REVISION
UNIT 3 OPTION D2 –
Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? C.1925-60
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6HI03/D D2 – Britain & the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a cost?
60% A2 Marks (30% GCE)
Exam: 2 hours.
Section A. (AO1 30 marks)
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One question out of a choice of 2 (30 marks). c50 mins
Analytical focus – reach a judgement on a historical issue or problem.
Section B (AO1 16 marks, AO2 24 marks)
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One compulsory question: c1 hour 10 mins
Compare provided source material (3 secondary sources) while exploring an issue of historical debate, reach a judgement in the light of own understanding of the issues of
interpretation & controversy.
It is vital that students make clear how the sources relate to the question, integrate points from the sources with their own knowledge, cross refer them with each other & evaluate
them in terms of content (but not provenance).
Content : To 1939
NB In Section A, students should appreciate the links between the bullet points & questions may be set which target the content of more than one bullet point (eg all 3 WW2 bullet points could
be drawn on to explain the reasons for eventual victory)
Section A Bullet Point One: British foreign policy 1925-37
1. Questions will not be set specifically on the period before 1925, but the legacy of WW1 & Versailles will be needed to understand:
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Locarno
The League of Nations
The ten-year rule
Disarmament
Controversies & diplomacy associated with reparations
The growing sentiment of pacifism.
2. Students should understand factors shaping foreign policy:
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Budgetary constraints
Public opinion
The demands of an extensive empire affecting relations with Italy & Germany
The personalities of the leading politicians
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3. Students should understand:
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The impact of Hitler & the changing relationship with Italy
The attempt to deal with German rearmament
Stresa Front, Ethiopia & the Rhineland
The intervention of the 2 powers in the Spanish Civil war
Section B
The first controversy requires a study of British foreign policy from May 1937, when Chamberlain took office, until the outbreak of war in Sept. 1939.
This includes the Anschluss, the Sudeten Crisis, the Munich Settlement, the destruction of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the Polish Crisis, the Nazi-Soviet Pact & the outbreak of war plus the
domestic background to British policy like public opinion, financial constraints & parliamentary politics. Students should be aware of the historical debate which surrounds this period. Some
historians have argued that British policy was sensible & pragmatic & others have seen it as craven or, at best, misguided.
Content: WW2
Section A Bullet Point Two: Defeat & Survival 1939-41
1. The British war effort from the declaration of war on Germany to the entry of the USA in December 1941.
2. Students should understand:
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The reasons for military setbacks in Norway, France, Greece & N Africa & for victories like the Battle of Britain & against Italy in N Africa in 1941.
The vital role of the Atlantic link to Canada & the USA & the onset of Lend-Lease.
Section A Bullet Point Three: Victory & the Grand Alliance 1942-45
1. Students should understand:
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The role & impact of war in the Mediterranean theatre
The impact of the bomber offensive of 1942-45
The victory over the U-boats in 1943
The landings in France in June 1944 & the subsequent liberation of W Europe.
2. The relationship with the USA will be central & though questions won’t be set on the Eastern Front, students should be aware of its importance to Britain & Britain’s relations with the USSR.
Section A Bullet Point Four: The Home Front 1939-45
1. Students should understand:
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The very real achievements in war production & the mobilisation for total war.
The role of women
The attempts to maintain morale
The impact of bombing, blockade, high taxation & extensive governmental controls
Unit 3 Strategy
Unit 3 Exam = 2 hours
Section A (30 Marks)
This is a 3-4 side essay done in about 50 mins, similar in approach to Unit 1. Start by planning an answer that sets out points for & against the proposition in the question.
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It is essential to keep the question in mind throughout. Highlight the case for/against in the introduction to help you focus.
Produce a balanced answer with an explicit focus on the key themes in the question. Look at the argument & counter argument; points must be backed up with sufficient range &
depth of examples.
Essential for the top levels to reach a conclusion which draws on the points made & reaches a judgement. This can’t be an afterthought – spend about 10 mins on it.
Be aware that questions can span bullet points.
Section B (40 Marks)
This section is worth the most marks & needs more time than Section A. The Board recommends 20 minutes to read the sources & plan the answer & 50 minutes to write it.
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In the introduction, highlight the debate which is the focus of the question, which will be found in the sources.
Produce a balanced answer which looks at the argument/counter argument. Organise your main points in paragraphs; in each paragraph, start with material from the sources & then
develop your argument using your own knowledge.
When you refer to the sources give brief quotes that show that you are using them, & don’t just treat the content of the sources as information - evaluate the claims the sources are
making by cross referencing between them and referring to your own knowledge (for the top marks you need to do both). NB You are not required to evaluate the nature of the sources
– you are evaluating the claims being made by them.
Sources must be integrated with own knowledge even to reach Level 2 - You MUSTN’T HAVE SEPARATE SECTIONS FOR SOURCES & OWN KNOWLEDGE.
Produce a well constructed conclusion that sums up the debate & gives your judgement and the reasons why you’ve reached it, with references to the sources as well. This can’t be an
afterthought – a sustained conclusion is essential for the top marks.
The thrust of the Section B topic is whether Appeasement was sensible or misguided – keep this framework in your minds when examining sources. You need to be aware that there are
different historical interpretations of Appeasement; you don’t need to name historians or schools of thought, though you would get credit if you can do so.
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SECTION A.
1. British Foreign Policy 1925-37.
Factors shaping foreign policy:
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Budgetary constraints
Public opinion
The demands of an extensive empire affecting relations with Italy & Germany
The personalities of the leading politicians
PODCAST – LISTEN TO THIS OVER AND OVER AGAIN!
http://media.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php/britain-and-the-challenge-of-fascism-saving-europe-at-a-cost-part-2/
PODCAST – ALSO USEFUL – BY THE CHIEF EXAMINER!
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/podcasts/education-britainandfascism2.htm
Events 1925-37.
Events
1924 October – Baldwin becomes PM
1925 – Locarno Conference
1926 – Germany joined League of Nations
1928 – Kellogg-Briand Pact
1929 – MacDonald become PM
Information
Conservative Government
1931 August – National Government formed with MacDonald as PM
National Government formed to deal with economic crisis. Split Labour Party and the
Government, though a coalition, was effectively a Conservative gov. under Baldwin
1931 September – Japanese troops began military operations in Manchuria
1932 February – Import Duties Act
1932 October – Lord Lytton’s commission reported on Manchuria
1933 January – Hitler became German Chancellor
1933 February – Oxford University Union debate
1933 October – East Fulham by-election
1933 October – Germany left Disarmament Conference
1935 March – Hitler announced German re-armament
1935 June – Baldwin replaced MacDonald as PM
Labour Government
10% tax on most imported goods, except from GB Empire.
Students declared ‘this House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country’
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1935 June – Anglo-German Naval Agreement
1935 June – League of Nations Union Peace Ballot
95% (11 million) voted GB should stay in L of N and most supported economic and
military sanctions
1935 October – Italy invaded Abyssinia
1935 November – Baldwin’s National Government won General Election
1936 March – Re-militarisation of Rhineland
1936 July – Start of Spanish Civil War
1936 November – Anti-Comintern Pact signed by Germany and Japan
1937 May – Chamberlain became PM
British Foreign Policy Explained.
 1920s weakness – GB was devastated by experience of First World War. Deaths of 750,000 young men had traumatic effect. Widespread feeling GB should never again send army to
continent – ‘the war to end all wars’. Also GB had been devastated economically: debts = £7 billion, export markets lost, trad. Industries (shipbuilding and textiles) in decline – GB could
not afford another war.
 1920s prestige – GB’s prestige remained high – had gained Germany’s African colonies and some of Turkey’s middle eastern provinces as mandates – GB Empire at its greatest. But this
masks reality – GB’s global responsibilities were logistical nightmare e.g. Palestine alone tied down 20,000 GB troops during a rebellion in 1938 and many GB forces had to be stationed
in India at time of rising Indian nationalism. GB could not defend such a disparate empire.
 1920s The Ten Year Rule – Aug. 1919 cabinet agreed ‘GB Empire will not be engaged in any great war during next 10 years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this
purpose.’ Dramatic cuts were made in armed forces expenditure. This was extended in 1929 and rearmament only restarted in 1934.
 1920s Revisionism – From moment Paris Peace Treaties were signed GB gov. was revisionist i.e. viewed T of V as too harsh and economists saw that GB economic prosperity also
depended on German economic recovery. GB approach differed from France – based on economic self-interest rather than defence. Not surprising that GB clashed with France over
Ruhr Invasion 1923. GB saw itself as neutral between Fr. And Ger. Rather than allied to former against latter. After Locarno it was hoped Europe could be left to solve own prob.s but by
1930s was clear detachment might not keep peace. As world situation deteriorated after Wall Street Crash, GB could not stand idly by. The GB gov. still believed it had a special moral
role as leader in world affairs.
 1930s Japan – Agreed to extend Ten Year Rule in 1929 + Depression made rearmament financial impossibility. Crucial event that changed GB’s policy was Japan’s invasion of Manchuria
in 1931. Cabinet reluctantly concluded Ten-Year Rule should be cancelled on 23 March 1932 and in 1933 Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) was est. to advise on strategy and
rearmament. Manchuria was defeat for L of N and privately politicians were aware of its ineffectuality but League was very popular with GB public and in new era of full democracy (all
men and women over 21 had vote from 1928) gov. had to take notice of public opinion.
 1930s rearmament – Rearmament was not popular. East Fulham by-election 1933 saw Conservative candidate who advocated rearmament turn majority of 14,000 into defeat by 5,000
at hands of Labour candidate advocating disarmament. 1935 – L of N’s ‘Peace Ballot’ that advocated international disarmament was endorsed by 11 million people. Stanley Baldwin,
Conservative leader became convinced rapid rearmament would mean defeat in next general election (1935) ‘I give you my word there will be no great armaments’ (though he did plan
some rearmament).
 1930s Germany and the RAF – DRC produced first report in Feb. 1934 and identified Germany as ‘the ultimate potential enemy’, pushing Japan and naval considerations into second
place. DRC recommended est. of Expeditionary Force, but cabinet felt public opinion would be hostile and gave priority to building up RAF (Chancellor N.Chamberlain saw this as best
deterrent against Germany). DRC reported again in Nov. 1935, by which time Hitler’s rearmament prog. Was public knowledge and Abyssinian crisis was turning Mussolini, a potential
ally, into a potential enemy and stated GB f.p. should ‘avoid possible development of a situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with the hostility of Japan in the Far
East, Germany in the West…’ In March 1936 DRC’s conclusions formed basis of a 4-Year Plan for rearmament that Chamberlain accelerated when he came into office.
 Stanley Baldwin, PM 1935-37 – Aware of GB weakness and acting on advice of DRC and defence chiefs, Stanley Baldwin, PM from June 1935, did his best to avoid crisis. He and his
predecessor Ramsay MacDonald acquieseced in Hitler’s reintroduction of conscription and remilitarisation of Rhineland, attached little importance to Stresa declaration, signed naval
agreement with Germany, which upset French, did little to prevent Mussolini taking Abyssinia and stayed out of Spanish Civil War – giving dictators a free hand. With hindsight, these
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policy decisions look like failures but have to be seen in context of GB’s military weakness and global concerns. Baldwin was too ready to accommodate public opinion – following it
rather than moulding it. His gov. seemed to be caught off guard by each successive crisis and constantly reacting rather than having any influence over how they might develop. When
Chamberlain became PM in May 1937 he was determined to inject more vigour and purpose into f.p. and take the initiative – from passive to active appeasement.
The role of public opinion in influencing policy –
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The Franchise Act of 1918 increased the electorate from under 8 million to over 21 million, and gave women the vote for the first time. Because of this politicians were much more
conscious of public opinion in shaping their policies.
Finding out what the public felt about foreign policy issues was difficult because the first opinion polls in Britain were not established until 1937. However there were widespread
assumptions that politicians were reluctant to challenge: i) that by cutting down on armaments another world war could be avoided and ii) faith that the League of Nations could
settle international disputes without recourse to war.
Spectacular evidence of the popular belief in the need to cut down on armaments was shown in the East Fulham by-election of October 1933 in which the Conservative candidate,
defending a majority of 14,000, advocated rearmament and was defeated by nearly 5,000 votes by his Labour opponent, who supported disarmament. This result had a considerable
influence on the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, who became convinced that rapid rearmament would mean defeat in the next general election.
Faith in the League settling disputes without recourse to war was at its peak in 1931 with the British League of Nations Union (the League’s supporters’ club) boasting more than
400,000 members. In 1935 the Union published the result of its ‘Peace Ballot’ of more than 11 million people, which appeared to give a ringing endorsement of the League and its
principles, including international disarmament.
The rapturous reception given to Chamberlain when he returned from Munich suggests that, even as late as September 1938, many people in Britain were anxious to avoid war and
actively support the policy of appeasement.
The political landscape in Britain had been altered by WWI. By 1922 the Labour Party had emerged to challenge the Liberals as the principal opposition to the Conservatives. The rise of
the Labour Party – with its socialist constitution – worried the Conservatives. Tory leaders believed that only moderate, unadventurous policies would be sufficient to win over former
Liberal voters and keep themselves in power.
Similar calculations were being made by the Labour leaders, who were convinced that they could only achieve power and pick up a share of former Liberal votes if their party adopted
responsible and cautious policies.
The result was a political consensus in which both main parties aimed to control the middle ground of British politics and avoid policies, particularly concerning foreign and defence
issues, that courted electoral unpopularity.
Winston Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s, summed up this thinking when he opposed more money for the Navy because he could not ‘conceive of any course
more certain to result in a Socialist victory.’
In October 1935 Stanley Baldwin (who had taken over as PM of the National Government in June 1935) won the General Election based on a sanctions policy which avoided war and
was popular and neatly tailored to the requirements of the election campaign.
In the election campaign, Baldwin refused to emphasise new rearmament for fear of losing support.
Labour actually argued the same constraint but, with the economy improving and Baldwin inspiring calm, the National Government won the election.
The First World War and the advent of democracy altered government spending priorities. Welfare took a much higher proportion of the government’s budget than before the War.
After the War, public demands for the extension of the welfare responsibilities of government were irresistable.
War pensions, more generous dole payments and extensions of the scope of National Insurance all added to the demands on the Exchequer in the post-war years, and no government,
much less one striving to hold the middle ground, could contemplate irreversible cuts in these benefits to finance rearmament.
The role of economic problems in influencing policy –
 The First World War did immense damage to Britain’s economy and accelerated the decline that had begun in the late 19th century. Key industries such as cotton, coal and ship building
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declined in the face of foreign competition. The number of unemployed in Britain never fell below a million. The First World War saddled Britain with huge international debts. A large
slice of government revenue in the post-war years was devoted to paying off Britain’s war debt to the US.
The Wall Street Crash in the US in 1929 caused serious economic problems in Britain. Exports fell, unemployment rose to 3 million and, in 1931, GB was forced to abandon the Gold
Standard. The politicians who dominated the National Government, which had been formed in 1931 to deal with the crisis at its worst, were haunted by the fear that rash economic
policies would cause the problems to recur. During the 1930s the Treasury maintained that Britain’s economy was ‘the fourth arm of the defence’. They argued that GB needed to
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maintain a healthy balance of payments. They argued that a rapid rearmament would cause a balance of payments deficit. If factories switched to war production they would not be
producing export goods but would still consume imported raw materials. The Treasury nightmare was that Britain would enter a war with a weak pound and few reserves, and so would
be unable to survive a major war without becoming bankrupt after a few months. Slow disarmament, based only on what the nation could afford, might mean that the country’s armed
forces were not strong enough to cope with an enemy attack.
 The Ten Year Rule left an unfortunate legacy. When the gov. did decide to rearm, it found that the munitions industry, starved of orders since 1918, had shrunk in size and capacity.
Biggest problem was lack of skilled labour. Although there was a vast pool of unemployed workers, few of them had the skills to operate machine tools or train others in their use. The
government also ruled out compelling skilled workers to transfer from consumer industries to armaments factories.
 Treasury officials were keen on appeasement and believed that the gov. should do everything in its power to reduce the number of Britain’s potential enemies. Some officials argued
that economic difficulties in Germany explained why the Nazis were so aggressive. Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer believed economic policy was vitally important
to the solution of Europe’s diplomatic problems – he also believed German aggression stemmed from economic difficulties. Chamberlain believed if British diplomacy could secure
return of territories lost at Versailles then Germans would have no need to go to war, or even build up armaments in preparation for war.
 Chamberlain and the Treasury shared mistaken, but understandable, interpretation of German internal politics. They believed that Hitler was advised by ‘moderates’ (who shared the
British view of solving Germany’s problems) and ‘extremists’ (who wanted conquest and war). Chamberlain hoped concessions would increase power and influence of moderates.
Unfortunately for Chamberlain, influence of ‘moderates’ were negligible after 1936. Chamberlain’s mistake was to believe Hitler was a rational leader.
The personalities of leading politicians.
 The period 1925 to 1937 saw only two PMs: Stanley Baldwin (1924-29, 1935-37) and Ramsay MacDonald (1929-31 and 1931-35). Both have been portrayed as ‘Guilty Men’ (along
with Chamberlain).
 ‘Guilty Men’ (1940) by ‘Cato’ (Michael Foot, Peter Howard, Frank Owen) asserted that MacDonald and, especially, Baldwin deceived and betrayed the nation because of their
priorities for electoral success and power. Much of the criticism came from the political Left, yet Labour and the Liberal Party argued against Government rearmament in the mid
1930s!
 Criticisms of the leading personalities comes with the benefit of hindsight, yet their decisions need to be understood in the complex domestic and international situations of the
period. Certainly, ‘personalities of the leading politicians’ cannot be seen as factor in the failure of GB foreign policy to avoid war without an understanding of the myriad
constraints on political decision making, particularly budgetary constraints, public opinion and the demands of an extensive empire.
 Certainly, the priority for the leading politicians in the period 1925-37 was to maintain peace in Europe. This was a priority for both MacDonald and Baldwin with memories of the
Great war and the fear that another European war would be ‘cataclysmic’ (Baldwin). MacDonald supported disarmament and tried to develop collective security through the
League of Nations, and, like many others, did not see Nazi Germany as a particular threat to Britain. Baldwin too, largely supported disarmament though with a more suspicious
view of the League of Nations and being behind the abandonment of the extended ‘Ten Year Rule’ in 1935 and the start of limited rearmament. Baldwin made the warning that
‘the bomber will always get through’ and from 1936 directed the building up of the RAF (particularly bombers) as a deterrent to any attack on Britain.
 MacDonald has been attacked for failing to see the threat from Nazi Germany and putting too much faith in the L of N and Baldwin of not directly making foreign policy decisions
(instead leaving these to his Foreign Secretaries Austen Chamberlain, Hoare and Eden), of undermining the League, not taking the threat from Germany seriously (he saw the USSR
as a greater threat), of delaying rearmament and of being more concerned about political popularity than international peace. These are difficult accusations to maintain when the
period is studied in context, and while not excusing some of the actions of Britain’s leading politicians, their policies are understandable.
 Disarmament and compromise with Germany (and to some extent, Italy) has been the main drive of the period that has been linked with the leading politicians – yet, can these
policies necessarily be seen as flawed or entirely down to the ‘personalities of leading politicians’?
 The period 1925-31 was dominated by Locarno (1925), uneasy relations with the Soviet Union, the League of Nations, Disarmament, improving relations with Germany and the
onset of the Depression. Baldwin’s suspicion of the USSR can be traced to the General Strike of 1926 when the USSR gave a donation to the Miners’ Federation and Baldwin
accused Arcos – the All Russian Co-operative Society – as ‘directing military espionage and subversive activities’. MacDonald did steady relations with the USSR but Baldwin’s
suspicion of the USSR can be seen as a failing into the 1930s when fears of the USSR overshadowed those of Nazi German in the Conservative leader’s mind. Yet, Baldwin was not
alone in this belief nor does this accusation support the accusation of the failure to rearm. Baldwin’s Government has been criticized for Locarno strengthening Germany and
leaving her eastern borders an open issue, while undermining the freedom of France to act against future German aggression. Yet, Locarno, Kellogg-Briand (1928) and the Young
Plan (1929) seemed to have ushered in a new period of peaceful relations. No-one foresaw the impact of economic depression in disintegrating political stability in the 1930s. The
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actions of Britain’s leading politicians in the 1920s can only partly be understood by their ‘personalities’ but rather the absence of the USA from international affairs and a desire to
address issues like harsh reparations on Germany to foster a new peace in Europe.
It is in the period 1931-37 that the MacDonald and Baldwin governments have received most criticism.
The leading politicians and Japan: Can Britain’s leading politicians be criticized for failing to stop Japanese aggression? As chairman of the Cabinet Far Eastern committee during the
Japanese attack on Shanghai in early 1932, Baldwin became convinced that with the USA and USSR outside the League and so under no obligation to assist collective security,
‘sanctions are a mistake’ and could not be enforced against a first class power. This would risk escalation into war and the risk would fall largely upon GB as the greatest naval
power, yet it lacked the resources to act as the League’s chief armed agent. While Britain’s politicians were critical of Japan’s action, a war could not be risked when: Britain had
serious economic problems in 1931-2; GB forces in Far East were small; there was some sympathy for Japan – Japan had faced provocation from Chinese Nationalists in 1920s and
Japan had brought order to Manchuria + Japan could provide a bulwark against Soviet aggression. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was keen to restore friendly
relations with Japan as a way to protect GB possessions and investments in the Far East and reducing money GB would have to spend on improving defenses to combat Japan. The
Lytton Commission was not followed up with sanctions (for reasons mentioned) but some limited precautions were taken: work was resumed on Singapore naval base; Ten Year
Rule was abandoned but GB did not yet embark on serious rearmament programme. In 1936, Japan and Nazi Germany signed the anti-comintern pact, and though directed against
the USSR, it was also seen as a dangerous move by GB’s leading politicians.
The leading politicians and Italy: Undoubtedly the Japanese and German departure from the League of Nations in 1933 damaged already faltering faith amongst Britain’s leading
politicians in the League of Nations. In 1934 Baldwin took it as ‘generally accepted that sanctions meant war, and insisted that they could not be contemplated without American
participation. Italian aggression in Abyssinia followed the huge majority vote from the Peace Ballot that supported the League but also the use of economic and military sanctions.
Baldwin was not convinced by the League’s actions over the Abyssinian crisis and urged Hoare and Eden to also pursue an Anglo-French effort for an ‘honorable’ cessation of the
Abyssinian War. This, of course, resulted in the Hoare-Laval crisis of December 1925. Britain voted for oil sanctions in March 1936 but refused to impose a full-scale naval blockade,
and oil continued to flow from the USA into Italy. Baldwin’s actions have been seen as causing the demise of the League, of failing to halt Fascist Italy when it was militarily possible
and had public support for sanctions and of alienating Italy from the allied cause. Yet, once again, context needs understanding: The USA would not support collective security;
economic weakness meant that jeopardizing GB trade through the Suez control was to be avoided; GB and France feared pushing Italy towards Nazi Germany; GB was not militarily
ready to support any League sanctions; Baldwin had won the October 1935 election promising the principle of collective security and disarmament (yet collective security would
rely on military preparedness of member nations!) and he refused rearmament plans for fear of losing support. Certainly, British policy 1935-6 was weak and inept and fell between
two stools: the search for a compromise with Italy and the need to withstand Italian aggression. Neither was achieved.
The leading politicians and Germany:
ESSAY QUESTIONS ‘Weak and ineffective.’ How far do you agree with this opinion of the conduct of British foreign policy 1933-7?
‘There was limited opposition to the British policy of appeasing Germany, 1933-7, because no realistic policy alternative existed’. How far do you agree?
‘Complacent and ultimately harmful to British interests.’ How far do you agree with this opinion of British foreign policy in the years 1925-9?
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2. Defeat and survival, 1939-41: military setbacks - reasons for military setbacks in Norway, France, Greece and North Africa
Timeline:
September 1939:
GB declares war upon Germany; the Phoney War begins
April 1940:
Germany invades Norway
May 1940:
Churchill becomes PM; Germany invades France
May 1940:
Dunkirk Evacuation
July – Sept 1940: Battle of Britain
Reasons for Military setbacks – Norway April 1940-June 1940
BACKGROUND.
 The Allied (British and French) operations in central (Andalsnes and Namsos) and northern (Narvik) Norway.
 The Allied operation was rushed and preparations and supply poor. The British had no skis and the French had no straps for their skis.
 The central landings at Andalsnes and Namsos failed in the face of German air superiority and the Allied forces were evacuated by sea.
 There was greater success in the north at Narvik where the British navy inflicted heavy losses on German shipping and a reasonable level of land-based airpower was
established by the Allies, preventing German air supremacy.
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 However, the German invasion of the Low countries and France from May 10 meant that the Allies had different priorities and Allied troops were evacuated on June 8 1940.
ASSESSMENT.
 Norway was a major strategic failure for the British.
 This was a campaign that should have played to British strengths. Instead it brought out one of the major weaknesses of the contemporary Royal Navy - its incapacity to contest
command of the air off a distant shore, due to its lack of radar control and high performance fighters.
 In addition to the other losses, the cruiser Effingham was wrecked and the anti-aircraft cruiser Curlew bombed and sunk near Narvik, while a French cruiser was seriously
damaged. A total of seven British destroyers were lost, plus one French and one Polish. Given Allied superiority in numbers these losses were not too serious, but the sense of
failure was real.
 The Norwegian campaign was the first occasion that the Allies fought a combined operation of land, sea and air forces with total chaos resulting from each service issuing its
own, often contradictory, orders.
 Germans gained naval and air bases from which they could attack the Russian convoys.
 BUT in the long-term the German occupation of Norway tied down some 300,000 German troops for the rest of the war when they could have been used more effectively on
fighting fronts.
 Perhaps most importantly, it led to the evacuation of Chamberlain and the emergence of Churchill as British PM.
 Furthermore, the invasion of Norway was another influence on the minds of neutral US politicians and public.
Reasons for Military setbacks – France May 1940-June 1940
BACKGROUND.
 The German invasion of France and the Low countries started on 10 May 1940 and ended the ‘Phoney War’.
 Blitzkrieg tactics were used. German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes to cut off and surround the British and French forces that had advanced into Belgium.
 BEF and French forces were evacuated from Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo).
ASSESSMENT.
 Several factors combined to enable the Germans to win quickly and relatively easily.
 Shrewd and daring handling of concentrated German armoured divisions, effectively supported at critical moments by the tactical employment of the Luftwaffe, gave the major
impetus to this victory.
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But two critical errors of the French command contributed immensely to the inability of the Allies to cope with the breakthrough one they discovered what was really
happening.
French Command Errors
 French Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin, had left most of his forces in and behind the Maginot Line and deployed such substantial elements for a useless dash into
Holland that there was no substantial reserve force available to push either into the gap or against the flanks of the German spearhead.
 No effective Allied command structure existed 1939-40. The French had failed to organise their command structure to operate with any efficiency.
 Rivalries and confusion reigned between Gamelin and the key field commander General Georges, and there were equally confused command relations below Georges.
 With the speed of the German invasion there was no time to sort out incompetents or to put forward new clear ideas of command nor to impose order on the chaos of
demoralised headquarters.
 French units broke in battle largely due to the chaos and confusion of command.
 The French and British failure to cut off the German spearhead by attacking from the flanks (north and south) was largely due to poor co-ordination.
 This was largely due to an incoherent command structure in the north between French and British command. Also due to the removal of General Gamelin with General
Weygand by PM Reynaud.
 This change wasted 3 days before Weygand ordered the same plan of counter-attack that Gamelin had been planning (attack from north and south). It came too late.
 Weygand could neither co-ordinate the needed counter-attack quickly enough nor reinvigorate the reeling French forces.
British Leadership Failure
 Commander of the BEF Lord Gort proved inflexible on the first signs of Allied defeat and failed to act with the necessary speed or decisiveness.
French and British air forces
 French and British air forces were unable to destroy the bridges critical to the German advance. This reflected a lack of interest and real training for ground support operations amongst
the Allied air forces.
 The two Allied air forces fought well but with diminished strength and inadequate or distant air bases as the battle raged.
 The British held back RAF fighter reserves, but this would have been unlikely to turn the battle and were able instead to be used to cover the Dunkirk evacuation and defend Britain
from home bases.
 In the air the Allies were inferior: 1,046 French aircraft, 416 British, 300 Belgian and Dutch. Germans had more than 3,000 aircraft.
 Disparity made worse by comparative quality of machines. Most of French and British aircraft were obsolete partly due to British insistence on reserving main bomber force for
bombing the Ruhr and best fighter squadrons for home defence.
Tanks
 Allied tanks, especially the British heavily armoured ‘Mathilda’ could and did inflict heavy losses on the German forces, but they were used too sparingly. Furthermore, many of the
Allied tanks were used in small numbers to support infantry divisions rather than in the form of squadrons of German panzers (tanks).
Weakness of French democracy
 Many writers have suggested that the workings of French democracy had introduced so great a degree of dissension as to make it difficult for French citizens to work together to defend
their country.
 Some of the political right were even ready to welcome military defeat in order to end dangers of left-wing dominance. With defeat, the Vichy regime exploited this opportunity to
destroy the left.
 BUT only a tiny minority of the right wanted France to be conquered. The left instead were blamed after defeat.
 Nor can left-wing pacificism be blamed as in facing Nazi conduct, it was rare after March 1939.
 Another interpretation has blamed the low birth rate, the manpower losses in the previous war and a slow industrial innovation cycle in France as the main factors.
German superiority
 In purely military terms, the Germans were a vastly superior force (although not in numbers). They used their mechanisation and manoeuvre more effectively, and benefited from
domination in the air. German military doctrine was more advanced, and generally their commanders coped much better with high-tempo operations than did their Allied counterparts.
 Allied command and control was cumbersome, and the Anglo-French operational plan was deeply flawed. However, the very success of the risky blitzkrieg approach led the Germans to
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gamble even more heavily on their next major operation - the invasion of Russia. But this time the strategy failed, with consequences for the Nazi regime that were ultimately fatal.
Dunkirk: A British Victory
Britain had not suffered a complete defeat. Churchill had predicted that 30,000 men could be lifted off, whilst Admiral Ramsay had
hoped for 45,000. To everyone’s astonishment the vast bulk of the army (around 330,000 men) had been rescued, and while Britain
still had an army there was hope.
If the evacuation attempt had failed and Hitler’s lenient peace treaty had been accepted, the outcome of the war would of course
have been vastly different. Germany would have had extra resources – including the 40 divisions which Britain’s continued hostility
required in Africa and on the Atlantic Wall, as well as the 1,882 aircraft, and their experienced pilots and bomber crews, which were
lost over Britain in the coming months. Faced by a Germany buoyed with these additional forces, Russia almost certainly would have
fallen.
Dunkirk aroused American sentiment. Epic accounts of the evacuation captured the public imagination and generated the first overt
signs of popular and governmental support for Britain. The effects of Dunkirk were instantaneous, and by mid-June some half a
million rifles were on their way across the Atlantic. The whole episode, and Britain’s reaction following it, had proved the resolve of
the nation, which Churchill’s speech further highlighted when he promised that Britain would preserve ‘the whole world, including
the United States’ from sinking ‘into the abyss of a new Dark Age’.
Dunkirk: A British Defeat
Dishevelled, weary and weaponless, the men of the BEF
arrived back in England.
Britain’s material losses during the campaign had been
astounding, with its army’s stores and equipment
strewn around Northern France.
The Navy too had paid a heavy price for its heroics. Six
destroyers, five minesweepers, eight transport ships and
a further 200 vessels had been sunk, with an equal
number badly damaged.
British casualties amounted to 68,000, while French
losses totalled around 290,000 with many more than
that either missing or taken prisoner.
Over 102,000 of the 123,000 French troops rescued
Churchill’s rallying cries made an instant impression. Dunkirk had proved, with its much publicised civilian participation, that the war
was more than a conflict between armies on the continent, the outcome of which the public were powerless to determine. The
threat of invasion, along with the necessary myth of an army saved by the ‘little boats’, brought a nation together. A sense of
involvement that had been lacking since the declaration of war now burst forth. Britain had sleep-walked into the war and it took the
reverses in France and the evacuation to wake her from the complacency and over-confidence that existed prior to those events.
Essentially, Dunkirk provided Britain with a second chance that had to be seized.
After Dunkirk Churchill’s leadership was never questioned. The eloquence of his patriotic and determined rhetoric captured the
mood of the nation and inspired the citizens of Britain to unwavering defiance of the Nazi peril.
An often-neglected consequence of the fighting leading up to Dunkirk was the effect it had on Hitler himself. His undeniably
successful tactic of attacking through the Ardennes and his firm support of blitzkrieg tactics instilled a belief in him that as a military
commander he was infallible. Hitler, the First World War Corporal, had proved that the caution of his Wehrmacht Generals was
unfounded. Increasingly after Dunkirk, he made decisions that would have been best left to his commanders, and this was to have
catastrophic effects during the Russian campaign.
Reasons for Military setbacks – Greece and Crete March 1941-April 1941
BACKGROUND.
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ASSESSMENT.
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Italian troops invaded Greece on 28 October 1940 but were driven out by Greek forces within weeks and forced into southern Albania.
In March 1941, a major Italian counterattack failed, and Germany was forced to come to the aid of its ally.
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On April 6 1941 German troops invaded Greece through Bulgaria.
Churchill argued of the vital need to support Greece and 62,000 British and Commonwealth troops were sent.
British Commonwealth and Greek fought back but were vastly outnumbered and outgunned.
Athens fell on 27 April 1941 and 50,000 British troops were successfully evacuated to Crete and Egypt.
German forces attacked the British held Greek island Crete on 20 May 1941 in a massive airborne invasion.
After seven days of fighting on Crete, Allied commanders decided the cause was hopeless, and ordered evacuation. By 1 April 1941 the Allied evacuation was completed –
16,000 were evacuated.
German and Allied losses were heavy. Crete was ‘the graveyard of the German paratroopers’.
The Greek campaign ended in complete German victory.
The British did not have necessary military resources in the Middle East to permit them to carry out simultaneous large scale operations in North Africa and the Balkans.
Germans had superiority in ground forces and equipment.
German supremacy in the air combined with Greek inability to provide the RAF with more airforces.
British and Commonwealth forces committed were too small in numbers.
Absence of a unified command and lack of co-operation between the British, Greek and Yugoslav forces.
Turkey’s strict neutrality and early collapse of Yugoslav resistance also hindered British Commonwealth forces.
Furthermore, Churchill’s strategy to send British Commonwealth forces to Greece was criticised by Field Marshall Alan Brooke as a ‘strategic blunder’ as it denied General
Wavell the necessary reserves to complete the conquest of Italian held Libya or to successfully withstand Rommel’s Africa Korps in March 1941. It therefore can be seen as
having prolonged the North African campaign.
Battle of Crete though was nearly a British Commonwealth victory. German paratroopers suffered terrible losses. It was first time Allies made significant use of deciphered
German Enigma codes (Ultra intercepts). But British defences were hampered by lack of modern equipment (for example the British Mathilda tanks were equipped with
armour piercing rounds that were useless against infantry) and intelligence made the British Commonwealth deploy troops to fight off amphibious landings that never came,
therefore leaving the airfield defences weakened.
Reasons for Military setbacks – North Africa February 1941-November 1941
BACKGROUND.
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To bolster the faltering Italians, Hitler sent General Erwin Rommel (The Desert Fox) with the Afrika Korps, consisting of two armored divisions. On 14 February 1941, Rommel and
the 5th Leichte (Panzer) Division arrived in Tripoli and were joined in early May by the 15th Panzer Division. Although originally intended to be only a small blocking force, by 15
April Rommel and his German-Italian army had pushed the British eastward back to the Egyptian border. He simultaneously assaulted Tobruk, still held by the British, but Tobruk
did not fall.
The failure to capture Tobruk was followed by a series of sharp battles (Operation Crusader) in November 1941 that resulted in the Afrika Korps being forced back to its starting point
at El Agheila. Rommel's difficulties in the desert had more to do with the ability of the Allies to disrupt his supplies than any failure of Rommel as a commander. Eventually the Afrika
Korps returned to the offensive, driving the British back to the Gazala line, just in front of Tobruk, 26-27 May 1942. Rommel then returned to Tobruk and took the port on 21 June
1942, capturing 35,000 British troops.
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ASSESSMENT.
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The early part of the North African Campaign was plagued by a lack of supplies on both sides. Sweeping battles took place that culminated with one side or the other's supply
lines growing too long while the other's grew shorter. Major engagements of the campaign include the Battle of Gazala, First Battle of El Alamein, and the Second Battle of El
Alamein.
2. Defeat and survival, 1939-41: Victories - The Battle of Britain, 1940 and against Italy in North Africa in 1940; The vital role of the Atlantic link to Canada and the USA
and the onset of Lend-Lease.
Reason for victory – The Battle of Britain, 1940.
BACKGROUND.
 Hitler wanted to invade Britain to ensure victory in WWII – ‘Operation Sealion’. But the German Navy was not as strong as the British Navy
 Hitler planned to use the German Airforce, the Luftwaffe, to defend his invasion force. But the Luftwaffe had to defeat the RAF first.
 In August 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked British radar stations and airfields. The Luftwaffe lost more planes than the RAF… But the RAF had also lost many planes. The pilots were
exhausted and were dying faster than they were being trained.
 The Luftwaffe continued coming and the RAF were on the brink of defeat…But the Luftwaffe accidentally bombed London and the RAF replied by bombing Berlin.
 Hitler was so angry he ordered the Luftwaffe to disengage the RAF and bomb London. This gave the RAF time to recover…But the Luftwaffe returned in numbers on Sept 15th.
 At one point every British plane was in the sky – soon, some would have to come in to refuel and there were no reserves to protect them…But the Luftwaffe too, was at the
limit and – just in time – it turned back.
 Hitler postponed Operation Sealion. and concentrated on night-bombing London. This became known as the Blitz.
ASSESSMENT.
 TECHNOLOGY: British radar was superior. It could tell where the enemy planes were coming from and tell the RAF where to go to attack them. The British developed 2 brilliant
planes: The Hurricane was reliable and could be used to shoot down German Bombers and the Spitfire (the fastest plane in the world) was used to destroy the fighters
protecting the bombers.
 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATION AND TACTICS: Air Chief Marshall Dowding was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command. He was a brilliant commander who – on a
small budget – was able to reorganise the RAF into four Groups, each divided into a number of sectors (each with a main sector airfield with a number of supporting airfields).
Much has been written about the different tactics employed by Nos 11 and 12 Groups and their commanders, and the supposed disagreements these differences caused.
Suffice to say that 11 Group's fast response tactics with whatever was available, meeting the enemy formations as far from their targets as possible, was best suited to their
geographical proximity to the German bases. 11 Group Squadrons simply did not have the time to assemble, they had to get airborne and climb to height as quickly as possible
or miss intercepting the raid altogether. 12 Group, being further north had somewhat more time for a large formation of fighters to assemble and climb to meet the oncoming
attacks, tactics that suited their circumstances. Dowding, as befits a true leader, allowed his Group commanders to run their organisations as they saw fit, the detail work being
done a Group level while he dealt with the overall picture. The life of an 11 Group pilot was made more difficult by these operating methods, but Park understood the true
situation of his command, and employed his Squadrons with brilliant effectiveness. In the light of the outcome of the Battle, and the fact that for many days he had the fate of
a nation resting on his shoulders alone, Park must be considered as the architect of the RAF's victory. The Luftwaffe’s change in tactics was crucial to victory. Knowing the
target to be London and the industrial centres, the British controllers now had time to assemble a large number of fighters to attack the German formations and break them up
before they could bomb. The appearance of large numbers of Hurricanes and Spitfires came as something as a shock to the Luftwaffe pilots, who had been told by their
intelligence officers that Fighter Command had practically been wiped out by the earlier raids against the airfields. By changing tactics and targets, the Germans had actually
helped Fighter Command to deal with raids.
 PRODUCTION: In May 1940, Churchill put Lord Beaverbrook (owner of the Daily Express) in charge of aircraft production. He ran one appeal for aluminium – ‘We will turn
your pots and pans into Spitfires and Hurricanes’ – and another scheme where towns, groups or individuals could ‘buy’ a Spitfire (for £5000) and send it off the fight the Nazis.
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He also set up a Civilian Repair Organisation, which made new planes from the left-over pieces of planes which had been shot down. Beaverbrook cut through government red
tape, and increased the production by 250%; in 1940, British factories produced 4,283 fighters, compared to Germany’s 3,000.
GERMAN/LUFTWAFFE MISTAKES: The crucial turning point for the RAF to gain air supremacy was the change of objective of the Luftwaffe away from the sector airfields. Had
the Germans driven the RAF further to the north, north of the Thames, then the relevant flight time in combat may have benefitted the attacker. Initially the Germans were
winning the fight, and despite the reputation of the Spitfire & Hurricane the Luftwaffe were knocking down more aircraft than the RAF could sustain. The invention &
improvement in the use of Radar was crucial. The change of plan to bombing cities was a mistake for a number of reasons. It gave 11 Group a chance to repair their airfields
and radar sites, so the defences became fully operational again. The German Me 109 fighter could only carry enough fuel for 20 minutes flight over Britain, so London was on
the edge of its limited range. The German raids now came within the range of 12 Group, and their large formation tactics known as "Big Wings". Goering’s orders to the
Luftwaffe fighters (mainly Mescherschmitt ME 109s) to fly with the bombers denied them any advantage of speed and altitude.
ROYAL NAVY: The Germans stayed away because while the Royal Navy existed they had not a hope in hell of capturing these islands. The Navy had ships in sufficient numbers
to have overwhelmed any invasion fleet - destroyers' speed alone would have swamped the barges by their wash. Even if the RAF had been defeated the fleet would still have
been able to defeat any invasion because fast ships at sea could easily manoeuvre and were pretty safe from air attack. As the German general Jodl put it, so long as the British
Navy existed, an invasion would be to send 'my troops into a mincing machine'. It also said that after the defeat in France in early 1940 it was vital for Britain to have a victory
to reassure the public it was winning the war and the RAF fighter pilots were an obvious choice. "In 1940, the total acceptance of the story's simple broad-brush strokes was
very necessary," ( Richard Overy). "The RAF's was a substitute victory - a substitute for the certain victory over Sealion, had the Germans been mad enough to attempt
invasion" (Dr. Gordon).
Reason for victory – North Africa April 1940-June 1940
BACKGROUND.
 The Northern African Campaign was strategically important for both the Allies and the Axis powers. The Allies used the campaign as a step towards a second front against the
Axis powers in "Fortress Europe", and it helped to ease Axis pressure on the Eastern Front. The Axis powers had planned to dominate the Mediterranean through control of
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and planned to follow a successful campaign in North Africa with a strike north to the rich oil fields of the Middle East. This would have cut off
nearby oil supplies to the Allies, and would have tremendously increased the oil supplies available for the Axis war machine.
 On 13 September 1940 Italy launched the Tenth Army stationed in Libya in a 200,000 troop invasion into the British protectorate of Egypt and set up defensive forts at Sidi
Barrani. But Italian Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, Governor-General of Libya, with little intelligence on the state of Allied forces there, chose not to continue further towards Cairo.
 The Allied forces were outnumbered, 36,000 men compared to a total of 200,000. Nevertheless at the end of 1940 they launched a counter-attack, Operation Compass. It was
more successful than expected and resulted in the destruction of most of the Italian Tenth Army, and the advance of the Allied forces to El Agheila. The stunning defeat did not
go unnoticed and fresh Italian troops under Uldo Capzoni together with German troops, the Deutsches Afrikakorps under Erwin Rommel were sent in to reinforce the Italian
forces in western Libya. At the same time the forces who had just routed the Italians were withdrawn from the Western Desert. An Australian infantry division was sent to
reinforce the Greek armies fighting the Axis invasion of Greece while the 7th Armoured Division was sent to the Nile Delta to refit. They were replaced by two inexperienced
and weakened divisions.
ASSESSMENT.
 Generals Wavell and O’Conner fully utilised the mechanised warfare punching their way through the Italian forces through the combined use of tanks, infantry and artillery.
 General Graziani was reluctant to carry out Mussolini’s orders in Egypt claiming his troops were ill equipped and badly trained.
 In five days the British and Commonwealth forces pushed the Italian forces back into Libya and had control of the important port Tobruk.
Reason for victory – The vital role of the Atlantic link to Canada and the USA and the onset of Lend-Lease.
BACKGROUND.
 In late 1939 Roosevelt had persuaded Congress to amend the Neutrality Act (originally passed in 1930s) to allow the Allies to purchase arms on a ‘cash and carry’ basis, i.e.
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ASSESSMENT.
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they were carried back to GB in British ships. Following the fall of France in May 1940 FDR gave GB 50 destroyers in return for building US bases in the West Indies, whilst at the
same time asking Congress for more money to build up US defences
FDR talked of the USA becoming the ‘arsenal of democracy’ and in March 1941 signed the Lend Lease Bill that made enormous quantities of US resources available to GB (who
was unlikely to be able to afford ‘cash and carry’ for much longer). By the end of the war Lend Lease had ensured that GB received $22 billion of US food, oil, arms, aircraft and
vehicles. Despite US opinion polls showing sympathy for GB, most Americans (93%) still had no wish to become involved in this war.
In August 1941 FDR and WC signed the Atlantic Charter, making it clear that the Allies were fighting for a wide range of freedoms, not for territorial goals. FDR was slowly
edging the USA nearer to war. In July 1941 US forces had occupied Iceland (replacing British forces there), and its navy was helping to protect convoys in the western Atlantic –
FDR authorised US ships to sink U-Boats. However it was the bombing of Pearl Harbour that swayed opinion fully behind the USA entering this war. WC said he ‘went to bed
and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful’. Four days after the Japanese bombing, both Germany and Italy declared war on the USA. Churchill rushed across the Atlantic to
meet FDR – they both agreed upon a ‘Europe First Strategy’. This meant that dealing with Hitler was given priority to dealing with Japan.
Canada also provided a Lend Lease deal and crucially provided warships to help protect convoys alongside the RN.
Between June 1940 and June 1941 (when Germany invaded the USSR ‘Operation Barbarossa’) Britain could stand alone only with American help. The determined nature of
British resistance and Churchill’s defiant rhetoric served to convince Roosevelt that it was worthwhile to back Britain rather than concentrating on building up US defences.
QUICK REVISION & SELF-TESTING - Defeat and survival, 1939-41
Describe the activities of the British Government
in the first four months of the war
Explain the early mistakes of the Allies during the
war (i)
Explain the early mistakes of the Allies during the
war (ii)
Describe an early success of the Allies in 1939
How did the British refer to the Phoney War
(September 1939 – April 1940)?
How effective was Chamberlain during the
Phoney War
Why did GB & France intervene in Norway? (i)
Why did GB & France intervene in Norway? (ii)
Coffins were being stockpiled, two million men called up (January 1940), barrage balloons erected, and an evacuation programme was put
into place (September 1939).
The French sat behind the Maginot Line, correctly assuming the Germans would eventually attack through the Low Countries, and
positioned the best French and British troops in this area. However the defences of the Maginot Line did not extend to this area
An opportunity to attack the western border of Germany was not taken, whilst the majority of the Wehrmacht was directed towards the
east invading Poland
The Graf Spee was cornered in the port of Montevideo, Uruguay, and chose to scuttle itself, December 1939
The Bore War – more people were dying from traffic accidents during the blackout than by enemy bombing
Why did Germany decide to intervene in
Norway? (i)
He refused to engage the Wehrmacht believing that an economic blockade would be more effective; 12m pamphlets were dropped onto
the German people; yet Churchill was recalled to the Cabinet
The French were worried that their blockade strategy was not working; the Soviet Union was providing the Germans with RMs such as oil
The French thus considered helping the Finns against the Russians; when the Finns were defeated however the plan changed to mining
Norwegian waters
Hitler was receiving exports of iron ore from Sweden which were shipped via the Norwegian port of Narwik; Norway provided good bases for
the German navy from where they could attack Allied shipping
Why did Germany decide to intervene in
Norway? (ii)
Hitler was irritated by the re-capture of British prisoners from the German ship, Altmark, in Norwegian waters; this showed Hitler that the
British were unlikely to respect Norwegian neutrality in this conflict
Why did the Allies fail in Norway? (i)
The operation was seriously mismanaged – the Allies landed in Norway without proper supplies such as skis; they lacked air superiority and
air cover for their landing forces and their ships; their naval radar was not good enough
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Why did the Allies fail in Norway? (ii)
Why did Hitler succeed in Norway? (i)
Why did Hitler succeed in Norway? (ii)
Were there any Allied successes during this
campaign?
What were the political consequences of failure?
What brought the Phoney War to an end?
Why did Hitler succeed in France? (i)
How effectively did the Allies respond to the
German advance? (i)
How effectively did the Allies respond to the
German advance? (ii)
How effectively did the Allies respond to the
German advance? (iii)
The Royal Navy lost seven naval destroyers during the Norwegian campaign; by the time British and French units had arrived to aid the
Norwegians, the Germans had established a foothold
Hitler had anticipated Allied intervention in Norway and pre-empted it with a full scale invasion;
they used surprise – some soldiers were landed having been hidden in the holds of merchant ships
German air crews had been specially trained in maritime operations and could make up for Germany’s naval deficiencies; the Norwegian
army was paralysed by the speed of the conquest and offered little resistance
The only Allied success was in the far north at Narvik in May 1940, but this port had to be abandoned once the Germans invaded France; the
Norwegians and the Royal Navy put up stiff resistance against the Germans, sinking many vessels, e.g. the heavy cruiser, Blucher. Hitler then
had to keep 300,000 German troops in Norway for the rest of the war who might have been more effective elsewhere!
Chamberlain was replaced by Churchill as Prime Minister!
The German invasion of France and the Low countries which began on 10 May 1940; a surprise attack through the Ardennes caught the Allies
off balance and led to the British deserting their only ally at Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo)
Blitzkrieg tactics were used. German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes to cut off and surround the British and French forces that
had advanced into Belgium. They were closely supported by the Luftwaffe
General Gamelin, had left most of his forces in and behind the Maginot Line; no effective Allied command structure existed 1939-40; there
was very poor communication , and many French infantry units performed poorly in battle.
French and British air forces were unable to destroy the bridges critical to the German advance. This reflected a lack of real training for
ground support operations. The two Allied air forces fought well but with diminished strength and inadequate or distant air bases as the
battle raged
Most of French and British aircraft were obsolete partly due to British insistence on reserving main bomber force for bombing the Ruhr and
best fighter squadrons for home defence. In the air the Allies were inferior: 1,046 French aircraft, 416 British, 300 Belgian and Dutch.
Germans had more than 3,000 aircraft.
The Dunkirk Evacuation: Success or Failure
The Navy too had paid a heavy price for its heroics. Six destroyers, five minesweepers, eight
transport ships and a further 200 vessels had been sunk, with an equal number badly
damaged.
Dishevelled, weary and weaponless, the men of the BEF arrived back in England.
After Dunkirk Churchill’s leadership was never questioned. The eloquence of his patriotic
and determined rhetoric captured the mood of the nation and inspired the citizens of
Britain to unwavering defiance of the Nazi peril.
Dunkirk aroused American sentiment. Epic accounts of the evacuation captured the public
imagination and generated the first overt signs of popular and governmental support for
Britain. The effects of Dunkirk were instantaneous, and by mid-June some half a million
rifles were on their way across the Atlantic. The whole episode, and Britain’s reaction
following it, had proved the resolve of the nation, which Churchill’s speech further
Britain had not suffered a complete defeat. Churchill had predicted that 30,000 men could be lifted
off, whilst Admiral Ramsay had hoped for 45,000. To everyone’s astonishment the vast bulk of the
army (around 330,000 men) had been rescued, and while Britain still had an army there was hope.
Over 102,000 of the 123,000 French troops rescued
Britain’s material losses during the campaign had been astounding, with its army’s stores and
equipment strewn around Northern France. British casualties amounted to 68,000, while French
losses totalled around 290,000 with many more than that either missing or taken prisoner.
If the evacuation attempt had failed and Hitler’s lenient peace treaty had been accepted, the
outcome of the war would of course have been vastly different. Germany would have had extra
resources – including the 40 divisions which Britain’s continued hostility required in Africa and on
the Atlantic Wall, as well as the 1,882 aircraft, and their experienced pilots and bomber crews,
which were lost over Britain in the coming months. Faced by a Germany buoyed with these
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highlighted when he promised that Britain would preserve ‘the whole world, including the
United States’ from sinking ‘into the abyss of a new Dark Age’.
Churchill’s rallying cries made an instant impression. Dunkirk had proved, with its much
publicised civilian participation, that the war was more than a conflict between armies on
the continent, the outcome of which the public were powerless to determine. The threat of
invasion, along with the necessary myth of an army saved by the ‘little boats’, brought a
nation together. A sense of involvement that had been lacking since the declaration of war
now burst forth. Britain had sleep-walked into the war and it took the reverses in France
and the evacuation to wake her from the complacency and over-confidence that existed
prior to those events. Essentially, Dunkirk provided Britain with a second chance that had
to be seized.
additional forces, Russia almost certainly would have fallen.
An often-neglected consequence of the fighting leading up to Dunkirk was the effect it had on
Hitler himself. His undeniably successful tactic of attacking through the Ardennes and his firm
support of blitzkrieg tactics instilled a belief in him that as a military commander he was infallible.
Hitler, the First World War Corporal, had proved that the caution of his Wehrmacht Generals was
unfounded. Increasingly after Dunkirk, he made decisions that would have been best left to his
commanders, and this was to have catastrophic effects during the Russian campaign.
ESSAY QUESTIONS June 2008: ‘The defeats suffered by the British army in the years 1940-1941 were the result of its being set impossible tasks by its political masters.’ How far do
you agree?
Jan 2008: How close to defeat did Britain come during the Battle of Britain in 1940?
June 2007: ‘Britain’s resistance to Germany on land, sea and in the air, 1939-1941, was marked by incompetence and lack of resources.’ HFDYA?
Jan 2010: ‘The RAF alone of the three armed services achieved success in 1939-1941.’ HFDYA?
3. Victory and the Grand Alliance 1942-45: the Mediterranean, 1942-44 - the role and impact of the war in the Mediterranean theatre; the Battle of the Atlantic - the
victory over the U-boats in 1943; the bomber offensive; D–Day and the liberation of Europe.
Victory and the Grand Alliance – North Africa 1942-43
BACKGROUND
 Tobruk fell to the Germans in June 1942, the British forces had been pushed back to Egypt and the Afrika Korps seemed to be threatening Alexandria and the Suez Canal. The collapse of
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the British position in North Africa negated any possibility of the Western Allies opening up a second front in 1942. The Us decided to rush 300 Sherman tanks to the 8 Army and land
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their own 1 Army in French North Africa (Operation Torch) to threaten Rommel’s rear.
 In July 1942, in the first Battle of El Alemain, Auchinleck fought Rommel to a standstill. Churchill did not appreciate the significance of his success and replaced him with General
Alexander and, at operational level, General Montgomery. ‘Monty’ adopted Auchinleck’s plans and claimed them as his own.
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 Under General Montgomery the British 8 Army had considerable superiority over the Africa Korps in terms of men and tanks by August 1942. In August 1942 the British halted
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Rommel at Alam Halfa. By October Monty had 195,000 men to the enemy’s 103,000 and 1300 tanks to Rommel’s 500. The second Battle of El Alamein proved to be decisive. Rommel’s
forces were sent into a headlong 1500-mile retreat across Libya. By early 1943, Rommel was forced to retreat to Tunisia.
 Simultaneously an Anglo-American force under General Eisenhower landed in Morocco and Algeria in November 1942, to close the net around the Africa Korps. Thanks to the tact of
Eisenhower, Anglo-American co-operation worked remarkably well. In the end, Vichy French Morocco and Algeria declared for the Allies but French Tunisia did not. The US decision to
capture Tunis can be seen as a mistake as Hitler poured 150,000 fresh troops into Tunisia and prolonged the campaign for extra 6 months. This pre-cluded any Allied landing in the west
in 1943, though at Casablanca in January 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill decided to invade Sicily.
ASSESSMENT
 The British hold on Malta proved crucial to the North African campaign as the RAF and RN significantly curtailed German shipping supplying Rommel’s forces. By May 1943, although
German and Italian forces still outnumbered the Allies, three quarters of their supplies were not getting through. The defeat of the Africa Korps resulted in the Allies capturing between
150,000 and 250,000 prisoners.
 The North African campaign was a humiliation for Hitler, it resulted in large losses of German soldiers and was a disaster for Mussolini.
Victory and the Grand Alliance – the Mediterranean, 1942-44 – the role and impact of the Mediterranean theatre
BACKGROUND.
 Agreed by GB and US leaders at Casablanca Jan. 1943 that after fall of Tunisia an invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) should be lauched to ensure control of Med. But no
decision on what should happen to Italy thereafter. British – esp. Churchill – developed Med. Strategy that envisaged not only invasion of Italy but of Balkans too – argued
these actions would draw German forces away from France and give cross channel invasion greater chance of success. US disagreed – wanted every concentrated on France.
Final decision was left to Eisenhower.
 Allied forces landed on Sicily July 1943 – Germans and Italians taken by surprise. Deceived by ‘man who never was’ – dead body with bogus plans in sea off Spain with
deception of landings in Sardinia.. Landings ultimately a success but badly planned and poorly executed – Germans allowed to escape island and Montgomery and Patton poor
relations hampered Allied co-operation. Most important outcome = fall of Mussolini 25 July making invasion of Italy practicable. Eisenhower wanted capture of airfields of
Foggia to bring German industry within range of Allied bombers.
 Italy did not turn out to be ‘soft underbelly of Europe’ (Churchill). Germans moved swiftly to occupy most of peninsula + mountainous terrain, river valleys, mud and fierce
resistance ground campaign to a halt.
 Field Marshall Kesselring formed a line along Volturno, 30 miles north of Naples – a brilliant German defensive campaign against unimaginative Allied command. Naples
‘liberated’ on 1 Oct. and Allies hoped to be in Rome by end of month – this only happened in June 1944! Allies advanced only 70 miles in 8 months with strong German
defensive retreat to the defnsive heights of the ‘Gustav Line’ (incl. Monte Cassino).
 At Tehran Conference 28 Nov.-1 Dec. 1943 – Stalin insisted ‘Overlord’ (invasion in France) start ASAP and Italy was secondary to USSR. Churchill gave up his Balkans strategy in
return for continued US commitment in Italy.
 Allies decided to outflank Gustav Line with landings to north at Anzio (Jan. 1944) but US Commander (General Lucas) was indecisive and failed to seize initiative and move
inland allowing Kesselring to bring in German forces to attack Allied forces bottled up on beach. Breakthrough did not come until May 1944, but US commander General Mark
Clark was more interested in being the liberator of Rome than destroying the Wehrmacht allowing the Germans to again reconsolidate defences!
 It took four major offensives between January and May 1944 before the line was eventually broken by a combined assault of the Fifth and Eighth Armies (including British, US,
French, Polish, and Canadian Corps) concentrated along a twenty mile front between Monte Cassino and the western seaboard. At the same time the forces at Anzio broke out
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ASSESSMENT.
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of their beachhead but an opportunity to cut off and destroy a large part of the German Tenth Army retreating from the Gustav Line was lost when, on the brink of success, the
[12]
Anzio forces changed their direction of attack to move parallel with the coast to capture Rome. Rome was declared an open city by the German army and the US forces took
possession on 4 June
After fall of Rome, Churchill wished to make rapid advance north, but had to concede that troops needed to be diverted to landing in south of France (criticised as a worthless
operation).
Continuation of the Allied offensive in early 1945 was made impractical by the poor winter weather (making armoured manoeuvre and exploitation of overwhelming air
superiority impossible) and also by further requirements to withdraw British troops to Greece and the Canadian I Corps to north-west Europe as well as due to the massive
losses in its ranks during the autumn fighting, the Allies adopted a strategy of "offensive defence" while preparing for a final attack when better weather and ground conditions
arrived in the spring.
The Allies' final offensive commenced with massive aerial and artillery bombardments on 9 April 1945. By 18 April forces of Eighth Army in the east had broken through the
Argenta Gap and sent armour racing forward in an encircling move to meet U.S. IV Corp advancing from the Apennines in central Italy and trap the remaining defenders of
Bologna. Bologna was entered on 21 April by the Polish 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division and the Italian Friuli Group from Eighth Army and U.S. 34th Infantry Division from Fifth
Army. 10th Mountain Division, which had bypassed Bologna, reached the river Po on 22 April and Indian 8th Infantry Division, on the Eighth Army front, reached the river on 23
April.
As April came to an end Army Group C, the Axis forces in Italy, retreating on all fronts and having lost most of its fighting powers, was left with little option but surrender.
General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who had taken command of Army Group C after Kesselring had been transferred to become Commander in Chief of the Western Front (OB
West) at the end of 1944, signed the instrument of surrender on behalf of the German armies in Italy on 29 April, formally bringing hostilities to an end on 2 May 1945.
Allied campaign in Italy saw significant command mistakes: lack of co-operation between GB and US forces, in part, due to differences between commanders; US Generals
Lucas and Clark showed inflexibility and hot-headedness; General Montgomery and Alexander criticised for slow, ponderous advance. Political masters and their differences
can also be seen to hampering the Allied efforts especially after Tehran and removal of forces and equipment for invasion of France – Italy became seen as a ‘sideshow’.
However, weather and terrain were also huge factors, though German forces utilised these fully.
It is estimated that between September 1943 and April 1945 some 60,000 Allied and 50,000 German soldiers died in Italy. Total Allied casualties during the campaign totaled
[7]
about 320,000 and the corresponding Axis figure (excluding those involved in the final surrender) was over 658,000. No campaign in Western Europe cost more than the
Italian campaign in terms of lives lost and wounds suffered by infantry forces.
However, it succeeded in removing German troops from France and tied down substantial German forces that could have been used elsewhere (Germans had 35 divisions in
Italy, leaving 61 divisions in France, 190 divisions in Russia). In term of diverting German resources, the Italian campaign can be viewed as a success; in terms of allowing an
invasion of central Europe, it was a disappointment.
Reason for victory – The bomber offensive 1942-45.
BACKGROUND.
 Bombing was the only means of attacking Germany after the fall of France. Despite criticism, largely on moral grounds, most British people supported the campaign and this
not only united the country but also drew the USA towards the War when it saw that we were not willing to surrender. It also gave hope to the peoples of the occupied
countries and, to some extent, supported the Russians after their country was invaded.
 Most G. cities were heavily damaged (but this caused problems for invading Allied armies and for subsequent military governors). German estimates are that 593,000 people
were killed by bombing and some 3.7M. dwellings were destroyed.
 The German economy was not as badly affected as was expected. There was much slack in the economy early on, e.g. Single shifts were the norm; women were not employed
in armaments factories; consumer goods continued to be produced well into the war. Armaments production rose steadily until mid 1944, often employing slave labour.
Occupied countries supplied many resources, e.g. Oil from Rumania. Perhaps a reduction in production of 10% could be attributed, at most, to bombing BUT note that G.
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figures for output may have been exaggerated to please Hitler (e.g. repaired aircraft could be counted as new for accountancy purposes) and we do not know what figures
would have been achieved without bombing.
“Hitler forgot to put a roof on his Fortress Europe”, Roosevelt.
ASSESSMENT.
 Mine laying. BC dropped (‘laid’) 47,000 sea mines. These delayed U-boats from leaving their ports during the early days of the Invasion, prevented the new generation of U-boats from
entering their usual training grounds and, when laid in the Baltic, forced Sweden to limit war supplies to G.
 U-boat construction was delayed.
 6 major warships were sunk.
 Raids on Italian targets encouraged the It. people to challenge Mussolini.
 The bombing of Peenemunde delayed the introduction of the V- weapons by many months, by which time, the campaign was limited to a few months, as advancing Allied armies
captured launch sites. These sites themselves were heavily bombed with further delays to a concerted attack.
 Pre D-Day bombing of railway yards and junctions delayed the G. reinforcements from reaching the Invasion beaches.
 When the Allied air forces switched to bombing specific communication and particularly oil production targets in late ’44, early ’45, German forces soon lost effectiveness. Although
these two aims had been identified earlier in the war, such precision bombing was not a practical alternative before this time.
 Destruction of armaments factories, particularly aircraft, necessitated dispersal to more remote, smaller sites. The targeting of the transport links between these (8.above) did ensure
reduced production in the last 6 months of the War.
 Crucially, and often understated, the effort G. put into the defence of the Reich denied resources and manpower from the fighting at the land fronts, especially from the Russian
conflict; at least 2 M. men were tied down in defence of, or repairs to, G. cities. In 1944, 33% of all artillery was for flak guns, 20% of all ammunition, 30% of optical sights and 50% of
radar and signalling equipment were for anti aircraft use.
 German Minister for War Production, Albert Speer, considered this was the greatest loss to G. of all the effects of bombing. [But what of the costs to the Allies in mounting the bombing
campaign?].
 The defeat of the Luftwaffe was principally the result of the USAAF campaign, once the Mustang was available in numbers. [The intention was to draw the fighters up and then to shoot
them down, whereas the RAF by night aimed to avoid the fighters].
 Other services and commands were keen to have some of the resources spent on the bombing campaign. In particular, Coastal Command would have benefited from earlier allocation
of four-engined aircraft for their anti-submarine patrols. When the magnetron cavity valve was developed for centimetric radar, BC was given priority, to help it navigate (it was a
component in H2S). It was an advance over anything the Germans had, yet, they recovered one intact from a shot down bomber on only its second night of use. The other contender
was Coastal Command for anti U-boat patrols at night when many U-boats were on the surface, recharging their batteries. A CC plane lost at sea would not have yielded radar secrets to
the enemy. How many ships/lives could have been saved had CC had these valves before BC….?
Reason for victory – The Battle of the Atlantic. Podcast: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/podcasts/atlantic-battle.htm
BACKGROUND.
 1941. Increasing US involvement to protect convoys containing US ships.
 After the US entered the war, U-boats plundered the ships off the US East coast, the second ‘Happy Time’ for German crews. US Admiral King refused to consider use of
convoys; ships sailed with lights on and were silhouetted against brightly lit coastal towns.
 Development of Asdic, then radar, and HF/DF (Huff-Duff). This latter pinpointed radio transmissions from U-boats. It is likely that the Germans never realised that was how we located
many of their boats.
 Use of Enigma machines to contact U-boats and the attempts to decipher these messages. For the first part of the war, the enemy was ‘reading’ our naval codes.
 Increasing use of VLR aircraft, such as the Liberator, Catalina and Sunderland. The Leigh light, centimetre radar, air-dropped anti-sub weapons such as rockets, were important
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developments.
Escort carriers, converted from merchant ships gave convoy air cover. Fast escort vessels, called corvettes, hunted submarines.
It became essential to build replacement merchant ships faster than the Germans could sink them. The ‘Liberty’ ships were designed to be mass-produced and US shipyards were
capable of building one every 4.5 days.
 Also, remember that other events played their part; the bombing by US and RAF planes of German shipyards and factories and, later, of transport links disrupted that construction of Uboats. The bombing of the reinforced concrete U-boat pens in the French Atlantic ports was largely unsuccessful until the last months of the war, when much larger bombs became
available.
 The mining by the RAF of the western Baltic Sea meant that the testing grounds for U-boats had to be moved eastwards. These bases and yards were the first to be threatened by the
Russian advances of ’43-44 and Hitler ordered that large numbers of troops (40 Divisions, 30% of all men available) should be kept there to defend them, thereby depriving the rest of
the Eastern Front armies of essential resources.
 Germans developed Schnorkel U-boats that could charge their batteries while submerged. Also, fast, new electric boats and acoustic torpedoes but the introduction of these major
developments was so delayed that they had little influence on the outcome of the war.
ASSESSMENT.
German Misconceptions
 Underestimated our technology, especially DF. and radar.
 Couldn’t believe we had broken the enigma codes.
 Slow to introduce the U-boat supply boats (the ‘Milch’ Cows).
 Slow to bring in new designs of U-boats and new technology, such as Metox.
 Inflexible Leadership, with constraints on scientific development.
 Goering’s refusal to allocate enough/appropriate aircraft to support subs.
British Misconceptions
 Slow to recognise U-boat threat before the War started (Lessons not learned from WWI).
 Slow to allocate suitable aircraft.
 Priority given to RAF Bomber Command for aircraft and crews and centimetre radar over needs of Coastal Command which had to defend convoys and hunt U-boats.
Losses
 Of 1,131 U boats built (or 1,162, depending on sources), 735 were lost (781). The majority were lost fighting at sea but 63 were destroyed in port by bombing and 83 to ‘other’ causes,
such as storms, accidents.
 Out of 41,000+ U-boat crewmen, 27,400 were lost, a higher percentage than any other arm of the military on either side.
 Coastal Command lost 1,777 planes and 5,866 aircrew.
 Merchant losses already quoted but realise that ship owners refused to pay crews of ships sunk, any wages from the time of the sinking.
 “Allied air power played the decisive part in the campaign against the U-boat.” (Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, page 289).
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i. Bombes and Ultra.
 early computers called ‘bombes’ were used to break the German naval codes and then the capture of several enigma machines from German ships and U-boats in the early months of
1941.
 The breaking of the enigma codes (the British codename ‘Ultra’) proved a crucial turning point for the war in the Atlantic as Allied naval command could now track the positions of all UBoats throughout the Atlantic meaning the Allies could now track the positions if all U- Boats that threatened its vital shipping lines.
 However, despite the capture of the enigma machine being viewed as a major breakthrough it also came with its limitations. The Enigma machine was so sophisticated it required the
‘boffin’ code breakers at Bletchley Park to constantly re- crack the code as it changed regularly; this meant that there were periods in which the Allies, despite having the enigma code
machine, were unable to trace U-boat movements and Allied shipping continued to be lost.
 Furthermore, the technological advance of breaking the codes were limited by the need not to be detected as having cracked the German naval codes; if the Allies acted on large
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Sonar.
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numbers of the U-Boats that were threatening their shipping they would immediately show to their German counterparts that they had captured the Enigma machine or had cracked
the codes. However, the Allies did act on the enigma codes in ways that would avoid obvious detection by the Germans of code breaking; convoys were diverted or re-routed during the
Battle of the Atlantic based on the cracking of the codes, and the convoys were unaware as to why.
Other technological advances that were at least as vital as ‘Ultra’ and the ‘bombes’ for the Allied success over the U-Boat threat in the period 1941-45 included weaponry advances such
as huff- duff, depth charges and hedgehog, sonar and radar. All of these technologies proved to be important in the Allies’ quest to defeat the U-Boat peril 1941-45. However, there
were also limitations to all of the technological advances of the era but the technology used in unison would provide a very effective means of fighting the U-Boat threat.
The Allies developed the use of sonar, which in turn was needed before they could effectively use their weaponry such as depth charges or ‘hedgehog’. The sonar could detect German
U-Boats below the surface; however this was often counteracted by the U-Boats by releasing oil causing confusion with Allied sonar systems. Therefore undermining the effect Sonar
could have on winning the ongoing battle for the allies.
Radar.
 Allied technological advances in radar were further limited with the German invention that saw the advancement of a simple device known as ‘the schnorchel’, which allowed the UBoats to run on diesel engines even when underwater. Being able to run U-Boat diesels, and not the electric matters that needed to be recharged through surfacing, underwater was a
tactical advantage for the Germans; not only were the U-boats more powerful, faster, and longer range, but more importantly, they eluded allied radar. Although not invented until
around 1942 and was only in service in the type V11 U-Boats. Hitler himself limited the effectiveness of German technology ordering old style U-Boat types to be mass produced.
However the effectiveness of this, was seriously undermined with the arrival of long distance aircraft around the same time. Furthermore, developments in allied radar made it sensitive
enough to be able to detect an object as small as a snorkel head. Although this was much more difficult compared to a surfaced U-boat, allied reports indicated that a surfaced U-boat
could be detected up to a distance of 10km, whereas a snorkel head could be detected at about 5km.
German advances counteracting Allied technology.
 During the period when the Battle in the Atlantic was most hard fought the German also were undergoing much more naval technological advancement counteracting those of the
allies. The Battle of the Atlantic turned into an ‘arms race’ between the two enemies and German naval advancements on U-boats went a considerable distance towards limiting the
effectiveness of Allied technology. The greatest advancement was the design of larger type 9 U-Boats which were specifically designed for long range battle, therefore posing a greater
threat to the Allied merchant ships meaning the Allies further needed to advance their tactics if they wanted to avoid a confrontation with the U-boats. Also U- Boats were fitted with
anti- radar systems allowing them to counteract the technological advancement of the radar which had seen the Allies take the advantage dramatically.
 Furthermore U- Boat engineers produced a design a revolutionary streamlined hull model including a propulsion system which allowed the U-Boat to be submerged underwater for
longer periods of time and also allowed it to reach remarkable speeds of which submarines had nit seen before which meant once again the U-Boats could stalk much more larger areas
and even chase down Allied shipping further. Other advances on behalf of the U-Boats fleets saw them begin to use was became known as a metox receiver which once fitted with radar
detectors enabled the U-Boats to avoid sudden attacks from the allied escorts. Showing just how the German navy could quite easily counteract any technological advancement from
the British navy. It is clear to see the naval technological advancements of the Allies and the effectiveness of them was severely undermined by the German navy who were undergoing
advancements themselves. With this in mind the overall advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic during the period 1941-5 was unclear and the battle would be won by not just
technological advances but through tactics, the wider war and the failings of the German naval command.
RAF Technology.
 Long distance aircraft gave the allies a significant advantage over the U-Boat wolf packs. During the early periods of the war, it was the Luftwaffe who dominated the Atlantic air
demonstrating that without command of the air the allies could not gain supremacy of the sea – as shown in the spring of 1940 off the coast of Norway. However the British and allied
naval forces needed a solution. The invention of long distance aircraft meant the RAF would be capable of supporting and protecting the convoys much further into the Atlantic, turning
the advantage back to the allies in terms of the battle of the Atlantic because it was a luxury that the Luftwaffe didn’t have. Meaning the RAF could provide unrivalled support to the
convoys heading for Britain. Furthermore with the RAF now an increased threat to the U-Boats from the air, it meant in order to protect themselves the U-boats were forced to spend
much more time submerged underwater than at any other time in the campaign. This turning into a more serious problem for the U-Boat fleets as it is much harder to attack a shipping
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convoy when submerged underwater than it would be to attack it from on the surface. As well as this the earlier advancement of the snorchel, on all U-Boats and its effectiveness was
effectively cancelled out by the long distance air craft because instead of using the snorchel to remain submerged in the water so they could ambush the convoys, they had to use it
merely as an element of survival, staying submerged underwater so the short waved radar being used by the RAF wouldn’t be able to track them. A disadvantage of the short waved
radar was the fact it couldn’t track anything submerged at a great depth. However with the U-Boats hiding away from the aircraft at such a depth their effectiveness was seriously
undermined anyway. It became difficult for Donitz to coordinate all of the wolf packs as the radio signals became much less successful the further the U-Boats were forced underwater.
Also with them at such a low depth the chance of attacks were almost nullified. This can be shown more clearly through comparing the shipping losses of the allies after the time the
long distance aircraft were introduced into the campaign. A sure sign of how supremacy of the air was needed just as much as supremacy of the waters.
Now the RAF had supremacy of the airs, the Navy could take vital steps into taking supremacy of the waters. Towards the latter end of the Battle the Leigh light - basically a powerful
searchlight – was added to aircraft. It was capable of exposing to the RAF U-Boats that were recharging during the night. It meant U-Boats would no longer have any rest bite from both
allied battleships and the RAF, proving a significant turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic, because of this technological advancement allied shipping reported a huge drop in losses
as a result of this remarkable advancement. From around 600,000 tonnes lost to 200,000 tonnes lost as the ingenious device began to be commonly used by all aircraft. Proving once
again the role the RAF had to play in protecting allied shipping across the Atlantic.
Allied Tactics.
 With the Allied Navies and the German U-Boats locked in a ferocious battle in the Atlantic both sides made technological advances to counteract the other. Many historians have
emphasised the technological advances made by the Allies and concluded that this was the most significant factor in the defeat of the U-Boats in the Atlantic, yet these histories have
made little of the effectiveness of the German U-Boat counter technology. Rather than the cause of the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic lying with technological advances it is
more accurate to see success in the development of new tactics. Yet, even these tactical developments were in part reliant on the new technology developed by the Allies.
 After disastrous moments in the early years of the war and with the supremacy of the Atlantic slipping from their grasp the Allies were forced to change their tactics in escorting the
convoys safely across the Atlantic. The allies decided as much as possible to train their seaman in tactics to be on the threshold of taking advantage of any U-Boat slip up, when the
escorts encountered trouble. This base was at Tobermory, in the Hebrides. However even with the new escort tactics the emergence of short waved radar in 1941, designed for small
ships and aircraft began to be significant in the battle against the U-Boat peril. The change in tactics began to be evident from March of 1941 with several U-Boats and their fleets being
lost at sea because of confrontations with the new escort groups. However much of this new found supremacy at sea was because of the cooperation with the RAF as well. All this was
achieved still several months before the enigma machine was captured by HMS Bulldog proving allied success in the Atlantic wasn’t dependant on the advances of technology. However
once the Enigma was captured these new escort groups would have a clear supremacy over the U-Boats.
 However without the enigma machine the Allies were powerless do little when Donitz, leader on the German navy, moved his U-Boat wolf packs further west in order to attack the
convoys before the battleships joined them. This increased the success of the U-Boats. Suggesting the allies needed to find a solution to this problem fast and was counteracted by the
allies in 1941, when the Canadian navy decided they would escort all convoys the full length of the Atlantic crossing. From this it is clear to see the effect of good tactics on behalf of the
Admirals played throughout the battle of the Atlantic. However for these tactics to achieve ultimate success they still relied heavily on the use of the technological advances. To give
them that vital edge over the U-Boats. With the use of tactics alone the campaign could still have been won but it would have taken much longer and the price would have been much
German failings and the wider war.
 Other than technological advancements and tactics, the wider war and German failings also played a vital role in the British naval victory during the battle of the Atlantic in the period
1941-5. Germany was fighting a war on many fronts and that required Germany to divide their resources accordingly. Putting them at a disadvantage in the Atlantic as the allies began
to benefit from an influx of resources.
 Despite all the technological advances of the time, not one of them can be described as the sole reason for the allies gaining supremacy in the Atlantic. Instead it is widely considered
that the convergence of all the many factors tat I have talked about that effectively eradicated the threat of the U-Boats. What began to make these resources so much more effect
than they had been in the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic was the new found luxury of the allies of having an influx of resources, to coincide with the lack of resources the
German faced as a result of being stretched on two fronts by the Russians in the east and the other allies in the west. The allies could now begin to reinforce the advantage they now
had. With the added resources available to them it meant the allies could now escort a much higher percentage of merchant ships across the Atlantic, now there was not only just
enough escorts to securely protect the convoys but also enough to form ‘hunter killer groups’ that were set with the casts of aggressively hunting the German U-Boats. However these
nd
would not stray too far away from convoys, just in case they were needed if the escort groups came off 2 best in a confrontation. Furthermore the advancement of naval intelligence
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and technological advances can not be discounted. The continual breaking of the Enigma codes by the ‘boffins’ at Bletchley Park, meant the convoys could not only evade the U-Boat
wolf packs much more easily but with the Enigma decrypts being constantly broken revealing the position of these wolf packs the ‘hunter killer groups’ could work extremely
effectively. As a result of this the allied began to get a significant upper hand as the campaign came to its end. Furthermore the effects of this were felt both at the home front and on
the European battlefields. The U-Boats tried to respond. They reinforced their batteries combining with new models emerging from the shipyards that were capable of travelling at
speeds much quicker than before. Around 17 knots. Therefore counteracting the role the RAF could have on proceedings. Staying submerged for longer periods of time. Combine this
with the new torpedoes, being commissioned, that became very effective in destroying the merchant ships they faced and it is easy to see the German navy were doing there best to
stay in the battle. However despite the British merchant navy recording an increase in the amount of shipping lost, the U-Boats were fighting a losing battle. In this period they lost UBoats on a catastrophic level.
The threat of the U-Boats in the Atlantic was effectively ended in two months. The effects of the wider war became apparent and the Germans simply could not cope. The allies were
closing in on vital U-Boat bases in and around mainland Europe; many of these Boats were deliberately sunk to avoid capture. Any that remained at sea surrendered. Virtually nullifying
the U-Boat threat. Furthermore the building of U-Boats was further undermined through the use of bomber command. As the allies began to target bases the Germans scattered
different factories across France in an attempt to counteract the allied bombing raids. Bomber command simply rose to this by bombing the railways. Severely hampering the U-Boat
making plan of the Nazis. Therefore effectively bringing an end to the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic. This on its own opened up the Atlantic waters so endless supplies could now
arrive in Britain unaffected by the threat that the U-Boats once had. It was a battle that had to be one as the allies could now begin preparations for the Normandy landings that needed
enormous amounts of supplies from across the Atlantic to be successful.
The involvement of the USA.
 With the German and British navy effectively locked in a technological ‘arms race the full entry of the U.S.A into the war in December 1941 proved to be the turning point for supremacy
in the Atlantic; it was an involvement that brought vital technological advancements but, more critically, brought significantly more warships to counter the U-Boat threat in the
Atlantic. With the support of the Americans the Allies could now support more of their merchant ships with more naval ships, meaning more merchant ships in theory could successfully
cross the Atlantic and successfully gain entry into the British ports. This is seen by the data showing before and after the U.S.A became involved in the War, the amount of shipping
successfully arriving in Britain rose sharply.
 This was a result of having more warships guarding the merchant ships combined with the breaking of the enigma codes and other technological advances. With the inclusion of the
Americans in the war and a change of fortunes for the allies they saw the number of escort vessels grow rapidly which meant more merchant shipping could be escorted across the
Atlantic. The Americans gave the British navy old destroyers and the British and the Canadians built flower class corvettes in ever increasing numbers, meaning a confrontation with
German U-Boats could be fought off successfully by the Allied shipping. This is shown by looking at the change in the amount of tons of shipping arriving in British ports. However
without military intelligence of the enigma machine plotting cracking the German codes, the effectiveness of all these new warships coming into the battle would have been very
limited. Furthermore with all these new battleships being built the weaponry advances such as huff-duff, hedgehog and other advances such as sonar were still needed on all the
warships if they were to fight off the U-Boat threat. Therefore is it possible to say the technological advances on behalf of the Allies combined with an increase in resources on offer was
possibly the defining reason for the Allies gaining authority in the Atlantic.
Conclusion.
 The naval war in the Atlantic throughout 1939-45 was effectively an armed race that the German lost. However losses on both sides were on an unimaginable scale. The allies lost:
30248 merchant sailors, 3,500 merchant vessels, this meant around 14.5 million tonnes of shipping was lost. 175 warships were also lost. The Germans losing 28000 sailors and 783
submarines. Victory for the allies was achieved at a tremendous cost.
Reason for victory – D-Day and victory in Europe.
BACKGROUND: D-DAY.
 “Unless we can land overwhelming forces and beat the Nazis in battle in France, Hitler will never be defeated.” Winston Churchill.
 Planning: 1943 at the Quebec Conference decision was taken to attempt a large-scale invasion, code-named Overlord, against the continent of Europe in the spring of 1944.
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Landing in lower Normandy, on shores less heavily fortified than those in the Pas de Calais, gave the Allies the advantage of surprise. In the absence of a large port in the area
to unload the heavy equipment, it had been arranged for two artificial harbours to be constructed, one off Arromanches at the western end of the British sector, and the other
off Omaha Beach, in the American sector.
Deception: “Fortitude” was the codename given to the decoy (or disinformation) mission mounted by the Allies to deceive the Germans about the date and above all the place
of the landings. The latter were convinced that the British and American attack would come in the Pas-de-Calais area and it was important not to disillusion them. They
therefore had to be made to think that a whole group of armies was present in Kent, opposite the Pas-de-Calais. To deceive the German observation planes, which their
antiaircraft defences did their best to avoid, the local estuaries, creeks and harbours were crammed with dummy landing craft, made out of bits and bobs. A giant oil pumping
head for PLUTO (made from papier mâché) was erected near Dover, while large numbers of inflatable rubber tanks were positioned in the fields. Plywood vehicles and guns
lined the roadsides. At night, convoys of lorries - always the same ones – drove back and forth across the region. For the benefit of the Germans, a team of technicians
maintained constant radio traffic between totally fictitious units. Long after June 6th, Hitler remained convinced that the Normandy Landings were a diversionary tactic to
induce him to move his troops away from the Pas-de-Calais, so that a decisive attack could then be launched there. He therefore kept his best units in readiness there, until the
end of July, desperately scanning an empty horizon, while the fate of the war was being decided in Normandy.
Supply: One of the most crucial logistical problems posed by sending an ultra-mechanized, fuel-guzzling army across the Channel was the supply of petrol. The operation was
codenamed PLUTO – nothing to do with the Disney cartoon character, but simply the initials of Pipe Line Under The Ocean. The undersea pipeline went into service in
Cherbourg at the start of August 1944. However, as early as June, another system had been used to supply the Allied armies. In front of Port-en-Bessin and Sainte-Honorinedes-Pertes, a system of oil terminals had been set up, supplied by tankers anchored out to sea. From there, a network of pipes was laid, keeping pace with the Allied armies’
advance inland.
So as to disorganise the enemy defences, the Allied air force and navy were brought in to provide heavy bombardment of the Atlantic Wall fortifications. Special armoured
vehicles (amphibious tanks, bulldozer tanks, mine-clearing tanks and flame-throwing tanks) were designed to support the assault troops during the attack. Other preparations
included: Months of training, practising attacking copies of the Nazi emplacements. These were so realistic that many men were killed in these exercises Building ‘mulberries’
– floating harbours that could be towed across the Channel and set up once a bridgehead had been established A Spanish double agent convinced the Nazis that the main
invasion was going to take place at Calais, and that the Normandy attack was just a diversion.
Attack on the Soviet Union on June 22nd 1941 and the unexpectedly strong resistance put up by the Red Army forced the German High Command to transfer increasing
numbers of troops away from the Western front, considerably weakening it in the process. When the United States entered the war in December 1941, fears of an AngloAmerican landing intensified, and in the same month, Hitler reinforced his system of defence by ordering the construction of the Atlantic Wall. This gigantic project, entrusted
to the Todt Organization, was begun in 1942 but had still not been completed by 1944, despite the efforts of Field-Marshal Rommel, who had been made responsible for the
entire sector between the Netherlands and the Loire at the end of 1943. Built 15,000 structures along the entire coast of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Atlantic.
This required the labour of 450,000 workers (both voluntary and impressed) and the use of 11 million tonnes of concrete and 1 million tonnes of steel for the reinforcing rods.
Despite the image that German propaganda sought to project, the “Wall” was not a continuous obstacle. It could basically be said to be composed of four types of structure:
the fortresses, the coastal batteries, the close beach defences and the obstacles erected either on the beaches themselves or inland.
In the case of an amphibious assault such as Operation Neptune (the codename for the landings on the Normandy beaches), the navy obviously had a vital role to play. The
Allied armada which crossed the Channel in the night of June 5th-6th comprised no fewer than 4,300 ships of all shapes and sizes (not counting the 2,600 barges carried by the
large transport ships and lowered onto the waves close to the shore). It was made up mostly of British and American ships, though there were also Norwegian, Dutch, Polish,
Danish, Greek and Free French vessels. These ships were to open fire on the German defences forty-five minutes before H-Hour, taking over from the aerial bombardments
that had been carried out overnight and at dawn. During the battle, they were to provide continuous covering fire, silencing most of the coastal batteries of the Atlantic Wall
and giving valuable tactical support to the infantry, sometimes getting them out of tricky situations, as at Omaha. For their part, the troop ships carried 130,000 men and more
than 20,000 vehicles of all kinds, including tanks and lorries, across the Channel to the Normandy coast in the course of June 6th. A few dozen decrepit merchant and warships,
such as the French battleship Courbet, were scuttled in a long line in front of the Landing Beaches to form breakwaters. In all, some 150,000 seamen belonging to the war
fleets and the merchant navy took part in the landing operations – a force equal to the number of troops sent into battle on land on June 6th 1944.
THE BRITISH AIRBORNE LANDINGS: The airborne plan was to take place before the main landings, and in darkness, to achieve an element of surprise. The first troops to be in
Normandy were the paratroopers who were to clear landing sites for later glider landings. The 5th Parachute Brigade group under Brigadier J.H.N. Poett was to: 1.Seize the
bridges over the river Orne using six gliders manned by the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and 2. Seize and hold the area of Pegasus Bridge and Ranville and
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clear the LZs (landing zones) north of Ranville for glider reinforcements. Three gliders crushed the first defensive line of barbed wire around the bridge perimeter. Those guards
who heard the crash dismissed the noise as the remnants of some hit allied bomber falling to the ground. This gave time for the dazed and semi-unconscious airborne troops to
recover. Lt. Brotheridge charged up the embankment beside the bridge with his platoon shouting ‘Able, Able’ (their identification code). Private Romer, one of the German
sentries saw these black faced troops charging at him and ran screaming ‘Fallschirmjager!’ (Paratroopers). The other sentry was shot by Bren gunner Private Billy Gray, but as
the sentry was shot he fired a Very pistol to light up the sky. In such heroic actions the airborne troops captured both bridges inside ten minutes, but there had been casualties.
Bren gunner, Lance Corporal Fred Greenhalgh drowned in the pond as the third Horsa crash landed – he was probably the first casualty of D-Day.
SWORD BEACH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH HEAD. Through the night of 5/6th June RAF bombers raided coastal defences. The USAF took over at dawn with
supporting fire from the escort warships of the approaching invasion fleet. THE LANDINGS ON SWORD – At 7.25a.m. the first tanks landed on Sword Beach and started their
clearance operations. Special modifications had been made to the British tanks to aid these clearance operations. These armoured vehicles were nicknamed ‘Hobart’s Funnies’
after Major-General Percy Hobart, the creator of most of the vehicles. These versatile devices saved thousands of lives on D-Day (the Americans did not use the ‘Funnies’ and
consequently suffered high casualties on Omaha Beach). 29,000 men had landed on Sword Beach. 630 casualties. Still 5 km short of their objective – Caen.
JUNO BEACH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH HEAD. THE LANDINGS ON JUNO – On Juno Beach the Canadians found the height of the tide a mixed blessing. The
landing craft were swept over the shallow shoals more quickly than expected but the infantry arrived ahead of the armour and many landing craft ran into each other and the
mined ‘hedgehogs’. The D-D tanks did well on the western end of the beach and were able to support the infantry in the street fighting beyond the beach. Advances, though,
were slow due to the strength of enemy fire and counter attacks. 21,400 landed on Juno Beach. 1,200 casualties (one in eighteen). Failed to reach objective to the south – the
N13 and to the east there was a 4 to 7 km gap between Canadians and British from Sword Beach. Objectives too optimistic for untried troops. Landings hampered by tides and
winds. More formidable obstacles than expected. Air and sea bombardment disappointing. Too many vehicles on beach = congestion.
GOLD BEACH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH HEAD THE PLAN – The plan was to capture Bayeux, establish a bridgehead across the Bayeux/Caen road (N13).
Capture the gun battery at Longues sur mer and establish contact with American troops that had landed at Omaha to the West and Canadians from Juno Beach to the east. The
landing plan was for infantry to follow Hobart’s Funnies and secure the beach and destroy its defences. Then advance inland and capture a prominent house with a circular
drive, behind which there was Mont Fleury gun battery. Concrete emplacements that were home to 150mm guns that could do significant damage to the ships stationed off
the beaches and the soldiers who would wade ashore. Then advance further inland and capture high-ground of Meuvaines Ridge where there was a suspected rocket site to
be taken. Then advance further to capture a ridge near St Leger, across the Caen-Bayeux road. The final destination for troops was only 9 miles from King beach but would
involved moving through small fields, dense hedges, orchards, narrow lanes and little hamlets ..an attacker’s nightmare …a defender’s paradise! Take the German gun battery,
advance on Bayeaux and Caen. The weather on GOLD Beach was bad with Force 5 winds and 4 foot waves. Soldiers on the landing craft suffered sea sickness. The sea was too
rough for the D-D tanks and had to be landed directly on the beach. 130 warships of the British Task Force bombarded the coast before the assault HMS Ajax opened fire on
the battery at Longue-sur-Mer. The beach was backed by low and marshy land where Hobart’s ‘Funnies’ were at their most effective, clearing mines and digging ditches.
Penetrated 10 km inland and established links with Canadians at Creully. Achievements: Had reached Arromanches. Had not taken Bayeux or crossed the N-13. 25,000 men
ashore. 400 casualties.
OMAHA BEACH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH HEAD Omaha was the bloodiest of all the landing beaches and along the four miles of sands below its high frowning
cliffs the Allied invasion came perilously close to failure.
The Cotentin peninsula did not offer the protection from heavy seas that it did for the Utah landings. The American troops were loaded into their assault craft from about 11
miles offshore, twice as far as the British and against the latter’s advice. Being so far out, the operation had to be started well before 0630 hours and it was, therefore, dark. In
the darkness, many of the craft got out of position. Six thousand yards offshore, twenty-nine D-D floating tanks were launched. Only two of these reached the beach. Many did
not float at all but went straight to the bottom taking their crews with them. There were also high losses amongst the landing craft carrying infantry. Many sank in the heavy
seas and the men, loaded with 70lb of equipment, had little chance of survival. The artillery to support the infantry made the amphibious DUKWs top heavy causing them to
topple over at sea with the loss of artillery and crews. The first landing craft were off target. Infantrymen had no choice but to find what shelter they could as they faced hours
of heavy fire and were short of armour and artillery. The beach was strewn with burning vehicles and dead and wounded men. The heroism of a company of Rangers saved
the day. Brigadier General Norman D. Cota and Colonel Taylor led the Rangers in actions of extreme bravery to knock out the German guns. The German defences had been
further weakened by the successful dropping of decoy dummy paratroopers further inland which led the Germans on wild goose chases inland. By the evening of the 6th June
the Americans had scaled the cliffs and a small bridgehead had been established. Over 2,000 American lives had been lost. 40,000 landed. 2,200 casualties (one in nineteen).
Beach-head in American hands.
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UTAH BEACH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH HEAD: On June 6th 1944, supported by amphibious tanks, the first assault waves of the 8th Regiment of General
Barton’s 4th US Infantry Division landed on the beach at 6.30 am. Due to a navigational error, they ended up in front of the Madeleine dunes - just a few kilometres from the
village of Sainte-Marie-du-Mont and roughly two kilometres south of their planned destination. This turned out to be providential, as the German defences were far weaker
here. Carried to their left by powerful coastal currents, the barges arrived opposite the WN 5defences, which had been badly damaged by aerial and naval bombardments and
offered very little resistance. The beach was rapidly cleared of its obstacles by army engineers and most of the troops were able to land without any problem, despite sporadic
fire from Crisbecq Battery. Without further ado, General Barton’s men marched inland along the marsh causeways and established contact with the paratroops near
Pouppeville in the early afternoon. The 4th Division’s losses on June 6th (killed, wounded, missing) came to just 200 men out of more than 20,000 landed.
 THE AMERICAN AIRBORNE LANDINGS On the morning of 6th June 1944 American troops of the 82nd and 101st Divisions were dropped around the ridge that carries the main
road from Cherbourg down to Carentan. This ridge had to be secured because the lower lying valleys and marshes had been flooded by the Germans; the ridge was the only
inland route for the troops landing at UTAH. The aeroplanes and gliders carrying the airborne troops were hindered by thick cloud and heavy anti-aircraft fire. The drop was
widely scattered and many were drowned in the floods and marshes.
BACKGROUND – Liberation of France and the Low Countries and fall of Germany.
 British faced bulk of German armoured divisions in Normandy. GB forces faced seven SS armoured divisions while US forces faced only one. The result was that Montgomery’s
forces took almost three months to liberate Caen and surrounding area, including the key high ground of Hill 112, while US forces under Gen. Bradley and Patton moved more
swiftly (though with heavy losses) through the Cotentin Peninsula and captured port of Cherbourg and to west and south. Montgomery has been criticised for hesitancy but
this fails to recognise that GB forces tied down bulk of German armour and were suffering terrible losses day-by-day.
 Allied forces enclosed German forces at Falaise and in a pincer move inflicted heavy losses on Germans in ‘Falaise Pocket’ but even Hitler saw need to withdraw (16 Aug.).
Germans lost 60,000 men and most of their armour but equal no. escaped before pocket closed. US again accused GB forces of hesitancy! Germans retreated back to border
and Allied advance through France was rapid. With overstretched supply line the Allied forces were ordered to halt on the French border, just 100 miles short of the Rhine with
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minimal, and poor quality, German divisions in their way. The eventual order to advance came on September 7 when German reinforcements had been brought in and
defences established – the advance was a slow and costly one.
 By end of August, Allies had 2 million men in France. Beginning Sept. 1944 Gen. Montgomery liberated Brussels and Antwerp but 3 factors prevented speedy end to war: 1)
Allies suffering from severe logistical constraints – took 4 months to get a tank from US to France! Hitler ordered some Channel ports to be held to last man – some held on
until May 1945! 2) Strategic disagreements, mainly between Montgomery and Americans. Monty wanted to undertake rapid drive on Berlin while others wanted more cautious
broad front approach designed to take over Ruhr, Reich’s industrial heart. Eisenhower did allow Monty’s ambitious ‘Operation Market Garden’ to capture Dutch bridges of
Eindhoven, Son, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem by airborne assault (Sept. 1944). The operation that ‘could have shortened the war by sixth months’ however stalled at Arnhem.
Reasons for failure: poor intelligence; bad weather; wrong drop zones used; poor equipment e.g. radio sets did not work and lack of anti-tank weapons; XXX Corps moving
along road across bridges held up by German counter-attacks; bad luck – unexpected German division just arrived in Arnhem. 3) Germans had retreated to the West Wall
(Siegfried Line) – regrouped and recovered.
 Hitler launched a winter offensive through the Ardennes to recapture Antwerp, split the Allies and roll them back into the sea. Hitler’s generals thought it was over-ambitious.
German attack on 16 Dec. was complete surprise to Allies despite clues in Ultra (decripts of German codes) – 28 German divisions, 200,000 men and 600 tanks + poor weather
(fog, snow, mud – hampered Allied air superiority and movement of vehicles/troops) enabled panzers (tanks) to make quick advance. Allies recovered – Battle of the Bulge was
won. Germans failed to reach vital fuel supplies held by allies and tanks halted with overstretched supply lines. Clearance of weather on 23 Dec crucially allowed Allied airforce
to attack the German advance. By mid-Jan. 1945 ‘bulge’ of German advance was pushed back. Monty’s subsequent claim that he had saved the Americans did little to improve
relations. Germans lost 100,000 men and great deal of new equipment (including heavily armoured Tiger and Panther tanks) that would have been better used on Eastern
Front. Allies suffered too but their could be replaced more easily – German industry by now collapsing with Allied bombing and Allies cutting off raw materials. Also committed
Germany’s last reserves to Western Front when could have been used against Red Army. Eisenhower ‘The war was won before the Rhine was crossed.’
 Fall of Germany must be put into context of Red Army facing bulk of German defence. After closing of the ‘Bulge’ in the West Allied forces numbered 4 million. Allies fought
German forces west of the Rhine – occupied Eisenhower’s forces from 8 Feb. – 21 March 1945 resulting in 350,000 German losses (300,000 of these were prisoners – losses
that could have been avoided had Hitler let them withdraw across the Rhine). Allies enveloped the Ruhr from north and south trapping German forces – another 300,000
surrendered. GB forces given task of taking northern Germany and still faced fierce resistance in places.
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Battle for Berlin was fought by the Red Army with terrible losses. Hitler committed suicide on 30 April 1945 and his replacement Admiral Donitz made a full unconditional
surrender on 7 May 1945.
ASSESSMENT.
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Reasons for success of D-Day: Allied co-operation; combined operations (air, sea, land); technology; propaganda and disinformation; leadership, planning and preparation; mistakes
made by German command.
Reasons for Allied success 1944-45: Material, industrial superiority of the Grand Alliance + leaders, service personnel etc. (see p.102-104 in ‘Europe at War’).
ESSAY QUESTIONS ‘Remarkable military achievements resulting from effective Anglo-American co-operation’. How far do you agree with this opinion of the D-Day landings and the
subsequent liberation of France?
How significant was the Battle of the Atlantic (1942-3) to the final defeat of Germany in Western Europe?
‘The strategic bombing offensive against Germany in the years 1942-45 was strategically misguided.’ How far do you agree?
4. The Home Front: Morale, war production and social change 1939-45
Morale 1939-45: – How successful were attempts to maintain morale in Britain?
BACKGROUND.
 The willingness of civilians to contribute to the war effort was a matter of decisive military importance because Britain’s armed forces depended on the industrial and
organisational skill of the home population. The responsibility for maintaining civilian morale fell to the Ministry of Information (MOI), which began work in September 1939
but which had planned since 1935.
 Minister of Information in 1939, Lord Macmillan, summarised the three central messages to be carried to the public: what was Britain fighting for; how Britain was fighting; and
the need for sacrifice if the fight was to be won. Macmillan’s stewardship of the Ministry was widely regarded as a failure and his two successors – Sir John Reith and Duff
Cooper – fared little better. The MOI attracted intense criticism in first two years of war – seen as expensive, bureaucratic, overstaffed, ineffective. Patronising tone of early
efforts was captured in poster: ‘YOUR courage, Your cheerfulness, YOUR resolution, will bring us victory’. It was only when Brendan Bracken became Minister of Information in
July 1941 that the MOI began to operate effectively, working well with the three main branches of the wartime media to support civilian morale.
 The National Press: In interests of gov. to maintain cordial relations with press, especially as demand for war increased sales. Freedom of the press could not survive outbreak
of war; censorship in some form had to be employed to safeguard information which might have been of military value to the enemy. Relations with the press became strained
in early stages of conflict, creating a climate of mutual suspicion which took some time to evaporate. Initial point of controversy was tight control which authorities exercised
over official information e.g. in September 1939 MOI withheld news that BEF had left for the continent, even though this was public knowledge in France and the US. In
October 1939 the accreditation and monitoring of war correspondents proved so restrictive that 100 neutral reporters made their way to Berlin where they found it easier to
obtain reliable information. At this stage of the war tight control of information was combined with voluntary system of censorship in which editors sought guidance from the
Censorship Division. The result was columnists were often unable to discuss progress of the war and vented their frustration on the MOI (commonly referred to as the Ministry
of Aggravation). May 1940, in response to Hitler’s invasion of the west, extended controls over the press to cover critical opinion as well as sensitive information. By November
1940 an export ban had been applied to nine newspapers with communist or left-wing sympathies. Yet, restriction of free comment conflicted with the official portrayal of the
war as a defence of democracy against totalitarianism. This may explain why ministers attempted to regulate press coverage wherever possible by discreet approaches to
newspaper proprietors and editors e.g. in October 1940 Attlee and Beaverbrook threatened the ‘Daily Mirror’ and ‘Sunday Pictorial’ with compulsory censorship if they
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continued to criticise the government. There were occasions when more direct methods of press censorship were used e.g. the socialist ‘Daily Worker’ was suppressed January
1941-August 1942 after the paper campaigned for more deep shelters, better ARP services, better rates of compensation, the commandeering of large houses and opening up
of large private shelters; it was claimed that this undermined public morale but Home Intelligence found no evidence of this. The ‘Daily Mirror’s’ habit of blaming military
blunders and deficiencies in central organisation for British defeats 1941-early 1942 was a constant irritant for Churchill. Matters came to a head in March 1942 when the
Mirror published a cartoon featuring a shipwrecked merchant sailor clinging to a raft with caption: ‘The price of petrol has been increased by one penny- official’; the paper
was warned of possible closure and this reminded proprietors that the government was prepared to use sanctions against national newspapers.
The BBC: MOI and BBC functions interlocked. BBC was determined to preserve some autonomy but was conditional on good relations with government. In reality was only
nominal retention of BBC’s independence with ministers having final authority over broadcasting policy. BBC was government’s official channel of communication, carrying out
instructions from MOI and aware of role it had to play in mobilisation of civilian war effort and maintenance of morale. Output of BBC confined to radio during war years. BBC
radio broadcasts contributed to war effort in 3 main ways: spread information in straightforward manner to mass audience e.g. ministerial announcements, news from
battlefield, advice on food preparation, health, national savings etc.; Reflected concerns, hopes and fears of ordinary people through programmes broadcast from factories,
civil defence units and army barracks; Helped to shape public attitudes. The BBC functioned as point of common reference for civilians and soldieres, bringing people together
as they listened to same news, programmes and Churchill’s broadcasts. At start of war BBC only provided news but with the ‘Phoney’ or ‘Bore’ War broadcasters found little
news to report with the result that many listeners tuned into the German propaganda broadcasts of Lord Haw Haw (who attracted 30% of listeners). BBC was sufficiently
concerned about Lord Haw Haw to schedule most popular programmes after main evening news and after Dunkirk the reputation for BBC wartime reporting was established.
From this point, most people used the BBC rather than the press as their main source of news and by February 1941 Listener Research found that two-thirds of civilians
considered BBC news to be 100% reliable. There were some complaints though: bad news was often released slowly or too positively e.g. the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1942
was reported in a highly selective and duly positive way and the following year the BBC failed to report knowledge of the extermination of Jews. The BBC was reliant on
information from various government departments, some of which proved less than accurate e.g. the BBC reported hugely distorted figures of aircraft shot down in the Battle
of Britain. But the BBC still earned the trust of its listeners and the improvement in outside broadcast facilities brought alive the allied advance after D-Day. Serious output and
home front propaganda was balanced with light entertainment with very successful programming like the ‘Forces Programme’, ‘It’s That Man Again’, ‘Ack Ack – Beer Beer’,
‘Music While You Work’ etc.
Cinema: Film was one of the most powerful mediums of communication and propaganda. Weekly cinema attendances reached 25-30 million. Production of wartime
propaganda films was overseen by the Films Division of the MOI, which liaised with film studios, independent producers and newsreel companies. According to MOI newsreels
were the most effective form of film propaganda, so were given priority in the allocation of film stock. The Press and Censorship Division controlled the flow of information to
newsreel companies. Documentaries like ‘Britain Can Take It!’ and ‘Target for Tonight’ reassured audiences that the country was coping with the crisis of 1940 and hitting back
in 1941. Audiences were often resistant to overt propaganda because what they wanted from the cinema was entertainment, therefore films can be regarded as the best
propaganda. Early pictures emphasised the moral superiority of Britain’s cause and downplayed the scale of effort required to defeat the enemy. War films were popular in the
early years of the conflict reflecting the novelty of war and several received great critical acclaim (even today) e.g. ‘In Which We Seve’ and ‘They to the Stars’. MassObservation’s research however showed that the kind of entertainment most audiences favoured was escapist – comedies and melodramas.
ASSESSMENT.
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Despite initial difficulties, Britain’s propaganda campaign can be judged an overall success. Press, radio and cinema played their part in victory, assisted by MOI.
Co-operation between government and media functioned fairly smoothly over six years of war.
Audience played its part. Audiences shaped wartime media through MOI and BBC surveys, writing letters, deciding which papers to buy and films to watch and led towards
democratisation of the media. Films and the BBC became noticeably less stuffy and working class accents even began to cut into the previously exclusive middle class accents.
The presentation of the British in the mass media helped the construction of the sense of a ‘people’s war’ and a shared national identity.
War production 1939-45: – How far was Britain’s economy mobilised?
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BACKGROUND.
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The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of August 1939 was the first in a series of measures which enabled the government to intervene in the economy on an unprecedented
scale. As the war progressed an extensive network of economic controls was established, covering almost every aspect of supply, production and trade.
In the ‘phoney war’ there was reluctance to exploit these powers to the full: Chamberlain’s government was ideologically opposed to extensive state intervention in the
economy; it feared that a rapid mobilisation of resources for war production would have damaging economic consequences, and mutual suspicion between government and
trade unions meant imaginative manpower policies were rejected as unlikely to work. The most significant developments in the war economy therefore came after May 1940
with Churchill’s coalition government.
Most important for the coalition government resourcing manpower, control of which was the responsibility of the Minister of Labour and National Service, Ernest Bevin. His
task was to distribute labour between competing needs: demands of armed forces, requirements of war production and needs of civilian industry and services. In theory Bevin
had massive powers over labour from the outset: the Emergency Powers Act gave him the authority to require individuals to register for war work under terms and conditions
laid down by the Ministry. At the peak of mobilisation approximately 10 million persons were in active service or employed in the munitions industries. Also, 8 million were
effected by Essential Work orders, introduced in 1941 to keep workers in jobs vital for the war effort – engineering, coal, shipbuilding, iron and steel – by restricting rights of
employees to resign and of employers to dismiss. In practice, Bevin relied as far as possible on the voluntary principle (he had a trade union background) to avoid industrial
unrest. He consulted both the TUC and employers’ federations over policy and used his powers to direct labour sparingly. In fact, only some 25,000 men and 90,000 women
were directed into wartime work which they had not chosen.
Bevin realised that the support of the unions was vital if labour was to be transferred from civilian production to essential war industries without widespread unrest. Cooperation from the unions was also vital in the constant battle against skills shortages. The Ministry of Labour had to ensure that workers had the skills to produce good quality
material for the war effort. This meant key workers had to be prevented from joining the armed forces and accelerated training programmes had to be set up for new workers.
This process, known as dilution, usually involved dividing work into a set of less complex tasks and often made use of new machinery. The trade unions were never entirely
comfortable with dilution as they feared it would undermine the value of skilled labour in the post-war world, but they were prepared to compromise with government and
employers for the sake of the war effort. This agreement proved vital when millions of women entered the labour force after 1941.
Manpower controls were an important tool in the government’s direction of war production. As the supply needs of the military increased, the state organised the expansion
of the munitions industries and the consequent contraction of civilian production. There were major changes in the economy’s product mix during wartime: the production of
consumer goods probably fell to no more than half its pre-war level, leading to shortages of many household goods such as furniture and clothing.
Overall volume of imports was reduced by nearly 40% during the war. This helped the balance of payments, and allowed the limit of shipping when convoys were suffering high
losses. But it also exacerbated shortages of food and other consumer essentials and led to further restrictions on civilian consumption.
The main restriction on consumption was rationing, the scope of which was extended throughout the war after it was introduced in January 1940. It was an effective way of
distributing scarce resources fairly, avoiding unrest. There were some complaints that food rationing failed to take into account the higher calorific requirements of heavy
manual workers, but surveys showed consistently high public approval of the system.
US Lend-Lease was a vital source of food and raw materials and freed Britain to concentrate on war production without the need to worry about its export performance during
hostilities.
ASSESSMENT.
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Difficult to assess wartime economic performance as many ways to assess e.g. short or long term success, efficiency. Also, British war economy was not mobilised in isolation –
depended on US/Canadian Lend-Lease and Empire and Commonwealth.
Labour mobilisation has to be seen as successful. By June 1944, 55% of labour force was either in uniform or in civilian war work, a higher proportion than in Germany and USA.
% of national net income mobilised for Britain’s war effort climbed steeply. From 16% in 1939 to 57% in 1943. But this was below the 76% achieved by Germany and the USSR.
The transformation of GB economy for war had to be achieved quickly, because it was only after 1938 that defence requirements took priority over the maintenance of
domestic economic stability. Yet, by the start of the war GB had already matched Germany’s defence spending in relative terms, while its production of tanks and aircraft
already exceeded German output. Spectacular increases in output were achieved in small arms, shells, high explosives and wheeled vehicles.
Agriculture performed very well, with more land under cultivation, more labour employed and the balance of crops altered to produce a greater calorific yield per acre of land.
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Increase in production suggests that labour had been mobilised effectively. From May 1940, as invasion threatened, factories worked day and night to provide supplies for
Britain’s defence, encouraged by propaganda which stressed the vital role played by industry in war. Holidays were cancelled, weekends were ignored, length of shifts were
increased and workers completed 12 hour shifts 7 times a week. However, the workforce was criticised with constant concern about levels of productivity e.g. at the start of
1942 The Times reported that arms production was 40% below what was possible. Critics pointed to alleged deficiencies in the British workforce: poor management; education
system that failed to train industrial workers; long-term failure to keep pace with advanced technological change; worker slackness, absenteeism, lack of work discipline,
unofficial strikes and reluctance of skilled workers to abandon restrictive practices. Regular stoppages affected aircraft, coal and shipbuilding industries, sometimes caused by
trivial issues such as canteen facilities. This was not helped by the Essential Work Order of 1941, because it restricted the rights of employers to sack workers in certain key
industries and removed an important source of discipline in the workplace. But hours of work were higher in Britain than USA and Germany and this might explain
absenteeism. Coalmining, where output fell every year of the war, showed problems faced by an industry when it lost manpower to the armed forces and was left with an
aging workforce (though the introduction of the ‘Bevin Boys’ later helped to address this problem). Also, stoppages were mostly brief and three quarters were confined to the
four industries of metals, engineering, coal and shipbuilding.
Conclusions: After depression years GB mobilised workforce remarkably well after 1939. Although some industries saw an increase in strikes, government largely retained
consent and support of the civilian population in its management of war economy. Rationing, price subsidies and steeply progressive taxation all contributed to the belief that
economic policy was based on a principle of ‘fair shares’. War witnessed a temporary narrowing of income diffrentials as unskilled wages rose more than skilled wages. There
remained criticism of the labour force, management and production levels but the wartime constraints facing Britain need to be considered. GB emerged from the war
dependent on the US for economic support.
Social change 1939-45: How far was British society transformed by the Second World War?
BACKGROUND – The Blitz.
• To an unprecedented degree the burden of war fell on the nation as a whole from September 1939, testing the resolve of the civilian population as much as the power of Britain’s
armed forces.
• The collective nature of the war was held to have produced profound social change: pre-war division of class, wealth, status and power were allegedly set aside in favour of a new social
cohesion which developed from the common experience of war and the shared aim of defeating the enemy.
• As the British faced the invasion scare of 1940, as the Luftwaffe attacked urban centres and as the nation prepared for the long hard struggle on the road to victory, rich and poor, male
and female, majorities and minorities alike apparently submerged their differences and stood together in common defiance.
• This idea of a new sense of collective consciousness in wartime was continually promoted by government propaganda as a means of maintaining morale and heading off the danger of
internal social conflict.
• The Ministry of Information and BBC emphasised that the nation was fused together in a common cause and reassured the public that if they continued to work together, survival and
eventual victory would be secured.
• There is a huge problem in measuring social change. Identifying legislative and institutional changes is simple enough e.g. legislation conscripting women into the workforce. But tracing
the precise origins of social changes and measuring their impact on millions of individuals over a long period of time is more problematic. It is difficult to make meaningful
generalisations about the attitudes, values and experiences of people in a highly complex, multi-dimensional and multi-layered society across six years of war.
BACKGROUND – Evacuation.
• The first great social upheaval in Britain during the Second World War was the evacuation of ‘priority classes’ and schoolchildren in September 1939. Movement of population from
urban centres during the ‘phoney war’ despite absence of air-raids. By end of war approx. 4 million city dwellers had spent some time in the country. With exception of direct
experience of air-raids, evacuation was the crucial life-event for millions during the war.
• According to the social change thesis, evacuation played a major role in the promotion of social solidarity as town met country and working class met middle class. This interaction of
previously distant social groups was held to have increased national awareness of the problem of urban poverty, as reception halls across the country with apparently malnourished and
lice-ridden children, lacking adequate clothing and displaying little if any evidence of schooling. Stories of poverty stricken evacuees filled the local and national press, PM Chamberlain
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even promised remedial action would be taken.
BACKGROUND – Women at war.
 Under Churchill’s guidance the government took active steps from May 1940 to mobilise the war effort. When it became clear that another 2 million workers were needed in British
industry, the government reluctantly accepted that women should be conscripted. From December 1941 women aged 20-30 had to register and be available for war work.
 Approximately 50% of women (7.2 million) were in paid employment by 1943 – yet if voluntary work is taken into consideration, as many as 80% of married, and 90% of single women
were working in some capacity outside of the home. The marriage bar vanished overnight and nurseries were set up to allow young women with children to work. By 1944 there were
1,500 nurseries established. Women worked in a wide range of jobs: munitions factories, ship building, railways, vehicle manufacture, as well as more clerical jobs than ever before.
 Yet problems existed: there were insufficient nurseries and their hours of opening were unsuitable for shift work; their cost of 1 shilling per day was high. Many women disliked war
work – it tended to be monotonous, low paid, and prevented women from shopping which was often a lengthy process during the war. Attitudes from male colleagues and even
government propaganda could be patronising (see below). Other examples included the prevention of female newsreaders in case they got upset – one famous wartime poster urged
people to avoid gossip: keep mum, she’s not so dumb!
 Women often worked for just 60% of a typical wage earned by a man – not until 1943 did the government accept a sex-blind policy of equal compensation for personal injury due to
enemy action. Most union leaders were unwilling to fight for women’s rights during the war. Politicians also viewed the increase in women workers as merely temporary
 During WWII women played a much larger role in the fighting services than in WWI. Over 500,000 women served in the: WRENS (Women’s Royal Naval Services); WAAF (Women’s
Auxiliary Air Force); ATS (Auxiliary Territorial Service)
 In addition over 350,000 women worked in civil defence (air raid precautions, fire fighting, nursing), and many thousands in the ‘Land Army’. Yet prejudice against women was more
pronounced in the services than in the factories. One woman in the WAAF complained that ‘whatever one applies for, they always try to get one committed to working in a canteen’.
The WRENS poster emphasised how women could join them, not to fight, but to save a man for the fleet. No women were allowed to join the Home Guard.
ASSESSMENT – Did the Blitz bring social change?
• German air-raids on British cities, which had been expected in the first weeks of the war, began in earnest during September 1940. London suffered the most but other major towns and
cities shared in the devastation.
• Interpretations of the British experience of the Blitz on civilians largely support the view of a ‘people’s war’ of shared defiance and common endeavour: communal shelters, run by
informal elected committees; shops and businesses which refused to close despite the bomb damage; neighbours taking in homeless families; volunteer wardens, fire-fighters and
rescue workers. These were seen as the outward expressions of the new communal and civic culture which developed among the urban population.
• While the Blitz doubtlessly provoked countless acts of heroism, self-sacrifice and altruism these provide a one-sided view of stoical resistance and social solidarity.
• Ministry of Information reports on civilian morale 1940-1 often showed a different response to bombing: ‘great depression, a widespread feeling of impotence…and many open signs of
hysteria’ (Coventry); ‘looting and wanton destruction had reached alarming proportion…’ (Portsmouth)
• Other evidence challenges the assumption that raids helped to break down barriers of social isolation and class consciousness: Only a small minority of the population used communal
shelters, for most individuals and families the Blitz was a personal experience.
• Mass Observation found that if raids promoted wider social identification it occurred in specific localities rather than across the nation as a whole. The heavier bombing of certain
districts, such as the largely working class East End of London, produced a degree of class-based resentment. Home Intelligence founds that raids intensified resentment directed at
ethnic minorities e.g. anti-semitism in the East End of London. Crime rates also increased in the period of the Blitz – looting and sexual crime in the black-out. This belies in part the
myth of the ‘people’s war’.
ASSESSMENT – Did evacuation bring social change?
• Evidence that evacuation stirred the national conscience and produced important changes in social policy: Increased provision of milk and meals in schools; School Medical Service
increased role in ensuring welfare.
• Evidence to challenge social change caused by evacuation thesis: Reports from largely middle class voluntary social work agencies identifies working-class parental failure and ‘problem
families’ as explanations for poor condition of evacuees, not deep-seated social and economic deprivation. They argued that a change in social mores rather than social reform was
needed; Reports discovered that many evacuee families found it difficult to reside with their hosts, often living almost separate lives. Also, middle class families became increasingly
reluctant to host evacuee families; Reports also showed that evacuee families were most happy when residing with hosts of a similar social background.
ASSESSMENT – Did women experience social change?
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•
The theory that war promoted social changes features frequently in studies of wartime female roles. The mobilisation of women during the ‘people’s war’, particularly after conscription
of females was introduced in December 1941, led to a public re-examination of gender roles during wartime.
• Several writers have claimed the war produced fundamental social and economic improvements for women, particularly in their position within the labour market. BUT social historians
and sociologists have argued that many of the changes which affected women during the war were often transitory or superficial.
• The early stages of the war offered little evidence that the conflict would further the cause of emancipation. Chamberlain’s government made no determined attempt to mobilise
female labour. Instead, unemployment among women increased in the first few months of war.
• The situation only changed when Minister of Labour Ernest Bevin in 1941 persuaded government colleagues that female conscription was needed.
• By 1943 the compulsory recruitment of females into women’s services, civil defence or munitions factories had helped increase the number of women in the workforce by 1,500,000
compared with 1939.
• Although the National Service Act had the most immediate impact on single women aged 19-30, the increased female presence in the labour force was due in part to the voluntary
entry of married women into employment at a time when many husbands were in the armed forces and wives’ earnings became vital.
• Marriage had escalated to 43% of women 19-30 during the war and the provision of state-run nurseries helped these married women into the workplace.
• The way women were distributed across occupations also changed. The Extended Employment of Women Agreement, May 1940, brokered by Bevin and signed by employers and trade
unions. It meant women could be employed in jobs previously reserved for male workers, but only for the duration of the war.
• There was an increase in the numbers of women employed in the traditionally ‘male’ sectors of industry: engineering, transport, metals, chemicals, shipbuilding.
• Women in traditionally ‘female’ and lower-paid sectors – textiles, domestic service, food, drink, consumer services – declined.
• Autobiographical evidence suggests that many women viewed their wartime experience as an important phase of their personal development, enabling new opportunities and learn
new skills.
• BUT there are several qualifications to be made to this positive change for women in wartime:
• Increased female participation in the workforce peaked in 1943 and declined thereafter; between 1943 and 1947 1,750,000 women left the workplace and by 1951 proportion of adult
women in the paid labour force was almost at pre-war levels.
• The long-established practice of sex differentiation in public and private sector pay continued during the war; women usually received less pay than men for the equivalent work.
Employers circumvented the Extended Employment of Women Agreement by slightly altering the work process so that women required some supervision (which negated equal pay).
• Wartime sexual discrimination was also seen in the 1939 Personal Injuries Act setting rates of compensation for civilian women with war injuries lower than that received by men. But
following an outcry by MPs the government accepted equal pay for injury compensation in April 1943, This was a small concession overall to sexual equality!
• The need to mobilise women for the war effort conflicted with long-standing assumptions about female roles in society i.e. mother’s place in the home. There were exemptions to
conscription e.g. mother’s living with a child under 14 were exempt and married women could not be conscripted into the armed forces.
• The government’s wish to recruit female labour while minimising any challenge to sexual stereotypes is seen in propaganda films e.g. MoI films ‘Jane Brown changes her job’ and ‘Night
Shift’ emphasise that women could take on manual occupations without sacrificing femininity. Women’s magazines continued to promote the view that the home and the family were
women’s primary responsibility – it seemed to all that employment for women was a temporary wartime adjustment.
• Although many young single women left employment after the war, the self-esteem and sense of independence they developed in the wartime workforce and services made them less
likely to accept a subordinate role within a marriage.
• It would be a mistake to argue that there was a transformation of women’s socio-economic status as a result of the war, but it would be misleading to claim that the war produced no
longer-term consequences at all for women in any field.
ASSESSMENT – Did the war bring social change?
• It was a ‘people’s war’ in as much as Britain mobilised its population for war to a greater degree than any other nation – taking account of the intensity and duration of the mobilisation.
The population overwhelmingly supported the national effort; even allowing for the impact of propaganda, the absence of a strong peace movement or large-scale anti-war
demonstrations is striking. The state ensured that a truly national campaign was fought by conscription, rationing, requisitioning and taxation cut across some social boundaries and
produced a degree of social levelling.
• But must acknowledge a more complex and nuanced picture of the wartime home front than the traditional versions of the ‘good’ war; one which includes the looting and hysteria in
the aftermath of air-raids, rising crime rates, hostile reactions to ethnic minorities, infringements of civil liberties and class-based resentment.
• Despite the rhetoric of equality which accompanied the people’s war, it was to be some time before important aspects of discrimination were tackled in Britain: the colour bar
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•
•
remained legal until the 1960s and women had to wait until the 1970s before the principle of equal pay between the sexes was established in law.
The restructuring of the wartime labour force undoubtedly had positive results for many women in both the public and private spheres, but the dismantling of the wartime economy
saw a significant shift towards pre-war norms in gender relations.
The benefits of the people’s war bypassed large numbers of its participants.
ESSAY QUESTIONS To what extent was the Home Front in Britain mobilised for a policy of ‘total war’ in the years 1940-5?
To what extent did the demands of total war transform the every day lives of British citizens 1939-45?
In what ways did the war cabinet seek to maintain civilian morale and support for the war effort in the years 1940-45? How successful were these efforts in
maintaining morale and support?
How successfully did the coalition government of 1940-5 transform Britain to meet the needs of total war?
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SECTION B - Controversy: Was British Foreign Policy in the Years 1937-1939 a triumph or a disaster for Britain?
Was British foreign policy in the years 1937-9 a triumph or a disaster for Britain?
FACTFILE:
1937
1938
1939
May
Feb
Mar
Sept 15
Sept 22/23
Sept 29/30
Oct
Mar
Mar
Apr
May
Aug
Sep 1
Sep 3
Chamberlain becomes PM
Lord Halifax becomes Foreign Secretary,
following Eden’s resignation
Hitler annexes Austria
Chamberlain meets Hitler at Berchtesgarden
Chamberlain meets Hitler at Bad Godesburg
Munich Conference
Two by-elections
End of Czechoslovakia
GB guarantee to Poland
GB introduces conscription
Pact of Steel signed between Germany and Italy
Nazi-Soviet Pact
Germany invades Poland
GB and France declares war on Germany
FOR REVISION ON THE WHOLE OF 1937-39 YOU MUST LEARN CHAPTERS 8 AND 9 FROM YOUR TEXT BOOK. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE USEFUL TO SUPPLEMENT YOUR KNOWLEDGE.
1) MUNICH.
What were Chamberlain’s aims in foreign policy?
Chamberlain was an obvious choice for PM: a competent Chancellor who had steered GB through the Depression and a widely respected politician. Chamberlain was determined to play a more
vigorous role in foreign policy than a largely disinterested Baldwin. Chamberlain intended to control foreign policy and not be controlled by civil servants or by his Foreign Secretary.
It was clear to NC that there would soon be enormous changes in the relative international standing of the great powers, especially Germany. He hoped these changes could occur without war:
in NC’s view, war ‘wins nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing.’ Nazi Germany would be a difficult enemy to defeat and consequently was prepared to go to great lengths to preserve peace. But
he was no pacifist – if GB’s vital interests were at stake he was prepared to fight. Convinced that peace could not be achieved without GB’s participation in foreign affairs, NC resolved to play a
key conciliatory or appeasing role. He believed a just settlement of many of the German, Italian and Japanese grievances was possible.
NC has been criticised for lacking an insight into the minds of the dictators. In his defence, NC did not trust Hitler, Mussolini or the Japanese. For this reason he was not simply intent on
appeasing the dictators. He also favoured rearmament. But until Britain was adequately armed, he believed ..’the double policy of rearmament and better relations with Germany and Italy will
carry us safely through the dangerous period, if only the Foreign Office will play up.’
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Chamberlain was suspicious of the Foreign Office and was quite prepared to use his own intermediaries and communicated directly with some ambassadors, such as Sir Nevile Henderson in
Berlin. It was Henderson who pictured Hitler as a moderate with limited aims, a man with whom it was possible to do business.
Who could GB rely upon?
France: a series of weak and short-lived governments in the 1930s
ensured NC had little confidence in either the country or its statesmen
USSR: feared by NC as much as he feared Hitler and Nazism
USA: NC realised that there was an overwhelmingly isolationist outlook
with no appetite for foreign entanglements
What was Britain’s reaction to the Anschluss, March 1938
Chamberlain was not opposed to the Anschluss as such, but to the way it
happened. He accepted that the only way to prevent it would be to use force:
Britain’s own forces were small, and France, although possessing a large army,
was once again without government; Austria, which had prevented such a
union in 1934, did nothing at all. In any case, given the enthusiastic welcome
given by the Austrians, it was hard to claim that a great crime had occurred.
Perhaps the most important feature of the Anschluss was how it had happened:
if one frontier could be changed in this way, why not others? Hitler’s
justification was that there were large numbers of people of German stock in
Austria demanding union with Germany. The uncomfortable fact was that
there were German-speaking people in Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia
who also wished to join Germany.
Why was Czechoslovakia a major problem in 1938?
The Anschluss immediately focused attention on Czechoslovakia, much of
which was surrounded by German territory. By the 1930s only half of its 15
million people were Czechs. The largest ethnic group were Germans who
numbered over 3 million, mostly living in the Sudetenland. By 1938 these Germans were claiming to have been victimised and demanding union with Germany. Benes, the leader of the Czechs,
resisted the Sudeten Germans’ demands, since he realised that giving more independence to a particular ethnic group would lead to the break up of his country. Benes would stand firm against
Nazi pressure.
What were Chamberlain’s views?
Most GB politicians were sympathetic towards Czechoslovakia; whilst it did not treat its ethnic minorities particularly well, it had successfully preserved democracy since 1919. Chamberlain
however considered Czechoslovakia as a ‘highly artificial’ creation and had some sympathy for the Sudeten Germans.
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In March 1938 NC told parliament that vital interests were not involved in Czechoslovakia. Britain had no treaty obligation to defend the Czech state and was in no position to offer military aid.
The Chiefs of Staff agreed with Chamberlain: ‘We conclude that no pressure that we and our possible allies can bring to bear, either by sea, on land, or in the air, could prevent Germany from
invading and overrunning Bohemia (a major province in Czechoslovakia) and from inflicting a decisive defeat on the Czechoslovakia army’.
France however did have an alliance with the Czechs, and NC feared being dragged into a war to defend them. The French however concluded that Czechoslovakia could not be defended, and
Daladier, the new French PM, was frantically looking for ways to avoid having to defend this country. They would be delighted if GB gave them an excuse.
How effective was Chamberlain’s policy, March – September 1938?
NC’s main aim now was to extract concessions from the Czech government that would satisfy the Sudeten Germans before Hitler had an opportunity to use force. This policy had the full support
of Lord Halifax, the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. The flaw in the plan was that the Czech Government was in no mood to make concessions.
In May, following what proved to be false reports of German troop movements, the Czechs prepared for war. Both GB and France, fearing a German attack on Czechoslovakia warned Hitler
against making such a move. Tension increased throughout the summer – the German press claimed the Sudeten Germans were being openly persecuted. The Czech government stood firm,
whilst the French, troubled by yet more economic and political crises, were quite happy to see GB undertake the major initiatives to preserve peace. Yet the USSR had also drawn up an alliance
with Czechoslovakia and might be persuaded to support actions against Hitler. However NC distrusted Stalin, suspecting the Soviet leader wanted GB and France to fight Germany; moreover the
USSR was in the midst of the great purges, which involved the imprisonment and execution of millions of people. NC’s military experts assured him that the USSR lacked the capacity for an
offensive war.
In early September 1938 GB intelligence reported that Germany was planning a war against Czechoslovakia in early autumn. GB was divided over which action to take but the majority
supported NC’s idea of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans and thought war should be avoided at all costs. Furthermore almost all of the Dominions, e.g. Australia, were hostile to the
idea of fighting for Czechoslovakia: NC realised the dangers of taking a divided country and Empire into war. Hitler kept up the pressure, proclaiming at the Nuremberg Rally that the Sudeten
Germans would be neither defenceless nor abandoned. In response the Czech government declared martial law. Several ethnic Germans were killed and thousands more fled to Germany with
tales of brutal repression: war between the two countries seemed imminent.
Was Chamberlain right to meet Hitler to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia?
On September 15 NC boarded a plane for the first time in his life and flew to Hitler at Berchtesgarden. A rough agreement was reached: NC accepted Hitler’s demand that all areas of
Czechoslovakia in which Germans made up over 50% of the population should join Germany. In return Hitler promised not to attack Czechoslovakia until NC had consulted the French and the
Czechs. Hitler, assuming that the Czechs would refuse to concede the Sudetenland and that GB would then wash its hands of them, was delighted!
NC flew back to GB to convince the Cabinet, the French & the Czechs that Hitler’s demands would produce a lasting peace. The Cabinet and the French were won over easily; the Czech
government was appalled, yet without the backing of GB or France it had to accept the loss of the Sudetenland.
On September 22 NC flew back to Germany to meet Hitler at Bad Godesberg, expecting that ‘I had only to discuss quietly with him the proposals that I had brought with me’. Yet now Hitler said
the previous proposals were insufficient – he had not expected the Czechs to agree to the loss of the Sudetenland. Hitler now said the German occupation of the Sudetenland had to take place
by October 1, and that Poland and Hungary also be allowed to seize parts of Czech territory. NC returned to London, but this time many of his Cabinet colleagues rejected the proposals;
Daladier, the French PM, now said France would honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia and resist Hitler’s bullying tactics. The Czechs stated the proposals to be unacceptable. Both GB and
France began to mobilise their armed forces: trenches were dug in London parks and 38 million gas masks were issued. On that same day NC broadcast the following message to the GB people:
‘How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know
nothing …
38
The next day news came through whilst NC was making a speech to the Commons that Hitler had accepted Mussolini’s suggestion of a conference involving GB, France, Germany and Mussolini,
at Munich. There were scenes of jubilation in parliament and many surged forward to shake NC’s hand. Only Gallagher, the single Communist MP, spoke against NC going to Munich.
On September 29 Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier and Mussolini met at Munich – Benes was not invited, nor was Stalin. An agreement was reached the next day, very similar to Hitler’s
Godesburg proposals; Benes had no choice but to surrender.



The Sudeten Germans were given self-determination within Germany
German occupation of the Sudetenland would be carried out over the course of 10 days rather than 1
The precise borders of the new Czech state would be determined by GB, France, Germany and Italy.
What were the immediate results of Munich?
NC was not convinced Munich made peace more secure – he had few illusions about Hitler and
feared he would not be content with these recent gains. In private he regretted using the terms
‘peace with honour’ and ‘peace for our time’. Yet at least he was given breathing space by this
agreement. Some MPs were critical of the Munich Agreement: Churchill described it as a ‘total
and unmitigated disaster, and Labour leaders thought he should have won better terms.
The press were divided over Munich, with those of left-wing views generally critical. It is more
difficult to determine how the majority of the population felt: NC certainly did not suffer byelection disasters following the agreement, and there was undoubtedly great relief that war had
been avoided, with many giving NC the credit for securing peace. However public opinion polls
still revealed that most Britons distrusted Hitler.
What do by-elections then tell us of people’s attitudes?
There were two by-elections held after the Munich Agreement in October 1938:
(i) Bridgwater by election, where the Labour and Liberal Parties combined to put up an anti-appeasement candidate, Vernon Bartlett, a radio journalist. He won this by election which was
entirely dominated by foreign affairs with a majority of over 2000, representing a swing of 9.6%
(ii) Oxford by election a similar process happened, with the Labour and Liberal Parties selecting Sandy Lindsay, Master of Balliol College. He did not however manage to beat the Conservative
candidate, Quintin Hogg, despite using the slogan: A vote for Hogg is a vote for Hitler. Hogg won the seat with a reduced majority of 12.2%.
Why did Hitler continue to pose a threat in early 1939?
GB drew even closer to France following disturbing (and incorrect) reports from GB Intelligence predicting German moves against Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yet Anglo-French relations had
been marked by years of mistrust. NC thought France ‘never can keep a secret for more than half an hour – nor a government for more than nine months’. The GB Chiefs of Staff were wary of
conducting detailed talks with France for fear of being committed to a French war plan over which they had no control. In addition they feared that some French politicians seemed prepared to
accept German dominance in Eastern Europe. Yet the majority in 1939 did reflect the new public mood in France of resisting Nazi expansion. The French government now wanted GB to commit
39
itself to sending a large army to defend France. In February NC agreed top detailed military talks with France and committed itself to raising an army of 32 divisions – this was a radical
change in Britain’s defence policy.
How successful were British rearmament efforts in 1938-9?
Following Munich NC was more determined than ever to pursue rearmament, even in the face of criticism of left-wing MPs. In his view the main purpose of rearmament was to deter Hitler. The
increase of aircraft was due to plans made back in 1935. Indeed rearmament had long been geared to reach its peak in 1939/40. But GB’s arms spending increased considerably after October
1938. The production of aircraft rose from 240 a month (1938) to 660 a month (1939). By the end of 1939 GB aircraft production was expected to, and indeed did, overtake German production.
This was partly because of increased emphasis on building fast fighter aircraft (Hurricanes & Spitfires) which were only a quarter of the cost of heavy bombers. GB radar defences were also
improved – by September 1939 a radar chain ran from the Orkneys to the Isle of Wight.
From 1936 to 1938 GB Intelligence had consistently exaggerated German strength. However, after Munich it came to a more realistic assessment: Germany was facing a severe economic crisis
and would not be able to sustain a long war. In a long war of attrition GB and France’s economic strength and the power of a naval blockade should ensure eventual victory. By 1939 NC was
much more confident of GB’s capacity to fight: as a result he might have been prepared to take a firmer line than in 1938. But he still hoped for, and talked of, peace.
Why did the end of Czechoslovakia have such an impact on Chamberlain?
Without its defences in the Sudetenland Czechoslovakia was at Germany’s mercy; it also faced serious internal problems; in March 1939 German forces moved into Czech territory.
Hitler had clearly broken the terms of the Munich Agreement and a signed agreement with NC; moreover he could not claim he was uniting Germans. There was a sense of outrage in GB as a
whole and opinion clearly shifted in the Conservative Party and the press. Most GB people now believed something should be done to stop Hitler before he controlled the whole of Europe.
Chamberlain reacted mildly, announcing there was no question of going to war: Czechoslovakia had collapsed as a result of internal disruption which freed GB from any obligation. This ‘soft
line’ angered many MPs and he faced pressure from the press and even his own Cabinet to do something even stronger.
The next day GB and France delivered sharp protests to Germany. NC told the Cabinet that his hopes of working with Hitler were over: ‘No reliance could be placed on any of the assurances
given by the Nazi leaders’
Was Chamberlain wise to offer the Polish Guarantee?
On March 31 Poland received guarantees from both GB and France that they would come to her aid if she were the victim of an unprovoked attack. The irony was that Poland was a very rightwing, anti-Semitic state, and probably of all the East European states the one that GB disliked the most. Poland had distanced itself from the League, accepted Japanese and Italian expansion,
won territory from Czechoslovakia in 1938-9, and its foreign minister, Colonel Beck, was completely untrustworthy.
Hitler’s actual demands – Danzig & access across the Polish Corridor – were actually far more reasonable than those made against Czechoslovakia. Many historians regard the guarantees as
blank cheques given to a country notorious for its reckless diplomacy. Moreover these guarantees were worthless since there was little GB or France could do to prevent a German invasion
there: France intended to defend the Maginot Line, and GB had no large army nor plans to bomb German cities for fear of retaliation.
Yet many in British political circles thought something had to be seen to be done. The Polish Guarantee was a warning to Hitler that any territorial expansion would result in him fighting a two
front war. Poland was certainly a more reliable and possibly stronger ally than the USSR. Moreover the guarantee was not quite a blank cheque: it only committed GB to defending Polish
independence, not her territorial integrity, e.g. placing Danzig in German hands need not lead to war. The guarantee was designed to display GB resolve and to deter Hitler from further
aggression. Unfortunately the guarantee angered Hitler and he abandoned any thought of accommodation with Poland; he ordered his generals to prepare for a war against Poland by the end
of August.
Was such a view supported by ordinary people?
40
Public opinion now favoured standing firm against the dictators. There were demands for faster rearmament, alliance with the USSR, a broadening of the national Government, and Churchill’s
inclusion into the Cabinet. Chamberlain was aware of the pressure from his own party, and from the country at large. By February 1939 a poll revealed that only 28% of people thought
appeasement would bring a lasting peace; in July 1939 85% supported the creation of a grand alliance with the USSR, which Churchill had been calling for some time now. At the end of March
he announced the doubling of the Territorial Army, and in April announced the introduction of conscription.
Why was Chamberlain not keen to ally with the USSR?
The big question remained: how could GB and France actually defend Poland? Only the USSR could offer Poland military help. Most French and some British politicians (particularly those on the
left) thought the only possible course of action was an alliance with the USSR. Yet many British politicians had considered Communism as a greater menace than Nazism.
In 1935 the USSR had finally joined the League of Nations; signed defence pacts with France and Czechoslovakia; had suggested high-level talks with GB. Yet both Baldwin and Chamberlain
suspected that the real aim of Soviet policy was to embroil GB and France in a war against Germany and Italy. Stalin was not invited to the Munich Conference, 1938, and his approaches to GB
and France during the Czech crisis were ignored.
NC had several reasons for not allying with the USSR:
 Encircling Germany could be counterproductive and might lead to rather than prevent war
 Following on from Stalin’s purges, GB Intelligence reported that Soviet forces were of little military value – 80% of senior army officers had been killed or imprisoned
 A Soviet agreement might alienate those eastern European countries that GB was trying to win over (they feared Soviet troops occupying their territory)
 An Anglo-Russian alliance could also drive Spain and Japan into the arms of Hitler
In 1939 Stalin had a far worse record of terror and murder than Hitler; however Stalin’s terror was concealed, ignored or even justified by many on the left who ideologically preferred
communism. Therefore NC found himself at odds with public opinion in GB – there was growing support for an alliance with the USSR.
NC was under pressure from France, the press, Parliament, and even his own Cabinet to establish closer ties with the USSR. Lloyd George commented in 1939:
Without Russia, these three guarantees of help to Poland, Rumania and Greece, are the most reckless commitments that any country has ever entered into. It is madness.
Why did Hitler & Stalin sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
In 1939 Hitler realised that a deal with Stalin would very much strengthen his position, at least in the short term, and in January sent German diplomats to the USSR. By August Ribbentrop, the
German Foreign Minister, flew to Moscow to sign the Nazi Soviet Pact. This appeared to be a pact of non-aggression, but secret clauses divided Poland and Eastern Europe into spheres of
German and Soviet influence.
Much criticism has been levelled at NC for his failure to secure a Soviet alliance. Certainly he had little enthusiasm for the Grand Alliance of Poland, the USSR, France and Britain envisaged by
Churchill. However such an alliance was probably beyond even the most skilled British statesman. Poland was certainly not interested in a Soviet alliance, and Stalin had little love for either GB
or France. The only thing the West had to offer Stalin was the prospect of an immediate war, a war in which the USSR would do most of the fighting. Hitler however offered peace and
territory: Soviet dominance over the Baltic states and eastern Poland.
Exam (Essay) Questions from Previous Years:
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‘Chamberlain’s conduct of foreign policy between May 1937 and September 1939 was sensible, if un-heroic.’ HFDYA? (Jun 09)
Sensible
Yet
Chamberlain could do nothing to prevent Anschluss which appeared both popular and in the spirit
Munich left the rest of Czechoslovakia defenceless & Hitler could later seize the Skoda
of self-determination
arms works & enough tanks to equip three more Panzer divisions
Munich bought valuable time for rearmament especially fighter production & radar preparation; in
addition the army was unprepared and the navy reliant upon an ageing force of capital ships
Munich was a defeat for GB and robbed her of important Czech armed forces, alienated
the USSR (Churchill’s view)
Gave Hitler a necessary last chance to prove his good intentions – his failure actually cemented
support in Britain and brought the Dominions on side
The Polish Guarantee represented GB’s improved strength in terms of rearmament
Nightmare scenario had to be avoided – fighting Germany, Japan and Italy at the same time
Civil defence was in its infancy – witness the hastily dug trenches and distribution of gas masks
To what extent was Munich a diplomatic defeat for Britain? (Jan 09)
Diplomatic Defeat
It alienated the USSR as a potential ally against Hitler
Czech frontier defences were lost (March 1939), as was the Skoda arms factories
Diplomatic Necessity
The Munich Agreement bought time for rearmament for GB, especially fighter
production & radar preparation; in addition the army was unprepared and the navy
reliant upon an ageing force of capital ships
Over 1/3 of German tanks in 1940 were now originally Czech – three Panzer divisions!
Letting Germans join Germany was in the spirit of self determination
Gave Hitler a necessary last chance to prove his good intentions – his actions in March
1939 actually helped to cement support within GB (results of by elections) and brought
the Dominions on side
This support was reflected in the House of Commons – only opposed by Gallagher
Hitler actually regarded Munich as a diplomatic defeat for himself as it ‘robbed him of
his entry into Prague’ and prevented a war in 1938
Nightmare scenario had to be avoided – fighting Germany, Japan and Italy at the same
time
Civil defence was in its infancy – witness the hastily dug trenches and distribution of gas
masks
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To what extent was Britain defending its vital interests by declaring war on Germany in September 1939? (Jun 08)
Defending Vital Interests
Other Factors
Growing threat posed by Nazi Germany to GB security in terms of balance of power in Europe (Hitler New found British confidence in its military capacity – e.g. early warning radar system,
was bidding for European hegemony and not just seeking to overturn an unfair treaty): this was
increased fighter production
evident in his conquest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939
GB and France had moved closer together as allies in 1939
The threat from renewed German air power
Dominions convinced of need for war in 1939, not 1938
Our interests constituted security of the British Isles, Empire, commercial & economic interests
German military preparations had been exaggerated – growing belief that Germany was
in serious economic difficulties and unable to sustain a long war
‘Chamberlain displayed a necessary realism in the negotiations which led to the Munich Settlement of September 1938’ HFDYA? (Jan 08)
Necessary Realism
However
The Munich Agreement bought time for rearmament for GB, especially fighter production & radar
It alienated the USSR as a potential ally against Hitler
preparation; in addition the army was unprepared and the navy reliant upon an ageing force of
capital ships
Czech frontier defences were lost (March 1939), as was the Skoda arms factories; over
1/3 of German tanks in 1940 were now originally Czech – three Panzer divisions!
Nightmare scenario had to be avoided – fighting Germany, Japan and Italy at the same time
German military preparations had been exaggerated
Civil defence was in its infancy – witness the hastily dug trenches and distribution of gas masks
Public opinion was actually fickle and would have responded to a firm lead from the
Letting ethnic Germans join Germany was in the spirit of self determination
government
Gave Hitler a necessary last chance to prove his good intentions – his actions in March 1939 actually
helped to cement support within GB and brought the Dominions on side
NC over confident – Anglo-German Declaration of 30 September can question the
realism of Chamberlain
Hitler actually regarded Munich as a diplomatic defeat for himself as it ‘robbed him of his entry into
Prague’ and prevented a war in 1938
Was NC weak in not making the GB people face up to an unpalatable conflict
‘The British Government’s decision to declare war on Germany in September 1939 was primarily a consequence of a dramatic change in public opinion regarding the morality of appeasing
Germany’. HFDYA? (Jun 07)
Dramatic Change in Public Opinion
Other Factors
Events of November 1938: Kristallnacht & the by-election of Bridgwater just a few days later
New found British confidence in its military capacity – e.g. early warning radar system,
increased fighter production
Events of March 1939: Invasion of Czechoslovakia
GB and France had moved closer together as allies in 1939
Evidence of opinion polls
Dominions convinced of need for war in 1939, not 1938
Influence of the press – Daily Express dropped its support for appeasement after March 1939
German military preparations had been exaggerated – growing belief that Germany was
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NB: However it was public opinion and the changing attitude of the government which really
evolved together, from an awareness of the growing threat posed by Hitler & the fact that he was
now not merely overturning an unjust treaty
in serious economic difficulties and unable to sustain a long war
‘The appeasement of Germany at Munich arose from a desire to be fair to Germany rather than from British military weakness.’ HFDYA? (Jan 07)
Desire to be Fair
British Military Weakness / Other Factors
Letting ethnic Germans join Germany was in the spirit of self determination
The Munich Agreement bought time for rearmament for GB, especially fighter
production & radar preparation; in addition the army was unprepared and the navy
Chamberlain hoped by addressing valid German objections to the 1919 settlement that war could
reliant upon an ageing force of capital ships
be avoided
Nightmare scenario had to be avoided – fighting Germany, Japan and Italy at the same
time
Civil defence was in its infancy – witness the hastily dug trenches and distribution of gas
masks
‘Germany’s attack on Poland in September 1939 was the main reason for Britain’s decision to declare war’ HFDYA? (Jun 06)
Attack on Poland
Other Factors
Explanation of the Polish Guarantee issued at the end of March 1939: GB would protect the
New found British confidence in its military capacity – e.g. early warning radar system,
independence of her new ally
increased fighter production
GB and France had moved closer together as allies in 1939
Before moving onto other factors you could discuss the following ironies:
i)
ii)
iii)
Poland was a right wing, anti-Semitic state that had won territory from Czechoslovakia
in March 1939 when Hitler entered Prague
In the event of an attack on Poland there was little GB could actually do!
Hitler’s actual demands were quite reasonable: Danzig and access across the Polish
Corridor
Dominions convinced of need for war in 1939, not 1938
Growing belligerence of Cabinet – pressure from backbenchers in Sept 39
Public opinion had firmly moved against appeasement after March 1939
German military preparations had been exaggerated – growing belief that Germany was
in serious economic difficulties and unable to sustain a long war
Treasury View: considering the escalating costs of arms, it was better to have a war in
Sept 39 and ‘get it over with’
Specimen Question: How should you approach this question?
 This source-based controversy question attracts 40 marks – you should spend approx. 10 minutes studying the sources and 50 minutes writing your answer; you should write between
800 and 1000 words
 AO1: Recall, select & deploy: 16 marks
 For AO1 you need to offer a sustained analysis from your own knowledge integrated with analysis of the presented source material; you should demonstrate explicit understanding of
the key issues raised by the question, evaluating arguments and interpretations
 AO2 : Analysis & evaluation of interpretations: 24 marks
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




For AO2 you need to interpret the sources with discrimination (i.e. question their interpretations) and assimilate (i.e. cross-reference) the authors’ arguments; you should present a
sustained evaluative argument and reach a fully substantiated conclusion
Essentially you are integrating material from the sources with your own knowledge to reach a judgement
You should compare, contrast and evaluate the three sources, all of which will be secondary
OVERALL:
The examiner is looking for a sustained evaluative argument that does indeed evaluate the different arguments presented in the sources supplemented by considerable own
knowledge.
7. Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.
‘The Munich Settlement of September 1938 was a disaster for Britain.’
To what extent do you agree with this opinion? Explain your answer, using the evidence of Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60
SOURCE 7
(From W S Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1, published 1948)
Germany’s takeover of Czechoslovakia robbed the allies of the Czech army of twenty-one regular divisions, fifteen or sixteen second–line divisions already mobilised, and also their mountain
fortress line which, in the days of Munich, had required the deployment of thirty German divisions, or alternatively the main strength of the mobile and fully-trained German army. According to
Generals Halder and Jodl, there were but thirteen German divisions, of which only five were composed of front line troops, left in the West at the time of the Munich arrangement. We certainly
suffered a loss through the fall of Czechoslovakia equivalent to some thirty-five divisions. Besides this, the Skoda works, the second most important arsenal in central Europe, the production of
which between August 1938 and September 1939 was in itself nearly equal to the actual output of British arms factories in that period, was now at Germany’s disposal.
SOURCE 8
(From A J P Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, published 1961)
The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with far less clear intentions. Nor was it merely a
triumph for selfish or cynical British statesmen, indifferent to the fate of far-off peoples or calculating that Hitler might be launched against Soviet Russia. It was a triumph for all that was best
and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of
Versailles.
SOURCE 9
(From J C Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, published 1989)
Unlike Churchill in 1938, Chamberlain had knowledge of what passed for the French war-plan and of the latest report of the British Chiefs of Staff. The French plan was to wait behind the
Maginot Line until the British had expanded their army and the economic blockade began to bite. This was not a strategy that promised speedy relief to the Czechs, as the Poles were to discover
a year later.
The Chiefs were adamant that there was nothing that either France or Britain could do to ‘prevent Germany from overrunning Bohemia and inflicting a decisive defeat on Czechoslovakia’.
Britain was still a year away from when her rearmament programme would be substantially complete. The omens for war were not good.
7. Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.
‘The Munich Settlement of September 1938 was a disaster for Britain.’
To what extent do you agree with this opinion? Explain your answer, using the evidence of Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.
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The Munich Agreement, in the context of the events leading up to 1938, was not a disaster for Britain, and yet it is hard to see it as a total success in the context of the outbreak of the Second
World War. Certainly, while Churchill offers the widely held view in the post-war period that the policy of appeasement was largely responsible for the outbreak of war and that the Munich
Agreement was a disastrous failure and miscalculation of military strength in Europe, it is now hard to support such a view of Munich as being a part of a disastrous ‘policy of delusion
championed by an ineffective leader’. As Sources 8 and 9 suggest, the Munich Settlement must be viewed more as a moral, rational, logical and realistic policy based on a detailed assessment of
Britain's economic and military weakness and a clear realisation of her declining power and influence in the world.
Churchill’s assertion (Source 7) that ‘Germany’s takeover of Czechoslovakia robbed the allies of the Czech army’ that was superior the German army of the time as well as the loss of the Skoda
armaments works is hard to dispute. The German military command were indeed concerned about their military unpreparedness, as they demonstrated with some consternation in Hitler’s
th
outlining of war plans in the Hossbach Memorandum of November 5 , 1937. However, Churchill does not show the military intelligence and advice that Chamberlain’s Government received;
Source 9 states that ‘unlike Churchill in 1938, Chamberlain had knowledge of what passed for the French war-plan and of the latest report of the British Chiefs of Staff’. While Churchill, then,
may accurate in showing the relative numerical strengths of the Czech and German forces in 1938 he fails to understand, or show, the seeming military reality for Britain at the time. Source 9
shows that ‘the [military] chiefs were adamant that there was nothing that either France or Britain could do to prevent Germany…inflicting a decisive defeat on Czechoslovakia’. While the Chiefs
of staff advising Chamberlain’s government may have overestimated the German military strength in 1938 – it was short of tanks, fuel, ammunition, trained officers and reserves – they were
accurate in suggesting that little could be done to protect the Czechs from defeat. Churchill confuses numerical strength and the existence of the Skoda munitions plant with an effective military
force. The Chiefs of Staff and Chamberlain were correct in seeing Czech military vulnerability – their armed forces were weak and divided, with an insecure border in the Sudetenland, with the
likelihood that most Sudeten Germans and Slovaks would fight against the Czechs and with Czech military technology lagging behind German advances in tanks and aircraft. Furthermore,
Churchill fails to realise the reality of Britain’s military unpreparedness that Charmley shows – ‘Britain was still a year away from her rearmament programme being complete’. Nor could
Chamberlain have been convinced of the support of the ‘Soviet Union’ (Source 8) in forming what Churchill believed would be a ‘grand alliance’ to protect Czechoslovakia. Relations with the
USSR by 1938, while to a large extent the fault of Chamberlain and his government, was not sufficiently strong to guarantee such an alliance would stand firm over the Czech crisis. Obviously,
Churchill’s accusations need treating with some caution, with his clear agenda of showing the ‘appeasers’ as ‘guilty men’ leading to a rather contrived interpretation of the events around
Munich. As AJP Taylor correctly states (Source 8) Munich was not ‘merely a triumph for selfish or cynical British statesmen’; Munich was not signed solely through an ‘indifference to the fate of
far off peoples’. However, it is also hard to fully support Taylor’s moral argument of Munich providing a total ‘triumph’ of the ‘best and most enlightened’.
Taylor’s thesis clearly sees Munich as a ‘triumph’ in that it saw Britain and France reach a compromise with Germany over the Treaty of Versailles. Taylor sees that, unlike Churchill,
appeasement was not the cause of the Second World War but rather it was the Treaty of Versailles that was the root cause of the war. He therefore sees Munich as ‘a triumph for those who
preached equal justice between peoples’ and the application of national self-determination and also for those ‘who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles’. Taylor
sees the failure of Chamberlain’s government rather in abandoning appeasement after Munich and Hitler’s take-over of Czechoslovakia with the Polish Guarantee. However, Taylor’s thesis is
again too simplistic. It suggests that appeasement was to a large extent guided by moral concern over the ‘harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles’ and on British public opinion over
Versailles. This thesis, however, ignores the military realities of 1938 as argued by Charmley (Source 8). While the morality issue over the Versailles Treaty may have had an influence on British
foreign policy, especially in the arguments over self-determination for Sudeten Germans it provides on one influence in a complex inter-relationship of influences. Furthermore, while Taylor
implies the influence of public opinion linked to Versailles it is certain that public opinion before 1937 consistently opposed a strong stand being taken against the dictators outside the League
of Nations. The evidence of elections, by-election, and public opinion polls such the 1935 'Peace Ballot' all confirm this view. If public opinion did influence Munich it was more-so influenced by
the changing military and diplomatic scene of the late 1930s than a long-term moral concern over Versailles. Nevertheless, such public opinion would seem to make the Munich Agreement
understandable and justified, if not a triumph. Also, while Taylor dismisses the influence of the USSR in the Munich Agreement it was an influence – Chamberlain’s suspicions and uncertainty
over the likely stance of the USSR over the Czech Crisis further necessitated the agreement. In the light of public opinion and the uncertainty of the USSR’s position, then, it is hard to see the
Munich Settlement as a ‘disaster’.
Charmley provides the most satisfactory assessment of the Munich Settlement, then, in realising that the ‘omens were not good’ for Britain making a stand against Hitler over Czechoslovakia.
However, his focus is largely on the military situation. Taylor’s moral concerns cannot be ignored as also having an influence but Britain’s economic and imperial problems need to also be
considered….Taylor is correct to see that Chamberlain and most in the government and parliament believed that Germany had a genuine case for revision of the 1919 Peace settlement. Yet, as
Charmley shows, Chamberlain also knew that Britain lacked sufficient military and economic resources to fight Germany, however Charmley does not mentioned that it is also the combined
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threat of Germany, Italy and Japan that shapes appeasement and the Munich Agreement. In this context, the Munich Agreement was not a ‘disaster’ but rather an agreement in which
Chamberlain 'hoped for the best and prepared for the worst'. Munich provided a breathing space for British military preparation and, while it ultimately failed to avoid war, it was not the
disastrous cause of war that Churchill presented it as.
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