Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
2012, Vol. 141, No. 2, 260 –281
© 2011 American Psychological Association
0096-3445/12/$12.00
DOI: 10.1037/a0025658
University of Wuerzburg
The sensorimotor contributions to memory for prior occurrence were investigated. Previous research has shown that both implicit memory and familiarity draw on gains in stimulus-related processing fluency for old, compared with novel, stimuli, but recollection does not. Recently, it has been demonstrated that processing fluency itself resides in stimulus-specific motor simulations or reenactment (e.g., covert pronouncing simulations for words as stimuli). Combining these lines of evidence, it was predicted that stimulus-specific motor interference preventing simulations should impair both implicit memory and familiarity but leave recollection unaffected. This was tested for words as verbal stimuli associated to pronouncing simulations in the oral muscle system (but also for tunes as vocal stimuli and their associated vocal system, Experiment 2). It was found that oral (e.g., chewing gum), compared with manual (kneading a ball), motor interference prevented mere exposure effects (Experiments 1–2), substantially reduced repetition priming in word fragment completion (Experiment 3), reduced the familiarity estimates in a remember– know task (Experiment 5) and in receiver-operating characteristics
(Experiment 6), and completely neutralized familiarity measured by self-reports (Experiment 4) and skin conductance responses (Experiment 7), while leaving recollection and free recall unaffected (across
Experiments 1–7). This pattern establishes a rare memory dissociation in healthy participants, that is, explicit without implicit memory or recognizing without feeling familiar. Implications for embodied memory and neuropsychology are discussed.
Keywords: recollection, embodiment, fluency, familiarity, recognition
The past survives under two distinct forms: first, in motor mechanisms; secondly, in independent recollections.
— Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory
Bodily processes play an important role in several essential mental faculties, such as processing emotions (e.g., Niedenthal,
Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009), representing abstract meaning (e.g., Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Doherty,
1989; Masson, Bub, & Warren, 2008), or building memory (Glenberg, 1997). In this latter domain, it was shown that sensorimotor processes contribute to memory retrieval (Cohen, 1989; Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1980; Saltz & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981), to metacognitive judgments concerning memory content (e.g., Strack
& Neumann, 2000), and to recognizing emotional faces
(D’Argembeau, Lepper, & Van der Linden, 2008). The present work investigated the role of sensorimotor processes in the most
This article was published Online First October 17, 2011.
This project was partially funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Str 264/26-1. I am very grateful to Thorsten Erle for his conscientious support in the receiver-operating characteristic analyses. I thank Fritz
Strack, Edgar Erdfelder, and Rainer Scheuchenpflug for valuable comments and Anand Krishna for language check. I thank Rebecca Spatz,
Carolin Kempf, Andreas Weber, Elisabeth Schwille, Katharina Hass, Lydia
Jakob, and Teresa Geiling for their support in collecting the data.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sascha Topolinski, Department of Psychology II, University of Wuerzburg, Roentgenring
10 97070. Wuerzburg, Germany. E-mail: sascha.topolinski@psychologie
.uni-wuerzburg.de
basic memory function, namely, the memory of previous occurrence (Mandler, 1980; Schacter & Tulving, 1994).
Memory concerning the status of a target as being old or new comes in diverse forms, ranging from implicit memory to feelings of familiarity and even conscious recollection of the previous encounter episode (for reviews, see Schacter, 1987; Yonelinas,
2002). The present work investigates sensorimotor contributions to these different forms of memory. In the following, I introduce the most relevant concepts and assumed mechanisms for different memory forms and then derive predictions about their possible sensorimotor groundings.
260
Explicit memory is the conscious recognition of a previously encountered stimulus (Schacter, 1987). Recognizing, however, is not a unitary process but may draw on familiarity and recollection
(for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002; cf. Mandler’s, 1980, classic differentiation between familiarity and retrieval during recognition), which are two distinct and experimentally dissociable memory forms (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002). Recollection is the retrieval of specific episodic information of the previous encounter, for instance, the temporal and spatial context (Curran, 2000; Yonelinas,
1997, Yonelinas, 2002) or concomitant experiences or thoughts
(Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) from when it was first encountered. Thus, recollection draws on additional memory retrieval beyond processing the given stimulus.

In contrast, familiarity is the feeling of having encountered an item before without associated episodic cues (Yonelinas, 2002).
The psychological mechanism driving familiarity is often assumed to be processing fluency, that is, the speed and efficiency with which the item itself is processed (e.g., R. Reber & Schwarz, 1999;
R. Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Topolinski & Strack,
2009a, Topolinski & Strack, 2009b), as conceptualized in the classic framework by Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). The more fluently that an item is processed, the more familiar it is rated. This effect can be even induced experimentally for actually novel items, for instance by increasing their perceptual (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) or semantic fluency (Whittlesea, 1993).
Most interestingly, such fluency manipulations were shown to selectively affect familiarity but not recollection (e.g., Huber,
Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram &
Geraci, 2000; for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). In conclusion, recollection draws on the quantity of additionally retrieved episodic cues from the previous study event, while familiarity draws on the fluency with which the stimulus itself is processed.
1 Beyond these forms of memory, more implicit forms assessed with indirect measures have been conceptualized.
EMBODIED MEMORY 261
In conclusion, both implicit memory and the form of explicit memory referred to as familiarity feature processing fluency as their underlying psychological mechanism and are thus essentially distinct from recollection, a form of explicit memory which draws on additional episodic memory (for an earlier conceptual pooling of implicit memory and familiarity, see Kelley & Lindsay, 1993;
Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Mandler, 1980; see Buchner & Brandt,
2003, for psychometric arguments for this). Concerning the sensorimotor groundings of these different memory forms, it is interesting that the procedural roots of fluency itself have more recently been identified as embodied in nature, which is outlined in the following.
In contrast to explicit memory, which entails a conscious recognition of a stimulus, implicit memory is expressed when previous processing of a given stimulus changes subsequent stimulusrelated preferences or performance without conscious recognition
(Schacter, 1987; Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993). The two most extensively investigated manifestations of implicit memory are the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968; for a review, see Bornstein,
1989), which is the finding that repeated stimuli are liked more than novel stimuli, and repetition priming (e.g., Warrington &
Weiskrantz, 1970), which is the finding that stimulus repetition facilitates stimulus identification under degraded presentation conditions. Both these phenomena emerge independently from explicit recollection (Bornstein, 1989; Seamon et al., 1995; Tulving,
Schacter, & Stark, 1982).
As an underlying mechanism for implicit memory, processing fluency has again been discussed, for instance in repetition priming of word identification (Masson & MacLeod, 1996; Wagner &
Gabrieli, 1998) or word fragment completion (Bodner, Masson, &
Caldwell, 2000). For the mere exposure effect in particular, processing fluency has become the primary explanatory framework
(Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992). It states that through repetition of a stimulus, the processing of that stimulus is trained and becomes more fluent (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), and this fluency gain automatically triggers positive affect (Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), which drives the preference for old, compared with new, stimuli (R. Reber et al., 2004). In sum, implicit memory effects such as mere exposure and repetition priming also draw on fluency of stimulus processing, similar to familiarity (see Wagner
& Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner, Gabrieli, & Verfaellie, 1997, for the differences in the sources of fluency between implicit memory and familiarity).
According to embodiment theory (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Schubert
& Semin, 2009; Semin & Smith, 2008) stimuli are represented by covert simulations in the sensorimotor systems that act on or that are associated with these stimuli (e.g., Glenberg & Robertson,
2000; Masson et al., 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2008). Consequently, any time a given stimulus is encountered, the specific sensory processes that are associated with this stimulus or the typically associated motor response are automatically triggered. For instance, passively seeing a graspable object triggers a motor simulation to grasp it (Tucker & Ellis, 1998), hearing the sound of a piano piece triggers manual motor activity for piano players
(Haueisen & Knösche, 2001), or merely seeing letters triggers the motor programs to type these letters in skilled typists (Beilock &
Holt, 2007; Van den Bergh, Vrana, & Eelen, 1990).
Concerning the role of these sensorimotor simulations for memory (Glenberg, 1997), the question is what happens when a certain stimulus is encountered repeatedly. Each time a stimulus is encountered, related sensorimotor representations are simulated.
Thus, with stimulus repetition, the according sensorimotor simulations are repeatedly executed and thus trained, which results in a more efficient simulation. For instance, the dominant response automatically triggered by the mere perception of words is to read and pronounce them (Stroop, 1935), and repeated exposure to a word increases the fluency of pronouncing it (cf. Savage, Bradley,
& Forster, 1990; see also Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989). This fluency gain in sensorimotor simulations in turn triggers positive affect (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Cannon,
Hayes, & Tipper, 2010; Topolinski et al., 2009; Van den Bergh et al., 1990).
More recently, Topolinski and Strack (2009c, 2010) have argued that this positive fluency gain in sensorimotor simulations is the causal mechanism driving mere exposure effects for words, that is, the preference for repeated, compared with novel, words
(Zajonc, 1968). To test this hypothesis concerning words and the related motor simulation of pronouncing words, they experimentally prevented stimulus-specific sensorimotor simulations in the domain responsible for simulations of pronouncing, namely, the oral motor system. Specifically, they presented words as verbal
1
The amount of retrieved episodic cues influencing recollection might also be coined as fluency, namely, retrieval fluency (cf. Benjamin, Bjork,
& Schwartz, 1998; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001), but the present notion of fluency-dependence only concerns the processing fluency of the stimulus itself.

262 stimuli and characters as visual control stimuli in a classic mere exposure paradigm. Crucially, during the (partially repeated) presentation of those stimuli, participants were asked to engage in concurrent motor tasks involving either the oral motor system
(chewing gum) or the manual motor system (kneading a ball). For the control manual task, they found robust mere exposure effects for both the words and the characters. In contrast, under the experimental oral task, they found mere exposure effects for characters, but not for words.
Furthermore, Topolinski and Strack (2009c, Experiment 3) also provoked a double dissociation between two types of stimuli and two types of motor interference. Specifically, in a mere exposure paradigm, they presented words associated with the oral motor system and tunes associated with the vocal motor system under either oral (moving the tongue) or vocal motor interference (humming). For the oral task, they found mere exposure effects for tunes, but not for words; however, for the vocal task, they found mere exposure effects for words, but not for tunes. Importantly, in all experiments, they found not an attenuated, but a completely neutralized, mere exposure effect under stimulus-specific motor interference.
These results strongly suggest that mere exposure effects hinge on fluency gains in stimulus-related motor simulations, which was further supported by experiments concerning name repetition in the false-fame effect (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; see Topolinski & Strack, 2010). Moreover, in yet another recent line of research targeting visual processing, Topolinski (2010) experimentally increased the fluency of stimulus-specific motor simulations without actually repeating stimulus presentations and still gained repetition effects, thus provoking mere exposure without exposure. In conclusion, fluency resides in sensorimotor processes.
TOPOLINSKI
The previous considerations lead to the following prediction as the rationale of the present investigation: If both implicit memory and familiarity, but not recollection, are driven by stimulus-related processing fluency (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Masson
& MacLeod, 1996; Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998), and fluency resides in stimulus-specific motor simulations (Beilock & Holt, 2007;
Topolinski, 2010; Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Topolinski &
Strack, 2010), then interfering with these simulations would prevent both implicit memory effects and familiarity, while leaving recollection unaffected.
The present experiments systematically tested this prediction with mostly words as target stimuli (except Experiment 2) because this classic stimulus type of memory research is easy to implement and controllable, and its associated motor system is highly specified and easy to block (e.g., Emerson & Miyake, 2003).
In the following, I first report experiments implementing stimulus-specific motor interference on implicit memory, namely, mere exposure for words (Experiment 1) and for tunes (Experiments 2), as well as word fragment completion (Experiment 3).
Then, I report experiments concerning familiarity, as measured by familiarity ratings (Experiment 4), the remember– know task (Experiment 5), receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs; Experiment
6), and skin conductance responses (SCRs; Experiment 7). In all of these experiments, recollection (and recall, Experiment 3) was assessed under similar motor interference.
The previous finding that oral motor interference impairs mere exposure for words as measured by liking ratings (cf. Topolinski &
Strack, 2009c) was replicated. Furthermore, it was tested whether the same motor interference also interferes with recollection under identical implementation conditions.
Method.
Participants.
One hundred (78 female, 22 male) individuals from various professional backgrounds and undergraduate psychology students participated for a reward of € 6 (U.S.$10 at that time) or course credit.
Materials and procedure.
As target stimuli, 48 names of actually existing corporations from the Asian stock market were used (see Topolinski & Strack, 2010, Experiment 2). The names ranged in length from seven (e.g., Unitika) to 14 (e.g., Zheijanghuahai) letters. Participants were told that these were nonsense words to be studied and later rated for further experiments. As a study phase in the beginning of the experimental session, participants received one half of the 48 names (counterbalanced across participants) in random order, with each item presented for 3,000 ms and with an interstimulus interval of
1,000 ms. Participants were asked to merely read the names.
Then, several unrelated experimental tasks (Topolinski &
Sparenberg, 2011) followed for 15 min. In the crucial test phase thereafter, participants received the 24 old names together with the 24 remaining new names from the stimulus pool in a random order (randomized individually for each participant), with each name presented in the middle of the personal computer screen until the participant responded.
Judgments.
In the liking group, participants were asked to indicate how much they liked each particular stimulus by typing in a number from 0 ( I do not like it at all ) to 7 ( I like it very much ; cf. Topolinski & Strack, 2009c). In the recollection group, participants were asked to indicate with a key press whether they could recollect having encountered the name before in the study phase, including any episodic or situational cue (yes–no). Specifically, they were instructed,
Respond with “yes” only if you can actually recollect the moment in which you encountered the item before. This should include some specific memory content, such as what you were thinking or feeling in that moment or what was happening here in the lab, for instance, a noise on the street or the movement of another participant.
To further encourage participants to limit responses to recollection only, the following instruction was presented before the first trial and after every 12th trial (altogether four times) for 15 s: “Please avoid giving false alarms for items that are actually novel. It is normal to positively recollect only a few items .
”
Motor tasks.
For the time of the study phase, participants were asked to either chew a tasteless gum (oral motor group) or to knead a soft foam ball with their nondominant hand (manual motor group; for details, see Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Experiment 1).
The whole experimental session took about 40 min.

Debriefing.
In a computer-administered debriefing, participants were asked for any speculations concerning the experimental rationale. No participant reported a relevant guess.
Results.
Liking.
A 2 (exposure: old, new; within) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the liking judgments yielded a main effect of exposure, F (1, 54) ⫽
12.92, p ⬍ .001, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .19, but also an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 54)
⫽
7.99, p
⬍
.007,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.13.
Planned comparisons within each motor task group showed that participants who kneaded a ball liked old items more than new items, t (27) ⫽ 4.93, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.08, but participants who chew gum showed no such effect ( t
⬍
1, p
⫽
.62); see Figure 1 and
Table 1.
Recollection.
A 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within)
⫻
2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA showed only a main effect of exposure, F (1, 42) ⫽ 50.84, p ⬍ .001, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .55, and no other effects ( F s
⬍
0.1). Crucially, the interaction between exposure and motor task was far from significance ( F ⬍ 0.1, p ⫽
.79). Collapsed over both motor groups, hit rates were higher than false alarm rates, t (43) ⫽ 7.22, p ⬍ .001. Furthermore, recollection accuracy d
⬘ did not differ between the oral and the manual motor group ( t ⫽ 0.12, p ⫽ .91).
This dissociation between liking and recollection was further evidenced by an omnibus interaction ( z standardized). A 2 (exposure: old, new; within) ⫻ 2 (judgment: liking, recollection; between) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA yielded an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 96) ⫽ 6.04, p
⬍
.016,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.06, as well as a reliable three-way interaction among exposure, judgment, and motor task, F (1, 96) ⫽ 6.01, p ⬍
.016,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.06 (all other F s
⬍
1).
Discussion.
Replicating Topolinski and Strack (2009c), a concurrent oral motor task interfered with the acquisition of implicit memory for words, as measured by higher preference for old, compared with novel, words (Zajonc, 1968), compared with a manual motor task, which did not interfere. However, the same manipulation had no effect on recollection, with recollection accuracy not being lower for the oral, compared with the manual, motor group (see Figure 1). A failure to demonstrate this interaction due to low power is unlikely given the relatively large sample
(cf. Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Topolinski & Strack, 2010).
In the next experiment, I sought to replicate this pattern with a different stimulus and motor domain.
3
2
5
4
1
0
7
6
Old names
New names
Manual ( n = 28) Oral ( n = 28)
Figure 1.
Liking ratings for target words in Experiment 1 as a function of exposure and motor interference (means). The error bars indicate the standard deviations.
EMBODIED MEMORY 263
Table 1
Recollection for Target Words in Experiment 1 as a Function of
Exposure and Motor Task
Motor interference
Recollection
Manual: Kneading a ball Oral: Chewing gum n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
23
0.27 (0.03)
0.10 (0.02)
1.03 (0.18)
21
0.28 (0.04)
0.11 (0.02)
1.00 (0.23)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
The present account argues that implicit memory draws on fluency gains in stimulus-specific motor simulations that can be blocked by interference in the respective motor system, while recollection is independent from such sensorimotor groundings.
Generalizing from words as verbal stimuli associated with the oral motor system, the present experiment addressed tunes and the associated vocal motor system (cf. Topolinski & Strack, 2009c,
Experiment 3). In this case, a vocal motor interference during the repeated exposure of tunes should interfere with mere exposure effects for tunes, which has been already demonstrated by Topolinski and Strack (2009c, Experiment 3). Going beyond this, in the present experiment, I also investigated the impact of vocal motor interference on recollection for tunes. Experiment 2A realized a full 2 (liking vs. recollection) ⫻ 2 (oral vs. vocal interference) design with a less strict recollection instruction than Experiment 1, while Experiment 2B replicated only the recollection task under stricter recollection instructions.
Method.
Participants.
One hundred ten (92 female) individuals from various professional backgrounds participated for a reward of € 3
(U.S.$5 at that time).
Materials and procedure.
Experiment 1 was replicated with the following modifications. (a) Instead of words, 24 random tone sequences were used, ranging in length from four to nine tones (see
Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Experiment 3). (b) In the study phase, a randomly chosen half of the tunes was played to participants via headphones while they continuously performed either an oral or a vocal motor task: As oral motor interference , participants were instructed to alternately tap the inside of the right and left corner of their mouths with the tip of their tongue while keeping their mouths shut. As specifically vocal motor interference , participants were instructed to repeatedly hum the paraverbal response token
“mm-hm” (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Experiment 3). (c) The delay between the study and test phases was 10 min, filled with a task involving dialing numbers on cell phones (Topolinski, 2011).
(d) In the recollection task, the additional instructions concerning avoidance of false alarms presented during the trials were left out.
Again, participants were randomly assigned to the different judgment and motor-task conditions (see Table 2 and Figure 2).
The whole experimental session took 30 min.

264 TOPOLINSKI
Table 2
Recollection for Target Tunes in Experiments 2A and 2B as a
Function of Exposure and Motor Task
Motor interference
Recollection
Oral: Tongue movements Vocal: Humming
Experiment 2A n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
Experiment 2B n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
30
0.24 (0.02)
0.19 (0.02)
0.28 (0.17)
30
0.22 (0.03)
0.08 (0.01)
0.89 (0.23)
30
0.28 (0.02)
0.23 (0.02)
0.27 (0.14)
30
0.23 (0.03)
0.10 (0.02)
0.86 (0.20)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
Debriefing.
Again, no participant reported a valid suspicion.
Results.
Liking.
A 2 (exposure: old, new; within)
⫻
2 (motor task: oral, vocal; between) ANOVA over the liking ratings revealed a main effect of exposure, F (1, 48)
⫽
13.74, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.22, which was qualified by an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 48)
⫽
7.69, p
⬍
.008,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.14. Separate comparisons within each motor-task group showed that participants who moved their tongue (oral) liked old tunes more than new tunes, t (24)
⫽
3.98, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.91, while participants who hummed (vocal) showed no such difference ( t
⬍
1, p
⫽
.43), which is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Recollection.
A 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within)
⫻
2
(motor task: oral, vocal; between) ANOVA over the hits and false alarm rates found only a main effect of exposure, F (1, 58)
⫽
5.17, p ⬍ .027, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .08, and no other effects ( F ⬍ 2, ns ; interaction between exposure and motor task, F
⬍
0.1, p
⫽
.99). Collapsed over both motor groups, hit rates were higher than false alarm rates, t (59)
⫽
2.29, p
⬍
.025, d
⫽
0.40. Accuracies d
⬘ did not differ between the motor groups (see Table 2; t ⫽ 0.05, p ⫽ .96).
Confirming this pattern of results, a 2 (exposure: old tunes, new tunes) ⫻ 2 (judgment: liking, recollection) ⫻ 2 (motor task: oral, vocal) omnibus ANOVA (z-standardized) yielded an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 106) ⫽ 8.13, p ⬍ .005,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.07, and, most importantly, the crucial three-way interaction among exposure, judgment, and motor task, F (1, 106) ⫽ 8.03, p ⬍
.006,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.07 (all other F s
⬍
1, ns ).
Participants and procedure.
Sixty (40 female, 20 male) psychology undergraduates took part for course credits. The recollection task under identical oral and vocal interference (each n ⫽
30) from Experiment 2A was replicated. However, similar to
Experiment 1, a stricter recollection instruction was implemented by presenting the following additional instruction before the first trial and after every 6th trial for 15 s: “Please avoid giving false alarms for items that are actually novel. It is normal that you positively recollect only a few items.”
Results.
All cell means are shown in Table 2. The 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within)
⫻
2 (motor task: oral, vocal; between) ANOVA again showed only a main effect of exposure,
F (1, 58)
⫽
35.91, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.38 (all other F s
⬍
1, p s
⬎
.5).
Again, there were no differences between motor groups in d ⬘ ( t ⫽
0.11, p
⫽
.92; see Table 2). Using the z standardized liking ratings from Experiment 2A to establish a cross-study interaction between liking and recollection in this Experiment 2B, a 2 (exposure: old tunes, new tunes) ⫻ 2 (judgment: liking, recollection) ⫻ 2 (motor task: oral, vocal) omnibus ANOVA again showed the crucial three-way interaction among exposure, judgment, and motor task,
F (1, 106)
⫽
8.48, p
⬍
.004,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.07.
Generalizing to tunes as vocal stimuli and the associated vocal motor system, it was found that a vocal, compared with an oral, control motor interference prevented mere exposure effects for tunes as a measure of implicit memory (Topolinski & Strack,
2009c) but left recollection unaffected. Although the present recollection performance exhibited lesser accuracy compared with
Experiment 1 (see Table 2), which is probably due to the different stimulus types, the type of motor interference again had no detectable effect on recollection. Furthermore, implementing a more or less strict recollection instruction (Experiment 2A vs. 2B) changed the general level of hits and false alarms rates (see Table 2) but still did not cause an impact of motor interference to be detected.
As a further generalization, the next experiment should implement other assessments of the currently addressed memory forms, namely, word fragment completion as a measure for implicit memory (e.g., Tulving et al., 1982), as well as recollection and free recall (MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Warrington & Weiskrantz,
1970) as indicators of explicit recollection.
As outlined above, another manifestation of implicit memory is repetition priming, which is improved stimulus identification under degraded conditions (Tulving et al., 1982), such as identifying the word M_ _OR_ after having read MEMORY earlier. For this phenomenon as well, stimulus-related processing fluency was discussed as the underlying mechanism (Bodner et al., 2000; Masson
& MacLeod, 1996; Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998). Specifically, it was argued that prior exposure facilitates the fluency of retrieving the
3
2
5
4
1
0
7
6
Old tunes
New tunes
Oral ( n = 25) Vocal ( n = 25)
Figure 2.
Liking ratings for target tunes in Experiment 2 as a function of exposure and motor interference (means). The error bars indicate the standard deviations.

target from memory. For instance, Masson and MacLeod (1996) argued that the prior exposure of target words increases the likelihood “that the target word comes fluently to mind” (p. 10), and
MacLeod and Masson (1996) concluded “that enhanced performance on implicit measures is indeed a consequence of fluent retrieval” (p. 170). This retrieval fluency (cf. Benjamin, Bjork, &
Schwartz, 1998) is different from recollection because it pertains to processing the (degraded) stimulus itself, not to retrieving additional contextual memory concerning the prior study episode.
Previous findings already suggest that this fluency may also reside in stimulus-related simulations (Curran, Schacter, &
Galluccio, 1999; Downes et al., 1996; McClelland & Pring,
1991). These studies presented words in word stem and word fragment completion tasks while changing modalities between the study and test phases (e.g., visual study phase and auditory test, McClelland & Pring, 1991, Experiment 3). They found that interfering with covert articulation of words during the study phase diminished cross-modal repetition priming, presumably because covert articulation was used to recode the word representation from one modality to another (Curran et al., 1999; see also the General Discussion). Going beyond this, the present approach predicts that oral interference will impair repetition priming even within the same modality (i.e., both study and test visual), where no cross-modality recoding is necessary because even within a single modality, pronouncing simulations are the driving mechanism for repetition-induced fluency gains in identifying a degraded stimulus.
To test this, a word-fragment completion task (Tulving et al., 1982) was used, which also offered the possibility to replicate the present pattern with meaningful and more standard verbal material. In this task, participants study a set of words (e.g., MEMORY ), later receive a list of fragment words for which several letters are eliminated (e.g.,
M_ _OR_ ), and are asked to identify the word implied by the fragment. For some of the fragments, the implied word was contained in the study list. Across various stimulus and delay manipulations, it has been found that fragments of old words are identified with a greater likelihood than are fragments of novel words (e.g., MacLeod &
Kampe, 1996; Rajaram & Roediger, 1993). Again, this effect occurs independently of recollection of the prior study (Tulving et al., 1982;
Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970).
Besides recollection, free recall was also implemented as another measure of explicit recollection memory. Because free recall does not draw on target-related fluency (since in a free recall no target is presented at all) but does draw on episodic memory retrieval, it was predicted that oral interference would have no impact on recall.
Method.
Participants.
Two hundred forty-seven (211 female, 36 male) individuals from various professional backgrounds and undergraduate psychology students participated for a reward of
€
3 (U.S.$5 at that time) or course credit.
Materials.
Because exposure effects for word fragment completion are usually stronger for low-frequency than for highfrequency words (MacLeod & Kampe, 1996), target words with low frequency in everyday language were used (cf. Challis &
Brodbeck, 1992; Tulving et al., 1982). From the pool of lowfrequency items published in the classic study by Tulving et al.
(1982), 40 randomly chosen items were translated into German, constituting the present pool of target words (e.g., ESPRESSO ).
2
EMBODIED MEMORY 265
The words ranged from five to 10 letters in length. To derive a concordant pool of word fragments, random letters were replaced by an underscore (e.g., _S_R_S_O ). Each resulting fragment entailed enough letters to imply a single correct solution only (e.g.,
Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Tulving et al., 1982).
Procedure.
In a study phase in the beginning of the experimental session, a randomly chosen half of the target words (counterbalanced across participants) was presented in an individually randomized order for each participant. To decrease the contribution of explicit memory to the later fragment completion task, thus rendering the task as implicit as possible given the brief study-test delay (see below), (a) the words were presented shortly only, and
(b) no memorizing instruction was given. (a) In random order, the words were presented for 500 ms each, followed by a 500 ms backward mask consisting of a random letter string of matched length, followed by a 1,000 ms intertrial interval. (b) No mention of the later test phase was made, and participants were instructed not to memorize the items but rather to watch the appearing stimuli as a warm-up (cf. Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Rajaram & Roediger,
1993). Although it has been shown that deeper semantic elaboration of the study items (e.g., evaluating or memorizing) leads to higher exposure effects than shallow encoding (e.g., reading or perceptual rating; Challis & Brodbeck, 1992), no special task beyond merely watching was implemented because this task would require manual responses that were likely to interfere with the concurrent manual motor task.
The oral and manual motor tasks were identical to Experiment
1 and were again implemented for the whole time of the study phase (lasting less than a minute). After the study phase, an intervening filler task (cf. Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Rajaram &
Roediger, 1993) followed, in which participants rated the pleasantness of diverse paintings for approximately 5 min.
In the test phase, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three following tasks (for sample sizes, see Figure 3 and Table 3).
Word fragment completion.
Participants were introduced to the basic task of completing word fragments by showing a fragment example together with its solution. The underlying experimental rational was not mentioned, and no connection was drawn to the previous study phase, rendering the task an implicit one. All
40 word fragments were presented one-by-one in an individually randomized order for each participant, and participants were asked to identify the word for each particular fragment. Each word fragment was presented for a maximum of 15 s in which the participant could press a key and then type in a solution candidate
(MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Rajaram & Roediger, 1993). If the participant did not the press the key within the 15 s time window, the trial timed out and the next fragment was presented.
Recollection.
All 40 target words were presented in random order. Using the instruction, as in Experiments 1A and 2A, participants were asked to indicate whether they could recollect having encountered the given word before in the test phase involving episodic or situational memory cues (yes–no).
Free recall.
Participants were shortly reminded of the previous study phase and were asked to type in any word that they could recollect from this phase, with the sequence of words being irrel-
2
The pool is available on request from the author.

266 TOPOLINSKI
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 old new
Manual ( n = 55) Oral ( n = 50)
Figure 3.
Probability of correctly identifying word fragments in Experiment 3 as a function of exposure and motor interference (means). The error bars indicate the standard deviations.
evant. They were given no time limit for this task. The whole experimental session took 30 min.
Debriefing.
No participant reported a valid suspicion.
Data preparation.
A reported word in the completion and in the free recall task was treated as being correct even if it was typed with minor orthographic flaws.
Results.
Word fragment completion.
A 2 (exposure: old, new; within)
⫻
2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA over the likelihood that a given fragment was identified correctly found a main effect of exposure, F (1, 103)
⫽
74.66, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.42, that was qualified by an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 103)
⫽
18.97, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.16. This interaction was constituted by the following pattern (see Figure 3). Although old items were more likely identified than new items in both motor groups; manual: t (54) ⫽ 10.01, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.29; oral: t (49) ⫽
2.79, p
⬍
.008, d
⫽
0.44, old items were even more frequently identified in the manual group than in the oral motor group, t (103)
⫽
4.19, p
⬍
.001, d
⫽
0.83, while there was no difference for new items between the motor groups ( t ⬍ 0.2).
Recollection.
A 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms: within)
⫻
2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA yielded only a main effect of exposure, F (1, 92)
⫽
569,24, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.86, and no other effects reached significance, including the interaction with motor task (all F s
⬍
0.6, p s
⬎
.40). Consequently, in both motor groups, hits were more frequent than were false alarms ( t s ⬎
15, p s
⬍
.001). Also, there was no reliable difference between the motor groups concerning accuracy d ⬘ ( t ⫽ 1.3, p ⫽ .19; see
Table 3).
Free recall.
There was no reliable difference in the number of correctly recalled items between the oral group and the manual motor group ( t ⬍ 0.5, p ⫽ .47, see Table 3).
Finally, evidencing the dissociation between fragment completion and recollection in response to motor interference, a 2 (exposure: old, new; within)
⫻
2 (task: recollection, fragment completion; between) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) omnibus
ANOVA using z-standardized values yielded the crucial three-way interaction among exposure, task, and motor task, F (1, 195) ⫽
4.49, p
⬍
.035,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.02, that justified the separate analyses. The recall data were not included in this analysis because the factor exposure could not be applied to them.
Discussion.
Generalizing the previous dissociations between preference and recollection to repetition priming in word fragment completion as another measure of implicit memory, it was found that oral, compared with manual, motor interference decreased repetition priming by half (see above the effect sizes). Although recollection performance was much higher than in the previous experiments due to the short delay between the study and test phases (compare Tables 1–3), the type of motor interference still did not affect recollection, nor did it affect free recall.
In conclusion, across Experiments 1–3 stimulus-specific motor interference substantially reduced or even neutralized implicit memory while leaving recollection memory unaffected. In the second part, several measures of familiarity were investigated.
The next experiments should generalize the present demonstrations to various measures of familiarity and familiarity-based recognition (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985; Whittlesea, 1993), which, although conceptualized as being explicit memory forms, also draw on stimulus-related processing fluency (Rajaram, 1993;
Yonelinas, 2002) and may thus be prone to stimulus-specific motor interference. While the different memory forms were assessed between participants in the experiments thus far, Experiments 4 – 6 assessed them within participants, thus provoking a dissociation between familiarity and recollection within the same participant.
As a first demonstration of a motor-induced dissociation between familiarity and recollection, independent self-reports were used (cf. Yonelinas, 2002).
Method.
Participants.
Fifty-five (30 female, 25 male) participants with various professional backgrounds participated for a reward of
€
3
(approximately U.S.$5 at that time).
Materials and design.
Twenty names were randomly chosen from a pool of names of actually existing Bollywood actors (Topolinski & Strack, 2010, Experiment 1). Every name consisted of a first and a second name (e.g., Aishwarya Rai). In the study phase, participants were shown 10 randomly chosen names, each presented for 3,000 ms with a 1,000 ms interstimulus interval, and were asked to merely read them. After 30 min of unrelated tasks
(solving anagrams, executing lexical decisions), the 10 old names from the study phase reappeared in a test phase together with 10 new names in a random order. In this test phase, participants were
Table 3
Recollection and Free Recall for Target Words in Experiment 3 as a Function of Exposure and Motor Task
Memory parameters
Recollection n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
Free recall n
Free recall (0–25) a ball
49
0.60 (0.03)
0.07 (0.01)
2.27 (0.15)
24
4.17 (0.59)
Motor interference
Manual: Kneading
Oral: Chewing gum
45
0.58 (0.03)
0.08 (0.01)
1.98 (0.15)
24
3.58 (0.53)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.

first introduced to the general conceptual difference between recollection and familiarity and were reminded that these two experiences are independent from each other. Then they were asked to provide the following two judgments for each appearing name.
1. Recollection.
The instruction for the recollection judgment was the same as in Experiment 1. Participants should indicate a positive recollection if they could retrieve some episodic or situational cue from the previous encounter ( yes – no ).
2. Familiarity.
Participants were asked to focus on the name without any memory search and to indicate spontaneously how familiar this name was to them in general, independently from any additionally retrieved memory cues, on a Likert scale ranging from
0 ( not at all ) to 7 ( very much ). The order of judgments was counterbalanced between participants and was controlled as an additional between-subjects factor (judgment sequence) in the later analyses.
Motor tasks.
The motor tasks were again implemented in the study phase only. While in the manual condition participants again kneaded a ball, in the oral condition participants were asked to eat popcorn by picking it from a small bowl in front of them with the left hand while using the right hand to provide their judgments with the computer mouse (Topolinski & Strack, 2010, Experiment 1).
Pathologic status.
Because a similar dissociation between familiarity and recollection is known from pathological conditions
(see the General Discussion), participants were screened for psychopathological status after the experiment. More specifically, they were asked whether they had ever suffered a psychiatric disorder that required psychiatric treatment or medication without indicating specific details. Moreover, they were asked whether they had ever suffered brain injuries. Four participants affirmed one of the questions. Their data were dropped.
In the analyses, 51 participants remained (see Table 4 for the sample sizes).
Results.
Familiarity.
A 2 (exposure: old, new; within) ⫻ 2 (judgment sequence: recollection-familiarity, familiarity-recollection; between) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA over the familiarity ratings yielded a marginal effect of exposure, F (1,
47) ⫽ 3.68, p ⫽ .061, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .07, as well as an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 47)
⫽
5.24, p
⬍
.027,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.10, and
EMBODIED MEMORY 267 no other effects (all F s ⬍ 3, p s ⬍ .09). As a consequence, familiarity ratings collapsed over judgment sequence were higher for old, compared with new, items in the manual-motor group, t (23)
⫽
3.08, p
⬍
.005, d
⫽
0.27, but not in the oral-motor group
( t ⬍ 0.3, p ⫽ .80; see Table 4 for the cell means).
Recollection.
A 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within)
⫻
2 (judgment sequence: recollection-familiarity, familiarityrecollection; between)
⫻
2 (motor task: manual, oral; between)
ANOVA showed only a main effect of exposure, F (1, 47) ⫽ 23.07, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.33, and no interaction effects (all F s
⬍
1.2, p s
⫽
.29). Collapsed over the factors judgment sequence and motor task, hit rates ( M
⫽
0.43, SD
⫽
0.20) were higher than false alarm rates
( M ⫽ 0.27, SD ⫽ 0.22), t (50) ⫽ 4.80, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.73. Most crucially, this recollection performance was reliably detected in both the manual, t (23) ⫽ 3.37, p ⬍ .003, d ⫽ 0.90, accuracy d ⬘ ⫽
0.67, and the oral motor groups, t (26)
⫽
3.40, p
⬍
.002, d
⫽
0.61, accuracy d ⬘ ⫽ 0.75, with no reliable difference in recollection accuracy between the two groups ( t
⫽
0.7, p
⫽
.44; see Table 4 for all cell means). Judgment sequence had only a marginal effect on memory accuracy, F (1, 49)
⫽
2.93, p
⫽
.09,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.06.
This pattern of effects was verified by an omnibus ANOVA conducted over z -standardized recollection and familiarity using the full 2 (exposure: old names, new names; within) ⫻ 2 (judgment: recollection, familiarity; within)
⫻
2 (judgment sequence: recollection-familiarity, familiarity-recollection; between) ⫻ 2
(motor task: manual, oral; between) design. In this analysis, a main effect for exposure emerged, F (1, 47) ⫽ 9.26, p ⬍ .004, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .17, that was qualified by a two-way interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 47) ⫽ 5.19, p ⬍ .027, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .10, and most crucially, by a three-way interaction among exposure, judgment, and motor task, F (1, 47) ⫽ 1.14, p ⬍ .04, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .09. No other effects reached significance (all F s
⬍
3, p s
⬍
.10). Importantly, the four-way interaction among exposure, judgment, motor task, and judgment sequence was not significant ( F
⬍
1, p
⫽
.33).
Discussion.
The present data are initial evidence that stimulus-specific motor interference impairs familiarity but not recollection. Participants for whom the mouth could freely simulate pronouncing could reliably discriminate between old and new items by means of both recollection and familiarity. In contrast, participants for whom the mouth was engaged in a concurrent
Table 4
Recollection and Familiarity for Actor Names in Experiment 4 as a Function of Exposure, Judgment Sequence, and Motor Task
Judgment recollection or familiarity
Judgment sequence:
Recollection/familiarity
12
Manual: Kneading a ball
Judgment sequence:
Familiarity/recollection
12 n
Recollection
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
Familiarity (0–7)
Old names
New names
0.38 (0.06)
0.27 (0.05)
0.32 (0.29)
4.04 (0.44)
3.42 (0.43)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
0.48 (0.06)
0.24 (0.06)
1.01 (0.29)
4.19 (0.59)
3.88 (0.56)
Motor interference
Judgment sequence:
Recollection/familiarity
14
Oral: Eating popcorn
Judgment sequence:
Familiarity/ recollection
13
0.43 (0.05)
0.29 (0.05)
0.61 (0.27)
3.29 (0.50)
3.31 (0.58)
0.42 (0.06)
0.29 (0.05)
0.90 (0.28)
4.76 (0.55)
4.82 (0.58)

268 TOPOLINSKI motor task could only discriminate between old and new items via recollection, while their feeling of familiarity was not diagnostic any more. This pattern was even obtained within-participants, thus provoking a clinical state of recognizing without feeling familiar.
An alternative explanation might be judgmental correction (Jacoby et al., 1989). Specifically, in the present paradigm, participants provided both recollection and familiarity judgments for the same item, judgments that are likely to influence each other. A positive recollection before judging the familiarity of an item might have prompted participants to correct their familiarity rating for the recollected study episode (Jacoby et al., 1989). This speculation offers the alternative explanation that type of motor interference somehow moderated such correction, or reattribution, processes, especially in those conditions in which recollection judgments preceded familiarity ratings. However, the basic finding that motor interference did not affect recollection itself renders this hypothesis implausible in the first place. Nevertheless, the next experiment had a memory measure that precludes judgmental attributions.
An established way to differentiate familiarity and recollection is the well-known remember– know paradigm (RK-paradigm, Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). In this framework, remembering is conceptualized as the memory for co-occurring events or experiences during study, while knowing is the awareness that the item had been presented before without further episodic memory (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). Thus, remembering can be equaled with recollection and knowing, with familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas,
2002). There are several influential frameworks and substantial evidence suggesting that the remember and the knowing component in the RK-paradigm are two independent memory processes
(Gardiner, 1988; Ochsner, 2000; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985;
Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005), although there are also sophisticated accounts that the RK-paradigm only maps a single process, which is discussed in the General Discussion (for comprehensive reviews, see Dunn, 2004, Dunn, 2008; see Wixted &
Mickes, 2010, for a possible integration between dual and single process views).
Because in this paradigm participants do not render two separate judgments of familiarity and recollection, reattribution processes
(e.g., discounting familiarity because of prior recollection; Jacoby et al., 1989) are unlikely (but see Strack & Förster, 1995, for other ways of judgmental contamination of this measure). Thus, this paradigm should be used as a further generalization predicting that stimulus-related motor interference would selectively impair the familiarity estimate in the RK-paradigm. Furthermore, visual stimuli (Chinese characters) were implemented as a control condition.
Method.
Participants.
Seventy (42 female, 28 male) individuals from various professional backgrounds participated for a financial compensation of € 6 (approximately U.S.$9 at that time).
Materials and procedure.
As verbal stimuli, the 48 names of
Asian shares from Experiment 1 were used. As visual control stimuli, 48 Chinese ideographs were used (cf. Topolinski & Strack,
2009c, Experiment 1). The procedure of Experiment 1 was again replicated except for the following modifications. (a) In the study phase, in one block, one half of the names (counterbalanced across participants) were shown with each word presented for 3,000 ms and a 1,000 ms interstimulus interval; and in another block, one half of the characters (also counterbalanced across participants) were shown with each character presented for 1,000 ms and a
1,000 ms interstimulus interval. The sequence of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were not informed about the later memory probe. (b) The delay between test and study phase was 25–30 min and was filled with unrelated experimental tasks (evaluating simple geometric shapes, evaluating jokes, executing head movements and aesthetic judgments). (c)
In the test phase, the items again appeared in two blocks, a word-block and a character-block, with the sequence of stimulusblocks counterbalanced across participants. Within each block, old and new items were presented in random order.
Remember– know task.
In the test phase, participants were instructed to report their memory status for each particular item with one of the following three responses (cf. Aggleton et al.,
2005).
1. Remembered.
Participants were instructed to indicate this memory status if they actually remembered something specific from the study phase, for instance their own thoughts or feelings when confronted with the word, or some situational cues, such as a sound in the laboratory.
2. Familiar but not remembered.
Participants were asked to respond with this option if they felt or simply knew that the item was studied before but could not recollect any specific experience from the study phase.
3. New item.
Participants should chose this option if they thought the word had not been presented in the earlier study phase.
Motor tasks.
The motor tasks were identical to Experiment 1 and were again implemented in the test phase only.
Pathologic status.
Again, in a computer directed debriefing, participants were asked whether they had ever suffered a psychiatric disorder or a brain injury. Four participants affirmed one of the questions; their data were dropped. In the analyses, 33 remained in the manual group, and 33 remained in the oral motor group.
Results.
Data preparation.
The basic probabilities of remember, know, and new responses for each experimental condition are presented in Table 5. From these probabilities, estimates for remember and familiarity performance were calculated the following way (according to Aggleton et al., 2005, p. 1817; Yonelinas, Kroll,
Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998, p. 339). For both remember and familiarity, the difference between hit and false alarm rates were calculated. Remember was estimated with the probability of a remember-response for old items minus the probability of a remember-response for new items. Familiarity was estimated with the probability of a familiar-response given that the particular item had not been recollected, that is, familiar/(1
⫺ remember), thus obtaining an independent remember– know (IRK) estimate of familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). This IRK-familiarity know-estimate was calculated separately for old and new items. The eventual familiarity-component was the difference between the estimates for old items minus the estimates for new items. Thus, both the remember and the familiarity estimates indicate the amount of discrimination between old and new items.
Words.
A 2 (memory component: remember, IRK-familiarity; within) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA

EMBODIED MEMORY
Table 5
Mean Probabilities for Remember, Know, and New Responses in Experiment 5 as a Function of
Stimulus Type, Exposure, and Motor Interference
Response Type
⫻
Stimulus
Chinese characters
Remember
Know
New
Asian names
Remember
Know
New
Manual motor task
Old items
0.42 (0.04)
0.32 (0.04)
0.26 (0.03)
0.28 (0.03)
0.41 (0.03)
0.31 (0.03)
New items
0.08 (0.02)
0.26 (0.03)
0.66 (0.04)
0.11 (0.02)
0.29 (0.02)
0.59 (0.03)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
Motor interference
Oral motor task
Old items New items
0.37 (0.04)
0.36 (0.04)
0.27 (0.03)
0.30 (0.03)
0.33 (0.02)
0.38 (0.02)
0.06 (0.02)
0.29 (0.03)
0.65 (0.03)
0.11 (0.02)
0.31 (0.02)
0.57 (0.03)
269 yielded a marginal main effect of motor task, F (1, 64)
⫽
3.87, p
⫽
.054, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .06, as well as an interaction between memory component and motor task, F (1, 64)
⫽
14.47, p
⬍
.003,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.18.
3
While the remember components as well as remember accuracies
(see Table 6) did not differ between the manual and the oral groups
( t s ⬍ 1, p s ⬎ .40), the IRK-familiarity component was substantially larger for the manual motor group than for the oral motor group, t (64) ⫽ 3.70, p ⬍ .005, d ⫽ 0.92 (see Figure 4).
Characters.
A 2 (memory component: remember component,
IRK-familiarity component; within) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA found only a marginal main effect for memory component, F (1, 64) ⫽ 2.83, p ⫽ .10, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .04, with the remember component being marginally higher ( M
⫽
0.34, SD
⫽
0.25) than the know component ( M ⫽ 0.24, SD ⫽ 0.32), t (65) ⫽ 1.69, p ⫽
.10, which is conceptually irrelevant. No other effects were found
( F s ⬍ 0.5). Crucially, the interaction between memory component and motor task was far from significance ( F
⫽
0.37, p
⫽
.55).
Across motor groups, both the remember, t (65) ⫽ 10.45, p ⬍ .001, and the IRK-familiarity components, t (65)
⫽
6.03, p
⬍
.001, were reliably above zero (see Figure 4).
Evidencing this pattern of results, an omnibus ANOVA on the full memory Component ⫻ Stimulus ⫻ Motor Task design found a main effect of stimulus, F (1, 64)
⫽
16.07, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.20, a marginal interaction between memory component and stimulus,
F (1, 64)
⫽
3.23, p
⫽
.077,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.05, and a significant three-way
Table 6
Remember Accuracies d ⬘ in Experiment 5 as a Function of
Stimulus Type and Motor Interference
Motor interference
Accuracies
Manual: Kneading a ball
Oral: Eating popcorn n
Asian names (verbal)
Remember accuracy d
⬘
Chinese characters (visual)
Remember accuracy d
⬘
33
0.87 (0.13)
1.84 (0.27)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
33
1.04 (0.17)
1.80 (0.25) interaction among memory component, stimulus, and motor task,
F (1, 64) ⫽ 4.54, p ⬍ .037, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .07 (all other F s ⬍ 1.8, ns ). The main effect of stimulus indicated that both memory components were higher for characters ( M ⫽ 0.28, SD ⫽ 0.20) than for words
( M
⫽
0.18, SD
⫽
0.14) across motor groups, t (65)
⫽
4.00, p
⬍
.001, d ⫽ 0.63. The marginal interaction between memory component and stimulus further qualified this pattern: Across motor tasks, the remember component was higher for characters ( M ⫽
0.34, SD ⫽ 0.25) than for words ( M ⫽ 0.17, SD ⫽ 0.16), t (65) ⫽
5.26, p
⬍
.001, d
⫽
0.76, but the IRK-familiarity component did not differ between characters ( M ⫽ 0.24, SD ⫽ 0.32) and words
( M
⫽
0.18, SD
⫽
0.17), ( t
⬍
1.3, ns ).
Discussion.
Using the RK-paradigm (Gardiner, 1988) to derive memory estimates for remember (
⫽ recollection) and independent remember– know familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002), it was found that oral, compared with manual, motor interference impaired familiarity selectively for words (see Figure 4). In contrast, motor interference had no impact on the remember estimate for words and no impact on remember and familiarity estimates for visual characters. This very rare pattern of impaired familiarity with unaffected recollection in the RK-paradigm (Yonelinas,
2002) is all the more impressive given that the IRK-familiarity component is inversely depending on the amount of remember responses (but see Dunn, 2004, Dunn, 2008, for a differentiated criticism on this nonindependence between the two components; see also the General Discussion).
Most recently, converging evidence was already provided that motor fluency affects the know, but not the remember, component in the RK-paradigm. Yang, Gallo, and Beilock (2009) addressed automatic typing simulations in skilled typists and memory for typing-related stimuli. They found that manipulations of typing motor fluency affected the know component but not the remember component, at least for false alarms. Although this publication did
3
One might object that treating the two judgments “remember” and
“know” as two levels of an independent variable might be statistically inappropriate because they might be considered stochastically dependent.
However, this caveat does not question the present findings because the single t tests reported in the previous paragraphs indicating the interaction pattern are statistically valid in any case (Rajaram, 1993).

270 TOPOLINSKI
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Words Manual
Oral
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Characters Manual
Oral
Remember estimate Independent familiarity estimate
Remember estimate Independent familiarity estimate
Figure 4.
The remember and independent familiarity estimates in the RK-paradigm in Experiment 5 after manual and oral motor interference during study for words (left) and visual characters (right; means). The error bars indicate the standard errors.
not report the impact of motor interference on memory accuracy
(Yang, Gallo, & Beilock, 2009, p. 1363), this finding nevertheless supports the present claim indirectly. The next experiment should generalize the present findings to yet another memory paradigm, namely, ROCs (Yonelinas, 1994).
Experiments 4 and 5 have provided converging evidence that selective motor interference impairs familiarity while leaving recollection unaffected. However, a disadvantage of the paradigms used in these studies is that they rely on subjective introspection of familiarity and recollection, which can be biased by individual differences in interpreting these two recognition states (Strack &
Förster, 1995). To address this issue, a paradigm was used that does not draw on subjective introspection regarding the difference between familiarity and recollection, the ROC paradigm (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 1994). In the ROC-paradigm, participants are asked to discriminate between old and new items and report their confidence in this discrimination for each particular item. Then, in the
ROC curve, the proportions of hits and false alarms are plotted against each other for different levels of confidence (Yonelinas,
1994, Yonelinas, 2001).
According to the dual-process model of recognition (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 1997, Yonelinas, 1999, Yonelinas,
2001) independent contributions of familiarity and recollection can be estimated from the ROC curve, which has been done in numerous lines of research (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007; Diana, Yonelinas,
& Ranganat, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas et al., 2002).
However, there is also evidence supporting the notion that only a single mnemonic process, namely, general memory strength, underlies the ROC performance, the unequal-variance signaldetection (UVSD) model (e.g., Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & Adams,
1999; Heathcote, Raymond, & Dunn, 2006; Jang, Wixted, &
Huber, 2009; see also Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Wixted, 2007; for reviews), which is discussed in the General Discussion. In the present experiment, ROCs were used to extract separate recollection and familiarity estimates according to the dual-process model
(Yonelinas, 1994), but a single-process model (Wixted, 2007) was also considered.
Method.
Participants.
57 (35 female) individuals from various professional backgrounds participated and were rewarded with € 12 (approximately U.S.$20 at that time) for the whole experimental session, of which the ROC task was only a part.
Materials and procedure.
Only verbal stimuli were used. The pool of ancient Greek words (e.g., LOIDORI ) used in Topolinski and Strack (2009c) was extended to 80 words overall, ranging in length from seven to 18 letters and including no proper names or repeating syllables. After approximately 60 min of unrelated experimental tasks in a first part of the experimental session (evaluating geometrical shapes, evaluating jokes, typing numbers on cell phones), the study and test phases of Experiment 5 were replicated with the following modifications. (a) This time, participants chewed a tasteless gum during both the study and the test phase, which was decided arbitrarily to show that the present dissociation pattern can be obtained under different motor interference implementations (see Topolinski & Strack, 2009c, Experiment 2, that the timing of the motor interference does not qualify the relevant fluency effects; see also Topolinski & Strack, 2010, p.
723, for a brief discussion). (b) The break between the study phase and the test phase comprised 15–20 min, involving irrelevant experimental tasks (head movements and evaluations of dot movements). (c) In the test phase, to obtain confidence ratings to plot
ROCs, participants were asked to indicate the confidence of recognizing an item. Following the established procedure to obtain
ROCs (e.g., Aggleton et al., 2005; Glanzer et al., 1999; Yonelinas,
1994) participants were instructed to rate their confidence concerning their recognition on a 6-point scale, from 1 ( certain the item was not studied ) to 6 ( certain the item was studied ), with the
Responses 1, 2, and 3 indicating that they did not recognize the item (with decreasing confidence from 1 to 3), and 4, 5, and 6 indicating that they recognized the item (with increasing confidence from 4 to 6). Thus, for instance, if a participant had the impression that the item was old but was rather unsure, she or he should choose Response 4.
Pathologic status.
In the debriefing after the experiment, three participants indicated a previous psychiatric disorder or brain injury; their data were dropped.
Unusual performance.
Of the remaining 54 participants, three participants (two from the manual group, one from the oral group) exhibited average response latencies (649 ms, 1,015 ms,
1,055 ms) more than 2 standard deviations below the overall average response time ( M
⫽
2,749, SD
⫽
797). Also, while all other participants showed discrimination between old and new items descriptively at the least (areas under the ROC-curves above

the guessing level of 0.5, see below), the performances of these three participants were below guessing level (areas under the individual ROC-curves 0.49, 0.45, and 0.39, respectively). These findings suggest that those participants did not follow the instructions carefully but rather guessed randomly; their data were dropped. Furthermore, while all other participants used each of the six response options at least one time, three additional participants
(1 manual, 2 oral) did not exploit the full range of options but rather confined themselves to two or three response options and used one option in more than 80% of the trials. The data of these participants were also dropped.
4 In the analyses, 48 participants remained; 24 in the manual group and 24 in the oral motor group.
Results.
ROC curves.
The average numbers of recognition responses for each confidence category are displayed as ROC curves in
Figure 5, with the crucial difference in motor interference illustrated by squares (manual) and triangles (oral). There, the proportion of false alarms and hits are plotted on the x - and y -axes, respectively. The leftmost point represents the proportion of items that received the most confident response option (i.e., 6). Each consecutive point also included the items that received the next most confident response option. For instance, the second point included items with the Responses 6 and 5 (cf. Aggleton et al.,
2005).
A first inspection of the ROC curves in Figure 5 reveals that the
ROCs cover a larger area under the curve for the manual group than for the oral interference group, indicating that general memory performance was better for the manual group than for the oral group. The question is whether this was due to a difference in recollection, familiarity, or both. According to the dual-process model by Yonelinas (1994, 1997, 1999, 2002), a ROC curve will exhibit a linear function that is asymmetrical along the negative diagonal if recollection alone would determine judgments and will exhibit a curvilinear function that is symmetrical along the diag-
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
DPSD
UVSD
Oral
Manual
EMBODIED MEMORY 271 onal if familiarity alone would determine judgments (Yonelinas,
1997). Concerning these features, both curves exhibit a mixture of recollection and familiarity, but with a relatively large contribution of familiarity (Yonelinas, 1997, Yonelinas, 2001). Most interestingly, higher amounts of recollection result in an increased intercept, while higher amounts of familiarity result in an increased slope (Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 1997). Regarding these features, the intercept does not differ between the groups, suggesting that a difference in recollection is not the cause for the decrease in memory performance in the oral motor group. Whether familiarity is responsible for this should be statistically analyzed by quantifying the ROC curves.
Recollection and familiarity.
The average ROC for each participant was quantified by fitting a nonlinear equation to the observed ROCs using the least-squares approach, which provides estimates for independent recollection and familiarity components in the ROC performance (Aggleton et al., 2005; Bowles et al.,
2007; Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 1997, Yonelinas, 1999, Yonelinas, 2002).
5 In this procedure, the equation P (“old”| old)
⫽
P (“old” | new) ⫹ R ⫹ (1 ⫺ R ) ⌽ ( d ⬘ /2 ⫺ c i
) ⫺ ⌽ ( ⫺ d ⬘ /2 ⫺ c i
) was used, assuming the independent contributions of recollection ( R ) and a familiarity process, with d ⬘ reflecting the distance between two equal-variance Gaussian strength distributions, c i reflecting the response criterion at point i , and
⌽ reflecting the cumulative normal response function (for details, see Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 1997, Yonelinas, 1999, Yonelinas, 2002). In this way, parameter estimates were derived for recollection and familiarity for each participant, which allowed statistical comparisons between the two motor groups.
These average parameter estimates of recollection and familiarity for each motor interference group are displayed in Figure 6.
Over these parameter estimates a 2 (memory component: recollection, familiarity) ⫻ 2 (motor interference: manual, oral) repeated-measures ANOVA with motor interference treated as a between-subjects factor yielded a main effect of memory component, F (1, 46) ⫽ 29.40, p ⬍ .001, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .39, and of motor interference, F (1, 46) ⫽ 10.67, p ⬍ .002, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .19, as well as the crucial interaction between memory component and motor interference, F (1, 46) ⫽ 4.86, p ⬍ .03, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .10. While the size of the recollection estimate did not differ between the manual ( M
⫽
0.12,
SD ⫽ 0.23) and the oral motor groups ( M ⫽ 0.08, SD ⫽ 0.16, t ⫽
0.6, p ⫽ .53), the familiarity estimate was larger in the manual motor group ( M
⫽
0.62, SD
⫽
0.39) than in the oral motor group
( M ⫽ 0.29, SD ⫽ 0.35), t (46) ⫽ 3.04, p ⬍ .004, d ⫽ 0.86.
Dual-process versus unequal variance model.
As already mentioned, the dual-process signal detection (DPSD) assumption that independent recollection and familiarity estimates can be extracted from a ROC (Yonelinas, 1994) is not shared by all authors in the field. Rather, there is also convincing evidence that
ROCs merely reflect a single process, the general memory strength, according to the UVSD model (Wixted, 2007). Thus, although the present approach is not aimed at considering the differential validities of these approaches (see the General Discus-
0
0 0.2
0.4
0.6
P('Old' | New)
0.8
1
Figure 5.
Receiver-operating characteristics for old and new words in
Experiment 6 after manual and oral motor interference during study, with least squares model fits for dual-process (DPSD) and unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) modeling.
4
Analyses including the discarded data yielded virtually the same results with the crucial group difference in familiarity being significant.
5
I thank Andrew Yonelinas for providing the algorithms for these computations and for his careful advice.

272 TOPOLINSKI
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Manual
Oral
Recollection estimate Familiarity estimate
Figure 6.
Recollection and familiarity estimates from a dual-process model for the manual group and the oral motor group, respectively, in
Experiment 6 (means). The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
sion for a brief treatment), a UVSD modeling is reported for the sake of completeness. Both the DPSD and the UVSD model fit are displayed in Figure 5, evidencing that both models fit the data excellently. Using total sum of squared errors, the model fit was slightly better for the UVSD model (manual: 0.000017, oral:
0.000086) than for the DPSD model (manual: 0.000269, oral:
0.000313). However, this difference occurred at the fourth decimal place.
Furthermore, the UVSD provides two functionally independent parameters, which are d ⬘ reflecting the memory strength and thus accuracy, and the ratio of the standard deviations of the ratings for novel items and the ratings for old items ( s lure
/ s target
, e.g., Mickes,
Wixted, & Wais, 2007; Wixted, 2007). The estimates of memory accuracy were d ⬘ manual
⫽ 0.83 and d ⬘ oral
⫽ 0.44, reflecting a reduction of memory strength due to oral motor interference according to the UVSD. The variance ratios were r oral r manual
⫽ 0.85 and
⫽
0.86 (similar to Mickes et al., 2007), implying that these rations were similar under both motor tasks. Concluding from this, a UVSD model might support the same conclusion as the dualprocess interpretation, namely, that selective motor interference increased memory strength, or familiarity, without affecting the variance ratios.
Discussion.
Investigating the impact of selective motor interference on receiver operating characteristics (ROC, Yonelinas,
1994, Yonelinas, 1997) when recognizing words from a previous study, it was found that oral, compared with manual, motor interference substantially decreased familiarity while sparing recollection. A similar dissociation between recollection and familiarity in the ROC paradigm was only observed in a clinical case study of a highly specific brain lesion (Bowles et al., 2007), which is discussed in the General Discussion.
It was also found that participants generally exhibited only a small contribution of recollection and a large contribution of familiarity (cf. Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 1997, Yonelinas,
2001). This may be due to the fact that participants were exhausted by the preceding 60 min of unrelated experimental tasks and thus studied the items with low attention and effort, which decreases recollection performance overall (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Yonelinas,
2001). However, this finding is incidental and not relevant for the present question. As a final replication, a physiological memory measure is implemented.
The present experiment should provide a further generalization to a physiological memory measure, namely, SCRs (Tranel &
Damasio, 1985). Since the classic demonstration by Tranel and
Damasio (1985), it has been repeatedly shown that individuals exhibit increased SCRs for stimuli that had been previously presented, compared with novel stimuli, for instance with faces
(Tranel & Damasio, 1985) or words as stimuli (Morris, Cleary, &
Still, 2008). This autonomous response occurs completely independently (e.g., Tranel & Damasio, 1985) and before recollection
(Morris et al., 2008). For instance, patients with prosopagnosia, that is, the inability to recognize people’s faces, showed higher
SCRs to familiar, than to unfamiliar, target faces without being able to recollect the faces’ identities (Tranel & Damasio, 1985).
Thus, SCRs have been argued to map implicit memory (Schacter,
1987). In recent approaches, however, SCRs have been also conceptualized as indicators of familiarity (de Vries et al., 2010;
Morris et al., 2008). Irrespective of whether SCRs reflect genuine implicit memory or familiarity, the prediction derived from the present approach is the same for both notions, namely, that SCRs would be affected by stimulus-specific motor interference, which was tested in the present experiments. Similar to Experiment 2A and 2B, Experiment 7A realized both SCRs and recollection under selective motor interference, while Experiment 7B replicated only recollection under selective motor interference with a stricter recollection instruction.
Method.
Participants.
One hundred (79 female, 21 male) undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. During recruitment phone calls, previous psychiatric disorders or braininjuries were screened for. Volunteers with such positive indications in their anamnesis were not invited.
Materials and procedure.
The pool of 80 nonsense words from Experiment 6 was used again. The study phase was introduced as a warm-up to participants to get them used to working with the lab personal computer and to perform a simple multitask.
One half of the stimulus words (counterbalanced across participants) was presented one-by-one in random order, and participants were asked to merely read them and to press a key after having read the word (thus, presentation time self-paced, intertrial interval
1,000 ms). The later reappearance of the words was not mentioned, thus, participants did not actively memorize the material. The manual and oral motor-interference tasks were identical to Experiment 1. Between the study and test phases, a break of 10 min was implemented. During this break, participants in the SCR-group were asked to go to the adjoining rest room to wash their hands (to clean the skin for the SCR assessment) and to relax while the SCR electrodes were attached. Participants in the recollection group were asked to merely relax during the whole break.
In the test phase, the 40 old words from the study phase reappeared randomly intermixed with 40 new words, with each target presented for 6,000 ms followed by an intertrial interval randomly varying in length between 8,000 ms and 14,000 ms (to avoid predictability of the stimulus onset and assure an autonomic orienting response to each appearing stimulus during the long and monotonous task, Tranel & Damasio, 1989). These timings were similar for the SCR group and the recollection group. As in
Experiment 1, no motor task was executed during the test phase to prevent a physiological impact on the SCR measure.

Orthogonally to the motor tasks, participants were randomly assigned to either SCR assessment or recollection. In the SCR group ( N ⫽ 55; n ⫽ 25 manual, n ⫽ 30 oral), participants simply watched the stimuli during the test phase without any judgment or response being required. In the recollection group ( N ⫽ 45, n ⫽ 18 manual, n
⫽
27 oral), participants provided recollection judgments
(same instructions as in Experiment 2A) for each appearing stimulus. The whole session took 40 – 45 min for every condition.
Electrodermal activity assessment and data preparation.
Skin conductance was measured using two Ag/AgCl surface electrodes on the hypothenar eminence of the palmar surface of the nondominant hand, recorded with a V-Amp 16 amplifier (Brain-
Products Inc., Richardson, Texas) at 1,000 Hz, and stored on an additional personal computer. As an indicator of SCR, the difference between the skin conductance level for the 6 s of word presentation and a prestimulus baseline of 1 s before stimulus onset was calculated (cf. de Vries et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2008).
This SCR was then averaged over the 40 old and new trials for each participant, dividing the 6 s of stimulus presentation into six
1 s time intervals (cf. de Vries et al., 2010). In these averaged
SCRs, five participants (two in the manual group, three in the oral motor group) showed electrodermal activity 2 standard deviations above the sample mean across time intervals and exposure conditions. Their data were discarded, resulting in 23 participants in the manual and 27 participants in the oral motor groups.
Results.
SCRs in the manual motor group.
The mean SCRs for all conditions are depicted in Figure 7. A 2 (exposure: old, new; within) ⫻ 6 (time after stimulus onset, 1– 6 s; within) ANOVA over the SCRs for the 6 s of target word presentation showed main effects for exposure, F (1, 22) ⫽ 8.66, p ⬍ .008, ␩ 2 p time, F (5, 18)
⫽
6.02, p
⬍
.002,
␩ 2 p
⫽ .28, and
⫽
.63. The crucial main effect of exposure was constituted by the fact that SCRs were larger for old ( M
⫽
0.01, SD
⫽
0.04) than for new stimuli ( M
⫽ ⫺
0.05,
SD ⫽ 0.09) collapsed over time, t (22) ⫽ 2.94, p ⬍ .008, d ⫽ 0.84.
The respective significance levels for single pairedt tests between old and new stimuli for each time step were .490, .051, .011, .011,
.012, and .008.
SCRs in the oral motor group.
Only a main effect of time was found, F (5, 22)
⫽
5.08, p
⬍
.003,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.54; no other effects were found ( F s ⬍ 1, p s ⬎ .44). Concerning the absent main effect of exposure, SCRs across time showed no difference between old
( M ⫽ ⫺ 0.04, SD ⫽ 0.07) and new stimuli ( M ⫽ ⫺ 0.02, SD ⫽
EMBODIED MEMORY 273
0.07, t ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .46), and no such difference could be detected in any of the time intervals (all p s
⬎
.38, see Figure 7).
This differential pattern of SCRs in the oral and manual motor group was evidenced by a 2 (exposure: old, new)
⫻
6 (time after stimulus onset, 1– 6 s) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral) ANOVA yielding a main effect of time, F (5, 44) ⫽ 10.65, p ⬍ .001, ␩ 2 p
⫽
.55. This effect of time indicated that collapsed over the other factors, SCRs continuously decreased in the course of stimulus presentation, linear trend F (1, 49)
⫽
53.53, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.52
(similar to de Vries et al., 2010, Experiment 3). More importantly, an interaction between exposure and motor task, F (1, 48) ⫽ 6.61, p ⬍ .013, ␩ 2 p
⫽ .12, and a three-way interaction among exposure, time, and motor task, F (5, 44)
⫽
2.48, p
⬍
.047,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.22 (all other F s
⬍
2, p s
⬎
.19), were also found, constituting the pattern reported above.
Recollection judgments.
A 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within) ⫻ 2 (motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA over the recollection judgments yielded solely a main effect of exposure,
F (1, 43)
⫽
117.97, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.73, and no other effects (all
F s ⬍ 0.3, p s ⬎ .50). Collapsed over motor task, hit rates were higher than were false alarms rates, t (44) ⫽ 11.20, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽
2.1. Accuracy d ⬘ did not differ between the motor groups ( t ⫽ 0.4, p
⫽
.57; see Table 7).
An omnibus interaction between memory assessment (SCR vs.
recollection), motor task, and exposure was not tested because the
SCR assessment involved the additional factor if time that did not apply to the recollection judgments. Also, this omnibus interaction was repeatedly established in the previous experiments.
Participants and procedure.
An independent sample of 30
(19 female, 11 male) psychology undergraduates took part for course credits. Only the recollection task from Experiment 7A was replicated; however, the stricter recollection instruction from Experiment 2B was used.
Results.
The 2 (exposure: hits vs. false alarms; within) ⫻ 2
(motor task: manual, oral; between) ANOVA showed solely a main effect of exposure, F (1, 28)
⫽
160.03, p
⬍
.001,
␩ 2 p
⫽
.85 (all other F s ⬍ 1, p s ⬎ .45). Again, there were no differences between motor groups regarding d ⬘ ( t ⫽ 0.63, p ⫽ .53; cell means, see
Table 7).
0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
1
Manual group Oral group old new
0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
old new
2 3 4
Seconds after stimulus onset
5 6 1 2 3 4
Seconds after stimulus onset
5
Figure 7.
Skin conductance responses for old and new words in Experiment 7 after manual and oral motor interference during study (means). The error bars indicate the standard errors.
6

274 TOPOLINSKI
Table 7
Recollection in Experiments 7A and 7B as a Function of Motor
Interference
Motor interference
Recollection
Manual: Kneading a ball Oral: Chewing gum
Experiment 7A n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
Experiment 7B n
Hits
False alarms
Accuracy d
⬘
18
0.57 (0.03)
0.30 (0.03)
0.76 (0.10)
15
0.46 (0.02)
0.12 (0.02)
1.39 (0.25)
27
0.55 (0.03)
0.27 (0.03)
0.79 (0.11)
15
0.46 (0.05)
0.15 (0.02)
1.17 (0.25)
Note .
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown.
Generalizing the motor dissociation between familiarity and recollection to a physiological measure of familiarity, namely,
SCR (Morris et al., 2008; Tranel & Damasio, 1985), it was found that participants who had chewed gum during the incidental reading of nonsense words could later recollect having read those words before above a chance level but did not show a particular autonomous response toward those old, compared with new, words, while participants who had kneaded a ball did. Such a pattern of remaining recollection under lacking autonomous responses is only found in the severe clinical state of Capgras
Syndrome, in which patients with brain lesions recognize familiar persons’ faces but do not show physiological responses to them
(Ellis, Young, Quayle, & De Pauw, 1997), which is discussed more thoroughly in the General Discussion.
The objection that the present SCR responses are not a pure measure of familiarity but may also reflect conscious recollectionbased recognitions does not question the present conclusions because recollection itself was not affected by motor interference. To whatever extent the SCR responses were contaminated by conscious recollections, these recollections could not be the driving force behind the present motor interaction. Future research should extend this initial finding with other dimensions in physiological responses that indicate more specific cognitive components of familiarity, such as SCR latency (Morris et al., 2008).
Connecting theorizing and evidence from several fields across psychology, namely, cognitive psychology, embodiment, social cognition, and even psychiatry (see below), the present approach tested the following hypothesis concerning the sensorimotor components of implicit memory, familiarity, and recollection. Because both implicit memory and familiarity draw on stimulus-related processing fluency (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Wagner
& Gabrieli, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002), but recollection does not
(Yonelinas, 2002), and fluency resides in stimulus-specific motor simulations (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Topolinski & Strack, 2009c,
Topolinski & Strack, 2010; Van den Bergh et al., 1990; Yang et al., 2009), both implicit memory and familiarity should be impaired by stimulus-specific motor interference preventing such simulations, while recollection should not be affected.
This hypothesis was tested for the case of words (but also for tunes, Experiment 2), for which it was assumed that through repeated exposure, covert pronouncing simulations run more fluently, and these fluency gains drive implicit memory and familiarity, but not recollection. Preventing such pronouncing simulations with oral motor interference neutralized mere exposure effects (Experiment 1–2) and reduced performance in a fragment completion task (Experiment 3; both measures of implicit memory), reduced the familiarity estimates in a RK- and a ROCparadigm considerably (Experiments 5– 6), and even neutralized self-reports (Experiment 4) and physiological indicators (Experiment 7) of familiarity. In contradistinction, recollection, although substantially varying in accuracy and response criterion across studies and stimulus sets (see Tables 1– 4), and recall were not affected by motor interference in any of the present experiments.
This body of evidence provides further support for the notion of embodied memory (Glenberg, 1997), which assumes that memory is the process of meshing the representation of a given stimulus with the sensorimotor experiences previously acquired with that stimulus (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Engelkamp & Zimmer,
1980; Saltz & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981). In the following, important implications for our understanding of implicit and explicit memory forms are outlined. Then, connections to clinical and neuropsychology are drawn, and finally, alternative perspectives are integrated.
The present pattern of preventing implicit memory while leaving explicit memory unaffected is an unorthodox dissociation in the literature (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Jacoby et al., 1989) because for over 4 decades, studies in diverse research fields have furnished abundant evidence that implicit memory is more robust and persistent than its explicit counterpart (A. S. Reber,
1989; Schacter, 1987). For example, it was shown that implicit memory is acquired even during general anesthesia (Andrade,
1996), that it resists the transience of explicit memory (forgetting)— even over many years (e.g., Mitchell, 2006), and that it is invulnerable to the effects of severe psychiatric disorders and brain lesions that affect explicit memory (e.g., Graf et al., 1985;
Tranel & Damasio, 1985). The features of robustness and persistence even became signature characteristics of the concept of implicit memory (A. S. Reber, 1989; Schacter, 1987), being taught to every freshman in psychology.
The present findings draw a somewhat different picture. The present simple behavioral manipulations were able to reduce or even switch implicit memory off while, most importantly, leaving explicit memory intact. The only previous demonstrations in this direction concerned changing the stimulus itself between the study and test phases (see below, concerning processing specificity) and severe brain lesions (e.g., Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner,
Stebbins, Masciari, Fleischman, & Gabrieli, 1998).
Furthermore, the present finding may also serve as a caveat for the general distinction between implicit and explicit memory created by roughly allocating representation features to each category, such as persistence versus decay. Concerning the present feature of

sensorimotor grounding, one would rather group implicit memory and (explicit) familiarity into one group (cf. Mandler, 1980; Lindsay & Kelley, 1996), distinct from (explicit) recollection. Thereby, the present approach also adds an argument to the discussion concerning the relations between implicit memory and familiarity, especially as to whether they draw on independent or common underlying mechanisms (e.g., Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner et al., 1997; Wagner et al., 1998). Although a thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present article, the present evidence supports a common-process view of implicit memory and familiarity, since both draw on stimulus-specific motor simulations. These virtual simulations may nevertheless reside in different brain areas depending on stimulus modality and processing style, for instance, perceptual versus conceptual, thus explaining results that point to distinct brain areas serving implicit memory and familiarity, respectively (Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998).
Finally, the present findings are also interesting from the perspective of earlier psychometric arguments that many psychological factors affect explicit, but not implicit, memory measures because the latter are simply less reliable measures than the former
(Buchner & Wippich, 2000). In this vein, it has been demonstrated that several implicit measures exhibited lower reliabilities than did explicit measures and that this lower reliability renders implicit measures less prone to experimental manipulations of psychological factors (Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & Wippich, 2000).
The present evidence provides a reversed empirical case, that is, an experimental factor (motor interference) affecting implicit, but not explicit, measures, which should be integrated with the reliability hypothesis in future research.
The results of Experiments 4 –7 show a similar unconventional dissociation between recollection and familiarity. Although these components are conceptualized to be dissociable in any direction, the vast majority of findings demonstrated the impact of experimental manipulations on recollection and no selective impact on familiarity (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a comprehensive review).
In contrast, dissociations in the opposite direction, that is, impaired familiarity with preserved recollection, are extremely rare outside abnormal psychology (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007; see below). Of course, several studies found a main effect of fluency manipulations both on hits and false alarms for familiarity, but not for recollection judgments (e.g., Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1994; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000; Yang et al., 2009), thus showing that high fluency increased the overall tendency that any item (both old and new) felt familiar. However, the present approach targets the accuracy of familiarity, that is, the discrimination between old and new items. To the author’s knowledge, there is only one publication reporting this unconventional dissociation, namely Gregg and Gardiner (1994), showing that familiarity accuracy in an RK-paradigm was decreased when the study and test phases differed in presentation modality (see below for a thorough discussion on modality manipulations). However, a similar modality manipulation had no effect on familiarity at all in
Rajaram (1993, Experiment 1; also reviewed by Yonelinas, 2002, appendix, p. 498).
EMBODIED MEMORY 275
Recollection was affected by stimulus-related motor interference in none of the present experiments, presumably because it does not draw on the fluency with which the stimulus itself is processed but rather on additional episodic memory concerning the study event (Tulving, 1985). These memory contents are independent from stimulus fluency (Yonelinas, 2002), but more importantly, they do not necessarily draw on stimulus-related motor simulations because they involve other modalities and stimuli.
For instance, when recollecting the episode in which a word has been seen, participants focus on the temporal and spatial context, such as concomitant sounds or objects in the environment or their own thoughts (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). These representations may also be grounded in their own sensorimotor modalities
(Cohen, 1989; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) but not in oral pronouncing simulations because they involve different stimuli associated with different motor systems. For instance, the recollection of a concomitant sound may draw on vocal simulations (see Experiment
2), while the recollection of spatially close objects may draw on manual simulations (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Because of this stimulus variety in the contextual information and the resulting richness of sensorimotor sources, recollection is less vulnerable to stimulus-specific motor interference. However, there may also be cases where recollections may draw on the same sensorimotor simulations as the stimulus, for instance, in recollecting what one has thought in response to study words because such thoughts may involve subvocalizations also grounded in the oral motor domain
(cf. Richardson & Baddeley, 1975).
These considerations lead to new research questions, for instance, provoking a double dissociation between familiarity and recollection by implementing targets and contextual stimuli from different specified modalities (e.g., words as targets and sounds as contextual stimuli) and selectively blocking modality-specific simulations.
At this point, the present paradigm shall also be integrated with the well-known articulatory suppression effect (Richardson &
Baddeley, 1975). In that paradigm, it is found that recall for words is impaired when words were studied under oral motor interference
(for a review, see Wilson, 2001). Although related, this effect is only tangentially relevant because of the following reasons: (a) In that paradigm, free recall is measured, but not familiarity and recollection, as in the present studies. (b) In that paradigm, participants actively study and rehearse the words in the phonological loop, thus intentionally using the oral muscle-system (Richardson
& Baddeley, 1975), while in the present paradigm, participants have no memorization task and no articulation instruction. (c) In the literature concerning the articulatory suppression effect, the fluency of motor simulations is not conceptualized as a causal mechanism for recall performance (Wilson, 2001), while it is the crucial mechanism for familiarity in the present theorizing.
Despite all these differences, the question remains why oral interference affected recall in those studies while not affecting recollection and recall (Experiment 3) in the present studies. This can be explained by the fact that participants in the classic articulatory suppression studies intentionally used covert, or even overt, pronunciations or subvocalizations to rehearse the study words using the phonological loop (Richardson & Baddeley,

276 TOPOLINSKI
1975), a memory vehicle that was disrupted by oral interference. In contrast, in the present studies, participants did not actively memorize the study words, since no memorization instruction was given and, thus, did not draw on subvocalizations to rehearse the items. In the following, connections are drawn to abnormal psychology, in which memory states similar to the present dissociations have been found for severe clinical cases.
Stimulus-specific motor interference substantially decreased familiarity across the present experiments, and in Experiments 4
(self-reported familiarity) and 7 (skin-conductance responses), it even attenuated familiarity to the level of chance. This memory condition of recognizing without a feeling of familiarity found in mentally sane volunteers resembles the mnemonic states of severe pathological cases. First, this memory dissociation is known from individuals with specific brain lesions. As recently reviewed by
Diana et al. (2007), there is evidence that the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex support recollection by encoding and retrieving contextual information, while the perirhinal cortex selectively supports familiarity by encoding and retrieving item-specific information (e.g., Brown & Aggleton, 2001; but also see Yonelinas et al., 2005). As a consequence, a lesion of the perirhinal cortex with the hippocampus remaining intact should lead to impaired familiarity with preserved recollection. Indeed, this unusual memory dissociation could be demonstrated most recently in the patient NB, who had undergone a resection of the perirhinal cortex that spared the hippocampus (Bowles et al., 2007; see also
Yonelinas et al., 2002). Applying the present notion of the embodied grounding of familiarity to these brain structures, in the future, researchers shall investigate whether the perirhinal cortex
(or the temporal lobe more generally, Yonelinas et al., 2002) exhibits connections to regions that may provide item-specific sensorimotor information.
Second, and even more important, a related memory distortion in face recognition can be observed in individuals with a severe psychiatric disorder stemming from brain injuries or intoxication, namely, the Capgras delusion (Ellis & Lewis, 2001). This condition is characterized by the firm belief of the patient that formerly well-known and familiar people are no longer who they were but rather have been replaced by visually identical doubles, impostors, or aliens. Often, these patients think that their own spouse has been substituted by a double with whom they do not feel familiar any more (Ellis & Lewis, 2001).
It is apparent that these patients still recognize the target person— otherwise they would not call her a double — but lack a feeling of familiarity. Evidencing this, it has been shown that
Capgras patients lack autonomic responses of familiarity to familiar faces they still recognize (Ellis et al., 1997). The healthy participants in the present Experiment 7 exhibited a similarly clinical mnemonic condition. In the future, researchers should investigate possible sensorimotor undercurrents in this phenomenon also, for instance processes of facial mimicry (Niedenthal et al., 2009) and interconnections between the dorsal and ventral visual streams—that are affected by Capgras in different ways—to somatosensory areas providing sensorimotor information (Ellis &
Lewis, 2001).
In the following, the limitations of the present demonstrations are outlined. Also, the findings are considered from alternative perspectives.
Limitations.
The present demonstrations are mostly limited to words and their respective oral motor system. However, given the present findings on implicit memory for vocal stimuli and the vocal muscles (Experiment 2; see also Topolinski & Strack, 2009c,
Experiment 3), recent converging evidence on preference for visual stimuli and the eye muscles (Topolinski, 2010), as well as evidence on familiarity for letters and the manual muscles (Yang et al., 2009), it is highly likely that the present memory dissociations will be generalized to other stimuli and sensorimotor domains in future research.
Cognitive tuning.
A possible objection to the present findings might be that the present motor tasks altered not memory but the memory judgments themselves (Strack & Förster, 1995) by working like a cognitive tuning (e.g., Bless, 2001; Schwarz, 2002).
Specifically, it is conceivable that the present oral tasks induced a more systematic processing style that increased participants’ tendency to recollect the study event and thus correct for fluency effects on familiarity, as compared with the manual motor tasks
(Jacoby et al., 1989), which would lead to the present findings.
This speculation, however, is implausible because shifts toward more systematic processing would first and foremost lead to increased recollection, the more systematic, or controlled, memory process (Bless, 2001; Schwarz, 2002), which was found in none of the present experiments.
Processing specificity.
Previous research has established that implicit memory performance in repetition priming is positively related to processing overlap between study and test phases, while explicit recollection is not (for a brief review, see Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004; but also see the rather mixed evidence for processing specificity and mere exposure, Suzuki & Gyoba, 2008, and familiarity, Yonelinas, 2002). For instance, changing the presentation format (e.g., typing font) or the modality between study and test (e.g., visual study but auditory test) decreased repetition priming for word fragment completion but left free recall unaffected (e.g., Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985; Rajaram & Roediger, 1993). Because this pattern is similar to the present one, oral interference might be considered a special case of the more general phenomenon of processing, or encoding, specificity: The overlap of stimulus-related processing was simply greater if the target words could be covertly pronounced both in study and test phases
(manual motor interference during study) than only during the test phase (oral motor interference during study).
There is, however, an important difference between specificity studies and the present paradigm. In the present studies, the stimulus itself was not changed between the study and the test phases.
In contrast, manipulations of processing specificity usually entail a change of the stimulus itself, for instance, in case letter manipulation, a visual change (study WoRd , test wOrD ). To give a more blatant example, a modality-shift between visual and auditory presentation of a word actually involves actually two different stimuli, namely, the sight of a printed word and the sound of a human utterance of that word. It is only the cross-modal correlation between visual (the letters) and phonological (the sounds) information that allows us to refer to a common lexical entity here,

the word (in contrast, compare the sight and the sound of a cow).
This change of the stimulus itself reduces later processing facilitation.
However, we could also adopt the broader notion of response specificity (Schacter et al., 2004), which refers to the recent finding of increased priming when the same response or judgment is required during both study and test (e.g., Dobbins, Schnyer,
Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004). Applying this notion not to the overt response participants were asked for (reading during study and evaluating or judging during test) but to the covert, automatic response of pronunciation simulations, the present oral interference could be conceptualized as an inhibition of a covert response, and consequently, the present paradigm may constitute the prima facie case of covert response specificity, hence an extremely subtle specificity with, nevertheless, strong impact. However, even overt response specificity is a rather rare finding (Schacter et al., 2004).
Finally, yet another argument questions the subsumption of motor interference under processing specificity. If selective motor interference during the test phase (as was realized in most of the present experiments) reduces processing overlap between test and study phases, then common motor interference during both test and study phases would not change processing overlap: For both instances the participant receives the same visual information without covert articulation simulations. However, previous work has established that implementing the oral interference during both study and test results in the same blocking of mere exposure as in the present Experiments 1 and 2 (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c,
Experiment 2). Furthermore, in the present Experiment 6, participants chewed gum during both study and test, which is a full processing overlap, but nevertheless, familiarity was reduced.
Concluding, motor interference hardly seems to be a subcase of processing specificity, but future theorizing should further examine this possible integration.
Nevertheless, articulation simulations may play an important role during study-test modality shifts, as was shown by earlier work (Curran et al., 1999; Downes et al., 1996; McClelland &
Pring, 1991). In these approaches, which implemented modality shifts (visual vs. auditory) between the study and test phases for word stems, it was found that oral motor interference (Downes et al., 1996, Experiment 2; McClelland & Pring, 1991, Experiment 3) and pathological verbal production deficits due to brain injuries
(Curran et al., 1999) led to diminished cross-modal priming, compared with control conditions. As the authors already argued, this blocking effect may target the recoding of a stimulus from one modality to another via covert simulation processes (Curran et al.,
1999). For instance, during the visual study phase, participants generate an internal auditory trace by covert articulation, and this trace in turn facilitates processing of an auditory presentation during the test phase. Blocking this internal recoding mechanism by oral interference impaired cross-modal priming. In this vein, the above mentioned pioneering studies have already introduced the role of covert oral simulations for implicit memory, at least under conditions of modality-shifts.
A single-process view on the present findings.
The present interpretations concerning the RK- and ROC-paradigm (Experiments 5– 6) were based on the assumption that familiarity and recollection estimates that are independent of each other and, thus, map two purportedly separate memory processes can be derived from these measures, an assumption that is shared by several other
EMBODIED MEMORY 277 authors (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Ochsner, 2000; Rajaram, 1993;
Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 1994, Yonelinas, 2002). However, other authors have provided substantial evidence for a single-process view of these paradigms (the so-called signal-detection interpretation, for comprehensive reviews, see Dunn, 2004, Dunn, 2008;
Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). Pertaining to the ROC paradigm, these approaches argue that the purported difference between familiarity and recollection reflects the mere memory strength for a given item, with familiarity simply reflecting weak memory evidence and low confidence, and recollection merely reflecting strong memory evidence and high confidence (e.g.,
Wixted, 2007). Pertaining to the RK paradigm, it is argued that individuals use a lower (know) and a higher (remember) decision criterion, or threshold, on a single dimension of increasing memory strength: If the memory strength for a particular item does not even exceed the lower criterion, the item is judged novel, if it is between the lower and the higher criteria, a know response is made, and if memory strength exceeds the higher criterion, a remember response is made (Dunn, 2004; but also see Wixted &
Mickes, 2010).
This single-process view of mere memory strength can be applied to the present Experiments 4 – 6 (but not to Experiment 7, with its physiological familiarity measures). Supporting this, it was found in Experiment 6 that a single-process UVSD model (Wixted,
2007) fit the data excellently (see Figure 5). Considering the present results from this perspective, oral, compared with manual, interference generally decreased memory strength, particularly by selectively impairing the weaker, low-confidence memory judgments.
This may have occurred because (a) participants were biased to generate more high-confidence responses or (b) weaker memory evidence was not available or compromised in accuracy. (a) The first possibility would mean that participants did not use or rely on weaker, low-confidence memory evidence under oral interference, although this evidence was still experientially available. However, this seems unlikely given the above arguments concerning cognitive tuning, which suggested that an impact of motor interference on decisional criteria or judgmental style is unlikely. (b) The second possibility means that participants still accessed strong memory evidence while lacking weaker evidence at the same time.
This seems paradoxical at first, and actually, this dissociation prompted Bowles et al. (2007) to interpret the pattern of impaired familiarity under preserved recollection as being evidence against a single-process view (p. 16,386). However, the selective impairment of low-confidence memory might be brought in line with the present claims, namely, if we accept that weaker cues for mnemonic judgments are diffuse feelings of stimulus-fluency (like the feeling-of-knowing, Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; insight, Topolinski & Reber, 2010a, Topolinski & Reber, 2010b; or intuition,
Topolinski & Hertel, 2007; Topolinski & Strack, 2009a, Topolinski & Strack, 2009b, Topolinski & Strack, 2009d), which in the present case stem from stimulus-related sensorimotor processes, while stronger mnemonic evidence is based on other cues that are not exclusively based on motor simulations. Future theorizing shall elaborate a detailed single-process account of the present findings.
Conclusion.
The present article argues that stimulus-specific motor simulations, or reenactments, form an important component of implicit memory (mere exposure, repetition priming) and familiarity, while recollection is independent of these reenactments.

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Received August 20, 2011
Revision received August 26, 2011
Accepted August 26, 2011 䡲
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