The Federalist #10
Large Republic: Best Control of the Effects of Faction1
Introduction
The important tendency of a well-constructed Union to control the violence of faction deserves
careful consideration. The likelihood of this dangerous vice alarms every friend of popular governments.
Our most virtuous citizens, friends of public and personal liberty, complain that our governments are too
unstable. They say the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties. Too often, measures are
decided by the superior force of an overbearing majority rather than the rules of justice and the rights of the
minority.
Faction Defined:
By a faction, I mean a group of citizens, either a majority or a minority, united and motivated by some
common passion or interest adverse 2to the rights of other citizens or the community as a whole. There are
two methods of curing the mischief of faction: remove its causes or control its effects.
Removing the Causes of Factions
There are two ways we could destroy the causes of factions: destroy the liberty that is essential for it
to exist, or give every citizen the same opinions and interests.
The first remedy (destroy the liberty which allows groups to exist) is worse than the disease of
factions themselves. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire. Without the nourishment of liberty, faction
instantly dies. But abolishing liberty because it nourishes faction is as silly as the wish to annihilate air
because it gives fire its destructive energy. The second cure (give all the same interests) is as impractical as
the first is unwise. As long as man’s reasoning remains fallible and he’s free to use it, differing opinions will
be formed.
Therefore, faction is part of the very nature of man. Differing opinions on government, the various
ambitions of leaders, human desires, and diversity of interests have divided mankind into parties and
inflamed disagreements, making people more likely to oppress each other than to work for the common
good.
Controlling the Effects of Factions
Thus, the causes of faction cannot be removed; relief can only be sought by controlling the effects of
factions. And so, to secure the public good and private rights by controlling the effects of factions is the
object of our discussion. How is this possible? The composition of our proposed union, in its structure and
its size, offers the best remedy for the ills just discussed. Stated differently, a representative democracy
(republic) will offer the cure that we are seeking for the effects of faction.
Focusing on the main differences between a democracy and a republic will provide our remedy for
controlling the effects of faction. First, the system of representation in a republic serves to filter and refine
the opinions of the public. The wisdom of representatives can discern the true interest of the citizens, and
their patriotism will make it less likely that they will sacrifice the common good for temporary interests or
considerations. And since, in the case of this Union, each representative is chosen by a large number of
citizens, it will be more difficult for the influence of faction to allow unworthy or biased candidates to win
office.
A group of persons forming a unified, usually divisive minority within a larger group. Madison was mostly
referring to political parties, but we should include interest groups under this term.
2 In opposition to
1
Another major difference between a democracy and republic is that republics can include a greater
number of citizens and larger territory than democracies. This circumstance makes factious combinations
difficult. The larger size adds a greater variety of interests and parties. It becomes less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.
So it clearly appears that the same advantage a republic has over a democracy is enjoyed by a large
republic over a small one. Factious leaders may kindle a flame within their specific states, but they will not
be able to spread a conflagration 3through the other states. All the same, a faction may influence the
policies of one area of the nation, but the variety of interests dispersed throughout the entire country
secures the national government from the effects of that group.
Therefore, in the size and proper structure of the Union, we see a remedy for the most common
disease of republican government.
Questions:
1) Why does Madison say that factions are detrimental to the public good?
2) Why is removing the causes of factions not possible, according to Madison?
3) What “remedy” does Madison propose to cure the effects of factions?
4) Explain Madison’s argument with regard to this remedy.
5) In your opinion, do factions (parties, interest groups) have a positive or negative effect on our
democracy? Why or why not?
3
A very intense and uncontrolled fire.