Draft: Not for Citation
without Author's Permission]
U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea*
Sung-Han Kim
Associate Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Seoul, Korea
Tel: 02-3497-7644
Fax: 02-575-5245
Email: ksunghan@chollian.net
"Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula:
Developing a Research Agenda"
May 26-27, 1999
The University of California at San Diego
* The views in this paper are the author's own and do not represent the official
position of the R.O.K. government.
U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea
Sung-Han Kim (IFANS)
Introduction
One common view that seems to be shared by all states in the region is that
the security commitment of the United States is the indispensable anchor for East
Asian security, insofar as it is conducive to peace and stability as well as to
preventing an arms race in the region. There is virtually no country that would not
like to see a continued U.S. presence in this region. An abrupt and large-scale
American withdrawal would leave a power vacuum that would likely produce
intense and destabilizing competition among the regional powers. Japan, which
would have no US. security umbrella, inevitably would expand its military forces,
which would escalate into an arms race between China and Japan, and also
Korea.
Thus, even China welcomes the U.S. military presence, albeit with much
ambivalence. To be sure, Beijing's acquiescence to America's military role in the
Western Pacific is predicated upon China not being the target or the victim of the
U.S. power. From Beijing's point of view, China will oppose an American role if
the U.S. presence does not prohibit Japan's militaristic tendencies or if
Washington stands in the way of China's goal of national unification with Taiwan.1
A research question in this paper is whether the United States will need or be
able to continue its military presence after Korea is reunified. If so, how will be the
force structure changed? This paper aims at analyzing the question of the
continued presence of U.S. forces, or their status, that is to be raised before or
after a "durable peace system" has been established on the Korean peninsula.
1
) Yong Deng, "The Asianization of East Asian Security and the United States' Role," East Asian
Studies, Autumn/Winter 1998, p.105.
1
When the two Koreas sign a peace treaty ending the Korean War in legal terms, it
would indicate de facto unification of the Korean peninsula. Since the formation
of a peace treaty will be possible only after reconciliation and economic
cooperation between the two Koreas have been realized in a full scale and
political and military confidence has been restored, reaching this phase means
that a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula has been
established. This is an interim step toward peaceful unification of the two Koreas,
or de jure unification. Thus, this paper will touch upon how to handle the situation
in which North Korea urges the change of the status of U.S. forces before or after
the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two Koreas, and will discuss the
issue of U.S. military presence in a unified Korea that has been achieved on
South Korea's terms.
Creation of Peace Mechanism and the Role of U.S. Forces
Establishing Peace Mechanism
There are two issues with regard to a peace mechanism (or system) on the
peninsula. One is how to set up such a peace mechanism and the other involves
the role of U.S. forces in Korea, an issue that is certain to be raised in the
negotiations over a new peace mechanism. If the process of creating a peace
system is assumed to involve three phases -- maintenance of the truce system,
implementation of the North-South Basic Agreement, and conclusion of a new
peace mechanism -- the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is likely to be critical in the
third phase, during the final negotiations over a peace agreement between the
two Koreas, with the endorsement of the United States and China.
North Korea can be expected to argue that once a peace treaty is concluded
then U.S. forces stationed in Korea would no longer be necessary since peace
has been assured on the peninsula. Thus, South Korea and the United States
need to re-define the strategic role of U.S. forces in Korea not only from a
perspective of the Korean peninsular situation, but from a broader framework
linked to the maintenance of geopolitical equilibrium, or balance of power, in
Northeast Asia. Therefore, South Korea and the United States should seriously
review the matter of structuring the role of U.S. forces in Korea to better suit the
2
circumstances following the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The first step toward establishing a viable peace regime on the Korean
peninsula should involve the maintenance of the armistice system. Emphasis
should be placed on ensuring a state of peace through the normalization of the
truce system and stabilization of the respective military sectors. The existing
truce system should be retained until the two Koreas reach a new peace treaty to
replace the current armistice agreement.
During the second phase, emphasis should be placed on laying the
groundwork for a peace system based on the North-South Basic Agreement.
Various subcommittees and joint commissions envisioned in the Basic
Agreement should be instituted, while detailed programs are prepared and
undertaken to build confidence in politics and the military.
When the results of political
2
and military
3
confidence-building and
exchanges and cooperation have become tangible between the two Koreas due
to the successful efforts of the first two phases, then further measures should be
promoted in the third phase to convert the truce system into a peace system, to
have the United States and China endorse an inter-Korean peace treaty based
on the four-party talks, and to secure the United Nations' acknowledgement of
this accord with the participation of Russia and Japan.
Status of U.S. Forces
2
) A political prerequisite for the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula involves an
atmosphere of "political confidence-building." Confidence-building in the political realm between the
two Koreas refers to a situation in which North Korea renounces any intention to engineer a subversive
revolution in South Korea and agrees to abide by the spirit of the North-South Basic Agreement, while
South Korea promotes an environment in which North Korea is convinced that the South has no
intention to achieve unification through absorption of the North. Since military confrontation on the
Korean peninsula reflects underlying political antagonism, military confidence-building will more
easily follow suit once trust is developed in political relations.
3
) The priority focus for promoting confidence building in military relations involves prohibition of the
development, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction. If either North or South Korea
possesses or attempts to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, this would shatter the
political goal of peaceful coexistence and constitute a fundamental obstacle to the development of
inter-Korean relations.
3
An issue likely to emerge at this phase involves the very question of the need
to maintain the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. North Korea insists
that dissolution of the United Nations Command is inseparably linked to the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. But since American forces are stationed in
Korea under the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. troops in Korea are not
tied to operations of the United Nations Command.
Furthermore, as the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty provides for a
defensive military alliance between South Korea and the United States, which
was concluded by a lawful exercise of their sovereignty, third countries have no
right to intervene in this regard. In this light, the issue of establishing a peace
mechanism on the Korean peninsula and the questions regarding the future of
U.S. forces in Korea and the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty should be
handled separately.
However, since the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is likely to arise sometime
during the process of establishing a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula,
and since debate will center on the original raison d'etre once the threat from
North Korea disappears, South Korea and the United States need to begin
discussing how to deal with the issue of revising the Korea-U.S. alliance and the
future role of U.S. forces in Korea.
Security Interests of South Korea and the United States
Convergence or Divergence?
The strategic interests of South Korea and the United States converge most
in the post-Cold War era over the issue of establishing a new order in Northeast
Asia. South Korea and the United States both desire a stable power balance in
the region. It is against this backdrop that the United States describes its
participation in bilateral or multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia as a
"stabilizing force." This may well be akin to the United States performing the role
of a "balancer" between China and Japan.
The interests of the United States, as a superpower, are in line with those of
South Korea, as a semi-developed country, in seeking to engage North Korea as
a responsible member of the world community. However, the two countries may
4
differ in their policy priorities related to promoting such engagement.
The U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in
particular is part of a larger framework of global, Northeast Asian and Korean
peninsular strategic interests. At the global level, the U.S. deals with North Korea
in terms of maintaining the leadership role of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. In
order to protect its leadership as the sole superpower, the U.S. must prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction among the nations which do not possess
them already. Thus, the U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem and
missile exportation is basically premised on this global strategic view. At the
regional level, the U.S. policy to North Korea is interconnected mainly with its
policy toward China.
If the U.S. successfully deals with China through the
U.S.-Japan security alliance and holds North Korea under its arm, the policy goal
of the U.S. (i.e., preventing the emergence of a hegemon in Northeast Asia) could
be more easily achieved. At the level of the Korean peninsula, the U.S. must
reduce the tension between the two Koreas in order to prevent the outbreak of a
war on the peninsula and must also seek the ways by which the sudden change
of North Korea can be successfully managed.4
At this point the policy priorities between the United States and South Korea
diverge. The Clinton Administration puts the first priority on the North Korea
policy at the global level, the second on the regional level, and the third on the
peninsula level, while Korea's priorities are in reverse order. In other words, the
South Korean government is more concerned with how to reduce tension and
promote reconciliation between the two Koreas, while the United States is keen
on preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, South
Korea and the United States have already reached the like decision that the
United States should play a leadership role in the Northeast Asian security
architecture and that North Korea should be engaged to the international
4
) Sung-Han Kim, "Korea-U.S. Relations: Convergence or Divergence?" The Korea Herald, November
21, 1998, p.5.
5
community in a gradual manner. However, convergence of interests does not
always guarantee convergence of policy priorities, which thus requires
sophisticated efforts.
Regional Adjustments
A clue to resolving any divergence should be found in overcoming differences
in policy priorities between South Korea and the United States. In other words,
the two countries can adjust the nature of their alliance in such a way that places
their top policy priority on the "regional strategic interests of Northeast Asia
surrounding the Korean peninsula." The two countries should capitalize on the
global outlook of the U.S. strategy and the national focus of South Korean
strategy to pursue their common interests.
To adjust the South Korea-U.S. alliance to a regional strategic approach
means reaffirming the fact that the efforts designed to deter war on the Korean
peninsula will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia as well;
emphasizing that even if the threat from North Korea dissipates, the South
Korea-U.S. alliance can continue to contribute to regional stability; and creating a
crisis management system between South Korea and United States in
preparation for any unexpected change in the situation in North Korea.
At the same time, to ensure the South Korea-U.S. alliance can move in such a
direction, both countries should promote closer relations with China in an effort to
minimize any negative influence that Beijing may exert at the time of unification of
the Korean peninsula, and to ensure China's constructive role in the interests of
regional security. Furthermore, by also strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance,
which parallels the South Korea-U.S. alliance, Japan will be properly aligned,
regional security promoted, and security cooperation enhanced between South
Korea and Japan.
Along with the promotion of an engagement policy to encourage North Korea
to participate in the international community and to induce Pyongyang to reform
and open itself up, South Korea and the United States should prepare fully for any
6
contingency that might arise in North Korea.5 At the same time, the two countries
should initiate preparations so that their alliance can be developed into a
relationship which facilitates close cooperation for ensuring regional security
even after unification, instead of remaining a system designed to deal only with
the current Korean peninsula situation.
Efforts should be undertaken to prepare for discussion about the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Korea, which is certain to arise in the course of bringing about
a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. However, since such measures
may cause concern on the part of China, as was the case with the revised
U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, South Korea and the United States should
emphasize that they are pursuing a "multilateral security cooperative system,"
involving the participation of all the countries of the region for forging a security
mechanism for Northeast Asia.
When the security-related officials of South Korea and the United States
discuss measures to develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional
alliance in the long term, one of the focal points will involve the issue of the future
role of U.S. troops in Korea. The two security-related challenges now facing
South Korea and the United States on the Korean peninsula include the
deterrence of war and preparations for a crisis other than war.
The most important issue to address in the process of transforming the
Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional one involves the restoration of the U.S.
wartime operational control over South Korean forces to the Korean side.
However, South Korea should now refrain from taking back wartime operational
control as long as a serious threat from North Korea persists because South
Korea has little experience in commanding a war effort and is rather lacking in its
ability to collect and analyze strategic intelligence. Thus, South Korea and the
United States should prepare a phased schedule to discuss this issue. At the
5
) See Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: Korea-U.S. Reponses (Seoul: Institute of Foreign
Affairs & National Security, 1997).
7
same time, South Korea should request that the United States assist South Korea
in improving its ability to plan for its own defense, operate a command system
effectively, collect and analyze intelligence, monitor combat situations and
maintain an early warning system. Wartime operational control should be
restored only after full preparatory measures have been completed.
Post-Unification Role of U.S. Forces in Korea
Expanding the Scope
South Korea and the United States should promote the creation of a peace
mechanism on the Korean peninsula through close consultations on converting
their bilateral alliance into a regional system. Once unification is realized on the
Korean peninsula, there will be the need to transform the South Korea-U.S.
alliance system from a security cooperative relationship for stability and peace on
the Korean peninsula into a regionally-oriented security system. Under Article 3
of the South Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the treaty is to be invoked when
either South Korea or the United States encounters an armed attack from the
"Pacific area." Therefore, the scope of security cooperation between South Korea
and the United States can reasonably be expanded to the Pacific area beyond
the Korean peninsula.
The significance of revamping the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional
alliance is that it would involve a cooperative system designed to contain any
hegemonic efforts by China or Japan,6 provide a common forum for discussing
regional issues, and collectively deal with factors involving regional instability
such as possible political unrest in China or Russia. At the same time, military
cooperation between South Korea and the United States should aim to ensure
safe sea lanes of communication (SLOC). Presently, safe passage along sea
6
) The most important bilateral relationship that may significantly influence the East Asian security
architecture in the first half of the 21st century would be the Sino-Japanese relationship. See Charles
Horner, "The Third Side of the Triangle: The China-Japan Dimension," The National Interest, Winter
1996/97, p.23.
8
lanes linking South Korea to world markets hinges in large measure on the
presence of the U.S. Navy.
However, once the South Korea-U.S. alliance becomes a regional system
following unification of the Korean peninsula, both parties will need to clarify the
extent of its responsibility with regard to Korea-U.S. naval cooperation. If the
nature of regional security is defined vaguely under a mutual defense treaty,
substantial confusion may occur with Korea being expected to cooperate in
various disputes. Therefore, it is important to clarify the specific scope of such an
alliance. It would be desirable to restrict the realm of cooperation to the Northeast
Asian area surrounding the Korean peninsula in view of Korea's primary
interests.
Force Restructuring
When an expanded role for regional cooperation between Korea and the
United States and the responsibility and scope of such an alliance are specified, it
will be necessary to resolve issues related to force restructuring. Possible
scenarios related to the restructuring of U.S. forces in Korea include a complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea; a pullout of U.S. ground troops with U.S. air
and naval forces remaining in Korea; and the continued presence of U.S. air and
naval forces with a reduced number of ground troops.
First, the idea of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea can only be
put into practice based on a premise that the United States has no vital interest in
the Korean peninsula. Under such a scenario, it may be inadvisable for the United
States to maintain a confrontational presence toward China by continuously
stationing troops in such close proximity as on the Korean peninsula to contain
China after Korean unification. Some political voices in the United States assert
that if the United States continues to maintain U.S. troops in Korea and Japan at
substantial U.S. expense, Korea and Japan will continue to enjoy a free ride on
security, while jeopardizing the economic interests of the United States.7
7
) Chalmers Johnson & E. B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug
1994, pp.103-4.
9
However, if the United States pulls its troops out of Korea after unification, this
would inevitably create a power vacuum in this part of the world, a void that would
likely be filled by China or Japan. South Korea can hardly accept such a
consequence, especially since it has already suffered dearly in previous
hegemonic
struggles
between
China
and
Japan,
most
recently
the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. If a unified Korea is forced to fend for itself under
a new Northeast Asian order without any trustworthy ally in terms of security
matters, it is highly possible that Korea would feel compelled to resort to the
development of nuclear arms, for lack of a better alternative, in the interests of its
own security. If Korea goes nuclear, Japan can be expected to follow suit in short
order. Consequently, Northeast Asia would enter an era of a "balance of terror" in
which nuclear countries face off against each other.
Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw its ground troops from
Korea leaving behind only naval and air force units in a unified Korea. This may
well be an approach by which Washington would retain its existing role of
ensuring regional security while at the same time enjoying increased flexibility.
Seen from the standpoint of the United States, this option is compatible with the
policy of ensuring safe passage in the Pacific, while avoiding possible criticism of
infringing upon the sovereignty of Korea that may be raised over a continued
presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea, in addition to checking the emergence
of hegemonic activity in the region.
Nevertheless, a drawback of this scenario is that in light of its lack of ground
forces, the U.S. commitment to "automatic involvement" in any development on
the Korean peninsula would be seen as considerably weakened. The presence of
ground troops constitutes the clearest evidence of the political determination of
the United States. Therefore, if Washington's political commitment appears
diminished due to the withdrawal of all but its naval and air forces, the
effectiveness of U.S. forces in Japan would also decline markedly. Moreover, if
the United States were to maintain naval forces along Korea's west coast across
from the Chinese coastal territory, Beijing would likely react sensitively, a factor
10
which could harm U.S.-China relations.
A third option is to maintain a minimum number of U.S. ground troops,
perhaps around 3,000 to 5,000, along with naval and air forces, in a unified Korea.
This alternative seems to be the most desirable in reality. The presence of U.S.
ground troops, no matter how small their number, would bolster the Korea-U.S.
alliance as a regional alliance. In this manner, the United States would be able to
dampen a possible hegemonic struggle between China and Japan and negate
the urgency of a unified Korea to go nuclear, which would be a major source of
instability in Northeast Asia. From the standpoint of Korea, too, Seoul should
contemplate how much it would really help Korea's national interests to possess,
in an effort to appease public sentiments, nuclear arms that are likely to fuel
regional instability in Northeast Asia.
The stationing of U.S. ground troops could be limited to the southern region of
the Korean peninsula far from the Chinese border, as a gesture of good faith to
Beijing. During his visit to South Korea in March 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen said that the United States would continue to station its military in
Korea even after unification if the Korean people so desired. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Kurt Campbell also told a Congressional hearing that "The United
States is thinking of maintaining a strong security alliance with Korea in the
interests of regional security even after threat from North Korea disappears."
To translate this third option into action, one condition should be satisfied.
The shared feeling that the United States made a considerable "contribution" to
the process of Korean unification should be promoted among the Korean people.
Otherwise, even the symbolic presence of U.S. ground forces will be subject to
public opposition. However, there should be no major problem if the two countries
redefine the focus of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and undertake detailed
preparations for these and other possibilities.
Conclusion
The raison d'etre of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which represents an
11
important element of Washington's Asia-Pacific strategy in the post-Cold War era,
has been sustained as inter-Korean relations have yet to depart from the
Cold-War confrontation. It is also true that there are limits to the alliance, while
various problems have emerged in South Korea-U.S. relations due to differences
in policy priorities of the two countries.
Therefore, South Korea and the United States should promote an
engagement policy toward North Korea with due patience, while simultaneously
strengthening their alliance system and striving to develop a regional alliance
capable of contributing to regional stability in Northeast Asia. Security officials of
both countries should engage in close consultation and announce sometime in
the future a "new Korea-U.S. security joint statement" comparable to the
"U.S.-Japan security joint statement," while preparing to transform their bilateral
relations into a new alliance based on a shared new role for promoting stability
and prosperity in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.
The U.S. forces in Korea, who have contributed immensely to ensuring
stability on the Korean peninsula, should continue to cooperate with the South
Korean forces under the South Korea-U.S. joint defense system so long as a
threat from North Korea persists. Once this threat from the North dissipates, the
scale of U.S. forces in Korea will inevitably be reduced. But the continued
presence in Korea of a symbolic number of U.S. ground troops, along with naval
and air force elements, even after Korean unification, together with U.S. forces in
Japan,8 will contribute to maintaining stability in Northeast Asia.
Since the present South Korea-U.S. joint defense system will have to be
changed once the threat from North Korea disappears, consultations should be
8
) Regarding the question of the double presence of U.S. military forces in Korea and Japan, the United
States will have to consider the fact that Japan will remain the sole country hosting the U.S. military
presence when the United States withdraws its forces from unified Korea. If so, opposing voices in
Japan toward the U.S. military presence will be stronger, thereby endangering the U.S. presence even in
Japan. This is not the scenario that China wants to happen, since Japan without U.S. security umbrella
means Japan which is embarking on rapid military build-up. Thus, the question of U.S. military
presence in Korea and Japan should be treated as a single basket.
12
held with the United States to discuss the issues of restoring wartime operational
control and improving the South Korean military's ability to prepare for its own
defense, manage command control operations, and effectively gather and
analyze intelligence.
The key to overcoming differences between South Korea and the United
States in policy priorities, as evidenced in the waging of a "triangular game"
among North and South Korea and the United States despite South Korea-U.S.
concurrence in security interests, lies in further cementing the South Korea-U.S.
bilateral security alliance and preparing to convert this alliance into a regional
alliance system.
One thing that should be kept in mind in this process is that a multilateral
approach to a security system for Northeast Asia should be pursued in parallel
with a consolidation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. South Korea's relations not
only with the Untied States but also with China, Japan and Russia should be
handled with attention to detail under a framework of South Korea's security
policy structure. It is now time for South Korea to lay the groundwork for long-term
security programs by retaining cooperative relations with the United States in
regard to North Korea policy amid a changing security environment in the
post-Cold war period while preparing for new developments on the Korean
peninsula.
13