Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change
Author(s): Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 379-400
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Linkage versus Leverage
Rethinking the InternationalDimension of Regime Change
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Studies of regime change since the cold war have drawn considerable
attention to the
"internationaldimension" of democratization.1Scholars have pointed to diverse
forms of external influence, includingdiffusion, promotion of western democracy,
multilateral conditionality,and the spreadof new communications technologies and
transnationalhuman rights networks.2Nevertheless, the relationshipbetween the
post-cold-war international environment and regime outcomes remains poorly
understood. Recent
evidence
suggests
that many of the most widely
studied forms of
internationalinfluence, includingconditionality,U.S. policy, and democracy assis
tance programs, have not had a consistent
democratizing
impact. Moreover,
interna
tional effects vary considerablyacross regions.They are stronger inCentralEurope
and Latin America than inAfrica, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union.
A new framework for analyzing the international dimension of regime change can
help explain these patterns. The post-cold-war internationalenvironment, in this
framework,operates along twodimensions:western leverage,or thedegree towhich
governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure, and linkage to the
West, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organization
flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication)
al) and cross-border
between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and
institutions.3 Leverage in the absence of linkage has rarely
western-led multilateral
since the end of the cold war. Although
been sufficient to induce democratization
external pressure at times succeeded in forcing elections or blocking authoritarian
regressions,themore diffuse effects of linkagehave contributedmore consistently to
democratization.
Linkage
has raised the cost of autocratic abuses by increasing
their
internationalsalience and the likelihoodof external response, enhancing the power
and prestige of opposition forces, and expanding the number of domestic actors with
a political, economic, or professional stake in adhering to international norms
Cross-nationalvariation in internationalinfluenceon democratizationis rooted in
in degree of linkage and leverage. Where linkage is extensive, as inmuch
of Central Europe and Latin America,
international pressure is intense and consis
to democratization
even in countries with unfavorable
tent, at times contributing
domestic conditions. Lower levels of linkage create a more permissive international
differences
379
Comparative
Politics
July 2006
environment. Where both linkage and leverage are low, as in much of the Middle
East, former Soviet Union, and East Asia, the degree and effectiveness
of external
pressure is limited.As a result,domestic factorspredominate in shaping regime out
linkage is low but leverage
comes.Where
is high, as inmuch
of sub-Saharan Africa,
internationalpressure is intermittentand only partially effective. Itmay weaken
authoritarianism,but it is rarelysufficient toproduce democratization.
In competitive authoritarianregimes, democratic institutionsexist and aremean
ingful in that they are viewed
liberties violations,
as the primary means
of gaining power, but fraud, civil
and other abuses skew the political
playing
field heavily
in favor
of incumbents.4Competitive authoritarianregime trajectorieshave varied consider
ably since the end of the cold war. In high linkage regions,
such as Central Europe
and the Americas,
linkage was
nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Where
less extensive, as in most of Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet
Union, few of themdemocratized.
Four countries illustrate how varying levels of linkage and leverage shape regime
In Mexico
and Slovakia extensive linkage contributed in an important
In Russia,
even though leverage was limited in Mexico.
way to democratization,
outcomes.
leverage and linkage are relatively low, the impact of external democratizing
pressure was limited. Hence there were few external checks on authoritarian rule. In
where
Zambia,
where
weakened
high
authoritarian
leverage was combined with low linkage, external pressure
In the
rule but was insufficient to induce democratization.
absence of a strong domestic push for democracy, the result was unstable competi
tive authoritarianism. These four cases do not constitute a test of the argument but
rather serve to illustrate the causal mechanisms
at work. The objective is to present a
new theoretical framework, generate hypotheses,
and make an initial case for their
plausibility. More rigorous testing of these propositions
is left to future work.5
The
Environment
Post-Cold-War
International
Scope and Limits of External Influence
and Democratization:
The
The post-cold-war internationalenvironment challenged overt authoritarianism
to an unprecedented
and to a lesser extent, encouraged democratization
degree.
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a precipitous decline inmilitary and eco
nomic assistance for Soviet- and U.S-backed dictatorships inmuch of the developing
world, weakening many to the point of collapse. The post-cold-war
realignment
encouraged
the diffusion
of formal democratic
institutions,
as the disappearance
of
internationallylegitimateregime alternatives,combinedwith theWest's unparalleled
military
and economic
power,
induced
elites
world
to
the status of the promotion
of
throughout
the developing
adoptwestern-style institutions.6
The disappearance
380
of the Soviet
threat also elevated
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
on western
democracy
foreign policy agendas. Western
powers
stepped up efforts to
promotedemocracy throughdiplomatic and occasionallymilitary pressure, andboth
and multilateral
governments
institutions began to condition
loans and assistance
on
theholding of elections and respect for human rights.7This new political condition
by efforts to create permanent
ality was complemented
legal frameworks
for the col
lective defense of democracy, such as the EuropeanUnion's rigorousmembership
the emerging
conditionality
and
Organization
of American
mechanisms
of collective
sanction
in the
States.8
Finally, a transnationalinfrastructureof organizations and networks, including
internationalorganizations,party foundations,electionmonitoring agencies, and a
burgeoning community of nongovernmentalorganizations, has emerged since the
end of the cold war, committed
which
to the promotion of human rights and democracy.9
state abuses triggered a "boomerang effect," in
these networks were effective,
Where
abuses were widely
reported by international media
and human rights groups,
inducingwestern governments to takepunitive action.10 In some cases, international
criticism
set inmotion
to make
democratic
a "spiral effect"
concessions
in which
from which
states were induced
norm-violating
they could not easily extricate them
selves." I
Nevertheless, the democratizing effects of the post-cold-war internationalenvi
ronment should not be overstated. In 2001, a decade after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, amajority of regimes in the world remained nondemocratic.12 Although these
outcomes are explained largely by the absence of a strong domestic push for democ
racy, the pull of international
democratizing
forces was
also limited
in important
ways. First, outside of the EU and its potential member states, promotion of western
democracy was inconsistent. Political conditionality was applied in a selective man
ner, targeting poor, aid-dependent countries inwhich western powers had no compet
ing strategic or economic
interests.13 Second, again with the exception of the EU,
promotion of democracy was markedly "electoralist," in that it focused almost exclu
issues such as civil
sively on the holding of multiparty elections while downplaying
liberties.'4 Indeed, western pressure often eased up after elections, even if they did
not result in democratization
(for example, in Kenya, Peru, and Zambia during the
1990s).Electoralismwas exacerbatedby problems of monitoring and enforcement.
Although externalpressuremay be effective for easilymonitored, single processes
such as the holding of elections,
it is less effective
in sustaining
civil liberties and a
level playing field.15Outside the EU, the international
monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms
needed
to impose
the full package
of democracy
are largely absent.
Even in internationallymonitored elections, incumbents routinely get awaywith
harassing
opponents,
monopolizing
media
access,
and manipulating
electoral
results.16
External pressure has thus proved to be a relatively blunt instrument in promoting
since the end of the cold war. Although blatant authoritarian regressions
democracy
381
July2006
ComparativePolitics
(military coups, cancellation of elections) often triggered strong international
responses, a variety of other abuses, includingelectoralmanipulation and attackson
themedia and opposition, have been routinely ignored.Consequently, electoral non
democracies
or regimes
in which
elections
coexisted with varying
degrees of auto
cratic abusehave proliferated.17
The democratizing impact of the post-cold-war internationalenvironment has
also varied considerably across regions.Democratic ideas and institutionsdid not
diffuse evenly across the globe, but rather were contingent
upon geographic
and cul
turalproximity.18Thus, democraticdiffusionwas more extensive inCentral Europe
than in Africa,
and Latin America
The
and the former Soviet Union.
East Asia,
impactof new information technologies and transnationalhuman rights networks
also varied by region: both the internet and human rights organizations spread more
than in
rapidly and exerted greater influence in Central Europe and Latin America
other developing
western
areas.19 Regional
democracy. Whereas
variation was
also manifest
the U.S. and EU member
in the promotion
of
states actively and consistent
ly promoted democracy in theAmericas and postcommunist Europe during the
1990s, democratizationwas frequentlytrumpedby economic and securityobjectives
in theMiddle
East and East Asia.
In Africa, U.S. policy was characterized
primarily
by "indifferenceand neglect."20
In sum, although external pressure played a major
role in undermining
authoritar
its impact on democratization was more limited, and the international
dimension of democratization was "thicker" in some regions (Central Europe, Latin
America) than in others (Africa, the former Soviet Union).
ian regimes,
and Linkage
Leverage
An alternative framework for analyzing international influences can capture and
explain
in external
this variation
environment
West. Both
along
operates
pressure
two dimensions:
for democratization.
western
leverage
The
international
and linkage
to the
leverage and linkage raise the cost of autocratic abuses, but they do so in
different ways and with different effects.
Western
Leverage
Western
ity to external pressure
leverage refers to incumbent governments' vulnerabil
Such pressure may be exerted in a vari
for democratization.
ety of ways, includingpositive conditionality (for example,EU membership), puni
tive sanctions (aidwithdrawal, tradesanctions), diplomaticpersuasion, andmilitary
in the size and strength of countries' states and
economies. Governments of weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (as in
much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those in
force. Leverage
382
is rooted primarily
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
largercountrieswith substantialmilitary and/or economic power (such as China,
India,andRussia).
Western leverage may be limited by two additional factors. The first is the exis
tence of a regional power that can provide alternative sources of economic, military,
and/or diplomatic
Soviet Union
support. Regional
(Russia),
in Asia
powers
and sub-Saharan Africa
(China,
(South Africa,
Japan),
the former
France) at times pro
vide critical financial,military, or diplomatic support to neighboring autocracies,
thereby mitigating
the impact of the western
by contrast, no alternative
Americas,
In Central Europe and the
influence.21
regional power existed during the 1990s to the
EU and the U.S. Second, western leverage may be limited by competing foreign poli
cy objectives. In countries where western powers have important economic or securi
ty interests at stake, autocratic
democracy
by casting
governments
themselves-and
may ward off external
regime stability-as
tecting those interests. In this context,
issues of democracy
demands
the best means
are more
for
of pro
likely to divide
western powers, thereby limiting their capacity to carry out effective punitive
action.22
Leverage
raises the cost of authoritarian
abuse. During
the post-cold-war
period,
autocraticgovernments inweak, aid-dependent,and strategicallyunimportantstates
were most
likely to be targets of western
pressure, and among cases in
democratizing
which noncompliance triggeredpunitive action by western powers (for example,
Haiti, Kenya), they suffered themost severe consequences.23
Nevertheless, the overall democratizing impactof leverage has been limited.
Western
powers
allowing many
employed leverage inconsistently during the post-cold-war
period,
autocrats to escape sanction. Moreover, because mechanisms
of inter
nationalmonitoring and sanctionwere insufficiently rigorous to impose the full
package of democracy, autocrats routinely got away with minimal reforms, such as
holding elections without ensuring civil liberties or a level playing field, that fall
short of democracy. Indeed, one study of conditionality during the 1990s found that
itmade
a "significant
cases.24 Even
contribution" to democratization
in only two of twenty-nine
in sub-Saharan Africa, where external vulnerability is highest, scholars
have foundno positive relationshipbetween conditionalityand democratization.25
to theWest
Linkage
der flows between
multilateral
linkage
institutions.26
includes
Geopolitical
Linkage
as the density of ties and cross-bor
It can be broken down
trade, investment,
linkage includes
ern-led alliances,
can be defined
a particular country and the U.S.,
the EU, and western-dominated
into five dimensions.
credit, and bilateral
ties to western
governments
treaties, and international organizations.
of people
across borders,
munities,
as well
and multilateral
and participation
Social
Economic
aid flows.
in west
linkage, or the flow
includes migration,
tourism, refugees, and diaspora com
in theWest. Communication
linkage, or the flow
as elite education
383
Comparative
Politics
July 2006
of information,includescross-bordertelecommunications,internetconnections, and
the degree of western radio and television penetrationand coverage.Transnational
civil society linkage includes local ties towestern-based nongovernmentalorganiza
tions, religiousgroups, andparty organizations.
Themost importantsourceof western linkage is geographicproximity.Countries
in regions
that are geographically
proximate
to the U.S.
and the EU, such as Latin
America and Central Europe, tend to have closer economic ties,more extensive
intergovernmentalcontact, and higher cross-border flows of people, organizations,
and information
in less proximate
than countries
and the former Soviet Union.
However,
areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa
also be a product of colonial
linkage may
heritage,military occupation, or long-standinggeopolitical alliances, and itmay be
enhanced by ethnic and cultural similarities.
is also enhanced
Linkage
by socioeco
nomic development,which tends to increase cross-bordereconomic activity, com
munication, and travel.
Linkage generates several sourcesof antiauthoritarian
pressure.First, itheightens
the international
governmental
salience of autocratic
dense
organizations,
abuse. Heavy
flows of people
penetration
of media
and communication,
and non
and wide
spread elite contacts increase the likelihood that government abuses will become
"news" in western capitals. Extensive media coverage and the activities of transna
networks
tional advocacy
have an amplifying
effect,
capable
of transforming
a
reportedabuse into an internationaloutcry.Consequently,even relativelyminor vio
lations (such as electoral irregularities or harassment of journalists) may generate
substantial attention in theWest. Indeed, abuses inMexico, Romania, and Slovakia
during the 1990s received far greater attention in western media and policymaking
circles than more severe human rights violations in countries with lower linkage like
Belarus, Cambodia,
Kenya,
and Zambia.
that western governments
will take
Second,
linkage increases the likelihood
action in response to abuses. Greater media coverage and lobbying by nongovern
mental organizations, exile groups, and their western allies increase the pressure on
western
governments
to act. For example,
intense lobbying by Haitian
refugee orga
nizations, human rights groups, and theCongressional Black Caucus successfully
pushed Clinton's administration to act against Haiti's military regime in 1994.27 By
contrast, due to the weakness of western-based Africa lobbies, western governments
felt little domestic
region.28 Western
cases because
to take action
pressure
governments
they are more
are also more
likely to perceive
against
human
rights abuses
likely to take action
in high
in that
linkage
that they have interests at stake. Thus,
the potential social, political, and economic effects of instability (for example,
refugee
Europe
Africa.
384
flows)
in the Caribbean
(for EU members)
Basin
are far greater
(for the U.S.)
and Central
than those of instability
and Southern
in Sub-Saharan
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Third, linkage shifts domestic preferences in a prodemocratic direction by
expanding
the number of domestic
actors with a stake in their country's
standing. Where
linkage is extensive, myriad
maintain personal, financial, and professional
international
individuals, firms, and organizations
ties to the West. Because
isolation
from thewestern democratic community would put valued markets, investment
flows, grants, job prospects,
and reputations at risk, these actors will be wary of gov
that threaten such an outcome. Thus, because economic
linkage
the number of firms for whom a sudden shift in trade or investment flows
would be costly, business
leaders in such a context often develop an interest in
adhering to regional democratic norms.29 Similarly, linkage increases the number of
ernment
actions
increases
western-educated
elites
many
of whom maintain
ties to western
universities
and
internationalorganizations-for whom associationwith a norm-violating govern
ment could bring futureprofessional costs. Linkage thus creates an "intermestic"
constituency for adherence to democratic norms. When numerous political, econom
ic, and technocratic elites perceive they have something to lose from international
isolation,
it is difficult
to sustain a coalition
behind authoritarian
rule. For example,
when Alberto Fujimori'spresidentialcoup threatenedto disruptPeru's reintegration
into the internationalfinancial system, technocratsand business allies convinced
him to abandon plans for dictatorship
and call early elections.30
Finally, linkage reshapes the domestic balance of power within authoritarian
regimes. For one, a large-scale presence of international media
and nongovernmental
organizationsoften helps protectvulnerableopposition groups from state repression,
inMexico. Opposition
as occurred with the Zapatista movement
ties to western gov
ernments, parties, and nongovernmental
organizations also yield critical sources of
finance and organizational support. In Serbia, for example, U.S. and European assis
tance in 2000 helped level the playing field against Milosevic's
by
government
financing independentmedia, opposition activists' salaries, and amassive get-out
the-vote campaign.31 Linkage may also enhance domestic public support for democ
ratic forces. Thus, in Croatia, Nicaragua,
and Slovakia, where nondemocratic
gov
ernments were perceived to threaten their country's access to the western democratic
community, opposition parties' ties to theWest and credible promise to improve rela
tions with western powers proved to be valuable electoral assets. Finally, linkage
strengthen reformist tendencies within autocratic parties. In Croatia, for exam
may
ple, widespread frustrationwith internationalisolation helped reformists towrest
control of the governing Croatian Democratic Union from radical nationalists after
the death of Franjo Tudjman.32
of leverage such as military force, diplomatic pressure, and
Unlike mechanisms
conditionality, the effects of linkage tend to be subtle and diffuse. Linkage generates
"soft power," or the ability to "shape preferences" and "get others to want what you
want."33
It influences
a range of nonstate
actors, generating
decentralized
forms of
pressure that frequentlyoperate below the radarscreens of internationalobservers.
385
ComparativePolitics
July2006
To a significant extent, then, linkageblurs internationaland domestic politics, trans
forming internationalexpectations intodomestic demands.By heightening domestic
actors' sensitivity
to shifts in a regime's
international
that, if ignored, may be far more
sure points
measures meted
image, it creates multiple
to incumbents
threatening
pres
than punitive
out by foreign powers.
Linkage enhances the effectiveness of leverage.Although itmay at times reduce
leverageby placing competing bilateral issues on western foreignpolicy agendas, it
nevertheless increases the consistency, scope, and force of external pressure.34
Linkage extends the sources of monitoring and pressure beyond governments and
multilateral institutions to include a vast infrastructureof internationalmedia,
human rights groups,
infrastructure
and other transnational
tends to be permanent,
actors. The pressure generated
rather than focused on election
by this
cycles,
and it
extends beyond "electoralism"to include theprotectionof human rights,press free
dom, and other civil
punitive
crucially, linkage increases the likelihood that
action (or threatened action) by western powers will trigger broad domestic
opposition
national
among politicians,
isolation
Guatemalan
of U.S.-led
opposition
liberties. And
technocrats,
president
Jorge Serrano's
and voters who view
entrepreneurs,
as costly. Such a dynamic
could be observed,
closure of congress
sanctions triggered such widespread
that Serrano was forced to resign.35
for example,
in 1993, when
business, military,
inter
after
the specter
and technocratic
The relationship between leverage and linkage has important implications for the
"boomerang" and "spiral" effects discussed by scholars of transnational networks
effects are likely to be
(see Figure 1).36Where
linkage is extensive, boomerang
in
stronger and broader
scope. They are stronger because even minor abuses are
likely to reverberate in western
international reactions impose heavy
more
capitals. They are broader in scope because
costs not only on governments,
but also on
thus
governments
myriad domestic political and economic actors. Norm-violating
confront a double boomerang effect, as abuses are likely to trigger hostile reactions
on both the international and domestic fronts.
Leverage,
Linkage,
and Variation
in International
levels of leverage and linkage are critical
variation
in international pressure
tions of leverage
Democratizing
Pressure
in understanding cross-national
In effect, different combina
for democratization.
Different
and linkage create distinct
external
environments.
Across
these
environments, the relative influence of domestic and international forces over regime
outcomes varies considerably. Where
leverage and linkage are high, international
factors may be decisive, contributing to democratization
even where domestic condi
tions are unfavorable. Where leverage and linkage are low, domestic factors are far
more likely to predominate.
Table
386
1 shows four ideal-typical
configurations
of linkage and leverage and their
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Figure
1 Linkage
and the Boomerang
Effect
Low Linkage
High Linkage
Intemnationalat
actors
Government
Goverment
\
\
t
technocrats,
~~~~~~~~~(Business,
)
Democratic
violations
,Democratic
violations
hypothesized
effects. Where
linkage and leverage are high, as in much
of Central
Europe and theAmericas, external democratizing pressurewill be consistent and
intense. Autocratic
abuses are likely to gain international attention and trigger costly
is often magnified
by opposition among internationally ori
In such a context, autocracies are unlikely to survive.
ented domestic constituencies.
Because opposition forces usually maintain close ties to theWest, and because link
the fall of
age-based pressure tends to be permanent rather than elections-centered,
is likely to result in democratization. Hence it is in a high
autocratic governments
linkage/high leverage context that international influences are most pronounced. In
punitive
action, which
such an environment,
unfavorable
domestic
is likely even in countries with relatively
democratization
and
conditions
for democracy
(for example, Nicaragua
Romania).
Where linkage is high but leverage is relatively low, external democratizing pres
sure will be diffuse, indirect, and slow-moving, but itmay nevertheless be substan
the absence of direct external pressure, governments
face
tial.37 Notwithstanding
intense scrutiny from international media,
transnational human rights networks,
and
internationallyorienteddomestic constituencies.Moreover, due to thepredominance
of western-educated
technocrats,
governments
will be particularly
sensitive
to inter
national opinion.Hence, even if autocraticgovernments face little externalpressure
to leave power, they have an incentive
to avoid large-scale
abuses,
and to maintain
themselves in power through internationallycredible political institutions.When
387
ComparativePolitics
Table
July2006
1 How Variation
in Linkage
and Leverage
Shapes
External
Pressure
for
Democratization
Low Linkage
High Linkage
High
Leverage
Consistent andeffective
democratizingpressure
Low
Leverage
Consistentbut diffuse,
Weak externaldemocratizing
indirectdemocratizingpressure pressure
serious
opposition
efforts
to maintain
challenges
arise,
these governments
may
be trapped by these
to pay the external and
credibility. Unwilling
crackdown, they are likely to leave power peacefully
international
domestic costs of a large-scale
in the event of an opposition victory. Again,
manent
Intermittentand limited
democratizingpressure
nature of linkage-based
opposition ties to theWest and the per
it likely that turnover will result in
pressure make
democratization.
Where
pressure
leverage is high but linkage is low, international democratizing
will be intermittent and only partially effective. In a context of high external vulner
that fail
ability, full-scale authoritarianism will be difficult to sustain. Governments
to meet minimal
international standards with respect to elections and human rights
may confront debilitating
sanctions or cuts in external assistance. However, many
autocrats will escape sanction, often remaining in power by combining international
ly acceptable elections with restrictions on civil liberties and an uneven political
playing field. Even when autocrats fall, regimes may not democratize. In the absence
of extensive linkage, international pressure often ceases after an electoral turnover,
which may allow successor governments to violate democratic norms at low external
cost. Hence,
although
scale authoritarianism,
a high leverage/low
it is not propitious
linkage environment may undermine full
In such an environ
for democratization.
democratization
requires a strong domestic push.
Finally, where both linkage and leverage are low, international
pressure will be minimal. In such a context, even serious abuses may
ment,
democratizing
fail to trigger a
it is
strong international reaction, and even when punitive action is undertaken,
unlikely to have a significant impact. Incumbent governments will thus have greater
in building or maintaining
room to maneuver
authoritarian regimes. In these cases,
regime outcomes will hinge largely on domestic
factors. For this reason, both
and democratization
will require a stronger domestic
authoritarian
breakdown
"push" than in the other scenarios discussed above.
388
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
The International Environment and Competitive Authoritarian
Change, 1990-2004
Regime
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian electoral regimes inwhich democratic
institutions exist and are viewed as the primary means of gaining power but inwhich
incumbentabuses, including civil libertiesviolations,media restrictions,and elec
toral manipulation,
At
a democracy.38
tilt the playing
field so heavily
least thirty-five
regimes
that the regime can not be labeled
either were
or became
competitive
authoritarianbetween 1990 and 1995.39These regimes diverged considerablyover
the following decade. Fourteenof themdemocratized.Elections were free, and civil
libertieswere protected.40Nine remained stable competitive authoritarianregimes.
Autocratic incumbentsor theirchosen successors remainedinpower through2005.41
In eleven
autocrats
fell, but regimes
did not democratize.
In most
cases,
they
In the regions generally
char
remainedcompetitiveauthoritarian.42
These outcomes
acterized
show a striking regional variation.
by the highest
levels of linkage, Latin America/Caribbean
and Central
Europe, democratizationwas widespread.Of twelve cases, nine democratizedafter
1990.
(Two others, Albania
Equally
striking was
twelve Latin American
chosen successor
tization, Haiti,
and Macedonia,
were
the failure of authoritarianism
and Central European
nearly democratic
by 2005.)
in the two regions. In none of the
cases did an autocratic government
or
survive through 2005. The only case of thoroughly failed democra
lies at an extreme in terms of unfavorable structural conditions. Yet
even there autocrats failed to consolidate power.
In Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union, which are characterized by
medium to low levels of linkage, democratization was far less frequent. Of twenty
three cases, only five democratized during the 1990-2005
period, and one of them,
Taiwan, is characterized by substantial linkage to the United States.43 Seventeen
regimes remainednondemocratic.Nine of them remainedstable and authoritarian,
and eight others experienced turnover but did not democratize. Stable competitive
authoritarianism was most likely where both linkage and leverage are relatively low,
as inMalaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe, and post-1994 Belarus.
These patterns are obviously not only a product of international forces. Domestic
factors such as socioeconomic
development and strength of civil society are critical
in explaining
why
democratization
was more widespread
in Central
Europe
and
than in Africa. However,
these outcomes can not be explained by
variables alone. In high linkage regions democratization
(or near democra
Latin America
domestic
tization) occurred even where domestic conditions were highly unfavorable
(DominicanRepublic, Nicaragua, Romania, Albania). In low linkage regions, by
contrast,competitive authoritarianismpersisted not only in very poor countriesbut
also in relatively developed ones (Belarus, Malaysia, Russia).
Four cases illustrate the mechanisms
through which linkage and leverage shape
389
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
regime outcomes: Slovakia,with high linkageand leverage;Mexico, with high link
age and low leverage; Zambia, with
low linkage and high leverage; and Russia, with
low linkageand leverage.
Slovakia
strong ties to and dependence
Slovakia's
on the EU make
it a case of high
linkageand high leverage.EU membership conditionalitydiffers frompolitical con
ditionality
in the world
elsewhere
in three important
respects.
First, unlike
other
western forms of conditionality, the EU demands the full democratic package,
including
"respect
for human
rights and fundamental
freedoms
and the rule of
law."44Second, EU conditionality is accompanied by extensive-and institutional
ized-monitoring. Detailed annual reviews of compliancewith democratic condi
tionality were
reinforced by a dense network of regional and international organiza
tions, including theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Council
of Europe,
and NATO. Thus, "political monitoring
of applicant countries
is
reallyperpetual."45
Finally, the (real and perceived) benefits of ties to theEuropean
core are sufficiently
large to induce far-reaching
on the part of prospec
concessions
tivemembers.Unlike negativepolitical conditionality imposedelsewhere (withdraw
al of aid if certain conditions
integration
autocratic
to be broadly
abuses
are not met),
embraced
tend to produce
the EU's positive
at both
a double
conditionality
the elite and mass
boomerang
effect
levels. As
has led
a result,
that includes
both
internationalsanctionand domestic opposition.
Slovakia's relationship with the EU and its general proximity to western Europe
have also created extensive linkage. Even during Slovakia's relative political isola
tion in the mid 1990s, social, communication,
and civil society ties to Europe were
substantial,
and Slovaks
EU countries provided
access to European media. In addition,
funding and training to civic groups, and Slovak
enjoyed widespread
substantial
politicianswere closely connected towestern politicians andparty networks.46
in 1994 when
Slovakia
authoritarianism
emerged as a case of competitive
for Democratic
Vladimir Meciar's Movement
Slovakia (HZDS) regained control of
the government
and rapidly sought to eliminate major
took firm control of Slovak
television,
used
sources of opposition. Meciar
the secret police
to harass and detain
leaders (in one case, kidnapping the son of a rival), ignored several unfa
vorable constitutional court rulings, and in 1997 refused to carry out a legally consti
tuted referendum that would have limited his power.47 Efforts to oppose Meciar
opposition
faced serious obstacles.
The prime minister's
my, and a powerful mass-based
governing
popularity, a relatively healthy econo
party placed him in a strong position vis
in the absence of
and divided opposition.48 Hence,
a-vis a weak, underfinanced,
extensive linkage to theWest, Meciar's autocratic government might well have con
solidatedpower.
The EU
390
intervened
heavily
in Slovak
politics
during
the 1990s.
In addition
to
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
constant diplomatic pressure, it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting
Slovakia's
request to begin accession
negotiations
due to a failure tomeet
democrat
ic criteria.Although EU leveragegenerally failed to gainMeciar's compliance to
demands, the European presence shifted the balance of power toward the
in at least three ways. First, European party support and EU finance and
specific
opposition
trainingprovided the oppositionwith far greater resources than it could otherwise
have mobilized.
observation
In 1998
the EU's heavy
programs played amajor
in voter
investment
turnout and electoral
role in leveling the playing
field.49
Second, Slovakia's failure tomove towardsEU membership, forwhich the EU
directly (and very publicly)
blamed Meciar,
created a salient electoral
issue that ben
the opposition.
Fear of being
left out of the EU appears to have tilted some
voters against Meciar
(and motivated
many
efited
erstwhile nonvoters
to vote)
in the 1998
parliamentaryelections, inwhichMeciar lost power.50
Third,EU ties and pressure isolatedMeciar frompotential allies. Constant con
tact with
EU and other western
Slovakia
to defect
actors
to the opposition
persuaded
in the mid
many
governing
in
officials
1990s.51 Further, because of Meciar's
pariah status,opposition leaderswho cooperatedwith him risked internationalisola
tion. Thus, although Meciar's party remained the largest in the country after 1998, all
major parties refused to enter into a coalition with it, and Meciar was consequently
forced frompower.
Ties toEurope contributedin an importantway to Slovakia'spost-1998 democra
tization.Because of theirweakness and external dependence, anti-Meciar forces,
once
in power, had a strong motivation
to maintain
good
relations with
the EU.
Mikulas Dzurinda,who replacedMeciar as primeminister, viewed successfulnego
tiations with the EU as critical to his political
the EU to impose democratic
conditionality,
democratic since 1998.
Mexico
Mexico
is a case of high
success.
It was
and Slovakia
linkage but relatively
thus much easier for
has remained solidly
low leverage. Although
U.S-Mexican relationshave been characterizedby complex interdependence,bilater
al ties were extended and deepened after 1982 by economic integration, culminating
in the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1993.52
NAFTA quadrupledU.S. investment inMexico and transformedMexico into the
U.S.'s second largesttradingpartner.53Immigration,transportation,communication,
and media ties expanded, and political interaction between the two countries "multi
plied at all levels."54 Linkage was also seen in the rise of U.S.-educated
technocrats
within
theMexican
state. Presidents Miguel
De
laMadrid
(1982-88),
Carlos Salinas
(1988-94), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) all attended Ivy League universities,
and U.S.-educated
nocrats maintained
in each administration.
These tech
predominated
ties to U.S. academic, business, and policy circles and
technocrats
close
closely followed global intellectual and ideological trends.55Finally, extensive
391
Comparative
Politics
July 2006
transnationaldemocracy and human rightsnetworksprovided resources,protection,
and access
to the U.S. media
and Congress,
which
"strengthened
the clout
of
Mexican opposition organizations" and helped "magnify domestic demands for
democracy."56
At the same time, western
leverage was relatively
low. The size and importance of
theMexican economy limited its vulnerability to external democratizingpressure.
Although theU.S-Mexican relationshipwas highly asymmetric,extreme interdepen
dence
limited the U.S.'s "ability to bring the full range of its overall power capabili
ties to bear against Mexico."57
Thus,
issues such as trade, drugs,
immigration,
and
securityweakened U.S. incentives to employ political conditionality.
During the 1980sMexico underwenta transitionfrom hegemonic to competitive
authoritarianism.Although the governing InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI)
faced increasing competition
from the National Action
Party (PAN) and Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD), due to continued civil libertiesviolations, abuse of
media
and state resources,
and fraud the electoral
playing
field remained
skewed.
Civic and opposition forces strengthenedconsiderablyduring the 1990s,but thevast
power resources
of the party-state and ideological
to dislodge the PRI from power.
divisions
within
the opposition
limited its capacity
Internationalpressureplayed a fundamentalbut indirectrole inMexico's democ
ratization. At no time did the U.S.
administrations
backed
impose political conditionality. Successive U.S.
the PRI governments
and explicitly excluded democracy
fromNAFTA negotiations.58Nevertheless, NAFTA increasedMexico's salience in
the U.S. political arena, forcing the PRI to "accept the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress,
public interest groups, and a myriad of committees and commissions."59 Expanded
international media coverage and the growing presence of transnational human
rights networks increased the potential reverberation of even minor abuses. Having
future on integration, the PRI's technocratic leadership was "greatly
bet Mexico's
concerned with
the international image of Mexico
and the damage done.. .by wide
spread reports of human rights violations and democratic failings."60
In this context, the PRI was induced to make a series of liberalizing concessions
that eventually
aftermath
undermined
its grip on power. This dynamic was first manifest
in the
of the fraud-ridden
1988 election, which tarnished the Salinas govern
ment's international image at a time when it sought to advance integration with the
U.S. As NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international
scrutiny, including unprecedentedmedia coverage of electoral scandals and U.S.
congressional hearings on Mexican human rights.6' In response, Salinas launched a
campaign to improve Mexico's
image in the United States that included the creation
on Human Rights, and English-language
of the National Commission
reports were
sent to U.S. human rights organizations.62 Although
the PRI initially responded with
force to the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, repression "spurred international
concern
392
and
led to an influx
of human
rights organizations
from abroad."63
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Concerned
that repression would
"frighten away investors" and "create a backlash
thatcould destroyNAFTA," thegovernmentabandonedthemilitary option.64
On the electoral
al attention
front, when
a string of local election
in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
scandals gained
the PRI began,
internation
for the first time, to
concede state-levelelections.65Concerned about internationalcredibility in the 1994
presidentialelection, thePRI undertook"a seriesof unprecedentedmeasures to limit
fraud,"includingthepresence of vast numbersof internationalobservers and foreign
fundeddomesticmonitors.66
By
the late 1990s opposition
could win national elections.
forces had strengthened
to the point where
they
such an outcome would have required large
Preventing
scale fraudor repression,which, givenMexico's internationalposition,would have
costly. In 1996 the PRI "reluctantly and grudgingly"
been extremely
of reforms that, by creating a level playing
field and an independent
negotiated
a set
electoral author
ity, fully democratizedMexico.67 PAN candidateVicente Foxwon theheavilymoni
tored2000 presidentialelection, and thePRI leftpowerpeacefully.
Zambia
Zambia
illustrates many of the limitations of conditionality
of linkage. One of the poorest
and most
in the absence
in the world,
is a clear case of high leverage.68 In the absence of competing foreign policy
issues or support from a regional power, the country's vulnerability
to external
aid-dependent
countries
Zambia
democratizing
theWest
is extremely high. At the same time, linkages to theWest are
from Europe and the U.S., Zambia's economic ties to
pressure
weak. Geographically
distant
are minimal.
Penetration
tions is low; relatively
by western media
few Zambian
tiny elite has regular access to western
community's dependence on government
tic pressure points available to theWest.
Zambia
and nongovernmental
elites have been educated
organiza
abroad; and only a
news
and ideas.69 Moreover,
the business
connections limits the number of intermes
substantial
international
attention
in 1991, when Kenneth
one of the region's first long-standing autocrats to hold multiparty
elections. The 1991 election attracted a large number of western observers. When
Kaunda lost and ceded power to theMovement
forMulti-Party Democracy
(MMD),
Kaunda
received
became
Zambia was
cited as a "model
democratize.
New
and the opposition.
President
for democratic
Frederick Chiluba
In 1993 theMMD
change."70 Yet the country
quickly
government
did not
cracked down on the media
declared a state of emergency
and
prior to the 1996 presidential election manipulated constitutional rules to bar
Kaunda, Chiluba's main
rival, from running. The 1996 election was marred by fraud,
intimidation of journalists and opposition figures, unfair media access, and harass
ment
of observers.71
although
exchange
he was
In December
released
early
1997
the government
in 1998, he was
for an end to harassment.
Chiluba
forced
arrested Kaunda, and,
to retire from politics
in
stepped down after completing
his sec
393
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
ond term in 2001, but theMMD
used electoral
rigging
to ensure his successor's
vic
tory in the2001 presidential race.72
External democratizingpressure on Zambian governmentswas sporadic and of
limitedeffectiveness.Although internationalpressure and relativelyextensivemoni
toring of the 1991 elections
to the collapse
contributed
of one party rule and to
Chiluba's victory, subsequent abuses rarely triggeredbroad internationalsanction.
Western
even
to isolate or stigmatize Chiluba,
powers never attempted
in Zambia
norms
of democratic
though violations
as they did Meciar,
were
far more
serious.
Although internationalactors reacted strongly to some of the government'smost
egregious
abuses,
such as Kaunda's
imprisonment, western
focus, and breadth. Thus,
sistency,
Kaunda was banned
from the 1996 election,
intervention
some bilateral
although
donors
lacked con
froze aid after
the IMF and World Bank continued
to
providemuch needed support. In 2001 the internationalcommunity broadly con
but took little punitive
demned
the flawed elections
excellent
example of the international
community's
In a context of limited and sporadic
age cases.
action.73 Zambia
short attention
international
is thus an
span in low link
pressure, Chiluba was
able to carry out abuses, such as torturing and exiling opposition leaders, that were
virtually absent in Central Europe and Latin America during the 1990s.
It is clear, then, that the boomerang effect in Zambia was both weaker and more
intermittent
than in Latin America
due to Chiluba's
or Central Europe. While
reputation as an economic
reformer,
itwas
this result was partly
also a product of weak
linkage. Government abuses rarely reverberated in western capitals, and the paucity
of intermestic actors limited the available pressure points for western powers. 74
Because
business
and technocratic
ties to theWest were weak,
external pressure was
on the government
rather than on a broad range of interests. Thus,
although punitive measures such as the reduction in bilateral aid in 1996 had serious
concentrated
financialconsequences, it did not triggersignificant domestic opposition. 75
Russia
Russia
is a case of low leverage and low tomoderate
linkage. Although
the
profound economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union increased
Russia's
forcing it to seek western
external dependence,
ty to external democratizing
size, its possession
of key oil and gas reserves, and, most
itary and geostrategic
aid, the country's vulnerabili
pressure was offset by several factors, including
significance.
race and the threat of Russia's
During
important, its continued mil
the 1990s the potential
spread of nuclear
its sheer
capabilities
revival of the arms
abroad made western
on Russian security cooperation.76 For most western govern
then, security far outweighed democracy as a foreign policy priority.77
Russia's linkage to theWest is also relatively weak, due to a combination of geo
graphical distance and more than seventy years of closed Soviet rule. Russia remains
powers highly dependent
ments,
weakly
394
integrated into the global economy, with
its exports
limited primarily
to com
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
modities
such as gas, oil, and timber. Although Russia trades extensively with the
EU, it has not participated in EU expansion and thus is subject to few of the mecha
nisms of political integrationand democraticpromotion thatwere so influential in
like Bulgaria,
countries
are also less extensive
much of theWest,
Romania, and Slovakia. Social and communication
linkages
than in Central Europe.78 Russian travel remains restricted in
there are large Russian
and although
communities
in the U.S. and
Finally, the closed nature of the Soviet
Europe, they are relatively disorganized.
regime resulted in a dearth of technocratic linkage. Because travel to theWest and
access
to western
Russia's
were
publications
elite had virtually
limited
strictly
no exposure
to the West
in the Soviet
era, most
of
until late in their professional
careers. Consequently, during the 1990s western influence on Russian politics
on ties to a small handful of prowestern
depended
Chubais
and Yegor Gaidar. Combined
uation gave the reformist government
with Russia's
elites, such as economists Anatolii
importance for security, this sit
of Boris Yeltsin
vast leverage, as Yeltsin
and
his allies could credibly claim thatRussia's prowesternorientationhinged on their
political survival.
Notwithstanding its relativeopenness during the 1990s,Russia underYeltsin is
best characterized
as competitive
authoritarian.
During
his first presidential
term
media was
Yeltsin closed down parliamentthrougha violent coup.The independent
systematically
harassed,
marred by fraud.79After
at times violently,
and Yeltsin's
reelection
in 1996 was
1999, when Yeltsin handed power to a handpicked
successor,
Vladimir Putin, authoritarianism
became increasinglyinstitutionalized.
By 2003 Putin
had shut down all independent
television
stations and arrested, exiled, or bullied
into
the leading business magnates capable of financing opposition parties. In
2003 Putin's Unified Russia party obtained more than two-thirds of the seats in the
legislature, which transformed the body into a virtual rubber stamp. Having effective
ly done away with almost all viable opposition, Putin faced no serious contender in
the 2004 presidential election, and he won with 71 percent of the vote.
submission
Although
domestic,
in postcommunist
Russia are mostly
the roots of authoritarianism
this outcome was reinforced by the heavy insulation of Yeltsin's and
Putin'sgovernments from externaldemocratizingpressures.The Clinton administra
tion supported Yeltsin
throughout
the 1990s, never putting other bilateral
issues at
risk by demanding full democratization.Yeltsin used the specter of Communist
to gain western backing for his 1993 attack on parliament and his flawed
1996 reelection.80 The U.S. also did little in response to large-scale human rights
in Chechnya.81 Western powers later acquiesced
in Putin's increasing
violations
resurgence
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the
in Afghanistan
and willing
U.S. Indeed, U.S. dependence on Russia's cooperation
ness to permit U.S. military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia further reduced
authoritarianism,
particularly
its leverage over Putin's government.82 Hence
to autocratic rule.
Putin faced very few serious external
obstacles
395
Comparative
Politics
Conclusion:
Linkage
July 2006
and the Study of Regime
Change
Although it iswidely believed that the internationalenvironmenthad a significant
direct forms of
after 1989, studies have shown that most
impact on democratization
western intervention,includingmilitary force, diplomaticpersuasion, conditionality,
and democracy assistanceprograms,have not consistentlyproduceddemocraticout
In explaining
comes.
state or multilateral
this pattern,
this analysis
has focused
less on direct state-to
(the use of leverage)
of democracy
promotion
than on the eco
nomic, social, communication, intergovernmental,and transnationalcivil society
relationshipsthat tie countries to theWest (the effects of linkage).Extensive linkage
the salience of abuse, increasing
raises the cost of autocratic behavior by heightening
the likelihood of a western
constituency
response and creating a broad domestic
for
international norm-abiding behavior. In this way, linkage blurs the distinctions
between
and domestic
international
pressure
for democracy,
transforming
interna
tionalor regionaldemocraticexpectations intopowerfuldomestic demands.
This analysis has importantimplications for scholarly debates over the relative
importanceof domestic versus internationalfactors in explaining democratization.83
It is not a substitutefor domestic-orientedexplanations.Domestic variables, such as
socioeconomic development, economic performance,and the strengthof civil soci
ety, are critical
in explaining
that the relative weight
regime outcomes.84
of domestic
This analysis
and international
suggests,
however,
factors varies across cases and
regions.Where linkage is extensive, intense internationalpressure at times out
weighed unfavorable structural conditions during the post-cold-war period (for
example,
in Romania
and Nicaragua).
Where
linkage is low, domestic
variables were
more likely to predominate.
These findings also complementmodernization theoryby adding anothercausal
mechanism linking development and democracy. Economic development creates
linkage, in the form of greater economic integration,cross-bordercommunication,
education,
and travel, and more
ties to transnational
extensive
civil society, which
appears, increasingly,to contributeto democratization.
Linkage-centeredexplanationsaremore structuralistthan the institutionaldesign
centered
With
approaches
that have predominated
the partial exception
of EU-related
in recent studies of democratization.
integration,
linkage to theWest
is less the
productof specific elite decisions thanof geography,economic development, colo
nialism,
amenable
and long-standing
to short-term
geostrategic
foreign policy
alliances.
goals
It is therefore
than are individual
less malleable
or
leaders or constitu
tions.Nevertheless, themultiple, decentralized, "soft," and often difficult-to-mea
sure effects of linkage may be the most
zation in the post-cold-war
396
era.
important international
cause of democrati
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
NOTES
thank Richard Deeg, Jorge Dom?nguez, M. Steven Fish, Axel Hadenius, Marc Howard, Nahomi
Ichino, Lisa Martin, Marc Plattner, Mark Pollack, Andreas Schedler, and Susan Stokes for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
The authors
1.
The Third Wave (Norman: University
of Oklahoma
Press,
Huntington,
1991); Laurence
ed., The International Dimension
Europe and the Americas
(Oxford: Oxford
of Democratization:
Press, 1996); Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., Building Democracy?
Samuel
Whitehead,
University
The International
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in Eastern Europe (London: Leicester University
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of Democratization
in New
without Borders:
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ed., Democracy
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(London: Routledge,
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to the Spread of Democracy
Dimisi?n Approaches
in the
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See Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes:
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International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
and David
A. Reilly,
"Geographic
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and Imperatives
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in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues
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for International Peace, 1999); Joan M. Nelson and
1-37; Larry Diamond, Promoting
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What Role for Conditioned
Aid? (Washington,
D.C.:
Democracy:
Stephanie
Encouraging
Overseas Development
Council,
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Assistance
and Political Conditionality
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Judith Kelley,
Analysis of Democracy
Learning
on the Domestic
"International Actors
Scene: Membership,
and Socialization
by International
Conditionality
58 (2004), 459; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn
Organization,
International
Norms
and Domestic
eds., The Power of Human Rights:
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Third
Force:
The
Rise
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Civil
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Cambridge University
of
for International Peace, 2000).
Society (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
International
Institutions,"
framework builds on Geoffrey
Influences and Democratic
Transition:
Pridham, "International
in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Encouraging
of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics,"
Democracy:
The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe
Press,
(Leicester: Leicester University
on
Barbara
"International
Influences
Economic
and Structural
1991);
Stallings,
Policy: Debt, Stabilization,
in Stephan Haggard
and Robert R. Kaufman,
Reform,"
eds., The Politics
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Adjustment:
3.
This
Problems
International Constraints, Distributive
Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: Princeton University
Whitehead,
ed.; Kopstein and Reilly.
4.
See Steven Levitsky
and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism,"
13 (April 2002), 51-65.
Democracy,
5.
are undertaking
We
such testing
as part of a larger research
project
on post-cold-war
Press,
1992);
Journal
of
competitive
authoritarian
regimes.
6.
Richard Joseph, "The Reconfiguration
inAfrica
ed., State, Conflict, and Democracy
7.
of Power
in Late Twentieth-Century
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
Africa,"
in Richard
Joseph,
1999).
Nelson
and Eglinton.
Frank Schimmelfennig
and Ulrich Sedelmeier,
eds., The Europeanization
of Central
Press, 2005); Kelley; Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty:
(Ithaca: Cornell University
Europe
in the Americas
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
Defending Democracy
8.
Diamond; Carothers; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds.
Activists
E. Keck
and Kathryn
Sikkink,
Margaret
International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
11. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization
and Eastern
Collectively
9.
10.
Domestic
Practices:
12.
Larry Diamond,
Introduction,"
"Thinking
beyond
Borders:
of International Human
inRisse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds., pp 18-32.
about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy,
Networks
in
Rights Norms
into
Advocacy
13 (April 2002),
30-31.
397
Comparative
Politics
13.
Carothers;
14.
Larry Diamond,
University
Consent:
Elections
July 2006
Crawford.
Toward Consolidation
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Democracy:
Developing
was coined by Terry Lynn Karl, "Imposing
Press, 1999), pp. 55-56. The term "electoralism"
versus Democratization
in El Salvador,"
Electoralism
in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds.,
in Latin America,
and Democratization
1980-85
(La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American
Studies, 1986).
15. Nelson and Eglinton, p. 35.
16.
Thomas Carothers, "The Observers
17.
Diamond,
8 (July 1997), 17-31.
Observed," Journal of Democracy,
"Thinking about Hybrid Regimes"; Levitsky and Way.
and Reilly; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. David, Jr., "Understanding
the Domestic
18. Kopstein
Impact
of International Norms: A Research Agenda," International Studies Review, 2 (Spring 2000), 73-74.
"Lessons from Latin America,"
19.
Javier Corrales,
in Leslie David Simon, ed., Democracy
and the
Internet: Allies or Adversaries?
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), pp. 38-39; Ann M.
Florini, "Lessons Learned," inAnn M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society
for International Peace, 2000), p. 221; Kathryn A. Sikkink, "Human
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
Principled
Rights,
(Summer
Domestic
Issue-Networks,
Thomas
1993), 435-36;
and Sovereignty
and Stephen
Risse
in Latin America,"
International
"International Human
C. Ropp,
in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink,
Change: Conclusion,"
in Florini, ed., p. 7.
theWorld Needs Now?"
to 'Virtual Engagement':
20.
Chris Alden, "From Neglect
Africa," African Affairs, 99 (2000), 355.
21.
include France's
Examples
South Africa's role in Zimbabwe.
22.
role in Cameroon
eds.; Ann M.
Florini
The United
States
and Gabon,
and Eglinton, p. 20.
Crawford, pp. 210-27.
24.
Gordon Crawford, "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality:
4 (Autumn 1997), 73-80.
Democratization,
Russia's
and P. J. Simmons,
and Its New
role in Armenia
41
Organization,
Rights Norms
and
"What
Paradigm
and Belarus,
for
and
Nelson
23.
Issues of Effectiveness
and Consistency,"
inAfrica: Regime Transitions
25.
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic
in
Experiments
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Comparative Perspective
26.
This definition builds on Pridham, "International Influences and Democratic
Transition"; Whitehead;
and Kopstein
and Reilly. This conceptualization
differs from Rosenau's; he defines linkage as "any recurrent
in one system and is reacted to in another." James N. Rosenau,
"Toward
in James N. Rosenau,
ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the
Linkages,"
and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45.
Convergence
of National
27.
in Florini, ed.
Chetan Kumar, "Transnational Networks
and Campaigns
for Democracy,"
28.
Jeffrey Herbst, "The United States and Africa: Issues for the Future," in John W Harbeson and Donald
sequence of behavior that originates
the Study of National-International
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29.
"The Politics
of the European
Transnational
Networks
Pridham,
Geoffrey
Community,
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pp. 220-25.
30.
and Policy Making
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Philip Mauceri, State under Siege: Development
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31.
Thomas Carothers, "Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia," Carnegie Endowment
Brief, vol. 1(2001).
See M.
and
Press,
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Steven Fish and and Andrej Krickovic,
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of the Croatian Democratic
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Union," East European Constitutional
Review,
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(Spring-Summer
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105 (1990),
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power," Political Science Quarterly,
32.
'Christian-Democratization'
181.
34.
398
Crawford,
pp. 203-4.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
and Russia," Journal of Democracy,
9 (January
35. Maxwell A. Cameron, "Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala,
1998), 125-39.
36.
Keck and Sikkink; Risse and Sikkink.
37.
Few authoritarian regimes existed in such countries during the 1990s. Mexico
and Taiwan may most
closely approximate such conditions.
38.
39.
Levitsky andWay.
They are Albania,
Ethiopia,
Gabon,
Armenia,
Belarus,
Ghana, Guyana,
Georgia,
Benin,
Cambodia,
Cameroon,
Haiti, Kenya, Macedonia,
Croatia,
Madagascar,
Dominican
Malawi,
Republic,
Mali, Malaysia,
Peru, Romania, Russia,
Moldova, Mozambique,
Nicaragua,
Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan,
Tanzania, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
40.
Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico,
Benin, Croatia, Dominican
Peru, Romania,
Republic,
Nicaragua,
are rated "free" by Freedom House in
Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, and Taiwan. All cases scored as democracies
Mexico,
2004.
41.
Cambodia,
42.
Albania,
Russia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique,
and
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova,
1991 and 2004, is scored as an ambiguous
Ukraine, which was competitive authoritarian between
Zambia.
case, as the 2004-5
transition was
43.
Tucker,
too recent to score itwith
Taiwan,
any confidence.
and the United
Bernkopf
Nancy
Hong Kong,
1994).
Friendships
(New York: Twayne Publishers,
44.
"The European Union's Democratic
Pridham,
Geoffrey
Slovakia: The Meciar
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Governments
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Conditionality
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1945-1992:
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and Domestic
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Ibid., p. 207.
Transnational
Pridham, "Complying with the European Union's Democratic
Conditionality:
Studies, 51 (1999), 1229-30.
Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998," Europe-Asia
inKaren Henderson,
47.
Karen Henderson,
"Slovakia and the Democratic
Criteria for EU Accession"
ed.,
Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union
(London: UCL Press, 1999), pp.
221-40.
46.
Geoffrey
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic"
48.
Kevin Deegan-Krause,
and Party Competition
"Accountability
(Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2000).
49.
Pridham, "Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality,"
pp. 1229-30.
and Heiko
"The Impact of EU Political
Frank Schimmelfennig,
Stefan Engert,
50.
Knobel,
in Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier,
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of Central and Eastern
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Undivided:
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after Communism
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de Castro, The United States and Mexico:
and Rafael Fern?ndez
Between
(New York: Routledge,
2001).
51. Milada Vachudova,
(London: Oxford University
52.
Jorge I. Dom?nguez
Europe
Partnership and Conflict
in Conflict:
F. Lowenthal, Partners
The United
Abraham
53.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 70.
54.
and Fern?ndez de Castro, p. 75.
Dom?nguez
States
and Latin America
in the 1990s
inMexico
within Reason: Technocratic Revolution
55. Miguel ?ngel Centeno, Democracy
(University
Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1994), pp. 125-26.
a Stick: International Actors and the Promotion
of
Denise Dresser,
56.
"Treading Lightly and without
in
in
in
Tom
the
Farer,
Mexico,"
ed.,
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Beyond Sovereignty:
Collectively Defending Democracy
Americas
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the Failure of US.-Latin
and Juan G. Tokatlian, "Dope and Dogma: Explaining
Bagley
Drug Policies," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., The United States and
Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1992), p.
57.
Bruce M.
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221.
399
ComparativePolitics
58.
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Centeno,
pp. 320-21.
p. 240.
60.
Dresser,
p. 337.
61.
62.
Sikkink, p. 432.
Ibid., p. 433.
63.
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July2006
p. 334.
E. Schulz
and Edward J.Williams,
"Crisis or Transformation?
The Struggle for the Soul of
in Donald E. Schulz and Edward J.Williams,
Faces
the 21st Century
eds., Mexico
Mexico,"
(Westport:
Greenwood
Press, 1995), p. 12.
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Informal Electoral
Dresser, p. 332; Todd A. Eisenstadt,
"Thinking outside the (Ballot) Box: Mexico's
Institutions," Latin American Politics and Society, 45 (Spring 2003), 25-54.
64.
Donald
66.
Purcell, "The Changing Nature of US-Mexican
Relations," Journal of Interamerican
and World Affairs, 39 (Spring 1997), 150.
the Fourth Estate: Democratization
and the Rise of a Free Press
in
Chappell H. Lawson, Building
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(Berkeley: University
Bratton and
the early 1990s foreign aid constituted
one-third of Zambia's GDP. Michael
During
Susan Kaufman
Studies
67.
Mexico
68.
van de Walle, Democratic
in Africa: Regime Transitions
in Comparative
Experiments
Perspective
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 67.
In 2001 Zambia had six and eight times fewer televisions per capita than inMexico
69.
and Slovakia,
and Slovakia.
respectively, and in 2002 it had twenty and thirty-three times fewer internet users than Mexico
Nicolas
World
70.
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C. Baylies
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Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalization
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Review
72.
73.
74.
Ibid., pp. 150,153,162.
A Lexis Nexis search found that between
ries on the Mexican
Zapatista movement
was
in Zambia
1990 and 2000
eight times greater
1991-2001
(Stockholm:
Nordic Africa
the number of New York Times and CNN
than the number
sto
of stories on any topic
in
Zambia.
75.
June 21, 1996.
Africa Confidential,
Strobe Talbott, Russia Hand (New York: Knopf, 2002).
An estimated 80 percent of U.S. assistance to Russia during the 1990s was security-related, whereas
77.
of democracy.
2.3 percent of USAID
James Goldgeier
and Michael
funding was aimed at the promotion
76.
McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy towards Russia after the Cold War (Washington, DC:
Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), pp. 110,114.
In 2002 there were forty-one internet users in Russia per 1,000 population,
78.
compared to ninety-eight
inMexico
and 160 in Slovakia. World Bank, World Development
Indicators Online.
79.
Centre,
Hoover
Michael
McFaul
and Nikolai Petrov, eds., Politicheskii Almanahh Rossii (Moscow: Moscow
Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics
Michael
McFaul,
1998);
Institution Press, 1997).
Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia (New York: Belka Publications,
1994), p. 135.
to Massive
Svante E. Cornell,
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Studies, 51 (January 1999), 85-100.
Chechnya," Europe-Asia
Carnegie
(Stanford:
80.
81.
82.
and McFaul,
ch. 11.
Goldgeier
See Whitehead,
pp. 3, 9; Bratton
and van de Walle, p. 30.
Adam Przeworski
Diamond,
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Democracy,
Theories and Facts," World Politics, 49 (January 1997), 155-83.
83.
84.
400
The Case
and Fernando
Limongi,
"Modernization:
of