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EVALUATION OF CHINA’S RESONSE TO EAST TURKISTAN
TERRORIST FORCES
Wang Yinghui
Nanyang Technological University
Abstract: East Turkistan terrorist forces in Xinjiang (ETTF) are currently posing a great
threat to China’s security and development. The Chinese government has been combating
ETTF vigorously and has achieved some effect. This paper examines Chinese
government’s hard response as well as social and economic measures to the threat posed
by ETTF. In addition, the essay also evaluates the successful experiences as well as
lessons China has learned from the war on terror. Finally, the paper also discusses the
aspects on which China should make improvement.
According to Chinese government, the stability of China is threatened by three
evil forces, namely, terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism. The
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China is no doubt the most afflicted area
by the three evil forces, and the Chinese government has made consistent efforts
to crack down the terrorist and insurgent activities, and have achieved some effect.
However, the breakout of the 5 July 2009 Riot in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang
Autonomous Region, fully exposed problems in China’s counterterrorist measures.
This paper examines the Chinese government’s response against East Turkistan
Terrorist Forces over the past decades from the aspect of capability building, mechanism
building, legislation effort, intelligence, international cooperation, and social and
economical measures, etc. Meanwhile, it also examines the major strength and
deficiencies in China’s response. Finally, the essay also discussed the ways that China
should follow to boost its counterterrorist ability to a new level. The paper points out that
hard measures only are not sufficient in dealing with terrorism aroused by ETTF, and
social and economic measures, or “soft measures” should also be resorted to in coping
with this complicated issue in a comprehensive way.
Overview of East Turkistan Terrorist Forces and its Threat
The term “Turkistan”, meaning “the region of the Turks” was originally a historic term
used in the Middle Ages, referring to west-central Asia extending east from the Caspian
Sea to the border of China and south from the Aral Sea into Afghanistan. In the late 18th
century it became very vague in historical record. However, in the early 19th century, the
term was revived due to colonial expansion by major powers like Russian, who used the
term “East Turkistan” or “Chinese Turkistan” to refer to the areas around Tarim Basin in
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China’s Xinjiang east of “Turkistan”.1 During the first half of the 20th century, a tiny
number of separatists and religious extremists in Xinjiang politicized the term “East
Turkistan”, and advocated about the “independence of East Turkistan”. Due to the
massive instability and continuous insurgencies in China, there appeared the short-lived
and self-claimed East Turkistan Republic and Second East Turkistan Republic occupied
by warlords.2 From the early 1930s to the mid-1940s, with the support of some forces
from abroad, the "East Turkistan" separatist forces raised slogans like “killing the Han
and annihilating the Hui” and “opposing and expelling the Han”, causing many riots and
even slaughtering innocent people.3 Since the founding of PRC, Xinjiang was established
as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region under the control of the Chinese Central
Government, and the “East Turkistan” separatist forces waned to some degree, but still
persisted.
After the Cold War, influenced by the turbulence of international and ethnic situation,
the “East Turkistan” forces both inside and outside China turned to terrorist violence as
the chief means of their separatist activities. According to statistics from Ministry of
Public Security, in the past 10 years until 2005, the "East Turkistan Islamic Forces” in
Xinjianag had created over 270 terrorist incidents inside and outside Chinese territory,
resulting in the deaths of more than 160 people of all ethnic groups and injuries to more
than 440 people. The major crimes they committed included explosions, assassinations,
attacks on police stations, poison and arson.4 Since 2008, the “East Turkistan” forces
have started a new round of sabotage activities, and created a number of bloody incidents
of terror and violence aimed at the Beijing Olympics. In particular, the seriously violent
incident of July 5, 2009 in Xinjiang caused 197 death, 1803 casualties, demolition of 380
stores and destruction of 169 cars.5 It seriously jeopardized the normal order and social
stability of the region.
It takes time for China to perceive and respond properly to the threat caused by East
Turkistan forces. In December 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security, for the first
time, issued a list of identified “Eastern Turkistan” terrorist organizations, including the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Eastern Turkistan Liberation
Organization (ETLO), the World Uygur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the Eastern
Turkistan Information Center(ETIC).6 ETIM, the spearhead of the forces, is undoubtedly
the vanguard of this fight against China. To sustain its fight against China, the ETIM had
tried to obtain support of other transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the
1
"Origin of the "East Turkistan" Issue," State Council of the People's Republic of China (May 1, 2003).
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/4.htm.
2
“East Turkistan”, Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Turkestan.
3
“East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001).
4
“Counterterrorist Bureau: East Turkistan Forces is the Major Terrorist Threat,” Beijing Youth Daily
(September 12, 2005).
5
“Press Conference of Xinjiang Legal Experts on July 5 Riot,” ifeng.com, (October 12, 2009). http:
//news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/wulumuqisaoluan/zuixbaodao/200910/1012_7229_1384851.shtml
6
“China issues 'terrorist' list”, BBC News, Monday, 15 December, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/3319575.stm
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Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union(IJU). ETLO was
also a terrorist group with its headquarters in Istanbul, and had committed assassination
and sabotage activities. WUYC merged with another radical group, the Eastern Turkistan
National Congress (ETNC) and formed World Uighur Congress (WUC) in Munich,
Germany in April 2004.7 Now, WUC appears to be the most prominent organization
among Uighur exile communities around the world, whose newly elected Chairman,
Rebiya Kadeer was believed to have instigated the July 5 Riot.8 ETIC serves as the
mouthpiece for WUC, and also collect fund, search for recruit and disseminate sabotage
information. According to Chinese counterterrorist expert Li Wei, for the same separatist
purpose, these groups are increasing collaboration in recent year.9
The Chinese government seems to be ambiguous when referring to “terrorism” in
China. China interchangeably used the term “East Turkistan Forces”, “East Turkistan
Terrorist Forces”, “East Turkistan Separatist Forces” or “East Turkistan Islamic Forces”
to refer to the Islamic radical force in Xinjiang. However, some separatist subgroups or
sentiment are not violent. While on the other hand, some violent activities or terror are
increasingly performed not necessarily by the organization members, but by some selfradicalized cells and individual in Xinjiang. Therefore, the term ETTF in this essay refers
to the organized terrorist forces, such as ETIM, as well as the self-radicalized groups
inside and outside Xinjiang seeking terrorist means for the separation end.
Before 2001, China addressed the separatist forces mainly through hard measures, or
military and paramilitary means. Starting from the 1980s and 1990s, China launched a
series of “Strike Hard” campaigns to crack down on the riots. It was after the September
11 terrorist attack when the world began to reflect seriously on the root cause of terrorism
that China began to address the problem in a comprehensive way. With the accumulation
of experience in dealing with ETTF, and under the influence from the international
community on countering terrorism, China began to resort more to other instruments. So
far, China has greatly improved its anti-terror intelligence, legislation, anti-terror finance,
international cooperation, and has taken social and economical approach to fight
terrorism in an all-round way.
Building up a Professional Anti-terror Fighting Force
China’s anti-terror fighting forces is the key to understanding the effectiveness of China’s
anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns.10 Now the fighting forces are mainly
composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police Force
7
Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China,
(Palgrave Macmillan, May 2010), p. 81.
8
“Family asks Rebiya Kadeer not to organize violence, undermine harmony,” China-Embassy.org, (July 3,
2009), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t576801.htm
9
“East Turkistan Forces Strengthen Collusion and Share Labor”, China Daily, (June 30, 2010) ,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2010-06-30/content_518034.html
10
Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China,
p. 142.
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(PAPF), and the People’s Police. Chinese officials claim that this system of “joint
defense” is playing an “irreplaceable special role” in the campaigns of “smashing and
resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration,” and in
“maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.”11
The PLA had been the traditional force that the government relied on to counter
insurgencies and riots in Xinjiang in the 1990s. After the Baren uprising in April 1990,
the central and local government officials were pressured to build a more professional
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism force to fight against ETTF. Therefore, the
PLA troops in Xinjiang have improved their capabilities both in terms of equipments and
personnel. Now the PLA has a presence of an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 troops in
Xinjiang mainly responsible for border defense, economic development, and internal
security.12 In each Regional Military Command, there are Special Forces that take the
mission of coping with terrorist activities and emergencies. However, in general, China
depended more on PAPF and People’s Police in fighting terrorist activities, while the role
of PLA in China’s counter-terrorism is limited to deterrent and supportive functions.
The People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is the central professional force
increasingly capable of handling political unrest and terrorist attacks within China. In
China’s National Defense in 2008 report, the PAPF is defined as “the state’s mainstay
and shock force in handling public emergencies” and “an important counter-terrorism
force of the state.”13 After the September 11 terrorist attack, China began to strengthen
the special counter-terror forces in PAPF, building tactical counter-terrorism units,
immediate action units, and special police units. Among them, the most prominent one is
Snow Wolf Commando Unit (SWCU), a 300-strong unit taking the mission of counterterrorism, riot control, and other special tasks, such as hijacking and bomb disposal.14
Early in 2010, Meng Jianzhu, the Commissar of PAPA emphasized to build the PAPF
into a “fist force” in counterterrorism and internal security safeguarding.15
The People’s Police, under the charge of Ministry of Public Security (MPS), is the
backbone among the anti-terror forces. Xinjiang Local police have always been in the
vanguard in the war against terrorist activities and insurgencies in the region. Since the
1980s, the Police, together with the PLA and PAPF, had launched “strike hard” waves
targeting against separatist activities and insurgencies in Xinjiang. The campaign carried
on to the 1990s and after 2000s, and the police arrested large numbers of insurgents and
separatist propagandists, and clamped down scores of “illegal religious organizations”.
11
“Role of Xinjiang Production Construction Corps Important: White Paper,” Xinhua News (Beijing, 2003).
Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the
21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 80.
13
China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of PRC, January 20,
2009). http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009–01/20/content_17155577.htm.
14
Li Zhihui and Li Shu, “China’s Anti-terrorism Force in Action Ahead of Olympics,” Xinhua Net ( June 19,
2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–06/19/content_8400608.htm.
15
“Building PAPF counter-terror Forces into a “Fist Force’,” China.com (January 8, 2010),
http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news/03/11078238/20100108/15768550.html
12
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After the July 5 Riot, the Ministry of Public Security arrested a large number of terrorists
who participated in the riot. In March 2010, it was reported that 97 cases and 198 people
were arrested and tried.16
The waves of “strike hard” measures have been effective and had also played the
deterrence role. However, China has long been criticized of excessive and indiscriminate
use of force in response to terrorist threat. There were also comments that the use of force
may intensify ethnic tension and grievance and may provide more recruit for ETTF.
Command and Control System
China has built up the counterterrorist system both on the state and local level. Shortly
after the September 2001 terrorist attack, China established its National Anti-Terrorism
Coordination Group (NATCG) and a Secretariat led by President Hu Jintao. The system
is an up-down horizontal command and control level, from State Council to Provincial
Government down to Municipal Government structure. The Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) also simultaneously set up an Anti-Terror Bureau (ATB) responsible for the
research, planning, guidance, coordination, and undertaking of the national anti-terror
agenda. The NATCG’s office was headquartered in the Anti-Terror Bureau of the MPS.
With Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Xinjiang, and Tibet at the forefront, all the
provinces followed suit by organizing their own anti-terrorist coordination groups and
offices. On the municipality level, counterterrorism agencies are also set up. Actually
counterterrorism has become an important part of emergency responding mechanism in
local government. Meanwhile, Quick Response System (QRS) has been set up for
China’s relevant authorities to take speedy and determined measures to work for a quick
resolution in the event of emergency. To some degree, the QRS overlaps with anti-terror
system. In many local governments, the “Counterterrorist Office”, “Quick-response
Office” and “Safeguarding Security Office” is the same organ.17
According to a Chinese counterterrorism expert, Wang Baofu, after decade of
construction, the counter-terrorist system is basically complete now, and China is
stepping into an era of counterterrorism with perfecting law and regulations.18 This
command and control system proved effective in the 2008 Olympic Games. However,
China was widely criticized for the slow response and incapability in command and
control when dealing with July 5 Riot. This requires China to strengthen its emergency
response and to enhance coordination between different counterterrorist sectors.
Legislation Effort
16
“97 Cases and 198 People Have been Trialed for the July 5 Riot,” China News.com. (March 7, 2010)
“China’s Anti-Terrorism Structure” Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekely (July 29, 2010),
http://big5.news365.com.cn:82/gate/big5/www.news365.com.cn/wxpd/wz/jsbl/201007/t20100719_277
2954.htm）
18
Ibid.
17
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Before the 1990s, the term “terrorism” or “terrorist” could not be found in any Chinese
law documents. It was not until 1994 that “terrorist crime” began to be stated clearly in
Rules for Implementation of the State Security Law of the People's Republic of China. In
Chapter I, Article 8, it regulates that “Organizing, plotting or committing terrorist acts
endangering the State security” fall to “other sabotage acts endangering the State
security”.19 After the September 11 terrorist attack, to conform to the world situation of
counterterrorism, and to prevent various terrorist activities from happening, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, the Supreme People’s Court and the Public Security Ministry
jointly issued the “Notice on Harshly Striking Terrorist Criminal Activities”.20 In
December 2001, China passed the Amendment III to PRC Criminal Law, which made a
modification to the criminal law, adding 7 new accusations related to terrorist crimes, and
intensified the penalty of these crimes. These accusations include providing funding for
terrorist organizations, stealing guns, ammunitions, and spreading poisonous or
radioactive substance, money laundry, etc.21 In particular, China also set up special laws
concerning terrorist financing. In October 2006, China published the Anti-Money
Laundering Law, providing the legal system for the prevention of terrorist financing.22
However, until today, China still lacks a special Anti-Terror Law, which will serve as
the comprehensive legal framework to preventing and countering terrorism. This has
been mentioned by quite a few experts.23 Good news is that the effort is underway.
Relevant personnel said that the framework of China’s Counterterrorist Law has been
completed in 2005, but still need more effort in defining basic concepts, designing special
counter-terror measures and linkage with other legislations.24
Intelligence Network Building
An effective intelligence mechanism is essential to carry out effective security and
defense strategies. China has established a counter-terror intelligence network, which is
in full function now. There are three national intelligence organizations: Ministry of State
Security (MSS), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and PLA, in charge of domestic,
foreign and military intelligence respectively. As to the intelligence coordinating
mechanism, National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group is the top body. China’s
intelligence agencies also set up an Early Warning and Prevention System (EWPS).
19
Adopted at the19th Executive Meeting of the State Council on May 10, 1994，promulgated by Decree
No.157 of the State Council of the People. http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/yingyu_246317.html
20
Han Shubin, “Work Report of Supreme Procuratorate”, (Mar 11, 2002),
http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2006-02-22/00018-293.html)
21
See the Website of PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkxw/t208622.htm
22
“China adopts anti-money laundering law,” China Daily (October 31, 2006).
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006–10/31/content_721316.htm.
23
“China’s Anti-Terror System Emerged; Legislation yet to be Strengthened to Deter Terrorists,” 1n0.net.
(September 14, 2009), http://www.1n0.net/Article/sztg/77404.html
24
“China Took the initiative in Counterterrorism, Preventing Large Casuaties,” CNWEST.COM (Aug 5,
2009). http://mil.cnwest.com/content/2009-08/05/content_2287794.htm
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During the 2008 Olympic Games, the intelligence system was comprehensively
exercised and tested, and proved to be successful and effective. Even before the
launching of the Games, Beijing had obtained the information that the ETIM were
planning to “sabotage and destruct” the Games.25 This helped the relevant agencies in
cracking down their plan.
However, the two most serious violent terrorist attacks in China, the March 4 2008
Tibet Riot and July 5 2004 Riot in Xinjiang, exposed the loopholes in the counterterrorist
intelligence work. China’s intelligence must improve its integration of resources and
coordination between different intelligence organs. China should learn from US to
establish a position like director of national Intelligence to take charge of the overall
intelligence coordination, and integrate intelligence information from Ministry of Public
Security, Department of General Staff of PLA, and the People’s Police. China also need
to put more professionalism in its intelligence work, and enhance intelligence sharing
with other countries, so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in anti-terror
intelligence level.
International Cooperation
Since 2001, China has strengthened counterterrorist coordination with related countries
and organizations through regional frameworks or bilateral channels on many aspects,
such as joint counter-terror exercise, joint counter-terror training, intelligence sharing and
cooperation in anti-terror financing.
China has always stated clearly that counter-terrorism should be held within the
framework of UN. So far, among all the 12 UN international conventions on Countering
terrorism, China has joined 11 of them.26 The most prominent regional counter-terrorist
framework is Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In June 2001, the five member
countries signed The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and
Extremism. 27 Since 2002, China has launched six joint exercises and training with other
SCO member countries. The “Peace Mission 2010”, the seventh joint exercise, will be
held in the coming fall in Kazakhstan. China also held joint training and exercises with
Pakistan, Thiland, and India under the name of counterterrorism. In particular, China held
3 counterterrorism joint trainings with Pakistan, from whom China learned valuable real
combat experiences in counterterrorism. According to Vice Chief of Staff Ma Xiaotian,
the PLA lacks real combat experience, and is willing to continue to hold joint exercises
25
Yang Hui, “Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation and Promoting Peace in the AsiaPacific,” (presented at the Asian-Pacific Intelligence Chief ’s Conference, Singapore, February 18,
2009).
26
Zhang Jie, “China's Anti - terror Policy: Principles, Content and Measures,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific
Studies. (No.11, 2005)
27
The document is from SCO’s website. See http://www.sectsco.org/EN/2001.asp
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with other countries.28 In addition, China also sent Armed Police Force contingents to
Israel to learn counter-terror tactics from Israeli military.
China has also been seeking international cooperation in curbing terrorist financing
and money-laundering. China was accepted in February 2005, as a observer in Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental agency spearheading the fight against
money laundering and terrorist financing. In October 2004, China, together with Russia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus, established the Euro-Asian Group on
combating Money-laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), which became one of
the key components of international anti-terrorist financing cooperation.29
China and U.S. also started counter-terrorist cooperation after the 9-11 attack. In the
wake of the attack, China voted for UN 1368 and 1373 Resolution to combat terrorism.
In 2002, US President Bush claimed that China and U.S. were “allies” in combating
terrorism.30 Prominent cooperation have been mainly conducted with the FBI, including
anti-terror financing cooperation assistance of anti-terror expertise and technology for
Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games. However, there still exist frictions and
misunderstandings between the two countries concerning counter-terror issue.
Washington kept supporting the Uighar exile groups operating in US and Europe. In 2007,
Bush met Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of World Uighur Congress (WUC), which was
strongly objected by China. Beside, until now, US did not identify the three groups,
WUC, ETLO and WUC as terrorist groups, which have been recognized by China as
early as 2003. And in US, there were criticism that Beijing’s intention was to exploit
counter-terrorist campaign to justify its harsh control of Uighur people.31
Social and Economic Response
The large number of Han people migrating to Xinjiang has always been the cause of
grievance among Uyghur people.32 The Uyghur people are concerned about the widening
gap of social and economic development between the two ethnic groups. They are also
worried that large influx of Han people will cause more unemployment of Uyghur people,
and consume more scarce resources like water. Most importantly, they believe that Han
people pose a threat to their ethnic religious identify.
Perhaps it is the most difficult thing to mitigate the ethnic tension, and win the “heart
and mind” of the Uyghur people. To address this issue, the central and local government
need humane instead of hard measures. On the one hand, the ethnic relationship between
28
“PLA Vice Chief of Staff: China is Willing to Strengthen Counterterrorism Cooperation with Foreign
Armies,” (July 7, 2010), http://mil.eastday.com/m/20100710/u1a5320810.htm
29
The EAG official Web site. http://www.eurasiangroup.org/..
30
Shirley Kan, “US-China Counter_Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress.
(December 7, 2004). http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21995.pdf
31
Ibid.
32
According to China’s census, in 1949, there were 75.9% Uyghur people and 6.7% Han people in Xinjiang,
while in 2000, the figure changed to 45.2% and 40.6% respectively.
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Han and Uyghur must be improved. The government could use the media to spread
propaganda about harmony between the two groups, and could conduct educational work
as well as psychological assistance on the grassroots level. In terms of achieving
multiethnic harmony, China should learn from other countries that cope well with these
problems well, like Singapore. On the other hand, the government should enhance efforts
that can genuinely help Xinjiang to develop the economy and improve the living standard
of Uyghur people.
The July 5 riot has exposed that the government is insufficient in developing Xinjiang
socially and economically. It urged the central as well as the local government to take
stride in developing Xinjiang’s economy. After the riot, China and the local government
took a series of measures to boost the local economy and promote the welfare of the
Uyghur people. In May, China launched a package of favorable policies to help the
region, which was described as “leapfrog development”. It was noted by Chinese
President Hu Jintao as “a major and urgent task of strategic significance” to achieve the
lasting stability in the region.33 The blueprint is that Xinjiang will build six new airports
covering 1.66 million square km by 2015. And the railroad will extend from 3,599 km to
more than 12,000 km by 2020 with an investment of 310 billion RMB yuan.34 Some
underdeveloped areas, especially the south of Xinjiang, will be the priority of assistance.
There were also slogans to build Kashgar City into a Shenzhen in China’s West.35
Conclusion and Suggestions
According to Chinese counterterrorist expert Li Wei, there are two major reasons that
lead to the China’s modest achievement in counterterrorism and the relative stabilized
situation in Xinjiang. The first is the effective control of guns, and the second is the
powerful grassroots regime.36 From the above discussion, we could also conclude China
has been successful in cracking down the terrorist criminals and in law enforcement,
which brought the terrorists to justice and played a deterrence role for terrorists. However,
the hard response is a double-edged sword. China has been criticized by foreign media
being too “tough” in hard response, referring to the “torture” and “death penalty” of
terrorist criminals. Moreover, there are also criticism that some strict and compulsory
measures infringed upon people’s personal freedom and right. For example, the 10-month
long ban of mobile phone SMS and internet use after the July 5 riot caused much
inconvenience to people in Xinjiang.
There has been increasing awareness among Chinese officials and experts that the
war on terrorism does not only rely on tough military measures, but also on social and
economic measures to tackle the “root cause” of terrorism, such as poverty,
33
“China builds new Silk Roads to revive fortunes of Xinjiang,” People’s Daily Online, (July 2, 2010).
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7050355.html
34
Ibid.
35
Shenzhen is a city in Guangdong, south of China. It is China’s first, and arguably one of the most
successful special economic zones.
36
“China’s Anti-Terrorism Structure,” Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekly.
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marginalization and ethnic tension. Now the central government is on the right track to
“strike hard” on the criminals committing terrorism on the one hand, and to enhance the
social, cultural and economic development of Xinjiang on the other hand.
Counterterrorism is a complicated issue and need a holistic approach from military, law,
social, economic and psychological aspects to achieve real effect. China should continue
to make effort in perfecting the counterterrorist system, completing legislation framework,
strengthening international cooperation, etc. Meanwhile, China should figure out more
ways to address the “root cause” of ETTF terrorist activities. In the final analysis, a
harmonious ethnic relationship between Uyghur and Han people will be the final solution
to counter terrorism successfully.
162