Police Pursuits:
An Overview of Law
and Policy Considerations
International Association
of Chiefs of Police
2007 Annual Conference
New Orleans, LA
Presented by
Alan Andrews,
High Point, N.C. Police Attorney
and
Julie Risher,
Winston-Salem, N.C. Public Safety
Attorney
Grateful acknowledgement goes to Wake Forest University School of Law student Matthew
Deutsch for his substantial assistance and research contributions.
Introduction
TheSu
pr
e
meCour
t
’
sr
e
c
e
ntde
c
i
s
i
oni
nScott v. Harris has been viewed by some
as a victory for law enforcement and a carte blanche for agencies to initiate highspeed pursuits in any situation. This perception however is far from the truth.
While the Court did limit the liability of law enforcement agencies to the fleeing
suspect, it did not limit liability to third parties or free officers from the
requirement that a seizure must be reasonable. Thus, an effective pursuit policy,
written with an understanding of the particular state tort laws, is essential to
protect agencies from liability when officers have chosen to initiate vehicular
pursuits.
I.
CIVIL LIABILITY
Creating an effective pursuit policy requires an understanding of the potential
civil ramifications that vehicular pursuits may pose. Possible liability issues may
be grouped as either a) potential liability to the fleeing suspect or b) potential
liability to third parties. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§1983) exposes law enforcement
agencies to civil liability under the Fourth Amendment when the agency has used
excessive force to apprehend a fleeing suspect during a pursuit. State tort law is
mos
tof
t
e
nut
i
l
i
z
e
di
nr
e
g
a
r
dt
ol
a
we
nf
or
c
e
me
nt
’
sr
e
s
po
ns
i
bi
l
i
t
yt
oi
nnoc
e
ntt
hi
r
d
parties, though in some instances §1983 actions have come into play.1
A.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability
Lawsuits pursuant to §1983 are likely to arise where the fleeing suspect
was injured or killed. §1983 allows a citizen to bring a lawsuit against a police
officer for a violation of the citizen's constitutional rights. There are two types of
§1983 suits: (1) Fourth Amendment suits where the officer intentionally makes
c
ont
a
c
twi
t
ht
hef
l
e
e
i
ngmot
or
i
s
t
’
sv
e
hi
c
l
e
;a
nd(
2
)Four
t
e
e
nt
hAme
ndme
nts
ui
t
s
where the injury occurred by accident. Allegations of unconstitutional seizures
under the Fourth Amendment are far more common in part because the Fourth
Amendment standard is an easier standard to prove. Recovery under the
Four
t
e
e
nt
hAme
ndme
nti
spos
s
i
bl
eb
uto
nl
yi
nt
hei
ns
t
a
nc
ewhe
r
et
heof
f
i
c
e
r
’
s
2
actions were so severe as to shock the conscience.
1. Fourth Amendment Recovery
To determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred two
questions must be answered affirmatively. First, was the suspect seized under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? And if so, was that seizure unreasonable
under the circumstances?
1
2
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir 1994).
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998).
1
In Brower v. County of Inyo3 decided in 1989, the United States Supreme
Court considered a case involving what has been described as a "deadman
roadblock." Police had chased a stolen vehicle at high speeds for approximately
20 miles. The driver Brower was killed when he crashed into a police roadblock
consisting of an 18-wheel tractor-trailer placed across both lanes of the two-lane
highway in the path of Brower's flight.4 The roadblock was "'effectively
concealed' by placing it behind a curve and leaving it unilluminated. . .and by
positioning a police car, with its headlights on, between Brower's oncoming
vehicle and the truck, so that Brower would be 'blinded' on his approach."5
The Court first held that the placement of this particular roadblock was
designed to produce a stop by physical force and as such was a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.6 A seizure is "a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. Brower was meant to
be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock -- and . . . was so stopped."7
The next question was whether the seizure was reasonable since the Fourth
Amendment only prohibits "unreasonable" seizures. The Court held that a jury
may conclude that the circumstances of the roadblock, particularly the use of
headlights to blind Brower, resulted in an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.8
Brower was the first Fourth Amendment case involving a police pursuit
that reached the Supreme Court. Its lesson is that a roadblock may be an
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment if officers set up a
roadblock in such a manner that it is likely to kill the driver, especially when the
driver is not given the option to stop. Accordingly, a roadblock must be set up in a
reasonable manner, such as at the end of a long straightaway or in a way that
gives the driver a reasonable opportunity to stop the vehicle.
2. Third Party Fourteenth Amendment Recovery
In cases when the officer accidentally makes contact with the suspect or
the suspect's vehicle, a claim may arise under the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause, but it is unlikely to succeed. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis9
decided in 1988, the Supreme Court considered whether an accident between a
deputy and a motorcycle passenger resulting in death of the passenger violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Lewis a deputy observed a motorcycle with two people approaching at a
high rate of speed. The deputy attempted to stop the motorcycle by turning on his
3
Bower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
Bower at 594.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 598.
7
Id. at 599.
8
Id.
9
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1988).
4
2
blue lights and yelling at the boys to stop. The pursuit lasted for only 75 seconds
over 1.3 miles in a residential neighborhood, with the motorcycle weaving in and
out of oncoming traffic and forcing vehicles off the road. The motorcycle and
patrol car reached speeds up to 100 miles an hour, with the deputy following at a
distance as close as 100 feet; at that speed, his car would have required 650 feet to
stop. The chase ended after the motorcycle tipped over as the fleeing driver
attempted to make a sharp left turn. By the time the deputy slammed on his
brakes, the driver was out of the way but the passenger Lewis was not. The patrol
car skidded into Lewis at 40 miles an hour, propelling him some 70 feet down the
road and inflicting massive injuries. He was pronounced dead at the scene.10
In the lawsuit, Lewis' family argued that the deputy violated Lewis'
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by causing his death through
deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high speed automobile chase aimed
at apprehending a suspect. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the due
process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment is only violated when there is
arbitrary conduct that shocks the conscience.11 The Court explained that "a
police officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand the need
to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and on
the other, the high-speed threat to everyone within stopping range, be they
suspects, their passengers, other drivers, or bystanders."12 The Court concluded
t
ha
tt
hede
put
y
’
sa
c
t
i
onsi
np
ur
s
i
ngt
hemot
or
c
y
c
l
edi
dnots
hoc
kt
hec
o
ns
c
i
e
nc
e
and therefore was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. State Negligence Claims
Nearly every state has some statutory language that exempts law
enforcement vehicles from normal traffic laws when in pursuit of a suspect or
when traveling to an emergency.13 States, however, vary widely on the standard
of care police officers owe to third parties during pursuits. Some states grant
almost no immunity and expose officers and departments to liability for simple
negligence for their actions14 while others attempt to grant complete immunity to
officers engaged in pursuits.15 It is helpful to think of this as a spectrum of
liability, with the simple negligence standard on the left, gross negligence roughly
in the middle, and almost complete immunity on the right.16
10
Id. at 853.
Sacramento at 853.
12
Id.
13
An example is in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-145:“
The speed limitations set forth in this Article shall
not apply to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the police in
the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or of persons charged with or suspected of any
s
uc
hv
i
ol
a
t
i
o
n…”
14
Nebraska and their innocent third party statute is the ultimate example of preserving proximate
cause for the liability of government agencies. Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-911 (1987).
15
California lies at this end of the spectrum, with only a slim window open for state liability in
police pursuits. Cal. Veh. Code 17004 (2005).
16
Pa
t
r
i
c
kO’
Conn
or&Wi
l
l
i
a
mNor
s
e
,Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad
Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability Law, 57 Mercer L. Rev 511, 517 (2006).
11
3
The simple negligence and gross negligence standards represent two
different approaches to what in many cases arise from almost exactly the same
statutory language. The problem comes from the language in the Uniform Vehicle
Code which has been adopted by a number of states. An example of this is found
in Arizona state law, which sta
t
e
s
,“
Thi
ss
e
c
t
i
ond
oe
snotr
e
l
i
e
v
et
hedr
i
v
e
rofa
n
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons and does not protect the driver from the consequences of the
17
driver's reckless disregard for the safety ofot
he
r
s
.
”
The confusion stems from
t
hef
a
c
tt
ha
tt
he‘
dut
yt
odr
i
v
ewi
t
hduer
e
g
a
r
df
o
rt
hes
a
f
e
t
yofa
l
lpe
r
s
o
ns
’s
e
e
ms
t
obeas
i
mpl
ene
g
l
i
ge
nc
es
t
a
nda
r
dwhi
l
et
he‘
r
e
c
kl
e
s
sdi
s
r
e
g
a
r
d’l
a
ng
ua
g
ei
st
he
framework of a gross negligence standard. State courts have been split in deciding
whether to apply the negligence or gross negligence standard, both of which
a
ppe
a
ri
nt
heu
ni
f
o
r
mc
ode
’
sl
a
ng
ua
g
e
.
1. Simple Negligence
On the left end of the spectrum, many states have chosen to set the
standard of liability for police officers at simple negligence.18 Courts in these
states have been willing to find negligence on the part of the officer for simply
engaging in a pursuit where there is a risk of danger, while others have even held
the initial decision to pursue may be negligent in and of itself.19 Every agency in a
jurisdiction where simple negligence is the standard needs to know what actions
wi
l
lt
r
i
gg
e
raf
i
ndi
ngne
g
l
i
g
e
nc
eunde
rt
he
i
rr
e
s
pe
c
t
i
v
es
t
a
t
e
’
sl
i
a
bi
l
i
t
ys
t
a
nda
r
d
s
.
In Haynes v. Hamilton County, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied a
s
i
mpl
ene
gl
i
ge
nc
es
t
a
nda
r
dt
ot
hepol
i
c
eof
f
i
c
e
r
’
sa
c
t
i
onsa
n
dt
o
okav
e
r
ybr
oa
d
20
v
i
e
woft
het
e
r
m‘
c
onduc
t
.
’ In denying a motion for summary judgment, the
court held that negligent police conduct in either the initiation or continuation of a
high-speed chase can be the proximate cause of injuries to innocent third parties.21
In Tennessee, factors such as weather conditions, levels of traffic, alternate
methods of apprehension, and suspected criminal activity are balanced to
determine whether the chase is reasonable.
Pennsylvania has taken a joint liability approach. There, the state supreme
court in Jones v. City of Philadelphia22 ruled that police officers can be held
jointly liable with a fleeing driver. In that case a Philadelphia police officer began
a police pursuit without a working siren, and the supervisor failed to terminate the
pursuit. The officer collided with the vehicle and the passenger was killed. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that even though the driver was negligent
17
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §28-624 (2007).
At least 25 states have applied this standard.
19
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §28-624 (2007).
20
Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994).
21
Id. at 607.
22
Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 700 A.2d. 417 (Pa. 1997).
18
4
by fleeing from the police, a governmental party is not immune from liability
whe
ni
t
sne
g
l
i
ge
nc
e
,a
l
ongwi
t
hat
hi
r
dpa
r
t
y
’
sne
gl
i
ge
nc
e
,c
a
us
e
dha
r
m.
State courts differ on whether to factor in such things as the underlying
crime or department pursuit policies in determining whether a chase was
conducted negligently. However all states that apply the simple negligence
s
t
a
nda
r
dha
v
el
a
ng
ua
g
es
i
mi
l
a
rt
oI
ndi
a
na
’
s“
dr
i
v
e
r
sofe
me
r
g
e
nc
yv
e
hi
c
l
e
sa
r
e
23
not relieved from the duty to drive with due r
e
g
a
r
df
o
rt
hes
a
f
e
t
yofa
l
lpe
r
s
ons
.
”
Law enforcement officers in these states are in danger of being held liable under a
proximate cause theory for almost any innocent party harmed during a pursuit.
2. Gross Negligence/Recklessness
Choosing to remain somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, some state courts
ha
v
ef
ou
ndt
he“
r
e
c
kl
e
s
sd
i
s
r
e
g
a
r
d”l
a
ng
ua
g
et
obet
h
emos
ta
ppr
o
pr
i
a
t
es
t
a
nda
r
d
to use when applying the Uniform Vehicle Code and similar statutes. The Iowa
Supreme Court noted that while Iowa courts generally hold police officers to a
s
t
a
nda
r
dofd
uec
a
r
e
,“
p
ol
i
c
epr
ot
e
c
t
i
onf
r
e
ef
r
omt
hec
hi
l
l
i
nge
f
f
e
c
tofl
i
a
bi
l
i
t
yf
or
split-s
e
c
ondde
c
i
s
i
ons
”i
sa
ni
mpor
t
a
ntj
us
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
onf
orus
i
ngt
he“
r
e
c
kl
e
s
s
24
di
s
r
e
g
a
r
d”s
t
a
nda
r
di
npol
i
c
epur
s
ui
t
s
.
While some state courts use the term
gross negligence instead of recklessness, the standards of liability are principally
the same.
The common standard for gross negligence is laid out by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Norris v. Zambito.25 The suspect in that case, who at
the time of the pursuit was drunk and had a history of fleeing from the police,
crashed into and killed an innocent third party during the pursuit. In a lawsuit
filed by the estate of the third party, the court said the Durham police could not be
l
i
a
bl
eunl
e
s
st
he
ye
ng
a
g
e
di
n“
wa
nt
o
nc
o
nd
uc
tdo
newi
t
hc
ons
c
i
o
uso
rr
e
c
kl
e
s
s
26
di
s
r
e
g
a
r
df
ort
her
i
g
ht
sa
n
ds
a
f
e
t
yofot
he
r
s
.
”
The court then weighed the same
factors that courts use when determining simple negligence, such as pursuit
procedure and amount of surrounding traffic, to determine whether the officer had
engaged in gross negligence.
Ot
he
rc
o
ur
t
sha
v
ede
s
c
r
i
be
dt
hes
t
a
nda
r
da
sa“
c
ons
c
i
ousorr
e
c
kl
e
s
s
disregard of an unreasonably high probability of injury to the public despite the
27
absence o
fs
i
g
ni
f
i
c
a
ntc
ou
nt
e
r
v
a
i
l
i
ngl
a
we
nf
or
c
e
me
ntbe
ne
f
i
t
s
”
or“
whe
na
n
officer is so indifferent to the consequences of his conduct as not to give a slight
28
c
a
r
ea
st
owha
thei
sd
oi
ng
.
”
While balancing the same factors as in a simple
negligence jurisdiction the bar is set higher in order to allow police officers the
23
Ind. Code 9-21-1-8 (2005).
Morris v. City of Des Moines, 534 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1995).
25
Norris v. Zambito, 135 N.C.App. 288 (N.C. 1999).
26
Zambito at 293.
27
Eckard v. Iredell County, 630 S.E.2d. 134 (N.C. 2003).
28
Clark v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety, 608 S.E.2d. 573 (S.C. 2005).
24
5
leeway to make the split-second decision to engage in a high speed pursuit
without undue fear of liability.
2. Discretionary Immunity
Finally on the right side of the spectrum some states regard police pursuits
as a discretionary as opposed to a ministerial act. Instead of adopting legislation
like that found in the Uniform Vehicle Code, they have statutory language similar
t
ot
ha
tf
o
un
di
nCa
l
i
f
or
ni
a
’
sVe
hi
c
l
eCode
.Thel
a
ng
ua
g
ei
nCa
l
i
f
or
ni
a
’
sc
ode
s
t
a
t
e
st
ha
tapubl
i
ce
mpl
oy
e
ei
snotc
i
v
i
l
l
yl
i
a
bl
ef
ori
nj
ur
i
e
so
rde
a
t
h“
r
e
s
ul
t
i
ng
f
r
omt
heo
pe
r
a
t
i
on,
i
nt
hel
i
neofdut
y
,ofa
na
ut
h
or
i
z
e
de
me
r
g
e
nc
yv
e
hi
c
l
e
…i
n
29
t
hei
mme
di
a
t
epur
s
ui
to
fa
na
c
t
ua
lors
us
pe
c
t
e
dv
i
ol
a
t
oro
ft
hel
a
w.
”
No state, however, grants officers complete and total immunity, as each
state that views police pursuits as a discretionary function carves out some type of
exception. The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that discretionary immunity is
30
only applicable if the officer i
sf
ol
l
owi
ngt
hede
pa
r
t
me
nt
’
spur
s
ui
tpol
i
c
y
,
while
the California Vehicle Code explicitly states that a department is only granted
discretionary immunity if it has a pursuit policy in place.31 The Georgia Supreme
Court set the bar as high as a §1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment by
stating that the only way to hold a police officer liable would be through evidence
that he or she acted with malice or intent to injure the plaintiff.32
II.
SCOTT v. HARRIS
A. Facts of the Case
In March 2001, a Georgia county de
put
yc
l
oc
ke
dr
e
s
po
nde
ntHa
r
r
i
s
’v
e
hi
c
l
e
traveling 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. The deputy subsequently
activated his blue flashing lights in an attempt to pull the respondent over. Instead
of pulling over the respondent fled, initiating a chase on what is primarily a twolane road at speeds in excess of 85 miles per hour. The deputy broadcast the
license plate number and Deputy Scott, upon hearing the broadcast, joined in the
chase. In the midst of the pursuit Harris pulled into a parking lot and was nearly
bo
xe
di
nbute
l
u
de
dc
a
pt
ur
ebyc
ol
l
i
di
ngwi
t
hSc
ot
t
’
spol
i
c
ec
r
ui
s
e
rbe
f
o
r
ea
g
a
i
n
speeding off.
Harris continued at speeds upwards of 90 miles per hour, driving through
numerous red lights and forcing vehicles off the road. Six minutes and nearly ten
miles after the chase had begun, Scott asked his supervisor for permission to
execute a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT) maneuver to terminate the
chase, which was granted. (A PIT maneuver is intended to cause a fleeing vehicle
29
Cal. Veh. Code 17004 (2005).
Mumm v. Mornson, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 5 (Minn. 2006).
31
Cal. Veh. Code 17004 (2005).
32
Cameron v. Lang, 544 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. 2001).
30
6
to safely spin to a stop.) Scott, however, determined the cars were moving too fast
to safely execute a PIT maneuver and instead pushed the bumper of his patrol car
i
nt
ot
heba
c
kofHa
r
r
i
s
’v
e
hi
c
l
e
.Thi
sc
ont
a
c
tc
a
us
e
dHa
r
r
i
st
ol
os
ec
ont
r
ola
nd
crash into an embankment, rendering him a quadriplegic.
Harris sued Scott as well as numerous Georgia state entities under §1983 alleging
that the contact which caused him to crash was an unconstitutional seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. Scott filed a motion for summary judgment based on an
assertion of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that
“
t
he
r
ea
r
ema
t
e
r
i
a
li
s
s
ue
soff
a
c
tonwhi
c
ht
hei
s
s
ueofqua
l
i
f
i
e
di
mmuni
t
yt
ur
n
s
33
which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a j
u
r
y
.
”
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with this decision.
It is important to note that both the district court and circuit court viewed the facts
of the incident as portrayed by respondent Harris.
B. Decision and Reasoning
The overarching consideration applicable to all use of force cases under the
Fourth Amendment is the objective reasonableness test laid out by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. Conner.34 The question then in this case is whether Deputy
Sc
ot
t
’
sa
c
t
i
onsi
nt
hepursuit of Harris were reasonable under the circumstances as
viewed by a reasonable person.35
Balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion against the importance of the
governmental interest, the Court compared the probable likelihood that a high
speed collision would seriously injure Harris against the actual and imminent
threat posed by Harris to the public (which Scott intended to eliminate).36 While
t
henumbe
rofl
i
v
e
sa
tr
i
s
ki
sr
e
l
e
v
a
nt
,t
heCour
tc
ons
i
de
r
swha
ti
tc
a
l
l
e
d“
r
e
l
a
t
i
ve
c
ul
pa
bi
l
i
t
y
”i
nt
heba
l
a
nc
i
ngt
e
s
t
.“
Wet
hi
nki
ta
ppr
o
pr
i
a
t
ei
nt
hi
spr
oc
e
s
st
ot
a
k
e
into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative
37
c
ul
pa
bi
l
i
t
y
.
”
The Court went on to conclude that while the motoring public in
the area was innocent, Harris was culpable because by initiating the chase he had
placed himself and others in danger. Thus the intrusion, while severe, did not
v
i
ol
a
t
eHa
r
r
i
s
’Four
t
hAme
ndme
ntr
i
g
ht
s
.
33
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). citing Harris v. Coweta County, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27348 (N.D. Ga., Sept. 23, 2003).
34
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
35
Justice Scalia points out that at the summary judgment stage, determining all the relevant facts
and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-mov
i
ngpa
r
t
y
,de
t
e
r
mi
ni
ngwhe
t
he
rr
e
s
ponde
nt
’
s
actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a pure question of law, and is not taking the
decision out of the hands of the jury.
36
Ha
r
r
i
s“
pos
e
da
na
c
t
ua
la
ndi
mmi
ne
ntt
hr
e
a
tt
ot
hel
i
v
e
sofa
nype
de
s
t
r
i
a
nswhomi
g
htha
v
ebe
e
n
present, to other civil motor
i
s
t
s
,
a
ndt
ot
heof
f
i
c
e
r
si
nv
ol
v
e
di
nt
hec
ha
s
e
…Sc
ot
t
’
sa
c
t
i
on
sp
os
e
da
high likelihood of serious injury or death to Harris –though not the near certainty of death posed
by
,s
a
y
,s
hoot
i
ngaf
l
e
e
i
ngf
e
l
o
ni
nt
heba
c
koft
hehe
a
d…orpul
l
i
nga
l
ong
s
i
deaf
l
e
e
i
ngmot
or
i
s
t
’
s
car and shooting the motorist. Scott v. Harris at 1778.
37
Scott v. Harris at 1778.
7
TheCou
r
t
’
sl
og
i
cboi
l
e
ddownt
oonei
mpor
t
a
ntpoi
n
t
,t
ha
tHa
r
r
i
swa
smor
e
culpable not because of the nature of the underlying crime (in this case speeding)
butbe
c
a
us
eofHa
r
r
i
s
’de
c
i
s
i
on,i
nt
hec
o
ur
t
’
swor
ds
,
t
o“
i
ni
t
i
a
t
e
”t
hec
ha
s
eby
choosing not to stop for blue lights and sirens thereby endangering the public.
That culpability offs
e
toro
ut
we
i
g
he
dt
hes
u
bs
t
a
nt
i
a
ll
i
ke
l
i
hoodofHa
r
r
i
s
’de
a
t
hor
serious injury if Scott collided with him.
Three other noteworthy points put the Scott decision in perspective. First the
court never addressed the underlying offense that initiated the traffic stop and
further declined to say that forcible seizures after pursuits for minor crimes are
categorically unreasonable. Most pursuit policies now in place consider the nature
of the underlying crime for which the suspect is being pursued along with other
factors. In view of potential liability under state laws, departments should be
careful in their decision whether or not to factor in the underlying offense in light
of this decision.38
Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment’
s
objective reasonableness standard required Deputy Scott to discontinue the
pur
s
ui
t
,n
ot
i
ngt
ha
t“
t
heCons
t
i
t
ut
i
ona
s
s
u
r
e
dl
ydoe
snoti
mpos
et
hi
si
nv
i
t
a
t
i
ont
o
39
impunity-earned-by-r
e
c
kl
e
s
s
ne
s
s
.
”
Ra
t
he
r
,J
us
t
i
c
eSc
a
l
i
awr
ot
et
ha
t“
apol
i
c
e
of
f
i
c
e
r
’
sa
t
t
e
mpt to terminate a dangerous, high-speed car chase that threatens the
lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
40
pl
a
c
e
st
hef
l
e
e
i
ngmot
or
i
s
t
sa
tr
i
s
ko
fs
e
r
i
o
usi
n
j
u
r
yorde
a
t
h.
”
Third, policy makers must remember that this case did not involve a claim by
a
ni
nj
ur
e
dt
hi
r
dpa
r
t
y
.Thu
s
,t
hi
sc
a
s
edoe
snota
dd
r
e
s
sa
no
f
f
i
c
e
r
’
sorc
i
t
y
’
s
liability in the third party injury context, particularly under state law. Review of
applicable state law is still imperative in crafting any revisions to pursuit policy in
light of the Scott decision.
C. Applicability of Tennessee v. Garner
Respondent Harris urged the Supreme Court in this case to apply the standards
laid out in Tennessee v. Garner41 because, like Garner, this case dealt with law
e
nf
o
r
c
e
me
nt
’
sus
eofde
a
d
l
yf
or
c
e
.Unde
rGarner three preconditions must be met
before an officers use of deadly force can survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny:
(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to
the officer or others; (2) deadly force must be necessary to prevent serious
physical harm, either to the officers or to others; and (3) where feasible, the
officer must have given the suspect some warning.42 Harris argued that Gar
ne
r
’
s
preconditions were not met by Scott, making his actions per se unreasonable.43
38
Because Scott is a seizure case and not a pursuit case, the Court did not mention many of the
f
a
c
t
or
so
f
t
e
ni
nc
l
u
de
di
nde
pa
r
t
me
nt
’
sp
ur
s
ui
tp
ol
i
c
i
e
s
.
39
Scott at 1779.
40
Id.
41
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
42
Garner at 9-12.
43
Scott at 1777.
8
The Court in Scott wa
sn
otpe
r
s
ua
de
dbyHa
r
r
i
s
’a
r
g
ume
nt
s
,howe
v
e
r
.
“
Re
s
ponde
nt
’
sa
r
g
ume
ntf
a
l
t
e
r
sa
ti
t
sf
i
r
s
ts
t
e
p;Garner did not establish a magical
on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever a
nof
f
i
c
e
r
’
sa
c
t
i
ons
44
c
ons
t
i
t
ut
ede
a
dl
yf
or
c
e
.
”
They instead stated that Garner was just an application
of the Graham reasonableness test to the specific circumstances of the Garner
case. In Garner the officer shot a fleeing suspect in the back, while here Deputy
Sc
ot
ts
t
uc
ka
n
ot
he
rc
a
rwi
t
hhi
sowni
na
na
t
t
e
mptt
os
t
opt
hec
a
r
.
“
Wha
t
e
v
e
r
Garner said about the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that
c
a
s
e
,s
uc
h‘
pr
e
c
on
di
t
i
ons
’ha
v
es
c
a
nta
ppl
i
c
a
bi
l
i
t
yt
ot
hi
sc
a
s
e
,whi
c
hha
sv
a
s
t
l
y
45
di
f
f
e
r
e
ntf
a
c
t
s
.
”
Scott does not overturn Garner but rather puts it in its place,
distinguishing different standards for reasonableness depending on how and when
de
a
dl
yf
or
c
ei
sus
e
d.“
Al
t
houg
hr
e
s
p
on
de
nt
’
sa
t
t
e
mptt
oc
r
a
f
ta
ne
a
s
y
-to-apply
legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still
46
s
l
os
ho
urwa
yt
hr
oug
ht
hef
a
c
t
bou
ndmor
a
s
sofr
e
a
s
o
na
bl
e
ne
s
s
.
”
III.
PURSUIT POLICIES
A. The Importance of Having a Pursuit Policy
Scott v. Harris grants law enforcement agencies a measure of freedom from
c
i
v
i
ll
i
a
bi
l
i
t
yunde
r§1
98
3f
orv
e
hi
c
ul
a
rpu
r
s
ui
t
s
,r
e
c
o
g
ni
z
i
ngl
a
we
nf
or
c
e
me
nt
’
s
need to apprehend fleeing suspects. However as Brower v. County of Inyo
illustrates, this decision should not be interpreted to allow officers unlimited
discretion to begin and forcefully end pursuits as they see fit. To protect law
enforcement officers from civil liability, every agency that operates vehicles with
blue lights and sirens should have a policy regarding pursuits. Creating a sound
policy provides a map for employees to follow, provides management the
authority to oversee pursuits, and enhances the operation of any organization.
B. Factors to Consider When Creating Policy
It would be difficult if not impossible to create one policy for all law
enforcement a
g
e
nc
i
e
si
nt
hec
ount
r
y
.I
ns
t
e
a
de
a
c
ha
g
e
nc
y
’
spur
s
ui
tp
ol
i
c
ymus
t
t
a
kei
nt
oa
c
c
ou
ntt
hea
g
e
nc
y
’
smi
s
s
i
on,s
i
z
e
,l
oc
a
t
i
on,a
n
dj
u
r
i
s
di
c
t
i
on.“
The
formulation of specific agency policies must take into account local political and
community perspectives and customs, perogatives and demands; often divergent
law enforcement strategies and philosophies; and the impact of varied agency
47
r
e
s
ou
r
c
ec
a
pa
bi
l
i
t
i
e
s
,a
mongot
he
rf
a
c
t
or
s
.
”
In primarily urban and suburban
areas like Atlanta, policymakers have recognized that the need to apprehend the
offender does not usually outweigh the inherent risks of a pursuit in such a
44
Id.
Scott at 1778
46
Id.
47
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy, Vehicular Pursuit, Oct. 1996.
http://www/theiacp.org/pubinfo/PolCtr
45
9
congested environment.48 In more rural areas where the risks a pursuit poses to
innocent motorists might be somewhat diminished, a more flexible policy for
engaging in pursuits may be appropriate.
1. Specificity and Flexibility
Any pursuit policy must be specific enough to protect the police officers
from liability, yet flexible enough to allow officers to do their jobs. A policy that
sets specific criteria for engaging in a pursuit stands a better chance of protecting
an officer from liability if it ensures that when terminating a pursuit, the officer
does so in a reasonable manner. Further an effective pursuit policy can protect
officers from liability to third parties under state tort laws by ensuring that
officers operate with the appropriate level of care to the public when engaging in
pursuits. Such a standard will answer questions like whether to pursue for
misdemeanor offenses or traffic violations, and how to proceed when the violator
is already operating the vehicle in a dangerous manner.
Still, any pursuit policy must be both flexible and practical. In the few
seconds after the suspect begins to flee, the officer must weigh the known facts of
the s
i
t
ua
t
i
on,a
ppl
yt
hede
pa
r
t
me
nt
’
spur
s
ui
tpol
i
c
yt
ot
hos
ef
a
c
t
s
,a
n
dde
t
e
r
mi
ne
whether to engage in pursuit. The policy must be short and simple enough (if the
policy is over 5 pages it is likely too long) so that the officer will be able to
quickly decide whether a pursuit will be authorized in that situation.
2. Specific Conditions
No policy can account for every situation that may confront an officer
when a suspect refuses to pull over. It is important to recognize that a
discretionary policy does not mean that officers will always initiate the pursuit or,
conversely, will never discontinue the pursuit. The essence of a discretionary
policy is that the officer at all times –prior to initiation and during the pursuit,
weighs the risks of the pursuit versus the danger to the public in allowing the
suspect to remain at large.
While apprehension of a suspect is always desirable, a pursuit may create
an even greater danger to the public than that posed by the violator being allowed
to escape. Once the necessary requirements under a pursuit policy to initiate a
pur
s
ui
t(
s
uc
ha
sas
uf
f
i
c
i
e
n
tunde
r
l
y
i
ngc
r
i
me
)ha
v
ebe
e
nme
t
,ade
pa
r
t
me
nt
’
s
policy should require an officer to consider a list of factors to determine whether
it is reasonable to initiate or continue a pursuit. Such factors include the
following:
 Volume of traffic;
 Location of pursuit –urban, suburban, or rural area;
48
Atlanta Police Department SOP 3050 Pursuit Policy.
10






Driving abilities of the officer;
Condition of the authorized emergency response vehicle;
Weather conditions;
Road conditions –poor road conditions, narrow and winding roads;
Speeds involved; and
Traveling against traffic –particularly on a divided highway.
The pursuing officer should continually reevaluate these conditions over
the course of a pursuit as the situation may change and render the chase
unnecessarily unsafe to the public. Further the pursing officer should be in contact
with communications at all times, giving details such as the reason for the pursuit,
present location, and direction of travel. A field supervisor should be apprised of
the pursuit and should be responsible for terminating the pursuit when, in his
determination, the threat created outweighs the necessity of the immediate
apprehension of the suspect.
3. Pursuit Training
Due to the dangerous nature of vehicular pursuits, it is imperative that all
officers receive sufficient training before they are authorized to initiate pursuits of
fleeing suspects. Not only do untrained officers pose a much higher risk to the
innocent public but they also expose the police department to potential legal
liability. In Usher v. Trafton49 a police officer engaged in the pursuit of a vehicle
who would not pull over after a speeding violation. The pursuit ended up severely
injuring a third party. Since the Town of Berwick could produce no evidence that
the officer had been adequately trained in pursuit procedures, the court concluded
that the plaintiff in the case could present a claim of negligent training to a jury
under Maine tort law.50
In contrast, if a municipality can show that an officer has received pursuit
training they are likely to be protected from negligent training tort claims. In
Chenoweth v. Wilson51 a van driven by a fleeing drunk driver struck and killed the
plaintiff whose estate subsequently brought a negligent training claim. The
I
ndi
a
naCour
tofAp
pe
a
l
ss
t
a
t
e
d,“
Att
hev
e
r
yl
e
a
s
t
,unc
o
nt
r
ov
e
r
t
e
de
v
i
de
nc
et
ha
t
the officer had completed the statutory training would establish the rebuttable
52
pr
e
s
umpt
i
onofa
de
q
ua
t
et
r
a
i
ni
ngoft
heof
f
i
c
e
r
.
”
Since defendants submitted
evidence that established that Officer Chenoweth had been trained as required by
law and the plaintiff presented no evidence that the training was inadequate, the
pl
a
i
nt
i
f
f
’
sc
l
a
i
mofne
g
l
i
ge
ntt
r
a
i
ni
ngwa
sdi
s
mi
s
s
e
da
sama
t
t
e
rofl
a
wa
t
summary judgment.53 Ensuring that officers are adequately trained in pursuit
49
Usher v. Trafton, 1989 Me. Super. Lexis 161 (Me. 1989).
Usher at 18.
51
Chenoweth v. Wilson, 827 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 2005).
52
Wilson at 49.
53
Wilson at 52.
50
11
procedure is essential to limit dangers to the public as well as to limit the liability
of the individual law enforcement departments.
4. Consideration of the Underlying Crime
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris did not take into
a
c
c
ountt
heun
de
r
l
y
i
ngc
r
i
mei
nde
t
e
r
mi
ni
ngwhe
t
he
rDe
p
ut
ySc
ot
t
’
sa
c
t
i
ons
constituted an unreasonable seizure. This, however, does not mean that
departments should disregard the underlying crime in crafting pursuit policies for
two reasons. The first is that the court did not address the underlying crime in
Scott v. Harris at all, leaving the topic open for the Supreme Court to revisit at a
later date. Second and more importantly, the underlying crime may still be
relevant in third party state tort law claims against law enforcement agencies. To
avoid a finding of liability in state court, agencies with a simple negligence
s
t
a
nda
r
dma
ywi
s
ht
oe
v
a
l
ua
t
ewhe
t
he
rt
ode
s
i
g
na
t
e“
noc
ha
s
e
”c
r
i
me
sort
oc
r
e
a
te
firmly defined criteria regarding crimes that can lead to a pursuit.
5. Discontinuing the Pursuit
Finally, a pursuit policy should address under what circumstances a pursuit
should be discontinued. In Scott v. Harris the Supreme Court specifically stated
t
ha
tapur
s
ui
ts
ho
ul
dnotb
edi
s
c
ont
i
nue
ds
i
mpl
ybe
c
a
us
ei
ti
sda
ng
e
r
ous
.“
(
W)
e
are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get
away whenever they drive so recklessly t
ha
tt
he
yputot
he
rpe
opl
e
’
sl
i
v
e
si
n
54
da
ng
e
r
.
”
If that were the case, every fleeing motorist would know that all he had
to do was drive dangerously enough to get the police to stop the chase. However
not all state courts have been so sympathetic. In Tetro v. Town of Stratford55 a
vehicle attempted to elude police by driving the wrong way down a one-way
street, causing a multiple car collision. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected
t
heof
f
i
c
e
r
’
smot
i
onf
ors
u
mma
r
yj
udg
me
nthol
di
ngt
ha
tt
her
e
c
kl
e
s
s
ne
s
soft
he
operator of the pursued car did not relieve the police of liability because the
pl
a
i
nt
i
f
f
’
si
nj
ur
yc
oul
dbef
ou
ndt
of
a
l
lwi
t
hi
nt
hes
c
opeoft
her
i
s
kc
r
e
a
t
e
dbyt
he
police in maintaining the pursuit.56 A department may want to consider
discontinuing a chase if it becomes too dangerous, particularly to innocent third
parties, especially if other options are available to track down the driver at a later
time such as using the license plate information or even continuing to track the car
by helicopter.
IV.
IN-CAR VIDEO USE & RETENTION
A. Use in Court
54
Scott v. Harris at 1779.
Tetro v. Town of Stratford , 458 A.2d 5 (Conn. 1983).
56
Tetro at 10.
55
12
An important point in Scott v. Harris i
st
heSup
r
e
meCour
t
’
sde
c
i
s
i
ont
ous
e
the in-car video recording made during the chase by Deputy Scott to determine
the relevant facts. This is a significant departure from the established tradition, if
not precedent, of courts accepting the facts in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the summary judgment motion in qualified immunity cases.57
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, following established practice, had
a
c
c
e
pt
e
dpl
a
i
nt
i
f
f
s
’pr
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
onoft
hef
a
c
t
si
nt
hi
sc
a
s
e
.“
Ta
ki
ngt
hef
a
c
t
sf
r
o
m
the non-mov
a
nt
’
sv
i
e
wpoi
nt
,[
r
e
s
po
nde
nt
]r
e
ma
i
ne
di
nc
ont
r
olofhi
sv
e
hi
c
l
e
,
slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He
58
did not run any motorists off the road. Nor was he a threat to pede
s
t
r
i
a
ns
…”
“
I
nde
e
d,
”a
sJ
us
t
i
c
eSc
a
l
i
aobs
e
r
v
e
s
,“
r
e
a
di
ngt
hel
o
we
rc
o
ur
t
’
sopi
ni
on,
o
neg
e
t
s
the impression that respondent, rather then fleeing from police, was attempting to
59
pa
s
shi
sdr
i
v
i
ngt
e
s
t
.
”
Without the in-car video of the incident, this is the version
of events the Supreme Court would have likely had to accept on appeal from the
Eleventh Circuit. If that had been the case it is likely the Supreme Court would
ha
v
ef
ou
ndaq
ue
s
t
i
onofma
t
e
r
i
a
lf
a
c
ta
st
owhe
t
he
rSc
ot
tv
i
ol
a
t
e
dHa
r
r
i
s
’
constitutional rights, allowing the case to proceed to trial.
The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
60
pa
r
t
yonl
ywhe
r
et
he
r
ei
sa“
g
e
nui
ne
”di
s
p
ut
et
ot
hos
ef
a
c
t
s
.
When instead there
are two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of
the facts for the purposes of ruling for summary judgment.61 The actual event
r
e
c
or
de
dont
hepol
i
c
eof
f
i
c
e
r
s
’da
s
h-mounted cameras told such a different story
f
r
omHa
r
r
i
s
’t
ha
tt
heSupr
e
meCour
tdi
s
r
e
g
a
r
de
dHa
r
r
i
s
’v
e
r
s
i
onoft
hef
a
c
t
si
ni
t
s
entirety. It explained that there was no longer a question of material fact because
Ha
r
r
i
s
’de
s
c
r
i
pt
i
onwa
spl
a
i
nl
yi
na
c
c
ur
a
t
e
.Wa
t
c
hi
ngt
hea
c
t
ua
lt
a
pe
s to review the
case, the justices ruled that the facts did not support a constitutional claim against
Scott. The tapes were convincing enough to sway Justice Breyer, who may have
otherwise upheld the decision against summary judgment.62 In fact the Supreme
Cour
twe
nts
of
a
ra
st
oc
ha
s
t
i
s
et
hel
owe
rc
ou
r
t
sf
orr
e
l
y
i
ngonpl
a
i
nt
i
f
f
s
’v
e
r
s
i
on
oft
hef
a
c
t
s
,s
t
a
t
i
ngt
ha
t“
TheCou
r
tofAp
pe
a
l
ss
h
oul
dn
otha
v
er
e
l
i
e
do
ns
uc
h
visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
63
v
i
de
ot
a
pe
.
”
B. Policy Concerning Retention
Recent technological advances have made in-car cameras far more practical
and useful. Until just a few years ago recording in-car videos on tape was the only
57
United States v. Diebold, Inc. 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Harris v. Coweta County 433 F.3d. 807, 815 (11th Cir. 2005).
59
Scott v. Harris at 1775.
60
Scott at 1775.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1780.
63
Id. at 1775.
58
13
option available. Because of this, recordings could only be kept for short periods
of time due to the sheer space required to maintain all the tapes.64 The advent of
digital recording and storage devices has solved the storage problem that had
plagued agencies with in-car recording devices.
I
owaCi
t
y
’
spol
i
c
ye
xe
mpl
i
f
i
e
s the relative ease and usefulness of the new
technology.65 In Iowa City each car is equipped with a device which records
events onto a flash card located in each vehicle. When the card is full, its contents
are uploaded to a police server. The flash card is then wiped clean and ready for
re-use. Once the video is uploaded onto the server it is saved to DVD. The video
also remains on the server for at least 90 days before it is erased. Even after the
video is erased from the server a record will still exist indefinitely since the DVDs
are not destroyed.
The advantages of video cameras and permanent storage are made clear in
Scott v. Harris. Instead of being forced to accept the facts as alleged by the
plaintiff, a tale of events that was clearly erroneous, the court instead granted the
motion for summary judgment based on the actual events of the case as recorded
by the video. Justice Breyer specifically stated in his concurring opinion that
“
wa
t
c
hi
ngt
hev
i
de
of
o
ot
a
g
eoft
hec
a
rc
ha
s
ema
deadi
f
f
e
r
e
nc
et
omyown view
66
oft
hec
a
s
e
.
” Indeed, one could say that the availability of the video evidence
saved the officer and agency the expense of a trial.
A further reason for adopting a digital-based video retention program is the
danger of potential legal liability of the law enforcement department for
destroying the recordings. In Jones v. City of Durham67 a plaintiff brought a claim
for obstruction of justice because the police department had misplaced or
destroyed an in-car recording of a patrol car striking a pedestrian. The Supreme
Cour
to
fNor
t
hCa
r
ol
i
nad
e
ni
e
dt
hec
i
t
y
’
smot
i
onf
ors
umma
r
yj
udg
me
nt
,s
a
y
i
ng
that evidence that the tape was misplaced or destroyed could allow a jury to find
that the city was guilty of obstruction of justice.68 The problem faced by the
Durham police department in Jones is an example of the dangers an agency can
face if the court determines it has not implemented an effective retention policy.
The Scott decision marked an important precedent in police chase claims that
should encourage every department to seriously consider installing in-car digital
video recording. When the events are recorded, the courts will not have to rely on
t
hepl
a
i
nt
i
f
f
’
sv
e
r
s
i
onoft
h
ef
a
c
t
sf
ors
umma
r
yj
udg
me
ntmot
i
onsi
n§
19
83or
state negligence claims. In proper cases this will lead to a much higher probability
64
For example in Santa Cruz, California the Santa Cruz Police Department General Orders still
states that only tapes which are deemed to possess any evidentiary value are kept, and even those
are erased after 15 months. http://santacruzcopwatch.org/go , GO 45.
65
Iowa City Police Department General Order # 31.
http://www.icgov.org/policefiles/genorder31.pdf
66
Scott at 1780.
67
Jones v. City of Durham, 643 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 2007).
68
Jones. at 633.
14
that a summary judgment motion will be granted in favor of the police
department.
Conclusion
As illustrated above, an effective pursuit policy is necessary for a law
enforcement agency to protect against the many ways they may face liability
when an officer decides to initiate a high-speed pursuit. While the decision in
Scott v. Harris protects officers and departments from liability under certain
circumstances, officers must still respect the right of a fleeing suspect from an
unr
e
a
s
ona
bl
es
e
i
z
ur
ea
ndmus
ta
l
wa
y
sbea
wa
r
eoft
hep
ubl
i
c
’
ss
a
f
e
t
y
.An
effective policy will assist officers in balancing the need to protect the public
from fleeing suspects against the need to protect the public from dangerous
vehicular pursuits.
15
Selected Bibliography
Cases
Supreme Court
Bower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
United States v. Diebold Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
United States Court of Appeals
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994).
State Courts
Cameron v. Lang, 544 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. 2001).
Chenoweth v. Wilson, 827 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 2005).
Cl
a
r
kv
.Sout
hCa
r
ol
i
naDe
p’
t
.ofPub.
Sa
f
e
t
y
,608S.
E.
2d
.5
7
3(
S.
C.2
00
5)
.
Eckard v. Iredell County, 630 S.E.2d. 134 (N.C. 2003).
Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994).
Jones v. City of Durham, 643 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 2007).
Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 700 A.2d. 417 (Pa. 1997).
Morris v. City of Des Moines, 534 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1995).
Mumm v. Mornson, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 5 (Minn. 2006).
Norris v. Zambito, 135 N.C.App. 288 (N.C. 1999).
Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5 (Conn. 1983).
Usher v. Trafton, 1989 Me. Super. LEXIS 161 (Me. 1989).
State Statutes
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §28-624 (2007).
Cal. Veh. Code §17004 (2005).
Ind. Code §9-21-1-8 (2005).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §13-911 (2007).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-145 (2007).
Police Department General Orders
Atlanta Police Department SOP 3050 Pursuit Policy
Iowa City Police Department General Order # 31.
http://www.icgov.org/policefiles/genorder31.pdf
Santa Cruz, CA. Police Department General Order 45.
http://santacruzcopwatch.org/go
Secondary Sources
16
Brief of The Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
Derek W. Meinecke, Assessment of Police Conduct during High-Speed Chases in
State Tort Liability Cases, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 325 (2000).
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy, Vehicular Pursuit,
Oct. 1996. http://www/theiacp.org/pubinfo/PolCtr
Pa
t
r
i
c
kO’
Conn
or&Wi
l
l
i
a
mNor
s
e
,Police Pursuits: A comprehensive Look at
the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability Law, 57 Mercer L. Rev 511
(2006).
17