CONFERENCE PAPER
WORKING PAPER N° 1
10 JUNE 2015
TRANSPOSITION OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION:
FLEMISH AND SCOTTISH PERFORMANCE
AN EXPLORATION OF FACTORS EXPLAINING VARIATION IN TRANSPOSITION PERFORMANCE IN SUBNATIONAL ENTITIES
Isabelle De Coninck
Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven
2015
(ORIGINAL) ABSTRACT
A precondition for the European integration project to be successful is the timely and correct transposition of
EU-legislation into the national law of all member states. The biannual internal market scoreboard published by
the European Commission indicates how the individual member states perform on the implementation of EUlegislation. Although a founding father of the European Union, Belgium consistently ranks low. This is
presumably partly due to its complex structure. In federalized and otherwise highly decentralized states,
subnational entities are often charged with transposition obligations according to their competences.
Consequently multiple (regional and federal) entities are jointly responsible for the transposition performance
their member state. As the transposition of a single directive can demand action on multiple levels federalism
brings with it complex and time-consuming vertical and horizontal coordination.
This research investigates what factors (internal and external) influence the transposition performance of
Flanders. The institutional setting, transposition practice and performance will be held against those of Wallonia,
the Belgian federal state and another federated regions of EU-member states- such as Scotland. Similarities and
differences between these cases and their performances are then explored. The research aims to uncover what
elements determine the timeliness and conformity of a transposition process as well as how these elements can
be handled in order to improve Flanders’ transposition record.
***
This present paper deals with the question of timely transposition of EU directives in Flanders and Scotland. It
makes a first exploration of factors that explain variations between their respective transposition performances.
KEYWORDS
TRANSPOSITION OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION, REGIONALISM, FEDERALISM, COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Table of Contents
Introduction: Framing the Research ............................................................................................................... 1
1.
Selection of Domestic Explanatory Factors............................................................................................ 2
2.
How do Flanders and Scotland Transpose Directives? ......................................................................... 6
2.1 Shaping the National Negotiation Position .......................................................................................... 6
2.1.1 Flanders ........................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1.2 Scotland ........................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Transposing Directives at the Subnational Level ................................................................................. 7
2.2.1 Flanders ........................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.2 Scotland ........................................................................................................................................... 8
2.3 Infringement Procedures and Sanctions for Maltransposition .......................................................... 9
3.
Preliminary Findings and Expectations................................................................................................. 10
3.1 Overall Transposition Performance and Evolutions .......................................................................... 10
3.2 Goodness of Fit .................................................................................................................................... 11
3.3 Political Priority .................................................................................................................................... 12
3.4 Complexity of the Division of Competences ...................................................................................... 13
3.5 Cooperation and Coordination ........................................................................................................... 14
3.6 Administrative Capacity: Expertise and Workload ............................................................................ 15
Conclusion: Expectations and Further Course of the Research.................................................................. 17
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 19
Introduction: Framing the Research
In an ever deepening European Union, an increasingly substantial portion of national and regional
legislation is in fact European, or at least in origin. One instrument of European legislation is the
drafting of EU directives. These are particularly interesting because they do not have a direct effect in
national law but require national implementation measures. As directives are result-oriented, they
grant the governments some leeway in how to fulfill their obligations. For each transposition process
the directive specifies a certain term to do so. The possibility thus arises that the provisions of a
directive might not be transposed timely or not correctly (meaning not conform with other provisions
of EU law or not in line with the directive’s wording or spirit). Maltransposition then, is a compound
term for delayed and non-conform transpositions.
Compliance research studies causal conditions for maltransposition. A wide array of variables has been
identified as either beneficial or detrimental to the transposition process. Institutional and cultural
features of the transposing entity may ease the transposition or render it more challenging.
Additionally, external factors -such as characteristics of the directives or the focus and control capacity
of the EU institutions - undoubtedly impact the transposition processes. These external factors,
however, cannot explain variation in the transposition of specific directives over different transposing
entities. Consequently internal variables are key to this research.
In federal and decentralized member states subnational entities are competent to transpose EU
directives according to their domestic competences. Consequently, here, multiple entities are jointly
responsible for the transposition performance of the country. These entities are faced with complex
institutional settings and do not have a distinct voice in the EU policy-making process. Therefore it is
interesting to study how they deal with the opportunities and obligations EU directives entail, how
they perform and what can explain variation between them.
This research is innovative and relevant as it approaches the question of compliance with EU law on
the subnational level. Although the political profile of subnational entities in the EU has been
increasing over the past decades, the issue of subnational transposition has hardly been studied. On
the one hand, studies on subnational entities so far did not include analyses of transposition, but
focused instead on their role in the European-level policy-making phase or on the management of
European structural funds. The compliance literature on the other hand, is very much directed at the
member state level, though acknowledging that decentralized states are confronted with a complex
set of actors and competences and the need for streamlined coordination between all levels involved.
Promisingly, Borghetto and Franchino (2010) examined the involvement of subnational authorities
(also including e.g. provinces) in the transposition of EU directives and consequently hint a link
between federalism and transposition delay.
A comparative study on the actual transposition performances of subnational entities within EU
member states and the explanation of their variation is still lacking. This research contributes to the
compliance literature by bringing the internal multilevel organization into the equation. It not only
brings an innovative empirical test of factors influencing transposition success but can also
theoretically expand the literature. An additional point of relevance is that many of the existing case
studies need an update as the subnational entities themselves, their attention to transposition, and
the EU’s infringement procedure have changed considerably over the past decade.
1
This study seeks to uncover the transposition performance of subnational entities over the last five
years, as well as to test propositions made in the compliance literature on the subnational level.
Data for this research was retrieved from academic literature on compliance and studies on the
countries and regions at hand, from preliminary interviews and official and legal documents (on
subnational, national and European level), including the systematic (regional) government follow-up
reports on transposition dossiers.
Compliance research requires a balance between on the one hand understanding the complexity of
the effects of combinations of and interactions between manifold factors, and on the other hand
keeping the study and its results feasible and understandable. A selection of explanatory factors at the
expense of others is inevitable. The selection of factors and the reasoning behind it, is outlined in the
first chapter if this paper. In the second chapter the role of Flanders and Scotland regarding EU
directives is briefly introduced. Finally, the ,explanatory conditions are explored a first time in both
cases, developing expectations as to their differential organization and the impact thereof on their
transposition performance. These expectations and the proposed approach for the remainder of the
research are given in the conclusions.
1. Selection of Domestic Explanatory Factors
A considerable share of compliance studies builds on the “misfit hypothesis” (cfr. Héritier, Knill and
Mingers, 1996; Börzel, 2000, 2005, 2011; Börzel and Risse 2000; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001).
This hypothesis sees the degree of misfit between the pre-existing national legislation and the
European directive as an explanatory variable for maltransposition. It holds that when a European
measure is compatible with the national traditions (fit) the cost of adaptation is low and the
transposition unproblematic. The more they are irreconcilable (misfit), the more the adaptation cost
rises - along with the chances of cumbersome and tardy transposition (Falkner, et.al., 2005). One can
then expect difficulties in the transposition of directives into strongly developed national policy
domains. Where, conversely, the policy domain is new to the national legal order, transposition also
tends to be problematic. This is because the adaptation costs increase through the need for new
structures and institutions, and the need to deal with political and interest group opposition.
Adaptation costs will be lower where changes are incremental rather than profound.
Goodness of fit should, however, be understood as a necessary though not sufficient condition for
adaptation. It does not bring a strict causal relationship to compliance but is mediated by domestic
factors (cfr. Mastenbroek, Keading 2006, Ancygier 2013, Falkner et.al. 2005). Indeed, a complex
combination of administrative, institutional and actor-based factors– through the mechanism of
goodness of fit – hold explanatory power for the outcome of transposition processes. Manifold such
factors have been proposed throughout the literature. The ‘worlds of compliance’-typology put
forward by Falkner et.al. (2005) is a useful tool in order to select a workable and promising set of
independent variables. Falkner et.al. (2005) propose an organization of EU member states into an
ideal-type classification of transposition patters, namely three worlds of compliance. The membership
of a member state into these worlds of compliance is based on their ‘specific national culture of
digesting adaptation requirements’ (Falkner et.al 2005). This typology does not point to good,
mediocre or bad transposition outcomes, but refers to the ‘typical patterns of how a duty to
implement a piece of EU law in the national context is tackled procedurally’ (Ibid.). For each of the
three worlds of compliance, another factor seems to determine the outcome of transposition of
particular directives. They distinguish between the world of law observance where the compliance
2
culture plays an important role; the world of domestic politics where the fit of the directive with
political preferences is predominant; and the world of neglect where maltransposition is likely to come
forth from administrative non-action (Ibid.). The authors place both Belgium and the UK in the world
of domestic politics. Here, domestic interests tend to prevail in case of misfit with the EU directive as
obeying EU rules is only a rather fragile aspiration among many other goals.
The typology distinguishes between an administrative and a political transposition phase. In the
administrative phase adaptation requirements to comply with the directive are identified and the
transposition process is initiated. Consequently, the involved actors are extended to include (among
others) politicians and interest groups, which discuss the transposition proposal and decide on its
further course. The world of domestic politics is characterized by an administrative system compelled
to abide EU rules, countered by a political phase during which compliance is no longer the main goal
and where transposition can be blocked or diverted into an incomplete or even flawed transposition
(Ibid.). The worlds of compliance serve to filter “which explanatory factors are relevant for different
country clusters and what direction their influence is” (Falkner et.al. 2007).
The predominant logic for both Flanders and Scotland is expected to be the pursuit of political
interests, where lack of compromise (or compromises against the terms of the directive) would be a
major determinant of non-compliance. Compliance is more likely where conflict with domestic
interests, is absent, and cases of maltransposition are expected to linger a long time before being
resolved (Falkner et.al. 2005). The eventual resolution of non-compliance is likely to result from a
change in the domestic cost-benefit analysis of compliance, triggered for example by complaints by
active domestic interest groups or pending sanctions.
Taking Falkner et. al.’s typology into account, we expect transposition performances in Flanders and
Scotland to be linked to the existence of EU law-abiding administrations and political contestations of
the directives’ requirements, mediating the effects of goodness of fit and adaptation pressure. A
number of factors is selected according to this logic:

Political priority – The more political attention is given to abiding EU-obligations and to the
the transposition progress, the more proficiently it will be handled (Bursens & Helsen, 2000).
The priority a particular transposition dossier receives also holds relation to the salience of
European issues – or a European issue in particular. An issue that catches much attention –
politically, societally or by the media – incites domestic politicians to take an active stance
(Bursens & Deforche, 2008). This political priority can either boost the process or hamper it,
depending on whether the domestic political priorities coincide or clash with the directives’
requirements. Where the domestic interest does not coincide with the directive’s
requirements, political attention and debate will slow down transposition. More technical
issues with low salience and a low political, economic, or societal impact can be reasonably
thought to be transposed more easily as they are not likely to be object of vivid debates once
the administrations – in cooperation with sectorial experts – have drafted a legislative
proposal.

Complexity of the division of competences for transposition – Subnational and national
authorities’ responsibilities for transposing directive provisions coincides with their domestic
competence allocation. For transposition to be timely and correct all national implementing
measures –without regard to the issuing authority – need to be conform the directive and
notified to the European Commission before expiration of the transposition deadline.
3
Consequently, many subnational and national veto players are involved. As the visions of
different actors can be at odds with each other, a large number of institutional or de facto
veto players makes it more difficult to reach an agreement (Steunenberg, 2006; Mbaye, 2001,
2003; Keading, 2007; Falkner et.al. 2007). The impact of the number of veto players is
considerable as they constitute gateways for political concerns which may block the
transposition process (Falkner et.al. 2007).
The entirety of a directive often entails the involvement of multiple vertically (nationalsubnational) and horizontally (different departments on one level) linked authorities, each
responsible for part of the transposition. The more entities involved in transposition, the more
coordination is needed to ensure successful transposition. Additionally, it is not always clear
from the outset who’s competences are invoked by the directive. Uncertainties or
disagreements on who needs to transpose what are bound to delay the transposition process.
Disagreements on policy competence are, essentially, highly political.

Cooperation and coordination in the transposition phase –Member states being viewed by the
EU as unitary actors, any form of maltransposition by any of the jointly responsible
transposing authorities can trigger an infringement procedure. It is thus in the best interest of
both the subnational and national levels of government to cooperate. The complexity of
coordination issues increases as the complexity and division of competences does. Firstly, the
coordination mechanism is complex and gains importance as the different transposition
measures should cover all of the territory and all of the directive without contradicting or
impeding each other. Secondly, a defensive attitude towards gained competences can
instigate institutional jealousy. This happens where political and administrative actors are
strongly committed to their competences and do not tolerate much interference of other
actors in their processes. Formalised cooperation mechanisms can help counter this tendency.
Moreover, a continuous stream of information needs to be present between those actors
involved in the negotiation phase and those who are charged with the transposition so that
both groups understand the philosophy behind the directive and know what is desirable and
manageable from a financial, political and practical viewpoint (Bursens & Helsen, 2000). This
requires well-conceived mechanisms where some transposing actors are not present in
negotiation.
The existence of one or multiple formal systems of coordination – administrative and/or
political – can improve the transposition process. Such mechanisms help to distribute the
necessary non-material resources, facilitating domestic adaptation. In practice they can take
the form of formal or informal ‘European expert’ meetings. Here, European experts of
administrative units and political cabinets follow-up the European dossiers and develop
common positions (Bursens & Deforche, 2008).

Administrative capacity in terms of expertise and workload – Expertise here can be simply
seen as a proper knowledge, first, of the European policy-making and –taking process, and
second of the regulated issue at hand. The latter then includes both a good understanding of
the content and intent of the directive and the more technical sector-specific expertise to
translate this into the internal order. Sectorial expertise can be sought in specialized agencies,
or for example through sectorial consultation. The more expertise is present at the
administration itself, the better one can expect the transposition (drafting phase) to go. Also,
ministries and administrations are often concerned with the transposition of multiple
4
directives at once. The more processes run simultaneously, the longer they will take as
resources are divided. If the administrations cannot swiftly draft transposition proposals, the
chances of catching up lost time in order to still meet the transposition deadline shrink
quickly. Therefore, governments should be attentive to capacity necessities and remedy
administrative bottlenecks (Falkner, et.al., 2005). They could, however, also hide behind the
argument of resource deficiency as not to openly disclose their resistance (Ibid.).
Transposition strategies also affect the timeliness and correctness of the implementing
measures. One can either ‘copy-out’ a directive by copy pasting its provisions in their original
wording into a new internal law, or ‘elaborate’ by translating the content and spirit of the
directive into the legal order using the wording and concepts of the domestic tradition and
fitting it to the specific internal context. While copying out can lower the required resources
for drafting legislation it can also incite non-conformity concerns by the European
Commission.
Figure 1: Selection of explanatory domestic variables.
Political
priority

Political attention to compliance record

Issue salience (media, pressure groups)
pro/anti transposition
Political preferences in line with directive


Competence
division
Veto players

Uncertainty transposition competences

Conflict transposition competences

Institutional jealousy

Coordination between phases

Formal coordination structures
(administrative and/or political)

Expertise

High workload

Copy-out
Compliance
Goodness of fit
Cooperation
and
coordination
Administrative capacity
5
2. How do Flanders and Scotland Transpose Directives?
The different subnational authorities in Belgium and the United Kingdom – here Flanders and Scotland
– are responsible for the transposition of the (parts of) EU directives that fall within their domestic
competences. The transposition measures that are taken in order to do so follow the ordinary internal
legislative procedures. Charged with the implementation of EU directives, the regional governments
are also – to a certain extent – involved in shaping the national negotiation positions of their countries
at the European level, and bear a share of the sanctions for incomplete or delayed transposition
where they are co-responsible.
2.1 Shaping the National Negotiation Position
2.1.1 Flanders
Belgian regional governments are competent for the international aspects of their internal
competences according to the ‘in foro interno, in foro externo’-principle.1 In order to guarantee that
federated interests are taken into account in the negotiations, all co-competent authorities prepare
their position to an EU legislative proposal and defend it in an interfederal coordination meeting. The
Belgian negotiation position that will be defended at the European level is a result of this discussion
and is therefore a compromise. The Belgian national negotiation position is taken by unanimity,
making each authority a true veto player. There is however a gentlemen’s agreement that no
(sub)national authority blocks the proposed negotiation position unless it is absolutely necessary.
Where no compromise is reached, Belgium will have to abstain from voting in the Council
negotiations.2
For the representation in the Council working groups, a complex system is set up based on the extent
of federated competences and a rotation mechanism between the Walloon and the Flemish regions.
Whether the federal of regional level leads the Belgian representation depends on who has the
principal competence for the matter at hand. The Belgian delegation will often also count an assessor,
representing the other policy-level.3 Regional representation alternates biannually between Walloon
and Flemish delegates. Such rotation is not necessary in matters of fisheries, as it is an exclusive
Flemish competence, and in matters of agriculture as in these matters the federal representative will
always be assisted by a Flemish and Walloon delegation..
2.1.2 Scotland
When it comes to foreign policy Scotland only has a limited competence but in practice the internal
devolution of competences has external implications. Especially so in the context of European
integration (Duran, M., Criekemans, D., 2009, p.195). The UK representation team at the Council
meetings is always led by a UK Minister. The interests of the devolved administrations are however
taken into account. Where the European legislative proposals under negotiation do not directly
1
2
Article 167,§ 3, of the Belgian Constitution
To this day this happened only once in the case of the Service Directive (2006/123/EC).
There are six categories, based on the policy domains treated by the different formations in the Council working groups.
Regarding (1) exclusive federal competences Belgium is represented by a federal delegation. When competences are mixed
Belgium will be represented (2) by a federal minister and a regional assessor when federal competences dominate, and (3) by
a regional minister and a federal assessor when regional competences are predominant. (4) Exclusive regional competences
demand regional representation in the EU-negotiations. Moreover, (5) the Flemish competent minister represents Belgium in
matters of fisheries, and (6) a delegation of Flemish, Walloon and federal ministers shall represent Belgium in agricultural
issues (VVPV,2010; Samenwerkingsakkoord van 8 maart 1994 tussen de Federale Staat, de Gemeenschappen en de
Gewesten, met betrekking tot de vertegenwoordiging van het Koninkrijk België in de Ministerraad van de Europese Unie (B.S.
17 november 1994).
3
6
concern devolved matters, the Secretaries of State for the devolved administrations –within the UK
Government – ensure their interests are properly represented and considered. In case a devolved
matter is under consideration in an EU legislative proposal, early consultation becomes essential
(Scotland Office, 2009; MoU, 2013,). The representation of the devolved administrations in EU
negotiations remains in law with the UK government. Nevertheless, the 2013 Concordat on
coordination of EU policy foresees in the co-ordination of European policy issues and attendance of
devolved Ministers to Council meetings. This concordat is, however, only binding by honor. The
composition of the UK team in Council negotiations is in the hands of the lead UK minister who will
decide on a case-by case basis the appropriateness of devolved assessors by taking into account the
likeliness of substantive discussion in the Council groups on matters of significant importance to the
devolved ministers. In rule, demands from devolved ministers to attend are accepted (Ibid.).
Nevertheless, in the end Scotland has no real veto power in the shaping of the UK position.
2.2 Transposing Directives at the Subnational Level
2.2.1 Flanders
Once the directive is agreed upon, the federal service on European Affairs and Coordination located
within the federal External Affairs service (DGE), indicates the authorities that are responsible for
transposition as well as the authority that will take lead on the transposition process. The actual
transposition takes place according to the regular internal legislative procedures, no special procedure
is set up for the transposition of EU obligations.
Regional and federal law have equal states and all competences in Belgium are exclusive, meaning
that only one level can be competent for a certain matter. It should be noted, however, that often
policy-domains are divided into multiple partial aspects competence over which is distributed
between federal and subnational authorities, leading to ‘shared’ competences (Belgische Kamer van
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2014). Under the principle of ‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ the internal
competence division extends to its external implications among which the compliance with EUobligations. One directive can thus easily demand transposition among various authorities, both
federal and sub-national.
The regional authorities need to decide how to transpose the directive. In some instances the
instruments to be used for transposition are set out in law, in other cases the transposing
departments can use the instrument of their choice. Most common are decrees Flemish parliamentary
acts) or arretés (Statutory Instruments). Other possibilities are cooperation agreements, ministerial
orders, circulars, collective labor agreements or sectorial covenants. These types of legislation,
however, are not recognized by the European Commission as implementing measures because of their
vagueness and their not generalizable legal enforceability. They should be accompanied by a decree or
arreté. Consequently, in practice directives are transposed via these latter two instruments (Dierickx
et.al. 2003). The draft proposal (of decree or arreté) is prepared by the administration in the
responsible department(s) in cooperation with the cabinets. Consultation and coordination takes
place with the other competent ministries and policy-levels where necessary. Horizontal and vertical
exchange of information and coordination of the transposition are a systematic component in the
preparatory phase of transposition legislation. The legislative procedure in itself is rather lengthy.
Where no obstacles are to be overcome and no delay of any kind occurs, an arreté will take five
months to be finalized starting from the point where the draft proposal is put forward by the
administration. For a decree the procedure takes roughly 7 months (Vlaamse Overheid, 2012).
7
2.2.2 Scotland
The Scottish Government is responsible for meeting the implementing obligations under EU law in the
areas of devolved legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (Section 53, Scotland Act 1998).
Where appropriate this should occur in bilateral consultation with the lead Whitehall Department and
other Departments and devolved administrations (MoU, 2013). There are three distinct ways in which
such transposition can take place:
Option 1: Scotland can opt to follow a policy approach separate from the rest of the UK and make own
transposition legislation following its own domestic procedure.
Option 2: Scotland can take a similar or identical policy approach to the rest of the UK through the
legislation of own transposing measures following its own domestic procedure. This option
is taken most regularly.
Option 3: A third option consists of the possibility for Scotland to follow the exact policy approach the
UK adopts seeking to have the directive transposed, partially or fully, through UK
legislation. This option is made possible under Section 57(1) of the Scotland Act.
(Scottish Government, 2012).
For the first two options Scotland will need to amend or create its own legislation through the normal
legislative procedure. Such approaches make it possible to take full account of specific Scottish
circumstances. Nevertheless, it demands regular discussion with the UK and other devolved
counterparts, especially when a common approach is necessary in order to transpose the directive
consistently or to reach target norms. The presumption is that directives falling within a devolved area
of responsibility will be implemented by the Scottish Government through its own institutions (Ibid.).
Scottish government officials weigh the policy approaches for transposition and prepare the dossier
after which they send drafting instructions to the their legal directorate for the actual drafting of the
transposition legislation (Ibid.). Normally EU obligations are transposed in Scotland through means of
secondary legislation in the form of Scottish Statutory Instruments (SSI). Occasionally they need
primary legislation (in the form of Scottish Parliamentary Acts) to be enacted (Ibid.). While the former
are usually adopted no later than three weeks after being laid before parliament, the latter procedure
can take up to two years.
Where Scotland decides to take identical or similar measures to the UK for transposition through its
own institutions (option 2), draft proposals put forward in UK counterparts may be used as a template
for the Scottish act, though when waiting for such acts would delay the Scottish transposition process
the Scottish officials should continue along their own path. A common policy approach across the UK
does, however, not ensure an ‘easy’ transposition. The measures might be similar or identical but the
Scottish measures can –due to the legal system- never be entirely the same as they are in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland (Scottish Government, 2012).
As a derogation to this usual transposition procedure, use can be made of Section 57(1) of the
Scotland Act where needed. An ‘opt-out’ of making specific Scottish legislation under section 57(1) can
-where the UK transposition measures seem to be the best option for Scotland as well- save the
Scottish institutions a lot of work and to a certain extent therefore speed up the overall UK
transposition process. It can also be used to avoid or close down infringement procedures. Allowing
the UK to transpose where the Scottish Parliament could reasonably be expected to do so, however,
entails political sensitivities (Scottish Government, 2012). Naturally, the Scottish Government aims to
make full use of its devolved responsibilities.
8
2.3 Infringement Procedures and Sanctions for Maltransposition
Infringement procedures are always directed against a member state as a whole, regardless of the
subnational or national responsibility for the lacking or problematic transposition. Since the Lisbon
Treaty, the Court of Justice can impose a sanction for non-notification or delayed transposition in its
first arrest (Art. 260 TFEU). The Commission considers notified implementing measures that do not
cover the entire territory of the member state or that only cover part of the directive to fall under this
category (European Commission, 2011, Art. 19).
Both in Belgium and in the United Kingdom agreements have been made between the national and
subnational level ensuring the partition of financial sanctions decided upon by the Court of Justice of
the EU. All responsible entities will bear a portion of the burden relative to their responsibility for the
infringement.4 Nevertheless it should be noted that neither country has so far specified a calculation
method for the partition of the fine where more than one entity can be held responsible for part of
the problem.
Belgium recently received its first financial sanction for maltransposition. It concerned the
transposition of the Urban Waste Water Directive 5, an exclusive regional competence. Although (all)
the regions were co-responsible for the infringement and ensuing sanction, it was the federal Belgian
government who paid the fine.6 It can, however, retrieve the money from the responsible regions
(Art.16 §3, Bijzondere wet over de hervorming der instellingen, 1980). This has not happened yet as
there is no clarity on how to partition responsibility and burden. So far, the UK – and consequently
Scotland – has never been convicted by the Court of Justice to payment financial sanction for
maltransposition. Already the administrative burden infringement proceedings entail motivates the
authorities to avoid maltransposition (N. Ritchie, interview, 08.06.15). Nevertheless, it is easy to
imagine - for member states as well as their subnational entities - that as long as no (threat of) ‘real’
consequence is given to a transposition infringement, it is not necessarily regarded as poor result or
high priority case.
4
For Belgium: Bijzondere wet over de hervorming der instellingen, 1980, Art. 16 §3; For Scotland: Concordat on CoOrdination of European Union Policy Issues, 2013,p. 9, par.21.
5
Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment.
6
The fine was considerable entailing a lump sum of EUR 10 million, and a penalty payment of EUR 859 404 for each sixmonth period of delay in taking the measures necessary to comply with the judgment in Commission v Belgium, from the
date of delivery of this judgment until the date on which the judgment in Commission v Belgium has been complied with in
full. At the moment of judgment still five (Walloon) agglomerations were not in full compliance. – Judgement of the Court, 17
October 2013, Case C-533/11. (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=143181&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=603816).
9
3. Preliminary Findings and Expectations
3.1 Overall Transposition Performance and Evolutions
The European Commission biannually composes an internal market scoreboard which tracks the
compliance of EU law in its member states. Internal market scoreboards (IMSB) are drafted each July
and December covering the six-monthly periods between November 1st of the previous calendar-year
and April 30th, and between May 1st and October 31st of the concerned year respectively. These
reports show a significant difference between the transposition deficits 7 and compliance deficits8 for
the United Kingdom and Belgium. The transposition and compliance deficits of both countries over the
IMSB of May 2010 thru November 2014 are shown in the graphs below. The UK scores above average
while Belgium is lagging behind though recently catching up. This is interesting as Belgium is a
founding father of the European project and is characterized by a pro-European attitude, whereas the
UK joined the European project later on and is known for its Eurosceptic attitude. Explaining such
variation demands insights into the domestic attitude towards and the organization of the internal
transposition process. The aim of this study is then, to see whether a similar dynamic exists on the
sub-national level. Can we expect Scotland to deliver better transposition performances than Flanders
on account of the UK scoring better than Belgium? And if these subnational transposition
performances differ, how can we explain it?
As member states are seen as unitary actors by the European Commission, all infringements caused by
untimely or non-conform transposition where subnational authorities were (co-)responsible for
transposition are caught within the national deficit. How do the sub-national deficits fit within those of
their member states: do they develop along the same lines and do they represent a portion of the
national deficits comparable to their portion of transposition obligations? 9
If subnational transposition performance follows the national tendencies, we expect Flemish
transposition deficits to increase significantly over the scoreboards of November 2010 through
November 2011 and to securely improve after the May 2013 scoreboard. As to the compliance deficit
we would expect it to drop throughout 2011, and remain rather steady from then onwards. For
Scotland we would expect to see a rather steady transposition deficit, slightly increased throughout
2011-2012, and a considerably food though deteriorating compliance deficit over time.
Where, on the other hand, subnational transposition performances do not evolve in line with the
national ones (i.e. where the subnational level performs noticeably better or worse than the central
level), the subnational level will portray a transposition profile different from that of their respective
7
The transposition deficit is the gap between the number of Single Market directives adopted at EU level and
those transposed in Member States. The European Commission defines it as follows: “The transposition deficit
shows the percentage of notifications of Internal Market directives not yet communicated to the Commission, in
relation to the total number of notifications which should have been communicated by the deadline” (Internal
Market Scoreboard 21, May 2010).
8
The compliance deficit is the number of incorrectly transposed directives. The compliance deficit “measures the
number of directives transposed where infringement proceedings for non-conformity have been initiated by the
Commission, as a percentage of the number of Single Market directives notified to the Commission as either
'transposed' or 'not requiring any further implementation measures'. However, only the Court of Justice can rule
definitively that a directive has not been transposed correctly. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the
statistics on compliance deficit” (Internal Market Scoreboard. Performance per government tool: Transposition.
Reporting period: 05/2014 – 11/2014)
9
On the approach used to derive these deficits, see ‘Further course of the research’.
10
central state. This could point to the domination of different explanatory factors for maltransposition
at subnational and national level.
Figure 2: Transposition deficit in Belgium and the UK over the internal market scoreboards of May 2010 thru November 2014.
Source: European Commission Internal Market Scoreboards.
Transposition deficit in Belgium and the UK
Transposition deficit in %
over the period of May 2010 thru November 2014
2,2
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
1,6
1,3
1,3
1,2
1,2
1
0,9
0,5
0,7
0,7
May
2010
2,2
2
1,9
0,7
May
2011
Nov.
2011
May
2012
Nov.
2012
May
2013
0,7
0,3
0,8
Nov.
2010
1,3
Nov.
2013
May
2014
0,6
Nov.
2014
Internal Market Scoreboard
UK
BELGIUM
EU
Target
Figure 3: Transposition deficit in Belgium and the UK over the internal market scoreboards of May 2010 thru November 2014.
Source: European Commission Internal Market Scoreboards
Compliance deficit in Belgium and the UK
over the period of May 2011 thru November 2014
Compliance deficit in %
1,6
1,5
1,3
1,4
1,2
0,9
1
0,8
1
0,8
0,9
0,7
0,8
0,6
0,6
0,4
0,9
BELGIUM
0,7
0,5
0,5
Nov.
2012
May
2013
1
0,8
0,7
UK
EU
0,2
0
May
2011
Nov.
2011
May
2012
Nov.
2013
May
2014
Nov.
2014
Internal Market Scoreboard
3.2 Goodness of Fit
During the negotiations at EU-level member states generally try to ensure as low adaptation costs as
possible. The bargaining power of a member state and the degree of assertiveness and obstinacy it
brings to the negotiation table are therefore key elements influencing the goodness of fit between the
resulting EU directive and its domestic legislation. Scottish interests are included in the assertive,
heavy-weight UK negotiation position. Scotland does not make use of the (extra-statutory) possibility
11
to delegate a representative to the UK-delegation very often. Most negotiations where Scotland is
represented in the UK-delegation concern agriculture (EERC, 16.01.2014). To the extend Scottish
interests are accurately defended by the UK-delegation, the misfit is expected to remain rather low.
The Belgian delegation, however, does not only hold a considerably smaller bargaining power and a
rather EU-centered unassertive negotiation style, it also defends a position that is a true compromise
between federated and federal positions. This means on the one hand that Flanders’ position is less
efficiently pushed than the Scottish one in EU negotiations, but on the other hand Flemish interests
are unavoidably anchored in the Belgian position. Additionally, regional delegations accompany (in
capacity of lead or assessor) the federal representative in all negotiations regarding subnational
competence.
We can expect less transposition problems related to the goodness of fit in those policy areas that
have already longtime been regulated by the European Union. Transposition of directives on such
matters would fit into the adaptation process launched by previous EU legislation and would therefore
not entail fundamental changes to the internal order. This external characteristic cannot explain
transposition variance, though outstanding transpositions in the subnational entities may impede on
transposition of 'update' directives on the same matter. If it is true that the transposition and
compliance deficit are higher in Flanders, this can be expected to play a role there.
Where directive provisions and ‘transposition’ obligations rather concern meeting set target values on for example air quality - Flanders can be considered more prone to encounter difficulties as a
consequence of its geographical and metropolitan specificities. Flanders - with its large metropolitan
hubs and little open space - faces a dense mix of industries, transport networks and densely populated
areas, which might make target values harder to reach.
Generally we expect Flanders to face larger misfit than Scotland, though this factor clearly demands
case-by-case analysis.
3.3 Political Priority
Over the past decade many efforts were made in Belgium - both on the national and subnational level
- in order to improve the transposition performance. Continual reflection on the matter resulted in the
development of new mechanisms in order to ensure follow-up of the transposition and infringement
dossiers and to better coordinate between all involved actors. Reports on Flemish transposition have
become more detailed and more broadly distributed in order to boost political (and administrative)
attention to the these issues (De Coninck, 2015). Moreover, Flemish Government Agreements10
explicitly emphasize the need for attention to (faster and better) transposition of EU legislation
(Vlaamse Regering, 2004; Vlaamse Regering, 2009; Vlaamse Regering, 2014).
Also in Scotland the political attention to transposition performance regarding EU directives is clearly
present. In 2007-2008 the European and External Relations Committee of the Scottish Parliament
conducted an inquiry into the transposition of EU directives in Scotland, looking for strong and weak
points as well as best practices in regions on the continent (Scottish Parliament 2007). Since then
multiple initiatives were launched in order to improve transposition. The endeavor covered many
aspects among which improved interest representation in the 'shaping' phase, continuous exchange
of information between the central and devolved level, follow-up and coordination of transposition
processes, as well as drawing up a detailed guidance document for Scottish officials.
10
Original: Regeerakkoorden.
12
The issue salience of transposition dossiers and the degree and effect alignment of political
preferences with the requirements of a directive, are more case specific. In-depth case studies are
needed in order to elaborate on their explanatory value for transposition performances in subnational
entities. We expect to find a link between the negotiation power and the alignment of domestic
political preferences with the required transposition (see also goodness of fit). Political agendas,
domestic ongoing or envisioned reforms, the political affiliation of the government, as well as the
technicality and originality of the directive are expected to determine the political attention to a
specific transposition dossier.
We expect political attention to the compliance record of the subnational entities to be high in both
cases and the issue salience and political preferences of transposition dossiers to be directive-specific.
3.4 Complexity of the Division of Competences
Determining which government is responsible for transposition is a challenge that arises early on in
the transposition process. In Belgian federated entities no competences are shared with the federal
level, but the transposition competences can be ‘mixed’. In order to comply with EU directives, the
right provisions need to be transposed in time and correctly by the right level of government. Unlike
Scotland, the Flemish authorities cannot waive their transposition competence.
On more than one occasion transposition competence has led to procedures before the Belgian
Constitutional Court. A striking example is the transposition of Directive 2008/101/EC on the inclusion
of aviation activities in the European Emission Trading Scheme, where adopted regional transposition
was ultimately nullified by the Constitutional Court, demanding an entirely renewed transposition
process (I. Vanden Bulcke, interview, 21.05.15). Such disputes cannot only significantly delay
transposition, it can additionally lead to trust issues engendering institutional jealousy and disturbed
cooperation. Disputes on competence divisions rapidly turn political.
Competences need not be disputed, however, to hamper transposition. The complicated partitions of
competence on policy matters, together with the multitude of policy aspects a single directive can
entail, make it cumbersome to accurately identify the competent transposers throughout Belgium.11
We expect to see a different dynamic in Scotland. The Scotland Act very clearly delineates the powers
reserved to the UK and those competences devolved to the regions, and all matters that are not
explicitly reserved to the central government are devolved. In practice this means that disagreements
and disputes on competences occur only rarely if at all (N. Ritchie, interview, 08.05.15). Where
devolved transposition competences are ‘waived’ in favor of UK-wide legislation, this is normally not
done as an answer to uncertainties or disagreements. Section 57(1) of the Scotland Actis only applied
sporadically and for matters where the resulting difference for Scotland is minimal. In the studied
period this ‘third option’ has been used five times on a total of 41 transposition dossiers.12 We do find
evidence of the use of section 57(1) of the Scotland Act in order to avoid further infringement
procedures for maltransposition. The transposition of Directive 2008/90/EC on the marketing of food
plant propagating material was delegated to the UK whose uniform legislation could, if desirable, be
11
A striking example is the transposition of Directive 2006/88/EC on health requirements for aquaculture animals, where the
Flemish competence on the transposition of two articles was 'discovered' long after the expiration of the transposition
deadline.
12
Section 57(1) of the Scotland Act was invoked to allow UK-wide transposition on Directives 2006/123/EC, 2009/125/EC,
2010/30/EU, 2008/90/EC and for the partial transposition of Directive 2008/56/EC (Scottish Government report on the
transposition of EU directives: EERC, 16.11.10).
13
retracted and replaced by Scottish legislation at a later date (Lochhead, 2010). It is not a means to
undermine devolved competences as it can only be invoked by the devolved authority itself. Nor is it
used to resolve competence problems as such issues would be of too much a political importance for
Scotland to waive its authority. Moreover, in Scotland there is one central public administration where
officials (and their ministers) work with a shared agenda. Horizontal competence division on the
devolved Scottish level therefore does not entail the participation of multiple separate
administrations, but can occur simply by keeping ministers with related agendas in the loop (N.
Ritchie, interview, 08.06.15).
We can therefore reasonably expect that the internal division of competences is more likely to be
linked to the occurrence of maltransposition in Flanders than in Scotland.
3.5 Cooperation and Coordination
In the UK coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the central and all devolved authorities
are based on principles binding by honor only. The principles of good communication, consultation
and co-operation are clearly emphasized by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between
these parties (MoU, 2013). A central coordination of the overall relationship (Joint Ministerial
Committee) was established. Policy coordination occurs here on all matters whether they are
international, European or domestic. Prior to the JMC – and in practice still today – most contact
between administrations occurs according to need on bi- or multilateral basis. Exchange of
information and coordination on all domestic and transposition-related policy dossiers occurs
between the different levels on a regular basis as part of the normal procedure (N. Ritchie, interview,
08.06.15).
In Belgium the ordinary legislative procedures at the different levels do not demand the vertical nor
horizontal coordination of views and policy-preferences when making domestic law. Indeed, all
regional and federal laws have equal legal status and cover distinct territories and domains. With
regard to transposing European legislation, however, sectorial permanent working groups are put in
place in which interfederal or interregional concertation is organized as a systematic part of the
process (Van Reybroeck & Bursens, 2005). Preliminary interviews with Flemish officials concur on the
one hand that information is exchanged and 'early' transposers can inspire the others through their
work. On the other hand, they also indicate that - in the end - each authority tends to go its own way.
This might be due to practical reasons, but it might also link back to institutional jealousy. Earlier
studies pointed to strong vertical institutional jealousy in Belgium but also to rivalries between
administrative and political actors (Dierickx, Bursens & Helsen, 2003).
Both Scottish and Flemish governments keep track of ongoing transposition processes and regularly
reports back to their parliaments. In Flanders this practice is longstanding and has become more
detailed over the years. The Flemish parliament is updated monthly. A Flemish ‘euro-coordinator’ has
the specific task of following up all transposition dossiers, alerting administrative and political players
of upcoming deadlines, stimulate concertation and so on. To do this job efficiently, a (confidential)
Flemish database on transposition was created in 2002 (Van Reybroeck & Bursens, 2005). The Scottish
Government reports on transposition presented to the EERC, communicated biannually, are
consequence of the 2008 inquiry,
Based on these considerations we expect cooperation on and coordination of transposing measures
to be more substantial, and institutional jealousy to be less frequent in Scotland compared to
Flanders.
14
3.6 Administrative Capacity: Expertise and Workload
Flanders13 and Scotland14 have each drawn up internal guidelines for the transposition of EU
directives. Such guidelines serve to ensure the regional officials have sufficient knowledge about the
EU legislative procedure, internal transposition rules and practices, and coordination and transparency
requirements. The overall expertise concerning the procedures - regarding both the shaping
(negotiations) and the taking (transposition) phases of EU legislation - should therefore be good in all
three subnational entities. Expertise regarding the matter at hand can be more complicated. The
officials responsible for transposition should be aware of not only the wording, but also the
background and meaning of the directive’s provisions in order to ensure its timely and correct
transposition within the internal order. A continuous stream of information between the actors
involved in the negotiations and those involved in the transposition is therefore critical. Flanders
seems to have an advantage here as regional representatives always attend the Council working group
meetings where EU law concerning regional competences is discussed, though in most matters the
rotation system alternates this advantage between regions.15 As discussed above, Scottish
representatives do not always attend the negotiations. They are kept informed by the UK-delegation.
The extent to which the transposers are knowledgeable of the directives thus largely depends on the
communication with the central level and their proactive follow-up of the negotiations. Additionally
transposers should be able to clearly identify the existing internal rules and practices that are affected
by the directive. Sectorial expertise is likely to be consulted for more technical and specialized
matters. A good working relation with sectorial experts could be an asset. Flanders and Scotland all
three have organized practices to involve sectorial experts and stakeholders early in the drafting
process, through sectorial advise committees and regulation-specific consultations.
With regard to administrative and drafting capacity the regions noticeably differ. The Scottish
government holds one central administration and legal directorate charged with the drafting of
implementation measures (N. Ritchie, interview, 08.05.15). In the update reports the Scottish
Government send biannually to the European and External Relations Committee of the Scottish
Parliament (EERC), officials frequently explicitly indicate the lack of resources as determining factor for
delays in the transposition procedure.16 Preliminary interviews with Flemish officials do not point to a
systematic challenge regarding administrative capacity, though high workloads are sometimes
mentioned . Earlier studies have indicated administrative capacity to be a challenge in Flanders
(Bursens & Helsen, 2000; Dierickx et. al., 2003; De Coninck, 2015).
Contrary to the English tradition, Scottish transposition rarely occurs via copy-out of the directive. As
more generally with other legislation frames coming ‘from above’ – Scotland rather fits the
(transposing) regulations as close as possible to its specific situation and needs, looking for ‘Scottish
solutions for Scottish problems’ (N. Ritchie, interview, 08.06.15). Nevertheless, in the past few years,
Scotland has revisited a small number of transposition measures in response to the European
13
Vlaamse Regering (2005). Draaiboek voor de implementatie van Europese regelgeving in Vlaanderen, Ministerie van de
Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Administratie Buitenlands Beleid, Afdeling Buitenlands Beleid binnen Europa; The guidance
document is currently under revision.
14
rd
Europe Team (2012). Influencing and Implementing EU Obligations. A Guide for Scottish Government Officials. 3 Ed,
2012, Europe Team, International and Constitution Directorate, Scottish Government.
15
Except for fisheries where Flanders is the only competent authority, and agriculture where both Flemish and Walloon
representatives are always present next to the federal ones.
16
Lack of resources explicitly mentioned as cause for transposition delay regarding the Directives 2011/97/EU, 2012/18/EU,
2012/33/EU and 2013/45/EU (Scottish Government report on the transposition of EU directives: EERC, 27.06.13; EERC,
26.06.14).
15
Commission’s concern on the use of copy-out.17 Overall, elaboration seems to be the preferred
transposition strategy in Scotland. Where directives are very detailed and technical (or similarly when
transposing lists included as annexes to directives) and little to no marge de manouevre is left to the
transposing entity, a (nearly) ‘copy-paste’ transposition is most adequate. This is a common practice in
transposing particularly technical directives, also in Flanders.
Taking these elements into account, we expect administrative capacity to play a larger role in
explaining transposition difficulties in Scotland than in Flanders.
17
Directives 2000/60/EC, 2008/105/EC, 2006/118/EC (Scottish Government report on the transposition of EU directives :
EERC, 16.01.14)
16
Conclusion: Expectations and Further Course of the Research
From the preliminary research we expect the following:
1. Flanders to face a larger transposition and compliance deficit than Scotland;
2. Flanders to generally be more likely to face larger misfit than Scotland, though this factor
clearly demands case-by-case analysis;
3. Political attention to the compliance record of the subnational entities to be high in both
cases and the issue salience and political preferences of transposition dossiers to be directivespecific;
4. The internal division of competences to be more strongly linked to the occurrence of
maltransposition in Flanders than in Scotland;
5. Cooperation on and coordination of transposing measures to be more substantial, and
institutional jealousy less frequent in Scotland compared to Flanders; and
6. Administrative capacity to play a larger role in explaining transposition difficulties in Scotland
than in Flanders.
Further Course of the Research
This paper fits within a larger research project aiming to explain variation in transposition performance
in subnational entities, conducted by the Public Governance Institute (Leuven University). This
research project will reveal the transposition performances in five subnational entities, namely
Flanders, Wallonia, Scotland, Catalonia and Baden-Württemberg (with the inclusion of a control case:
the Netherlands). The conditions laid out in this paper will be tested for their value in explaining the
variation in transposition performance between these cases. This research includes transposition as
well as compliance deficits.
To keep the research manageable a temporal delineation of five years is set, encompassing all
transposition and infringement dossiers figuring in the internal market scoreboards of these
subnational entities from May 2010 (November 1st 2009) thru November 2014 (October 31st 2014).
Data collection occurs mainly digitally and through interviews with concerned transposing officials.
Next to these interviews the main sources for this study are official documents, reports and listings;
the directive’s and transposition measures’ texts and timelines, communications throughout
infringement procedures and region-specific literature.
Transposition and compliance deficits per subnational entity will be determined statistically through
the use of SPSS datasets, compiled on the basis of all gathered pieces of information. As no data are
available on the total number of internal market directives the subnational entities were charged with
throughout the years since the accession of their central state to the EU, a strict calculation of
transposition and compliance deficits is not possible. Instead – being the closest alternative – their
success-rates in terms of timeliness and of conformity will be calculated relative to the total number
of transposition dossiers they faced per scoreboard. This will be accompanied by calculations of
average delays and or correction times, and other relevant descriptives. Comparisons then, should
also take into account that the subnational entities – in contrast to the member states – do not have
an equal or even necessarily similar amount of EU directives to transpose. To put the subnational
17
performances in perspective to those of their central state, the member state deficits will be
‘recalculated’ into success-rates equally based on the occurrence per scoreboard of different sorts of
maltransposition relative to the total of transposition dossiers in that scoreboard period.
Testing the impact of the conditions set out above demands in depth knowledge on particular
transposition dossiers. Therefore, a dozen directives are selected throughout three different yet
strongly Europeanized policy sectors, namely environment, agriculture and transport. These policydomains set out the top three subject matters of all directives with transposition date in the set time
period. More importantly, the selected subnational regions have considerable competence in each of
these policy domains.
18
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VR/2009/04.12/MED.0488.
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2010f).
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VR/2010/10.09/MED.0416.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2010g).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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VR/2010/08.10/MED.0471.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2010h).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Oktober 2010.
VR/2010/19.11/MED.0548.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011b).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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VR/2011/18.03/MED.0131.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011c).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011d).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011e).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011f).
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VR/2011/19.09/MED.0438.
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Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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VR/2011/25.11/MED.0548.
21
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2011j).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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VR/2011/16.12/MED.0584.
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Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012e).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012f).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Juli-Augustus 2012.
VR/2012/05.10/MED.0436.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012g).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. September 2012.
VR/2012/26.10/MED.0464-1;
VR/2012/26.10/MED.0464-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012h).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Oktober 2012.
VR/2012/23.11/MED.0518-1;
VR/2012/23.11/MED.0518-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012i).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. November 2012.
VR/2012/21.12/MED.0590-1;
VR/2012/21.12/MED.0590-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2012j).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. December 2012.
VR/2013/22.02/MED.0076-1;
VR/2013/22.02/MED.0076-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013a).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Januari-Februari 2013.
VR/2013/22.03/MED.0137-1;
VR/2013/22.03/MED.0137-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013b).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
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Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013c).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. April 2013. VR/2013/13.05/MED.0291-1;
VR/2013/13.05/MED.0291-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013d).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Mei 2013. VR/2013/21.06 /MED.0334-1;
VR/2013/21.06/MED.0334-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013e).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Juni 2013. VR/2013/19.07/MED.0416-1;
VR/2013/19.07/MED.0416-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013f).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Juli-Augustus 2013.
VR/2013/27.09/MED.0541-1;
VR/2013/27.09/MED.0541-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013g).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. September 2013.
VR/2013/15.10/MED.0556-1;
VR/2013/25.10/MED.0556-2.
22
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013h).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Oktober 2013.
VR/2013/22.11/MED.0604-1;
VR/2013/22.11/MED.0604-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013i).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. November 2013.
VR/2013/13.12/MED.0659-1;
VR/2013/13.12/MED.0659-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2013j).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. December 2013.
VR/2014/07.02/MED.0074-1;
VR/20134/07.02/MED.0074-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014a).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Januari-Februari 2014.
VR/2014/21.03/MED.0133-1;
VR/2014/21.03/MED.0133-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014b).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Maart 2014. VR/2014/25.04/MED.02001; VR/2014/25.04/MED.0200-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014c).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. April 2014. VR/2014/23.05/MED.0267-1;
VR/2014/23.05/MED.0267-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014d).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Mei 2014; VR/2014/20.06/MED.0287-1;
VR/2014/20.06/MED.0287-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014e).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Juni 2014. VR/2014/18.07/MED;0332-1;
VR/2014/18.07/MED;0332-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014f).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Juli-Augustus 2014.
VR/2014/19.19/MED.0374-1;
VR/2014/19.19/MED.0374-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014g).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. September 2014.
VR/2014/10.10/MED;0397-1; 2014.
VR/2014/10.10/MED;0397-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014h).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. Oktober 2014.
VR/2014/07.11/MED.0432-1;
VR/2014/07.11/MED.0432-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014i).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. November 2014.
VR/2014/12.12/MED;0472-1;
VR/2014/12.12/MED;0472-2.
Departement internationaal Vlaanderen (2014j).
Mededeling aan de leden van de Vlaamse
Regering. Maandelijkse rapportering van EUdossiers. December 2014.
VR/2015/16.01/MED.0021-1;
VR/2015/16.01/MED.0021-2.
Preliminary interviews
I. Vanden Bulcke, interview 21.05.15;
G. Schockaert, interview, 26.05.15;
M. Van Der Elst, interview, 26.05.15;
J. Schaerlaeckens, interview, 27.05.15;
D. Knight, interview, 29.05.15;
N. Ritchie, interview, 08.06.15.
23