Draft paper -- Please do not quote without permission from the author
Theoretical Integration in Foreign Policy Analysis:
The Case of the Governmental Politics Model and the
Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making
Dr. Klaus Brummer
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Institute for Political Science
Kochstr. 4
91054 Erlangen
Germany
Phone: +49 – 9131 – 85 22 004
Email: Klaus.Brummer@polwiss.phil.uni-erlangen.de
Paper prepared for
ECPR Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR)
7th Pan-European Conference on IR
9-11 September 2010
Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract
This paper aims at enhancing the explanatory power of the governmental politics
model (GPM) and contributing to the discussion on theoretical integration in Foreign
Policy Analysis (FPA). Specifically, the paper addresses the GPM’s lack of clarity
concerning the formation of decision makers’ policy preferences. It argues that the
GPM’s core proposition in this respect, which is neatly, albeit imperfectly,
summarized in the aphorism “Where you stand depends on where you sit”, can be
operationalized by integrating the substantive claims of the proposition into the twostage process of the poliheuristic theory of decision making (PH). This is
accomplished through the introduction of a “noncompensatory organizational loss
aversion variable” in the first stage of PH, according to which decision makers discard
all options that are unacceptable for their organization irrespective of their benefits on
other decision dimensions. In the second stage of the preference formation process, the
decision makers scrutinize the remaining options more thoroughly against several
decision dimensions, including organizational interests. This paper uses Germany’s
decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo, a military operation of the European
Union (EU) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to illustrate the explanatory
power of the revised GPM.
Introduction
Ever since the publication of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (Allison 1971) the
governmental politics model (GPM)1 has been one of the most frequently applied frameworks
in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).2 Given the seeming parsimony of the GPM this is hardly
surprising. At its core, the model puts forward three propositions. The stand-sit proposition
relates to the sources of the actors’ policy preferences, the bargaining proposition focuses on
the type of interaction among the actors during the decision making processes, and the
resultant proposition refers to the character of decisions that are eventually adopted.
Essentially, the GPM conceptualizes foreign policy decision making as a bargaining process
between governmental actors who are driven by the competing interests of their respective
organizations, which culminates in unintended compromise solutions.
Despite, or because of, its prominence the GPM has been among the most heavily contested
concepts in FPA.3 Among its core propositions, it was particularly the stand-sit proposition
that has been heavily criticized.4 The ambiguity surrounding this proposition, which
represents probably the key distinguishing feature of this “second wave” (Art 1973: 468) of
research on the influence of the bureaucracy on foreign policy decision making, calls into
question the model’s explanatory power. Given the prominence of the stand-sit proposition
regarding both the explanatory leverage of the model and the uniqueness of the analytical
framework as such, it seems all the more necessary to gain clarity on both the substance of
this proposition and how to operationalize it.
In brief, this paper argues that the stand-sit proposition could be operationalized by
integrating its substantive claim into the procedural framework of the poliheuristic theory of
decision making (PH). The explanatory power of the revised GPM is tested in an illustrative
case study. It examines the decision making process in Germany on the participation of the
country’s armed forces (Bundeswehr) in an European Union (EU) military operation, codenamed EUFOR RD Congo, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006. The
case was selected for two reasons. First, the decision was about the initiation of a mission,
which gave governmental actors room for maneuver when deciding whether and how
Germany should participate in the mission. Conversely, if decisions are taken on the renewal
of missions, individual decision makers should be facing considerably more constraints when
trying to pursue their respective organization’s interests. Second, the decision was taken by a
“grand coalition” government that brought together the major parties from the right
(CDU/CSU) and the left (SPD). Since the government had more than a two-third majority in
parliament, this all but guaranteed parliamentary approval of government decisions, which is
why the impact of the legislature (e.g., Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010) or domestic opposition in
general (e.g., Hagan 1993) on the executive’s decision making should have been low.
Furthermore, decisions to deploy the German armed forces are usually examined from a
structural vantage point, such as role theory (e.g., Harnisch and Maull 2001) or strategic
culture (e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). The actors who actually take the decision usually
receive little attention (for exceptions see Rathbun 2004; Malici 2006). This holds particularly
1
Allison (1969) originally termed his model III “bureaucratic politics”. However, in both editions of Essence of
Decision (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999) model III is referred to as “governmental politics”. For an
overview of the model’s roots, application, and refinements see Jones (2010).
2
Recent applications include Jones (2004); Yetiv (2004); Fuhrmann and Early (2008); Brummer (2009);
Mitchell and Massoud (2009).
3
See, for instance, Krasner (1972); Art (1973); Freedman (1976); Smith (1980); Rosati (1981); Hollis and Smith
(1986); Bendor and Hammond (1992); Welch (1992); Rhodes (1994); Kaarbo (1998); Bernstein (2000).
4
For criticisms of the other two core propositions see, for instance, Art (1973); Freedman (1976); Hoyt (2000).
2
true for the impact of the actors’ organizational interests on their preference formation and the
eventual decision of the government as a whole.5 Therefore, in addition to testing the model’s
explanatory leverage, using the GPM to explain Germany’s EUFOR RD Congo decision
offers a rarely employed theoretical perspective on the country’s decision to deploy its armed
forces.
This article takes into account the phenomenon of equifinality, which refers to “several
explanatory paths … leading to the same outcome” (George and Bennett 2005: 20). This is to
say that deployment decisions that represent unintended compromise solutions as predicted by
the GPM might spring from sources other than clashing organizational interests. Likely
alternative domestic politics explanations for the case under scrutiny are party politics inside
the government or the influence of the legislature on executive decision making.6 Since the
grand coalition government brought together two parties of almost similar strength (e.g.,
number of ministers and members of parliament),7 the government could have quite easily
been deadlocked by inter-party conflict. In such a situation, the only chance of overcoming
the deadlock could have been a compromise solution that none of the governmental actors had
originally intended. An alternative explanation could be the influence of the legislature on
executive decision making. In contrast to the political argument advocated above, according
to which the large parliamentary majority of the grand coalition granted the executive
considerable leeway, a legal perspective suggests that the parliament could have forced the
governmental actors to settle for an unintended compromise solution. Indeed, in Germany
parliamentary approval of foreign deployments of the armed forces is mandated by the
Parliamentary Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz). However, the strong position
of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mitigated insofar as parliamentarians can only agree
or object to a proposal by the government, but not change or amend it. It is this combination
of power (mandatory consent) and powerlessness (no changes allowed) that seems
particularly conducive to the emergence of resultants in the German case. Overall, the
explanatory power of the (revised) GPM would be called into question if there were no
connection between the policy preferences of the decision makers and the interests of their
respective organizations. The model’s analytical leverage would also be cast in doubt if the
decision under scrutiny was caused by sources other than clashing organizational interests, or
if the decision was not an unintended compromise solution at all but the outcome of, for
instance, one actor having his or her way, consensus seeking, or persuasion (Hoyt 2000).8
Both the theoretical approach used in this paper and the case under scrutiny pose considerable
challenges to source material. It is widely acknowledged that the source requirements for
studies using the GPM are quite high (e.g., Allison and Zelikow 1999: 312-313). This
challenge is exacerbated by the “nature” of the decision under scrutiny. Indeed, decision
making in security policy is almost “per definition” a secretive affair (Vennesson 2008: 237).
What is more, the case is a rather recent one, which means that certain official documents,
such as protocols of cabinet meetings, are unavailable for the time being. To remedy these
shortcomings the paper draws on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including
speeches, interviews, parliamentary protocols, news agency reports, and newspaper articles.
5
Both Gross (2009) and Overhaus (2009) refer to organizational interests. However, neither work is a study of
governmental politics. Rather, the major theoretical point of reference is respectively the concept of
Europeanization (Gross) and liberal institutionalism (Overhaus).
6
Due to space constraints, alternative explanations from other levels of analysis cannot be examined in this
paper.
7
Kaarbo (1996) shows that small coalition parties can also exert considerable, and disproportionate, influence
within coalition governments.
8
On problems associated with single case studies and theory testing see, for instance, King, Keohane and Verba
(1994): 209-213 and Klotz (2008): 51-53.
3
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the theoretical model. Above all, it
proposes a new way the GPM’s stand-sit proposition can be operationalized. The section
starts with a discussion of the substantive claims of the stand-sit proposition and the criticism
that has been leveled against it and then shows how PH can be used to enhance the
explanatory power of the GPM. The second section applies the revised GPM to an illustrative
case study, namely Germany’s decision to participate in the EU military mission EUFOR RD
Congo. It starts with an illustration of the case, then applies the revised GPM to the case, and
closes with a brief examination of the explanatory power of alternative domestic politics
approaches. In line with the theoretical focus of this paper, the focus of this section rests on
whether the policy preferences of the key decision makers can be explained with the newly
operationalized stand-sit proposition. The paper concludes with a brief summary of the
argument and points to avenues for further research.
Grasping the Stand-Sit Proposition
How Actors Form their Policy Preferences
At the heart of the GPM lies the well-known aphorism “Where you stand depends on where
you sit” (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 307). The assumption is that an actor’s position in
government (“sit”) strongly impacts his or her policy preferences (“stand”). Thus, it should be
possible to infer an actor’s policy preferences from his or her position in government. The
“mission” of governmental actors is to pursue and realize the interests of their organization.
The latter gain practical relevance via socialization processes that occur inside organizations.
These processes affect not only career bureaucrats but also the political top-layer of
ministries. The political actors also internalize the interests of their organization and espouse
them vis-à-vis representatives from other organizations (e.g., Saalfeld 2006: 95-96).9
Drawing on literature from organizational theory and FPA’s organizational process model,
organizational interests can be subsumed into five categories. First, actors seek to preserve the
“organizational essence” (Halperin and Clapp 2006: 27) of their institution. Without the selfunderstanding and vision that derives from its essence, “an organization may not develop the
special skill set needed to possess influence within the bureaucracy, and it may also lose its
ability to instill morale in its members” (Hudson 2007: 76). Accordingly, organizations favor
policies that promise to strengthen their organization in accordance with their essence and
reject policies that might strip them of capabilities that are considered as crucial for upholding
their essence. Second, organizations stake out their turf, which refers to issue areas and skills
in which the organization claims to have primary expertise and influence (Hudson 2007: 78).
Organizations seek to expand their turf only if such a move follows from their organizational
essence but they always seek to avert turf losses (e.g., Peters 2010: 24). Third, organizations
seek to preserve their autonomy with respect to both their financial and personal resources and
the making and implementation of policies (Peters 2010: 214). The maximization of
autonomy is desirable not least because it helps minimizing bureaucratic rivalries. If interorganizational cooperation cannot be avoided organizations opt for agreements that leave
them the greatest leeway possible to pursue their interests (Wilson 1989: 183; Halperin and
Clapp 2006: 52). Fourth, the amount of resources that are at the disposal of organizations
9
What is more, even if political actors do not internalize the interests of their organization but merely employ
them to advance their personal interests, they would still seek to promote these interests because, for the most
part, their political power waxes and wanes with the competencies, resources, and functioning of their ministry.
4
matters. Indeed, budgetary power and strength in personnel are crucial indicators of an
organization’s power relative to other organizations. Organizations ascribe importance not
only to absolute gains or losses but also, and maybe even primarily, to relative gains (Peters
2010: 232). Finally, the functioning of an organization depends on the morale and motivation
of its personnel. Low morale weakens an organization’s position compared with other
organizations (Hudson 2007: 79) and also renders the recruitment of qualified personnel
particularly challenging (Peters 2010: 31). This is why organizations evaluate potential
changes in policies or action patterns not only with respect to its substantive consequences but
also concerning their potential effect on the morale and motivation of their personnel
(Halperin and Clapp 2006: 55).
Responding to criticism, Graham Allison explicated in the second edition of “Essence of
Decision” what exactly the stand-sit proposition meant on his understanding. Contrary to what
has usually been assumed, Allison argued that the word “depend” does not indicate a
deterministic relationship between an actor’s bureaucratic position and his or her policy
stance. Rather, it suggests that an actor’s bureaucratic position strongly affects his or her
preferences. As a result, an actor’s stance can be more or less reliably inferred, but not
deterministically concluded, from his or her position in government. The “long version” of the
aphorism therefore reads “where one stands is influenced, most often influenced strongly, by
where one sits. Knowledge of the organizational seat at the table yields significant clues about
a likely stand” (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 307; in a similar vein already in Allison 1971:
176).
This qualification of the stand-sit proposition means that factors other than the bureaucratic
position and organizational interests also exert at least some influence on the formation of
decision makers’ policy preferences. This holds particularly true regarding idiosyncratic, or
agent-specific, factors. Indeed, Allison and Zelikow argue that “each person comes to his or
her position with baggage in tow. … [P]eculiarities of human beings remain an irreducible
part of the mix” (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 298). Hence, although organizational imperatives
exert substantial influence on an actor’s policy stance, the individual’s policy preferences
have to be taken into account as well. Although the qualification does intuitively make sense,
the fundamental problem associated with this “opening” of the stand-sit proposition is that the
GPM remains silent about how organizational and personal interests interact with respect to
the preference formation of actors.
Due to this lack of clarity, the stand-sit proposition has been widely criticized. The main
thrust of the criticism was that by including the personal interests of actors as a potential
explanation for their policy preferences, the clearly defined stand-sit proposition has lost its
explanatory power. For instance, Bendor and Hammond complain that the model
“incorporates so many variables that it is an analytical kitchen sink. Nothing of any possible
relevance appears to be excluded” (Bendor and Hammond 1992: 318; in a similar vein
Bernstein 2000: 140). Welch even gets the impression that “at points Allison seems actively
to deny any theoretical relationship between a player’s position and his or her preferences or
perceptions” (Welch 1992: 121). Stern and Verbeek (1998), however, take an entirely
different stand on the issue. Rather than criticizing the GPM for incorporating nonorganizational interests, they argue that an accurate understanding of the stand-sit proposition
“entails the recognition that factors other than organizational affiliation have an impact on
officials’ preference formation” (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 206).
5
Bringing in the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making
Of course, even if one sides with the authors who argue for the incorporation of both
organizational and personal interests with respect to the formation of actors’ policy
preferences, the question remains how the stand-sit proposition can be operationalized in
order to make it usable and thus testable. This paper argues that this could be accomplished by
incorporating the substantive claim of the stand-sit-proposition into the procedural framework
of the poliheurisic theory of decision making (PH). PH conceptualizes decision making as a
two-stage process, with cognitive elements dominating the first stage and rationalist elements
the second (e.g., Mintz 1993, 2003, 2004). During the first stage, actors use heuristics that
help them simplify complex policy questions. As Mintz puts it, “[t]he decision maker adopts
heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant
alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few
criteria” (Mintz 1993: 599). PH assumes that actors overvalue losses and therefore seek to
avoid them. Actors eliminate options by applying a “noncompensatory principle”. This
principle stresses that potential losses of a choice on one crucial decision dimension cannot be
compensated by potential gains on other, less crucial dimensions. Usually, the crucial decision
dimension is domestic politics. Thus, based on a “noncompensatory political loss aversion
variable”, all options are eliminated in the first stage of the decision making process that are
likely to entail unacceptable domestic political costs or losses (Mintz 2004: 9).
Once all politically unacceptable choices are eliminated, actors choose in the second stage
their option by making recourse to analytic processing. PH does not predefine which decision
strategy actors use to arrive at their eventual choice. Actors might recur, for instance, to costbenefit, expected utility or lexicographic decision strategies (Below 2008: 4). In any case,
since domestic politics is considered as being “the essence of decision” (Mintz 2004: 7), the
option that promises the greatest benefit and the lowest risks with respect to the domestic
politics dimension is likely to prevail.
The claim of this paper is that the substance of the stand-sit-proposition can be integrated into
the framework of PH.10 This could be achieved by replacing the noncompensatory political
10
This integration presupposes that PH is not employed as a theory of decision making but “merely” for
inferring and explaining the policy preferences of individual actors with which they enter group decision making
processes within governments. This use of the theory points to a still underdeveloped area within the PH
research program; namely, the theory’s application to group decision making (Mintz 2004: 10). Most of the
studies employing PH focus on the decision making of a single individual. Usually, it is the president within a
presidential system of government whose decision is more or less equated with the decision of the country (e.g.,
Sathasivam 2003; DeRouen 2003; Below 2008). However, in group settings, such as coalition governments in
parliamentary systems, it seems more accurate to describe the “decision” of any one actor as merely defining the
policy preferences with which he or she will subsequently enter the collective decision making process. This
holds true even for the preferences of the head of government, who in many cases is just first among equals.
Efforts to remedy the PH’s shortcoming with respect to group decision making have been undertaken by Redd
(2002, 2005) and Brulé (2008). Whereas Redd’s work focuses on the impact of advisors on the decision of a
predominant leader in presidential systems of government, Brulé specifically addresses group decision making in
coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Brulé (2008: 283-284) shows how the preferences of group
members in coalition governments can be aggregated into a single choice based on PH. He argues that in stage
one, all options are eliminated that are unacceptable, i.e., non-compensatory, to any group member. In stage two,
the option that maximizes the utility of the group members is selected. However, the problem with this approach
seems to be that it does not explicate the process according to which options are eliminated or selected in the
group setting. Group members just seem to know what is unacceptable (or most beneficial) to others, and options
are eliminated (or selected) accordingly. Indeed, contrary to PH’s explicit focus on the “political” (Mintz 2004:
6), the latter seems all but absent here. Against this background, bringing together insights from PH and the
GPM not only helps clarify the latter’s stand-sit proposition but could also contribute to overcoming the former’s
6
loss aversion variable with a “noncompensatory organizational loss aversion variable.” In
other words, the key decision dimension does not relate to domestic politics but
organizational interests. Accordingly, in the first stage of the decision making process, which
in this paper is perceived as being a preference formation process, all options that are likely to
entail unacceptable costs for the actor’s organization are eliminated. Drawing on the above
discussion about organizational interests, options are discarded that might jeopardize an
organization’s essence or turf, curtail an organization’s autonomy, significantly reduce an
organization’s resource base, or endanger the morale and discipline of an organization’s
personnel. Since the noncompensatory principle applies, even options that score high on other
decision dimension will be eliminated if they are likely to engender unacceptable costs for the
actor’s organization.
Of course, the influence of organizational interests is not confined to the first stage of the
preference formation process but extends to the second stage. At this point, organizational
interests and the personal, primarily domestic political interests of the governmental actors
can be brought together. When actors thoroughly scrutinize of the remaining options, they
examine them against the background of these two decision dimensions. They may also
examine options against the background of other dimensions deemed important for the issue
at hand, such as alliance obligations, etc. In the end, actors select the option that promises the
greatest net benefit and lowest net risk when evaluated against all relevant decision
dimensions. In short, the bureaucratic position (the “sit”) does not determine an actor’s policy
stance (the “stand”). Nonetheless, it exerts a significant influence on the formation of the
actors’ policy preferences, particularly with respect to what actors do not want.
Bargaining Processes and Resultant Decisions
This brings the discussion briefly to the two other core propositions of the GPM. Having
formed their policy preferences as outlined above, governmental actors enter the group
decision making process inside the government. The GPM conceives decision making
processes as bargaining processes in which governmental actors seek to impose their position
on others. It is all about “the pulling and hauling that is politics” (Allison and Zelikow 1999:
255). Actors are driven primarily by the interests of their respective organizations. Since most
of these interests cannot be realized without inflicting costs on other ministries, conflicts
among governmental actors are all but inevitable. What is also important is that power, i.e.,
the “effective influence on government decisions and actions” (Allison and Zelikow 1999:
300), is distributed unevenly among foreign policy decision makers. That is to say, the actors
do not usually have sufficient power to simply impose their preferences on others. Competing
policy preferences and a lack of power to impose one’s will on other members of government
almost inevitably leads to “resultants”, which are defined as unintended compromise solutions
that no actor originally pursued for the problem under scrutiny (Allison and Zelikow 1999:
294). Depending on their structural and individual power, all actors involved in the bargaining
processes contribute to the resultant decisions, to a smaller or larger degree. Overall, then, the
GPM does not see governmental decisions as being the result of a rational decision making
process, but as “compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence” (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 295).
shortcomings with respect to group decision making, all the more so since it does not sacrifice the “political”
element of decision making, which is also in the focus of the GPM.
7
Germany’s Decision to Participate in EUFOR RD Congo
Case Illustration
In late December 2005, a request from the United Nation (UN) Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, to the European Union (EU) provided the
initial impetus for what was to become EUFOR RD Congo. Guéhenno asked whether the EU
would be willing to deploy a “deterrent force” to support the UN’s mission (MONUC) in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the electoral process in order “to prevent
potential spoilers from undermining the peace process” (UNSC 2006a). His concern was that
the first free elections in the DRC in more than four decades would be disrupted by violence
that neither MONUC nor the DRC’s security forces would be able to contain. In Germany,
Guéhenno’s request gained high political salience from the start. The main reason for this was
that in the first six months of 2006 Germany, together with France, provided a 1,500 person
strong “EU battlegroup”. Unlike to the other battlegroup that was available at that time,11 the
German-Franco one was suitable for a mission in the DRC along the lines requested by the
UN.
The initial decision of the EU was to deploy fact-finding missions to the UN headquarters in
New York and to the DRC. In mid-February 2006, the EU discussed several options for a
military engagement based on the missions’ findings. It remained an open question, though,
as to which member state would lead the mission. The initial expectation was that France
would assume that role, as it had done in the first EU military mission in the DRC in 2003
(operation “Artemis”). However, France used its past engagement to reject yet another
leadership role. In turn, the United Kingdom pointed to its ongoing commitments in Iraq and
Afghanistan in order to reject a leading role (FAZ 2006a). With two out of the “Big Three”
(Brummer 2006) out of the picture, and with only a handful of EU member states having the
necessary institutional structures to lead a multinational military mission of the size envisaged
in the first place,12 expectations were increasingly directed towards Germany.
With the leadership question being unresolved, the decision on whether to conduct a military
mission in the DRC, which had been foreseen for late February, had to be postponed. The
option that increasingly emerged as the most likely solution to break the deadlock was that
Germany and France would share leadership. In early March an informal meeting of the EU
defense ministers reinforced this tendency. However, the ministers were unable to arrive at a
decision. In addition to the leadership issue, two further questions still needed to be addressed.
First, although several EU member states (e.g., Poland, Spain, Sweden) had already signaled
their willingness to contribute to a mission, albeit in small numbers only, they hesitated to
make binding pledges. Second, it remained unclear whether the ruling elites in the DRC
would be supportive of an EU military mission in their country.
Progress was eventually achieved during the second half of March. On March 19, the EU’s
High Representative for Common and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, met with the
President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila. On this occasion, Kabila informed Solana about his
support for an EU mission (FAZ 2006b). The following day, defense ministers from eight EU
member states gathered in Berlin for an informal coordination meeting. They agreed that if
the EU decided to conduct a military mission, Germany and France would lead it jointly (AP
11
The other battlegroup was an amphibious one led by Spain. On the battlegroups see Lindstrom (2007).
The national headquarters of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom are available to the EU
(Lindstrom 2007: 23).
12
8
2006a). These two breakthroughs paved the way for an agreement in the EU, in late March,
which responded positively to the UN’s request. Then, on April 25, the UN Security Council
(UNSC) adopted Resolution 1671 (UNSC 2006b). Based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
the resolution authorized the EU to deploy a military mission to the DRC for a period of four
months, starting with the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections. Two days
later, the Council of the EU adopted a “Joint Action” on the EU military operation in the DRC
in support of MONUC during the election process (Official Journal 2006a). Germany was to
assume leadership on the strategic level (operational headquarters) and France on the tactical
level (force headquarters to be set-up in the capital of the DRC, Kinshasa).
On May 17 the German government made its decision about the country’s participation in
EUFOR RD Congo. The government defined as key tasks of the German contribution to
support the mission on the strategic level (i.e., provide the operational headquarters),
participate on the tactical level in the force headquarters, and conduct evacuation operations
in the area of Kinshasa (Deutscher Bundestag 2006). To take effect the government’s decision
needed parliamentary approval. The Bundestag passed its vote on June 1. The proposal of the
government was adopted with a huge majority.
EUFOR RD Congo was eventually launched on June 12 by a “Council Decision” (Official
Journal 2006b). The mission consisted of some 2,300 military personnel from 21 EU member
states and Turkey. Roughly one-third of the combined force was stationed in Kinshasa; the
larger part was deployed to Libreville in Gabon, one of the neighboring countries of the DRC.
Although the election process, which commenced on July 30 with parliamentary elections and
the first round of the presidential elections, saw occasional violent outbreaks, the overall level
of violence was significantly lower than initially feared by the UN and the EU. In late
November the DRC’s Supreme Court dismissed a challenge by Vice-President Jean-Pierra
Bemba against the results of the second round of the presidential elections, which had been
held on October 29. The court confirmed that President Kabila won the run-off against
Bemba. Bemba accepted the ruling and the election process came to a close. So did EUFOR
RD Congo, which ended on November 30.
Explaining Policy Preferences
Four options were seriously contemplated by the German decision makers with respect to the
country’s contribution to an EU military mission in the DRC.13 Option one (“political
support”) was to support an EU mission politically without contributing military personnel.
Option two (“military support”) was to provide military support to the mission, such as
logistics, transport, or support forces. Option three (“co-leadership”) was to take over a
leadership role in the mission together with another big EU member state. Option four
(“battlegroup”) was to use the German-Franco battlegroup to conduct the EU mission, which
would have meant a German military mission under the European flag since France
contributed only four soldiers to the battlegroup. Both Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung
(CDU) and Foreign Minster Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) advocated option two, whereas
Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) promoted option three.14 The following discussion shows
13
Hypothetical options that the decision makers did not actually consider, such as vetoing the decision on a
military mission in the DRC in the Council of the EU, are not discussed here.
14
While not denying the influence of, for instance, the finance minister or the minister for development aid on
certain foreign and security policy decisions, the actors discussed in this paper (the chancellor, the defense
minister, and the foreign minister) are the crucial ones when it comes to making decisions about the deployment
of the armed forces.
9
that the policy preferences of the key decision makers can be explained by the revised standsit proposition.
The minister in charge of peacetime deployments of the German armed forces, Defense
Minister Jung, supported option two, that is, the provision of military support to an EU
mission. Jung quickly rejected options three and four. Indeed, a co-leadership role for
Germany in an EU military mission in the DRC was out of the question for him, let alone the
use of the German-Franco battlegroup. However, this is not to say that Jung objected in
principal to any EU mission. In fact, on various occasions he emphasized the EU’s
responsibility vis-à-vis the DRC and the African continent more generally. For instance, Jung
referred to the responsibility of the EU to prevent an “excesses of violence” in Africa, such as
had occurred in Rwanda (FR 2006a). Jung did not categorically rule out the participation of
the German armed forces in a mission in the DRC. Rather, he stated that if there is an actual
need for the military support of the election process “Germany will assume responsibility
according to its capabilities” (FAS 2006).
However, Jung was clear that German engagement would be possible only if other European
states also contributed to the mission (AFP 2006a). This ruled out the use of the GermanFranco battlegroup, which, as stated, was actually a German battlegroup. Jund had already
expressed doubts concerning the use of the battlegroup during a cabinet meeting on January
18 (Der Spiegel 2006a). Later, Jung also stated his objection publicly. In an interview he
argued “[i]t is entirely clear that the battlegroup of the EU, to which Germany will contribute
1.500 soldiers, will not see action in the Congo” (FAS 2006). What is more, Jung ruled out
any leading role for his country. In late January and early February, he repeatedly argued
against any “lead function” for the German armed forces in a possible EU mission in the DRC
(e.g., DDP 2006a; WAMS 2006). Jung’s position was reflected in a Ministry of Defense
internal memorandum, according to which a significant contribution of the German armed
forces to a possible EU military mission “would not be in the German interest” (Der Spiegel
2006b). If Germany were to participate at all, the expectation in the ministry was that the
contribution would be limited to the provision of strategic transport capacities and possibly
the deployment of support forces but certainly not combat troops (Die Welt 2006a).
Jung’s quick rejection of the battlegroup option and the co-leadership option can be explained
using the stand-sit proposition. Both options presented fundamental challenges to the
organizational interests of his ministry. To begin with, a military intervention in Africa was
hardly essential for the ministry’s organizational essence. Indeed, the ministry still had not
fully completed the transition from a Cold War posture, with a focus on territorial defense, to
an intervention army, with the primary task of participating in global peace and conflict
management missions (e.g., Gareis 2009). Being preoccupied with the adaptation to the new
security environment, the least that a military engagement in Africa would have done was to
divert focus. In addition, a significant contribution would have posed a formidable challenge
to the financial and personnel resources of the ministry. Due to ongoing contributions to
multinational missions, particularly in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the defense budget was
already strained. Not surprisingly, then, when discussions about a German contribution to a
possible EU mission in the DRC commenced Jung emphasized that the budget of his ministry
had reached its limit (AFP 2006b). Moreover, with some 6,000 (out of more than 250,000)
soldiers already being sent on multinational missions (Gareis 2006: 182), the German armed
forces had all but exhausted its reservoir of deployable forces, which illustrates the abovementioned unfinished transition to post-Cold War requirements. Finally, participating in yet
another mission could have posed a threat to the motivation and morale, particularly of troops
in the field.
10
The rejection of the battlegroup and the co-leadership option left Jung to evaluate options one
and two more thoroughly. Option one (political support) was attractive to Jung insofar as
there would have been no financial costs involved. Also, it would not have jeopardized the
morale and motivation of the ministry’s personnel. However, costs would have arisen on the
political level. Above all, it would have called into question the reliability of the new minister
who had scant experience in security and defense policy on the national or international level.
One also needs to keep in mind that Germany was under particular pressure to contribute to
the mission in some respect due to the battlegroup commitment. Reneging on this
commitment without making any compensating effort would have strongly undermined the
reputation of the new minister, and the new government as a whole. Not surprisingly, then,
Jung settled for option two, the provision of military support. Despite existing strains on the
financial and personnel resources of the ministry, the provision of transport capabilities and
support forces would have been feasible. Equally important, it would have demonstrated the
reliability of the new defense minister and government to the country’s European partners.
The head of the German government, Chancellor Angela Merkel, promoted option three, a coleadership role for Germany in the mission. It is more difficult to delineate the organizational
interests of the chancellery than ministries that are dealing with specific issue areas.
Nonetheless, they certainly include fostering the European integration process and
maintaining Germany’s influence in that process as well as guaranteeing a smooth functioning
of government and securing the government’s survival. Since options one (political support)
and four (battlegroup) ran counter to those organizational interests they were quickly
eliminated.
The political support option would have weakened Germany’s position in Europe. Refraining
from making any military contribution to an EU military mission would have already been
problematic in itself. It would have displayed a lack of solidarity with other EU member states
and also called into question Germany’s commitment to the development of the EU as a
security actor. In the case of the DRC mission reneging from the battlegroup commitment
would have further exacerbated the consequences of opting out. Against this background,
walking away from prior commitments and making no military contribution would have
severely damaged Germany’s European credentials. This would have been particularly
damaging at a time when Germany’s success in Europe depended on its good standing with
other member states. Since the summer of 2005 the EU had been preoccupied with a
“constitutional crisis” that had been triggered by negative referendums on an European
constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands. Hopes of restarting the treaty reform
process, and thus putting the EU on a new legal foundation, rested primarily on Germany,
which was to take over the presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007. Limiting itself by
pledging political support for an EU military mission in the DRC would not have increased
the likelihood of a successful German presidency, to say the least.
The use of the battlegroup could have presented a severe challenge to the smooth running,
good standing and maybe even the ultimate survival of the government. Remember that the
German-Franco battlegroup was de facto a German one, which meant that a failure of the
battlegroup mission would have been attributed more or less exclusively to the German
government. The challenge inherent in the mission arose from the incalculable risks
associated with it, for instance with respect to a potentially high number of casualties or the
engagement of European soldiers with child soldiers. A failure of the mission would have
almost inevitably triggered significant domestic and international repercussions for the newly
established governing coalition. It is very likely that the defense minister, as the one
11
politically responsible for the operation, would have had to resign. A failure of the mission
would have also called into question Germany’s future engagement in multinational conflict
management missions, which would have been detrimental to the country’s influence in
organizations such as the EU and NATO. Crucial for fending off the battlegroup option was
convincing the French, who not only generally supported an EU mission but specifically
favored the use of the German-Franco battlegroup (SZ 2006a), that it must not be used in the
DRC. At a bilateral meeting on January 23, Merkel reportedly told the French President,
Jacques Chirac, that she would not agree to the use of the battlegroup or accept a German
leadership role in an EU mission (Der Spiegel 2006b). However, Merkel hinted that she might
be willing to accept a co-leadership role, with France (Der Spiegel 2006c). Merkel won
Chirac over to her case. After the meeting Chirac stated that if the EU were to take over a
military mission in the DRC Germany should not carry a disproportionate burden (Die Welt
2006b).
Thus, the battlegroup option was off the table. At same time, Merkel had made it clear that
she supported a German military contribution to an EU mission, which ruled out the provision
of only political support. This left Merkel with options two (military support) and three (coleadership). Merkel was convinced that following-up on the UN’s request to take over a
military mission in Africa presented the EU with an opportunity to demonstrate its fledgling
capabilities as a foreign and security policy actor. Conversely, if the EU were to turn down
the request, Merkel saw a danger of the organization discrediting itself as a security actor (FR
2006b). In her view, this meant that Germany had to contribute to the mission militarily in
one way or another. As her exchange with Chirac had suggested, Merkel rejected the military
support option and chose the more extensive contribution as represented by the co-leadership
option. The most crucial reason for Merkel to do so was that she wanted to mend fences with
France. The bilateral relationship had deteriorated during the last years of Merkel’s
predecessor, Gerhard Schröder (SPD), and it was further strained by Merkel’s own efforts to
ameliorate the German relationship with the United States (Die Welt 2006d). If Merkel
wanted to use the EU mission in the DRC to improve the bilateral relationship, she had to
give in to Chirac’s wishes to at least some extent, particularly since she had made Chirac drop
the idea of using the battlegroup. Offering German co-leadership in the mission seemed the
obvious thing for Merkel to do. This was all the more true because a good German-Franco
relationship (the “two engines” of the European integration project) would enhance the
chancellor’s and her government’s influence in the EU in general, which, as mentioned above,
was patently necessary to overcome the constitutional crisis. Lending support to this argument
are statements by members of the German parliament’s Defense Committee who stated that
German participation in an EU military mission is the explicit wish of Chancellor Merkel who
wants to send a signal for cooperation to France (Die Welt 2006c).
Turning to Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, his most noteworthy contribution
during the initial stages of the German discussion was the lack thereof. Whereas Defense
Minister Jung tried from the outset to frame the political discussion in his favor, Foreign
Minister Steinmeier remained silent. Indeed, in the first two weeks after the UN’s request and
the ensuing discussions in the EU had become public, the most notable public remark on
behalf of the foreign ministry did not come from Steinmeier but from a ministry
spokesperson, who commented, dryly, that the ministry was looking into the UN’s request
(SZ 2006a).15 It was not until January 30 that Steinmeier entered the discussion. In an
interview, he signaled his openness for both an EU mission and a German military
15
Steinmeier participated in the German-Franco bilateral meeting on January 23, where Merkel and Chirac
agreed not to use the battlegroup. However, it was impossible to identify any comments on the subject by him
before or after the meeting.
12
contribution to the mission (Der Spiegel 2006d). Since Germany had previously contributed
to multinational missions in Africa, the question of whether to participate once again was no
longer, to him, a question of principle. With this, Steinmeier seemed to imply that the decision
would be determined by issues such as necessity, risks, and political will. In this sense,
Steinmeier pointed to several questions that still needed addressing. Among other things, he
called on the UN to present a concept for the mission. Equally important to him was that the
government of the DRC would support an EU mission. Referring to the ongoing political
discussion in Germany, Steinmeier pointed out that several members of the parliamentary
parties of the governing coalition harbored doubts regarding the mission. Overall, Steinmeier
argued that a mission must be restricted to a given timeframe and, more generally, would
require a sound justification.
Organizational interests suggest that Steinmeier ruled out options one (political support only)
and four (battlegroup) early on. Since a military mission would strengthen both the UN and
the EU more than just political support would be required from Germany. Indeed, with the
concept of “effective multilateralism” representing one of the guiding principles of the foreign
ministry (Bulletin 2005), it would be highly problematic to turn down a direct request for
military assistance from the UN by offering merely political support. What is more,
positioning the EU as a complementary actor to NATO in the security realm is another key
theme of the foreign ministry (Auswärtiges Amt 2010). Refraining from contributing
militarily to an EU mission would have run counter to this objective. Of course, saying that
the foreign ministry would not object in principle to a military action in the DRC is not to
suggest that it would automatically favor the use of the battlegroup. At this point, turf
considerations came into play. Using the de facto German battlegroup would have diminished
the role of the foreign ministry in a world region that features much more prominently on its
agenda than on that of the ministry of defense.
This left Steinmeier with options two and three, the provision of military support or coleadership. He opted for the former. Limiting the German contribution to support activities
would put certain limits on the ministry of defense’s role while at the same time
demonstrating the foreign ministry’s support for both the UN and the EU. One should also
bear in mind that Steinmeier, like Defense Minister Jung, was new to the job and, by and
large, the issue. Being promoted by his mentor Gerhard Schröder, Steinmeier was a career
bureaucrat first at the regional and then at the federal level, with a focus on domestic politics.
The repercussions of failure for the government, including the foreign minister, would have
been greater if the German contribution to an EU military mission were larger.
Bargaining and Resultant
Defense Minister Jung and Foreign Minister Steinmeier pursued option two, the provision of
military support to an EU military mission to the DRC. In contrast, Chancellor Merkel
supported option three; namely, the co-leadership option. In order to fend off a considerable
German contribution to an EU mission in the DRC as advocated by the Chancellor, both
ministers defined certain parameters that in their opinion had to be respected under any
circumstances. Speaking after a meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers in late February,
Foreign Minister Steinmeier called for the broadest participation possible of other EU
member states in an EU mission (AFP 2006c). In addition, Steinmeier repeated his claim that
a mission must be limited in time from the outset. Moreover, he now argued that the EU
mission should be restricted to the capital city of the DRC (AP 2006b; also Bulletin 2006).
Defense Minister Jung put forward an almost identical list of criteria (Presse- und
13
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 2006: 34). Following an informal meeting of the EU’s
defense ministers in early March, he also argued that Europe’s joint responsibility for Africa
in general, and a mission in the DRC in particular, must be reflected in a burden-sharing
arrangement among EU member states (AP 2006c). Jung’s other conditions were the consent
of the Congolese government to an EU mission, a clear mandate from the UN, and restrictions
on the mission with respect to both duration and area of deployment.
Unless she wanted to severely damage the credibility of her defense minister, stir conflict
among the coalition parties by challenging her foreign minister, or call into question the
ability of her government to make important foreign policy decisions in general, Chancellor
Merkel had little choice but to accept the criteria set forward by her ministers. In mid-March
2006 she too argued that Germany would participate in an EU mission if certain conditions
were met. In fact, it was exactly those conditions that the two ministers had previously
advocated; namely, a broad European participation in the mission, consent of the Congolese
government to a mission, the restriction of the mission to Kinshasa, and a time limit for the
mission (FR 2006c).
In line with the predictions of the GPM, the decision of the German government regarding the
country’s participation in EUFOR RD Congo is best described as a resultant. The unintended
compromise solution, which was agreed upon in a Cabinet meeting on May 17, could be
labeled “restricted co-leadership”. This is because the decision combined elements of policy
options two and three, that is, military support as advocated by Defense Minister Jung and
Foreign Minister Steinmeier on the one hand and co-leadership as advanced by Chancellor
Merkel on the other. There is no doubt that Germany did contribute significantly to EUFOR
RD Congo. It did so in four respects. First, the operational headquarters of the mission was
located at the Armed Forces Operations Command of the German Armed Forces
(Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr) in Potsdam. Second, the then commander of the
German Armed Forces Operations Command, Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck, was
appointed EU Operation Commander. Third, Germany sent almost 800 troops (up to 500
combat forces and up to 280 support forces) on the mission, which represented more than a
third of the total force. Finally, Germany made substantial financial contributions to the
mission. Based on the ATHENA mechanism, which regulates the distribution of common
costs of EU military operations expenditures among member states, Germany paid some 20%
of the “European costs”. In addition, based on the principle of “costs lie where they fall”,
Germany had to cover the “national costs” of the mission, for which the government
earmarked up to 56 Million Euros (Deutscher Bundestag 2006).
Despite this considerable engagement, the German contribution to EUFOR RD Congo was
nonetheless restricted in at least three respects, thereby diminishing the country’s role as coleader of the mission. First, roughly two-thirds of the German troops were not deployed to
Kinshasa but to Libreville in Gabon, where they formed part of a quickly deployable “on-call”
force.16 Second, the German troops deployed to the DRC were restricted to the area of
Kinshasa, although the EU mission was not itself limited to the capital. Finally, heavy
emphasis was put, particularly by Defense Minister Jung, on the limiting the mission to a
period of four months, which meant an end date of November 30 (e.g., AFP 2006d). This
inflexible stance earned the German government earned criticism from within the EU. The
16
The German forces stationed in Gabon were sent to Kinshasa just once. This happened in the second half of
August when the publication of the results of the first round of the presidential elections triggered violent clashes
between the camps of the two leading contenders, Kabila and Bemba.
14
French, in particular, wanted to prolong the mission until the inauguration of the reelected
president in mid-December.17
Alternative Explanations
Party politics presents one alternative domestic political explanation for the resultant decision.
The government of the grand coalition, which brought together two parties of almost similar
size from different political camps, could have been deadlocked due to clashing party
ideologies or party political interests. The only chance of overcoming this deadlock was if the
individual ministers departed from their initial policy preferences and settled for an
unintended compromise. Yet there is little evidence that either party ideology or party politics
had any significant impact on the decision. The major fault line within the government did not
run between conservative cabinet members on the one hand and social-democratic cabinet
members on the other. Indeed, the differences between Chancellor Merkel and Defense
Minister Jung, both from the conservative CDU, were at least as pronounced as those between
Merkel and the social-democratic Foreign Minister Steinmeier. Conversely, although arriving
at their positions from different starting points, Jung and Steinmeier pursued similar policy
options.
Another alternative explanation is that all members of government had to abandon their initial
policy preferences because the German parliament, whose approval of deployment decisions
is mandated by law, forced them to. Yet, there is little evidence to support this claim either.
On June 1, the cabinet’s proposal for a mandate received an overwhelming majority in
parliament. Parliamentarians that voted in favor of the proposal numbered 440, 135 voted
against it and six abstained. The vote points to one factor that diminished the influence of
parliament, namely, the lack of unity among the opposition parties. Whereas the green party
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen supported the proposal of the cabinet, the liberal FDP and the postcommunist Die Linke voted against it.
Of course, since the grand coalition had a huge parliamentary majority, one could argue that
the lack of unity among the opposition parties was irrelevant. The primary determinant of the
legislative’s influence on the government was, rather, the degree of unity among the
parliamentary parties that supported the coalition government. Yet the parliamentary parties
of CDU/CSU and SPD did not pursue a unified position either. However, the fault line did not
run across the parties but within them, which supports the above claim regarding the low
salience of party politics. Politicians from both parliamentary parties that judged the mission
from a security and defense policy perspective were highly skeptical concerning German
participation in the mission and the mission itself in the first place. For instance, both the
deputy chairperson of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag, Thomas Kossendey (CDU),
and the SPD parliamentary party’s spokesperson on defense, Rainer Arnold, questioned the
preparedness of the German armed forces for a mission in the DRC. They concluded that the
armed forces could take over solely support functions in an EU mission (e.g., transport) (BZ
2006; Die Welt 2006e). Conversely, parliamentarians who viewed the mission from a foreign
policy or developmental policy perspective were much more favorable toward an EU military
engagement and a German contribution to it. For instance, both the chairperson of the
CDU/CSU parliamentary party’s working group on Africa, Hartwig Fischer (CDU), and the
chairperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party’s working group on economic cooperation
17
This position was advocated by the French Commander of the EU Force Headquarters in Kinshasa, Christian
Damay, and reportedly also by the French Minister of Defense, Michèle Alliot-Marie, at an informal meeting of
the EU Defense Ministers in early October (FAZ 2006d).
15
and development, Christian Ruck (CSU), decidedly supported the UN mission in the DRC
(FAZ 2006c; Die Welt 2006e). Overall, the lack of unity among the opposition parties, as well
as the parliamentarians who carried the government, relegated the Bundestag to the sidelines
with respect to Germany’s decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to enhance the explanatory power of the Governmental Politics
Model (GPM). Specifically, the paper addressed the model’s ambiguity concerning the
formation of decision makers’ policy preferences. It argues that incorporating the substantive
claim of the GPM’s stand-sit proposition (“Where you stand depends on where you sit”) into
the framework of the poliheuristic theory of decision making (PH) can overcome this
ambiguity. Accordingly, the formation of actors’ policy preferences is conceived as a twostage process. Based on a “noncompensatory organizational loss variable”, all options that are
likely to engender unacceptable costs for an actor’s organization are eliminated at the first
stage. During the second stage, actors chose the option that promises the highest net benefit
and the lowest net risk when measured against all the decision dimensions they have
identified as relevant. The model then continues with the other two core propositions of the
GPM, the bargaining proposition and the resultant proposition respectively. Thus, having
formed their policy preferences, governmental actors enter inter-governmental bargaining
processes that lead to unintended compromise solutions, or resultants.
Integrating insights from the GPM and PH not only contributes to overcoming the former’s
deficiencies with respect to the formation of actors’ policy preferences. It also enhances the
applicability of PH with respect to group decision making (Mintz 2004: 10). When being
applied to the latter, it might be more accurate to conceive PH as a viable tool for identifying
policy preferences rather than a theory about decision making. Of course, after having
identified the preferences of the decision makers involved in the group decision making
process one needs to explain how those preferences are aggregated into a collective decision.
Adding the GPM’s bargaining and resultant propositions to the picture, as suggested in this
paper, could help achieve this end.
The explanatory power of the revised GPM was tested in an illustrative case study; namely,
Germany’s decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo, which was an EU military operation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The discussion showed that the policy
preferences of key decision makers (Chancellor, defense minister, and foreign minister) can
be explained using the two-stage process of preference formation outlined above. Decision
makers discarded options that were unacceptable to their organization and selected from the
remaining options the one that promised the greatest net benefit when measured against
several decision dimensions, including organizational interests. Having formed their policy
preferences, the decision makers entered an intra-governmental bargaining process at the end
of which stood a solution that none of the actors had initially advocated. The claim of this
paper is that this resultant decision was the result of ministries’ clashing organizational
interests. Other domestic politics variables that could have caused an unintended compromise
solution, namely party politics or the influence of the legislature on executive decision
making, held little explanatory leverage in the case under scrutiny. The case study also
provided no evidence that the conflict between decision makers was prompted by factors
other than a competitive goal structure between different ministries, such as social or
psychological factors, as suggested by Kaarbo and Gruenfeld (1998; see also Ripley 1995).
16
Explaining the German decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo as a result of
governmental politics is not to deny the impact of international influences. The UN’s request
that the EU assist its mission in the DRC during the electoral process and the pledge made by
Germany to contribute to an EU battlegroup in the first half of 2006 were certainly important.
However, while those factors shaped the context in which the domestic actors had to make
their decision, they are insufficient to explain the extent of Germany’s participation in
EUFOR RD Congo or why Germany participated in the first place. Indeed, there is certainly
no automatism between UN peacekeeping activities and the contribution of German armed
forces to UN missions. In June 2010 Germany ranked 44th among the UN member states with
respect to contributions to military or police UN operations (UN 2010). Germany does not
always contribute great numbers to EU military missions, either. For instance, Germany
provided only military support for the first EU military mission in the DRC in 2003, and
when the EU conducted its largest military mission to date, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in
the Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 and 2009, Germany opted out altogether.
Despite a UN mandate and pressure by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, to step up its
engagement all Germany did was to send a handful of liaison officers to the operational
headquarters of the mission in Paris. In short, despite international pressure, Germany could
have said no to EUFOR RD Congo or opted for a much more limited engagement.
International influences had to be filtered by the domestic decision makers, and this paper
suggests that the major “filter” was the organizational interests of the key decision makers.
In closing, this paper suggests several paths for future research. In theoretical terms, the
explanatory power of the stand-sit proposition as presented above should be tested in
additional cases. On a more general level, this paper’s integration of insights from the GPM
and PH might prove helpful for thinking about additional ways in which to advance
theoretical integration in FPA. Empirically, Germany’s EUFOR RD Congo decision could be
examined by employing approaches from levels of analysis other than the domestic politics
approaches used in this paper. Finally, a systematic comparison of Germany’s participation,
or lack thereof, in other EU military missions seems warranted. Above all, the question should
be whether the factors stipulated by the GPM do not only explain Germany’s significant
contribution to EFURO RD Congo but also its non-contribution to other European military
missions in Africa.
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