The Impact of Skill-Based Immigration Restrictions:
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
Joyce Chen*
The Ohio State University
July 2012
Abstract
This paper considers the impact of skill-based immigration restrictions, using the Chinese
Exclusion Act as a natural experiment. I find that restrictions reduced the average occupational
standing of Chinese immigrants, suggesting substitution between observed and unobserved
skills. Conversely, children of restricted immigrants have greater human capital than those of
unrestricted immigrants, despite restricted immigrants themselves having lower skill. This
suggests particularly strong inter-generational transmission of skill among Chinese immigrants
of the exclusion era, More generally, the findings indicate that the effects of skill-based
restrictions are not always straightforward and may be heterogeneous across groups.
Keywords: immigration; skill-based restrictions; occupation; inter-generational mobility
JEL Codes: J15; J24; J61; J62
*
Contact information: Mailing Address – Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics,
324 Agricultural Administration Building, 2120 Fyffe Road, Columbus, OH 43210; E-mail – chen.1276@osu.edu;
Phone - (614)292-9813. I would like to thank Claudia Goldin, Guillermina Jasso, Alex Keyssar, Mark Rosenzweig
and participants of the 2011 NEUDC Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Support from the Center
for International Development at the Kennedy School of Government is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining
errors are my own.
I. Introduction
Restrictions imposed on Chinese immigrants marked two watershed moments in the
history of US immigration policy. The Page Law of 1875, which barred any persons from
entering the country for “for lewd and immoral purposes” and referred specifically to “any
subject of China, Japan, or any Oriental country” constituted the first legislated restriction on
immigration to the United States (see Appendix I). This act established the precedent for direct
federal regulation of immigration, including the authority to deny entry to certain undesirable
persons. Earlier statutes had regulated various aspects of the immigration process, but had placed
no explicit restrictions on immigration.1 The next piece of immigration legislation to be enacted,
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, was the first in US history to differentiate by national origin
and began a long history of racially-motivated immigration restrictions, in place until the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. It was also the first law to impose restrictions on the
basis of skill, a legacy that persists in current policy. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
prohibited immigration of all Chinese laborers, either skilled or unskilled, providing specific
exemptions for merchants, teachers, students and officials.
In this paper, I utilize historical census data to examine the human capital of Chinese
immigrants throughout history, using the restrictions of the Chinese Exclusion Act as a natural
experiment. While a tremendous amount of work has been done on the effect of skill-based
selection on outcomes for both natives and immigrants, relatively little is known about the effect
of skill-based restrictions. One the one hand, the effect of such restrictions seems clear – an
increase in the average skill of targeted immigrants. However, if skills are multi-dimensional,
1
Legislation enacted between 1790 and 1875 covered the following: regulation of the naturalization process,
registration of aliens entering the country, recognition of the government’s right to deport aliens deemed dangerous
to the country, vessel occupancy standards to safeguard the health and safety of passengers both entering and exiting
the country, and prohibition the transportation of “coolies” on American vessels.
1
then restrictions on observed skills may affect self-selection on unobserved skills, perhaps even
undermining the goals of the original policy. From an analytic standpoint, the case of Chinese
exclusion is particularly useful for two reasons: the restrictions were enacted (1) without
accompanying quotas, and (2) at a time in which immigration was essentially unrestricted
(excepting certain “undesirables” – e.g., criminals, prostitutes). Moreover, the restrictions were
later extended to an entire “Asiatic barred zone” ranging from the Middle East to the island
nations of the Indian Ocean and North Pacific. A comparison across origin countries will allow
us, under certain conditions, to separate changes in selectivity imposed by US law from those
that arose endogenously, in response to the new restrictions, providing additional insight into
historical differences in self-selection across countries.
Using microdata from the US decennial censuses, I find that occupational outcomes
among Chinese immigrants worsened after skill-based restrictions were imposed. Restricted
Chinese immigrants exhibited weaker positive selection, relative to the Japanese, who were
subject the same restrictions and migrated under similar conditions. More surprisingly, postexclusion Chinese immigrants also exhibit weaker positive selection relative to their
predecessors, who migrated without restriction. Because the Exclusion Act required higher levels
of observed skill, the decline in aggregate skill suggests that observed and unobserved skills2
were substitutes in the migration decision. Moreover, this finding suggests that the skill-based
restrictions of the Chinese Exclusion Act were, in some respects, ineffectual. Although they were
successful in limiting the immigration of laborers, narrowly defined, they did not, in fact, elevate
the average occupational standing or human capital of the restricted group.
In contrast, I find that children of restricted Chinese immigrants have better outcomes
(occupation, literacy, schooling) than children of restricted Japanese immigrants. But, given that
2
Alternately, these could be deemed targeted and untargeted skills, based on the nature of the restriction.
2
restricted Chinese immigrants had worse occupational outcomes and lower literacy rates, this
cannot be explained solely by the inter-generational transmission of skill, either observed or
unobserved. Rather, it seems that Chinese immigrants of the exclusion era invested particularly
heavily in the human capital of their children, as is commonly found among immigrant
populations (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990, 409). This helps to explain the evolution of the
Chinese stereotype from cheap, exploitable contract laborer to successful “model minority” in
less than 100 years. But skill-based restrictions cannot be credited with this upward progress
because, among the Japanese, children of restricted immigrants fare worse than children of
unrestricted immigrants, despite the fact that restricted Japanese had better occupational
outcomes. The findings of this paper suggest that, where skill prices and distributions are such
that there is significant scope for substitution between different types of skill, restrictions based
on a single skill type may, in fact, have adverse effects on the average skill of targeted groups, in
either the first or the second generation.
II. A Brief History of Chinese Immigration to the US
Unrestricted Immigration:1848-1882
News of the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in California in 1848 spurred the first
large-scale immigrant waves of Chinese to America, but anti-Chinese became apparent early on
in California. In 1852, California legislators proposed an exclusionary law to prohibit future
Chinese immigration but were only successful in enacting two new taxes that targeted newly
arriving immigrants and disproportionately burdened the Chinese. The commutation tax required
masters of all vessels arriving in California to post a bond for each foreign passenger aboard.
This bond could be “commuted” for a nominal fee and thus was typically added to the cost of
3
passage to America; the Chinese eventually paid over half of all commutation taxes to the state
of California. (Chang 2003, 42) The foreign miner’s tax required all foreign miners to pay
monthly license fees in gold dust in order to continue work on their mining claims (Kanazawa,
2005). Then, in 1853, it was ruled that Chinese could not testify against whites in court, a ruling
that “opened the way for almost every sort of discrimination against the Chinese... so long as no
white person was available to witness on their behalf.” (Chang 2003, 45 from Sandmeyer) The
rugged frontier lifestyle of California encouraged many Chinese to turn to ethnic/clan
associations (the Chinese Six Companies) for security. Those who were not members of formal
associations often joined secret societies known as “tongs,” many of which imported prostitutes
to be sold at auction in San Francisco. This spurred the passage of one of the first laws restricting
immigration into the United States, the Page Law of 1875, which barred any persons from
entering the country for “for lewd and immoral purposes” and referred specifically to “any
subject of China, Japan, or any Oriental country.” (see Appendix I)
Chinese prospectors who did not find their fortunes in gold soon headed back to the city
of San Francisco to seek other ventures. Newly arrived Chinese immigrants also began to stay in
San Francisco as the Chinese community and economy grew, seeking employment from Chinese
entrepreneurs or starting their own small businesses rather than staking out mining claims. Many
opened curio stores, ethnic groceries and restaurants, continuing the merchant tradition common
in their home regions of southeast China. The shortage of women in California at the time also
created niche markets that many Chinese were willing to fill by taking on “women’s work” as
launderers and restaurateurs, a stereotype that has persisted into the present. At the time of the
gold rush, many Californians shipped their laundry to Hong Kong for cleaning, a four month
process which cost roughly one dollar per shirt, in nominal terms. (Chang 2003, 49) Chinese
4
laundries in San Francisco flourished, and some Chinese even became domestic workers for the
more affluent residents of San Francisco. Construction of the transcontinental railroad also
absorbed many Chinese emigrants who were ready to leave mining. Railroad executives became
staunch advocates of Chinese immigration and, with the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, China
agreed to open up emigration in exchange for most favored nation status in trade. The Central
Pacific Railroad Corporation launched large recruiting efforts in China, and “at the peak of
construction, Central Pacific would employ more than ten thousand Chinese men.” (Chang 2003,
57) After the completion of the railroad in May 1869, all but a few hundred Chinese, as well as
the large majority of white laborers, were laid off and left at the completion point in Promontory
Point, Utah. At this point, the Chinese diaspora scattered much more widely across the country,
continuing to work as merchants but moving also into farm and factory labor.
Meanwhile, resentment of the Chinese continued to grow, based partly on the
observations that Chinese put downward pressure on wages, tended to keep their capital within
the Chinese community, and sent significant remittances to China (likely to repay the cost of
passage to the US, see Cloud and Galenson, 1987 and McClain, 1990). Moreover, in California,
where 78% of the Chinese population was concentrated in 1870, the revenue generated by taxes
targeted at the Chinese (the foreign miner’s tax and the commutation tax) had declined in
importance for the state’s fiscal position, paving the way for exclusionary legislation (Kanazawa,
2005). To add to the growing resentment of Chinese immigrants, the 1870s proved to be a time
of high unemployment and economic depression. The end of the Civil War increased the supply
of workers, and the completion of the transcontinental railroad increased labor mobility,
primarily into urban centers. The associated reduction in transport costs for goods also led to
significant changes in industrial composition and churning in the job market. In 1877, the stock
5
market plummeted due to a severe drought in the West and a sudden decline in silver output
from the Nevada Comstock Lode (Chang 2003, 124), further increasing unemployment and
urban crowding. Violence against the Chinese erupted in San Francisco and in smaller
neighboring towns, and large numbers of Chinese left the state in 1880. White laborers in the
East also began to equate Chinese workers with scabs, and resentment there flourished as well.
Figure 1 presents annual immigration of Chinese to the United States for the period 1846
to 1882. Prior to 1854, immigration of Chinese had been less than fifty persons per year. In 1854,
this number jumped to 13,100, presumably in response to the discovery of gold in California, and
then stabilized somewhat to a range of 3,000 to 7,000 for the next 10 years. Chinese immigration
declined steadily from 1864 to 1866 as gold discoveries slowed, reaching a low of 1,872 in 1866.
However, construction of the transcontinental railroad and the adoption of the Burlingame Treaty
led again to increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants through 1870. Completion of the railroad
led to high temporary unemployment among Chinese in the United States and the passage of
several anti-Chinese laws and ordinances, which depressed immigration for a short time, 1871 to
1872, before it again spiked in 1873. Extensive agricultural development and land reclamation in
the western states, spurred by lower land transport costs and expanded product markets,
supported relatively high Chinese immigration through 1876. At this time, the national economy
began to slump and anti-Chinese sentiment was renewed, leading to a period of depressed
immigration from 1877 to 1879. In 1880, the American and Chinese governments signed a
migration treaty, known as Angell’s Treaty, which granted the United States government
permission to regulate, limit or suspend the immigration of Chinese laborers but not prohibit it
entirely. (Tsai 1988, 23) Political discussions of an act to exclude Chinese immigrants altogether
6
started almost immediately, and many Chinese seized this opportunity to migrate to the United
States in anticipation of the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. (Chan 1988, 99)
The Exclusion Era: 1882-1943
The Chinese Exclusion Act was first introduced in 1881, with the purpose of barring
Chinese immigration for twenty years. President Chester Arthur vetoed the bill, but finally
signed another version into law on May 6, 1882. Immigration of Chinese laborers, “both skilled
and unskilled... and Chinese employed in mining,” was suspended for a period of ten years,
beginning ninety days after the passage of the law (see Appendix II). Chinese persons wishing to
enter the United States for the first time were now required to possess documentation from the
Chinese government verifying their occupation and eligibility for immigration. “Diplomatic and
other officers of the Chinese Government traveling upon the business of that government… and
their body and household servants” were explicitly exempted from the provisions of the act,
while “teachers, students, merchants… together with their body and household servants” were
designated exempt classes per Angell’s Treaty. All Chinese who entered the United States prior
to the effective date of the act were, however, granted permission to “go from and come to the
United States of their free will and accord,” and the evidence of this right was to take the form of
a certificate issued by customs officials. The scope of customs officials’ duties was thereby
expanded, requiring them to compile a detailed registry3 of all Chinese immigrants departing the
United States and issue an identification certificate to each person that would permit re-entry into
the country. Customs officials were also charged with the inspection of all incoming Chinese
passengers and verification of any certificates granting them permission to enter the country,
including both identification certificates issued by US officials for re-entry purposes and
3
Registry items included “name, age, occupation, last place of residence, physical marks or peculiarities, and all
facts necessary for... identification.”
7
certificates issued by Chinese officials to establish exemption from the provisions of the 1882
act. Finally, the 1882 act prohibited the naturalization of Chinese persons, thereby repealing all
prior laws that might have been in conflict.
Chinese immigration declined precipitously after the passage of the act, from 39,579 in
1882 to 8,031 and 279 in 1883 and 1884, respectively. In 1884, the Exclusion Act was amended
to cover all persons of Chinese descent, rather than only persons emigrating from China. The
amendment also imposed a more stringent process for identifying persons exempt from the
provisions of the act. Certificates issued by the Chinese government now had to be endorsed by
diplomatic representatives of the United States. These officials were further required to verify the
statements in the certificates, and failure to receive endorsement would render the certificate
invalid for immigration to the United States. These certificates were also now deemed the “sole
evidence permissible... to establish a right of entry into the United States,” and the United States
reserved the authority to deny entry to those it deemed to have false information on these
certificates. In 1888, the Chinese Exclusion Act was again amended by the Scott Act, which
revoked the right of free travel in and out of the United States previously granted to all legal
Chinese laborers. Hereafter, only those laborers with “a lawful wife, child or parent in the United
States, or property therein of the value of one thousand dollars, or debts of like amount due him
and pending settlement” were permitted to return to the United States. Roughly 20,000 Chinese
who were out of the country at the time the legislation was enacted were unable to return, and
600 who were currently in transit to the United States with government-issued return certificates
were denied entry. (Chang 2003, 135)
The laws enacted up to this point were renewed for an additional ten years with the Geary
Act of 1892, which further stipulated that
8
... any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent arrested under the provisions of this act or the
acts hereby extended shall be ajudged to be unlawfully within the United States unless such person
shall establish, by affirmative proof to the satisfaction of such justice, judge, or commissioner, his
lawful right to remain in the United States,
and required all Chinese laborers currently in the country apply for certificates of residence.
Those who did not obtain such certificates within one year of the date of enactment could then be
arrested and deported. These provisions were extended to the Territory of Hawaii in 1900, and
the entry of Chinese persons into the United States from Hawaii was thereafter prohibited. In
1904, all laws regarding Chinese immigration were re-enacted and extended indefinitely. A final
blow to Chinese immigration came with the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in United States v.
Ju Toy, in which it was ruled that the secretary of commerce and labor, who supervised
immigration issues, had final jurisdiction over all Chinese denied entry into the country, whether
citizen or alien. This effectively denied due process to Chinese-American citizens, as well as
removing an important check on immigration officials. After the ruling, 29% of Chinese
immigration applicants were rejected, compared to a rejection rate of only 10% between 1897
and 1899. (Chang 2003, 142-143)
On April 18, 1906, an earthquake hit San Francisco, and a resultant fire destroyed city
birth and citizenship records. The loss of these records allowed many Chinese immigrants to
claim their birthplace as San Francisco and thereby establish American citizenship. American
citizenship conveyed the right to travel to and from the United States for laborers who did not
meet the requirements of the 1888 Scott Act. Furthermore, foreign-born children of American
citizens were also entitled to citizenship4, which would allow Chinese currently in the United
States to bring members of their family into the country as well, even without belonging to one
of the exempted classes. In practice, many Chinese-American citizens, rather than sponsoring
4
Provided that his/her father was a U.S. citizen at the time of the birth and had lived in the United States prior to the
birth. (Chang 2003, 146)
9
their own children, if any, sold the paperwork for their “children” or passed it on to other
relatives in China. Birth records from China were difficult to obtain at the time, so relations were
typically established by testimony from others, creating a large loophole for chain migration,
deemed the “paper sons” program. The number of Chinese gaining admittance to the United
States via claims of citizenship did appear to increase in the early 1910s, as indicated by Table 1,
and the number of Chinese admitted as U.S. citizens exceed those admitted from exempt classes
between 1906 and 1918.5 It should also be noted that a new immigration station was established
on Angel Island, California in 1910, ostensibly to accommodate the large bureaucracy needed to
process Chinese immigrants. In practice, the location of the facility would be an effective means
for quarantining Chinese aliens, preventing possible escapes, and limiting communications with
friends and family already in the country who might be able to provide “coaching” through the
immigration process. (Lee 2003, 126-127)
Statutes passed after the first Chinese Exclusion Act gradually broadened the classes of
aliens ineligible for admission into the United States. In 1885, it was deemed unlawful to import
any contract laborers, with exceptions for skilled laborers and domestic workers. Acts passed in
1891, 1903, 1907 and 1910 prescribed additional inadmissible classes, not restricted by race or
ethnicity, as well as various reorganizations of the agency charged with enforcing immigration
and naturalization law. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 limited Japanese immigration to the
United States via treaty law (Inui, 1925); the limitations were enforced by the Japanese
government through the denial of passports to laborers intending to enter the US, rather than by
the US government, as in the case of the Chinese Exclusion Act. However, the Immigration Act
of 1917 established explicitly an “Asiatic barred zone” covering all Asian countries except Japan
5
Table 1, reproduced from Lee 2003, does not match the numbers I obtain from the Annual Reports of the
Commissioner-General of Immigration, and I have not yet been able to verify the validity of this table from primary
source documents.
10
(which was still covered by the Gentlemen’s Agreement), the Philippines and countries in the
Middle East, with exemptions for officials, teachers, missionaries, various skilled laborers,
merchants, travelers, and spouses and children of these persons. This act also established a
literacy requirement for all immigrants over sixteen years of age, physically capable of reading,
excepting any citizen or legal alien’s “father or grandfather over fifty-five years of age, his wife,
his mother, his grandmother, or his unmarried or widowed daughter.” The Immigration Act of
1924 further excluded all persons ineligible for citizenship, including the Japanese and others of
Asian descent, and further stipulated numerical quotas that reduced the number of Chinese
immigrants admitted but not did not alter the qualitative admission policies previously enacted.
However, in a 1925 ruling (Chang Chan et. al. v. Nagle), the Supreme Court determined that
Chinese wives of American citizens were also barred from entering the country under the
Immigration Act of 1924 (McKenzie 1927, 34).
Figure 2 presents the pattern of Chinese immigration from 1882 to 19306. Chinese
immigration dropped off dramatically after the passage of the first exclusion act in 1882 and
again after the 1884 amendment, the Geary Act of 1892, the Ju Toy Supreme Court decision in
1905, and the Immigration Act of 1924. A slight upward trend can be seen in 1907-1910,
presumably with the beginning of the “paper son” phenomenon, but there is again a slight drop
off in 1911 and 1912 with the opening of the Angel Island immigration station. Chinese
immigration as a percent of total immigration rose slightly after 1917 with the implementation of
the Asiatic barred zone and the subsequent reduction in immigration from other Asian countries,
primarily India. The large spikes in Chinese non-immigrant aliens can be attributed to persons
“granted the privilege of transit in bond across land territory of the United States.” In 1918,
28,838 of the Chinese non-immigrants admitted were “destined to France for war work” (U.S.
6
Primary source data for 1931 through 1943 have not yet been located.
11
Bureau of Immigration 1920, 270) and did not remain in the US. To verify that the skill-based
restrictions were binding, we can look at literacy and occupational scores, adjusted for
differences in demographic composition (age, sex, birth cohort) between Chinese immigrants
native-born whites. Note that, because data on year of entry are not available, these figures
conflate composition and arrival cohort effects, so the effects of the Exclusion Act will be
difficult to pinpoint. And, unfortunately, data from the 1890 census were destroyed (Blake,
1996), so we cannot determine whether literacy (occupational score) for Chinese immigrants
reached a nadir in 1890 or 1900 (1910). But, from Figure 3, clear upward trends are visible from
1900-1910 until 1940, when both whites and Chinese were, presumably, adversely affected by
the Great Depression.
III. Empirical Approach
To determine how human capital among Chinese immigrants is related to selection on
skill7, we can utilize exclusionary legislation, which imposed a specific form of skill-based
selection, as a natural experiment. But, as Chiswick (1986) suggests, immigrants may be selfselected not only on observed skills (e.g., literacy, occupation) but also on unobserved skills such
as ambition and initiative, which are also positively correlated with investments in human
capital. In that case, exclusionary legislation may have altered, rather than obviated, patterns of
self-selection among Chinese immigrants.
Theoretical Framework
To help fix ideas, suppose wages in the source and host countries can be expressed as
= + and = + with ~(, ) and ~(0, )
7
This paper does not utilize data on the human capital of native Chinese and therefore does not address the question
of positive/negative selection of immigrants. Rather, the focus is on human capital of ethnic Chinese in the US
relative to natives.
12
where s and k represent observed and unobserved skills, respectively, and µ and ε are the
country-specific (fixed) prices paid for these skills. As in a typical Roy model (Roy, 1951),
assume an individual migrates on the basis of net wage gains, where π represents the cost of
migrating.
I = 1 if + − ≥ + [1]
Note that, with a fixed moving cost, observed and unobserved skills are substitutes in this
simplified framework, and immigrants from the same source in the same year will display a mix
of the two attributes. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (and its successors) ensured that any
new immigrants would be admitted solely on the basis of high observed skill, effectively
legislating ≥ and shifting the skill composition of immigrants towards observed skill and
away from unobserved skill. Therefore, the weaker the selection on observed skill (and the
stronger the selection on unobserved skill) prior to exclusion, the larger the change in average
unobserved skills after exclusion.
Assuming immigration restrictions were binding, the average change in wages among
immigrants, before and after skill-based restrictions, can be expressed as
( | = 1, = 1) − ( | = 1, = 0) =
= 1, ≥ − (| = 1) + = 1, ≥ − (| = 1) .
[2]
The first term reflects legislated changes in selection on observed skill (“direct” effect) across
countries, while the second term reflects self-determined changes in selection on unobserved
skill (“indirect” effect) across countries. To learn something more about the effect of
exclusionary legislation on self-selection then requires identifying a “control” group – a
population subjected to the same immigration restrictions. And, because the average skill of
immigrants depends on not only the distribution of skill, but also on moving costs and source
13
country skill prices, the appropriate control group must also have faced similar economic
conditions in the source country. More formally, suppose skill prices in China and country (J)
are the same, even though the distributions of skills may differ.
! = + " and = + " with ~(#, ! ) and "~(0, ,!
)
Then, if the immigration restrictions are binding for both, the difference in wages between
immigrants from China and country J, before and after the exclusions are imposed, is
!
!
($ | = 1, = 1) − ($ | = 1, = 0) − ( | = 1, = 1) − ( | = 1, = 0) =
{ $ = 1, ≥ − ( $ | = 1) − [ ! = 1, ≥ − ( ! | = 1)]}
+ {( $ | = 1) − $ = 1, ≥ − [( ! | = 1) − ! = 1, ≥ ]}. [3]
If both skill prices and the distributions of observed skill are the same across the two countries,
the first term will be equal to zero, and the difference-in-difference will exactly identify relative
changes in self-selection as a result of exclusionary legislation. If, however, the distribution of
observed skill differs across countries, then the comparison across groups will attenuate, but not
eliminate, the direct effect of exclusion on observed skill. What remains of the direct effect will
reflect differences in the distribution of observed skill across countries, and we can sign the
direction of this “bias” by looking at a measure of observed skill, separate from unobserved skill.
Given that human capital is transmitted inter-generationally, we can also estimate the
effect of exclusionary legislation by examining wages for second-generation Chinese and
Japanese. Suppose, similar to Borjas (1993), that skills are transmitted from generation t to
generation t – 1 according to the following Markov process
)* = * + * = +, (*- + *- ) + .*
[4]
14
where ρ captures the extent of intergenerational transmission for ethnic group i. The average skill
difference between children of Chinese and Japanese immigrants, before and after “treatment”,
can then be expressed as
+$ )*-,$ = 1 − )*-,$ = 1, = 1 − + ! [)*-,! = 1 − )*-,! = 1, = 1]
Rearranging terms, we see that the above expression is positive if and only if
)*-,$ = 1 − )*-,$ = 1, = 1 − [)*-,! = 1 − )*-,! = 1, = 1] >
!
[(+0 1+0$ ) − 1][)*-,! = 1 − )*-,! = 1, = 1]
[5]
where I refers to the immigration decision of the parent(s), and T2 refers to having parents who
were “treated” by exclusionary immigration laws.
The difference between children of “treated” Chinese and Japanese immigrants then
reflects both the effect of exclusionary legislation on parents’ skill and the extent to which these
skills are transmitted across generations. But, from the analysis of first generation immigrants,
we know the sign of
)*-,$ = 1 − )*-,$ = 1, = 1 − [)*-,! = 1 − )*-,! = 1, = 1],
where T refers to migrants themselves being affected by exclusionary legislation, provided prices
for observed and unobserved skill do not differ too drastically. Then, assuming
)*-,! = 1 − )*-,! = 1, = 1 > 0, if the difference-in-difference estimate for the
second generation is positive (negative) and that for the first generation is negative (positive), it
must be the case that +0! < +0$ +0! > +0$ . However, because fertility (F) is endogenous, the
distribution of skill may differ across immigrants with and without children, suggesting that
(*- | = 1, = 1) = (*-| = 1, = 1, 3 = 1) ≠ (*- | = 1, = 1).
[6]
15
!
Determining the sign of +0$ − +0 , differences in preferences for human capital investments across
ethnic groups, then requires estimating the relationship between skill and fertility as well and how it
was affected by exclusionary immigration policies.
Empirical Specification
The simple theoretical framework outlined above suggests a difference-in-difference type
approach, comparing immigrants across ethnic groups, before and during the exclusion era, and
using native-born whites as a comparison group to account for secular changes in human capital
accumulation.
5,67* = 86 + 9* + :7 + , ∗ <6 + , ∗ =ℎ?@AA6 B6 + ,67*
The wage of individual i in ethnic group j, cohort c, at time t can be expressed as a function of
some group fixed effect (α), a period effect, (β), a cohort effect (γ), an indicator for whether the
individual was “treated” (T) – migrated before/after exclusions were imposed, and an interaction
term between the individual’s “treatment” status and ethnic group. The coefficient on treatment
status (δ) captures the effect of exclusionary legislation on the average skill level of immigrants.
For two groups subject to the same immigration restrictions, the coefficient on the interaction
term (θ) provides an indication of the extent to which exclusion affected self-selection among the
Chinese, relative to the control group. To the extent that source country economic conditions
(skill prices) and transport costs were similar for the Chinese and Japanese, we can further
interpret the interaction term as capturing differences in self-selection, net of legislated skill
requirements. For the second generation, I use a similar approach, comparing second generation
Asians, based on whether or not their parents migrated under the exclusionary laws, to estimate
the effect of parental “treatment” on children’s outcomes. In this case, the interaction between
16
treatment and ethnic group can, with some additional assumptions, provide insight into
differences in preferences for human capital investment across ethnic groups.
The” Control” Group
The validity of this approach relies, of course, on identifying an appropriate control
group. There are many similarities between Japanese and Chinese immigration to the US, in both
their timing and their history. Large-scale immigration from Japan began after the Chinese
Exclusion Act, primarily to replace Chinese laborers. However, natives expressed similar
animosity towards Japanese immigrants, and immigration of unskilled labors from Japan was
subsequently prohibited by the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, in which the Japanese
government agreed to voluntarily limit emigration (Inui, 1925). The exclusion of Japanese
immigrants was later formalized by the Immigration Act of 19248 and was not repealed until
1952. Suzuki (2002) documents increases in average skill levels among new Japanese
immigrants beginning around 1908, with clear evidence for greater selection on education, work
experience and occupation during the exclusionary period. Given the geographic proximity of
China and Japan and the similar timing of exclusionary legislation pertaining to each country, it
seems reasonable to assume that moving costs were comparable. Moreover, in both cases, we are
considering migration to the US, which implies that skill prices in the host country are identical.
Historical data on skill premia in Asia are quite limited, but Allen et. al. (2011) and van
Zanden (2009) find the average skill premium of construction workers between 1750 and 1820 to
be very similar between Japan and China, which suggests that skill prices in the source countries
may be comparable as well. Evidence on the distributions of observed skill is even more limited.
8
While the Immigration Act of 1917 had established and “Asiatic barred zone” that included Japan, the Japanese
had been exempt from the restrictions of the act insofar as it conflicted with the stipulations of the Gentlemen’s
Agreement of 1907. However, the Immigration Act of 1924 expanded exclusion restrictions to include all persons
ineligible for citizenship (i.e., all persons of Asian descent, per the Naturalization Act of 1790), thereby overriding the Gentlemen’s Agreement.
17
Both China and Japan began modernizing their educational systems in the late 19th century,
moving away from traditional Confucian teachings to more Western curriculum. However,
access to education seems to have expanded more rapidly in Japan (Godo and Hayami, 2002),
suggesting greater improvements in observed skill throughout the population and a flatter
distribution. Consequently, I relax the assumption of common distributions for observed skill
when discussing the results.
Data
Data are drawn from the U.S. decennial censuses of the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (Ruggles et. al., 2010). Direct data on wages are not available during and preceding the
exclusion era; instead, I examine the occupational income score (OCCSCORE) constructed by
IPUMS, which is based on median total income for each occupational category in 1950.
Additional outcomes of interest include literacy9, high school and college completion rates. For
the first generation, I include only males, age 30 and older, as the terms of the exclusion acts did
not apply to women and children immigrating with their spouses. “Treatment” status for firstgeneration immigrants is assigned on the basis of age and birth year, as data on year of entry are
not available. I examine the age distribution of the foreign-born, by ethnic group, and assign
individuals to the treatment group if their age during the exclusion era falls within one standard
deviation of the mean age for their group in the preceding census. Among foreign-born Chinese,
the mean age was 31 in 1880, with a standard deviation of 11; thus, all persons aged 20 and
younger in 1882 and aged 20 and older in 1943 are assigned to the treatment group. Similarly,
foreign-born Japanese had a mean age of 28 in 1900, with a standard deviation of 8, so all
persons aged 20 and younger in 1907 or aged 20 and older in 1952 are assigned to the treatment
9
Literacy rates are not available after 1930. Thus, to facilitate comparison, I construct an alternate measure of
literacy, for which an individual is considered literate if he/she has completed at least the fifth grade. This measure
tracks recorded literacy rates quite closely, generally within 0.05%.
18
group. Immigrants who likely arrived after exclusions were repealed (younger than age 20 at the
time of repeal) are excluded from the analysis. Given the coarseness of the treatment measure, I
include an additional control for individuals who may have been treated (i.e., who are residing in
the US during the exclusion era but do not fit the above criteria), weighted by the number of
years since the implementation of exclusionary legislation, as a rough proxy for the probability
of being treated. Finally, I allow for differential time trends, by ethnic group, before exclusion
and after its repeal.
The terms of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 differed somewhat from those of the
Chinese exclusion acts. Between 1907 and 1924, the Japanese government assumed
responsibility for screening emigrants to the US, agreeing to issue passports only to those
eligible for entry under the Gentlemen’s Agreement. In contrast, under the Chinese exclusion
acts and, later, the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924, US customs officials were granted the
authority to determine eligibility for entry, which seems to have resulted in a much more
stringent burden of proof for Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigrants were subject to long
detainment and interrogation periods, particularly at Angel Island, and anecdotal evidence
suggests that customs officials had great discretion in evaluating documents for entry (Chang,
2003). Moreover, Japanese immigrants were almost assured admission to the US prior to making
the journey, whereas the eligibility of Chinese immigrants was evaluated after transportation
costs had already been sunk, substantially increasing the risk inherent in the act of migration
itself. Thus, the Gentleman’s Agreement may have, initially, allowed more Japanese immigrants
with low observed skill and relatively high unobserved skill, suggesting that the estimates will
overstate the degree of selection among Chinese immigrants, relative to Japanese immigrants,
during their respective exclusionary periods.
19
For second-generation Chinese and Japanese, I include in the sample both males and
females aged 30 and older. Individuals are assigned to the treatment group on the basis of birth
year and parents’ place of birth. All persons born in the US during the exclusion period
(excepting the first year) with at least one foreign-born parent are considered “treated” in the
sense that their parent(s) likely immigrated under the restricted laws. Individuals born within five
years of the end of the exclusion era and with at least one foreign-born parent are also counted as
“treated”, for the same reason. All third- and higher generation Chinese and Japanese are
assigned to the “control” group. Again, given the coarseness of this measure, I include an
indicator for possible treatment (born during the exclusionary era to parents of unknown origin,
weighted by the number of years until exclusion is repealed), as well as differential time trends
for birth cohorts before and after the exclusion era.
IV. Results and Discussion
Selection among Immigrants
Looking at the occupational score (Table 2, Panel A), we see that both Japanese and
Chinese (“Asian”, collectively) immigrants ranked considerably lower than whites, although the
difference is significantly greater for Japanese. Exclusionary laws (“treatment”) increased the
occupational score among foreign-born Japanese, eradicating roughly 55-79% of the initial
difference. However, the average occupational score for Chinese immigrants was actually much
lower admitted during the exclusionary era (ranging from 68% to over 400% of the difference
between native-born whites and pre-exclusion Chinese), suggesting that greater negative
selection on unobserved skills dominated the greater positive selection on observed skills.
Allowing for possible “treatment” among additional foreign-born Chinese and Japanese present
20
in the US during exclusion increases the magnitude of the point estimates, which is consistent
with the conservative method used to assign treatment initially. Moreover, the coefficients on
possible treatment coincide with the direct effects of treatment, again suggesting that the
definition of treatment undercounts the number of immigrants subject to exclusionary laws. The
coefficients on pre-exclusion time trends indicate that immigration, particularly Japanese, was
becoming more selective even prior to exclusion, and allowing for these differential trends
reduces the magnitude of the estimated treatment effects as well.
Given the likely difference in the distributions of observed skill, we must also examine
the distribution of observed skill, separate from unobserved skill. Analysis of literacy rates
reveals a similar pattern, with Chinese immigrants exhibiting weaker positive selection on
observed skills after exclusion (Table 2, Panel B). The effect of treatment is more muted though,
particularly for the Chinese: restrictions reduce the difference in literacy rates between whites
and pre-exclusion Japanese by 56-63% (15-18 percentage points), compared to 55-79% for
occupational score, and it increases the gap between whites and Chinese by 15-133% (3-14
percentage points), compared to 68-400% for occupational score. This is somewhat surprising,
given the literacy requirement imposed in 1917, and suggests that the literacy test may not have
very effective in practice. However, the skill requirements imposed by exclusionary laws were
based on occupation rather than literacy per se. Note also that, although restrictions reduce the
Chinese literacy rate, literacy among exclusion-era Chinese is still equivalent to or slightly
higher than that for unrestricted Japanese, given their higher literacy rate prior to exclusion.
These estimates point to stronger selection on observed skill among the Chinese, relative
to the Japanese, prior to exclusion, but the opposite after exclusion. This suggests that the
distributions of observed skill for the Chinese and Japanese cross, and one of the crossing points
21
lies between the initial level of observed skill needed to immigrate and the new legislated
minimum (see Figure 4). This is consistent with historical descriptions of late Qing Dynasty
(mid-19th century) China, in which education was elitist and existed primarily to train
government officials (Feng, 1994), leading to a smaller proportion of highly educated people,
compared to Japan’s more accessible system (Godo and Hayami, 2002). However, it also
suggests that the analysis of occupation score exaggerates the extent to which exclusionary laws
weakened selection on unobserved skills among Chinese immigrants. But, given that restrictions
had a much larger negative effect on occupational score than literacy, it seems likely that
Chinese immigrants of the exclusion era exhibited weaker positive selection on both observed
and unobserved skills, relative to their Japanese counterparts.
Inter-Generational Transmission of Skill
For second generation Chinese and Japanese, we observe completely opposite effects;
children of restricted Chinese immigrants have higher occupational scores than children of both
unrestricted Chinese and restricted Japanese immigrants (Table 3, Panel A). This only emerges
clearly after the indicator for possible treatment (born during the exclusion era to parents of
unknown origin, weighted by the number of years remaining in the exclusionary period) is
included, suggesting that measurement error in the treatment variable is considerable. Allowing
for differential trends for birth cohorts before and after the exclusionary era also slightly
increases the relative treatment effect for Chinese, but the difference is not statistically
significant. Both Japanese and Chinese, pre- and post-exclusion have significantly higher
occupational scores than whites, although the gaps are not as pronounced as they are for the first
generation. Among those whose parents were unrestricted by exclusionary laws, the Japanese
score higher than the Chinese but, among those whose parents were subject to exclusionary laws,
22
the Chinese score significantly higher than the Japanese. In fact, being the child of a “treated”
immigrant almost completely eradicates the (positive) gap between Japanese and whites but
increases the (positive) gap between Chinese and whites by over 50%.
However, among the immigrants themselves, the reverse is true – restrictions improve
outcomes for the Japanese and worsen outcomes for the Chinese. This may seem inconsistent on
a first pass; Chinese immigrants exhibit stronger negative selection on both observed and
unobserved skill after restrictions are imposed, relative to the Japanese, but their children have
better occupational outcomes. From expressions [5] and [6], we see that there are two possible
ways to reconcile these results. One possibility is that exclusion allowed only a highly selective
group of individuals to marry and have children. This effect, if present, likely would have been
more pronounced for the Chinese, as wives and minor children of Japanese laborers domiciled in
the US were granted entry (Inui, 1925) until the Immigration Act of 1924, while the Chinese
Exclusion Acts offered no such exception. Thus, Chinese immigrants who both entered the US
and had children during the exclusion era are more likely to have immigrated with their spouses
and/or families, which may be indicative of higher skill. To test for this, I return to the sample of
immigrants and add an indicator for having at least one child currently living in the household10,
interacted with ethnic group and treatment status (Table 3, Panel B). While having a child at
home is positively correlated with occupational score for Asians, and Chinese in particular, I find
no evidence of a change in the relationship between fertility and skill after exclusionary laws are
implemented. Therefore, the results do not appear to be driven by differential selection into
child-bearing, as the effect of immigration restrictions on skills does not differ with fertility.
10
This is, unfortunately, the best proxy for fertility that is available prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
Controls for age, period and cohort are included to help account for differences in home-leaving and co-residence.
23
The other possible explanation is that Chinese immigrants invested more heavily in their
children’s human capital, relative to the Japanese, despite being drawn, themselves, from the
lower portion of the distribution for unobserved skill. This is consistent with the notion of a
“middleman minority” (Bonacich, 1973 and Hirschman and Wong, 1986), a minority racial or
ethnic group that comes to occupy a “middleman” position between the majority group and
another, lower status minority group. This, along with a sojourner mentality and, in the case of
the Chinese, exclusionary laws pertaining specifically to occupation, tends to foster occupational
concentration and intensive investment in both human and economic capital, resulting in rapid
convergence and even surpassing of the majority. Of course, both the Chinese and Japanese fit
this model in various respects, but the results here suggest that preferences for human capital
investment, in addition to economic conditions and self-selection, have also played a role, with
the Chinese displaying stronger preferences than the Japanese. However, Chiswick (1988)
suggests that what appears to be preferences may, in fact, be differences in the relative prices of
child quantity and quality (e.g., as a result of urban vs. rural residence or greater education of
mothers). This does help explain differences between some groups (e.g., Jews and Mexicans),
but Chinese and Japanese immigrants, where data are available, display similar labor force
participation rates and fertility rates in the US, with fertility actually being slightly higher for the
Chinese (Chiswick, 1988). And, when I re-run the difference-in-difference specifications with
number of children at home, conditional on having children, as the dependent variable, I find
evidence of slightly higher (or equivalent) fertility rates for Chinese immigrants (Table 4).
Robustness Checks
Given the lack of data on year of entry for immigrants (also parents of second generation
Chinese/Japanese) and consequent measurement error in the key explanatory variable, I repeat
24
the estimation with two alternate definitions of “treatment”. First, I narrow the treatment window
to increase the certainty of identifying immigrants who were subject to skill-based exclusionary
laws. In this case, first generation immigrants are assigned to the treatment group only if they
were born after exclusionary laws were implemented (1882 for Chinese and 1907 for Japanese)
and more than 31 (28) years before exclusion was repealed, where 31 (28) is the mean age of
foreign-born Chinese (Japanese) in the census immediately preceding exclusion. With the more
restrictive definition, the estimated “treatment” effects are much smaller as well, particularly for
first generation immigrants, although they maintain the same sign pattern and continue to be
statistically significant and sizable in magnitude (Table 5, Panel A). Skill-based exclusion is
estimated to have reduced the Japanese-white difference in occupation scores by 43%, and
reduced the Chinese-white difference by 4%. This specification indicates net improvements for
Chinese immigrants as a result of exclusion, suggesting that the greater positive selection on
observed skill dominated the relatively weaker selection on unobserved skill. However, the
difference-in-difference estimate is still negative suggesting, as in the main results, that
exclusionary policies had a greater negative effect on self-selection among the Chinese than the
Japanese.
For the second generation, individuals are again assigned to the treatment group (parents
immigrated during exclusion era) if they were born during the exclusion era, but now I exclude
those born in the first 10 years. With this definition of treatment, children of restricted Japanese
immigrants do not fare as poorly, compared to pre-exclusion Japanese, but the difference
between treated Chinese and Japanese remains roughly the same. This suggests that, for both
Chinese and Japanese, children born in the first decade of the exclusion era were more likely to
have had parents with weaker skills (i.e., laborers who immigrated prior to exclusion but delayed
25
childbearing). The parallel change for Chinese and Japanese also suggests that exclusionary laws
did not differentially affect skill-based selection into fertility, despite the fact that wives and
children of Japanese laborers continued to be admitted until 1924, while those of Chinese
laborers were prohibited as of 1882. This lends additional support to the hypothesis that Chinese
immigrants invested more heavily in the human capital of their children.
Second, the terms governing Japanese immigration in the early years (1907-1923) were
less stringent than those applied to the Chinese. Enforcement of Japanese exclusion was handled
by the Japanese government, prior to migration, rather than by the US government, after
transportation costs had already been sunk. This likely meant a lower burden of proof for
Japanese immigrants and would have allowed more risk-averse and more liquidity-constrained
Japanese to migrate. To the extent that this resulted in a greater proportion of Japanese
immigrants with high unobserved skill, the difference-in-difference estimate would tend to
overstate the degree of selection on unobserved skills for the Chinese, relative to the Japanese,
during the exclusion era. To check for this, I exclude from the sample all migrants and children
of migrants who would have likely immigrated under the Gentlemen’s Agreement, rather than
the Immigration Act of 1924, which was applied to both the Chinese and the Japanese. For the
first generation, point estimates are somewhat smaller in magnitude, although they clearly
maintain the same patterns of sign and significance (Table 5, Panel B). This is consistent with the
terms of the Gentlemen’s Agreement being less stringent than those of the Chinese Exclusion
Act (note that the sample of Chinese remains the same, so changes in the relative effects for
Chinese are precisely that; they do not reflect any level changes). For the second generation,
estimated treatment effects maintain the same pattern of sign and significance and are again
somewhat smaller, consistent with weaker positive selection under the Gentlemen’s Agreement.
26
There remains another possible explanation, which was not incorporated in the theoretical
framework. As a result of World War II and the internment of 1942-1945, Japanese-Americans
may have experienced greater discrimination in both labor markets and educational institutions,
as well as interruptions in their education or labor market trajectories. This would result in
relatively worse outcomes for the Japanese, particularly among the second generation who would
have acquired their education and work experience exclusively in the US. To test for this, I
exclude from the sample all individuals between the ages of 7 and 17 during the internment
period and residing in the states affected by internment (Washington, Oregon, California,
Arizona and Hawaii). Estimates for this sample are qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively
quite similar as well (Table 5, Panel C), suggesting that the main results are not explained by
differential treatment and discrimination of Chinese and Japanese immigrants.
Education Among the Second Generation
Finally, we can look at some more direct measures of human capital for evidence of
greater investment among exclusion-era Chinese immigrants. For high school and college
completion, we observe the same pattern as for occupational score (Table 6, columns I and II).
Among the Japanese, children of restricted immigrants have lower high school and college
completion rates than children of unrestricted immigrants, while the opposite is true for the
Chinese. However, although both the Japanese and Chinese have higher college completion rates
than native-born whites, both groups, particularly the Chinese, have lower high school
completion rates, and the Chinese have lower literacy rates as well (Table 6, column III).
Moreover, exclusionary laws are found to have the opposite effect for literacy – children of
Japanese immigrants have higher literacy rates after exclusion, while the opposite is true for the
Chinese. The heterogeneity in these outcomes suggests that exclusionary laws had different
27
effects on different parts of the immigrant skill distribution. Among the Japanese, it seems that
exclusion succeeded in increasing the average skill of incoming immigrants, but this was
transmitted to the second generation in a limited way. Children of restricted Japanese immigrants
did better than children of unrestricted immigrants only in terms of literacy, which perhaps
suggests stronger transmission of skill at the lower tail of the distribution. Conversely, among the
Chinese, exclusion seems to have resulted in a change in the skill composition, with restricted
immigrants having relatively higher observed skill but lower unobserved skill. However, intergenerational transmission of skill seems to have been much stronger between first and second
generation Chinese, particularly at the upper tail of the distribution, as indicated by college
completion rates.
V. Conclusion
Chinese immigration to the United States, as with all immigration, has been highly
selective over time. But, unlike many other ethnic groups, the Chinese were subject to skillbased restrictions, even before numerical quotas. Per the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
immigration of all laborers was prohibited, and only merchants, teachers, students and officials
were granted entry. However, these restrictions did not increase the average skill level among
new arrivals. Rather, I find that Chinese immigrants of the exclusion era have worse
occupational outcomes relative to both Japanese immigrants, who were subject to the same
restrictions, and to unrestricted Chinese immigrants. This points to significant substitution
between observed and unobserved skills and suggests that skill-based restrictions may not be
successful in altering the overall skill composition of incoming immigrants, depending on the
skills that are targeted and the scope for substitution among skills.
28
However, when we turn to the second-generation, the data suggest that there may be
some truth to the “model minority” label. Among the Chinese, human capital accumulation was
much more intensive for children of restricted immigrants, compared to children of unrestricted
immigrants, despite the restricted immigrants themselves having lower aggregate skill. This
suggests particularly strong inter-generational transmission of skill. Moreover, we observe the
opposite effect among the Japanese, suggesting that it is not immigrant selectivity per se driving
the results; rather, group-specific preferences for human capital seem to matter as well. And,
again, the impact of skill-based restrictions appears to be heterogeneous; for the group in which
restrictions succeeded in increasing the skill of immigrants, the gains were largely undone in the
subsequent generation, while for the group in which restrictions were unsuccessful, significant
gains were observed in the second generation. Additionally, I find suggestive evidence that these
effects were heterogeneous throughout the skill distribution, even within ethnic groups. Taken
together, the results suggest that the impact of skill-based immigration restrictions is not always
straightforward and should be the subject of further research.
29
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31
Figure 1. Chinese Immigration to the United States, 1846-1882a
40,000
16.00%
35,000
14.00%
30,000
12.00%
25,000
10.00%
20,000
8.00%
15,000
6.00%
10,000
4.00%
5,000
2.00%
0.00%
0
1846
1850
1854
1858
1862
1866
Annual Immigration
1870
1874
1878
1882
Percent of Total
For 1846-1856 and 1892, defined as alien passengers arrived.
Source: Annual report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration to the Secretary of the Treasury,
United States Bureau of Immigration.
a
Figure 2. Chinese Immigration to the United States, 1882-1930a
6.00%
40,000
35,000
5.00%
30,000
4.00%
25,000
3.00%
20,000
15,000
2.00%
10,000
1.00%
5,000
0.00%
0
1882
1886
1890
1894
1898
Non-Immigrant Aliens
1902
1906
1910
1914
Annual Immigration
1918
1922
1926
1930
Percent of Total
Source: Annual report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration to the Secretary of the Treasury,
United States Bureau of Immigration.
32
Figure 3. Regression
Regression-Adjusted Literacy Rates and Occupational Scoresa
0.9
27
0.8
24
0.7
21
0.6
18
Literacy
30
0.5
1860
Occupational Score
1
15
1870
1880
1890
1900
White
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
Chinese
a
Least squares estimates of period effects, controlling for age, sex, and birth cohort.
Source: United States Census, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0
33
Table 1. Chinese Admitted to the United States by Class, 1905-1918
Exempt Class
Returning Resident
U.S. Citizens
Year
Total
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1905
3153
1348
43
1171
37
634
20
1906
2720
714
26
1091
40
915
34
1907
3215
788
25
1498
47
929
29
1908
4563
1298
28
1656
36
1609
35
1909
6245
1818
29
1897
30
2530
41
1910
5792
1777
31
1906
33
2109
36
1911
4986
1142
23
2205
44
1639
33
1912
5253
1301
25
2196
42
1756
33
1913
5496
1303
24
2022
37
2171
40
1914
5563
1481
27
1881
34
2201
40
1915
5467
1628
30
1849
34
1990
36
1916
4984
1503
30
1549
31
1932
39
1917
4567
1240
27
1309
29
2018
44
1918
2887
930
32
1011
35
946
33
Reproduced from Lee 2003, 101.
34
Table 2. The Effect of Exclusion on the Foreign-Born,
Difference-In-Difference Estimates
a
A. Occupation Score
B. Literacy
I
II
III
I
II
III
***
***
***
***
***
Asian
-10.32
-11.73
-12.08
-0.253
-0.282
-0.279 ***
(0.140)
(0.187)
(0.196)
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.007)
Treated
7.886 ***
9.302 ***
6.61 ***
0.148 ***
0.177 ***
0.156 ***
(0.410)
(0.429)
(0.584)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.012)
***
***
***
Possible Treatment
0.248
0.27
0.0059
0.0057 ***
(0.030)
(0.031)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Years Before Treatment
0.923 *** -0.585
-0.006 ***
(0.056)
(0.002)
***
Years After Treatment
0.265
-0.628
-0.559
0.0029 ***
(0.025)
(0.000)
Relative Effects, Chinese
Chinese
6.80 ***
10.55 ***
8.71 ***
0.039 ***
0.177 ***
0.103 ***
(0.218)
(0.280)
(0.349)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.010)
Treated
-10.27 *** -14.04 *** -10.23 *** -0.179 *** -0.317 *** -0.251 ***
(0.482)
(0.517)
(0.704)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.016)
Possible Treatment
-0.379 *** -0.322 ***
-0.013 *** -0.011 ***
(0.033)
(0.034)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Years Before Treatment
-0.616 *** 0.1451
0.0152 ***
(0.063)
(0.002)
Years After Treatment
-0.185 *** 1.3333
0.5398
-0.001 *
(0.025)
(0.000)
N
226,573
226,573
226,573
324,215
324,215
324,215
2
R
0.182
0.183
0.183
0.037
0.038
0.038
Includes controls for period, cohort, age and sex. Treatment defined as age 20 or younger at time
of exclusion and age 20 or older at end of exclusion. Possible treatment defined as residing in the
US during the exclusion era (1882-1943 for Chinese, 1907-1952 for Japanese), excluding "treated"
individuals, weighted by the number of years since exclusion was enacted.
a
Because literacy is not recorded after 1930, this measure is construced from schooling
attainment. An individual is considered literate if he/she has completed at least the fifth grade.
Source: United States Census, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0
35
Table 3. The Effect of Exclusion on Occupation Score,
Difference-In-Difference Estimates
A. American-Born
B. Foreign-Born
I
II
III
I
II
III
***
***
***
***
***
Asian
1.877
3.183
3.162
-10.02
-11.03
-11.4 ***
(0.083)
(0.164)
(0.193)
(0.155)
(0.203)
(0.212)
Treated
-1.679 *** -2.983 *** -2.963 ***
7.268 ***
8.272 ***
5.375 ***
(0.274)
(0.306)
(0.322)
(0.534)
(0.551)
(0.683)
***
***
***
Possible Treatment
-0.091
-0.09
0.207
0.228 ***
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.030)
(0.030)
Years Before Treatment
-0.234 ***
0.959 ***
(0.059)
(0.056)
***
Years After Treatment
0.375
0.256 ***
(0.082)
(0.024)
a
Any Kids
1.272 ***
0.66 **
0.766 ***
(0.293)
(0.270)
(0.270)
Treated*Any Kids
-0.74
-0.128
0.441
(0.799)
(0.791)
(0.767)
Relative Effects, Chinese
Chinese
1.446 ***
-1.54 *** -2.315 ***
7.296 ***
11.06 ***
9.282 ***
(0.159)
(0.350)
(0.424)
(0.222)
(0.285)
(0.352)
Treated
-0.058
2.927 ***
3.703 *** -10.61 *** -14.39 *** -9.605 ***
(0.700)
(0.766)
(0.803)
(0.598)
(0.627)
(0.784)
Possible Treatment
0.049 *** 0.0777 ***
-0.366 *** -0.309 ***
(0.016)
(0.018)
(0.033)
(0.034)
Years Before Treatment
0.198 **
-0.657 ***
(0.079)
(0.063)
Years After Treatment
0.905 ***
-0.229 ***
(0.154)
(0.026)
Any Kids
0.451
1.946 ***
1.685 **
(0.759)
(0.745)
(0.748)
Treated*Any Kids
1.777
0.297
-0.545
(1.156)
(1.147)
(1.162)
N
451,264
436,332
436,332
226,573
226,573
226,573
2
R
0.359
0.359
0.359
0.186
0.186
0.186
Includes controls for period, cohort, age and sex. For American-born, treatment defined as born
to foreign-born parents between 1883-1948 for Chinese and 1908-1957 for Japanese (within one
year of the start and five years of the end of the exclusion era). Possible treatment defined as
born in the US during the same period to parents with unkown birthplace, weighted by age at the
time exclusion is repealed. For foreign-born, treatment defined as age 20 or younger at the time
of exclusion and age 20 or older at end of exclusion. Possible treatment defined as residing in the
the US during the exclusion era (1882-1943 for Chinese, 1907-1952 for Japanese), excluding
"treated" individuals, weighted by the number of years since exclusion was enacted.
a
Defined as having at least one child currently living in the household.
Source: United States Census, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0
36
a
Table 4. The Effect of Exclusion on Fertility
Among the Foreign-Born, Difference-In-Difference Estimates
I
II
III
Asian
-0.465 *** -0.862 *** -0.846 ***
(0.044)
(0.048)
(0.049)
Treated
0.677 ***
1.074 ***
1.081 ***
(0.130)
(0.131)
(0.217)
Possible Treatment
0.0514 *** 0.0506 ***
(0.007)
(0.007)
Years Before Treatment
-0.102 ***
(0.011)
Years After Treatment
-0.002
(0.009)
Relative Effects, Chinese
Chinese
1.01 *** -0.406 **
-0.08
(0.144)
(0.160)
(0.208)
***
***
Treated
-0.718
0.696
0.248
(0.196)
(0.209)
(0.326)
Possible Treatment
0.027 ** 0.0161
(0.011)
(0.012)
Years Before Treatment
0.058 **
(0.026)
Years After Treatment
0.0062
(0.010)
N
118,031
118,031
118,031
2
R
0.123
0.123
0.123
Includes controls for period, cohort, age and sex. Treatment
defined as age 20 or younger at time of exclusion and age 20
or older at end of exclusion. Possible treatment defined as
residing in the US during the exclusion era (1882-1943 for
Chinese, 1907-1952 for Japanese), excluding "treated"
individuals, weighted by the number of years since exclusion
was enacted.
a
Defined as number of children ever born, conditional on
having at least one child.
Source: United States Census, IPUMS: Version 5.0
37
Table 5. The Effect of Exclusion on Occupation Score, Alternate Definitions for "Treatment"
a
b
c
A. Narrow Treatment Band
B. Same Restrictions
C. Excluding Western States
Foreign
American
Foreign
American
Foreign
American
Born
Born
Born
Born
Born
Born
Asian
-11.44 ***
1.618 ***
-9.351 ***
1.556 ***
-12.09 ***
3.534 ***
(0.192)
(0.172)
(0.472)
(0.161)
(0.196)
(0.203)
***
***
***
**
***
Treated
4.912
-1.552
5.686
-0.994
6.56
-3.427 ***
(0.721)
(0.330)
(0.960)
(0.434)
(0.592)
(0.348)
Relative Effects, Chinese
Chinese
8.066 ***
-1.032 **
5.966 ***
-0.71 *
8.713 ***
-2.93 ***
(0.346)
(0.405)
(0.557)
(0.412)
(0.348)
(0.459)
3.44 ***
-9.288 ***
2.62 ***
-10.18 ***
4.285 ***
Treated
-4.769 ***
(0.363)
(0.856)
(1.036)
(0.906)
(0.709)
(0.867)
N
220,068
436,332
226,244
435,287
225,053
424,716
2
R
0.182
0.359
0.183
0.359
0.183
0.361
Includes controls for period, cohort, age and sex. For foreign born, treatment defined as age 20 or younger at
time of exclusion and age 20 or older at end of exclusion. For American-born, treatment defined as born to
foreign-born parents between 1883-1948 for Chinese and 1908-1957 for Japanese. Indicator for possible treatment (for foreign-born, defined as residing in the US during the exclusion era, excluding "treated" individuals,
weighted by the number of years since exclusion was enacted; for American-born, defined as born during the
relevant time period to parents of unknown birthplace, weighted by age at the time exclusion is repealed) and
pre- and post-exclusion trends are also included.
a
Treatment defined as age 0-31 during the exclusion era for foreign-born and born between 1892-1948 (19171957 for Japanese) for American-born.
b
Excludes Japanese who likely migrated under the Gentlemen's Agreement, rather than the 1924 Act.
c
Excludes individuals age 7-17 residing in states subject to Japanese-American internment.
Source: United States Census, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0
38
Table 6. The Effect of Exclusion on the Second Generation,
Difference-In-Difference Estimates
High School
College
Completion Completion
Literacy
***
***
Asian
-0.0969
0.205
0.00105
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.002)
Treated
-0.2 ***
-0.198 ***
0.019 ***
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.004)
Relative Effects, Chinese
Chinese
-0.0694 ***
-0.0811 ***
-0.0426 ***
(0.015)
(0.013)
(0.009)
Treated
0.207 ***
0.177 ***
-0.0698 ***
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.015)
N
272,098
246,026
600,606
2
R
0.234
0.060
0.027
Includes controls for period, cohort, age, sex. Treatment defined as
born to foreign-born parents between 1883-1948 for Chinese and
1908-1957 for Japanese. Possible treatment defined as born in the
US during the same period to parents with unkown birthplace,
weighted by age at the time exclusion is repealed.
a
Because literacy is not recorded after 1930, this measure is
construced from schooling attainment. An individual is considered
literate if he/she has completed at least the fifth grade.
Source: United States Census, IPUMS: Version 5.0
39
Appendix I.
Forty-Third Congress. Session II. Ch.141.
An act supplementary to the acts in relation to immigration
March 3, 1875
SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress-assembled, That in determining whether the immigration of any subject of
China, Japan, or any Oriental country, to the United States, is free and voluntary, as provided by
section two thousand one hundred and sixty two of the Revised Code, title "Immigration," it
shall be the duty of the consul-general or consul of the United States residing at the port from
which it is proposed to convey such subjects, in any vessels enrolled or licensed in the United
States, or any port within the same, before delivering to the masters of any such vessels the
permit or certificate provided for in such section, in ascertain for a term of service within the
United States, for lewd and immoral purposes; and if there be such contract or agreement, the
said consul-general or consul shall not deliver the required permit or certificate.
[Sections 2 through 5 omitted]
40
Appendix II.
Forty-Seventh Congress. Session I. Ch. 126.
An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese.
May 6, 1882
Preamble.
Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers
to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof:
Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That from and after the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of
this act, and until the expiration of ten years next after the passage of this act, the coming of
Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during such
suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the
expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States.
SEC. 2. That the master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within the United States on
such vessel, and land or permit to be landed, and Chinese laborer, from any foreign port of place,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars for each and every such Chinese laborer so brought, and
may be also imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.
SEC. 3. That the two foregoing sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the
United States on the seventeenth day of November, eighteen hundred and eighty, or who shall
have come into the same before the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act,
and who shall produce to such master before going on board such vessel, and shall produce to the
collector of the port in the United States at which such vessel shall arrive, the evidence
hereinafter in this act required of his being one of the laborers in this section mentioned; nor
shall the two foregoing sections apply to the case of any master whose vessel, being bound to a
port not within the United States by reason of being in distress or in stress of weather, or
touching at any port of the United States on its voyage to any foreign port of place: Provided,
That all Chinese laborers brought on such vessel shall depart with the vessel on leaving port.
SEC. 4. That for the purpose of properly identifying Chinese laborers who were in the United
States on the seventeenth day of November, eighteen hundred and eighty, or who shall have
come into the same before the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and in
order to furnish them with the proper evidence of their right to go from and come to the United
States of their free will and accord, as provided by the treaty between the United States and
China dated November seventeenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, the collector of customs of the
district from which any such Chinese laborer shall depart from the United States shall, in person
or by deputy, go on board each vessel having on board any such Chinese laborer and cleared or
about to sail from his district for a foreign port, and on such vessel make a list of all such
Chinese laborers, which shall be entered in registry-books to be kept for that purpose, in which
shall be stated the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, physical marks or peculiarities,
and all facts necessary for the identification of each of such Chinese laborers, which books shall
be safely kept in the custom-house; and every such Chinese laborer so departing from the United
States shall be entitled to, and shall receive, free of any charge or cost upon application thereof,
from the collector or his deputy, at the time such list is taken, a certificate, signed by the
collector or his deputy and attested by his seal of office, in such form as the Secretary of the
Treasury shall prescribe, which certificate shall contain a statement of the name, age, occupation,
41
last place of residence, personal description, and fact of identification of the Chinese laborer to
whom the certificate is issued, corresponding with the said list and registry in all particulars. In
case any Chinese laborer after having received such certificate shall leave such vessel before her
departure he shall deliver his certificate to the master of the vessel, and if such Chinese laborer
shall fail to return to such vessel before her departure from port the certificate shall be delivered
by the master to the collector of customs for cancellation. The certificate herein provided for
shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the United
States upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of customs of the district at which
such Chinese laborer shall seek to re-enter; and upon delivery of such certificate by such Chinese
laborer to the collector of customs at the time of re-entry in the United States, said collector shall
cause the same to be filed in the custom house and duly canceled.
SEC. 5. That any Chinese laborer mentioned in section four of this act being in the United States,
and desiring to depart from the United States by land, shall have the right to demand and receive,
free of charge or cost, a certificate of identification similar to that provided for in section four of
this act to be issued to such Chinese laborers as may desire to leave the United States by water;
and it is hereby made the duty of the collector of customs of the district next adjoining the
foreign country to which said Chinese laborer desires to go to issue such certificate, free of
charge or cost, upon application by such Chinese laborer, and to enter the same upon registrybooks to be kept by him for the purpose, as provided for in section four of this act.
SEC. 6. That in order to the faithful execution of articles one and two of the treaty in this act
before mentioned, every Chinese person other than a laborer who may be entitled by said treaty
and this act to come within the United States, and who shall be about to come to the United
States, shall be identified as so entitled by the Chinese Government in each case, such identity to
be evidenced by a certificate issued under the authority of said government, which certificate
shall be in the English language or (if not in the English language) accompanied by a translation
into English, stating such right to come, and which certificate shall state the name, title, or
official rank, if any, the age, height, and all physical peculiarities, former and present occupation
or profession, and place of residence in China of the person to whom the certificate is issued and
that such person is entitled conformably to the treaty in this act mentioned to come within the
United States. Such certificate shall be prima-facie evidence of the fact set forth therein, and
shall be produced to the collector of customs, or his deputy, of the port in the district in the
United States at which the person named therein shall arrive.
SEC. 7. That any person who shall knowingly and falsely alter or substitute any name for the
name written in such certificate or forge any such certificate, or knowingly utter any forged or
fraudulent certificate, or falsely personate any person named in any such certificate, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not
exceeding one thousand dollars, an imprisoned in a penitentiary for a term of not more than five
years.
SEC. 8. That the master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any foreign port or place
shall, at the same time he delivers a manifest of the cargo, and if there be no cargo, then at the
time of making a report of the entry of vessel pursuant to the law, in addition to the other matter
required to be reported, and before landing, or permitting to land, any Chinese passengers,
deliver and report to the collector of customs of the district in which such vessels shall have
arrived a separate list of all Chinese passengers taken on board his vessel at any foreign port or
place, and all such passengers on board the vessel at that time. Such list shall show the names of
such passengers (and if accredited officers of the Chinese Government traveling on the business
of that government, or their servants, with a note of such facts), and the name and other
particulars, as shown by their respective certificates; and such list shall be sworn to by the master
42
in the manner required by law in relation to the manifest of the cargo. Any willful refusal or
neglect of any such master to comply with the provisions of this section shall incur the same
penalties and forfeiture as are provided for a refusal or neglect to report and deliver a manifest of
cargo.
SEC. 9. That before any Chinese passengers are landed from any such vessel, the collector, or his
deputy, shall proceed to examine such passengers, comparing the certificates with the list and
with the passengers; and no passenger shall be allowed to land in the United States from such
vessel in violation of law.
SEC. 10. That every vessel whose master shall knowingly violate any of the provisions of this
act shall be deemed forfeited to the United States, and shall be liable to seizure and
condemnation on any district of the United States into which such vessel may enter or in which
she may be found.
SEC. 11. That any person who shall knowingly bring into or cause to be brought into the United
States by land, or who shall knowingly aid or abet the same, or aid or abet the landing in the
United States from any vessel of any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter the United
States, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in a
sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.
SEC. 12. That no Chinese person shall be permitted to enter the United States by land without
producing to the proper officer of customs the certificate in this act required of Chinese persons
seeking to land from a vessel. And any Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States
shall be caused to be removed therefrom to the country from whence he came, by direction of the
United States, after being brought before some justice, judge, or commissioner of a court of the
United States and found to be one not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States.
SEC. 13. That this act shall not apply to diplomatic and other officers of the Chinese
Government traveling upon the business of that government, whose credentials shall be taken as
equivalent to the certificate in this act mentioned, and shall exempt them and their body and
household servants from the provisions of this act as to other Chinese persons.
SEC. 14. That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to
citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 15. That the words "Chinese laborers", whenever used in this act, shall be construed to
mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.
43