Greater German Youth Association" (Grossdeutscher Bund) at the end of
March, with a membership of 70,000. They put themselves at President
Hindenburg and Hitler's disposal. Von Schirach was threatened with serious competition, which began to dawn on him when he studied the confiscated files of the National Commission, which provided him with detailed statistics and facts about the most significant German youth organizations. In 1934 he wrote:
"The position, which the HJ possessed through me, was not strong enough to overcome the last eccentricities within German youth. No one realized it as strongly as did the Führer, who was convinced that the leader of the HJ would have to have the support of the state to complete his work. When we discussed these things, I asked the Führer to avoid a definite connection to any particular

ministry, which he agreed to do. As the Führer said himself, no ministry can exist without a bureaucracy and every bureaucracy means death for youth. He wanted to create a position in which it would be possible to work freely." 10
On June 17, 1933, Hitler, therefore, released the following decree:
A national office is being erected which will carry the designation "Youth Leader of the
German Republic." The Youth Leader of the German Nation is the National Youth Leader of the NSDAP, Baldur von Schirach. The Youth Leader has authority over all male and female youth associations, including youth affiliates of adult associations. Creation of new youth organizations requires his permission. The offices, which he creates, assume the obligations of the state and communal commissions, whose duties require the direct cooperation of youth organizations.
11
This decree had no constitutional or legal sanction. It contained the typical Nazi vagueness, obfuscating traditional distinctions between state and party. It was the kind of tool von Schirach could use effectively to achieve his dreams of grandeur and power.
Acting under his newly acquired authority as Youth Leader, von Schirach created a Youth Leadership Council, composed of representatives from
Evangelical, Catholic, military, bündische, sport, and occupational groups. Also part of the Council were liaison men for the relevant state ministries Interior,
Labor, Propaganda, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Culture. Deputies of the Youth
Leader (Beauftragte) were named for the provinces and Prussian Länder. These in turn were to deputize the existing chairmen of the provincial youth commissions, in order to assure continuity of youth work. Deputies were also appointed for the various government districts and communal administrations.
These agents played an important role in the regional and local fight against concurrent youth associations. Within the National Youth Directorate

(Reichsjugendführung, RJF) [the designation HJ-Reichsleitung seems to have been dropped at this time], whose headquarters were being transferred from
Munich to Berlin, Kronprinzen-Ufer 10, von Schirach created a "Department for
Youth Associations" under the direction of Karl Nabersberg. This was to be the general headquarters for the war against the "enemy."
A few hours after his appointment von Schirach issued an order dissolving both the National Commission of German Youth Associations and the Greater German
Youth Association. On June 22, 1933, he ordered all youth organizations to report the following information by July 15: name; legal status; address and phone number of the chairmen; office address; bank and postal accounts; membership statistics; constitution and names of regional and local chairmen.
Organizations, which failed to reply by the given date, would be automatically disbanded.
12
Since the beginning of May a number of isolated coercive measures had been taken against Evangelical and Catholic youth groups. The HJ was determined to force these groups into submission before the Concordat with the Vatican, then being negotiated, was concluded. The HJ rightly feared that the Vatican pact might protect the independence of Catholic youth associations. When the state initiated actions against the affiliates of the Center Party on July 1, 1933, von
Schirach arranged to have the Gestapo search the offices of the Catholic Young
Men's Association (Katholischer Jungmännerverband, JMV) and other Catholic youth associations. These associations were then forbidden and their files were confiscated, The next day Franz von Papen, who was negotiating with Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli, telegraphed from Rome that the police action of the previous day was endangering the successful conclusion of the pact. A few days later the
Gestapo lifted the ban against the Catholic youth groups and returned the

confiscated materials, On July 8, 1933, the Youth Leader of the German Nation was subordinated to Interior Minister Frick, who issued specific "guidelines." defining von Schirach's competencies and thus ended the legal irregularities of his position. On July 9, 1933, the negotiations for the Concordat were concluded in Rome.
13 Hitler, it seems was not prepared to let the Hitler Youth's revolutionary Spielerei interfere with efforts to secure his hold on the government.
Frick's order of July 8, 1933, completely ignored Hitler's decree of June
17, 1933, and once more appointed von Schirach as Jugendführer des deutschen Reiches, noting that the position had "no official characteristics" and would not be attached to any government apparatus." But von Schirach was required to "cooperate" with the ministries. Frick also installed a Youth Bureau within his Ministry, which was to establish close liaison with the Youth Leader.
The "autonomy" of individual youth associations was not to be "touched." but they were, nevertheless, required to adjust to the "unifying consciousness of the German people" and inaugurate the "leadership principle" in their organizations. Frick officially recognized von Schirach's Leadership Council and
"deputies" with whom the state and communal administrations were ordered to cooperate. Von Schirach was advised that "coercive measures" were not allowed, but he could call upon state organs to assist him in his work. Frick's guidelines softened HJ methods and slowed the tempo, but they did not stop the totalitarian campaign. The action was merely transferred to regional and local Hitler Youth leaders, disguised as "deputies." 14 Within two years, when
Himmler had the Gestapo and police in his grasp, "coercive measures" took their full toll of the temporarily resurgent youth associations.

On October 17, 1933, Baldur von Schirach gave a speech in the Berlin
Sportpalast, which clearly revealed his impatient eagerness to implement the
"demand for totality" cannot understand why there are still youth associations in Germany which do not seem to grasp the spirit of the times and the development of German youth toward unity and uniformity." By the end of
October, fifteen youth organizations had either disbanded voluntarily, like the
Bismarckbund of the Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei (June 21, 1933) and the
Deutsche Freischar (March 8, 1933), or been dissolved when their parent, political parties were outlawed, like the Jungbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold and the
Verband der sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend. Eleven organizations had transferred to the Hi, either by decision of the leadership or majority vote of the membership. Among them were the Adler und Falken and the Scharnhorst,
Bund deutscher Jungmannen, the junior section of the Jungstahlhelm. Nine associations had disbanded themselves without HJ pressure, none of them very significant. But there were still twenty-five Catholic groups, thirty Evangelical associations and five Bünde. Many of these organizations were losing members to the Hitler Youth daily, but many were also gaining new recruits, some of which came from the Hitler Youth. In addition to these outstanding groups, there were thirty-seven "miscellaneous" organizations, among them twelve
Jewish youth groups, with a combined membership of 30,757. The statistical situation at the end of 1933 was as follows:
10-18 year-olds
Hitler Youth Catholic groups
Evangelical groups
Bünde Misc groups
7,529,000 2,300,000 1,286,000 1,536,000 9,000 649,000

These figures are rounded off to the nearest thousand. The ten- to eighteenyear-old figure was calculated for the end of December 1933. BDM girls, which means girls up to twenty-one are included in the total HJ estimate. The exact age distribution of the non-HJ groups is indeterminable, but they fall roughly between ten and twenty-one. The total for Germany's younger generation comes from Werner Klose, Generation in Gleichschritt, but it is unknown how he arrived at these figures. Hertha Siemering, Deutschlands Jugend in Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft, cites 5,056,591 as the total male and female youth between fourteen and twenty for 1933. Whatever the exact figures may have been the overall response to the demand for total inclusion was impressive enough. An approximate twenty-three-fold growth within a single year suggests not only organizational success, but also effectiveness of the Hitler Youth supra-class appeal.
15
INCORPORATION OF THE BÜNDE
The Bünde became the first target in von Schirach's incorporative campaign.
They were a peculiar phenomenon of the Weimar Republic, apolitical in origin, yet by inadvertence or eventual development they had a political impact. There is no adequate translation for Bund (plural Bünde), which means more than bond or association, being a "nation-wide (youth) organization, consisting of local groups with a fairly strict discipline. In these groups the emphasis was on collective life, on leadership and service." The old German Youth Movement, which euphemistically called itself Wandervögel, originated at the turn of the century as an anti-bourgeois, anti-conformist protest of youth and youngthinking adults. At the end of the First World War this already divisive movement disintegrated into a dozen major Bünde and hundreds of smaller groups, most of them becoming more or less political, Their ideology was

generally elitist, their politics took the full spectrum from left to right and most of them refused attachment to any political party.
16 Numerically they were insignificant, compared to the youth groups of the parties and churches.
Perhaps for these reasons von Schirach thought them to be an easy prey.
Unity among the Bünde had been a perennial quest, impossible to achieve until the threat of extinction became imminent. On March 30, 1933, eight of the larger movements* finally formed the Greater German Youth Association headed by Vice Admiral Adolf von Trotha, who reportedly had contact with Hindenburg and prominent right-wing politicians. Dissidents like Eberhard Köbel denounced the move as dishonest, defensive and dictated by fear of the Hitler Youth.
Köbel accused von Trotha of merely seeking a broader base for the
Jungstahlhelm and rejected all attempts to seek the crushing umbrella of the state. Von Trotha did negotiate with General Edwin von Stülpnagel, Director of the Reichskuratorium für Jugendertüchtigung (National Governing Board for
Youth Fitness) and General Vogt of the National Commission of German Youth
Associations* attempting to create a conservative front vis-a-vis the Hitler
Youth. Dr. Walter Kayser (formerly a member of the Jungnationaler Bund) sent a memorandum on March 28, 1933, on behalf of the Armed Forces Section in the Defense Ministry, to the Reich Chancellor, suggesting the installation of a
"Reich Ministry for German Youth." This ministry was to have been a further development of the Reichskuratorium and the Notwerk der deutschen Jugend
(Relief Organization for German Youth). The latter measure, decreed by the
Schleicher government on December 24, 1932, had been

*Freischar junger Nation, Deutsche Freischar, Deutscher Pfadfinderbund, Die
Geusen. Ringgemeinschaft deutscher Pfadfinder, Ring deutscher Pfadfindergaue,
Deutsches Pfadfinderkorps and Freischar evangelischer Pfadfinder.
aimed at preventing the "radicalization of unemployed young men." All of these efforts were designed to by-pass the Hitler Youth on the right and therefore justified von Schirach's fear expressed to party leaders on March 8, 1933.
17
On April 15, 1933, the Greater German Youth Association executive decided to integrate with National Socialism, while von Schirach mounted a national campaign in press and rallies vilifying von Trotha and the Bund as "reactionary."
The HJ press carried blistering articles calling for the "destruction of the
Bünde," denouncing the "pompous presumption of the leader-cliques" and the
"nauseating impudence, of those who "sought to influence the renovation of youth by seeking influence through backstairs politicking." The HJ leadership rejected every suggestion that the Grossdeutsche Bund be incorporated in the
Hitler Youth as a body, since its 70,000 members would have been a potential counter-weights threatening the authority of the HJ-Altkämfer and the vaunted notion of "totality.' Throughout April, May and early June constant conflicts and brawls punctuated the rivalry. Police at the instigation of Von Schirach forbade some of the assemblies of the Bund. Police and SA surrounded an encampment of 15,000 Grossdeutsche youngsters early in June 1933, and its participants sent home.
18
Propaganda and occasional physical intimidation, however, could not persuade von Trotha's followers to disappear. Von Schirach, therefore secured a form of state authority by suggesting to Hitler his appointment as Youth Leader of the German Nation, which gave him authority over "all youth organizations."

"Ten minutes after his appointment," on June 17, 1933, according to von
Trotha's account, von Schirach disbanded the Grossdeutsche Bund. Its files at the headquarters in Berlin were confiscated; bank accounts sequestered and even personal belongings of von Trotha carted off. The Vice Admiral seemed to be caught by surprise. He had written to Hitler on 29 April offering the "organic incorporation" of the Grossdeutsche Bund and inquiring how and where the
Bund should be "engaged." Hitler's reply on June 1 rejected incorporation and suggested that the Bund could decide for itself whether to exist or disband--he himself had no intention of forcing dissolution. President Hindenburg had told von Trotha on 13 June that an organization like the Ballila in Italy was the "right idea." On June 23, 1933, von Trotha sent a long letter to Hindenburg recounting the long history of unsavory events and asking the president's intervention against the illegal actions of von Schirach. But Hindenburg was neat death and Hitler sanctioned the actions of the Hitler Youth by von Schirach's appointment as Youth Leader. Von Trotha could only surrender which he did on
June 28, 1933, being rewarded with the expected fulsome praise by von
Schirach and an appointment as "honorary leader of the Marine-HJ." 19
The subservience of von Trotha, however, did not end the opposition of the
Bünde. Throughout the pre-war years, and to a limited degree thereafter, small groups of bündisch orientation met secretly, published pamphlets and small periodicals. Gottfried Neesse made the expected explanation: "It became obvious that the anarchistic tendencies of the pre-war youth movement was stronger than anticipated." He denounced these efforts as "nationalbolshevist" propaganda and "romantic Russophilism.11 The Günther Wolff Publishing House in Plauen, Saxony, became a center of bündisch literary activity. In February
1934* the RJF was compelled to forbid its members the purchase of these

tainted publications. Finally, in February, 1936, the Ministry of the interior was persuaded to issue a ban on the literature of the illegal Bünde, Eleven periodicals fifteen books and pamphlets, twelve song books and two calendars were specifically named, many of them edited by Eberhard Köbel and published by the Günther Wolff Verlag. The Hitler Youth Patrol Service was used, in conjunction with the police, to search and confiscate these materials. The
Gestapo, which had meanwhile created a special section dealing with the activities of the former Bünde, was forced to repeat its ban of the Bünde and their literature in February 1936, in May 1936, and again in June 1939. The last order named twenty-two illegal Bünde.
20 All of the orders were based on the
Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933, a meaningless gestures since Himmler had the Gestapo firmly in hand by this time.
Taking a cue from adult right-wing examples, many leaders of the Bünde tried to infiltrate various Nazi organizations, including the Hitler Youth, The purpose was to influence the life style, behavior and ideas of the HJ, not to bore from within in order to destroy these organizations. It was not, therefore, genuine resistance or opposition. Many Bund leaders went into the leadership of the
Jungvolk, the junior branch of the Hitler Youth, taking large numbers of followers with them. They tried to carry on traditional practices in HJ uniform.
But the RJF watched them closely and once the Hi built up its own leadership corps the "infiltrators" were expelled or intimidated into "conversion. other leaders maintained small groups of ex-Bend members in the Luftschutz-Bund
(Air-Defense Association), the Kraft Durch Freude organization, the Reichsbund für Leibesübungen (National Association for Physical Exercise) and even
Himmler's Forschungs- und Lehrgemeinschaft, Ahnenerbe, e.V. (Research and
Teaching Association for Ancestral Heritage) The circle around Friedrich

Hielscher went over to the Ahnenerbe intact. One member of the group,
Wolfram Sievers, later became an SS-Standartenführer and general secretary of
Ahnenerbe. He paid for it by execution as a war criminal in 1948.
21 Many infiltrators, or genuine resisters, like Eberhard Köbel, were imprisoned by the
Gestapo, some were shot while escaping," assassinated during the Röhm purge or incarcerated for long periods in special camps for young people.
INCORPORATION OF PROTESTANT YOUTH GROUPS
."He who wants an uncompromising Germany is the deadly enemy of every confessional principle in a state organization," wrote Baldur von Schirach in
1934. To compromise meant to be "treasonable toward the tragic struggle of the German people for its freedom." Some had suggested the installation of chaplains in the Hitler Youth, but von Schirach rejected the idea as inimical to a
Kameradschaft, transcending sectarian faith and church. The HJ did not officially force its, members to desert their faith or church, as long as these did not have political or social implications. Since few faiths were that private the
RJF carried on a vicious propaganda against the churches and their youth organizations. It also offered an alternative to traditional religion--"positive
Christianity." The latter doctrine maintained a strict separation of politics and religions "The equalization of political and religious elements of church and faith, of representative earthly organization and representative supra-sensory power was one of the ominous errors of human history from the beginning." National
Socialism was a Weltanschauung and had nothing to do with supra-mundane matters. It accepted religion, which was truly metaphysical, "moving the world and bringing every struggle to a point of decision." But it was to be only
"genuine religion," not "those elements which use religion as camouflage."
Count Ernst Reventlow expressed confidence "that youth would refuse to be led

by any church in a predetermined religious path, with the goal of perpetual compulsion. Youth will search in freedom, whether Christian or non-Christian,
The vestige of earlier decades ought to deter any attempt to coerce youth religiously or to exert authoritarian influence." 22 These precepts guided the
Hitler Youth campaign against religious youth organizations.
The leadership of the Protestant youth associations prepared the way themselves for their unexpected coercive incorporation in the Hitler Youth, Dr,
Erich Stange, head of the Reichsband der Evangelischen Jungmännerverbände
(Reich Association of Evangelical Young Men's Organizations) was an early sympathizer of Nazism. When the HJ campaign for totality got under way,
Stange introduced the "'leadership principle" by assuming the title Reichsführer der Evangelischen Jugend Deutschlands and by appointing regional and local '-
Deputies" a la von Schirach. On July 3, 1933, Stange telegraphed Ludwig Mailer, military chaplain, Hitler's "deputy for questions of the Evangelical Church" and patron of the Glaubensbewegung Deutscher Christen (Faith Movement of
German Christians), submitting evangelical youth to his protection, thus hoping to avoid dissolution. Mailer, whom Hitler planned to use in turning the German
Evangelical Church into a subservient "National Church," eagerly took up
Stange's bait. Discussions began almost immediately between Stange and officials of the Evangelisches Kirchenbundesamt fur die Innere Mission
(Evangelical Church Office for Domestic Missions), with the purpose of restructuring Protestant youth work. On July 14, 1933, von Schirach made his first incursion by securing a ban against uniforms for Evangelical youth. On July
26, 1933, the leadership of the Evangelical Youth of Germany met in Kassel-
Wilhelmshöhe with two agents of Müller, Pfarrer Themel and Schirmacher, to stamp approval on a new constitution for the renamed Evangelical Youth Work

of Germany (Evangelisches Jugendwerk Deutschlands), which was to be a Youth
Chamber for the German Evangelical Church at the same time. Since the Minister of the Interior had meanwhile issued "guidelines" for von Schirach, which seemed to protect the autonomy of independent youth associations, Stange felt safe and secure. The Evangelical Youth Work now enjoyed the official protection of the "Führer's Representative, (Bevollmächtigter), while the
"German Christians" won control of most presbyteries during the church elections of July 23, 1933. Ludwig Miller, who became Provincial Bishop of
Prussia on August 4, 1933, and Reich Bishop on September 27, 1933, officially recognized and welcomed the 700,000 members of the Evangelical Youth Work into the Third Reich on August 17, 1933.
"It soon became obvious, however, that tactical cleverness and organizational talent provided unsound foundations in a time of satanic temptations.' Von
Schirach was not about to incorporate a group of nearly a million members as a body within the Hitler Youth. Already on 20 July he had forbidden dual membership in Hi and confessional groups, which Stange subsequently tried to have revoked without success. Tension between the HJ and Evangelical youth escalated rapidly. Regionally and locally HJ and Evangelical youth made accommodating agreements, threatening a general exodus of Evangelical youth to the Nazi movement. On 29 August Bishop Müller dissolved the Evangelical youth groups in the free state of Danzig, permitting its members to join the
Hitler Youth. Soon after his promotion to Reich Bishop he began negotiations with von Schirach and on November 17, 1933, he submitted an agreement to the Leadership Council of the Evangelical Youth Work. Heated discussion ensued with the eventual rejection of the projected pact* which some denounced as a,
-Versailles of the Church." On December 19, 1933, Müller signed the agreement

despite its rejection by the evangelical youth leaders. The latter also rejected
Müller's "authority" as Reich Bishop, but it was already too late. The agreement went into effect, signaling the complete surrender of evangelical youth.
23
The preamble of the pact reads "The Evangelical Youth Work recognizes the unified state-political education of German youth through the National
Socialist State and the Hitler Youth as the carrier of the state idea." Members of the Evangelical Youth Work under eighteen were to be incorporated in the Hitler
Youth as individuals and those who refused were to be expelled from the
Jugendwerk. "State-political education" and sport training were the exclusive prerogative of the HJ, while purely spiritual nurture could continue under the auspices of the Youth Work. Two work-day afternoons each week and two
Sundays per month were set aside for religious education and two week days and two Sundays monthly were designated for service in the Hitler Youth.
Special permission would also be given by the Hitler Youth for "domestic missionary courses', and religious camps. The actual incorporation occurred gradually by arrangements made on the regional and local level. New members of the Jugendwerk were given a six-month period of grace, within which to join the Hitler Youth. Any-unavoidable sport activities in church camps were to be supervised by a Hitler Youth leader* The Evangelical Youth Work, furthermore, had "not only the rights but also the duty" to institute "state-political education in the spirit of National Socialism," as long as this did not entail independent political tendencies. Church camps and missionary courses were to be limited to one each year.
24
The agreement stimulated considerable protest expressed in telegrams directed to von Schirach and Müller; one of the sharpest came from Kurt
Gerstein, [Subsequently made famous through Rolf Hochhuth's play,

Stellvertreter (The Deputy).] at that time a leader in the Association of German
Bible Circles:
Reichsbishop, Berlin
Western Radio Network announces surrender of Evangelical Youth Work through Reichsbishop. Apart from inadequate representation the stab in the back came especially unexpected from these quarters. The church dies at the hand of the bishop. In shame and mourning for such a Christian
Church.
Gerstein, Diplomingenieur,
Gemeindekirchenrat, Hagen
Müller remained unaffected. Stange was replaced with Pfarrer Karl Friedrich Zahn on December 29, with the title of "Reich Youth Minister" and with a special mandate to oversee the incorporation of evangelical youth. Zahn also succeeded Stange on von Schirach's "Leadership Council" and worked closely with Karl Nabersberg, head of the RJF Office for Youth Associations.
25
Pfarrer Zahn wrote in Das Junge Deutschland that the December agreement had realized "the wish of thousands of evangelical boys and girls and the apprehension of numerous Protestant youth leaders." He continued
"German evangelical youth will build its church in the Third Reich or it will build no church at all. . . . It's a matter of taking Wilhelm Raabe's word seriously 'One has to cut bread with a knife, which fate puts in our hands.' This knife is
National Socialism. And we thank our Creator that this knife is sharp and cuts better than the dull and rusty knives of former years.' From January 31 through
February 15 Pfarrer Zahn lectured in fifteen major cities on the theme
"Revolutionary Youth." In each city Zahn followed a systematic schedule at four o'clock he consulted with representatives of local evangelical youth groups, at

five he held discussions with church councils and at six he held a press conference.
26 This ploy was designed to circumvent the national youth leadership by gaining the support of local parishes. It worked well enough.
In February, 1934, Zahn and Nabersberg agreed that the evangelical youth associations were not actually disbanded; hence, the Hitler Youth would not confiscate their physical properties nor assume outstanding debts. Monday and Friday afternoons were now designated as free for church-related activities for youngsters under ten Monday afternoons would suffice. Müller finally issued a decree confirming the arrangement in the context of church law and the
Minister of the Interior later recognized this. On March 4, 1934, Pfarrer Zahn held a special ceremony in the Berlin Cathedral, putting a public, sacerdotal stamp on the unholy alliance.
27
The subsequent development of Protestant youth, up to the Hitler Youth
Law of 1936, followed predictable lines. There was no question of organized resistance to the Hitler Youth or the Nazi regime in general. The HJ in conjunction with the Gestapo applied persistent pressure, putting even the sanctioned religious activities of the Evangelical Youth Work in question.
28 The latter did come under the control of the "confessional Church," which opposed the "German Christians," but this did not prevent most Protestant teenagers from actively participating in the triumphant march of the Hitler Youth.
INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC YOUTH GROUPS
Catholic youth was far less susceptible to Nazi propaganda than evangelical youth and its organizations were far less compliant to the Hi demand for totality* Although some Catholic bishops took a positive stand towards
Hitler's movement, most of the hierarchy opposed the HJ and supported the

resistance of Catholic youth organizations. Von Schirach's claim in 1934 that
1.5 million Catholic youth had joined the Hitler Youth during the first year of the regime may be accurate, 29 but the great majority of organized Catholic youths remained within the fold until finally forced to disband and join the Hi after
1936.
Catholic youth enjoyed a protective shield in Article 31 of the Concordat, negotiated by von Papen and Cardinal Pacelli in 1933. As already indicated, the successful conclusion of the pact affected the limitations of von Schirach's official powers, imposed by Interior Minister Frick. These restrictions did not really hamper the HJ Gleichschaltung in the long run, but the Concordat was an effective brake on HJ aggression towards Catholic youth organizations. Article
31 stipulated that "those Catholic organizations and associations which serve exclusively religious, cultural or charitable purposes and, as such, are subordinated to church authority, will be protected in their institutions and activity. organizations which were not purely religious, cultural or charitable, such as social and occupational groups, were to receive the same protection as long as their activity was not connected with a political party. The German
Episcopate, in discussions with the Reich government, was to determine which organizations and associations fell within the definition of the Article. This was the crucial provision, which left considerable room for maneuver and abuse. The
Hitler Youth accused Catholic youth associations of "exceeding" limits set by the Concordat and thus justified police orders designed to keep them within the
"legal" bounds of allowed activities.
30
Von Schirach had hoped that the Catholic organizations would follow the pliant example of evangelical groups. When they did not, despite suggestions by some leaders of "corporate inclusion," the campaign of terror intensified. Before

the final ratification of the Concordat on September 10, 1933, the HJ tried to intimidate the Catholic associations into submission, thus rendering Article 31 ineffective, but the associations increased their membership before and after
September. The Gestapo, SS and SA disrupted youth offices, camps and meetings. Some two-thousand members of the Katholisches Jungmännerwerk,
Sturmschar, Neudeutschland and Pfadfinderschaft St. Georg organized a pilgrimage to Rome at Easter, 1935o Upon their return they were submitted to investigation by the border police, Many other instances of intimidation were improvised by the Hitler Youth and the state, yet the activities of Catholic youth groups continued The Junge Front, a new Catholic youth publication started in 1933, rapidly increased its circulation to 300,000, equaling the
Reichszeitung der HJ. Reports of daily confrontations between HJ and Catholic youth were carried by the press, Minister Frick found it necessary to reiterate in
May, 1934, that Catholic youth organizations "can continue to exists but they should limit themselves to church activities." since national prohibitions were impossible, the "war" shifted to the regional and local level, where individual HJ leaders took independent action. For instance, Gebietsführer Günther Blum, von
Schirach's "Deputy" in Thuringia, forbade all HJ members to participate in "any religious activity." whether it be in "a position of leadership" or in
"propagandistic recruiting.' Individuals, "for whom religious work was more important than the activity of the Hitler Youth," had to face the "immediate consequences." Some Catholic youth leaders avoided "consequences" and went over to the Hi, defending the latter as non-sectarian and not anti-clerical as
Catholic publicity insisted.
31
A piece-meal approach by the governments of the provinces finally suppressed most of the extra-religious activities of Catholic youth associations.

Within a space of three months, from June to August 1935, fourteen provincial administrations banned "confessional youth associations." The Senate of
Bremen followed suit in December 1936. The similarity of the decrees and the short time-span suggests that their instigation lay in Berlin--von Schirach and
Himmler probably had something to do with it, all of them were based on the
Emergency Decree of February 28, 1933. The penalties of Article 4 of that decree--a minimum of one-month imprisonment or a fee of 150 RM to 15,000
RM -- were invoked. The provincial decrees uniformly prohibited any political, sport, military-sport, or other non-religious activities, uniforms, medals, banners, flags and pennants, identifying youths as members of a confessional group.
Marches, combined rambling or camping, as well as musical and theatrical groups, were prohibited. On August 4, 1937, Himmler, as Chief of the German
Police, in concert with the Ministry of the Interior and the Youth Leader, regulated the holding of church camps. They could only be held after permission had been obtained from the provincial church administration and the "provincial youth pastor." Four weeks prior to the opening of a camp the local police station had to be given the name of the camp leader and a list of all participants, with indication whether or not they were members of the Hitler
Youth. By 1938 these religious youth camps had been forbidden entirely.
32 A gradual process of attrition had made the final ban possible.
A number of "illegal" Catholic youth associations with a bündisch orientation sprang up in the middle 1930's. Some of these, like the
Neudeutschland and Quickborn, had to be specifically forbidden by Himmler in
June and July 1939. Symbolic of the whole process of attrition, however, was the dissolution of the Katholischer Jungmännerverband, the largest of Catholic youth associations, with a membership of 390,000 in November 1933. The

Gestapo began the disintegration of the JMV by dissolving individual diocese, like that of Paderborn, on July 27, 1937. Münster and Trier soon followed, A conference in Cologne of diocesan representatives considered the options* whether to dissolve voluntarily, thus saving some association property, or to let the police do it. Monsignor Wolker, the head of the JMV, argued that voluntary dissolution should not be countenanced without positive steps to carry out youth work in some other way. Some suggested that the pope should decide, since the Concordat was at issue. By June 27, 1938, when the executive of the
JMV met again in Cologne, the repressive action of the police had reduced membership to circa 40,000, Futile efforts were then made to liquidate its property, e.g., a bookstore of 17,000 volumes had been sold to the See despite the fact that the Gestapo had already confiscated it. The Vatican, which was fully informed, failed to act. On February 6, 1939, the entire JMV was disbanded and its properties seized by the Gestapo.
33
1 Gottfried Neesse, "Die Einigung der deutschen Jugend im NS Reich," Wille und Macht IV/21
(October 30, 1936), pp. 10-11. Baldur von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 34,
40-42
2 Kurt Fevers, "Einheit der Jugend-Einheit des Reiches," Wille und Macht I/10-11 (June 1, 1933), pp. 11-13.
3 Melita Maschmann, Fazit: Kein Rechtfertigungsversuch (Stuttgart, 1963), passim. Hans
Bofinger, "Die Revolution hat erst begonnen," Wille und Macht I/12-13 (July 1, 1933), pp. 16-
19. Hans Alfred Nessler, "Das Ziel," Wille und Macht I/19 (October 1, 1933), pp. 1-2. Albert
Muller, ed., "Hitler Jugend 1933-1943,11 special issue of Das Junge Deutschland jg.37/No. 1
(January 30, 1943), p. 13.
4 Baldur von Schirach, Revolution der Erziehung (München, 1939), pp. 14-17. Hans-Christian
Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ (Köln, 1968), p. 146.
5 Von Schirach to Amtsleiter der NSDAP, March 8, 1933; Records of the National Socialist
German Labor Party and affiliates (Washington: The National Archives), Microcopy T-580, roll
540, "ordner" 375. (Henceforth cited as T-580/540/375.)
6 Werner Klose, Generation im Gleichschritt (Oldenburg, 1964), pp. 27-28. The author of this account interviewed Frau Gehse in 1963 or 1964.
7 . Arno Klönne, Hitierjugend (Hannover, 1955), pp. 12-13. Von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend, pp.
32-33. Brandenburg, p. 147. See also, Annedore Leber, Das Gewissen steht auf (Berlin, 1954), p. 32.

8 Müller, pp. 10-11. Hermann Maass, "Der Reichsausschuss der deutschen Jugendverbände," in
Hertha Siemering, ed., Die Deutschen Jugendverbände (Berlin, 1931), pp. 357-360.
9 Die Hitler-Jugend übernimmt den Reichsausschuss deutscher Jugendverbände," "Aufruf Baldur von Schirachs nach der Gleichschaltung des Reichsausschusses der deutschen Jugendverbände,
- documents 29 and 30 in Brandenburg, pp. 279-282
10
Brandenburg, pp. 138-139. Von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend, p. 35.
11 Rudolf Apel, "Die Führung der deutschen Jugend," office memo, n.d. (probably June 1933);
Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (Stanford: The Hoover Institution), reel 18, folder 336. (Henceforth cited as HA/18/336.)
12 Rudolf Apel, "Die Führung der deutschen Jugend," office memo, n.d. (probably June 1933);
Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (Stanford: The Hoover Institution), reel 18, folder 336. (Henceforth cited as HA/18/336.)
13 Brandenburg, pp. 152-153. See also Walter Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus, Dokumente 1933-
1945 (Frankfurt, 1957), document 66 for Papen's telegram
14 See document 36 and 37 in Brandenburg, pp. 290-291.
15 Das Junge Deutschland 27/II (November, 1933), p. 296. Reichsjugendführung,
Vorschriftenhandbuch der Hitler-Jugend (Berlin, 1942-1943), pp. 1068-1070. (Henceforth cited as VHB-HJ). The handbook is reproduced in Records of the National Socialist German Labor
Party [Washington: The National Archives, Microcopy T-81, rolls 678-679.) Klose, p. 272.
Hertha Siemering, Deutschlands Jugend in Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft (Berlin, 1937), passim.
16 Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany, A History of the German Youth Movement (New York,
1962), passim; for definition of Bund see p. xiv.
17 Hans Laden, "Vom Werden des Bundes" (Grossdeutscher Jugendbund); HA/3A/334.
Brandenburg, pp. 137-138. Der Jugendführer des Deutschen Reiches, Anordnung 2, n.d.;
HA/18/339.
18 Willi Körber, "Grossenwahn; Der "bündische Geist' offenbart sich," n.d. (March or April,
1933?); T-580/540/ 375. "Bündische Jugend ist heute Bolshevismus," Wille und Macht III/16
(August 15, 1935), pp. 16-19. "Herr Rauch, der Prophet der bündischen Reaktion," Wille und
Macht II/22 (November 15, 1934), pp. 25-26. Vizeadmiral A.D. Trotha an den Herrn
Reichspräsidenten, Generalfeldmarschal von Hindenburg, June 6, 1933; document 32 in
Brandenburg, pp. 283-286. Laqueur, pp. 200-201.
19 von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend, p. 36. See also Laden, op. cit. for Trotha introduction:
HA/3A/334 and JFdDtR, Anordnung 2; HA 18/339.
20 Gottfried Neesse, "Die Einigung der deutschen Jugend im -,@S Reich," Wille und Macht IV/21
(October 30, 1936), p. 12. VHB-HJ, pp. 1071-1075. Laqueur, p. 207.
21 Klönne, Hitlerjugend, pp. 71-73. Brandenburg, pp. 194-209. Informationsdienst der Abteilung
F. der Reichsjugendführung, Nr. 7, June 1, 1934, streng vertraulich; HA/19/357.
22 Von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend, p. 42. Gottfried Neesse, "Positives Christentum," Wille und
Macht III/8 (April 15, 1935), pp. 4 2-3. Graf Ernst zu Reventlow, "Die Bedeutung der religiösen
Frage für Jugend und Arbeitertum," Wille und Macht I/15 (August 1, 1933), p. 11. Günther
Kaufmann, "Politischer Kampf auf religiösem Boden," Wille und Macht III/9 (1-lay 1, 1935), pp.
20-23.
23 Brandenburg, pp. 154-160. VHB-HJ, p. 1095. See also Dieter Freiherr von Lersner, Die
Evangelischen Jugendverbände Württemberqes und die Hitler-juqend 1933/1934, (Göttingen,
1958) and Manfred Priepke, Die evangelische Jugend im Wiederstand gegen das Dritte Reich von 1933-1936 (Frankfurt, 1960).

24 VHB-HJ, pp. 102-103. Das Junge Deutschland 28/1 (January, 1934), pp. 20-21.
25 Brandenburg, pp. 159-160.
26 Pfarrer Zahn, "Evangelische Kirche und HJ," Das Junge Deutschland 28/1 (January, 1934), pp.
1-2. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
27 VHB-HJ, p. 1103. Brandenburg, pp. 154-160.
28 Priepke, pp. 111-121.
29 Von Schirach, Die Hitler Jugend, pp. 41-42.
30 Paul Meier-Benneckenstein, ed., Dokumente der Deutschen Politik III (Berlin, 1941), p. 358.
Gottfried Neesse, Die Einigung . . ., p. 15.
31 Arno Klönne, Gegen den Strom, Ein Bericht Uber die Jugendopposition im Dritten Reich
(Frankfurt/Main, 1958), pp. 71, 74. Informationsdienst der Reichsjugendführung, N-r. 6/1 (June
31, 1934); HA/19/357. Informationsdienst der RJF, Nr, 3/35 (June 28, 1935); Records of the
National socialist Labor Party (Washington: The National Archives), microcopy T-81, roll 97, frames 112791, 112798. (Henceforth cited as T-81/97/112791, 112798.) Brandenburg, pp.
222-223.
32 See Prick letter to Reich agents in Bavaria, Conspiracy and Aggression, IV, p. 51. Meier-
Benneckenstein, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, 1, p. 14. VHB-HJ, p. 1101.
33 VHB-HJ, p. 1104. Lawrence D. Walker, Hitler Youth and Catholic Youth, 1933-1936: Study in
Totalitarian Conquest (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1965), pp. 229-237.