INCENTIVES FOR VIOLENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN ICE HOCKEY
Violent play and fighting are used purposefully and strategically by teams in the
National Hockey League (NHL). Research by John Haisken-DeNew, presented to the
Royal Economic Society's 2009 annual conference at the University of Surrey, finds
that aggressive play is beneficial not only for the team as a whole but even for the
individual players engaging in it.
At the team level, more aggressive play leads to a significantly increased probability of
reaching the play-offs. And individual players who take on the role of ‘enforcers’ (to
intimidate opposing players and to protect valuable players and enable them to score
goals) receive a compensating wage premium for engaging in fights and putting
themselves at risk of bodily harm. Most of these enforcers are otherwise comparatively
low-ability wing players.
Rough play and even actual fighting (exchanging blows), in the NHL is an integral part
of ice hockey games in North America. The level of violence has risen steadily in the
last decades until reaching its peak at the end of the 1980s. Since then, although
having been reduced somewhat, it persists at a relatively high level.
Based on an empirical analysis covering data over many years, this study suggests that
violent play and fighting are used purposely and strategically by the teams, following
basic economic incentives. Aggressive play is beneficial not only for the team as a
whole but even for the individual players engaging in it.
The study uses a database of publically available success indicators for NHL hockey
teams and their respective players. In addition, it merges publically available wage
information and also fight behaviour. Most interestingly, the researchers have
subjective fan information concerning the subjective ‘winner’ of the fight.
At the team level, more aggressive play leads to significantly increased probability of
reaching the play-offs. The incentive to encourage rough play are therefore clear, as
participation in the play-offs generates more revenue in form of ticket sales and
broadcast transmission rights for the teams.
Even more interesting are the results on the individual level, that is, the incentives for a
single player. By combining salary data, information about individual characteristics and
data on fighting behaviour of individual players, the study shows that some specific
players take on the role of ‘enforcers’ (a) to intimidate opposing players and (b) to
protect valuable players and enable them to score goals.
These enforcers receive a compensating wage premium for engaging in fights and
putting themselves at risk of bodily harm. Most of these enforcers are otherwise
comparatively low-ability wing players.
Detailed data on the outcome of fights shows that these players receive an even higher
wage premium for fights actually won, and are thus following a clear economic
incentive (comparable to bonus payment systems in other industries). The empirical
analysis suggests that engaging in a fight earns a player from US$10,000-US$18,000
per fight, depending on success. This is a substantial amount of money for one fight, as
the average salary in that time period is about US$1.5 million.
Some attempts have been made in the past to curb fighting and reduce violence in the
league, especially to make ice hockey more attractive to a broader public and to
discourage young players from dangerous behaviour in junior leagues. Overall, the
implemented rule changes did not have the desired effect.
If one is really interested in reducing violence, the researchers suggest imposing a fine
on violent players in such a way, that their economic incentive – the observed wage
premium – vanishes. For instance if one imposed a fine of $36,000 per fight, even the
most effective fighter earning $18,000 per fight would have no personal incentive to
fight.
To avoid collusion between fighter and team, the fine must be greater than the personal
gain to the fighter, otherwise the team would simply cover the fine costs to the fighting
player as the team would still have a strategic incentive to support their players to fight.
By introducing a ‘fight fine’ of twice the maximum potential gain and (crucially) adding
this amount to salaries paid for the team salary cap (fines would be 6.7% of the team
salary cap or the average wage of two players), then all involved would have either little
or no incentive to allow fighting to continue.
ENDS
John Haisken-DeNew
RWI Essen, Germany
+49-201-8149-280
jhaiskendenew@rwi-essen.de