NIKOLAUS J. BRAUN
CHAIRMAN AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND OPERATION (ADO) COMMITTEE
AREVA GMBH, KAHL A.M. / KARLSTEIN, 26./28.01.2015

• Introduction of Vereinigung Cockpits’ Professional Affairs
Section
• Human Machine Interface
• Automation in Aviation
• Case Studies 1-3
• Conclusion / Questions
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 3 / 21-Jan-15

INTRODUCTION OF VC’S PROFESSIONAL AFFAIRS SECTION
Vereinigung Cockpit – German Air Line Pilots Association
Industrial Affairs
Professional Affairs
Airports
Accident Analysis & Prevention
Air Traffic Control
Aircraft Design & Operation
+ 12 more
• 150+ volunteering Airline Pilots
• Main expertise: Airline Pilot, but many have additional knowledge, e.g.
Engineering Degrees
• Goals: Flight Safety, Professional Interest
• Coordinated work on EASA & ICAO level, contributing to ECA and IFALPA
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 4 / 2-Feb-15

DEVELOPMENT OF FLIGHT CONTROLS
Direct mechanical Link
Mechanical Link to Actuator
Link to Computer, Computer generates command for Actuator
The input is independent from the output. It is defined by the computer (e.g. as a rollrate or g-load), corrected and mixed with computer inputs (e.g. load alleviation).
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 5 / 2-Feb-15

ELECTRONIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS (EFCS)
“Basic” Modes – Wings Level / Roll Rate, Zero g-load, Auto Trim, Load
Alleviation
Limitations: Bank, Pitch – soft (Boeing) or hard (Airbus)
Protections: Overspeed, High Angle of Attack, Load Factor, Bank
Airbus: EFCS limits the Pilot, but allows instinctive reactions as the aircraft protects itself, e.g. Ground Proximity Avoidance Maneuver
Boeing: EFCS duplicates conventional control with added augmentation and protections , it will let the pilot know when he is about to leave the flight envelope, but he can still do it.
All EFCS’s rely on sensory data and preprogrammed algorithms.
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 6 / 21-Jan-15

PROS & CONS
+ Constant Performance in fatiguing, monotone, lasting tasks, e.g.
− Pilot is „out of the loop“
− Pilot‘s manual skills decrease monitoring tasks
+ Simultaneous routine tasks, e.g.
− Arousal level for crew might become too low fuel distribution
+ Advanced pilot-assistance, e.g.
− Can handle only preprogrammed situations flight director, terrain clearance
+ Correct handling of known tasks
− Certified up to legal requirements, unknown status beyond
+ Unbiased objective decisions, no
„human factor“
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 7 / 2-Feb-15

ACCIDENT CAUSES
Pilot-Error?!
Design?
Automation?
Human Machine Interface?
Source: IATA Safety Report 2013
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 8 / 21-Jan-15

AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 9 / 21-Jan-15

“This cannot happen!”
The Beginning…
Inconsistent speed measurements, likely following a blockage of the
Pitots by ice crystals
The technical consequences…
Autopilot & Auto Thrust disconnect
Flight Controls Degraded to Alternate Law
No clear message about speed inconsistencies
Flight Directors did not disconnect
No pilot called for appropriate “Unreliable Airspeed Procedure”
No pilot had training at high altitude for manual aeroplane handling
Inappropriate pilot reaction
One Minute after Autopilot disconnect, the airplane exited the flight envelope
Source: Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile, AF447 Final Report, English Version
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 10 / 21-Jan-15

The Situation
An aircraft with fuel, working engines, intact wings and body is literally falling out of the sky due to a sensory failure and inappropriate control inputs
Low Altitude Stall, “classic scenario”:
Altitude Loss: <100 feet
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 11 / 21-Jan-15

The Situation
An aircraft with fuel, working engines, intact wings and body is literally falling out of the sky due to a sensory failure and inappropriate control inputs
High Altitude Stall
Altitude Loss: >10.000 feet, high risk of re-stalling
…Automation?
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 12 / 21-Jan-15

“Complexity beyond the scope!”
Airbus A380 Uncontained Engine Failure causing several subsequent failures
Engine Failure is part of regular flight check program for crew
Engine Failure is part of certification (“blade off test”): A fan blade is blasted with a little amount of explosives at full throttle. The casing may not allow any debris to leave the engine radial.
Airbus Failure Handling:
1.
Failure
2.
(Memory Actions)
3.
Procedure according
Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor
(ECAM)
4.
Status
5.
“Secondary” Procedures
Sources: Australian TSB Official Report AO-2010-089, AvHerald.com; Picture: AvHerald.com
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 13 / 21-Jan-15

Crew needed 37 minutes to reach “Status”, 45 until APU was started,
1’13” to “full picture” and all requested actions completed
Doubtful information
Several Systems inhibited due to failures, e.g. fuel jettison
Crew assessed airplane controllability several times during approach
Crew was not able to calculate the landing distance for the maximum landing weight due to program issues (Later calculation led to 100m margin)
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 14 / 21-Jan-15

Complex problems beyond certification requirements – rare occasions, but they do happen
Automation can assist up to a certain degree, but can increase workload, too
Well experienced, rested crew, with additional support of further pilots was able to manage the problem (two crew + 3 check captains)
Note: After landing, engine 1 (left outboard) continued to run for two hours and 27 minutes, as the crew wasn’t able to shut it down. It was finally drowned by the fire brigade
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 15 / 21-Jan-15

“Fast adoption to unexpected situations”
The Situation: An A300 of DHL, departing from Baghdad on November
22 nd , 2003, was hit by a missile passing altitude 8000’ (~2450m):
All hydraulics lost, no usable flight control surfaces (e.g. ailerons, elevator, rudder, spoiler)
Left wing on fire, left fuel tank emptying
Parts of left wing surface missing
But: Two running engines and the crew remembered the Sioux City DC-10 accident from 1989
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 16 / 21-Jan-15

The crew re-learned to fly the aircraft:
Pitch / Flightpath is controlled by thrust
(Airspeed is more or less uncontrolled and a function of pitch)
Lateral path is controlled by asymmetric thrust
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 17 / 21-Jan-15

AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 18 / 21-Jan-15

To keep the left engine running, the crew had to transfer fuel into the left wing…
…the burning wing with the ruptured tank!
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 19 / 21-Jan-15

Automation is important to increase safety
Pilots (humans) may solve solutions, automation is not designed for
Pilots have to be kept “in the loop”
The design of the human machine interface is getting more and more important, as the complexity of the system increases
The human machine interface needs improvement, as accident rates remain unchanged at low level, but traffic increases
Pilots need the option to override automation for exceptional cases
Pilots need practice for their skills to act appropriate
AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 20 / 21-Jan-15

Dipl.-Ing. Nikolaus J. Braun
Chairman Aircraft Design and Operation Cttee.
Vereinigung Cockpit e.V. German ALPA
Nikolaus.Braun@VCockpit.de
All pictures – unless otherwise marked – © N. Braun

AREVA – Pilots versus Automation / Slide 22 / 2-Feb-15