Working Paper No. 675
The Rise and Fall of Export-led Growth*
by
Thomas I. Palley
New America Foundation
July 2011
* This paper was presented at a conference on the Mexican Economy organized by the Economics Department
of the University of Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, November 17–19, 2010 and at a conference on Brazil – China –
U.S. Relations held at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on June 10, 2011. I thank
participants for helpful comments. All errors and opinions are those of the author. Correspondence:
mail@thomaspalley.com.
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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the rise of export-led growth as a development paradigm and argues
that it is exhausted owing to changed conditions in emerging market (EM) and developed
economies. The global economy needs a recalibration that facilitates a new paradigm of
domestic demand-led growth. Globalization has so diversified global economic activity
that no country or region can act as the lone locomotive of global growth. Political
reasoning suggests that EM countries are not likely to abandon export-led growth, nor
will the international community implement the international arrangements needed for
successful domestic demand-led growth. Consequently, the global economy likely faces
asymmetric stagnation.
Keywords: Export-led Growth; Domestic Demand-led Growth; Economic Development;
Stagnation
JEL Classifications: F00, F01, F02, F10, F20, F50, O11, O19, O24
2
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past thirty years development policy has been dominated by the paradigm of
export-led growth. That paradigm is part of a consensus among economists about the
benefits of economic openness. This consensus has been used to justify globalization.
The Great Recession has surfaced contradictions that were always inherent in
export-led growth and globalization and the global economy now confronts a troubling
outlook of significant demand shortage. In developed economies the shortage is explicit
in high rates of unemployment and large output gaps. In emerging market (EM)
economies it is implicit in their reliance on export markets.
This paper argues the case for trade openness and export-led growth was always
over-simplified and over-sold. As a result of the widespread turn to openness and exportled growth the global economy confronts an extended period of asymmetric stagnation
marked by slower growth in EM economies, stagnation in developed economies, and
increased economic tensions between EM and developed economies.
II. THE RISE OF EXPORT-LED GROWTH
The export-led growth paradigm rose to prominence in the late 1970s when it replaced
the import-substitution paradigm that had dominated development policy thinking
(especially in Latin America) in the thirty years after World War II. Export-led growth is
a development strategy aimed at growing productive capacity by focusing on foreign
markets. It is part of a new consensus among economists about the benefits of economic
openness that took hold in the 1970s.
This new consensus rests on a fusion of three strains of argument that is illustrated
in Figure 1. The first strain, based on Hecksher–Ohlin–Samuelson comparative advantage
theory, is about the gains from trade between economies with different capital–labor
ratios (Ohlin 1933; Samuelson 1948; Dornbusch et al. 1980). The second strain concerns
the benefits of openness for controlling rent seeking, a problem that import-substitution
development was strongly criticized for (Krueger 1974). The third strain, which
3
developed later, is the benefits of openness for growth. The claim is trade encourages
technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers that contribute to faster productivity
growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991).
Figure 1. Arguments supporting the new
consensus on openness.
The case for openness
Comparative advantage
theory
Political economy
benefits
Growth benefits
of trade
Export-led growth represents a subsidiary branch within this new consensus that
applies to developing countries. The argument is self-conscious policy focused on
external markets helps capture the economic benefits of openness for developing
countries by encouraging best practice adoption; promoting product development; and
exposing firms to competition. The success of the four East Asian Tiger economies
(South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) appeared to provide empirical
support for these claims.
According to economists, export-led growth generates a win–win outcome for
developing and industrialized economies. All benefit from the global application of the
principle of comparative advantage, while developing countries gain extra benefit from
an external focus. Moreover, industrialized economies supposedly benefit even if
developing countries subsidize their exports so as to win additional exports. That is
because countries which subsidize their exports are giving a gift to countries receiving
those exports. However, that latter claim rests on two highly questionable assumptions.
First, there is no long-term dynamic cost to industries displaced by such subsidies.
Second, there is scarcity of resources and full employment (i.e. no Keynesian
unemployment) which makes the subsidies a gift.
4
These arguments about the benefits of trade and economic openness played an
important role in propelling the new agenda of international economic integration. That is
because they dovetailed with the economic interests of large corporations who were
looking to establish a new global economic structure that has since become known as
globalization. Corporations therefore embraced economists’ ideas as they helped power
their global economic agenda. That created a corporate–elite opinion alliance which
bonded trade theory with corporate globalization, and that alliance drove expansion of the
GATT and the subsequent establishment of the WTO in 1996.
With regard to developing countries, the IMF and World Bank played a special
role spreading the new agenda. That is because developing countries needed financial
assistance after the 1970s oil shocks, and the IMF and World Bank made access to
assistance conditional on governments embracing the openness agenda.
III. CRITIQUES OF THE NEW OPENNESS AGENDA
Though the new “openness” agenda swept academic economics, it was also always
opposed and the insights and arguments of this opposition have become increasingly
prescient. Figure 2 identifies four strains of critique of the openness paradigm. The first
strain is the comparative advantage critique. There has always been a small internal
neoclassical critique that focuses on potential pathologies of trade liberalization. These
pathologies included Johnson’s (1954, 1955) terms of trade deterioration critique;
Bhagwati’s (1958) immiserizing growth critique that extended Johnson’s critique to a
dynamic context; the Stolper–Samuelson (1941) critique about trade and income
distribution; and Lipsey–Lancaster (1956) based critiques about unintended negative
effects of trade liberalization in a world of market imperfections (see for example Brewer
1985). However, this internal critique is a collection of rare pathologies and in many
regards it is a confusing distraction to more systemic critiques. That is because it accepts
the fundamental logic of neoclassical trade theory rather than challenging it.1
1
Progressive activists sometimes appeal to arguments such as the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem to
criticize free trade. This is a dangerous tactic as it implicitly accepts the logic of neoclassical trade theory
5
Figure 2. Critiques of the new openness agenda.
New openness critiques
Internal neo-classical
critique
Kicking away the
ladder critique
Keynesian critique
Robinson beggar-thyneighbor critique
Prebisch-Singer terms
of trade critique
Export-led growth
critique
Structural
Keynesian critique
The second strain is labeled the Keynesian critique and it has its roots in
macroeconomics and Keynes rejection of comparative advantage (Milberg 2002; Prasch
1996). In a Keynesian world of demand shortage trade can reduce domestic demand,
leading to reduced output, employment, and national welfare. An implicit corollary
proposition is that in a Keynesian world export subsidies are not a gift but may instead
poach demand and employment.
The Keynesian aggregate demand shortage critique also makes exchange rates a
trade issue because undervalued exchange rates impact demand by altering the relative
price of imports and exports. Classical open economy macroeconomics, which is the twin
of neo-classical trade theory, asserts any employment effects of under-valued exchange
rates are at worst temporary. That is because monetary factors are supposedly neutral.
Either the real exchange rate adjusts to offset the effects of money, or the money supply
adjusts via the specie-flow mechanism in response to trade deficits. However, this logic
falls apart if there are hysteresis effects related to patterns of demand and the organization
of production (Palley 2003a). In that case exchange rates are non-neutral in both the
short- and long-run, and these non-neutralities make the benefits of trade contingent on
appropriate exchange rate arrangements. Absent such arrangements trade may reduce
welfare.
with its claims about the benefits of trade arising from application of the principle of comparative
advantage.
6
The Keynesian demand shortage argument also carries over to situations with
economies of scale. In the presence of economies of scale, measures that increase
demand (including protection) can increase exports by lowering the average costs of
producers. That can provide another reason to limit free trade (Krugman 1984).
The third strain of critique is labeled “kicking away the ladder” after the book of
that title by Chang (2002). This critique traces back directly to the post-World War II
import-substitution school of thought and argues trade protection, industrial policy, and
the ability to conduct macroeconomic policy are necessary for successful development.
Chang (2002) argues no country has successfully industrialized without such policies.
Whereas the Keynesian critique of openness is generic and holds for both developed and
emerging market economies, the kicking away the ladder critique applies only to
emerging market and developing economies.
The fourth strand of critique is specifically about export-led growth and it consists
of three separate elements. The first element is labeled the Robinson beggar-thy-neighbor
critique after Joan Robinson’s (1947) observations about macroeconomic mercantilism.
This argument is Keynesian and stems from the competitive devaluation experience of
the 1930s. The logic is countries that try to export their way out of demand shortage
implicitly harm their neighbors by poaching demand and employment. Applied to exportled development, the Robinson critique suggests there may be a fallacy of composition
and developing countries may crowd out each-others exports (Blecker 2000; Palley
2003b; Blecker and Razmi 2010).
The second element is labeled the Prebisch (1950)–Singer (1950) critique. It
focuses on supply and price effects of export-led growth in contrast to the Robinson
critique which focuses on demand and quantity effects. Sixty years ago Raul Prebisch
(1950) and Hans Singer (1950) identified a problem of declining terms of trade for
commodity exporting countries. Today, the problem has shifted from commodities to
manufactured goods and countries that engage in export-led growth may exacerbate the
problem by increasing the global supply of such goods (Sarkar and Singer (1991);
Kaplinsky (1993); Sapsford and Singer (1998).
7
The third element is labeled the structural Keynesian critique (Palley 2002, 2004).
The argument here is export-led growth promotes economic structures that deliver low
quality growth and prevent the development of deep prosperity. Within countries,
development has shallow roots because it is externally focused—a phenomenon
exemplified by export processing zones and Mexico’s maquilladora zone. Internationally,
export-led growth promotes a race to the bottom as countries try to gain competitive
advantage by any means. That results in wage suppression, disregard for labor and
environmental standards, disregard of workplace conditions, and weak regulation aimed
at pleasing capital.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXPORT-LED GROWTH
The last thirty years have seen tremendous spread of the export-led growth paradigm. The
strategy was pioneered by Germany and Japan in 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s and
1980s it was adopted by the four East Asian Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore. In the 1980s and 1990s it spread further, being adopted in South East Asia
by Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In Latin America it was adopted by Mexico. In the
2000s China has exemplified the paradigm.
The model has not been constant, but has instead evolved to fit changing global
circumstances and to fit individual country conditions. This evolution can be thought of
as involving four stages.
Stage I was kicked off by Germany and Japan and can be thought of as running
from 1945–1970. Both countries had their own indigenous industrial base and export
growth was driven by an under-valued exchange rate. Growth also benefitted from U.S.
aid made available after World War II as part of reconstruction and the Cold War.
Stage II captures the experience of the four East Asian tigers and runs from 1970–
1985. Once again countries relied on an under-valued exchange rate but now there was
need for more foreign technology acquisition. This was done via strategic planning and
benefitted from the fact that technology was becoming more mobile.
8
Stage III is epitomized by Mexico’s engagement with export-led growth. The
major change from stage II is that countries now started turning themselves into export
production platforms for foreign multi-nationals rather than developing their own
indigenous industrial capacity. This changed strategy was feasible because of increased
mobility of technology and capital. The key elements of the new strategy were a)
integration into the global economy; b) an undervalued exchange rate; c) suppression of
wages and social standards. The goal was to enhance international competitiveness so as
to become attractive to multi-national corporations (MNCs) as a site for foreign direct
investment (FDI) that was export-oriented. However, the benefits have also proved much
more elusive.
The new strategy is exemplified by Mexico’s experience which began with the
trade liberalization of 1986. That set the path to NAFTA and the creation of a North
American free trade area in 1994. The inauguration of NAFTA in January 1994 was
marked by a peso crisis that resulted in massive devaluation of the peso vis-à-vis the US
dollar, providing Mexico with an under-valued currency.
This third stage of export-led growth represents the beginning of the modern era
of corporate globalization, and a critical feature is that export-led growth is no longer a
purely national strategy. Instead, it is a partnership between developing countries, multinational corporations, and developed countries. Governments and multi-nationals
promoted the new system using the traditional language of free trade and claimed the
goal was creation of a global market place. However, the real goal was not to promote
traditional trade, but rather to create a global production zone in which corporations could
establish export production platforms that would export back to developed country
markets.
NAFTA is the template for the new model and it is massively significant from a
historical standpoint. By unifying the US, Canada, and Mexico into a single free trade
zone NAFTA created for the first time a free trade production zone that unified
developed and developing economies. This template was then extended globally via the
establishment of the WTO in 1996 and the admission of China into the WTO in 2001.
9
There are three important features of the NAFTA–corporate globalization model.
First, it promotes trade but not the classical trade of balanced exports and imports.
Second, it promotes a new type of export-led growth based on relocating existing
production and diverting new investment, that benefits emerging market economies by
creating jobs, transferring technology, and relieving balance of payments constraints on
growth. However, these economies do not own the industrialization process as was the
case in stages I and II. Third, it does considerable damage to developed economies via
deindustrialization, creation of international financial imbalances, and undermining the
wage–productivity growth link which in turn undermines the coherence of the domestic
income and demand generation process.
Stage IV is an extension and augmentation of the stage III model and is
exemplified by China. China’s model makes three major adjustments to Mexico’s
NAFTA model. First, it is characterized by asymmetric global engagement with China
maintaining greater tariffs on imports. Second, there is managed under-valuation of the
exchange rate that is maintained with capital controls. Third, there is a strategy for
building an indigenous national technological base via forced technology sharing, jointventures in which MNCs may be minority shareholders, and technology theft. China’s
policies toward banking and automobile production are prime examples of this.
MNCs have also changed their strategy. Thus, they are now willing to engage in
joint-ventures and also license and source from foreign producers rather than own
facilities. In the case of China that is the price of entry, with corporations hoping they
will be paid back by future profits from China’s large market. Licensing and jointventures also benefit corporations by reducing their capital investment.
However, the basic structure of dependence on multinationals for exports remains
intact so that stage IV Chinese export-led growth remains distinct from the earlier stage I
and II experiences of Germany, Japan, and the East Asian Tigers. This dependence is
illustrated in Table 1 which provides a decomposition of Chinese exports and imports by
ownership structure. Foreign-owned firms account for 50.4% of Chinese exports, and that
rises to 76.7% if joint ventures are included.
10
Table 1. Decomposition by firm ownership
structure of Chinese exports and imports in 2005.
Source:Manova and Zhang, 2008
All
firms
Stateowned
Private
domestic
Joint
ventures
Foreign
-owned
Exports
100%
10.3
13.1
26.3
50.4
Imports
100%
21.7
7.1
24.1
47.2
V. THE FALL OF EXPORT-LED GROWTH
So far the analysis has been backward looking. This section peers into the future. For past
several decades export-led growth has been a relatively successful development strategy
but there have also been clear signs of fraying. Though China has done well, stage III
participants (like Mexico) have been less successful. This is illustrated in Table 2 which
shows China has had rapid GDP growth, rapid labor productivity growth due to rapid
capital accumulation, and rapid total factor productivity (TFP) growth reflecting a
dynamic economy characterized by technical advance. In contrast, Mexico has not
recovered its strong performance of 1960–1980. Since 1980 GDP growth has been
sluggish, labor productivity has been unchanged, and TFP growth has been negative.
11
Table 2. Relative performance of Mexico (stage III)
and China (stage IV).
Source: Palma (2010)
GDP growth
Labor productivity
growth
Total factor
Productivity growth
1950- 19801980 2008
19501980
1980- 19602008 1980
19801989
1990-
Mexico
6.4%
2.6%
3.1%
-0.1%
1.6%
-2.4%
-0.6%
China
4.9%
8.5%
2.0%
6.7%
0.6%
4.2%
4.7%
2004
Looking into the future, there are reasons to believe the export-led growth
strategy is exhausted for all. The reason is changed conditions in both the developing
economies and the developed economies.
The financial crash of 2008 and the accompanying Great Recession represent a
watershed moment and have created an overarching structural condition of global
demand shortage. The US economy is debt saturated. Europe is constrained by fiscal
austerity and is itself wedded to export-led growth via Germany. Japan continues to
suffer from weak internal demand, has an aging population, and is also still hooked on
export-oriented growth. This combination augurs for stagnation in the industrialized
economies.
Emerging market economies have continued growing on the back of their exportled growth strategies but the positive factors are likely to prove temporary. EM
economies benefitted significantly from recovery of trade after the trade collapse of 2009.
They are also benefitting from high commodity prices that have bounced back with trade,
12
and commodity prices have further strengthened because commodities are viewed as a
speculative hedge against inflation. Lastly, EM countries are benefitting from interest rate
compression produced by the crisis. This rate compression will likely be a permanent
benefit, but the trade bounce is a one-off benefit and realization of the prospect of
stagnation will likely take the inflation premium out of commodities. At that stage, EM
economies as a group will face structural impediments that make export-led growth
collectively impossible.
The export-led growth model is now afflicted with several structural problems.
Problem number one is the debt saturation of US consumers. The model relied on robust
consumer markets in developed economies (particularly the US) to buy the exports and
justify FDI. For twenty-five years those markets were artificially strong, fuelled by rising
debt and asset price inflation. That pattern was unsustainable and it is now over, leaving a
hole in the logic of the export-led model.
Problem number two is the relative size of the EM economies. They have become
such a large share of the global economy that their exports are now driving a hole in the
industrialized economies and sabotaging the recovery of those economies. This is
illustrated in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the evolution of developed economies and
emerging markets plus developing economy shares of global GDP. The latter’s share has
risen from 39.1 percent in 1980 to 50.8 percent in 2008. Their share of global economic
activity therefore makes it difficult for the group to rely on export-led growth.
13
Table 3. The changing composition of global GDP
based on PPP (billions of current dollars).
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007
and author’s calculations.
World
Advanced
economies
1980
1990
2000
2008
$12.961b
7,896
(60.9%)
$26,988b
16,242
(60.2%)
$45,205b
26,071
(57.7%)
$77,109b
37,900
(49.2%)
10,746
(39.8%)
19,133
(42.3%)
39,210
(50.8%)
EM & dev. 5,064
countries
(39.1%)
Table 4 shows the changing composition of world trade. Non-OECD country
exports have risen from 25.1 percent of total in 1995 to 36.4 percent in 2008. Their share
of world imports has risen more slowly from 26.2 percent to 33.2 percent. As a bloc these
countries are running trade surpluses and they are still significantly dependent on exports
for growth despite their larger size.2
Table 4. The changing composition of world trade
(percent, %).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 87 database, June 2010.
Exports
Imports
1995
2000
2005
2008
G-7
48.9%
46.4
40.1
36.4
OECD
74.9%
72.2
66.9
63.6
Non-OECD
25.1%
27.8
33.1
36.4
G-7
48.7%
50.0
45.0
40.1
OECD
73.8%
75.0
71.1
66.8
Non-OECD
26.2%
25.0
28.9
33.2
2
In Table 4 non-OECD proxies for EM and developing economies. However, Mexico, South Korea and
Turkey are members of the OECD. If their exports and imports were subtracted from the OECD and added
to the non-OECD, the trade share of EM and developing economies would increase further.
14
In effect, the NAFTA globalization model has created a divided world where the
consumers are in the North and producers are in the South. In the era of globalization
expanding productive capacity is now relatively easy owing to technological innovations
that have increased the mobility of capital and managerial expertise. The more difficult
challenge is the structural Keynesian challenge of creating an income and demand
generation process that supports productive capacity (Palley 2006).
Nor is China likely to become the engine of growth because its growth model is
still that of an assembler focused on supplying industrialized country consumers. This is
illustrated in Figure 3 which provides a stylized representation of the new China-centric
global supply chain. East Asian country exports go to China and China’s exports then go
to the industrialized economies.
Figure 3. Stylized representation of the new Chinacentric global supply chain.
Japan
South Korea
China
Taiwan
Industrialized
economies
Others
This pattern of trade is supported by evidence in Table 5 which analyzes the
changing composition of East Asian exports. The share of East Asian exports going to
China has been rising, reflecting China’s assembly role. However, the share of Chinese
exports going to East Asia has been falling, reflecting China’s reliance on consumers in
industrialized economies.
15
Table 5. The changing pattern of East Asian trade:
percent of total exports going to East Asia & China.
Source: Haddad, M ., “Trade Integration in East Asia: The Role of China and Production
Networks,’ World Bank policy Research Working Paper 4160, M arch 2007.
Exporter
East
Asia
1990-94
East
Asia
2000-04
China
1990-94
China
2000-04
East Asia
44.1%
49.0
6.4
11.1
China
60.5%
45.3
n.a.
n.a.
Problem number three is the declining relative price of manufactured goods.
With the export-led growth strategy being so widely adopted, this is contributing to a new
Prebisch (1950)–Singer (1950) declining terms of trade problem similar to the one that
afflicted commodity producing developing countries in the second half of the 20th
century. During that period the relative price of primary commodities fell as supply
increased. Now the problem is increased supply of low technology manufactured goods
(Sarkar and Singer 1991).
Problem number four is what globalization critics term the “global race to the
bottom.” Because it is so easy for MNCs to shift production between countries, that has
created a “race to the bottom” dynamic in which developing countries undermine each
other. Each country is trying to get competitive advantage through a combination of wage
suppression; suppression of labor, environmental & social standards; suppression of
business regulation; shifting of tax burdens onto labor income away from capital income;
creation of extra-judicial export processing zones; and competitive devaluations that
create financial instability. Since all do it, none gains significant competitive advantage.
Instead, this destructive competitive dynamic undermines the development of standards,
institutions, income equality, and wage growth that are needed for deeply rooted
development. The only beneficiaries are MNCs whose profit margins are increased.
Finally, problem number five is the adoption of export-led growth by China.
Because China’s labor force is so large and its wages so low, and because the prospect of
16
producing for China’s large domestic market is so commercially attractive, China is
siphoning FDI and demand away from other emerging market economies. That is
undermining their industrialization and development. China’s emergence poses two
problems for other developing and EM economies. First, its size blocks access to the
traditional ladder of development for newcomers. Second, its entrance on the global stage
has introduced South–South competition to go along with North–South competition. That
explains why the benefits of export-led growth have been so limited for stage III
countries like Mexico.
One benefit from China for developing economies is that China’s relentless
urbanization is likely to create persistent upward pressure on commodity prices. The
urbanization process will require energy resources for power and transportation, and iron
ore, copper, and lumber for construction. However, even that is a mixed blessing. First, it
will only benefit EM and developing economies with these resources. Second, it stands to
create “Dutch disease” in these economies by appreciating their exchange rates,
something that is already clearly visible in Brazil and Chile. That will actually undermine
these countries’ industrialization and development and recreate an international division
of labor paralleling that created in the 19th century by British industrialization.
In sum, for a developing country beginning the process of industrialization thirty
years ago, export-led growth offered a reasonable bet. Its endowment and resources
would have been significantly different from developed economies, and the US economy
was about to embark on a thirty year consumption spree. Now, a newcomer must
compete with many EM countries that are already on the ladder of industrialization and
have similar resource endowments. Above all, it must compete with China. Moreover,
that competition must take place in an environment where developed economies are debtsaturated in both the private and public sector.
VI. THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC DEMAND-LED GROWTH
The implication of these arguments is the export-led growth paradigm is exhausted for
developing countries. It also risks serious harm to the global economy. That means there
17
is need to shift from export-led growth to a domestic demand-led growth model. This
does not mean the abandonment of exporting. Countries will always need exports to pay
for needed imported inputs and final goods they do not produce. However, it does mean
building up the domestic demand side of the economy and reducing reliance on strategies
aimed at attracting export-oriented FDI.
The outline elements of a domestic demand-led strategy are clear (Palley 2002):
a) Build social safety nets that diminish need for precautionary saving.
b) Raise wages and link wages to productivity growth by implementing a minimum
wage, improving labor protections, and increasing collective bargaining via unions.
c) Increase public infrastructure investment and fill the backlog of public investment
opportunities resulting from twenty-five years of neglect imposed by the neoliberal
Washington Consensus development model.
d) Increase the provision of public goods–like healthcare and education.
e) Rebalance tax structures by increasing taxes on higher income groups and lowering
them on lower income groups.
In the international economy there is need to:
a) End under-valued exchange rates and adopt a system of managed exchange rates
aimed at avoiding global imbalances in trade.
b) End policies of international labor competition via implementation of global labor
standards.
c) Implement global environmental and social standards that block international
competition on these margins.
d) Limit incentives to attract export-oriented FDI.
However, though it is clear what is needed, there are tremendous political
obstacles preventing change. First, EM economies are unwilling to give up a strategy that
has worked so well and has not yet been proven to fail. If a policy is successful, political
calculus suggests it is unlikely to be abandoned until it fails. That is because
abandonment means costs now for the sake of avoiding hypothetical future larger costs,
which is not politically compelling.
18
Second, there is also resentment that EM economies are being asked to change
when they still have far lower per capita income. Third, no individual country has an
incentive to abandon export-led growth and adopt these types of policy measures for fear
of being the only country to do so. Indeed, each individual country has an incentive to
cheat on such measures and pursue an export-led growth strategy by itself. In effect, there
is a collective action problem. The only way to get a global shift to a new growth model
is to establish and enforce multilateral rules on exchange rates, and standards on
acceptable labor, tax and environmental competition. However, getting agreement on
such rules and standards is unlikely.
In addition to these political obstacles to change, there are also structural
obstacles. Once countries embark on the path of export-led growth it seems to be very
difficult to change strategies. For example, Germany and Japan are still focused on
exporting, continuously running large trade surpluses fifty years after having adopted the
export-led model and long after they have become top tier high income countries. One
possible explanation is that once export-oriented industries acquire dominance they gain
political control, while the institutions and political interests that would promote domestic
demand-led growth remain weak.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PREDICTIONS
The above analysis suggests four conclusions and three predictions. Conclusion number
one is the export-led growth paradigm is exhausted because of changed conditions in
both EM and developed economies.
Conclusion number two is EM economies are mistaken in their belief that they
can collectively continue to grow on the basis of export-led growth. It will not deliver
success for them and it will further impede the task of economic recovery in the
developed countries.
Conclusion number three is there is need for a major recalibration of the global
economy that abandons export-led growth and replaces it with a new paradigm of
domestic demand-led growth.
19
Conclusion number four is globalization has so diversified global economic
activity that no country or region can act as the lone locomotive of global growth. A
diversified global economy requires that all regions pull together.
These conclusions support the following three predictions. Prediction number one
is for political reasons, it is highly unlikely that EM countries will shift away from
export-led growth, nor will the international community agree on the international
arrangements needed to make a domestic demand-led growth paradigm work. The fact is
once a country has adopted export-led growth it appears nearly impossible to abandon it.
Prediction number two is failure to recalibrate the global economy is likely to
produce a political backlash in the industrialized countries, particularly in the US where
the public has lost political patience because adjustment by China has been delayed too
long.
Prediction number three is the global economy is likely to experience asymmetric
stagnation marked by slower growth in EM economies, stagnation in developed
economies, and increased economic tensions between EM and industrialized economies.
20
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