Nepal | No 5 | September to October 2007
NEPAL | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation
In the past two months, the country faced great instability and uncertainty as the political parties leading the
peace process were struggling to overcome a major deadlock. The situation deteriorated after the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) [CPN-M] adopted new conditions for the holding of the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections on 22
November during their plenum meetings in August. Crucial to their demands was the declaration of a federal democratic
republic (hence the abolition of the monarchy) by the interim parliament and the adoption of a fully proportional election
system – both demands that deviate from the commonly agreed interim constitution. During the first weeks of
September it became evident that this new policy was more than an appeasing rhetoric to the CPN-M hardliners and that
the CPN-M was willing to flex its muscles to exert maximum concessions from other coalition parties. On 18 September,
the four CPN-M ministers stepped down from the government (whilst staying in the interim parliament) claiming no
meaningful CA elections could be held unless their new demands were met. Subsequently, the CPN-M announced a
series of peaceful protest programs, including the boycotting of the date set by the Election Commission to submit the
relevant party and candidate’s lists for the CA elections (30 September and 5 October respectively). As these deadlines
were approaching, the major parties agreed to postpone the date for the submission of the lists by a few days, hoping to
reach a last-minute agreement with the CPN-M. On 5 October, in the absence of such an agreement, the parties finally
decided to indefinitely postpone the CA elections and to hold a special session of the interim parliament to vote on a
republic and the adoption of a proportional election system (the CPN-M had filed a petition in this regard on 28
September). All major players of the international community, such as the EU, the US, India and the UN expressed
disappointment over the deferral of the polls.
The special session in the interim parliament, which was meant to start on 11 October, resumed on 29 October
after the country had come to a virtual stand-still during the Dashain celebrations. In the meantime, frantic talks had
been going on between the major parties, in which the pro-election CPN-UML tried to act as a mediator. However,
neither the Nepali Congress (NC) nor the CPN-M were willing to make any further concessions, the most contentious
issue between the two being the adoption of a proportional election system (which will have a direct bearing on their
electoral success in the CA elections). Thus the crisis finally resulted in a parliamentary vote on 4 November during which
a simple majority voted in favor of a CPN-UML proposal demanding the government to take steps to establish a republic
and to announce a fresh date for CA elections, and a CPN-M motion to adopt a fully proportional election system. These
adopted proposals, which are not legally binding (constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority), came about
thanks to a last minute understanding between the CPN-M and the CPN-UML against the NC.
Analysts argue that the reason for the sudden policy shift of the CPN-M – which has created a major obstacle in
the peace process – was the increasing influence of CPN-M hardliners at the bottom and in the leadership of the party:
The moderate CPN-M leaders Prachanda and Bhattarai risk being sidelined by the more radical members in the
leadership, such as Ram Bahadur Thapa alias “Badal,” C. P. Gajurel alias “Gaurav” and Mohan Baidya alias “Kiran.” At
the same time, it is believed that the CPN-M had lost so much popular support in the last months (e.g. because of the
Madhesi uprising and the unruly activities of its Young Communist League) that they were afraid of faring too poorly in
the CA elections, thereby losing more power to others than they had under the current interim arrangement. The new
demands put forward by the CPN-M allow them to capitalize on growing identity politics (e.g. demands for selfdetermination and proportional elections raised by ethnic groups sidelined in the peace-process), thereby re-establishing
themselves as a force for change. While a proportional election system would enable the CPN-M to achieve a better
overall election result, their demand for the setting up of a republic appears to be primarily aimed at deferring the
elections – considering that the CPN-UML and since 26 September, the re-united NC have also adopted a federal
democratic republic agenda. However, what the CPN-M intends to gain from an election deferral in the long-term is still
unclear since it risks losing its democratic credentials in the process. At the same time, the radicalization of the CPN-M
was not accidental and could have been averted by coalition parties had they shown more commitment to the November
peace agreement. Among others, the coalition parties should have more seriously addressed the issue of disappearances
of CPN-M cadres during the conflict, and the difficult conditions and lack of perspective of the CPN-M fighters in the
cantonments (which should have been addressed through security sector reform). The NC, as the CPN-M, does not have
a very strong interest in contesting the elections as it risks dropping below the current number of seats in parliament. A
further loss of votes was feared from increasing intra-party division over certain issues (e.g. abolition of the monarchy),
which surfaced when the pro-monarchy party founder Bhattarai decided to quit the party on 26 September.
Prolongation of the mandate of UNMIN, which expires in January 2008, is currently under debate at the UN
Security Council. There are discussions about the enlargement of UNMIN’s mandate even though such a move would be
opposed by the government, the CPN-M, India and China.
Inter-communal tension and violence, which has moved to the forefront since the Madhesi (inhabitants of the
Terai) uprising at the beginning of the year, has continued to be an issue of concern. Dissatisfied armed and unarmed
groups from different ethnic, caste or socio-cultural groups continue to spring up and to fight for greater rights. The most
FAST Update | Nepal | No 5 | September to October 2007
worrying incident of inter-communal tension took place in Kapilbastu, Dang and Rupendehi in the western plains from
16 to 20 September, where an unknown group killed Muslim landlord Abdul Moid Khan, who was also a leader of a
formerly active anti-Maoist resistance group in Kapilbastu. Enraged Moid supporters (mostly Muslims and HinduMadheshis) and criminal elements from across the border, who suspected the CPN-M behind the killing, subsequently
attacked houses of “hill” Nepalis, the security forces and CPN-M camps, torched vehicles and looted property. The next
day “hill” Nepalis retaliated in Rupendehi by attacking Madhesis and vandalizing a mosque. Altogether 14 persons lost
their lives during these incidents (all of them suspected to be CPN-M members and “hill” Nepalis), while over 500
houses were destroyed and around 5,000 persons temporarily displaced. On 20 September, angry “hill” Nepalis
(reportedly backed by the CPN-M) attacked and killed three more Madhesi leaders believed to be involved in the violence
of 16 September. The situation in the western Terai, which has a history of violence between hill-settlers and Muslim
landlords, remains tense. The CPN-M, who had reached a peace deal with Khan shortly before his assassination, denied
its involvement in Moid’s killing. Once again, the state response to this incident has been dismal and highlighted the
vacuum of governance and rule of law in the Terai.
The deferral of the polls has put some of the agreements reached between the government and marginalized
groups into jeopardy and paved the way for a realignment of forces and new activism. On 5 November, former minister
and chief of one of the splinters of the Terai-based Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP-Anandidevi) Mahato announced that
he will form a united front with all Madhesi groups including the armed outfits to launch a peaceful struggle from midNovember. This statement indicates that political Madhesi leaders always have maintained ties with armed outfits and
are now willing to formalize this relationship. At the same time, Mahato’s move might create an opportunity for dialog
with the armed groups.
On a positive note, the cabinet on 17 October decided to allocate 45% of vacant posts in the Nepal police and
armed police force to disadvantaged groups (ethnic groups, Madhesis, women, Dalits and people from backward areas).
However, recent appointments of high bureaucrats at the secretary level have shown the usual elitist bias with only
minimal representation of women and Madhesis.
The Nepal Oil Corporation finally raised the prices of petroleum products on 24 October to tackle its mounting
losses and supply problems. During the past months, Nepal has faced chronic shortages of petrol caused by restricted oil
supply from India and the prevailing unrest in the Terai.
Risk Map: Conflictive Events
Source: FAST event data
The security situation remains volatile with an anarchic situation prevailing in the Terai (see map). Particularly the
central and eastern Terai sees regular strikes and general shut-downs, crippling normal life in these areas. Violence and
activism by armed and unarmed groups driven by identity politics has continued unabated. Apart from the violence in
Kapilbastu, violence was also reported from the secessionist Madhesi armed group
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) in the central and eastern Terai, whose factions (one
of their factions has recently split) have been involved in targeted killings, abduction and
seizure of land of government employees, spies, businessmen, politicians and hill settlers.
Half-hearted government efforts to bring the armed groups to the negotiation table have so
far been unsuccessful and security forces remain helpless.
Pseudo law enforcement and occasional harassment of rival parties by CPN-M affiliated
groups have continued, while the CPN-M on 4 September announced the re-launching of a
parallel justice system similar to the one they disbanded last year. On 8 October, the cabinet
finally decided to release the long-awaited living allowance promised earlier to CPN-M
soldiers in the cantonments; the fighters, who still live under difficult conditions, have
reportedly not received any payments since last November, which has caused considerable
frustration amongst them.
Even though the postponement of the CA elections is a major set-back, the peace process as such has not broken
down. Talks between the different parties continue and the CPN-M has no real interest in returning to an armed struggle.
However, as more time passes before the elections, the higher the risk of spoiler violence, increased inter-communal
tension and spreading insecurity will be. An important re-alignment of forces, which has been looming for some time,
appears to have taken place with the CPN-M shifting from the NC towards the CPN-UML. This alliance, however, seems
to be short-lived and of a tactical nature only, because a long-term alliance with the CPN-M would not be in the CPNUML’s strategic interest, and is strongly resisted from within the party. The CPN-M, on the other hand, is likely to put
pressure on the government to implement the proposals passed by the interim parliament and possibly for the
establishment of a more likeminded government without Prime Minister Koirala. The government, or more specifically
the NC, is unlikely to bow down to such demands, which might trigger a new power game and lead to renewed protests
in the streets. In this power game, the NC might eventually lean towards the rightist forces, while it could also count on
the support of the army (the army would back either Koirala or Deuba) if the situation came to a crunch. It is certain,
however, that elections will not take place in the immediate future.
Contact
FAST International
Country Team: Nepal
Sonnenbergstrasse 17
3000 Bern 7
Switzerland
nepal@swisspeace.ch
www.swisspeace.org
FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace,
covering 25 countries/regions in Africa, Asia and Europe. Based in
Bern, Switzerland, the program is funded and utilized by an
international consortium of development agencies, including the
Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC).