Journal of Language and Social
Psychology
http://jls.sagepub.com/
Beastly: What Makes Animal Metaphors Offensive?
Nick Haslam, Steve Loughnan and Pamela Sun
Journal of Language and Social Psychology published online 15 June 2011
DOI: 10.1177/0261927X11407168
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JLS407168
SXXX10.1177/0261927X11407168Haslam et al.Journal of Language and Social Psychology
JL
Beastly: What Makes
Animal Metaphors
Offensive?
Journal of Language and Social Psychology
XX(X) 1­–15
© 2011 SAGE Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0261927X11407168
http://jls.sagepub.com
Nick Haslam1, Steve Loughnan2,
and Pamela Sun1
Abstract
Animal metaphors convey a wide range of meanings, from insulting slurs to expressions
of love. Two studies examined factors contributing to the offensiveness of these
metaphors. Study 1 examined 40 common metaphors, finding that their meanings
were diverse but centered on depravity, disagreeableness, and stupidity. Their
offensiveness was predicted by the revulsion felt toward the animal and by the
dehumanizing view of the target that it implied. Study 2 examined contextual factors
in metaphor use, finding that the offensiveness of animal metaphors varies with
the tone of their expression and the gender and in-group/out-group status of their
targets. These variations influence offensiveness by altering the extent to which the
target is ascribed animalistic properties.
Keywords
dehumanization, gender, metaphor, offensiveness
Metaphorical language allows people to experience and understand one kind of entity
in terms of another. Features of a particular source domain are conceptually mapped
and selectively transferred onto a target domain, allowing target categories to be apprehended in novel and often revealing ways. The cognitive processes involved in the understanding of metaphor—associative and inferential, pragmatic and semantic, abstract
and embodied—are the focus of an active research literature (e.g., Gibbs, 2006; Ritchie,
2009; Wilson & Carston, 2006).
1
University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia
University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, England
2
Corresponding Author:
Nick Haslam, Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia
Email: nhaslam@unimelb.edu.au
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology XX(X)
An especially intriguing class of metaphors involves the use of animals to refer to
people. The animal kingdom is an unusually bountiful source domain and provides a
rich metaphorical vocabulary. Animal metaphors are ubiquitous (Kövecses, 2002) and
often based on a hierarchical structure—the Great Chain of Being—in which humans
are located above and animals below (Lakoff & Turner, 1989). Animals are often understood in anthropomorphic ways (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), and people are
likened to animals in countless verbal expressions. The diversity, cultural importance,
and tantalizing almost-humanness of animals make them ideal vehicles for representing people and may even have made them the first symbols (Berger, 1980). As LéviStrauss (1963) wrote, animals are not just good to eat but also “good to think.”
Animal metaphors can be employed in diverse ways. They may be endearing, as in
the use of pet names for children or lovers, or hostile when used as slurs and insults,
and they may refer to individuals or groups. In many cultures, people use animal terms
to abuse persons who violate social rules (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2008) and as ethnic
slurs (Rice et al., 2010). Some animal metaphors stand for specific human traits in a
kind of zoological shorthand (“mouse” = timidity, “owl” = wisdom), others imply
indirect metonymic connections (the French are “frogs” because they stereotypically
eat them), and still others imply that the target has an almost literal equivalence to the
animal in question (e.g., Nazi images of Jews as “vermin”).
Different animal metaphors may have different meanings, and the same metaphor
can have radically different implications in different contexts of use. Simian metaphors may be cute when applied to children but extremely offensive when used in
interracial contexts. People are often called “animals” not only when they violate social
norms in depraved ways but also when they act in ways that are seen as desirably wild.
When Victoria Beckham stated that David was an animal in bed, we assume she was
not complaining about his body odor or lack of intelligence.
Although animal metaphors are widespread, little is known about what accounts for
their differences in meaning and offensiveness. Jay (2009) recognizes animal terms as
one class of taboo words, and Leach (1964) argued that they are insulting when the
animal itself has an ambiguous status or is difficult to classify. Brandes (1984) argues
that animal metaphors label socially disapproved attributes as a way to reinforce a
society’s moral order, and Goatly (2006) locates their offensiveness in the ideology of
human superiority to animals. Linguistic and anthropological studies of animal expressions have been conducted in several languages (e.g., Hsieh, 2006; Rakusan, 2004;
Talebinejad & Dastjerdi, 2005), but these have not attempted to lay bare the psychology of those expressions.
One lens through which animal metaphors can be viewed is the concept of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). Dehumanizing animal metaphors have figured prominently in many of the past century’s violent conflicts, such as the Rwandan Hutus’
reference to Tutsis as “cockroaches” (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996). Recent psychological
research has shown that many out-groups are subtly denied attributes that distinguish
humans from animals (Leyens et al., 2003), implicitly associated with animals in general (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Saminaden, Loughnan, & Haslam, 2010; Viki et al., 2006),
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Haslam et al.
or associated with apes in particular (Boccato, Capozza, Falvo, & Durante, 2008;
Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). People also go to great lengths to deny
and distance themselves from their own animality or “creatureliness” (Goldenberg
et al., 2001). Although this research has advanced knowledge of dehumanization, it
has not directly examined the use of animal metaphors. Its primary focus on group
perception also neglects those occasions when animal metaphors are applied to individuals on the basis of perceived personal qualities rather than group memberships.
Most fundamentally, likening people to animals is not invariably dehumanizing: calling one’s baby “piglet” is not the same as angrily calling someone an “ape.”
To understand what makes animal metaphors offensive, it is important to understand matters of content and context. That is, what meanings do animal metaphors
convey, and what situational factors moderate those meanings? With respect to content, we must map the characteristics that different animal metaphors imply, and which
characteristics contribute to offensiveness. There is an almost complete lack of previous psychological research or theory on the aspects of animal metaphors that might
predict offensiveness, so our search for candidate predictors was exploratory and
largely intuitive rather than based on a solid taxonomy. Nevertheless, several aspects
of animal metaphors are plausible predictors of offensiveness.
First, more offensive metaphors may be those that involve more disliked animals:
likening someone to a reviled or disgusting animal amounts to ascribing its negative
qualities to them. Second, more offensive metaphors may be those that are most dehumanizing. Certain animal comparisons may be especially degrading to people’s
humanity. These animals need not be the most reviled: the “dog” metaphor is insulting
but dogs are not disliked. Third, some animals may signify animality better than others,
directly implying that the person is animal-like rather than merely standing for certain
human traits. These metaphors may be especially offensive as they imply that the person is other than human. Fourth, metaphors that convey content that accurately describes
the particular animal (e.g., calling someone a “cat” implying that they have truly feline
traits) may be offensive for the same reason. Fifth, some metaphors may imply a literal
equation of the target with a particular animal rather than a mere figurative similarity.
Calling someone a “maggot” does not imply that they are literally legless and larval,
but calling them an “ape” may imply that they are fundamentally ape-like. Finally, more
genetically distant animals may serve as more offensive metaphor because they imply a
greater dissimilarity from humans. These six potential predictors of offensiveness may
not be conceptually or empirically independent, so multivariate analysis was used to
disentangle their associations with offensiveness.
We can also hypothesize about contextual determinants of offensiveness. These
might involve the metaphor’s target, the metaphor’s user, and the nature of the relationship between them. The offensiveness of a metaphor, in short, may depend not just
on its propositional meaning but also on the speaker’s intention in expressing it in a
particular social context (i.e., its “illocutionary force”; Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008).
With respect to the target, animal metaphors may be considered more offensive when
directed at women rather than men on account of benign sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1997),
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology XX(X)
which portrays women as vulnerable, pure, and in need of protection. In addition,
women appear to be more averse to offensive language than men (Jay & Janschewitz,
2008), and awareness of this difference might contribute to the greater judged offensiveness of potentially abusive metaphors directed at them. With respect to the user,
the manner in which the metaphor is expressed may moderate its offensiveness. A
hostile delivery is likely to make the expression more offensive than a jocular one,
even if the same animal metaphor is used. As Norrick (2003) argues in his work on
conversational joking, mockery and sarcasm can serve to enhance rapport among
friends and colleagues. With respect to the relationship between user and target, animal metaphors may be more offensive when they are expressed across group boundaries.
The same animal expression may be more offensive when expressed toward an outgroup member than an in-group member, just as people are more sensitive to criticisms from out-group members than in-group members (Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson,
2002; Sutton, Elder, & Douglas, 2006).
We conducted two studies to examine determinants of the offensiveness of animal
metaphors. Study 1 focused on metaphor content, systematically investigating the psychological meanings conveyed by a sample of metaphors and testing six hypotheses
about what makes some particularly offensive (animal dislike, dehumanization, animality, metaphor accuracy, literalness, genetic distance). Study 2 focused on the context of
metaphor use, testing hypotheses about target gender, user tone (jocular versus hostile),
and the user–target relationship (intra- vs. intergroup). Study 2 also examined whether
the offensiveness of an animal expression in context was associated with the implied
dehumanization of its target, offering an alternative test of a Study 1 hypothesis.
Study 1
The first study examined variability in the perceived offensiveness of animal metaphors as a function of their content. Common animal metaphors were rated on items
assessing (a) their offensiveness and target gender, (b) what psychological attributes
they ascribe to their targets, and (c) other aspects of the metaphor that enabled tests of
the six hypotheses. The psychological attributes examined were personality traits and
highly evaluative personality attributes (i.e., linked to depravity, stupidity, peculiarity,
and worthlessness; Benet-Martinez & Waller, 2002). The latter were included on the
expectation that many animal metaphors have insulting content.
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 60 Australian undergraduates (33 women,
27 men) whose mean age was 20.7 years (SD = 4.9). Participants were recruited for a
study of “Animal metaphors” and paid $10 for taking part.
Materials. All participants completed a questionnaire in which they made a series of
judgments about the use of several animal metaphors. Seven graduate students were
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5
Haslam et al.
instructed to list animal metaphors in common usage and generated 41 nonredundant
metaphors. After removing one metaphor that our ethics committee forbade us to use,
we employed a final set of 40 metaphors: animal, ape, bat, beast, cat, chick, chicken,
chimp, cow, dog, fish, fox, goat, gorilla, guinea pig, hog, horse, kitten, lamb, leech,
monkey, mouse, orangutan, owl, ox, pig, puppy, rabbit, rat, shark, sheep, sloth, slug,
snake, toad, vulture, weasel, whale, wolf, and worm. The metaphors included particular species (“gorilla”), broad classes (“fish”), and collective terms (“animal,”
“beast”). Each metaphor was judged on 10 items printed on a single sheet of paper,
headed by the following statement: “Imagine that someone calls someone else a
(ANIMAL TERM).”
Offensiveness and target characteristics. “How insulting is this expression?” (1 = Not
at all to 5 = Extremely); “Is it used more often to refer to males or females?” (1 = More
to males to 5 = More to females).
Content of metaphor. “Is this term used mostly to describe the person’s bodily features (e.g., appearance, physique, strength) or their psychological features (e.g., personality, abilities, behavior)?” (1 = More bodily to 5 = More psychological); “Listed
below are 14 groups of characteristics. Circle any group that captures what is implied
about someone when they are referred to as a (animal term) (you may circle none,
one, or more than one).” Ten groups were sets of four trait terms representing poles of
the Big Five personality dimensions. Four groups were sets of four terms representing
the dimensions of highly evaluative negative characteristics (Benet-Martinez &
Waller, 2002).
Hypothesis-related items.
Accuracy: “Do the characteristics you wrote and circled above accurately
describe (animal term plural)?” (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely well).
Animality: “Are the characteristics you wrote and circled above more typical
of animals in general than humans?” (1 = No more typical of animals than
humans to 5 = Much more typical of animals than humans).
Animal dislike: “How negative are people’s perceptions of (animal term plural)?” (1 = Not at all negative to 5 = Extremely negative).
Literalness: “The person using this expression is implying that the other person
is literally a (animal term)?” (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree).
Dehumanization: “The person using this expression believes the person they are
referring to is less than human” (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree).
Genetic distance: “How genetically similar are (animal term plural) to humans?”
(1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely; reversed).
Each participant was randomly assigned 10 animal metaphors to judge, so that
each of the 40 metaphors was judged by a random subsample of 15 participants.
Procedure. Participants completed the study in laboratory conditions under the supervision of a researcher. All completed the questionnaire in 30 minutes or less.
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology XX(X)
Table 1. Most Common Attribute Sets Endorsed for Each Animal Metaphor (Study 1)
Attribute Set
Metaphor
Agreeableness (high)
Agreeableness (low)
Extraversion (high)
Extraversion (low)
Conscientiousness (high)
Conscientiousness (low)
Neuroticism (high)
Neuroticism (low)
Openness (high)
Openness (low)
Depravity
Stupidity
Worthlessness
Peculiarity
Kitten, puppy, rabbit
Bat, beast, cow, rat, shark, snake, wolf
Chick, chimp, fox
Guinea pig, kitten, lamb, mouse
—
Animal, pig, sloth, slug
Chicken
Owl
Monkey
Sheep
Animal, beast, dog, hog, leech, pig, rat, toad, vulture, whale, worm
Ape, cow, fish, gorilla, orangutan
Worm
—
Note. Only metaphors with a peak endorsement frequency ≥5 (33.3%) are included. Metaphors with two
equally endorsed peak attribute sets are listed twice.
Results
All data were aggregated so that the animal metaphor could be the unit of analysis.
Thus, the mean rating of each animal on each item was calculated across the 15 randomly assigned people who rated it. For the attribute quality item, the number of
participants endorsing each of the 14 attribute sets was counted.
The animal metaphors were not seen as directed more toward one gender than the
other, M = 2.76, t(39) = 1.74, p = .09, or as having more psychological or more bodily
content, M = 3.27, t(39) = 1.96, p = .06. Table 1 lists the metaphors according to the
psychological attribute set that was most frequently endorsed for each. Collectively,
the metaphors had varied content, with only two attribute sets having no exemplary
animal. Figure 1 demonstrates that negative attributes predominate, with the most
common elements being depravity, disagreeableness, and stupidity.
Correlations between offensiveness ratings and the hypothesis-related ratings are
presented in Table 2. The table indicates that more offensive metaphors tend to be
addressed to male targets, convey meanings that do not accurately describe the animal
in question, involve more disliked animals, are relatively literal, and reflect a dehumanizing perception of the target. When offensiveness was regressed on its five significant correlates to assess which predictors had independent associations with
offensiveness—F(5, 34) = 10.53, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .55—only animal dislike (β =
.44, p < .01) and dehumanization (β = .48, p < .01) remained as significant predictors.
Thus, the offensiveness of animal metaphors appears to be a function of the taboo quality
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Haslam et al.
3.5
3
2.5
2
Positive
1.5
Negative
1
0.5
0
Figure 1. Mean frequency of endorsement of the attribute sets across the 40 animal
metaphors, Study 1
Table 2. Correlations Between Offensiveness of Animal Metaphors and Metaphor Attributes,
Study 1 (Decimal Omitted)
1. Female target
2. Psychological
3. Accuracy
4. Animality
5. Animal dislike
6. Literalness
7. Dehumanization
8. Genetic distance
Offensiveness
1
−33*
04
−35*
−15
63**
34*
64**
07
−15
−11
−26
−38*
−47**
−49**
36*
2
3
10
−13
53**
36* −17
−19
06
−01 −23
33* −31
4
−25
34*
03
−43**
5
6
37*
41** 58**
30
−23
7
−36*
**p < .01. * p < .05.
of the animal and the dehumanizing depiction of the person. These two phenomena
were only moderately related (r = .41, p < .05).
Discussion
Study 1 indicates that animal metaphors convey diverse meanings. Some of these
meanings are positive, indicating that animal metaphors are not invariably insulting.
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology XX(X)
However, the metaphor contents were primarily negative, and they disproportionately
involved highly evaluative characteristics. Despite their diversity, the main content of
animal metaphors is a view of their targets as depraved, disagreeable, and unintelligent.
No support was found for the hypotheses that the offensiveness of animal metaphors reflects how accurately they reflect the specific animal’s attributes, how well
they represent general animality, or how genetically distant they are from humans. Thus,
it does not appear to be the case that animal metaphors are offensive simply by virtue of
likening humans to animals (generally or specifically). Animals are not intrinsically disliked, and the attributes they are seen to embody are often positive. Similarly, animal
metaphors do not become offensive simply by taking humans down many phylogenetic
notches. Indeed, many of the most offensive metaphors involved our fellow mammals
(e.g., apes, pigs, rats).
The key finding of Study 1 is that offensiveness is primarily related to two factors.
The more offensive metaphors were those that involved more disliked animals and
those that were seen as dehumanizing the target. More literal metaphors were also
more offensive, but this association reflected the strong link between literalness and
dehumanization: more dehumanizing metaphors were those in which the person was
equated with an animal rather than just figuratively likened to one. The distinctness of
these two primary predictors of offensiveness suggests that two processes are involved.
Offensiveness derives both from the transfer of reviled characteristics from taboo animals to metaphor targets and from the positioning of the target as literally less than
human, even when the animal in question is not taboo.
This possibility is supported by further exploration of the results. Some of the
most offensive animal metaphors involved reviled animals such as snakes, rats, and
leeches. Targets of these metaphors were not seen as being literally animal-like. The
primary content of the metaphors was depravity and disagreeableness, indicating
moral disgust. Other highly offensive metaphors were seen as highly literal, equating
targets with animals, and having content that primarily involved stupidity. The best
examples of these metaphors were “ape” and “dog.” It may be possible to distinguish
two kinds of offensive animal metaphors: those that are disgusting and those that are
degrading.
Despite its exploratory nature, Study 1 therefore suggests some promising lines
of further inquiry into the meanings and implications of animal metaphors. Future
research would ideally use larger samples, examine metaphors collected in multiple language communities, and ensure that if different participants judge different
sets of metaphors they all share one or more common metaphors to anchor their
judgments.
Study 2
Study 2 shifted focus from the content of animal metaphors to contextual factors that
might influence their perceived offensiveness. We presented a vignette in which one
of three animal metaphors was used to describe a person and systematically varied
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Haslam et al.
contextual factors relating to the metaphor target (gender), user (tone of expression),
and user–target relationship (group context). We hypothesized that metaphors would
be judged more offensive when expressed to a female target, in a hostile tone, and in
an intergroup context. We also assessed the personality attributes that the metaphor
expression was judged to imply about the target. We hypothesized that expressions
implying that the target was less than human would be judged particularly offensive.
Method
Participants. Participants were 72 Australian undergraduates (46 women, 26 men)
whose mean age was 19.2 years (SD = 2.3). They completed the study as part of a
course requirement.
Materials. Participants responded to a vignette in which one person uses an animal
metaphor to refer to another. The vignette was systematically varied on four factors:
tone (jocular vs. hostile), target gender (male vs. female), group context (intra- vs.
intergroup), and metaphor (ape, rat, or pig). Three participants were randomly assigned
to each of the 24 permutations of these factors.
Person A is attending a party at a neighbor’s house. The neighbor has many
[Muslim/Anglo-Australian] friends who are present. Person A decides to join in
with the people dancing in the living room. While dancing, Person B, [a
Muslim/an Anglo-Australian] [female/male] partygoer, steps on Person A’s
toes. Person A [angrily/jokingly] says to Person B, “You [pig/rat/ape], have you
got two left feet?”
After reading the vignette participants rated the animal expression on three items
assessing its offensiveness (e.g., “How offensive is the animal expression in this situation?”; “How insulting is the animal expression in this situation?”; “How inappropriate is Person A’s use of the animal expression in this situation?”) on a scale from 1 =
Not at all (offensive/insulting/inappropriate) to 7 = Extremely (offensive/ insulting/
inappropriate). These items were summed (α = .88). Participants then rated 24 traits
on the extent to which the speaker implied that the target possessed them (“Consider
each of the characteristics listed below, and rate the extent to which Person A is implying that Person B has it”), using a scale from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much so. These
traits had been validated in previous research (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain,
Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005) as varying factorially on desirability and perceived
uniqueness to humans (UH) relative to animals (i.e., 6 were high UH and desirable,
6 were low UH and desirable, etc.). A dehumanization index was created by subtracting the ratings of the 12 high UH from the 12 low UH traits. Positive index scores
indicate that animalistic traits are seen as more characteristic of the target than uniquely
human traits.
Procedure. Participants completed the study in small groups in a laboratory setting,
under the supervision of a researcher and completed the task in 10 minutes or less.
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Results
A four-way ANOVA revealed main effects for all four factors on the offensiveness
index. Metaphor was significant, F(2, 48) = 4.99, p < .05, η2 = .09, with post hoc tests
indicating that “pig” (M = 15.46, SD = 3.56) was judged more offensive than “ape”
(M = 12.33, SD = 5.07) and “rat” (M = 12.67, SD = 5.14), both ps < .05. Hostile tone
(M = 15.08, SD = 3.72) was more offensive than jocular tone (M = 11.89, SD = 5.25),
F(1, 48) = 12.97, p = .001, η2 = .11. Offensiveness was greater when the target was
female (M = 14.56, SD = 5.01) than male (M = 12.42, SD = 4.38), F(1, 48) = 5.81, p <
.05, η2 = .05, and when the context was intergroup (M = 15.19, SD = 4.20) rather than
intragroup (M = 11.78, SD = 4.79), F(1, 48) = 4.83, p < .001, η2 = .13.
There was a significant two-way interaction between tone and group context,
F(1, 48) = 4.14, p < .05, η2 = .04, and a significant three-way interaction for metaphor,
tone, and group context, F(2, 48) = 3.22, p < .05, η2 = .06. An examination of the twoway interaction indicated that jocular tone only produced lesser offensiveness when an
animal metaphor was used in an intragroup context. The three-way interaction reflected
a tendency for the “rat” metaphor to have especially reduced offensiveness when
expressed in a jocular way to an in-group member.
The dehumanization and offensiveness indices were positively correlated (r =.29,
p < .05 across individuals; r = .55, p < .01 across vignette versions; see Table 3). Thus,
metaphor expressions that implied a denial of uniquely human attributes to the target
were judged particularly offensive. Notably, however, only 10 of the 24 vignette versions yielded positive dehumanization index scores, indicating that in most cases the
animal metaphor was seen as implying uniquely human traits rather than animalistic
traits.
Discussion
Study 2 demonstrates that the offensiveness of an animal metaphor is not simply
intrinsic to the metaphor itself but also depends on the context in which it is expressed.
Animal metaphors tend to be more offensive when addressed in a hostile manner to
female targets and in intergroup contexts. People may judge animal metaphors to be
less socially appropriate when expressed toward people who are stereotyped as more
pure and needful of protection (Glick & Fiske, 1997) or more sensitive to offensive
language (i.e., women; Jay & Janschewitz, 2008) and when they express or potentially
inflame intergroup tensions. Animal metaphors may be seen as invariably hostile and
insulting when expressed toward out-group members, a possibility consistent with the
interaction between group context and tone. In contrast, when animal metaphors are
expressed toward in-group members, they may be seen as jocular by default, unless a
hostile tone is used. This possibility is consistent with the higher-order interaction
effect, which suggests that certain otherwise offensive animal metaphors may be
acceptable jocular terms among in-group members.
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Haslam et al.
Table 3. Mean (SD) Offensiveness and Dehumanization Indices by Vignette Version, Study 2
Target
Animal
Pig
Rat
Ape
Tone
Gender
Group
Offensiveness
Dehumanization
Hostile
Female
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
In-group
Out-group
15.33 (2.08)
18.00 (3.61)
14.00 (4.36)
15.33 (0.57)
14.67 (3.14)
16.67 (2.73)
11.67 (3.21)
17.00 (1.73)
15.67 (3.21)
16.67 (5.85)
13.67 (4.16)
11.33 (5.51)
5.33 (2.52)
16.33 (2.08)
8.00 (4.36)
14.33 (1.53)
15.33 (2.52)
19.00 (2.00)
11.67 (3.51)
15.00 (2.65)
11.00 (6.08)
9.67 (3.06)
6.00 (3.61)
11.00 (6.25)
−2.00
+4.33
−0.33
+0.33
+4.67
−4.33
+1.00
+5.67
−0.67
+6.00
−9.00
−7.00
−3.00
−1.67
−3.33
−6.67
+0.67
+0.33
+0.67
+0.67
−3.33
−8.00
−8.67
−2.00
Male
Jocular
Female
Male
Hostile
Female
Male
Jocular
Female
Male
Hostile
Female
Male
Jocular
Female
Male
The offensiveness of animal metaphors appears to be influenced by a variety of
contextual factors, but it also seems to be explained in part by the kinds of attributes
that they implicitly ascribe to their targets. Variations in the perceived offensiveness of
the metaphors across versions of the vignette were associated with the degree to which
uniquely human attributes were denied to the target. By implication, animal metaphors
may be insulting in part because they are—or are intended to be—dehumanizing.
General Discussion
The two studies offer complementary views of animal metaphors. Study 1 demonstrates that different metaphors convey different meanings, and these meanings are
associated with their offensiveness. Study 2 demonstrates that contextual factors also
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influence offensiveness. Evidently, offensiveness is both intrinsic to particular metaphors and determined by contexts of use.
One finding that connects both studies is the importance of dehumanization. Both
studies show that calling people animals is not invariably dehumanizing. Many animal
metaphors were not seen as denying the target’s humanity, especially when they were
expressed toward in-group members and in a jocular manner. However, both studies
also showed that metaphors were offensive to the degree that they implied a view of
the target as less than human. This conclusion is novel in psychological research.
Although the use of explicit animal metaphors has been prominent in historical instances
of dehumanization, dehumanization research has focused instead on the denial of particular human characteristics to out-groups (e.g., Leyens et al., 2003) or on implicit
associations between the groups and animals (e.g., Goff et al., 2008). These subtle and
nonconscious forms of dehumanization are important bases for prejudice and intergroup conflict, but sometimes dehumanizing perceptions are manifested blatantly in
language. Studying the use of animal metaphors in discourse may be a promising
approach to investigating dehumanization that can be pursued outside the lab and in
the thick of real conflicts.
Our joint content-and-context approach may help illuminate two celebrated events
involving animal metaphors. In the 2008 U.S. presidential race then-Governor Palin
took offence when then-Senator Obama indirectly likened her to a pig (albeit humanized by lipstick). Obama himself was seemingly likened to a chimpanzee by a New York
Post cartoonist. Both events ignited firestorms of controversy. Study 1 indicates that
both metaphors are among the most offensive in content but for different reasons. Pigs
are taboo creatures, and as metaphors they imply that a person is repulsive and morally
depraved. However, the pig metaphor was not judged to be dehumanizing, suggesting
that the metaphor’s offensiveness primarily reflects a transfer of dislike from the animal to the person rather than a denial of the person’s humanity. Chimpanzees, in contrast, were not disliked, but they were judged the most dehumanizing metaphor of all.
Likening Obama to a chimpanzee was therefore a direct disavowal of his humanness
rather than a transfer of disliked qualities.
Contextual factors also played their part. Both metaphors were expressed by people
presumed to be politically hostile to the respective targets, a sensitizing factor that
Study 2 showed to be linked to greater offensiveness. The historical context of depictions of African Americans as ape-like (Goff et al., 2008) also contributed to the offensiveness of the Obama cartoon, and was one reason why it generated more heat than
the many simian depictions of George Bush. The gender context of the Palin-pig metaphor also exacerbated its offensiveness: animal metaphors appear to be more offensive
in general when expressed toward female targets, and this may be especially so for a
metaphor that casts aspersions on a person’s appearance.
Our studies only scratch the surface of the psychological study of animal metaphors. Many additional content and contextual factors are likely to influence the offensiveness of animal metaphors and the vocabulary and determinants of metaphor use
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Haslam et al.
will vary widely across cultures. Nevertheless, the present work indicates that animal
metaphors offer a revealing window into human prejudice and social judgment.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their generous
and helpful feedback on earlier versions of the article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article:
The research reported in this article was supported by Grant DP0771200 from the Australian
Research Council to Nick Haslam and Paul Bain.
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Bios
Nick Haslam is a professor in the Department of Psychological Sciences, University of
Melbourne, Australia. His research interests include psychological essentialism, psychiatric
classification, and dehumanization.
Steve Loughnan is a research associate in the Department of Psychology at the University of
Kent. His research focuses on dehumanization processes, biases in self-perception, and the role
of metaphor in social perception.
Pamela Sun received her bachelor of arts with honors in psychology at the University of
Melbourne in 2009, with a thesis on the psychology of animal metaphors. She now works in
adolescent mental health.
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