Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Service Intellectual
Author(s): Richard S. Kirkendall
Source: The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Dec., 1962), pp. 456-471
Published by: Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1902565 .
Accessed: 01/07/2013 09:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
D. Roosevelt
and the
Franklin
Intellectual
Service
BY RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL
PresidentFranklinD. Roosevelt shockedmanyAmericansin the
1930's by calling upon college professorsto occupy positionsof
prominenceand power in nationalpolitics.'To manypeople, these
men,sadly lackingin "practicalexperience,"seemed to be dominatActually,
ing the New Deal and pushingpoliticsin radicaldirections.
however,Roosevelt looked everywherefor advice, not just to the
and thus no single group dominatedhis regime.Furuniversities,
than his tendencyto employacathermore,of greatersignificance
demicianswas the factthattheyhad developed a pointof view useful to a man facedwiththepressingproblemsofa land in depression.
For twogenerationstherehad been a drivetowardthe"practical"in
Americanhighereducationand the riseof whatcould be termedthe
"service intellectuals"-men of academically trained intelligence
whose workas intellectualsrelatedcloselyto affairsof greatimportance and interestto men outside of the university.Contrasting
sharplywith those men of ideas who could not toleratethe nearly
overwhelmingpressureof affairsin America,serviceintellectuals
theirrole in termsofactiveserviceto theirsociety.'Thus,
interpreted
the universitieshoused people who could attracta chiefexecutive
trvingto tap all available sourcesof assistance.
Grateful acknowledgmentis made to the American Philosophical Society and the
Research Council of the Universityof Missouri for grantsand a fellowshipthat assisted
an extendedresearchproject, of which this study is one product. I am gratefulalso for
the critical attentionpaid to this essay by Merle Curti of the Universityof Wisconsin
and Lewis Atherton,Allen F. Davis, and Walter V. Scholes of the Universityof Missouri.
2 For treatmentof an extremeform of the service intellectualsee Loren Baritz, The
Servantsof Power: A Historyof the Use of Social Science in AmericanIndustry(Middletown, Conn., 1960). For definitionsthat assume that intellectualsneed not be alienated
see SeymourM. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960),
310-12, and Richard Hofstadter,"A Note on Intellect and Power," American Scholar
(New York), XXX (Autumn, 1961), 594-98.
1
456
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
457
In the daysbeforethe New Deal, thisview of intellectuallife appeared in a numberof places,3includingthe pragmatismof John
Dewey and thepracticesofmanyUniversityofWisconsinprofessors.
For Dewey, the idea of theserviceintellectualinvolvedtheremoval
of mutualdistrustbetweenintellectualsand therestof society,somefromthe class societiesof the
thingthathe regardedas a carry-over
Old World. Attemptingto alter the associationof the intellectual
witharistocracy,
thisphilosophercriticizedthe assumptionsthatintellectualabilityis confinedto a small group and that the ivory
toweris the properabode forintellectuals.By puttingtheirknowledge to workforthe reformof societytheycould promotebothintellectualand social progress.Denying thatthe changewould mean
"'a surrenderof thebusinessofthought,forthesake of gettingbusyat
some so-called practicalmatter,"Dewey insistedthatthe new relaof its
tion would "signifya focusingof thoughtand intensifying
qualityby bringingit intorelationwithissues of stupendousmeaning."4
Wisconsinduringthe ProgressiveEra providedone of the outof the serviceintellectualin action.There, facstandingillustrations
participatedin almostevery
ultymembersfromthe stateuniversity
aspectof the reformmovement.The listincludedmajor figureslike
JohnR. Commonsand Richard T. Ely who made importantcontributionsto the social sciencesat the same time that they served
politicalleaders.5
FranklinRooseveltbothacceptedand promotedthe development
of the serviceintellectual,increasinghis prominenceand power by
calling upon professorsto play key roles in politics.6Roosevelt has
been compared-and accurately-withGovernorLa Follette in the
'
For discussionof "The Uses of Knowledge in America" see Merle Curti, American
Paradox: The Conflict of Thought and Action (New Brunswick, 1956), chap. 1.
'Joseph Ratner (ed.), Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy
(New York, 1939), 462. See also Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People,"
American Historical Review (New York), LX (January, 1955), 279; Lewis S. Feuer,
"John Dewey and the Back to the People Movement," Journal of the History of Ideas
(New York), XX (October-December, 1959), 545-68, and Lawrence A. Cremin, The
Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957
(New York, 1961), 115-26. For a view of Dewey as a promoterof anti-intellectualism,
ratherthan a type of intellectuallife, see J. R. Watmough, "Anti-Intellectualism,"HibbertJournal (Boston), LVI (July, 1958), 357-60.
' For brief discussionssee Cremin, Transformationof the School, 161-68, and Robert
S. Maxwell, La Follette and the Rise of the Progressivesin Wisconsin(Madison, 1956),
128-52.
o William E. Leuchtenburg,"Anti-Intellectualism:An Historical Perspective,"Journal of Social Issues (New York), XI (September, 1955), 12-13.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
458
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
forRooseveltenlargedthepractice
use of "trainedexperts,"7
that
than
theelderLa Follette,more
anyoneelse,madea partofAmerican governmental
procedures.8
Developingthe habitduringhis
ofNew York,Rooseveltmadeno effort
yearsas governor
tobreakit
as he movedtowardthepresidency.
His abilityand willingness
to
learnfromotherpeoplehelpedacademic
toplayrolesfor
intellectuals
whichtheyhadbeenpreparing
themselves.9
While Rooseveltridiculedthosewhosaw himas "a BrainTrust
ruledDictator,"'"
he madeno effort
to concealthefactthathe used
and admiredintellectuals.
He praisedthemfortheircontributions
to theNew Deal, alertedpoliticians
to theworkof theprofessors,
urgedco-operation
betweenthetwogroups,and commended
RexfordGuyTugwell,a professor
fromColumbiaUniversity,
"forthe
wayhe stoodup underfire.""At Yale in June,1934,just aftera
periodinwhichtheprofessors
hadcomeunderparticularly
heavyattack,Rooseveltnotedthat"today,morethaneverbeforein our
publiclife,it is truethatwe are callingon theteaching
profession,
on the graduatesof scientific
schoolsand otherschools."To him,
did not seemunwise:"While thereis a certain
thisdevelopment
amountof comment
abouttheuse ofbrainsin thenationalgovernit
ment, seemsto me a pretty
whichwill
good practice-apractice
ofcallingon trainedpeoplefortasksthatrecontinue-this
practice
quire trainedpeople."'12
' Bernard
Bellush, Franklin D. Roosevelt as Governor of New York (New York,
1955)) 229.
8 David
A. Shannon has written that Eric Goldman's "assertion that La Follette
'exalted "the people" over the educated and the expert' simply does not fitthe historical
evidence. La Follette, perhaps more than any other figurein twentieth-century
political
history,was responsiblefor the now generally accepted practice of governmentofficeholders seeking the advice and drawing upon researchesby academic experts." Shannon,
"Was McCarthy a Political Heir of La Follette?" Wisconsin Magazine of History
(Madison), XLV (Autumn, 1961), 4.
' Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston, 1956), 101, 123,
196-97, 261, 265-66.
10 Roosevelt to Frederic R. Coudert, 1935, Roosevelt Library, President's Personal
File 269.
'Elliott Roosevelt (ed.) F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (2 vols., New
York, 1950), I, 309) 544; Roosevelt to Thurman Arnold, January 8, 1943, Roosevelt
Library, President's Personal File 83 19; Roosevelt to Raymond Moley, August 27,
1933) ibid., 743; Roosevelt to Tugwell, November 17, 1936) ibid., 564; Milburn L.
Wilson to Roosevelt, January 8, 1937, National Archives, Records Group 16, Secretary's Correspondence,Under Secretary; Moley, AfterSeven Years (New York, 1939),
46; Roosevelt to Senator Thomas J. Walsh (Montana), August 30, 1932, Roosevelt
Library, Group 27, Box 357; The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (3 vols., New
York, 1953-1954), I, 692, II, 9.
' New
York Times, June 21, 1934.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
459
aboutthewisdomofbusinessmen
and politicians
Someskepticism
influenced
Roosevelt'sdecisionto call academicpeopleintopublic
life.Earlyin 1932,one ofRoosevelt'sadvisers,
SamuelRosenman,
arguedthatthecandidate,
unlikehis predecessors,
shouldnotrely
upon industrialists,
financiers,
and politicalleaders,fortheyhad
"failedto produceanything
constructive
to solvethemesswe'rein
"You have
today."Instead,Rooseveltshouldgo to theuniversities.
beenhavingsomegoodexperience
withcollegeprofessors,"
theadviserconcluded.
"I thinktheywouldn'tbe afraidtostrike
outonnew
pathsjustbecausethepathsarenew.Theywouldgetawayfromthe
old fuzzythinking
on manysubjects,
and thatseemstobe themost
important
thing."'3
AlthoughRooseveltdidgo to theuniversities,
Rosenman's
advice
did notpersuadehimto stophispractice
ofrelying
also onbusinessmen,politicians,
and others.Bankersand businessmen
did notfall
backor waitin theanterooms,
hatin hand,fortheNew Deal to get
thestalledeconomic
machineintomotionagain,as certainromantic
conceptions
of the BrainTrustwould have it.'4Businessleaders
wereconspicuous
in Washington
in 1933," and neverdroppedout
of the picturecompletely
duringNew Deal years.One studentof
Roosevelt'sthought
has concluded
froma studyof hisappointment
calendarand his personalcorrespondance
"thata disproportionate
amountof advicecamefromconservative
businessand professional
men."'6AlthoughArthurSchlesinger,
Jr.,refersto theNew Deal
ofthenon-business
bytheendof 1935as "a coalition
groups,mobilized to preventthedomination
of thecountry
comthe
by
business
he sees in thecoalitioncertain"dissidentbusinessmen"munity,"
"businessmen
who felt themselveshandicappedby Wall Street
domination
of the moneymarket."These included"some of the
in thecountry
ablestentrepreneurs
. . . likeJosephP. Kennedywho
investedin bothnewregionsand newindustries
and waswillingto
beton thenation'scapacity
to resumeeconomic
growth."Obviously
13
Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York, 1952), 57-58. On
Roosevelt's skepticismabout the wisdom of the businessmanand the growth of it during
1934 and 1935 see ArthurM. Schlesinger,Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of
the New Deal (Boston, 1959) 496-503, and Schlesinger,The Age of Roosevelt: The
Politics of Upheaval (Boston, 1960), 272-73.
4 Leo Gurko, Heroes, Highbrows, and the Popular Mind (Indianapolis, 1953),
107-108.
'Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 4-5, 87-176, 423-33.
16 Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (East Lansing, 1958), 101.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
460
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
only"a powerful
sectionof business"had movedout of thePresident'scircle."7
Lawyers,socialworkers,
economists
fromgovernment,
business
and thefoundations,
journalists,
engineers,
laborand farmleaders,
andevensomepoliticians
also helpedto shapeRoosevelt'spolicies."8
To viewtheNew Deal as a professorial
brainstorm,
thejournalisthistorian
HenryF. Pringleinsistedin 1934, "ignoresthe obvious
truththatthisremains
a politicalformofgovernment
and thatMr.
Rooseveltis takinghisobjectives
bypoliticalmethods."'"
Roosevelt,
ThomasH. Greerhas written,
"would have beenthelast to suggestthatthegovernment
be turnedovertoa braintrust-his,orany
other."20
His skepticism
obviously
extendedto theprofessors.2"
He
surelyhaddoubtsthata democratic
politician
shouldrelyexclusively
uponthisoranyothergroup.
Evidencethat"practical
men"did nothaveto waituntilWorld
War II toregainpowerinWashington
canbe foundinthetestimony
oftheprofessors
themselves.
Some,likeRaymond
Moley,recognized
and welcomedtheinfluence
of thepoliticaland economic
leaders;22
otheracademicians,
likeTugwell,withless confidence
in suchmen,
werenotso pleasedabouttheirinfluence.23
Tugwellwrotewithobviousdispleasure
ofthe"businessmen
galore"the"old warhorsesof
politics,"and "the real powerand mightof finance
and industry"
thatprovidedRooseveltwithideasin 1932and 1933.24In hisdiary,
Schlesinger,Politics of Upheaval, 41 1, 443, 586.
See, for example, the development of Roosevelt's technique of using both economistsand farm leaders to develop farm policy. GertrudeAlmy Slichter,"Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the Farm Problem, 1929-1932," Mississippi Valley Historical Review
(Cedar Rapids), XLIII (September, 1956), 238-58, and Slichter,"Franklin D. Roosevelt's Farm Policy as Governor of New York State, 1928-1932," Agricultural History
(Champaign, Ill.), XXXIII (October, 1959), 167-76. On Tugwell's unhappinessin
1932 with Roosevelt's reluctance to commit himselfto the economists'farm plan and
put pressureon the farm groups to support it, see Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal
Diary," December 31, 1932, Roosevelt Library, Group 21, and Tugwell, The DemocraticRoosevelt (New York, 195 7), 233.
9 Henry F. Pringle, "Profiles: The President,"New Yorker (New York), X (June
16-30, 1934), 22.
2 Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, 100.
21 On the skepticalelementsin Roosevelt's attitudetoward one group of intellectualsthe economists see Schlesinger,Politics of Upheaval, 649-51.
' New
York Times, May 24, 1933; Moley, AfterSeven Years, 46.
23 A weakness of the professorsof the "First New Deal" persuasion was their inability to agree on the businessman. Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 183-84;
Politics of Upheaval, 235.
24 Tugwell, "The Preparation of a President," Western Political Quarterly (Salt
Lake City), I (June, 1948), 145-47; Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, 9, 2'13, 219-23,
242-43, 252-53, 261.
17
18
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
461
theColumbiaeconomist
of taking
of hischief'spractice
complained
advice"frommeat onetime,fromMoleyat another
time,and,perhapsif we are nothandy,fromsomesenatoror congressman
who
happenstoturnupatan opportune
moment."25
In short,Rooseveltdrewupona multitude
of groupsand individualsin theshapingofhispolicies.His procedures
causedonecorrespondent
toask:"How intheconfusion
could
aroundthePresident
any professorial
groupremainthe keeperof theconscience
of the
able manwho is themostastutepolitician
And the
of his time?"26
authorofBehindtheBallotssuggested
thatRooseveltmade"a sincereandhonesteffort
tostrike
a happybalancebetween
thetheoretical knowledge
gainedbytheprofessors
andschoolmen
andthepracticalknowledgegainedby menwho spendtheirlives in thebusy
worldof finance
and industry."27
Here was a methodthatputthe
Presidentin touchwithmanydevelopments
in American
life,producedpoliticalsupport,
he
and valuedan adviserfortheinterests
represented
as well as theideashe possessed.28
The methodmeantthatthePresident,
nottheprofessors,
dominatedtheNew Deal. Althoughtheyhada chancetoinfluence
policy,
theyhad to contendagainstothergroupsthatwerealso beingencouragedtocontribute.
The groupscouldpullandhaulamongthemselves,butultimately
a decisionhad to be madeon theirconflicting
proposals.Final responsibility
forthedecision,
at leastas Roosevelt
organizedhis administration,29
lay withthe President,
a factthat
thoseinclosecontact
withhimrecognized.30
"He likestotalktopeople," Tugwellconfided
to hisdiary,"buthe makesup hismindalmostregardless
of advice.""We couldthrowoutpiecesof theory;
andperhapstheywouldfinda placeinhisscheme.We couldsuggest
relations;and perhapstheinventiveness
ofthesuggestion
wouldattracthis notice,"thisColumbiaprofessor
recalledin anotherplace.
25Tugwell, "Diary," Roosevelt Library,Group 2 1.
'
Washington correspondentof London Times, in New York Times, June 28, 1933.
27James A. Farlny, Behind the Ballots (New York, 1938), 2'20-21; Tugwell, Art
of Politics (New York, 1958), 5.
2' See Frank Freidel's discussionof Roosevelt's concept of political balance, a concept
"Cofserving all importantgroups in the American community,"The Triumph, 317-18,
33 1-32, 337.
29 Schlesinger,Coming of the New Deal, 521-25.
30 Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss (New York, 1947), 90; Charles Michelson,
The Ghost Talks (New York, 1944), 11, 13; Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew
(New York, 1946), 328-33; Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York,
1954), 159; Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the Origins of the New Deal (New York, 1956), 209-17; Freidel, The Triumph,
322.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
462
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
"But thetapestry
ofpolicyhe wasweavingwasguidedbyan artist's
conception
whichwas not made knownto us."'" AnotherBrain
Truster,AdolfA. Berle,also testified
thathe and otheradvisers
couldnotruntheshowbecausethePresident
drewuponmanyadvisersand thushad to choosebetweenthemand makeup his own
mind.32
One shouldadd thattheprofessors
oftendisagreed
withone
another.ConsiderTugwelland Felix Frankfurter,
from
a professor
theHarvardLaw School.For severalyears,theycompeted
against
oneanother
forinfluence
within
theadministration.
Tugwell,a critic
of competition
and ofefforts
to restore
it in theAmerican
economy,
insisted
thatbigbusiness
mustbe acceptedas inevitable
anddesirable
and thatthe nationmustmoveon in a collectivistic
direction
and
establisha systemof nationalplanning.Frankfurter,
on theother
hand,distrusted
theschemes
oftheplanners,
believedincompetitive
and arguedthatthepowersofgovernment
enterprise,
mustbe employedto reverse
thetrendtowardeconomic
concentration.33
The influenceof intellectuals
likeTugwelland Frankfurter
wentup and
downwhileRoseveltremained
onforovertwelveyears.
The professors
had an opportunity,
notto takecommand,
butto
be useful.34
They had a chanceto co-operate
withmenof political
and economic
affairs
in thetaskofshapingpoliciesfora nationin its
mostseriousdepression.
Preparedbya longperiodofhistorical
development
fortherolesthatRooseveltencouraged
themtoplay,the
professors,
in thecollaboration
withothermenthattheyexperienced
duringtheyearsof theNew Deal, represented
a highlysignificant
trendinAmerican
intellectual
life.
To manyAmericans
of the 1930's,however,
Roosevelt'suse of
theprofessors
seem'eda radicaldeparture
fromthepast,ratherthan
31 Tugwell, "Diary," Roosevelt Library, Group 2 1 Tugwell, "Preparation
of a
President,"WesternPolitical Quarterly,I, 135.
32 New York Times, March 30, 1933. An examinationof Berle's intellectualdevelopment suggests that the relationshipbetween Roosevelt and his Brain Trust was not a
one-way relationship.He influencedas well as was influencedby this Brain Truster.
Richard S. Kirkendall, "A. A. Berle, Jr., Student of the Corporation, 1917-1932,"
Business History Review (Boston), XXXV (Spring, 1961), 43-58.
33Schlesinger,The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston, 1957),
194-98, 400-401, 415, 419, 423, 451-52, and Politics of Upheaval, 214-15, 223, 23335, 263, 387-94.
'3 Consider, for example, Roosevelt's relations with ProfessorsGeorge Warren and
0. W. M. Sprague in the fall of 1933. Warren seemed useful from political and economic points of view while Sprague did not. Thus Warren shaped monetarypolicy for
a brief period while Sprague left the administrationin a huff.Richard S. Kirkendall,
"The New Deal Professorsand the Politics of Agriculture" (Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Wisconsin,1958), 311-28.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT
AND THE
SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
463
part of a long-runtrend,or at least a highlyundesirabledevelopment. Thus denunciationsof these intellectualsin politicsfigured
prominentlyin the debates of the decade. Three themesappeared
most frequentlyin the vigorouscriticismof the academicintellectuals: theydominatedtheadministration;
theygave ita radicalorientation; and theylacked the requiredpracticalexperience.35
At times,
criticssimplyportrayedthe "Brain Trust" or "professors"as the
dominantgroup,while frequentlythe alarmed observerspointedto
particularindividuals,like Tugwell or Frankfurter,
as the men of
greatestpower.Sometimestheirbrandof radicalismwas notdefined,
but oftensuch labels as "communistic"and "socialistic"werepinned
on theirphilosophies.36
Accordingto mostcritics,
the lack of practical
experiencewas the fundamentaldifficulty.
The intellectualswere
dangerouslyradical because their minds had not been formedby
participation
in practicalaffairs.The critics'case involveda theory
of knowledgethat rationalizedthe claims of a few groups,chiefly
businessleaders,to positionsof dominantpowerin Americansociety.
Only they had the kinds of experiencethat produced the ideas
needed to conductaffairssuccessfully.37
Thus, the Presidentshould
free himselffrommen like Tugwell and substitutemen who had
"hustledup pay rolls," whilethe professors
should quit government
and enter businessin order to develop "more practicalideas."38
'For illustrationsof all threesee "The Rise of ConservativeOpposition," in Schlesinger, Coming of the New Dealt, 473-74, and the Wirt episode, ibid., 457-60, and
Kirkendall, "The New Deal Professors," 333-46. A few critics altered one or more
of the themes. President John A. Simpson of the National Farmers Union insisted
that only farm organizationshad the rightto offerplans to solve farmers'problemsand
that the "Brain Trust" did not speak nor understand "the farmers' language." He
charged that ProfessorMilburn L. Wilson was "financedby big business"and that some
Brain Trusters had "been in the employ of the crooks in the past and may not have
severed all connections."Simpson to W. R. Ronald, 1932, M. L. Wilson Papers (Montana State College Archives) ; Simpson to Roosevelt, October 24, 1933, Roosevelt Library,President'sPersonal File 47 1.
"
Charles H. L. Johnston to George N. Peek, September 3, 1936, Peek Papers
(Western Historical ManuscriptsCollection, Universityof Missouri); Missouri Farmer
(Columbia), XXXVI (March 15, 1934), 4; Rural New Yorker (New York), XCIV
(April 20, 1935), 335; George Benson, "Making Up the President'sMind," Review
of Reviews (London), XCIII (June, 1936), 66; Bernarr MacFadden in New York
Times, April 9, 1936; Edward M. Crane to Roosevelt, May 21, 1934, Roosevelt Library, OfficialFile 1-Misc.; Ickes, Diary I, 492; editorial, "Brains in Government,"
Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia), CCVII (July 28, 1934), 22.
"Spokesmen for businessin the 1920's had developed and used this idea. See James
W. Prothro, Dollar Decade: Business Ideas in the 1920's (Baton Rouge, 1954), 200201.
" Sibley Everitt to Roosevelt,April 15, 1935, Roosevelt Library,OfficialFile 1-Misc.;
W. R. Gentry to Tugwell, November 19, 1936, National Archives, Records Group
96, Farm Security Administration.See also Clyde 0. Patterson to Tugwell, July 4,
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
464
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
Views such as these rejectedthe basic assumptionof the serviceintellectuals,the assumptionthat theirtrainingenabled them to be
practicalmen.
As this hostilitymounted,membersand friendsof the Roosevelt
administration
suggestedthat the war had brokenout because the
intellectualsthreatenedthe "special interests"thatwere"struggling
to maintaintheirpowerin a periodof revolutionary
change."39The
real criticismof the Brain Trust, the New Republicexplained,
"comes fromthosewho feel thatthewhole courseof theadministration is hostile to theirspecial and privateinterests-menof great
wealthwho fearthatin one way or anothersome of it will be taken
fromthem,importantindustrialists
who see in the Roosevelt Administration
a degree of concernfor the rightsand interestsof the
commonman whichhas not been witnessedsincethe firsttwo years
of the Wilson Administration."40
Accordingto this theory,the
threatenedgroupswere reluctantto criticizethe Presidentdirectly
for he seemed to have tremendouspopular support.Attackingthe
professorsserved as an indirectand safe way of hittingRoosevelt.4"
Although the theorythrowslight on the criticism,something
moremusthave been involved.Why did the anti-NewDealers believe that an attackupon the professorsas professorswould bring
supportto the oppositionthatcould not be obtainedin otherways?
Perhaps the intellectuals'opponentsbelievedthattherewas a widespread resentmentof the special privilegesthat a highlyeducated
group enjoyed and the sense of superiority
that some membersof
the group displayed.42
Perhaps the criticsof the Brain Trustersas1934, National Archives, Records Group 16, Secretary's Correspondence,Criticism
(Tugwell); B. R. Douglas to Louis Howe, May 27, 1933, Roosevelt Library, Official
File 1-Misc.; R. R. Englehart to Roosevelt, April 25, 1934, Roosevelt Library, president's Personal File 965; Rural New Yorker, XCIV (December 2 1, 1935), 795;
XCVII (January 15, 1938), 46; Eugene Meyer in New York Times, April 22, 1934;
R. D. Bowen to Roosevelt, October 21, 1933, Roosevelt Library, Official File 227Misc.; Missouri Farmer, XXV (April 15, 1933), 9; (June 1, 1933), 8; William A.
Hirth to George N. Peek, August 25, 1936; J. M. Somerndice(?) to Peek, August 25,
1936; and Clarence A. Earl to Peek, December 6, 1935, Peek Papers; Farm Journal
(Philadelphia), LX (June, 1937), 7.
"3Ernest K. Lindley, "War on the Brains Trust," ScribnersMonthly (New York),
XCIV (November, 1933), 266. See also Donald Richberg in New York Times, April
11, 1934.
'New Republic (New York), LXXV (June 7, 1935) , 85-86.
4"The theorywas advanced by such importantadministrationfiguresas Louis Howe,
Paul Appleby, and Adolf Berle. Ickes, Diary, I, 82-83; Appleby to Mrs. Robert L.
Webb, March 2, 1935, and Appleby memorandum,May 1, 1934, National Archives,
Records Group 16, Secretary's Correspondence, Criticism (Tugwell);
New York
Times, June 19, 1933.
'Lipset, Political Man, 339.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
465
sumed that Americansbelieved that men of politicalpower needed
the experiencefound in the businessworld. If such attitudesprevailed, denunciationsof the professorsas impracticalwould discreditthe New Deal and stimulatethe ratherpassive membersof
the body politicto rally behind the active opponentsof the policy
changesof the period. In the 1930's some theoristssuggestedthat
the hostilitytoward intellectualsgrew out of unique featuresof
Americanlife,especiallythe frontierexperienceand the devotionto
businessactivity.43
Many professionalpoliticianscertainlybehaved as though they
regarded distrustof the professoras a widespreadAmericantrait
that could be exploited. Members of both major partiescriticized
and even ridiculedthe academicians.A numberof Democrats disliked the new policiesof theirpartyand resentedthe factthatintellectuals occupied positionsof power and prestigethat could have
been filled by professionalpoliticians."Even beforeinauguration,
BernardBaruch,a sourceof moneyand ideas formanyDemocrats,
was disturbedby Roosevelt's fondnessforthe advice of intellectuals
who seemed to Baruch to lack the experiencenecessaryfor solving
the country'sproblems.45Figuring conspicuouslyin the battles
againstTugwell in 1934 were two southernDemocratsin the Senate, Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and Ellison D. ("Cotton Ed")
Smith of South Carolina. The latterwanted "a graduate of God's
University,the great outdoors,"ratherthan the Columbia economist,to become Under Secretaryof Agriculture.46
The frustrated
and bitterAlfred E. Smithcriticizedthe "absent-minded"and "inexperiencedyoungcollege professors"withtheirsocialistictrappings
"Claude C. Bowman, The College Professor in America: An Analysis of Articles
Published in the General Magazines, 1890-1938 (Philadelphia, 1938), 176; "Professors at Washington," Christian Century (Chicago), L (May 31, 1933), 711-12;
Scrutator,"The Professor'sDilemma," Atlantic Monthly (Boston), XLII (July, 1933),
124-25; Henry Seidel Canby, "Trusting in Brains," Saturday Review of Literature(New
York), June 13, 1936, p. 16.
4Leuchtenburg, "Anti-Intellectualism,"Journal of Social Issues, XI, 13-14; Edwin
B. Bronner, "The New Deal Comes to Pennsylvania: The Gubernatorial Election of
1934," Pennsylvania History (Philadelphia), XXVII (January, 1960), 52; Forrest
Davis, "Behind the New Deal," New Outlook (New York), CLXI (March, 1933),
13; Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, 1947), 252-54; "The Brain Trust,"
Business Week (Greenwich, Conn.), March 22, 1933, pp. 16-18.
'Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston, 1957), 429-30, 432, 438, 439.
"
New York Times, April 25, May 29, June 9, 1934. On some other Democratic
criticismof the professorssee James A. Trent to Roosevelt, February 21, 1935, Roosevelt Library, President'sPersonal File 327; Lord, Wallaces, 353; Ickes, Diary, I, 330;
Michelson, Ghost Talks, 52-53, 15 1; Lela Stiles, The Man Behind Roosevelt: The
Story of Louis McHenry Howe (Cleveland, 1954), 275-76; and Schlesinger,Politics
,'1 w
oJ Uphea'bat) &-s1
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
466
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
and preferred"the leaders of the past . . . people who made the
whatitis."47By 1936theDemocratic
country
candidate
presidential
of 1928wascampaigning
forAlfredM. Landonandsuggesting
that
the intellectuals
who had led the Democratic
partyawayfromits
traditions
shouldwrapthemselves
in the"raccooncoatsthatthecollege boyswearat a footballgame" and go to Russiawherethey
couldplan all theywanted."Roosevelt,"Smithprotested,
"could
have calleduponthebestmenbutlook at whathe got!"48
With Democratsfighting
amongthemselves,
manyRepublicans
workedstrenuously
to makean issueoutof thequestionofthekind
of man who shouldgovernthe nation.As earlyas the springof
1933, the Republicanleader in the Senatecomplainedaboutthe
oftheprofessors.49
By thecampaign
of 1936,
powerand philosophy
attacks
uponthemhad becomesucha conspicuous
feature
ofRepublicanvote-seeking
techniques
thatthecautiousJamesA. FarleydecidedthatTugwellshouldnotjoin in theefforts
to re-electRoosevelt50
and someobservers
accusedtheRepublicans
ofanti-intellectualism."I am somewhat
disappointed,"
one personwrote,"to see no
plankin the Republicanplatform
recommending
the abolitionof
colleges.... If it is a crime,as Republicanorators
assert,fora colhimselfwithnationalaffairs,
lege man to identify
whythennot
economize
byclosingup thecolleges."5'
WhilemanyAmericans
ofthedepression
decadeprotested
against
in
theintellectuals politics,
manyothersobviously
believedthatsuch
people were capableof participating
successfully
in the political
processon itshigherlevels.In fact,one ratherlargesurveyof the
O'OscarHandlin, Al Smith and His America (Boston, 1958), 170, 174, 180; Schlesinger,Coming of the New Deal, 483-84; Leuchtenburg,"Anti-Intellectualism,"Journal
of Social Issues, XI, 13-14.
4 New York Times, October2, 23, 25, November 1, 1936.
"Congressional Digest (Washington), XII (November, 1933), 269-75. For examples of other Republican criticismfrom 1933 to 1936 see Herbert Hoover, Addresses
upon the American Road, 1933-1938 (New York, 1938), 175; New York Times,
April 26, May 2, 29, June 13, 15, 1934, May 15, 16, September 17, December 11,
1935, March 4, April 4, September 22, October 1, 2, 4, 27, November 18, 1936;
LiteraryDigest (New York), CXVII (June 23, 1934), 5-6; National Grange Monthly
(Springfield, Mass.), XXXIII (November, 1936), 14; and pamphlets like "Rex the
First: The Ruler Nobody Elected," thatcan be foundin the Peek Papers.
'Ickes, Diary, I, 580; Farley to Roosevelt, May 9, 1936, Roosevelt Library, Official
File 1-Misc.; Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York, 1948),
57; New York Times, October 29, 1936. See also Stephen Early to Tugwell, August
14, 1936, Roosevelt Library, OfficialFile 1, for evidence of the care Tugwell took
not to embarrassRoosevelt during the campaign.
"1Letter to editor, New. York Times, September6, 1936. See also Times, June 24,
1934.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
467
treatment
of theBrainTrustin periodicals
concludedthatmostof
themwerenothostileto theprofessors.52
Even themuchmaligned
Tugwellhad hisadmirers,
someofwhomsawhimas a friendofthe
"workers"and an enemyof the "greedyindividuals"who had
"economicruin"uponthepeople.He recognized
thatthe
brought
old "capitalist-eat-worker
system"was obsolete.One of thosewho
applaudedhopedto get workagain so as to earnenoughto buy
everybooktheeconomist
had published.53
While someof the friends
of theprofessors
saw themas substitutesfor the discredited
businessmen
and politiciansand distindisinterested
adherence
to principle,54
other
guishedbyan objective,
supporters
weresatisfied
to makesimpleclaimsfortheusefulness
of
the intellectuals
withoutunrealistic
notionsabouttheirpoweror
thedevelopment
superiority.
Recognizing
ofa utilitarian
orientation
in Americanhighereducationand oftenemphasizing
the growing
complexity
of publicaffairs,
thesepeople saw menwho had been
trainedto studyaffairs
thoroughly
and to consider
theirfundamental implications
as oneswhocouldand shouldco-operate
withother
typesofmenin thedevelopment
ofpolicy.Thisviewof theservice
was muchlike FranklinRoosevelt's.55
intellectual
Bowman, College Professors,186.
"Paul Whitney to Tugwell, June 11, 1934; M. N. Holland to Tugwell, June 21,
1934, National Archives, Records Group 16, Secretary'sCorrespondence.The Secretary's Correspondencefor 1933-1936, under such headings as "Criticism," "Congratulations (Tugwell)," "Criticism-Commendations,"
"Under Secretary,"and "Farm Relief,"
contains evidence of support for Tugwell. See also Roosevelt Library, Official File
I-Misc., for thespringof 1934.
54Owen R. Lovejoy, "Philosophy for a New Deal," Survey Graphic (New York),
XXII (October, 1933), 522-23; F. H. Underhill, "Democracy and Leadership," Reference Shelf (New York), IX (November, 1933), 117; Forrest Davis, "Rise of the
Commissars," New Outlook, CLXII (December, 1933), 23-26; Oswald Garrison
Villard, "The Idealist Comes to the Front," Nation (New York), CXXXVII (October
4, 1933), 371; Jonathan Mitchell, "Don't Shoot the Professors! Why Government
Needs Them," Harper's Magazine (New York), CLXVIII (May, 1934), 740-495
"Brain Trusts for Literature," Saturday Review of Literature,X (December 2, 1933),
304; "Professorsand Politics," School and Society (New York), XXXVIII (November
11) 1933), 640-41; "Trust Brains," Collier's (New York), XCIII (May 19, 1934), 66.
'New York Times, July 29, 1933; June 5, 1934; November 7, 1934; September
30) 1936. R. L. Duffus, "A New Spirit in Government:ProfessorTugwell Charts the
Prevailing Winds of Economic Doctrine," New York Times Book Review., May 14,
1933; "We Still Need Experts," Collier's, CI (March 12, 1938), 70; Albert W. Atwood, "Governmentby Professors,"Saturday Evening Post, CCVI (October 14, 1933),
23 ff.; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, "We Shall Make America Over," Saturday
Evening Post, CCXI (November 19, 1938), 92; Dorothy Thompson, "Trust in Brains,
Instead of Brain Trusts," Ladies Home Journal (Philadelphia), LV (May, 1938), 4 ff.;
"Keep Our UniversitiesFree," School and Society, XLIV (July 25, 1936), 123-24;
Oliver McKee, Jr., "ProfessorsPut to the Test," North AmericanReview (New York),
CCXXXVIII (October, 1934), 345. See the letterfrom an Oklahoma farmerto Tug52
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
468
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
A numberof politicians
applaudedtheprofessors,
seeingthemas
usefulallies,ratherthanas substitutes
forlegitimate
rulers.Tugwell
had significant
support-as well as manyenemies-inthe House
and Senate.56
Althoughhe was encouraged
in the
notto participate
1936 campaign,
Democratic
leadersurgedsomeof theotherintellectualsto join in campaigns
and had an especiallyhighregardfor
theefforts
in thisareaoftheMontanaeconomist,
MilburnL. Wilson.57Top administrators,
especiallySecretary
HenryA. Wallace,
also liked the serviceintellectual.58
And in 1936 the Republicans
hiredtheirowngroupof professors
to assistin thecampaign.
The
creation
of a Republican
"BrainTrust"delightedsupporters
of the
New Deal's professors.
"If we can divertthemindsof the people
offour ownbraintrust,"Congressman
MauryMaverickof Texas
wroteto Tugwell,"we cantakea lot of windoutoftheRepublican
bag."59TwittingtheG.O.P. was obviously
greatfun,butit should
notbe allowedto obscurethe significance
of whatRoosevelt'sopthatat leastsomeimporponentshad done.Theiractionindicated
well July 8, 1934, National Archives,Records Group 16, Secretary'sCorrespondence,
Criticism (Tugwell). The farmerassured Tugwell that farmersneeded "theory and
how to put it into practice."
'
Paul Appleby to W. W. Waymack, March 1, 1935, National Archives, Records
Group 16, Criticism-Commendations.
Compare T. V. Smith to Roosevelt, May 22,
1934, National Archives, Records Group 16, Secretary's Correspondence, Criticism
(Tugwell): "Tugwell is your best bet for the Middle West and the Western South,
both of which and only which I well know." For an example of support for Tugwell
and other professorsfrom a state politician see the speech by Clyde Tingley, governor
of New Mexico, at Las Cruces, August 20, 1935, and Tingley to Senators Carl A.
Hatch and Dennis Chavez, July 13, 1935, National Archives,Records Group 96, Farm
SecurityAdministration,Adm. Correspondence,1935-38, Ad-1.
"
Mrs. James H. Wolfe, Democratic National Committee,to Wilson, November 24,
1936; Sam Rayburn and Paul C. Aiken to Wilson, November 13, 1936, National
Archives,Records Group 16, Secretary'sCorrespondence,AssistantSecretary(Personal);
Elbert D. Thomas to Wilson, November 14, 1938, ibid., Secretary's Correspondence,
Politics; James Murray to Roosevelt, January 13, 1937, Roosevelt Library, Official
File 1.
'
Homer S. Cummings, "Are the Increasing Powers of the PresidentImproving the
American Government?" CongressionalDigest, XII (November, 1933), 276; Daniel C.
Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life (Durham, 1941), 282; Harold Ickes, in New York
Times, January 27, 1936; Hugh Johnson, ibid., June 22, 1934; Donald Richberg,
quoted in Schlesinger,Coming of the New Deal, 490; ChesterC. Davis, "The Place of
Farmers,Economists,and Administratorsin Developing AgriculturePolicy," Journal of
Farm Economics (Menasha, Wis.), XXII (February, 1940), 1-9; Henry A. Wallace,
"Farm Economistsand Agricultural Planning," ibid., XVIII (February, 1936), 1-11;
New York Times, November 19, 1936.
59 Maury Maverick to Tugwell, May
1, 1936, National Archives, Records Group
96, General Correspondence, 1935-38. See also New Republic, LXXXVI (April 22,
1936), 299-300, and M. L. Wilson to Selig Perlman, May 4, 1936, National Archives,
Records Group 16, Secretary'sCorrespondence,AssistantSecretary (Personal).
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
469
and acmenalso recognized
tantmembers
of thispartyof practical
ceptedthe riseof theserviceintellectuals.60
members
of thepoliticalworldplaceda highvalue
As important
in theacademy,
on thepragmatic
of
developments
so did a number
businessleaders.Professor
Wilson,forexample,had verygood relationswitha largenumber
ofthesepeople,including
thepresident
and a topofficial
ofthe
of theUnitedStatesChamberof Commerce
PrudentialLife InsuranceCompany;6'and behindGeorgeWarren
fortheNation,a groupdominated
of CornellstoodtheCommittee
by businessleaderswho did nothesitateto saythattheirmonetary
A significant
theorieshad beenformedby a professor.62
featureof
thebehaviorof manybusiness
leadersduringtheNew Deal period
to workcloselywithandapplaudtheactionsofsome
wasa tendency
while condemning
intellectuals
others,a patternsuggesting
that
in politicsare notcontrolled
businessmen
of
byabstract
conceptions
of intellectuals.
the capabilities
freAlthoughthesebusinessmen
shouldnotbe allowedoutof
quentlytalkedas thougha professor
theirbehaviorrevealedthatto thema serviceintelhis classroom,
lectualwas notnecessarily
impractical.
His statusin theirworldderelation
the
between
upon
their
interests
and his ideas.63
pended
of
a
The reactions number
ofacademicians
tothepresence
oftheir
kindin thepoliticsof the 1930'sindicates
thatmanyof themfelt
readyand eagerto enijoy ower."Presidents
NicholasMurravBut0 Some Republicans were unhappy about the establishmentof a Republican Brain
Trust. See the New York Times, June 16, 1936, and the man who argued: "The Administrationof Mr. Harding was a successfuladministration.He was not a college man
and he never consulted with college savants." Leuchtenburg, "Anti-Intellectualism,"
Journal of Social Issues, XI, 14. But it is incorrectto suggest that the Republicans did
not accept the service intellectual until 1953. See Mario Einaudi: "Having for twenty
years scoffed at Roosevelt's brain trusts and at the wide-eyed, non-payroll-meeting
academicians infestingthe White House, the Republicans appointed in 1953 as chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers the top theoreticianof themall, ArthurF. Burns,
the Columbia Universityeconomist." The Roosevelt Revolution (New York, 1959),
130. Republican historyis more complex than thisimplies.
etKirkendall, "New Deal Professors," 143-53, 207-209, 2 30-32.
"'Earl Harding radio speech, July 14, 1933; Edward Rumely to Roosevelt, April
15, 1933, Roosevelt Library, Oficial File 5707; Committeefor the Nation, "Facts vs.
'Baloney,'" George Warren Collection (Cornell UniversityArchives.)
"'
George N. Peek and the membersof the Committeefor the Nation provide good
examples. Kirkendall, "New Deal Professors," 13, 97-102, 176, 184, 189, 298, 306,
319, 322, 324, 332-46, 399; Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm
Parity (Norman, 1954), 271.
4 For examples see statementsby Dean Virginia C. Gildersleeveof Barnard College,
PresidentMary E. Woolley of Mount Holyoke, PresidentRemsen B. Ogilby of Trinity
College, George E. Vincent of the RockefellerFoundation, Dean Howard Lee McBain
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
470
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
ler of Columbiaand RobertM. Hutchinsof Chicagosuppliedparand revealingdefensesof the expandingrole
ticularly
conspicuous
of scholarsin publicaffairs.
thatpeoplehad "becomeso
Suggesting
accustomed
to thelongruleofthe'blockhead
trust'in Washington"
thattheywere"verycynical
andcontemptuous
ofthe'braintrust,"
Butlerarguedthat"the truescholaris themostpractical
personin
theworld,becausehe spendshistimeadjustinghimself
to realityin
accordance
withthe evidence."And the ColumbiaPresidentindicatedthathe believedin theserviceintellectual:
"We havebeeninsistingnownearlyforty
is a publicserviceinyearsthata university
stitution
of thehighesttype.. . . Its businessis notmerelyto preserve,to increaseand to interpret
knowledge,
butto carryscholarshipand scientific
knowledge
intothefourcorners
of theearthfor
theserviceof mankind
and thesolutionof itsproblems."65
As Butler'sdefensereveals,theories
oftheserviceintellectual
involveda substitute
forthebusinessman's
aboutthesuassumption
ofknowledge
periority
derivedfrombusiness
experience.
Thispoint
appearedwithemphasis
in Hutchins'argument
thatit wasprecisely
becausetheywereprofessors
thattheBrainTrusters
hada contribution to make-"the applicationof a clear,disinterested,
honest,
trainedintelligence
to thegreatproblems."According
to thisuniversitypresident,
mostbusinessmen
and politicians,
and especially
thosewho had ruled the nationduringthe precedingten years,
lackedthe valuablekind of intelligence
thatthe professors
pos-
sessed.66
Clearly,as someviewedthem,theserviceintellectuals
deserved
to be morethanmere"servants
ofpower."67
Theyshouldbe an imone."Never beportantpowergroup,perhapsthemostimportant
forehastheworldbeenmoreobviously
in needofexpertleadership
and neverhas theobligation
of leadership
moreobviously
devolved
upona singlegroup,"Tugwellhad written
beforemovingtoWashof Columbia, Dean Carl W. Ackerman of Columbia, and President Frank Aydelotte
of Swarthmore,in New York Times, November 23, 1932; May 27, June 14, 20,
November 19, 1933; June 4, 6, September27, 1934. See also 1. G. Davis, "The Social
Science Fellowships in Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology," Journal of Farm
Economics,XVI (July, 1934), 501.
8 New York Times, February 14, June 7, 193 3.
"6Ibid., May 18, 1933.
87 Loren Baritz concluded that those social scientistswho worked in industrybecame
servantsof "the industrialelite" and abandoned "the wider obligations of the intellectual who is a servant of his own mind." Servants of Power, 194.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ROOSEVELT AND THE SERVICE INTELLECTUAL
471
econoington.He believedthatit was "thecleardutyofAmerican
systemof Americacan and should
miststo say whatthe economic
do and to pointthe truepathtowardnewgoals."68Obviouslythe
forthisrisinggroup,the
had greatambitions
Columbiaeconomist
intellectuals.
service
who servedunderRooseveltfailedto achieve
The professors
thatTugwell had in mind,but theydid
powerof the magnitude
in operaof the serviceintellectual
illustrations
provideimportant
inshocked
others,
many
While
those
many
people,
operations
tion.
as readyfor
cludingFranklinRoosevelt,lookedupontheprofessors
politicalroles.Althoughhe did not give the academic
important
fearedandothershopedthey
menas muchpoweras someAmericans
these
intellectuals
witha chanceto workwith
did
supply
had, he
of
othermenin theshapingof theNew Deal. Like mostfeatures
rootsin earlierpethisone had important
thatpoliticalmovement,
riods.RooseveltsimplyrecognizedthatformanyyearsAmerican
a strongutilitarian
emphasis,
had beendeveloping
highereducation
a significant
byincreaspushforward
and he gavethatdevelopment
of serviceintellectuals.
ingthe politicalopportunities
eTugwell, The Trend of Economics (New York, 1924), 384. Other professorsin
the New Deal were not so ambitious. Wilson, for example, busied himself building
institutionsdesigned to enable intellectuals and other people to work together. In
these institutions,no group would monopolize leadership, but the intellectualswould
have some power. Kirkendall, "A Professorin Farm Politics," Mid-America (Chicago),
XLI (October, 1959), 212-16.
This content downloaded from 193.52.222.246 on Mon, 1 Jul 2013 09:04:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions