PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Safety Culture Application Guide
Final Version
Prepared by
Ronny Lardner
Chartered Occupational Psychologist
The Keil Centre
5 South Lauder Road
Edinburgh EH9 2LJ
United Kingdom
Tel (00 44) 131 667 8059
Fax (00 44) 131 667 7946
E-mail ronny@keilcentre.co.uk
www.keilcentre.co.uk
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Table of Contents
1
2
3
4
Executive summary ..................................................................... 3
Overview ..................................................................................... 4
Introduction ................................................................................. 4
Safety culture theory ................................................................... 5
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
Safety culture & climate definitions ............................................................ 6
Model of safety culture ............................................................................... 7
Influence of national and organisational culture ......................................... 8
Safety sub-cultures .................................................................................. 10
Safety culture and health and safety outcomes ......................... 10
5.1.1 Organisational accidents ................................................................... 11
5.1.2 Individual occupational accidents ...................................................... 11
6
Defining a positive safety culture ............................................... 13
6.1 Features associated with a positive safety culture ................................... 14
7
Assessing safety culture............................................................ 15
7.1 Tips and good practice ............................................................................ 16
7.2 Quantitative methods (questionnaires) ..................................................... 18
7.3 Qualitative methods ................................................................................. 19
7.3.1 Interviews, focus groups and workshops .......................................... 19
7.3.2 Observation & ethnographic methods ............................................... 20
7.4 Triangulated methods .............................................................................. 21
7.4.1 Loughborough safety climate toolkit .................................................. 21
7.4.2 Safety Culture Maturity® model ........................................................ 21
7.5 Summary of safety culture assessment techniques ................................. 23
8
Links to behavioural safety and teamworking ............................ 24
8.1 Safety culture and behavioural safety ...................................................... 24
8.2 Safety culture and teamworking ............................................................... 24
9 General conclusions and discussion ......................................... 26
10 Key references .......................................................................... 27
11 Appendix 1: Relationship between safety climate and accident
rates ................................................................................................ 30
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
1 Executive summary
This safety culture application guide is designed to inform readers in the European
process industries about safety culture theory, the features associated with a positive
safety culture, and the link between a positive safety culture and health and safety
performance. The guide also describes the main methods used to assess safety
culture, and the relationship between safety culture, behavioural safety and
teamworking. Key references are provided.
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
2 Overview
This document is a guide to safety culture. The guide was prepared as part of the
activities of the EU-funded PRISM project, which concerns human and organisational
factors which affect health and safety in the European process industries. Within the
PRISM project, Focus Group 1 is concerned with 3 topics: safety culture, teamworking and behavioural safety.
This safety culture guide provides managers and safety specialists with an overview of
safety culture theory, validity, measurement techniques and its relationship with
behavioural safety and team-working. One of the needs identified earlier in the PRISM
project by industry members of Focus Group 1 was the need to demonstrate how the
topics of safety culture, team working and behavioural safety are integrated.
The remainder of this guide is set out as follows:
Section 3:
An introduction
Section 4:
Outlines the theory underpinning safety culture
Section 5:
Describes the link between safety culture and health and safety
performance
Section 6:
Lists the features associated with a positive safety culture
Section 7:
Reviews the main techniques for measuring safety culture
Section 8:
Discusses the relationship between safety culture and behaviour
modification and team working
Section 9:
Draws general conclusions.
3 Introduction
The process industries increasingly recognise the importance of the cultural aspects of
safety management. This is due in part to the findings from investigations into major
disasters in process industries (e.g. Flixborough and Piper Alpha) and other industries
such as nuclear power (e.g. Three Mile Island and Chernobyl), marine transportation
(Exxon Valdez and Zeebrugge) and passenger rail transportation (Ladbroke Grove
and Clapham Junction). All these investigations concluded that systems broke down
catastrophically, despite the use of complex engineering and technical safeguards.
These disasters were not primarily caused by engineering failures, but by the action or
inaction of the people running the system. “The causes in each case were
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
malpractices that had corrupted large parts of the socio-technical system”. (Lee, 1998
p217).
A major focus over the past 150 years has been on developing the technical aspects
of engineering systems to improve safety, and these efforts have been very
successful. This success is demonstrated by the low accident rates in the majority of
safety-critical industries, however many believe that a plateau has now been reached.
The effectiveness of engineering and procedural solutions has highlighted the key role
of human behaviour in the causation of the residual accidents. Some safety experts
estimate that 80-90% of all industrial accidents are attributable to "human factors"
causes (see Hoyos, 1995).
It is now widely accepted that an effective way to further reduce accident rates is to
address the social and organisational factors which influence safety performance. In
parallel with the wider recognition of the importance of behavioural and psychological
aspects of safety, the concept of organisational safety culture has come to the fore.
Safety culture has been described as the most important theoretical development in
health and safety research in the last decade (Pidgeon, 1991). The importance of
safety culture is illustrated by the fact that although airlines across the world fly similar
types of aircraft, with crews who are trained to similar standards, the risk to
passengers varies by a factor of 42 across the world’s air carriers. Since these
organizations have very similar technology, systems and structures, some argue that
the difference in performance is largely due to systematic differences in the behaviour
of their employees, in other words their safety culture (Reason, 1998).
4 Safety culture theory
The term ‘safety culture’ was introduced by International Atomic Energy Agency in
their report on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986. The errors and
violations of operating procedures which contributed to the Chernobyl disaster were
seen by some as being evidence of a poor safety culture at the plant (Lee, 1998). The
identification of a poor safety culture as a factor contributing to the accident led to a
large number of studies investigating and attempting to measure safety culture in a
variety of different high-risk, high-hazard industries. Although the importance of safety
culture is widely accepted, there is still little agreement about what is meant by the term.
To an extent, safety culture has been a victim of its own success, because the
explosion of interest in safety culture has led to a range of conceptualisations, nearly
one for each research team working in the area. A recent review of the research
literature identified 16 separate safety culture definitions (Guldenmund, 2000). The
issue is further confused by the related concept of safety climate. It appears that those
who introduced the term safety culture ignored the earlier concept of safety climate
described by Zohar (1980). Once the concept of safety culture became popular in the
early 1990’s the question of its relationship with safety climate arose. Over the last
decade several attempts have been made to distinguish between the two terms (see
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Cox and Flin, 1998), but safety climate is still often used interchangeably with safety
culture. The following section presents the most accepted definition of safety culture
and a model that explains the relationship between safety culture and safety climate.
4.1 Safety culture & climate definitions
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) arguably
produced the most widely accepted and comprehensive safety culture definition. They
defined safety culture as
‘the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine commitment to, and
the style and proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety management.
Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterized by
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the
importance of safety and by the efficacy of preventive measures’ (ACSNI
1993, p23).
Safety culture consists of values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and behaviour
of the people that make up the organisation. In an organisation with a positive safety
culture there are high levels of trust, people agree that safety is important and that
safety management systems are effective. This definition implies that a poor safety
culture would be one where people do not trust each other, and do not share the
perception that safety is important and that preventative measures are effective.
Safety climate has been defined as
“the workforce's attitudes and perceptions at a given place and time. It is a
snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator of the underlying safety
culture of an organisation” (Mearns, Flin, Fleming & Gordon, 1997, P8).
Safety climate also consists of attitudes and perceptions but does not contain values,
competencies and behaviour. It differs from safety culture since it is specific to one
time and location. It can be used as an indicator of the underlying safety culture.
These definitions indicate that safety climate is a sub-set of safety culture, which is a
broader, more enduring organisational feature.
Safety culture influences workers’ (or group of workers) view of the world (i.e. what is
important and how they interpret new information), and is relatively stable over time. It
can be likened to the personality of the organisation. Safety culture transcends the
organisational members that share the culture, is passed on to new members, and
endures. In essence, safety culture is independent of people who are currently part of
the organisation. The culture will exist after all these people have left. New members
of the organisation informally ‘learn’ the safety culture, through observation, social
feedback and trial and error.
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Safety climate is more transitory and can be likened to a person’s mood, which
changes in response to external events (Cox & Flin, 1998). Unfortunately, many
researchers use the terms interchangeably, which has caused much of the confusion.
In addition, questionnaires claiming to measure safety culture have very similar
dimensions and statements as those claiming to measure safety climate (Cox & Flin
1998). As will be discussed below safety climate can be assessed via questionnaire,
while safety culture arguably requires more qualitative measurement techniques.
4.2 Model of safety culture
In his review of the safety culture research literature Guldenmund (2000) concluded
“All in all, the models of safety culture are unsatisfactory to the extent that they do not
embody a causal chain but rather specify some broad categories of interest and
tentative relationships between those” (p243). Usefully, he developed a model of
safety culture based on organisational culture theories and attitude models.
Guldenmund (2000) proposed that safety culture consists of three levels, similar to the
layers of an onion (see Figure 1). The core consists of ‘basic assumptions’ that are
implicit, taken for granted, unconscious and shared by the entire organisation. These
assumptions are not specific to safety, but are more general. For example, if written
rules are regarded as critical then safety rules will also be considered as critical. The
next layer is labelled ‘espoused values’ which in practice refers to the attitudes of
organisational members. These attitudes are specific to safety, as opposed to general
organisational factors. There are four broad groups of attitudes, namely attitudes
towards hardware (e.g. plant design), management systems (e.g. safety systems),
people (e.g. senior management) and behaviour (e.g. risk taking). The outer layer
consists of artefacts or the outward expression of the safety culture. These would
include equipment (e.g. personal protective equipment), behaviours, (e.g. using
appropriate safety equipment or managers conducting safety tours), physical signs
(e.g. posting number of days since last accident publicly) and safety performance
(number of incidents).
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Figure 1: Safety culture model
Safety culture
Basic Assumptions
(Taken for granted/
unconscious)
Safety climate
Espoused values
(Attitudes about:
•Hardware
•Systems
•People
•Behaviour)
Artefacts
(Visible signs)
This model distinguishes between safety climate and safety culture, with safety
climate consisting of the two outer layers of safety culture. Safety climate is a subset
of safety culture and consists of espoused values and artefacts, which are specific to
safety.
These aspects can be measured quantitatively (e.g. via structured
questionnaires) and are less stable. Basic assumptions, the inner-most element of
safety culture, are more readily assessed by qualitative, non-numerical methods, as
basic assumptions are by definition subconscious, taken-for-granted and therefore
can only be inferred. Schein (1990) advocates ethnographic methods to measure
organisational safety culture, to get at these basic assumptions. For example, via
safety culture discussions with a large number of rail transport staff, it became
apparent to an external facilitator that they held three different, subconscious
definitions of safety: (1) train safety, (2) passenger safety and (3) staff safety. A very
high priority was afforded to train and passenger safety, whereas staff safety was
implicitly regarded as less important, and attracted less effort and resources. When
this aspect of their safety culture was pointed out to the organisation, it was
acknowledged that these implicit definitions did exist, and did influence how safety
was managed, but had not previously been explicitly recognised. It is difficult to
envisage how purely quantitative methods could have unearthed these types of
subtleties in an organisation’s safety culture. It required qualitative methods and an
external observer to notice.
4.3 Influence of national and organisational culture
In the safety culture model shown in Figure 1, basic assumptions influence espoused
values, which in turn determine artefacts (see Figure 2). This poses the question what
influences basic assumptions? Theoretically, basic assumptions are influenced by the
national and organisational cultures, although there is limited research evidence to
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support this proposition. Although the basic assumptions do not have to be specific to
safety, organisations that have strong safety cultures will have basic assumptions
about the priority of safety, which are shared by organisational members. If
organisations do not possess these basic assumptions, this would be an indicator of a
poor safety culture.
Figure 2: Relationship between national and organisational culture and safety culture
National
Culture
Safety culture
Basic
Assumptions
Espoused
values
Artefacts
Organisational
Culture
The national culture is likely to influence the basic assumptions of organisational
culture, as some basic assumptions will come from the national culture, for
example the importance of rules and the acceptance of hierarchy (Hofstede,
1991). There is some evidence that safety culture varies significantly due to
differences in national cultures. For example, Cheyne et al (2003) compared
differences in safety climate across three member states of the European Union:
UK, France and Spain. Known national cultural differences between these
countries, such as (a) willingness to accept an unequal distribution of power,
wealth and privilege (known as power distance) and (b) individualism were
reflected in national responses to a safety climate questionnaire.
However, Fleming, Rundmo, Mearns, Flin and Gordon (1995) measured safety
climate on a number of offshore installations in the UK and Norwegian sectors of
the North Sea. They found greater differences within their sample of UK
installations and within their sample of Norwegian installations, than they found
when all UK and all Norwegian installations were compared. In other words in
this study, there was more variation in safety climate within a nation's offshore
safety climate than between the UK and Norwegian nations. This indicates that
installation safety climate differences are more significant than national cultural
differences.
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Moreover, a PRISM project case study by Labudde et al (2003) described how a
US-owned company successfully established their own US-influenced
organisational and safety culture on a greenfield site in Spain, where the
prevailing local safety culture was at odds with the desired culture.
In summary, there is limited evidence to support the notion that national culture
does influence safety culture, however differences within countries may be larger
than between countries. Also, the influence of national or regional culture does
not preclude establishing a local site safety culture which differs markedly from
other similar local sites. A strong safety culture can over-ride national or regional
culture, if this safety culture is actively and consistently promoted.
4.4 Safety sub-cultures
It is arguably meaningless to think of a large organisation having a single uniform
safety culture throughout. This is particularly true when an organisation operates in
several countries, merges with or acquires other companies, and employs a range of
different types of professions, contractors and sub-contractors. Industry experience is
that local variation in an organisation’s safety culture does exist, even within a single
site. It follows that it should not be assumed that if an organisation has a generally
strong safety culture, this exists at every local site.
There is a lot of debate about the existence and impact of safety sub-cultures within
an organisation. Despite the fact that there is limited research evidence supporting
the existence of subcultures (although Mearns et al, 2001 provide some evidence),
from a theoretical perspective safety sub-cultures will be present. As safety culture is
shared by a group of workers, this group may be an organisation but it could be an
occupational group, site or level of seniority Guldenmund (2000). It is likely that both
safety sub-cultures and a wider safety culture can co-exist, but that the organisational
safety culture will be more general or at a higher level of abstraction. Further research
is required to investigate the relationship between safety sub-cultures and the safety
culture of the entire organisation.
5 Safety culture and health and safety outcomes
The utility of the safety culture concept depends upon the extent to which it influences
health and safety outcomes. Theoretically there are two separate ways in which
safety culture may influence health and safety. Firstly, the safety culture of an
organisation may influence the likelihood of an organisational accident 1 occurring.
Secondly the safety culture may influence the occupational accident rate. The
1
Comparatively rare, but often catastrophic, events that occur within complex modern technologies such as nuclear,
petrochemical, and chemical plants, transport etc. Often involve multiple causes and actual or potential fatalities (after
Reason, 1997)
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evidence for a relationship between safety culture and organisational and occupational
accidents is discussed separately below.
5.1.1 Organisational accidents
Fortunately organisational accidents do not occur frequently, and therefore only limited
research has been conducted to investigate the link between safety culture and
organisational accidents. The evidence that links safety culture with organisational
accidents comes from investigations into major disasters. As previously mentioned,
many recent investigations into major disasters have a remarkable similarity in that
they identify deficiencies in the safety culture as the underlying cause of the disasters.
The failings of the organisational safety culture that contributed to the disasters are
listed below for a sample of major disasters.
Table 1: Link between safety culture and disasters
Disaster
Industry
Chernobyl
Nuclear power
Safety culture deficiencies
Violation or rules and procedures and overriding of safety systems
Clapham Junction Rail transportation
Poor working practices, high workload and a
lack of management oversight
Piper Alpha
Offshore oil production Lack of management commitment, poor work
practices, profits prioritised over safety
Space Shuttle
Aerospace
Ability to see and not see dangers at the same
time, production pressures
Three Mile Island Nuclear power
Poor understanding of the risks, inadequate
competency
Zeebrugge
Marine transportation Lack of senior manager appreciation of the
importance of safety, profit prioritised over
safety and poorly-implemented management
systems.
The safety culture concept originated from the investigation into the Chernobyl nuclear
disaster and it is clear that safety culture inadequacies have contributed to other
disasters. While these high profile incidents have focused attention on safety culture
there is a need for more scientific evidence of the importance of safety culture. The
following section reviews the research concerning the relationship between individual
occupational accidents and safety culture.
5.1.2 Individual occupational accidents
Two main sources of evidence provide support for the validity of safety culture, namely
(1) analysis of occupational accidents and (2) questionnaire studies. If safety culture
influences occupational accident rates then it should be possible to identify safety
culture factors that contributed to the cause of accidents. A review of 142
occupational accidents in two different sectors (steel industry and medicine) revealed
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that between 35-40% of accident causes could be attributed to organisational factors,
and of these a third were directly attributable to employee attitudes (van Vuuren,
2000). Although the author separates organisational factors into (a) structure, (b)
strategy and goals and (c) safety culture, all of these are included in the definition of
safety culture used in this guide. This study provides good evidence that safety
culture is a causal factor in individual occupational accidents.
The model of safety culture described in Figure 1 requires qualitative in addition to
quantitative methods, to tap into basic assumptions. Unfortunately the majority of
studies that link safety culture to safety outcomes use quantitative methods and
therefore measure safety climate not culture. Numerous studies (Donald & Canter,
1994; Lee, 1995, Mearns et al 1997) have linked accidents to safety climate
questionnaire responses, with lower accident rates being associated with positive
safety attitudes. The majority of studies have adopted a similar methodology, which
compares the responses of individuals who self-report accident involvement with
those who report no accident involvement. Brown and Holmes (1986), using the
instrument developed by Zohar (1980), found that accident and non-accident groups
differed in their perceptions, with non-accident group reporting more positive
perceptions. In the UK offshore oil and gas industry Mearns, et al (1997) found that
accident and non-accident respondents differed in their assessment of safety
measures, and on seven of the ten safety attitude factors, for example speaking up
about safety and supervisor commitment to safety. Lee’s (1998) survey of 5198
nuclear power plant employees, found that accident and non-accident groups differed
on 17 of the 19 safety climate factors measured. In a follow-up survey Lee and
Harrison (2000) of 683 nuclear power employees on three sites they found that 24 of
the 28 factors from their questionnaire were linked to accident performance.
Research studies in other industrial domains (e.g. Donald and Canter 1994 and
Niskanen, 1994) have also linked safety climate to safety performance.
All of these studies take the individual as their unit of analysis and therefore have
examined how individual attitudes are linked to individual accident involvement. The
extent to which this indicates anything about organisational factors is questionable.
There is a need to use the organisation as the unit of analysis rather than individuals.
A study conducted by Simard and Marchand, (1994) randomly selected 258 plants
from 20 manufacturing industries from Quebec, Canada. One hundred of the 258
agreed to participate in the study. The plants were split into high and low accident
plants on the basis of their accident rate relative to their industry average. Data were
collected through a battery of 13 questionnaires completed by senior managers,
middle managers, worker representatives and first line supervisors. They found that
the development of the safety management system and supervisor safety leadership
differentiate between high and low accident organisations. While this is an interesting
study, frontline workers were not surveyed, thus limiting the conclusions which can be
drawn.
A recent study conducted in the UK offshore oil and gas industry by Mearns, Whitaker,
Flin, Gordon and O’Connor (2000) compared differences between 13 offshore
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installations on self-completion questionnaires. Rank correlations were used to
examine the relationship between company accident data and factors on the Offshore
Safety Questionnaire. They found significant negative correlations between accident
rates and health surveillance and promotion and safety auditing.
The above indicates that there have been numerous studies demonstrating the link
between self-report accident rates and safety attitudes. Taken together there is
convincing evidence for the validity of the safety culture concept. Having said that,
there is also a need for research that uses qualitative research techniques to
investigate the relationship between basic assumptions and safety performance.
Furthermore, only one study investigated health and none of the studies examined the
relationship between safety culture and health outcomes. There is also a need for
intervention studies to demonstrate a causative link between safety culture and health
and safety outcomes. Finally, evidence of links between a strong safety culture and
other aspects of organisational performance (e.g. productivity, quality, environmental
performance) is sought by industry.
6 Defining a positive safety culture
There has been little direct research on the features of a positive safety culture (Lee,
1998). There are a number of indirect sources of information to identify likely
features of a positive safety culture. These include comparisons between high and
low accident companies and safety climate surveys. Since safety culture is
associated with occupational accidents then organisations that have a lower
accident rate than similar organisations are also likely to have a positive safety
culture. ACSNI (1993) conducted a comprehensive review of empirical research into
the differences between high and low accident organisations. Low accident
organisations were characterised by:









Frequent, less formal communication about safety at all levels
Good organisational learning
Strong focus on safety by all
Strongly committed senior management
Democratic and co-operative leadership style
High quality training, including safety training
Good working conditions and housekeeping
High job satisfaction
Good industrial relations
Selection and retention of employees who work steadily and safely
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6.1 Features associated with a positive safety culture
Evidence of the features of a positive safety culture is also provided by the
results of safety climate surveys which linked questionnaire responses with either
self-report accidents or company accident data. Appendix 1 summarises the
findings from 6 studies which linked safety climate questionnaire responses to
accident rates. Combining the characteristics of (a) low accident organisations
and (b) the safety climate survey review in Appendix 1 produces the following
features associated with a positive safety culture. These features are grouped
below into the four attitude categories described in the safety culture model in
Figure 1 (Guldenmund, 2000), with an additional category which refers to
elements of the general organisational climate.
1. Hardware:
 Good plant design, working conditions and housekeeping
 Perception of low risk due to confidence in engineered systems
2. Management systems:
 Confidence in safety rules, procedures and measures
 Satisfaction with training
 Safety prioritised over profits and production
 Good organisational learning
 Good job communication
3. People:
 High levels of employee participation in safety
 Trust in workforce to manage risk
 High levels of management safety concern, involvement and commitment
4. Behaviour:
 Acceptance of personal responsibility for safety
 Frequent informal safety communication
 Willingness to speak up about safety
 A cautious approach to risk
5. Organisational climate factors:
 Low levels of job stress
 High levels of job satisfaction
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7 Assessing safety culture
The assessment of all three layers of safety culture (as described in Figure 1) requires
the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. To date, no entirely satisfactory
methodology for measuring all aspects of safety culture has been described in the
research literature. Some researchers claim to measure safety culture (see Lee 1998)
through self-completion questionnaires. In the model described in Figure 1 such
questionnaire studies only measure the outer layers of safety culture, and do not get
at the underlying assumptions. To get at these underlying assumptions requires
phenomenological assessment techniques, such as interviews, trial and error,
observations and ethnographic studies. It is important to note that this is an area of
considerable academic debate. In practical terms the debate may only be one of
semantics, since safety culture expresses itself through safety climate then it is likely
that this can be used as an approximate measure of the safety culture. In addition,
most existing assessment tools measure safety climate and not culture; therefore,
organisations would need to develop their own safety culture assessment techniques.
Instruments designed to assess safety climate are described below.
There are a variety of methods that can be used to assess safety climate, and identify
the main issues that need to be addressed. It is important to note that the very act of
assessing the safety climate can have an impact on the culture. When people
participate in the process they will wonder what is happening and how it is going to
change their working environment. Frontline workers are likely to look for signs that
indicate that management are doing this because they are truly interested in their
safety, as opposed to some ulterior motive. The assessment method chosen can
either reinforce the negative aspects of the current culture or be the beginning of the
improvement process (Carroll, 1998). The assessment process should be consistent
with the positive culture that is desired, for example one which gains a high degree of
employee involvement.
The potential assessment methods can be divided into three main types:



Quantitative (e.g. safety climate survey tools)
Qualitative (e.g. interviews, workshops and focus groups, observation,
ethnographic methods)
Triangulated methods, which combine quantitative and qualitative
methods
One difference between these methods is the degree of confidentiality and security
they offer to the participants. Another difference is the degree of structure they
impose and the ease of analysing the output. Irrespective of the specific assessment
method used there are a number of tips and good practice guidelines, which are
outlined below, followed by a description of the three main types of assessment
methods.
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7.1 Tips and good practice
The following tips relate to the five main stages involved in assessing safety culture or
climate:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Gaining senior management commitment
Involving frontline employees
Assessing attitudes and perceptions
Analysing and feeding back results
Agreeing interventions via workforce consultation
Tip 1: Gain managers informed commitment to the assessment process
It is critical that senior management understand the assessment process and that they
are committed to making it work. The importance of senior management involvement
and commitment cannot be understated, because if the assessment process goes
ahead without this, then it is not only likely to fail, but may actually damage the safety
culture. In practice management commitment can be tested and secured by holding a
senior management workshop before any announcement about the assessment
process commences. The majority of the senior management team should attend this
workshop, which outlines the various assessment options, the potential problems and
the type of results that will be obtained. Managers need to consider how they would
respond if the results are negative and specifically if they are negative about
management. They also need to consider public reaction to negative results, as it will
be difficult to control them once they have been shared with the workforce. It must be
emphasised to management that, if they think they may want to suppress the results if
they are negative, then the assessment should not go ahead. Conducting a survey
and not sharing the results with the workforce is likely to increase distrust and ‘prove’
to frontline staff that managers are not really committed to safety.
Tip 2: Involve frontline workers in assessment, interpretation and identifying
interventions
Once managers are signed on, then frontline workers need to be involved. The most
suitable ways for involvement will depend on the method of assessment, number of
workers and the organisational structure. With a large workforce, a workforce steering
committee containing a representative sample of workers from each occupation and
location is often effective. If the workforce is smaller or group sessions are being
used, then involvement can be achieved by giving everyone an opportunity to
participate actively in the assessment process. It is important to provide workers with
an opportunity to ask questions and make suggestions. Irrespective of how frontline
workers are involved, it is important they are involved before assessment, and
included in interpreting findings and specifying interventions.
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Tip 3: Obtain a high response rate by making participation easy
Each assessment process has its own set of specific guidelines, but there are a
number of generic issues to be considered. Obtaining a representative sample is
critical. It is important that the sample is representative of all occupational groups,
levels of seniority, departments, locations and contractor staff. If a self-completion
questionnaire is being distributed to the entire workforce then a high response rate
(over 70%) is desirable. If only 40% of the workforce respond then it is likely that
those who made the effort to complete the survey have different attitudes than those
who did not complete the survey. Lee (1998) achieved a high response rate by
distributing questionnaires at weekly departmental meetings, and providing people
with time during the meeting to complete the questionnaire. In addition, the company
prepared a short video with a message from a senior manager outlining their
commitment to the process and how the data would be used. Returning the
questionnaires for analysis was also made easy by providing special post boxes for
preaddressed envelopes.
Maximising participant’s confidence in the confidentiality of their responses is also
important. If people are concerned that their responses could be used against them,
they are unlikely to respond honestly or at all. If a self-completion questionnaire is
being used then it should be anonymous and the number of demographic questions
should be limited to avoid some respondents being identifiable (e.g. only female
engineer with the company). If interviews or workshops are being used then the
choice of facilitator is critical, as he or she must be trusted. In addition, participants
should be at the same level of seniority to avoid more junior staff being intimidated.
Tip 4: Involve participants in the interpretation of the results
Assessing safety attitudes and perceptions is unlikely to be of much benefit if the
responses are not interpreted correctly. Questionnaire rating scale responses are
often difficult to interpret, as it can be difficult to know what constitutes a positive
response. Interpretation of the responses can be assisted through input from
participants. It is therefore recommended to present the results to a sample of the
workforce and ask them to interpret the results. The results should be presented back
in a simple form without complex statistical information.
Tip 5: Take actions quickly, which are directly linked to the results
Once the safety climate has been measured then interventions to improve the safety
culture will be required. Assessment alone is not enough. If people give their
perspectives on safety they expect action to be taken. The people in the best position
to identify suitable interventions are often those at the sharp end, i.e. frontline staff.
The specification of interventions should be a joint effort between senior management
who control resources, and frontline staff who have to make any interventions work in
practice. A lack of timely action is likely to be judged as a lack of management
commitment to safety and therefore make things worse not better. Too much analysis
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
of results can often lead to delay, it is therefore better to take some immediate actions.
It is also critical to explicitly link actions to the results of the safety climate
measurement, to demonstrate that actions are being taken. This process should be
consistent with the positive culture that is desired, i.e. it should be participative and
based on mutual trust.
Additional tips and insights on safety climate assessment can be gained from a
published evaluation of users of the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Health and
Safety Climate Survey Tool (HSE, 2002).
7.2 Quantitative methods (questionnaires)
Safety climate surveys are the most commonly used method to obtain information
about safety culture. Safety climate questionnaires measure ‘safety attitudes’ with
positive attitudes to safety being considered to be the most important aspect of a
‘good’ safety culture (Cox & Cox, 1991; Donald & Canter, 1994; Lee, 1995, Mearns et
al (1997). Questionnaire studies involve employees indicating the extent to which they
agree or disagree with a range of statements about safety e.g. ‘senior management
demonstrate their commitment to safety’. Although there are a large number of safety
climate questionnaires containing different statements to measure safety climate, a
number of common factors have emerged. A recent review (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor &
Bryden, 2000) has identified the following six common themes:






Management/ supervisor commitment to safety
Safety systems
Risk perception and self-reported risk taking
Work pressure
Competence
Procedures and rules
The majority of safety climate questionnaires are commercial products sold by health
and safety consultancies or academic institutions. There are some exceptions, such
as the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Climate Survey Tool (HSE, 1997) and
Loughbrough University’s freely-available downloadable offshore safety climate
assessment toolkit - Loughborough University, (undated).
.
The safety climate questionnaire tools currently in use are arguably deficient in a
number of respects. Firstly, the six common concepts identified in the Flin et al (2000)
review did not include trust or the perceived effectiveness of preventive measures, yet
these are key components of safety culture. Secondly, while some studies (e.g.
Mearns et al, 1997) have included measures of perceived risk, none have investigated
other issues surrounding risk such as norms for dealing with risk or risk acceptance,
yet these are key components of safety culture from a theoretical perspective.
The two main strengths of safety climate tools are that:
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
(a) employees can respond anonymously, and
(b) the results are expressed in numerical form making it easy to compare results from
different sites, or at different points in time
The main weaknesses of this approach are that:
(a) it can be difficult to turn results into actions to improve safety, and
(b) it is often necessary to hold further workshops or interviews with staff to clarify the
significance of the results.
7.3 Qualitative methods
7.3.1 Interviews, focus groups and workshops
Interviews and workshops have been used less frequently to assess safety culture,
and validated techniques are not widely available. Organisations that have used these
techniques have tended to develop them in-house. The assessment process should
follow the five tips outlined above, in addition to the following considerations. Since
there are few commercially available tools, it may be necessary to develop an
assessment process.
Topics to focus upon
Firstly, a series of questions or discussion points need to be developed. These should
be open questions to facilitate discussion, for example “Can you describe an event
which illustrates managers attitudes to safety?” The assessment process should
include questions for each the main elements of safety culture. Participants should be
encouraged to identify potential solutions to issues identified and to make general
suggestions about how the safety culture can be improved.
Facilitation
The success of interviews, focus groups and workshops is dependent on participants’
willingness to speak openly. It is recommended that facilitators external to the group
be used for these methods, to ensure that participants are willing to be honest. If the
process is being conducted internally the openness of participants will be influenced
by the existing culture and level of trust in the organisation. The following will enhance
openness:



Establish clear ground rules at the beginning of the session, requesting that
participants do not name individuals
Make it clear to participants that they do not have to answer any question, but
their perspectives are valuable and the aim of the process is to improve safety
for all.
Ensure focus group or workshop participants are at the same level of seniority
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


Explain what information will be collected, who will see it and how it is going to
be used
Do not request personal details of individuals and only use first names.
Use a suitable room where you are unlikely to be interrupted or over heard.
Analysis
Qualitative techniques produce a large amount of information, which can be
overwhelming. Data analysis is facilitated by the use of a coding scheme that is
based on the elements of safety culture described in section 6.1. Expert assistant
may be required for this phase of the assessment process.
The two main strengths of qualitative techniques are that:
(a) they provide a rich picture of the cultural issues and
(b) the participants can also suggest solutions to the issues they identify.
The main weaknesses of qualitative techniques are that:
(a) the lack of a validated structure means that important issues may be missed
(b) participants may be unwilling to be open and honest if confidence and trust are low
(c) it is not easy to make comparisons between sites or over time.
7.3.2 Observation & ethnographic methods
If an anthropologist wished to understand a different culture, they would not typically
reach for a questionnaire. An anthropologist would be more likely to live amongst the
inhabitants of that culture, observing their habits and customs at close quarters over
an extended period of time, and make comparisons with other cultures they are
familiar with. Similarly, a new member of, or visitor to, an organisation can offer
insights into the existing safety culture, by observing and drawing comparisons with
other safety cultures they have experienced, and current research findings and best
practice.
This observational method of safety culture assessment is used when internal or
external safety auditors, government health and safety regulators, external safety
consultants etc. visit a site to assess the adequacy of their health and safety
arrangements. For example, a high-hazard manufacturing site invited a safety
specialist from another company to visit for a few days, tour the site, make
observations, and provide feedback on the site safety culture and identify areas for
improvement. When visiting one part of the site, the visitor was met by the local health
and safety advisor. The advisor was going to act as a guide and explain local health
and safety issues. The visiting safety specialist interpreted this as a negative
indication that health and safety was not truly owned by line management, as they had
sent the local health and safety advisor to represent them rather than coming
themselves. This was quite different from what the visiting safety specialist would have
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
expected to find on a site with a strong line management commitment to health and
safety. The significance of sending the local health and safety advisor was not noticed
by site employees, as this was “how they did things round here”, and was to them an
invisible part of their basic assumptions about how safety should be managed.
The two main strengths of observation & ethnographic methods are that:
(a) they provide a rich picture of the cultural issues and
(b) they can uncover basic assumptions at the core of safety culture
The main weaknesses of observation & ethnographic methods are that:
(a) the lack of a validated structure may mean that important issues are missed
(b) an experienced external observer is required, who is sensitive to differences in
safety culture
(b) observations over an extended period of time may be required, to ensure
conclusions are not drawn on the basis of isolated, atypical incidents
(c) it is not easy to make comparisons between sites or over time.
7.4 Triangulated methods
An important research concept in the social sciences is triangulation of methods.
Triangulation refers to “the combination of several methodologies in order to
study one phenomenon”. For example, the strengths of quantitative and
qualitative methods for assessing safety culture can be combined, whilst
overcoming the weaknesses of a single method. Numerical comparisons can be
made, whilst explanatory qualitative insight is maintained.
7.4.1 Loughborough safety climate toolkit
The Loughborough safety climate toolkit (Loughborough University, undated)
involves triangulation of methods. In addition to a quantitative questionnaire, this
toolkit includes the option to conduct interviews, focus groups and behavioural
observations.
7.4.2 Safety Culture Maturity® model
The Safety Culture Maturity®2 Model is also a triangulated method, as it
combines quantitative assessment with qualitative exploration of safety culture
via focus groups. Developed by The Keil Centre, the Safety Culture Maturity®
Model has five levels of safety culture maturity, and ten elements, which are
described below. The ten elements are based on a review of the safety culture
2
Safety Culture Maturity is a registered trade mark of The Keil Centre Ltd
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
literature (see Lardner, Fleming and Joyner, 2001). A site’s overall level of
maturity is determined on the basis of the maturity level for each of the ten
elements. Safety sub-cultures are also defined and examined. It is unlikely that
an organisation will be at the same level on each of the ten safety culture
elements of the SCM®.










Management commitment and visibility
Safety communication
Productivity versus safety
Learning organisation
Health and safety resources
Participation in safety
Risk-taking behaviour
Trust between management and front-line staff
Industrial relations and job satisfaction
Safety training
This assessment method involves workshops with 10-12 participants, and is
conducted in two stages. Initially participants select the level of Safety Culture
Maturity® which best describes the current situation in their organisation, location or
department. Once this is completed the results of the groups are displayed and
participants provide more detail about each element. They then identify actions to
improve the safety culture within the organisation.
The three main strengths of the Safety Culture Maturity® model technique are:
(a) it is possible to compare results from different sites, teams, or at different
points in time
(b) it provides a rich picture of the cultural issues and
(c) the participants suggest solutions to the issues they identify.
The two main weaknesses of this method are:
(a) it is resource-intensive, requiring a series of facilitated workshops
(b) the group workshop format can limit individual confidentiality
A further description of the development of this method and an industrial case study
by Lardner, Fleming and Joyner (2001) is available.
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7.5 Summary of safety culture assessment techniques
The appropriateness of the assessment technique depends on the requirements of the
organisation. Table 4 below provides a summary to aid selection of the most
appropriate method. Remember that methods can be triangulated, for example by
combining quantitative and qualitative methods.
Table 4: Comparison between assessment methods
Criteria
Cost
Quantitative




Utility of
results


Strengths


Limitations 


Purchase of
instrument/
development of
instrument
Staff time to
complete
questionnaire
Analysing results
Meeting with staff to
identify interventions
Produces a large
amount of numerical
data
Results may be
difficult to link to
interventions
Efficient way of
collecting data about
employee’s
perceptions and
attitudes to safety
Can allow
benchmarking and
comparison between
sites
Limited employee
involvement
Employees often do
not see the link
between the survey
and interventions
Hard to know exact
meaning of results
Assessment methods
Qualitative













Triangulated
methods
Time to develop
interview schedule
External assistance
Workforce time
Time to analyse
results and identify
actions


External assistance
Workforce and
management time
Produces a large
amount of written
data
Data can be difficult
to analyse and
interpret
High face validity –
appears relevant
Interventions can be
directly linked to
interviews
Some employee
involvement

Qualitative data can
be difficult to analyse
and interpret
Can help with focus
on solutions
Confidentiality can be
a problem
Results can be
biased if level of trust
is low
Relatively time
consuming
Difficult to compare
results across sites
or over time

23






High face validity –
appears relevant
Can compare and
contrast different
types of data
Can lead to higher
confidence in results
External assistance
may be required
Time-consuming
Lack of comparable
norm data for
qualitative data
PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
8 Links to behavioural safety and teamworking
Focus Group 1 of the PRISM project concerned 3 topics: safety culture, behavioural
safety and teamworking. PRISM industry members were particularly interested in how
these three topics were inter-related. The following sections of the report outline the
relevant links.
8.1 Safety culture and behavioural safety
Current safety culture assessment techniques identify general organisational strengths
and weaknesses, which are not usually directly linked to specific behaviours. This can
limit the identification of specific behaviours which need to be adopted or promoted to
enhance a positive safety culture. Furthermore, the specific behaviours required to
promote a positive safety culture are likely to vary over time and between
organisations. It is therefore often necessary for an organisation to further analyse the
results of their safety culture measurement processes in order to identify the specific
behaviours required to promote or maintain a positive safety culture. Once these
behaviours have been described, one way to promote them is via a behavioural safety
programme.
Research evidence (Komaki, 2000) suggests that behavioural safety programmes can
enhance the safety climate of an organisation. They provide an opportunity for
management to demonstrate their visible commitment to health and safety, involve
employees, and provide an opportunity to learn about the behavioural causes of
accidents, and preventative measures. For example, one behavioural safety study
(Cooper and Phillips, 1994) measured site safety climate before and after a
behavioural safety programme was implemented. Over a one-year period, significant
positive changes in the plant’s safety climate occurred, suggesting the programme’s
impact extended beyond its initial focus on behaviour.
Other research (Fleming & Lardner, 2000) suggests that behavioural safety
programmes need to be matched to the maturity of an organisation’s existing safety
culture. This suggests a two-way relationship between behavioural safety programmes
and safety culture. The existing level of maturity determines the type of behavioural
safety programme which is appropriate and is likely to succeed, and this behavioural
safety programme will in turn enhance the maturity of the organisation’s safety culture.
8.2 Safety culture and teamworking
There is very little research that has investigated the relationship between safety
culture and team working. One study in Australia (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000) tested
the extent to which a socio-technical systems theory applied to safety climate. Sociotechnical systems theory advocates a teamworking approach to organisational design
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
as this facilitates variance (e.g. process upsets, occupational accidents) being
controlled at source. This increases organisational effectiveness, as the people who
are in the best position to control the variance are those who work with the system on
a day-to-day basis. In addition, giving workers control over variance increases their
motivation.
A large questionnaire study conducted in Australia (Neal et al, 2000) provides
evidence that teamworking is likely to have a positive impact on safety culture, by
increasing safety knowledge and motivation (see figure 3 below). These findings are
supported by two case studies conducted in the UK process and nuclear industries
(Lardner 1999) which concluded safety attitudes and motivation improved following
the introduction of team working initiatives. It was also noted that teamworking could
have a negative impact on safety performance if the team only had production goals,
and were not also set health and safety goals. Although there is limited research
evidence, it appears that properly-implemented teamworking is likely to enhance an
organisation’s safety culture, principally via increased employee involvement in
managing health and safety.
Figure 3: Socio-technical system model of safety culture.
ANTECEDENTS
DETERMINANTS
Safety
Knowledge
Organisational
Climate
COMPONENTS
Safety
Compliance
Safety
Climate
Safety
Motivation
Behavioural Safety/
Team-working etc.
Culture/Climate
Safety
Participation
Safety
Behaviour
& Employee
Involvement
Additional insights into the relationship between safety culture, teamworking and
behavioural safety are provided by a case study completed during the PRISM project
(Labudde et al, 2003). This case study of DuPont’s Nomex plant in the Asturias
region of Spain demonstrated how it is possible to design and construct the work and
safety culture you desire, despite the fact that this may run counter to the prevailing
local industrial safety culture. DuPont was able to capitalise on the fact that the Nomex
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
plant was a greenfield site, therefore all employees were selected and hired to be
compatible with the desired work and safety culture.
Interestingly, DuPont chose a flat organisational structure with self-managing
production teams. This type of team design reinforces the need for all employees
to take personal responsibility and develop high levels of competence. The wellknow DuPont STOP behavioural safety observation system was adapted for use
with teams who have no direct supervision in the team.
The integration of safety culture development, teamworking and behavioural
safety at the Nomex plant has made a significant contribution to the Asturias
site’s exceptionally strong safety performance over the first ten years of its
operation.
9 General conclusions and discussion
Safety culture is now generally accepted as a “good thing” to have, and there is a
growing consensus about the main features of a positive safety culture. The links
between safety culture and organisational and occupational accidents are
becoming increasingly clear. A local plant’s safety culture is likely to be
influenced by national cultural differences, but this does not mean incoming
organisations cannot develop their own safety cultures. Rather, they will have to
take into account existing national cultural influences as they develop their own.
There are a range of methods available to assess safety culture. A reciprocal
relationship exists between safety culture, behavioural safety and teamworking.
Behavioural safety and teamworking both can support the development of a
mature safety culture with high levels of employee involvement. Similarly a strong
safety culture allows teamworking and behavioural safety to flourish.
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
10 Key references
ACSNI (1993) Human factors study group Third report: Organising for safety.
London: HMSO
Brown. R. L. & Holmes, H. (1986). The use of factor-analytic procedure for
assessing the validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident
Analysis and Prevention, 18, pp 289-297
Carroll, J (1998) Safety culture as an ongoing process: culture surveys as
opportunities for enquiry and change. Work and Stress, 12, 272-284.
Cheyne, A, Oliver, A, and Tomas, J (2003) Differences in safety climate in three
European countries Proceedings of 2003 British Psychological Society
Occupational Psychology Conference, pages 87 – 91
Cooper, M and Phillips, R (1994) Validation of a safety climate measure
Proceedings of 1994 British Psychological Society Occupational
Psychology Conference
Cox, S. & Cox, T. (1991). The structure of employee attitudes to safety: a
European example. Work and Stress, 5, 93-106.
Cox, S. & Cox, T. (1996). Safety, systems and people. Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann.
Cox, S. & Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man of straw?
Work and Stress, 12, 189-201
Donald, I. & Canter, D. (1994). Employee attitudes and safety in the chemical
industry. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 7, 203208.
Fleming, M. and Lardner, R. (2000). Behaviour Modification Programmes:
Establishing Best Practice. HSE Books.
Fleming, M., Rundmo, T., Mearns, K,. Flin, R. and Gordon, R. (1995, December)
Risk perception and safety a comparative study of UK and Norwegian
offshore workers. Paper presented at the work and well-being
conference, Nottingham.
Flin, R. (1998) Safety Culture: Identifying and measuring the common features.
Paper presented at the International Association of Applied Psychology’
conference. San Francisco. August.
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P. & Bryden, R. (2000). Safety climate: Identifying
the common features. Safety Science, 34, 177-192.
27
PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Guldenmund, F.W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and
research. Safety Science, 34, 215-257
Hofstede, G (1991) Cultures and organisations, software of the mind,
Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill.
Hoyos, C.G. (1995). Occupational safety: Progress in understanding the basic
aspects of safe and unsafe behaviour. Applied Psychology: An
International Review, 44 (3), 235-250.
HSE (1997) Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool, HSE Books ISBN 0 7176
1462 X – see www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/misc097.pdf
HSE (2002) Evaluating the effectiveness of the Health and Safety Executive’s
Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool – Research Report 042 –
available via www.hsebooks.co.uk
Komaki, J et al (2000). A rich and rigorous examination of applied behaviour
analysis research in the world of work. International Review of Industrial
and Organisational Psychology, 15, 265-367.
Labudde, H; Lardner, R. and Martinez, F (2003) Safety Culture by Design –
PRISM case study : European Process Safety Centre
Lardner, R. (1999). Safety implications of self-managed teams HSE, OSD Report
. Suffolk: HSE Books.
Lardner, R.; Fleming, M, and Joyner, P. (2001) Towards a mature safety culture
in Proceedings of Hazards XVI Institution of Chemical Engineers
Conference, Manchester,UK, 6-8 November 2001
Lee, T. and Harrison, K. (2000) Assessing safety culture in nuclear power
stations. Safety Science, 34, pp61-97.
Lee, T. R., (1998). Assessment of safety culture of a nuclear reprocessing plant.
Work and Stress, 12, 217-237.
Lee, T.R. (1995). The role of attitudes in the safety culture and how to change
them. Paper presented at the Conference on ‘Understanding Risk
Perception’. Aberdeen: Offshore Management Centre, The Robert
Gordon University.
Loughborough University (undated) Offshore Safety Climate Assessment
Toolkit– see http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/JIP/
Mearns, K., Flin, R., Fleming, M. & Gordon, R. (1997). Human and organisational
factors in offshore safety. HSE, OSD Report . Suffolk: HSE Books.
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S., Flin, R., Gordon, R. and O’Connor, P. (2000) Factoring
the human into safety: Translating research into practice. Volume 1 OTO
2000 061. Suffolk: HSE Books.
Neal, A., Griffin, M.A. and Hart, P.M. (2000) The impact of organizational climate
on safety climate and individual behaviour. Safety Science, 34, pp 99109
Niskanen, T. (1994). Safety climate in the road administration. Safety Science,
17, pp237-255.
Pidgeon, N. (1991). Safety culture and risk management in organisations.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22, 129-140.
Reason, J. (1998). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate.
Aldershot.
Schein, E. H. (1990) Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45 (2)
pp109-119
Simard, M. & Marchand, A. (1994). The behaviour of the first line supervisor in
accident prevention and effectiveness in occupational safety. Safety
Science, 17, pp169-185.
van Vuuren, W. (2000) Cultural influences on risk and risk management: six case
studies. Safety Science, 34, pp 31-45
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organisations: theoretical and
applied implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65 (1), 96-102.
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11 Appendix 1: Relationship between safety climate and accident rates
Research
team
Brown and
Holmes
(1986)
Lee (1998)
Mearns et al
(1997)
Industry
Features
Manufacturing


High management concern for safety
High management safety activity
Nuclear power



















Confidence in safety procedures
Workers cautious about risk
Lower perception of risk
Trust in workforce
Efficient Permit To Work (PTW) system
Workers in favour of PTW
Workers interested and contented in their jobs
Good working relationships
Workers receive praise
Safety rules are understood
Safety rules are clear
Training is satisfactory
Effective staff selection
High levels of participation in safety
Safety actions taken by management
Individuals have control over safety
Good plant design
Good job communication
High levels of safety behaviour
Offshore oil
30
Accident data
Link self report accidents
to questionnaire
responses
Link questionnaire
responses to self report
accident data.
Link self report accidents
to questionnaire
PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Research
team
Industry
Mearns et al
(2000)
Offshore oil
industry
Niskanen
(1994)
Road
construction
Rundmo
(1992, 1994)
Offshore oil
industry
Features









Lower risk perception
Satisfaction with safety measures
Willingness to speak up about safety
Not feeling under pressure to violate procedures
Positive attitudes to rules and procedures
Personal responsibility for safety
Perceived management
Commitment to safety,
Willingness to report accidents.









Lower work pressure
Effective supervision
Value of work
Safety prioritised over production
Lower perception of risk
Low levels of job stress
Good working conditions
Satisfied with safety measures
Low levels of sensation seeking
31
Accident data
responses
Used Discriminant
Function analysis (DFA) to
identify the questionnaire
factors that differentiated
respondents who reported
and did not report being
involved in an accident
Differences between work
sites accident rates and
reported attitudes
LISREL models used to
link factors with self report
accidents