Introduction:
Culture and Pluralism in Philosophy
William Sweet
The diversity and richness of the cultures of the world are better known today than they have
ever been. In the past 100 years, sociological and anthropological research, and advances in
communications and information technology, have not only introduced us to other cultures, but
have challenged our understanding of our own cultures. And so it is curious that, in the Englishspeaking world, philosophers have only infrequently written on the theme of culture. That issues
explicitly related to culture have had so little a place in Anglo-American philosophical
discussion – particularly at a time when the impact of social scientific research has been so great
– is all the more curious since, in earlier centuries and in other parts of the world, philosophers
(e.g., Friedrich Schiller,1 Johann Gottfried Herder,2 and Georg Simmel3) had made conspicuous
contributions to the study of the topic. For at least the last half-century in Britain, the United
States, Canada, Australia, and other English-speaking countries4, it has been left to scholars in
sociology, history, and literary theory, such as Ernest Gellner, Fredric Jameson, Edward Said,
Clifford Geertz, and Terry Eagleton5, to address questions of what culture is, what the notion
presupposes, and what implications it has in nations – and in a world – marked by ethnic, social,
economic, political, and religious diversity.
Very recently, there have been some signs of change6, and the theme of culture has
started to surface in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, particularly in studies of
pluralism and multiculturalism. Here, philosophers – recognising the impact of cultural diversity
and, sometimes, responding to earlier sociological and literary studies – have begun to engage
questions of the influence and implications of culture for political philosophy, ethics, and (to an
extent) epistemology. Yet one notes, first, that there is still relatively little sustained discussion
of the notion of culture itself and, second, that virtually no attention has been paid to the question
of the implications of culture and pluralism for the nature and practice of philosophy. Thus,
despite the recent signs of change, one might still wonder: ‘What is meant by ‘culture’?’, ‘What
issues arise as we enquire into the subject of culture?,’ ‘What is at stake when a culture is
confronted with other cultures or with sub-cultures?’, ‘What role, if any, has philosophy had in
culture?’, ‘Can philosophy help us in responding to problems within culture?’, and finally, ‘What
does the relation between philosophy and culture tell us about philosophy and philosophical
enquiry?’
Clues to how we might answer some of these questions may be found in the literary and
social theorists mentioned above, but the extent to which their responses address the latter four
questions is minimal at best. In the present volume of essays, the authors both take up and
challenge some recent views concerning culture and pluralism by addressing one of four subthemes. The first sub-theme concerns the methodological, ideological, and historical
presuppositions of culture, plurality of culture, and multiculturalism. The second sub-theme
considers how philosophical discourse or positions may affect a culture’s ‘self-understanding,’
and how the philosophical perspectives of one culture can have a role in another – particularly in
light of the introduction of (and response to) so called ‘Western’ philosophies into ‘new cultural
contexts.’ The third sub-theme focuses on how (and how far) culture can allow room for
diversity, and how diversity can have an effect – positive and negative – on the selfunderstanding, social organisation, and growth of a community. The fourth sub-theme deals with
how philosophy in general may be related to culture – how far philosophy is a product of culture,
and whether (and if so, how) philosophy is capable of providing a response to or influencing
culture. In following the exploration of these sub-themes, then, the reader will be able to consider
not only whether philosophy has a role to play in the analysis and study of culture, but whether it
is important for philosophers to engage in a ‘philosophy of culture.’
1. Defining and defending ‘culture’
Before considering the specific issues raised in the essays in this volume, however, it may be
helpful to consider briefly what is involved in talking about culture, and how each of the subthemes bears on it. The word ‘culture’ is an ambiguous one; it is used in many senses, and there
is substantial disagreement on what, exactly, the term refers to.
The classic definition of ‘culture’ is generally held to be that provided by the
anthropologist, Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, at the beginning of his Primitive Culture (1871) 7:
Culture . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.
But, since Tylor’s time, the term ‘culture’ has come to be understood in a variety of ways.
Today, for example, we speak of a ‘culture of science’ or a ‘culture of health,’ which seems
roughly equivalent to ‘ideology.’ And so ‘culture’ can be said to be: “a more or less consistent
pattern of thought and action,”8 “the product of learned behaviour,” “ideas in the mind,” “a
system of ideas, signs, associations, and modes of behaviour and communication”9 – or even
accused of being “a logical construct” or “a statistical fiction.” In their Culture: A Critical
Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952)10, Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn provide
some 164 different senses of the term.
At times, ‘culture’ has been taken to mean what sociologists have called ‘high culture,’
and the existence of cultural diversity considered not to be of particular value. T.S. Eliot’s study,
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1948), is a well-known example of this.11 Eliot writes
that ‘culture’ is, “first of all what the anthropologists mean: the way of life of a particular people
living together in one place”12, but adds that a culture “can never be wholly conscious – there is
always more to it than we are conscious of”13 – and that an elite is necessary to “bring about a
further development of the culture in organic complexity: culture at a more conscious level, but
still the same culture.”14 Thus, culture is “the whole way of life of a people, from birth to the
grave, from morning to night,”15 but is adequately appreciated and developed only by a few.
Still, in the past quarter century, much of the research and discussion in the social sciences
and humanities has rejected this model; the tendency has been to return to something close to
Tylor’s definition, though without insisting that ‘culture’ have the characteristic of being a
‘complex whole’ and without focusing on its attribution to persons as members of “society.”
It seems fair to say, then, that today we can take the term ‘culture’ in a very broad sense as ‘a
collection of representations or ideas shared by and pervasive through a group of individuals’ –
as a set of what the idealist philosopher Bernard Bosanquet called ‘dominant ideas.’16 Such a
description provides a heuristic norm or a regulative idea for a study of culture, pluralism, and
philosophy, without being a complete definition – or even claiming that ‘culture’ can be defined.
And it should be sufficient to allow us to reflect on the kinds of issues and concerns both
expressed above and in the essays in this volume.
1.1 Presuppositions of culture and pluralism
After the general question of what ‘culture’ is, perhaps the next concern that comes to mind is
‘What is at stake?’ or ‘What is involved?’ in culture that makes it useful or important to bring
philosophy to bear on it. (‘Philosophy,’ here, should not be understood simply as ‘introducing
reasoned reflection to a topic’ but, more broadly, as ‘an enterprise that seeks to examine the
presuppositions of a subject and to provide general principles by which the most fundamental
concerns can be understood and seen in relation to one another.’) Even a brief consideration of
the subject reveals the range of possible issues involved. The existence of pluralities of cultures
and of sub-cultures in relation to a dominant culture, and the notion of culture itself, invite us to
rethink what (if anything) is meant by ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity,’ the plausibility or
‘reasonableness’ of relativism, and whether there can be a single model of ‘what is rational’ or,
for that matter, ‘what is real.’ And all of these are clearly of philosophical import.
If one holds that cultures are radically different, is there any possibility of cross-cultural
norms or unitary principles, or are we forced to the view that traditions and cultures are
incommensurable, and that any common action is purely contingent? Can we even speak of
cultures or traditions if everything is changing – for what meaning would history and heritage
have in such a context? Is individual (personal) identity possible without the practices and
discourses that seem to constitute a culture? Is a culture something that we can isolate and
observe at a precise point in time? Or is ‘culture’ a ‘dynamic’ notion, that is characterised by a
telos, and in terms of which particular cultures can be understood and brought into contact with
one another? The authors in this volume are conscious that discussions of culture and pluralism,
then, are not just discussions of ‘customs,’ ‘ideas,’ and ‘practices,’ but concern the most basic
aspects of lived human experience. And so it is here that we may be led to ask, ‘What role can
philosophy play in an understanding of culture?’
1.2 Philosophy in culture
Can philosophy affect culture – and, if it can, how? This issue may appear difficult to address
because the question is somewhat imprecise. For example, does it mean to ask whether
‘philosophy’ in a general sense can (or generally does) affect culture, or whether a particular
philosophical view (e.g., materialism, positivism, or dualism) has or does, or whether
philosophers have or do? Yet it seems that one can make a case for all three, and philosophy
clearly recognises culture as something of value that is normally to be defended.
For example, the generic analytical questions that a philosophical enquiry raises may help
people to think about a culture – what a culture takes for granted, what (if anything) unifies a
culture, and even whether a culture or way of life is worth preserving. And the answers given to
these questions concerning a particular culture may have significant consequences for it.
Philosophy can reinforce a culture: it seems fair to say that many liberal political philosophers
have taken on the project (the obligation?) of defending the value of liberal political culture and
the institutions that are broadly consistent with it. (Richard Rorty’s defence of liberalism is an
obvious and explicit illustration of this.) Or it can challenge it – by challenging its values or
traditions, or calling into question its claims to legitimacy, or casting doubt on such normative
principles within the culture as ‘truth’, ‘objectivity,’ the ‘good,’ etc. – or by advocating the
values or norms of other cultures. Philosophy could (and has) legitimized the domination of
certain cultures, by insisting that members of non-conforming communities must respect at least
the general exigencies of such a culture, and by insisting that all such norms reflect private
conceptions of the good, have no “external” value, and therefore should not be brought into the
public sphere.17 Philosophy can, it seems, serve to reorient a culture, for good or ill; for example,
whether it leaves room for the ‘non-natural,’ whether its metaphysics is realist or subjectivist,
how it views the nature and value of the person, and so on, will plausibly have an effect on how a
culture may change or develop. Philosophy can sometimes go so far as to deny the very
existence of a culture (which we see when empires or ideologies, and the philosophers that
follow in their wake, refuse to acknowledge the presence of local practices, values, forms of
social organisation, or and traditions). And a philosophy may even blind us to the richness and
diversity of cultures by articulating and defending a vision of the world which predetermines
what is to count as culture or what is to count as a value within a culture (e.g., the emphasis on
the individual, on autonomy, on rights (over responsibilities), and so on).
One might object that these effects are not effects of philosophy as such, but of philosophers
and of ideologies masquerading as philosophies. But even if we can make such a distinction,
there is reason to believe that, in some form, philosophy as a general enterprise does have an
impact on culture. It can serve to help individuals and groups respond to change within a culture
by clarifying what is at stake or what the options are – though perhaps, as Hegel would have it,
only at a very late stage.18 And philosophy may also help cultures to work together when – as
many philosophers do – it proposes that there are principles or interests common to all cultures
and peoples, that they are matters of shared concern, and that it is possible to ‘build bridges’ to
draw on the resources of other cultures.
1.3 Negotiating cultures and pluralities
The analytical and constructive character of many philosophies, if not of philosophy as such,
bears on the fourth and final issue to be addressed in this volume – how philosophy may provide
a means of understanding and ‘negotiating’ the tensions that can arise among pluralities of
cultures, especially where there is a dominant culture.
Culture has – and is – a value, and therefore so is the integrity of culture. But there are many
cultures, and so the problem or challenge arises of how and where plurality may be limited, and
also how and where a culture – particularly one that professes to value pluralism – has an
obligation not only to tolerate the existence of other cultures, but to favour their development.
Philosophical discourse has been held by some to be a model for a ‘public reason’ in such a
context – in the interaction among the various cultures in the world, within cultures (e.g., where
there are various cultural pluralities or ‘sub-cultures’), and among cultures within nation states.
But others have argued that this view of philosophy makes a number of assumptions – e.g., that
there is something shared or universal that allows such a cross-cultural discourse (such as a
universal human nature), that philosophy is in some sense ‘neutral’ with respect to the different
cultures in the world, that cultures and the values they reflect are somehow commensurable with
one another, that philosophy might properly be called on to provide limits – in political discourse
and in related cultural practices – on a culture, and that such ‘negotiations’ among cultures can
be carried out without falling victim to bias.
1.4 Culture and philosophy
But is philosophy so implicated in culture (or so much a part of a culture) that it cannot extend
beyond a particular context? After all, doesn’t culture affect philosophy? Doesn’t context or
history determine how philosophy is engaged in? Some philosophers would argue that
philosophy – by which they mean its basic principles and concepts, the modes of reasoning and
argument, and (properly speaking) its arguments – should in some way ‘stand above’ culture.
But, in recent years, many have found this claim problematic. They argue, for example, that to
do philosophy well, one must study its past – not just to mine it for arguments, but to understand
that this is not just one approach to philosophical enquiry – to see how problems were identified,
what made them problems, and how answers were answers; to tell us why certain issues were
raised and how philosophical issues can be better grasped by seeing them in different contexts
and perspectives; and to lead us to ask questions about our presuppositions. At the very least, this
response reminds us of the importance of background assumptions before engaging in
philosophical enquiry.
The force of this view comes, in part, from the recognition that culture gives us a
language and values. These are so clearly fundamental for philosophy to begin that it is almost
banal to remark on it. And it seems equally obvious that culture sets up the specific sorts of
problems and questions that philosophers pursue. But we can go further. For we might say that
culture influences the kind of material environment in which such questions are raised –
economic production that permits the creation of goods and the opportunities for leisure (in
which philosophy is done). (This may seem relatively innocuous, but it is not.) Culture seems to
tell us, as well, what counts as philosophy (as distinct from history and religion); this, too, may
seem innocuous – but, again, it is not. (For is it possible or appropriate to distinguish philosophy
from the religious, scientific (e.g., the scientific paradigm), the axiological, and the literary
elements of one’s culture?) And, further, it seems clear that culture influences in what ‘language’
philosophical questions are expressed and answered – and what counts as a satisfactory answer;
and philosophy has sometimes struggled in environments that require that it provide
explanations that can be shown to ‘work’.
In short, there is a strong case for the claim that culture provides – or imposes – a
discourse in which philosophical enquiry is pursued. And so a particular philosophical approach
may seem – or may be – largely ideological; some would insist that political philosophy in the
United States frequently reflects assumptions and principles that are virtually uniquely
American. This is perhaps even more apparent when one culture asserts itself in another
philosophical context (e.g., western culture in relation to Indian philosophy, or in relation to
African thought). Here, a culture may obscure or marginalize philosophical issues by putting
limits on the kinds of questions that can be asked – for example, by establishing norms of reason
or values (such as the value of the individual, the value of the common good or of the good of
communities such as the nation, the church, humanity, and the biosphere) that may have a
different role–or no role at all – in the context concerned. And culture may lead philosophers to
ignore other cultures (because their own philosophical views are so culturally-laden that they
cannot recognise the dynamics of other cultures; or because they are so immersed in their own
culture – in that medium – that they cannot see where they are).
But it does not follow that, because culture influences how philosophical questions are
expressed and answered (and, for that matter, which questions are raised in the first place),
philosophy is entirely determined by culture or that it is unduly constrained. There does seem to
be some positive value to the influence of culture in doing philosophy. For example, the
introduction of a philosophy into a new culture may suggest other ways of explaining or
defending what one is interested in defending, or a culture may have us reread and reinterpret
philosophical views that we take as givens. Or a culture may show what, exactly, a particular
philosophical position involves, what its benefits and resources are, and so on. In short, one
might reply that, even if philosophies presuppose cultural values, philosophical analysis is the
best tool we have to assess cultures and philosophies themselves – and thus to ‘rise above’
particular cultural contexts. Any philosophy to which we may appeal in ‘negotiating’ cultures
and pluralities must be one that is at least self-reflective, and which is able to recognise (and
therefore reconsider) even its starting points. Such an approach must be employed, then, with
care, but it may nevertheless allow one some way of addressing the competing demands of
different cultures, particularly where there is a dominant culture.
2. Exploring interrelations
The preceding discussion suggests, then, that there is much philosophical work to be done
concerning culture, particularly given the existence of cultural diversity. It seems as well that a
case can be made for claiming that philosophy has a role to play in the analysis and study of
culture – that culture affects philosophy, that philosophy affects culture (or, at least, how we see
and deal with other cultures), and also that philosophy can have a role in ‘negotiating’ or
communicating among cultures.
But how far do these influences extend? What implications does this have, and what does
this tell us in general about the interrelations among culture, pluralism, and philosophy?
In Part I – Presuppositions for Pluralism and Cultures – the authors draw our attention to
some of the philosophical issues underlying or involved in a discussion of culture,
multiculturalism, and the plurality of cultures. What is at stake is not simply whether there can be
any ‘grand narrative’ whereby cultures and subcultures are understood and evaluated, but
whether there can be any principles at all that we can use to describe or talk about culture –
whether there can be any shared discourse or understanding of reality, whether it makes sense to
speak of what is ‘real’ or ‘true’ or ‘objective,’ whether history or tradition has any relevance in
making normative claims about culture, and so on.
In “Three Views of Philosophy and Multiculturalism,” Carol Nicholson considers the
challenge that multiculturalism appears to create for teaching and studying philosophy. John
Searle, for example, argues that multiculturalism can compromise the pursuit of truth and of
objectivity by implying that neither truth nor objectivity exists. Nicholson responds that, rather
than stifle philosophical pursuit, multiculturalism awakens students to diversity, and serves the
very process that philosophy – the systematic reflection on presuppositions – has traditionally
engaged in. Nicholson concludes (following Rorty), that multiculturalism constitutes no threat to
truth or objectivity, and that there is no good reason to oppose multiculturalism in philosophy.
To speak of multiculturalism, however, presupposes that we understand how a culture
develops or evolves, and what culture is. In “Quelques présupposés historiques et idéologiques
d’une culture de la santé,” André Mineau, Thomas De Koninck, and Gilbert Larochelle discuss
the ‘culture’ of health – i.e., the “collection of representations” related to health – and provide an
analysis that may also serve as a guide for understanding culture generally. Mineau et alii note
that today’s ‘culture’ of health is interesting, since it has not only acquired a quasi-absolute value
in contemporary western society, but some have attempted to derive other ethical and social
norms from it. The authors trace the conceptual origins of this culture, and its preoccupation on
health and security, to the 18th and 19th centuries – the time of the Industrial Revolution. We
find that this culture rests on a paradigm of knowledge and reasonableness that is fundamentally
scientific – a paradigm where notions of ‘transcendence’ are challenged, toppled, or simply
abandoned, and nature is seen as the sole real. Mineau et alii show, then, how not just
philosophy, but politics, economics, technology, and psychology bring about – and reinforce –
this culture. While the authors do not draw out fully the consequences of such a culture, the
relation between its presuppositions and its consequences is clear.
Does it make sense to talk of ‘culture’ in a more general way – of ‘culture’ as such – in
the contemporary world? Can there be a unity to culture where the ‘spirit of an age’ is one that
holds that every culture is a ‘social construction’? And, if not, is the alternative relativism and
the incommensurability of cultures? In “Pluralité de la culture contemporaine et visée
eschatologique,” Louis Perron raises the question of how to think about culture in a world
marked by the existence of a plurality of cultures. Perron believes that we can embrace this
cultural diversity and yet also find unity; he examines a response suggested by Jean Ladrière,
who proposes that we should think of unity not as a static given, but as a dynamic, processional
unity – a convergence of different perspectives – towards an eschaton. Though Perron notes
problems in Ladrière’s approach, he underscores the value of Ladrière’s attempt to recognize the
importance of history and contingency without succumbing to historicism.
What role has philosophy played in the understanding and development of culture? In
Part 2 – ’Western’ Philosophy and New Cultural Contexts – the authors take as their starting
point the phenomenon of European philosophies which have entered into and affected nonwestern cultures – whether they have helped to build bridges and allow communication among
cultures, whether they have benefited from the opportunity to ‘explain’ themselves in different
environments, whether they have provided options or alternatives to those of other cultures, or
whether they have effectively excluded or marginalized cultural traditions, religions, and ways of
thinking.
In “Western Humanism and Chinese Philosophy,” Tran Van Doan outlines some effects
of western humanism – particularly positivistic philosophy – in China and in the development of
the Chinese understanding of its native philosophical tradition. The author challenges the claims
of those who marginalize the metaphysical and religious dimensions of Chinese thought, by
drawing to our attention the recent work of the philosopher and theologian, Gabriel Ly. Ly
argues that, in much of 20th century Chinese philosophy, there has been a bias against
philosophies open to religion. But rather than directly attacking the arguments of those who
exhibit this bias, Ly suggests that, on a classical Chinese approach (i.e., one that sees
‘philosophy’ as a philosophy of life, that recognises the participation of humanity in nature, and
that notes a ‘need for the Ultimate’ or something larger than the individual), even positivistic
philosophies must find room for a metaphysics that leaves room for a religious dimension. Tran
Van Doan maintains that Ly’s way of engaging his opponents not only shows that these attempts
to pit philosophy against religion are mistaken, but that an understanding of ‘philosophy’ in a
broader sense provides a bridge between western and eastern thought.
A second way in which ‘western’ philosophy has entered into new cultural contexts is
through ethics and political thought. Kusum Jain (“India and the Replacement of the RightsCentric World-View by an Obligation-Centric World-View”) notes that the dominant ethical and
political view in ‘the west’ is one where individual rights are central; she suggests that this is the
root of many problems in western countries and – as their influence extends – in Asia as well.
But if western philosophies can enter into, and affect, other cultures, the reverse may be true.
Jain suggests, therefore, that we can respond to these problems by challenging this western
approach and turning to a world view that is found in the classical Indian tradition – a world
view that is duty-centred and that sees obligation, and not right, as fundamental in understanding
moral relations. Such an approach provides, Jain claims, a discourse which emphasises personal
responsibility and which allows a greater respect for individual difference.
Yet not only have western philosophies had an effect on non-western cultures, but some
western philosophers have elevated their own culture over others, and have claimed that some
cultures have nothing at all to contribute. We see this, for example, in Lord Macaulay’s views on
Indian thought and culture, and in some Christian missionary views of aboriginal societies.19 In
“Hegel’s Africa,” Pantaleon Iroegbu argues that the devastating effects of western philosophy
into new cultural contexts can be seen in how it has regarded African culture. Iroegbu focuses on
Hegel’s views on Africa, presented in Hegel’s Introduction to the Philosophy of History – views
that have been excised from a recent translation of this work. Iroegbu examines Hegel’s
arguments on why Africa is to be excluded from ‘World History,’ and insists that they reveal
both a German ‘chauvinism. and an ignorance of African reality. He adds, however, that Hegel’s
very triadic method leads him to exclude African culture. Such an ignorance of other world
views, Iroegbu suggests (following Alfred Schutz) may be a sign of a failure to understand and
recognise one’s own culture. But Iroegbu does not claim that African culture is radically
incommensurable with western thought. In fact, he argues that African culture lies at the very
root of philosophy in the west – and he therefore calls for a rediscovery of African philosophy,
thought, and culture.
The essays in Part 2, then, show some of the ways in which ‘western’ philosophy has
influenced cultures outside the west, and how philosophy has been sometimes at the service of
the dominant forces within a culture. Yet, as noted earlier, it has been claimed that philosophy
can be a tool for negotiating divisions within a culture and among cultures – for suggesting how
unifying forces and culturally diverse groups can fruitfully interact. In Part 3 – Culture and
Pluralism – the authors explore this option, and focus on the relations among cultures – and the
impact of the ideal of pluralism – in the contemporary world.
In most, if not all, of ‘western’ countries, philosophical discussion of culture and
pluralism is dominated by what we might call a broadly ‘liberal’ perspective. This perspective
reflects the view that individual persons have a primary value, that they are to be left to
determine their own good in their own way, that there is a strong distinction between the private
sphere and the public sphere, and that communities (including states) are basically only means of
helping persons to realise fundamentally individual ends. Recently, however, some ‘liberal’
political philosophers have come to acknowledge and even to emphasize the importance of
communities and, by extension, the cultures they embody. Can liberals make this ‘concession’?
What should one’s moral attitude be to the range of cultures in a pluralistic world or within
broadly pluralistic societies?
Jocelyne Couture (“La valeur morale de l’appartenance culturelle”) presents an argument
the professes to be situated within contemporary liberal discourse. Couture sees culture as
providing i) a general conception of the good, and/or ii) a notion of public reason (usually
exhibited in liberal societies in the notion of the rule of law), and/or iii) a context for choice. She
insists, then, that there is a basic value to cultural belonging and that, from this, follows other
values. Couture notes that some liberals (e.g., Will Kymlicka and John Rawls) acknowledge the
importance of culture and defend the existence of minority cultures. But, she continues, their
respective approaches (which she labels ‘externalist’) do not go far enough – these authors either
do not see cultures as fundamentally morally valuable (e.g., that cultures are of value simply as
part of an individual’s plan of life) or see them all as equally valuable. In other words, their
approaches take minority cultures as phenomena to be tolerated or to be given rights to survive,
but they fail to see threats to cultures as violations of justice. Couture claims that, since it is
intuitively obvious that we have an obligation to do what we can to allow others to fulfill their
moral obligations, a liberal view must see the treatment of other cultures as potentially a matter
of justice. She advances therefore an ‘internalist’ approach to cultural belonging. On Couture’s
view, a culture is a mode of mutual recognition and is a context in which individuals pursue their
own long-term projects – and so a culture can impose obligations on its members (e.g., to
promote the values of that culture, to act so that that culture’s institutions thrive, and to give a
publicly intelligible justification for dissidence). Moreover, recognizing the value of culture and
the superiority of some cultures over others (e.g., based on the extent to which it allows
individuals to be social agents, to show solidarity, to show loyalty towards the community, and
so on) allows liberals to defend their own cultures, but also obliges them to defend other (liberal)
cultures. Thus, on Couture’s view, philosophy can provide a way of influencing culture and
‘negotiating’ among cultures; it can explain why individuals should be allowed to change their
cultural affiliation, and yet also explain how a culture can impose obligations on its members,
and how one culture may have positive obligations towards another culture.
David Lea, too, examines the ‘negotiating’ among cultures and within cultures in the
context of liberal political discourse – specifically, on issues concerning individual and group
rights. In “Governance, Cultural Diversity, and Property Relations in the South Pacific,” Lea
notes that, within liberal political philosophy, the ideal model of governance has long been
characterised by the importance of ascribing equal rights to individual citizens. (Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin are typical proponents of this view.) This view, Lea adds, has been challenged
by communitarians, who argue that the liberal emphasis on the individual is inconsistent with
lived experience and ignores the value of community – and some conclude that, therefore, there
must be at least some special group rights for communities. This is not just a theoretical issue;
Lea notes that very much the same exchange exists in the discussion of property rights in the
political context of Australia and neighbouring South Pacific nations; are such rights individual
rights, or do they belong to collectivities? Lea examines James Tully’s claim that aboriginal
property rights are basically the rights of collectivities – of aboriginal peoples as peoples – and
that such rights have not been recognised because the ‘culture’ of modern legal constitutionalism
and governance – with its focus on individual rights – systematically and systemically fails to
include traditional group rights. Tully’s solution is that legal and political institutions must be
modified to accommodate these rights. Lea argues, however, that Tully’s proposal is not
appropriate in the context of the South Pacific states, and insists that the principles of a liberal
political philosophy, with its affirmation of individual rights, not only ensure the accountability
and responsibility of property holders, but alone allow for trade and commerce to be engaged in,
in a way that can contribute to empowering the community as a whole.
In “Philosophy, Culture, and Pluralism: Some Peculiar Canadian Conditions,” Robin
Mathews discusses the liberal political discourse assumed by Couture and Lea, and considers
whether it is appropriate to dealing with the diversity and plurality of cultures. This discourse is
said to characterise all of contemporary western culture, but Mathews challenges this claim,
denying that there is a ‘consensus’ on the legitimacy of this discourse. He argues that this liberal
individualism – that emphasises the individual over the community – is not a characteristic of
western culture as such, but is a fundamentally American tradition. According to Mathews, in
Canada (where, traditionally, rights were ascribed not just to individuals but to small peoples and
cultures), the shift to this liberal discourse has not promoted popular participation, and has led to
what Mathews calls “democratic totalitarianism’ – i.e., the ‘operation of a police state within a
formally democratic country’ that elects its political leaders through democratic elections. The
defence of this ‘liberal discourse’ – with its emphasis on individual rights – by Canadian
philosophers (such as Kymlicka and Charles Taylor) is, Mathews argues, really a defence of a
capitalist corporate economy and of values that are foreign to Canada, and he criticises these
philosophers for failing to grasp the implications of this brand of ‘liberal’ political philosophy for
Canadian culture and democracy.
In Part 4 – Culture in Philosophy and Philosophy in Culture – the authors consider the
implications of the relations between philosophy and culture. Rather than focus simply on the
role of philosophy in culture, they are concerned with the way in which culture and philosophy
act upon one another, and what this suggests for philosophical enquiry as such – i.e., how
philosophy is influenced by culture, how philosophy might help to understand the direction of
cultures, and how philosophy might, as a consequence, influence or positively affect culture.
David Tabachnick (“Grant’s Lament, McLuhan’s Understanding, and Heidegger’s
Saving Power”) considers the challenge posed to culture and national identities by globalisation
– and suggests that philosophy may be able to provide some direction on how to respond.
Tabachnick presents the views of two central figures in the Canadian discussion of culture –
George Grant (1918-1988) and Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) – noting that both foresaw the
erosion of cultural traditions, national boundaries, and even the boundaries separating
individuals, by forces of technology. Yet neither McLuhan nor Grant were without hope. While
technology cannot be stopped, both held that it can be directed or humanised if understood and
dealt with thoughtfully. Tabachnick suggests that a similar way of addressing cultural change
and erosion is reflected in the work of another philosopher who saw clearly the challenges to
culture posed by technology, Martin Heidegger, and that philosophical reflection can provide us
with a means of responding to the process that drives technology today – globalisation.
In “Sense Knowledge and the Cultural Horrors of the Twentieth Century,” Jerzy
Wojciechowski argues that a philosophy can affect culture in a substantial way – and that we
have evidence of this in some of the ‘cultural horrors’ that took place in the twentieth century.
Wojchiechowski argues that if we look at philosophy in the modern period, we see that, as
philosophers shifted from an epistemology focussed on sensation (which allowed them to see the
‘measure’ of things and their relation to these things) to an epistemology focussed on intellection
and ideas, human beings lost a sense of perspective. And as the body of knowledge increased and
as will came to take priority over intellect, philosophers become increasingly concerned with
ideas rather than the objectively real. With these philosophical ‘shifts,’ Wojciechowski holds,
nations lost the intellectual resources to stop the move towards massive, ruthless destruction of
human beings in the name of ideology. It is only by returning to philosophical views that focus
on sensation and which recognise the existence of an ‘estimative power’ (that enables people to
see themselves rightly in relation to reality) that, Wojchiechowski believes. Humanity will be
able to avoid repeating the cultural horrors of the last century.
Leslie Armour (“Culture and Philosophy”) brings together several of the issues raised in
this volume, in a series of arguments and illustrations that show how ‘philosophy and reflections
on culture frequently come together.’ Armour understands the task of philosophy as getting our
understanding of reality ‘in order’ – and culture gives us a notion of (though it does not
determine) what a meaningful order might be. Armour notes how language structures how we
think, that cultures set limits to what we can express, how we can express it, and also to what we
hope to understand about it – and that if we ‘step outside’ of a culture, those remaining within it
may not understand what is at issue. Culture also provides a number of other ‘conditions’ on
philosophizing. Culture determines what options a philosopher may choose to consider. One’s
philosophy may take on different forms or acquire a more complex character as one engages in it
in new cultural environments – but where different circumstances may breed different
philosophies, there is no reason to believe that the same culture will give birth to similar
philosophies. (Armour refers to Heideggerian phenomenology, the Christian existentialism of
Karl Jaspers, and Moritz Schlick’s logical empiricism as examples of this latter point.) But none
of this entails that there are no common principles; since philosophy involves getting things ‘in
order,’ there is reason to believe that every culture will seek to articulate a similar set of
questions or issues. (Of course, even if there is a similar set of questions, it may very well be that
the answers will nevertheless take on a different colouring in different cultures.)
Aside from this suggestion that cultures have a common core of philosophical problems,
Armour argues for three important theses: first, that even though philosophy is influenced by
culture, it is not the prisoner of culture; second, that culture is necessary to philosophy (because
it is through culture – and ideally through a diversity of cultures – that a philosophy is
expressed); third, that by ‘working through’ the cultural presuppositions of a philosophical view,
and by being attentive to how that philosophy plays out in other cultures, we can arrive at an
adequate statement of what it stands for. (Thus, we need cultural diversity in order for
philosophies to be expressed, developed, and made clear.) But, Armour repeats, we also need to
recognise that, for the coherence of a culture, and for cultures to draw on one another, there must
be common ideas – perhaps a perennial philosophy.
Armour is confident, then, not only that culture influences philosophy but that philosophy
needs culture in order to be expressed – and that a plurality of cultures is necessary so that a
philosophy can be seen for all that it is. In this way, his essay may serve as a concluding essay or
afterword. Armour is, however, much less confident whether philosophy (by itself, or as such)
has shaped – or can shape – culture; he is at best cautiously optimistic. Still, the arguments in
Parts 2 and 3 of this volume would seem to provide strong evidence for the claim that, directly or
indirectly, philosophy has had and can have profound impacts on the character and orientation of
a culture.
3. Engaging culture, pluralism, and philosophy
The essays in this volume aim to open up and contribute to, rather than resolve, the numerous
issues involved in the relation of culture, pluralism, and philosophy. Despite the diversity of
perspectives and the themes addressed, the authors would agree that philosophical reflection on
culture needs to be engaged in, that there are important connections to be noted and explored
among philosophy, culture, and pluralism, that a case can be made for claiming that culture
affects philosophy and that philosophy – indirectly or directly – affects culture, and that
philosophy may be able to provide ways of negotiating the tensions that arise when we take
culture and cultural diversity seriously. And while the authors note that there is much further
work to be done in discussing the relations among culture, pluralism, and philosophy, they reject
the view that philosophy is not relevant to understanding culture or that philosophical enquiry
can be engaged in without taking into account the cultural context in which its questions arise.
Might one conclude that philosophy is inculturated, but not a slave to culture, nor so
closed within it that it cannot provide tools for analysis and communication among cultures?
Should we believe, as some authors suggest, that there may be common ideas and concerns on
fundamental issues – the nature of the real, the principles of value, and the nature and destiny of
humanity – that provide a core of questions for philosophical discussion? The essays that follow
invite readers to consider these issues – for example, whether there is a set of questions, common
to different cultures – and to investigate how certain philosophical questions have been pursued
in different cultures – if only in order to see better what these questions mean and what answers
are available to us. Clearly the issues of what culture is, how cultures may influence ways of
thinking and acting, and how cultures grow and develop, are all questions that can be approached
in different ways. At the very least – and as the essays in this collection show – the theme of
culture is one which philosophers in the contemporary west should seriously engage.
Notes
1
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), On the Aesthetic Education of Man: in a series of letters [Uber die asthetische
Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen] ed., tr. introd, and commentary, Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and
L.A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
2
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind [Ideen zur
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit] abridged ed, with an introd. Frank E. Manuel. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1968.
3
Georg Simmel (1858-1918), Philosophische Kultur: gesammelte Essais. Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911.
4
While the theme of the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy (1983) in Montreal was “Philosophy and Culture,” it
was scarcely an occasion in which many of the papers actually addressed that theme (see Philosophie et culture:
actes du XVIIe Congrès mondial de philosophie / Philosophy and culture: proceedings of the XVIIth World
Congress of Philosophy. ed. Venant Cauchy. 5 vols. Montréal: Editions Montmorency, 1988.
5
Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, and
Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1983; Fredric Jameson, “Culture and finance
capital” and “The brick and the balloon: architecture, idealism and land speculation” in The Cultural Turn: selected
writings on the postmodern. London; New York: Verso, 1998, and Theory of Culture: lectures at Rikkyo. Tokyo: Y.
Hamada, 1994; Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1994; Clifford Geertz, The
Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays, New York: Basic Books, 1973; Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture.
Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
6
See Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992; co-editor with Henry Louis Gate, Jr. of The Dictionary of Global Culture, New York:
Knopf, 1996. See also Morton White’s A Philosophy of Culture: the case for holistic pragmatism, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2002.
7
Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art,
and custom. 2 vols., London : J. Murray, 1871.
8
See Ruth Benedict, An Anthropologist at Work; writings of Ruth Benedict. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
9
See E. Gellner, cited in Jocelyne Couture, “La valeur morale de l’appartenance culturelle,” Chapter 7, below.
10
Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, with the assistance of
Wayne Untereiner and appendices by Alfred G. Meyer. Cambridge, MA: The Museum, 1952.
11
T. S. Eliot (1888-1965), Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, London: Faber and Faber, 1948. Eliot’s essays
here include: “The three senses of ‘culture’,” “The class and the elite,” “Unity and diversity: the region,” “Unity and
diversity: sect and cult,” “A note on culture and politics,” “Notes on education and culture,” “Conclusion,” and
“Appendix: The unity of European culture.”
12
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, p. 120
13
Ibid., p. 94. See also Eliot’s comment that “Culture cannot altogether be brought to consciousness; and the culture
of which we are wholly conscious is never the whole of culture” (p. 107)
14
Ibid., p. 37.
15
Ibid., p. 31,
16
See Bernard Bosanquet, “The Reality of the General Will,” International Journal of Ethics, IV (1893–1894), p.
311; reprinted in his Aspects of the Social Problem, London: Macmillan, 1895, p. 325 and in Essays on Aspects of
the Social Problem and Essays on Social Policy, in The Collected Works of Bernard Bosanquet¸ ed. William Sweet,
Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1999, Vol. 14.
17
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 236.
18
Recall Hegel’s comment that “When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then has a shape of life grown old. By
philosophy’s gray in gray it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only
with the falling of the dusk.” (Hegel, Preface to The Philosophy of Right, tr. T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1942).
See Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), “Minute on Education (February 2, 1835),” in Prose and Poetry,
selected by G. M. Young, Cambridge: Harvard Universty Press, 1952; see also Michael Edwardes, British India,
1772-1947 : a survey of the nature and effects of alien rule, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1967. In his “Minute on
Education,” Macaulay wrote that the native languages of India “contain neither literary nor scientific information,
and are, [...] poor and rude.” He argued therefore that local culture must be obliterated – ”We must at present do our
best to form a class who may be persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and
in intellect.”
19