Justifiable Conformity?
Research on the Causality behind the Disturbances in the
EU’s Cooperation with China in Priority Area ‘Civil Society’
Master’s Thesis
By
Supervisor:
Angelina Haralampieva
Per Lunde
European Studies, 10th semester
2010
1
Acknowledgements
Herewith I would like to express my appreciation to those who contributed to the
completion of my Master’s Program in European Studies at Aalborg University, marked at
last with the accomplishment of this Master’s Thesis.
I would thank the Authorities of Aalborg University and especially the Study Board for
International Relations for facilitating favorable conditions to carry out the Program.
Furthermore, I would like to state my satisfaction with the opportunity to combine the
European Studies Program with the innovative specialization in Chinese Area Studies, which
I availed of with willingness.
Most distinctively, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Per Lunde, for our
beneficial work together. With his attentive attitude, cooperative manner of supervision and
nevertheless critical appraisals, he held our consultations according to the Chinese proverb “Tell me and I will forget, show me and I will remember, involve me and I will understand”,
and, thus, deserved my gratitude.
Angelina Haralampieva
Abstract
2
China’s significance on the world scene justifies EU’s efforts to extend and diversify
its relationship to the People’s Republic beyond the initial trade connections and to carry out
its important economic and political interests as supporting China’s sustainable development
and transition to a ‘stable’, ‘prosperous’ and ‘open’ state.
This paper is concerned with the European Union’s (EU) development cooperation
with China, as regards to the ‘cooperation for establishing civil society capacity’ with the
People’s Republic. The initially stipulated EU’s willingness to aid China’s societal sector
through allocated funding does not meet with the realization of this intention. The aims of
cooperation: increasing of Chinese civil society organizations’ (CSOs) experience in project
and organization management, reiterating networking and mutual understanding between
Chinese and European CSOs, successful completion of pilot programs and participation in
macro-project schemes, etc.; are lined with € 20 million, when the cooperation was to start off
in 2002. However, due to implementation deficiencies, it became apparent that the aid cannot
be fully absorbed and would remain unrealized assets. This triggered alteration in terms of
objectives, activities, implementation, expected results and financial envelope; altogether,
changing the manner the cooperation in the field was carried out.
Hence, the latest relevant EU papers evidence of transforming the ‘cooperation for
establishing civil society capacity’ from ‘priority area’ to ‘complementary activity’ to EUChina relationship. Regardless of whether this could be defined as failure, or hesitantly as
‘shift of focus’, this change is due to certain causality that has implications both on the
ongoing process of cooperation and on the its prospects.
Table of Contents
3
Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………..………1
1.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………………………....1
1.2. Presentation of ‘civil society capacity building’ as an objective of the EU’s
development cooperation with China …………………………………………………2
1.2.1. EU’s development cooperation with China ……………………………..2
1.2.2. EU’s development cooperation with China for establishing ‘civil society
capacity’ ……………………………………………………………………….3
1.2.3. China’s EU Policy Paper ………………………………………………..8
1.3. Problem formulation ……………………………………………………………...8
1.4. Reservations ………………………………………………………………………9
Chapter 2: Disclosing the notion of ‘civil society’ ………………………………………...11
2.1. Methodological approach …………………..……………………………………11
2.2. Conceptualizing ‘civil society’ …………………………………………………..12
2.2.1. Describing the developments the concept ‘civil society’ has been
through………………………………………………………………………..12
2.2.2. Defining the concept of ‘civil society’ and its associations …………...14
2.2.3. Specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern
socio-political sphere ………………………………………………………...18
2.3. Civil society – the EU perspective ………………………………………………18
2.4. Civil society for China …………………………………………………………..22
Chapter 3: Analysis …………………………………………………………………………28
3.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………………………..28
3.2. Theoretical framework …………………………………………………………..29
3.3. Analysis ………………………………………………………………………….33
Chapter 4: Finale …………………………………………………………………………...47
4.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………....……………..47
4.2. Warts and all ………………………………………….....……………………….47
Bibliography
Annexes
4
List of Abbreviations
BINGO – Business International Non-Governmental Organization
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CSP – Country Strategy Paper
EC – European Commission
ENGO – Environmental Non-Governmental Organization
EU – European Union
GONGO – Government-Operated Non-Governmental Organization
INGO – International Non-Governmental Organization
MIP – Multi-Annual Indicative Programme
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NIP – National Indicative Programme
PRC – People’s Republic of China
RINGO – Religious International Non-Governmental Organization
QUANGO – Quasi- Non-Governmental Organization
5
“EU policies toward China and Chinese policies toward the EU developed partly in tandem, partly in
reaction to each other and partly in response to other circumstances affecting one side or the other”. 1
1. Introduction
The present thesis is concerned with the European Union’s (EU) development
cooperation with China, as regards to the ‘cooperation for establishing civil society capacity’
with the People’s Republic. The initially stipulated EU’s willingness to aid China’s societal
sector through allocated funding does not meet with the realization of this intention. The aims
of cooperation: increasing of Chinese civil society organizations’ (CSOs) experience in
project and organization management, reiterating networking and mutual understanding
between Chinese and European CSOs, successful completion of pilot programs and
participation in macro-project schemes, etc.; are lined with € 20 million, when the cooperation
was to start off in 2002. However, due to implementation deficiencies, it became apparent that
the aid cannot be fully absorbed and would remain unrealized assets. This triggered alteration
in terms of objectives, activities, implementation, expected results and financial envelope;
altogether, changing the manner the cooperation in the field was carried out.
Hence, the latest relevant EU papers evidence of transforming the ‘cooperation for
establishing civil society capacity’ from ‘priority area’ to ‘complementary activity’ to EUChina relationship. Regardless of whether this could be defined as failure, or hesitantly as
‘shift of focus’, this change is due to certain causality, which this project will attempt to
examine in the next chapters.
1. 1. Methodological approach
This introductory chapter is intended to give the reader a ‘guided tour’ through EUChina cooperation in the central, for this research paper, area of ‘civil society’. The section
presents the documental base of the EU development cooperation with China, which gets
further disclosed with annexes attached. Consequently, it goes into details, as particularizing
to a concrete sphere within this cooperation –‘civil society’. Accordingly, the chapter follows
chronologically the regulation of the matter with relevant documents, mainly issued by the
EU. Due to objectivity, however, the China’s EU Policy Paper is reviewed to demonstrate
China’s counterweight in the cooperation.
1 Snyder, F., “The EU and China 1949-2008”
6
By doing so, we construct the empirical fundament, which reveals the surroundings,
where the problem arises, and thus substantiate the research question. As offering our
reasoning for problem’s relevance and importance, we, furthermore, formulate theme of the
study.
Any following methodological specifications, including relevant reservations, which
are needed, are introduced consequently in the final subsection.
1.2. Presentation of ‘civil society capacity building’ as an objective of the EU’s
development cooperation with China
1.2.1. EU’s development cooperation with China
China’s significance on the world scene justifies EU’s efforts to extend and diversify
its relationship to the People’s Republic beyond the initial trade connections and to carry out
its important economic and political interests as supporting China’s sustainable development
and transition to a ‘stable’, ‘prosperous’ and ‘open’ state. The cooperation program is an
important element of this relationship.
The foundation of EU-China cooperation goes back to the 1985 ‘Trade and Economic
Co-operation Agreement’ that provides ‘a basis for institutionalized dialogue’ as regulates
trade, economic and developmental issues between the parties concerned.
The European Commission’s development program in China, stipulated with the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, understands the development cooperation
between both partners as “a multidimensional process covering broad-based equitable
growth, capacity and institution building, private sector development, social services,
environment, good governance and human rights”.
The extending complexity of the overall relationship between EU and China is
updated in the 2006 document ‘EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities’ and the
2007 ‘Partnership Co-operation Agreement’. Thus, besides the regular political, trade and
economic meetings, over 24 wide-ranging sectoral dialogues were established. (see Annex 1)2
Accordingly, the Directorate for External Relations specifies the following core
objectives of EU policy towards China:
-
Broaden and deepen dialogue with China, both bilaterally and on the world stage to face the global
challenges;
2 Annex 1 goes in further details on EU cooperation objectives as laid down in various applicable documents
7
-
Support China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human
rights;
-
Encourage the ongoing integration of China into the world economy and trading system, and
support the process of economic and social reforms;
-
Raise the EU’s profile in China, to aid mutual understanding. 3
These objectives are reflected in EU’s long term strategy toward China and over the
years have been subject to change in the EU-China intensifying relations. As the present
paper deals with the civil society matter, we look upon the documents, chronologically
regulating EU-China relations with regard to this very subject.
Thus, the examined documents are as follows:
 1995 Communication on "A long-term policy for China-Europe relations";
 1998 Communication on "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”;
 Commission Working Document, Country Strategy Paper China 2002-2006;
 National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China;
 National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China;
 China Strategy Paper 2007-2013;
 Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010
This list does not pretend to be altogether representative for the EU documents on China
touching upon the civil society issue, but they are selectively chosen as most distinct ones to
draw an overview on the subject.
1.2.2. EU’s development cooperation with China for establishing ‘civil society capacity’
In the 1995 Communication ‘A long-term policy for China-Europe relations’ European
Commission (EC) stated it willingness to “support potential efforts in China to open up and
liberalise all areas of Chinese life, in different sections of society as well as different parts of
the economy. These trends inevitably reinforce moves towards the development of a civil
society based on the rule of law”. In order these undertakings to be effective in practice, “the
EU can promote practical cooperation, such as training and technical assistance in the legal
and judicial fields, to back the efforts being made in China to establish a civil society based
on the rule of law.”
Anyhow, the paper admits that “up till now [1995] concrete action by the EU to
encourage cooperation [in this field] has been small-scale. The EU should henceforth
3 European Commission, Directorate General External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/index_en.htm
8
coordinate with the Member States and the many active European NGOs to support the
development of the rule of law in China”. 4
In 1998 Communication ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’, the EC,
considering China’s emergence as ‘an increasingly confident world power’, formulates the
desire “to see China integrated rapidly and fully into the international community, both
politically and economically [and, furthermore,] to support its transition towards an open
society based upon the rule of law.” This should be achieved through strengthening of the
civil society. “The EU should aim to strengthen those practices which make up the fabric of a
strong civil society. It should promote civil and political rights through initiatives such as the
support for a training centre in China for officials engaged in the implementation of the
village governance law. It could also allow for assistance to the most vulnerable groups in
society, including ethnic minorities, women … and children. Initiatives aimed at promoting
consumers' rights and at supporting consumers' organisations could also be a way of
strengthening civil society. The role of Non-Governmental Organisations in implementing
projects aimed at strengthening civil society should be fully exploited.5
Based on the implementation of the above mentioned Communication, EU-China Legal
and Judicial Co-operation Programme, launched in 2000, reconfirms Commission’s “support
to small-scale development aid projects, which have been launched by NGOs in the
education, health, and sanitation sectors … [Moreover,] the EU's support of NGOs does in
itself contribute to the strengthening of civil society.”6
Over the next years, as Directorate General External Relations evidences, the cooperation
with China moved away from the previous areas of infrastructure and rural development
towards support for social and economic reform, the environment and sustainable
development, and good governance and the rule of law. Various regional programs provided
project funding for non-profit-making organisations working in the areas of education,
environment, trade and investment, and human rights and democracy. 7
Based on EU’s “multi-faceted and dynamic relationship with China”, the China Country
Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (CSP) includes among all objectives of the bilateral cooperation the
promotion “grass-roots democracy and the implementation of economic, social and political
4 European Commission, A long-term policy for China-Europe relations, COM (1995)
5 Commission of the European Communities, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, COM(1998)
6 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Implementation of the Communication
"Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China", COM(2000)
7 Directorate General External Relations, op.cit.
9
and civil rights and strengthening of the structures and processes that make up the fabric of a
strong civil society”.8
EU periodically monitors the implementation of its Strategy Papers through the
National Indicative Programmes (NIP) that allow for a critical examination of operations,
which have been undertaken and announce necessary corrections of timing or priorities.
NIP 2002-2004 estimates €20million in Community contribution for priority ‘Good
Governance and Strengthening of the Rule of Law’, within which the civil society
development is viewed as means for betterment of the governance field in China:
Expanding support for the rule of law implies not only top-down initiatives such as support
for drafting new legislation and training of relevant servants, but also initiatives involving the
citizens’ opportunity to seek fairness and redress within the legal and administrative systems.
Such initiatives should involve support for newly-developing NGOs and other organisations
of civil society working for the betterment of communities in the midst of socio-economic
reform. 9
Generally, the objective ‘Support to civil society’ is most distinctive as initially
stipulated in NIP 2002-2004. Therefore, we consider necessary to place it here as it is. →
As can be seen from the abstract, €20 million in Community contribution are provided
to train Chinese CSOs in project and organization management; to involve Chinese CSOs in
number programs; to increase the communication, exchanges and activities between Chinese
CSOs and their European counterparts.
The consequent NIP (period 2005-2006) noticed that some modifications to the 20022004 NIP were required in order to reflect the realities encountered during project
preparation, ‘where political sensitivities were encountered’. In a response, NIP 2005-2006
foresees the financing for EU-China civil society cooperation program to be reduced from
€20 million originally allocated in the prior NIP to €10 million. “This reduction has come
about mainly because of concerns over absorption capacity in the Chinese context.”
Regardless the official organs’ positive attitude and merely indicative character of the
cooperation program, the allocated grant has not been absorbed. Nevertheless, NIP envisages
three areas of cooperation: ‘capacity building’, ‘networking of NGOs’ and ‘grants’, where
cooperation still can be achieved.
8 European Commission, Commission Working Document, Country Strategy paper China 2002-2006
9 European Commission, National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China
10
In order to either solve or moderate the downsides encountered the following steps are
predicted: “improving the interaction between government and civil society, supporting the
modification of legislation concerning NGOs, building capacity in Chinese civil society
organisations and strengthening public participation in local decision making”. In talks with
the Chinese government is decided “that [the] cooperation in this area should be continued
under the 2005-2006 NIP”. In consultation with the non-state actors “ways in which civil
society could play an active role” in the implementation” are discussed.10
Henceforth, the NIP 2005-2006 focused on the CSP priority areas of social and economic
reform, and good governance and the rule of law. Funding has been approved for the creation
of an EU-China Law School (€18.2 million) and for “Governance for Equitable Development:
Strengthening the Rule of Law and Civil Society Participation in China” (€6.8 million not
until 2006). (see Annex 2)
For the following period, the European Commission adopts the new 2007-2013
Country Strategy Paper for China and the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 20072010. Within this timeframe the Union weaves its “guiding, monitoring and reviewing
assistance” into an indicative budget of € 224 million to support EU-China cooperation
programs. Introducing the three areas for action that are on focus evidences where the
cooperation priorities have been reoriented to:
- Reinforcement of the bilateral relationship in the areas of trade, business exchanges, social
and economic development;
- Assistance to China in her efforts to address global concerns over climate change,
environment and energy;
- Support for China's internal reform process in areas of shared interest where EU experience
can provide added value.11
In addition, the Commission declares it’s readiness to continue financing “complementary
thematic interventions” in area “Non-State Actors in Development”, where assistance could
be provided to NGOs and other civil society organisations working in areas related to the
CSP.12
The outlined objectives show noticeable shift in the cooperation discourse. In order to
assist China to come closer to extension of its social wellbeing, EC does not any longer define
non state actors as irreplaceable partners, but talks more about strengthening “[the]
10 European Commission, National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China
11 Delegation of the European Union to China, http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu_china/development_cooperation/index_en.htm
12 European Commission, China Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013
11
Government capacity to manage social provision at national/regional level”. As to “the
private and informal sector”, EC goes so far as recommendations.
European search for cooperation effectiveness in a long run can be foreseen in the
priority “Human resource development”, stated in MIP. The objective “to contribute towards
China’s human resource development and to strengthen people-to-people links between the
EU and China” pledges on the presumed effect that the opening up of European academic
institutions for Chinese students would have. It is expected to multiply the social benefits
after these newly educated people return to China and “contribute towards the country’s
development”. 13
Very recently EuropeAid, the institution responsible for EU development services,
called for proposals to grant applicants under the thematic line “EU-China Civil Society
Dialogue” amounting to €1 million. The overall objective is to support the consolidation of a
structured ongoing dialogue between European and Chinese civil societies. The specific
purpose is to formulate common recommendations on public as well as private governance
for the benefit of sustainable development and of poverty eradication. 14
It
is
worth
noticing
also
that
in
recent
years
a
main
mode
of
communication/cooperation between the counterparts turns out to be sectoral dialogues,
which are supportive of China’s reform and development and constitute an important element
of the external dimension of EU policies. More important, by broadening and intensifying
these dialogues, a forum for exchange between policymakers, the business community,
researchers and civil society is provided.
Based on different workshops organized by the EU-China Civil Society Forum, the
associates to the Forum and members of staff of the German Asia Foundation, Sausmikat and
Fritsche define four specific areas in which European NGOs deal with China today: Human
Rights; Labour; Environmental Protection and Climate Change; Education. In two other
areas, Development Aid and Exchange Programs with schools and universities; China
activities are of central concern, but these areas rather fulfil the function of interstate
development aid. All these areas do not exclude each other, but rather could be applied as
cross-cutting issues. 15
13 European Commission, China Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010
14 DEVEX, http://www.devex.com/projects/eu-china-civil-society-dialogue
15 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., eds., Civil Society in European-Chinese Relations, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2010.
12
1.2.3. China’s EU Policy Paper
In so far as European attitude towards its partner was exhaustively introduced, the
Chinese might stay with considerable deficiencies since, whereas the first EU policy paper on
China goes back to 1995, the first Chinese on the EU appeared in 2003. Moreover, it mainly
states the general position of ‘appreciation’ EU’s importance to China, highlights the
objectives of China's EU policy, and outlines the areas and plans of all-round China-EU
cooperation.
Nevertheless, no particularities in a response to EU’s active promotion of ‘civil
society’ are mentioned. In a broad sense, in the social sphere the following is envisaged:
- To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the principle of mutual
emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and promote cultural harmony and progress
between the East and the West.
- China welcomes more EU development aid, especially in such fields as the environmental protection,
poverty-alleviation, public health and hygiene and education. China also welcomes a stronger and more
active role of the EU in human resources development, in particular, personnel training for China's
central and western regions and build-up of China's capacity of participating in multilateral trading
regime.16
Ever since this Policy paper, the Chinese side kept verbosely reconfirming its
dedication for establishment of a vital civil society before its European partner. Anyhow, if go
into depth of their political, economic and cultural common understanding and interaction, it
is getting clear that whatever China accomplishes in the ‘civil society’ sphere will not be for
the sake of its cooperation with the EU.
1.3. Problem formulation
The introduced overview on the EU’s development cooperation with China in the
priority area ‘Civil society’ discloses if not a failure, at least shifting from the initially
intended logic of implementation. This disruption incites us to look closer at the causality
provoking such a development. The evitable depreciation of the priority reflects at first sight
the nature of the EU-China relationship. Thus, even at the risk of verbosity, we assign the
general actuality of the issue to the new role in the world that China obtained in the past years
that led naturally to growth of its significance in the work of the European institutions,
European civil society organizations included. Furthermore, the development of civil society
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, China’s EU Policy Paper, 2003
13
in China is particularly attractive to Europe, which hopes to be able to influence China’s
development trajectory. Moreover, development policies can be powerful tools for promoting
reforms. Europe is thus pursuing a beneficial policy towards China that is based on mutual
cooperation.
Our motives to get on the matter are further enhanced by the importance we attach to it
in regard with the throughout significance civil society. Being a power beyond economics and
politics, the non-governmental sector is considerably growing in influence. Moreover, while it
is currently described as a “service provider” for information and expertise (70% in the areas
of health, education and social services, the rest in “advocacy for certain interest groups”), its
future role will be stronger in “designing and implementing policies.”17
Altogether, the inclusion of the ‘civil society’ in the EU’s documents on China, but
also the subject’s decline as a priority of cooperation, speak about risky ambiguity in terms of
relevance. However, this situation points out that there are many lessons to be learnt for the
cooperation between Chinese and European in the civil society area: in organizational aspects,
in socio-cultural aspects, regarding topic-wise commonalities and differences, and
cooperation questions. Therefore, with putting the focal point of research on the causality
instead of on the consequences of subject’s decline, this paper aims for explanatory value
with added positive implications for future developments.
1.4. Reservations
After the problem has been formulated and before proceeding to the next substantial
stage, some reservations need to be made in order to explain project’s general positions,
which are essential to the correct understanding of the applied logic of research. From a
methodological viewpoint the study meets loads of notional obstacles, which if not addressed,
might turn to functional distortions.
Let us first bring to your attention the central term ‘civil society’. When the text
discusses ‘civil society’ what is to be taken into consideration is that the expression is not
used in a broad socio-cultural sense, relating to participatory democracy per se, but rather
defines organized constituent of the society, represented by organizations, which structure the
civil society’s fabric.
Furthermore, we have to clarify what is to be understood under ‘civil society’ in the
perceptions of the actors concerned. Undoubtedly, aiming to disclose ‘civil society’ from the
17 Sausmikat, N, “Civil Society Dilemmas in Dealing with China”, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2009
14
EU’s intergovernmental stand is troublesome and likely requires numerous reservations to
guard from normative mistakes. Nevertheless, even with a risk of some inaccuracy, this paper
will need to present one generalized picture of EU’s perception of civil society. So it does in
chapter 2.3.
The idea of civil society of a transnational organization is looked at in its correlation
with a national state’s concept of civil society. We, by no means oppose the concepts, but
rather examine how they communicate among each other.
The paper risks to be accused in methodological incorrectness, since it is occasionally
vague on whether the Chinese counterpart is to cooperate with European civil society actors,
or directly with the institutions of the Union. Therefore, it has to be said that the institutional
system allocates Union’s development aid and creates the strategic policy papers towards
China. Chinese organizations apply with own projects to the Indicative Programmes, or
participate in joint ventures with European NGOs. In fact, the latter likely receive their
funding also from the Union’s resources.
Another consideration also has to be noted. In general, there are not many documents,
regarding the cooperation for ‘civil society’, issued on Chinese side. Thus, despite of its initial
idea to represent the matter examined in balance between the EU and China, after acquainting
the reality, we realized the limitations that the time, the logistic, and the scope, etc., were
imposing on us. It was most likely to accent on European side, more specifically the
relationship between EU and China to be viewed as between aid-provider and aid-receiver.
Moreover, when laid down in the EU papers, this relationship is regulated as such.
At some places, where the text cannot manage its intended balance, the notion of civil
society gets to sound obviously ‘westernalized’. To insure against methodological weakness,
it must be stated that although the project is not trying to impose any superiority of the
Western conceptualization, we cannot escape from ourselves, and therefore, our inherent
perceptions. If leaving this aside, still, the accessible resources are created mainly by Western
scholars, or Asian ones, including Chinese, working for scientific centers located in Europe
and the US. So the throughout dealing with the concept is very much dominated by the
Western political tradition.
Due to the necessity to accept a basic position on the ‘civil society’ within the text, the
expression gets its connotation explained in general, as well as in European and in Chinese
contexts in the next chapter.
15
2. Disclosing the notion of ‘civil society’
2.1. Methodological approach
This section is designed to give the reader as far as possible distinctive idea of the line
of thinking that has been followed, while working with the ‘civil society’ concept. Making the
reservation ‘as far as possible distinctive idea’, is necessary, since the diversity of
interpretations and uses of the ‘civil society’ in multiple contexts enforce to differentiate if not
exclusive at least guiding definition of the term that will facilitate the understanding of ‘civil
society’ as it is used in the present text.
However, in its attempt to overcome this vagueness, the chapter conceptualizes the
notion of civil society per se, as  describing the developments the concept of civil society has been through;
 defining ‘civil society’ and its associations; and
 specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern socio-political
sphere.
It should be clarified that the postulations made so far derive from the Western socio-cultural
heritage. Accordingly, they serve as a basis upon which the European perception on civil
society is drawn.
Consequently, this paper needs to present one generalized picture of EU’s notion of
civil society and its associations, so that it could further facilitate a well-grounded
examination on the matter within EU-China relationship.
To create such a generalized image, we approach various dimensions of the subject, as
describing  how and why the ‘civil society’ has emerged as a subject in the common European
‘vocabulary’;
 once there, how the EU classifies the organizations of European civil society and what
characteristics does it ascribe to them;
 how CSOs are embodied on the European level and what are the roles they perform
within the socio-political dialogue;
 furthermore, how has the effectiveness of their participation been manifested.
Having accomplished this, we put for discussion the applicability of the Western/European
concept of civil society to other contexts, in particular in the Chinese realm.
16
To bring into line with the coming analysis, we compulsorily need to familiarize with
the notion of civil society as it is perceived by the Chinese. The Eastern usage does not just
differ greatly from what the West has been experiencing; it actually offers a whole new
understanding of the theory and practice of civil associational life. Hence, the project gives a
try to  define the ‘Chinese civil society’ in counterweight to EU’s conception;
 describe the inception and development of the Chinese notion of civil society;
 characterize the organizations of civil society;
 depict the roles CSOs play in the Chinese society;
 reveal the functional hurdles CSOs meet and thus to incorporate the idea of ‘semi-civil
society’;
 deliberate on the ongoing debate whether a civil society has emerged in China;
 evaluate the positive impacts and downsides of the cooperation between local and
foreign societal organizations.
At the end, the section bridges the introduced concepts, as demonstrating how the
Chinese CSOs situation is viewed from EU’s point of view, which already lays down some
preliminary hints, relating to the causality of the failed cooperation between EU and China.
2.2. Conceptualizing ‘civil society’
2.2.1. Describing the developments the concept ‘civil society’ has been through
If we turn to the Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics, we get to
know that until recently, the dichotomy where the market or the economy is on the one hand,
and the state or government on the other, has dominated the social sciences and has left thirdsector institutions neglected. “The 'society' was pushed to the sidelines … not fitting the twosector world view.” 18
However, at the end of the Cold War the term ‘civil society’ became popularized to
describe what appeared to have been missing in state-dominated societies. The 1989 events in
Eastern Europe are thought to have inspired ‘a renaissance’ in thinking about the role civil
society holds in reinforcing democracy. The mass democratization in a number of countries
renewed the interest in popular engagement in political life and everything else that relates to
the way that political cultures affect the way a state is governed. Civil society has become one
18 London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm
17
of the key parts of the reference framework for governance, seeking to give new dimension of
traditional public action, in which representative democracy is combined with bureaucratic
implementation. The comprehension of ‘civil society’, from citizens’ protests to its
incorporation into public action, vividly displays an essential shift that makes the ‘civil
society’ objective pivotal to the problems of political and social representation.19
In the introductory article to the book “Civil life, globalization, and political change in
Asia”, its editor and Professor of Anthropology at Boston University, Robert P. Weller,
endorses the assumption that the civil society organizations have become “increasingly
visible and influential over the past two decades … [and they are] thus beginning to reframe
the nation-state both from below, by taking over social functions that the state previously
performed, and from above, by their ability to mobilize political and financial pressure from
beyond the bounds of national politics …[T]hey try to represent interests they perceive as ill
served by the current structure of markets and nation-states”.20
In the book “Changing images of Civil Society”, co-edited by Bruno Jobert, who is
senior researcher at the Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique, France, he proposes
orientation for understanding “the variety of representations of civil society in civic
discourses”. Significantly influenced by the “vast philosophical or ideological controversies,
from Locke, Fergusson, Hegel or Tocqueville to the current debate on deliberation, initiated
by Habermas”, Jobert draws a discourse on ‘civil society’ that relates the notion to “the
conditions of the formation and practice of a political community, based not on tradition but
on the free association of individuals”, realized through ‘horizontal relations’ (opposed to
‘bottom-up’), based on contracts. These agreements occur “in debates between peers” and
thus, bear the commonly shared principles of justice. Thereby, the ‘civil society’ concept
‘transcends’ and even ‘denounces’ the politics shaped through negotiations and compromises
between policy-makers, and seeks a self-organization by citizens.
Nonetheless, as it spreads out to the governance sphere, this theoretical formula proves
troublesome to maintain. “On the public scene it is a powerful myth …a symbol of citizens’
resistance. In the public-policy sphere, mobilization of civil society is embodied in various
frames put to the services of opposing … strategies.”
21
Stephenson, Professor of Political
Science at the University of Hawaii-Manoa, additionally discredits the perception of CSOs as
‘the voice of the people’, representing genuine democracy, and claims that the societal sector
19 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., eds., Changing Images of Civil Society, Routledge, 2008
20 Weller, R., ed., Civil life, globalization, and political change in Asia, Routledge, 2005
21 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.
18
is not able to provide for responsible, democratic representation or accountability, since it
‘reinforces, rather than counters, existing power structures’.22
2.2.2. Defining the concept of ‘civil society’ and its associations
Clarifying the notion of the ‘civil society’ is strategical to unfold this research. Therefore,
in order to cope with the diversity of concepts existing, the present paper needs to adopt an
initial working definition to get us through the mass of assumptions on the matter. Close to
our comprehension is the Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics’ statement:
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state,
family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and
market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a
diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality,
autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's
organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help
groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group[s].
UN’s definition deliberates further -
Civil society expresses the interests of social groups and raises awareness of key issues in
order to influence policy and decision-making. In recent decades, Civil Society Organizations
(CSOs) have been successful in shaping global policy through advocacy campaigns and
mobilization of people and resources.23
In an article exploring the practical and theoretical significance of civil society,
Michael Edwards, the Director of the Ford Foundation's Governance and Civil Society Unit,
interprets the ‘civil society’ concept as “fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society
by expanding free markets and individual liberty” (Cato in Edwards), and as “the single most
viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market” (World Social
22 Stephenson, C., Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Beyond Intractability, Burgess G. and Burgess, H., eds., Conflict Research Consortium, University of
Colorado, 2005
23 http://www.fao.org/tc/NGO/index_en.asp
19
Forum). The ‘civil society’ covers Gidden’s ‘Third Way’, seeking to provide “the missing link
in the success of social democracy”. Adam Seligman calls the civil society the “new analytic
key that will unlock the mysteries of the social order”, Jeremy Rifkin calls it “our last, best
hope”, and international organizations see it as the tool to ‘good governance’ and growth.
Edwards himself builds a conceptualization of ‘civil society’ by combining three
different sets of theories. One school of thought claims that “voluntary associations act as
gene carriers of the good society – microclimates … for developing values like tolerance and
cooperation, and the skills required for living a democratic life”.
As looking at the civil society ‘as the good society’, another theoretical setting
proclaims societal groups as guards against the tendency to some privilege part of society to
transcend over the others.
“In its role as the ‘public sphere’, civil society becomes the arena for argument and
deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration”, and this way secures
the ‘public interest’. 24
In “Changing images of Civil Society” Bruno Jobert draws a typology of ‘civil
society’ in accordance with the stand given to the following statements he applies:
Statement: The role of politics in the construction of civil society. The practice shows
that no societal association can conceive independently of politics and socializing institutions,
and also that political class “has a wide range of instruments to act on the constitution of
civil-society organizations”;
Statement: The modalities of involvement of civil society organizations in government
action in its three dimensions: the policy sector, the relation to knowledge, and the relation to
interests;
Statement: The conditions of rehabilitation of civil society when it has been disrupted
are crucial if one is to understand the emergence and legitimizing of civil cooperation.
Hence, the civil society could be functioning in four ‘ideal’ types of civil frame:
1. Tutelary modernization model dates from few decades ago in Western Europe of
economic growth and spread of welfare states. It implies supremacy of “professional elites
and bureaucratic corporations for the conduct of policies … [and to sustain a] system of
interest intermediation”.
2. The neo-conservative model argues that the governance and social institutions are
bringing the fundament of the society - “the family, religion and the fatherland” to decay, as
24 Edwards, M. (2005) 'Civil society', The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, www.infed.org/association/civil_society.htm
20
they increase the dependence on welfare, “resulting in the demoralizing passivity of the
beneficiaries”.
3. The transatlantic Third Way, theorized by Anthony Giddens, aims to “channel
social movements towards beneficial partnership” and to enable ‘social entrepreneurs’ to
construct “a strong civil society in which rights and responsibilities go hand in hand” (Blair,
2002, in Jobert).
4. The integrative model focuses on the civil society’s ability of “shaping public
interests, rather than [of directing] incorporation of civil-society organizations in the policy
process or their contribution to public services”. The model aims a general change of the
policy-making process through societal involvement on a broad scale that will negotiate the
agreement for the ‘public good’.
It could be altogether concluded that the lapses of each of the models justify the
existence of the rest, since they all outline the saturated objectivity which influence the
constitution of ‘citizenship regimes’. 25
Robert Weller uses Seligman to ascribe to the civil society somewhat inherent
character that indicates its associations as “voluntary, institutionalized groups that stand in
some kind of opposition to the state”. More specifically, they ‘intermediate’ the space
between the family structure and state structure. In connection to the relationship between
states and societies, Weller provides the assumption that they are “independent and usually
antagonistic entities” in ‘a zero-sum game’, where the society’s powers can grow if the state
superiority diminishes, and where the state raises by suppressing the society. At the same
time, undoubtedly, the state and the society do not grow only on each other’s expenses, but
are closely interwoven. 26
Robert Putnam, Professor of public policy at the Harvard University, is in the same
line when stipulating the idea of the ‘social capital’. To introduce it:
… [S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.27
This will mean that the interaction enables people to build social networks, to share
sense of belonging among them, and to benefit out of the social fabric.
If abandon the theoretical dimension, one sees the practical display of this interaction
defined by the broad, inclusive category - ‘civil society organizations’ (CSOs).
25 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.
26 Weller, R., op.cit.
27 Smith, M. K. (2001, 2007) 'Robert Putnam', The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, www.infed.org/thinkers/putnam.htm
21
The term used includes many types of organizations that constitute civil society as a
vast range of associations. By that, it is important to distinguish between the terms ‘CSO’ and
‘NGO’, although, in practice the majority of CSOs involved in service provision are NGOs,
as study by UN Research Institute for Social Development shows.
28
At the end, “NGOs are
subset of civil society organizations”, according to Weller, created by the relevant laws of a
particular state.
Sausmikat and Fritsche, experts at EU-China Civil Society Forum, explain that both
terms refer to different cultural contexts: CSO is often used as a substitute for NGO in
authoritarian societies without the freedom of association. It is a much ‘softer’, broader
apolitical term, which relates to all kinds of formal or informal organized interest groups
which do not necessarily share the same core value. 29
Weller gives a try to define NGOs’ heterogeneous nature. The long list of acronyms
that has accumulated around NGOs can be used to illustrate this. There exist: NGOs, INGOs
(international NGOs), BINGOs (business international NGOs), RINGOs (religious
international NGOs), ENGOs (environmental NGOs), GONGOs (government-operated
NGOs - which may have been set up by governments to look like NGOs in order to qualify
for outside aid), QUANGOs (quasi-nongovernmental organizations - i.e. those that are at least
partially created or supported by states), and many others. 30
But except for NGOs, Stephenson demonstrates that the civil society may contain:
grassroots organizations that are locally organized groups of individuals which empower their
members to take action on particular issues; social movements that are broader, more diffuse
and represents a segment of society which is interested in inciting or resisting social change;
‘major groups’ that are found to play supportive role to nation-states or intergovernmental
organizations, in various undertakings.31
Regardless to the exact form of CSOs, civil society seems to be strong to the degree
that those CSOs are large and powerful. Thus, the role CSOs play within the modern sociopolitical arena should be pointed out.
28 Clayton, A., Civil Society Organizations and Service Provision, UNRISD, http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/unrisd/intrac.pdf
29 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.
30 Weller, R., op.cit.
31 Stephenson, C., op.cit.
22
2.2.3. Specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern socio-political
sphere
In the 1990s, in human rights, development, environment, and even disarmament,
CSOs (mostly NGOs) had begun to obtain their role in influencing public policy at the
international bodies and in the nation-states. They play multiple roles, varying in their
usefulness, from ‘conflict resolvers’, acting as informal intermediaries, to providers of
development aid and humanitarian assistance, which can sharpen or moderate intractable
conflicts. They endow with human rights and justice advocacy, monitor elections and lobby
governments for conditions which promote international peace and security. Their
contribution is sufficient, despite that they are not primary players in any of these arenas. But,
as Stephenson opposes, “… without these NGOs, many of the accomplishments of states and
international organizations would not have been possible.”32
We will make a use of Edwards’s conclusion, as he claims that the “civil society is
simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means to achieve it, and a framework for engaging with
each other about ends and means. 33 Thus, the idea of ‘civil society’ has potential to explain
and predict the developments of the politics and social change, to incubate alternative ways to
meet and deal with social, economic and political challenges, and to impact the lives of real
people in the here and the now.
In principle, in the European political thought, regardless whether one looks at the
theoretical rise of the notion, or at the practical implications, it is not simple to isolate a single
European concept on ‘civil society’. If in theory the idea is used in multiple, conflicting and
contradictory ways, then in practice it is as well confusing and depending much on the
understanding of the context and conditions in which it is used.
2.3. Civil society – the EU perspective
At European level, a discourse on the involvement of civil society has emerged in the
1990s and has been endorsed ever since. With the debate about societal participation beyond
the nation states becoming “mature, increasingly fine-grained and sophisticated”
34
, EU
faced “a long way to go in trying to accommodate the frequently divergent interests of [the
32Stephenson, C., Ibid.
33 Edwards, M. op.cit.
34 Steffek, J., Kissling, Kl., Nanz, P., eds., Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
23
social partners]”35. Civil society participation had become “synonymous with good
governance”, in Michel’s wording36 (Helene Michel is a political scientist at the University of
Lille and researcher at the Groupe de Sociologie Politique Européenne). It was supposed to
improve the democratic process of decision-making and to bring citizens closer to European
institutions, thus tackling the so called ‘democratic deficit’ that was deepening than never.
Participatory democracy via societal inclusion, that is representative for the level of integration
‘from below’, as it is for the vigorous relationship between the Union’s structures and its citizens,
was considered as a favorable addition to representative democracy and entered EU
documents such as the European Commission 2001 White Paper on European Governance.
The Paper initiated the reinforcement of ‘a culture of consultation and dialogue’ in European
governance and could be seen as a prelude to formalizing civil society inclusion in policymaking process.
Later, the document was supplemented by 2002 Communication “General Principles and
Minimum Standards”. Furthermore, article of the Constitutional Treaty draft of 2004
specified that “the Union’s institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular
dialogue with representative associations and civil society” (article 47-1). A new generation
of EU consultation regime was set up, characterized by the principle of ‘participatory
democracy’, officially recognized also with the Lisbon Treaty. 37
Such a development make it clear that civil society was figured as proper ‘remedy’ whose
conceptual ‘vagueness’ was not presupposing any established institutional definition but
rather allowed varying notions. So that, the European Commission accepted “all-embracing
definition that integrated trade unions, employers’ federations, business associations, NGOs,
CBOs (Community-Based Organizations) and religious communities”.38
The Commission normally applies the following characteristics in its classification for
NGOs – ‘voluntary’ character, non personal profit aimed; ‘distinguished from informal or ad
hoc groups by having some degree of formal or institutional existence’; ‘independent, in
particular of the public authorities’; ‘not self-serving in aims and related values’.39
35 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., eds., Civil Society in Asia, Ashgate, 2003
36 Michel, H., Incantations and uses of civil society by the European Commission in Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.
37 Michel, H., Ibid.
38 Michel, H., Ibid.
39 Commission Discusion Paper, “The Commission and Non-govermantal organizations: Building a stronger partnership”,
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/ngo/docs/communication_en.pdf
24
Barbara Finke, scholar at German Hertie School of Governance, writes that the EU
civil society “is composed of voluntary groups, organizations and associations which
articulate the variety of societal voices in the EU multi-level system”. 40
From the CSO network perspective, particularly the one of Civil Society Contact
Group, a platform consisting of number CSOs operating within EU, the organizations of civil
society “represent their members and constituencies on a political level by lobbying political
actors on specific issues, by collecting information and channelling it between the national
and EU levels, and by building their network’s ability to participate in the European
process”.41
In “Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance”, Jens Steffek and
Partizia Nanz, researchers at Centre for European Law and Politics, University of Bremen,
concentrate on the democratizing potential inherent to a civil dialogue for the European
governance. The scholars consider the participation of the CSOs in the EU to be prosperous.
On one hand, because by participating in political debate, which transcends the nation states’
borders, non-state actors may communicate wide range of new issues, interests and concerns.
On another hand, they contribute to the emergence of European public sphere in which
“policy choices are exposed to public scrutiny”. Civil society actors collect and disseminate
information about, and critical evaluation of, international governance that enable the social
partners to engage in informal political debate. Organized civil society, claim Steffek and
Nanz, has the potential to function as a ‘transmission belt’ between a European citizenry and
the institutions of EU governance. 42
EU instituions
Collect information from EU
↓ ↑
Take concerns to EU
Inform wider public about international politics
←
→
CSOs
Inform wider public about political alternative
Pass on information to interested citizens
↓ ↑
Gather citizens concerns
Citizens
(Modified figure - CSOs as transmission belt between EU, the citizenry and the public sphere: a normative model)
40 Finke, B., Civil Society Participation in EU Governance, Living Reviews in European Governance, 2007
http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2007-2/
41 Civil Society Contact Group, "Making your voice heard in the EU - A guide for NGOs", 2006
42 Steffek, J., Kissling, Kl., Nanz, P., op.cit.
25
Nevertheless, argue Alhadeff - president of the Platform of European Social NGOs and Wilson - editor and publicist - the discussion about whether NGOs are effective in
changing policy, i.e. in directing the political process, is another story. The civil society,
represented by its organizations, has “no direct part in the political process, but rather act[s]
as catalyst of public opinion”. Civil society is, therefore, looking to increase its ability to
transmit information and opinion between the citizens and the EU authorities.43
Beyond the definitions, the practical embodiment of the intensifying partnership
between the EU and NGO sector is most evident in the European Commission’s financial
support to the non-governmental segment on broad range of issues, from policy dialogue and
policy delivery, to project and program management, both within and outside the EU. In the
launched in 2000 discussion paper “The Commission and Non-governmental organizations:
Building a stronger partnership”, it is estimates that over €1.000 million a year is allocated to
NGO projects directly by the Commission, mainly in the field of external relations for
development cooperation, human rights, democracy programs, and, in particular,
humanitarian aid (on average €400 million). Other important allocations are in the social
(approximately €70 million), educational (€50 million) and environment sectors. Altogether,
hundreds of NGOs in Europe and world-wide are receiving funds from the Union.
Consequently, the Commission highlights “the continued importance of high levels of public
support for the role of NGOs”. 44
Founded on the theoretical ground provided by the Western political thought, the EU’s
conceptualization of civil society proves itself occasionally dim and disputable even within its
own frontiers. This particularity, consequently, affects the EU’s reflection of the problem
when the Union gets to transmit its model beyond borders.
Although the insights, that have been presented so far, demonstrate the complexity and
delicacy of the European usages and are associated in contemporary forms of civil society, to
insist on their universality would be ‘arguable’ and ‘inadequate’, as Wayne Hudson claims. In
an article included in the book “Civil society in Asia”, the Professor of philosophy and history
at Griffith University, Australia, finds that often the European literature and practice fail to
observe great variety of cultural models existing and, thus, “confuse Western configuration of
43 Alhadeff, G., and Wilson, S., European Civil Society Coming of Age, Global Policy Forum, 2002 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31558.html
44 The Commission and Non-governmental organizations: Building a stronger partnership, op.cit.
26
civil society with civil society per se”. Such a trend does not tend to lead to ‘responsible’
sociopolitical analysis or ‘mature’ attempts to promote political and social reform. 45
As much of the framework for discussion of civil society comes out from European
cases, it does not translate easily to political, economic and social conditions in Asia. Weller
emphasizes on two problems that are symptomatic. The potential of traditional groups,
especially those based on old communal ties or those less formally institutionalized, is
ignored. Also, the idea of societal hierarchy reflected in the groups’ organization, is not well
perceived. As a whole, approaching civil society matter that concerns Asia requires rethinking
the assumptions about the opposition between state and society.46
2.4. Civil society for China
While exploring the notion of the civil society as it is perceived by the Chinese, one
gets the impression of a major discussion going on in the existing sources on the matter; a
debate referring to a questionable agreement between Western ideas of public participation
and Chinese capacity/leaning toward accepting the former.
To illustrate the stated, we use Heberer’s article “Creating Civil-Society Structures
Top-Down”, where the author, who is Professor of Politics of East Asia at University
Duisburg, sees the Chinese perception of civil society notion differing conceptually from the
Western. In Chinese the terms used for civil society are
the urban sphere, and
gongmin shehui,
shimin shehui,
which refers explicitly to
meaning ‘society of public people’. In other words, the
Chinese concept focuses upon the responsibility of the citizens in terms of “public goods and
good behaviour”. Evidently, to keep up with this definition, the civil part should not present a
model that poses a challenge to the state. Indeed, the stable ‘interconnectedness’ between state
and society is not proper prerequisite for the status quo to be dared. The Economics Professor
at Hong Kong University of Science & Technology Ding Xueliang, quoted in the article,
ascribes to this relationship the expression ‘institutional amphibiousness’ that illustrates the
two-way infiltration, as the societal associations are closely connected with party and state
structures, but also party and state institutions can be influenced by these associations. The
Western concept of civil society has a hard time to accept this interconnectedness. By
insisting on civil society’s autonomy it misjudges the effects of state-society interaction. 47
45 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., op.cit.
46 Weller, R., op.cit.
47 Heberer, Th., Creating Civil-Society Structures Top-Down, in Changing Images of Civil Society, Routledge, 2008
27
If aiming comprehension, it is worth proceeding by tracing the inception and
development of the Chinese civil society notion. For that, I benefit from Kin-man Chan’s,
Professor of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, contribution to the volume
“Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia“. China’s economic reforms since
1970s, which have been focusing on restructuring the economy while maintaining political
stability, have noticeably changed its economic structure, and social and political arenas,
bringing to the country ‘post-totalitarian regime’ (Linz and Stepan 1996 in Chan).
Accordingly, the “social space for people to associate among each other in the pursuit of
common interests and values” expanded and thus provided possibilities for the public sector
to advance.
Since the 1990s ‘social organizations’ are allowed to play “[an] active and
autonomous role in linking the Chinese state with business, social and cultural sector”,
aiming eventually to achieve ‘the three selves’
self-support
(zizhu, zili, zili).
(sanzi)
– self-governance, self-management and
In 1998 Ninth National People’s Congress ‘intermediate social
organizations’, social structures to mediate between individuals and the state, were promoted
“to enhance the development of market socialism”.
However, the state encouraged the development of the ‘third sector’, as it could assist
in implementing a new form of social administration and to provide alternative way to solve
social problems and needs. Additionally, the ‘third sector’ also “creates ‘social capital’ in
terms of trust, norms and social networks” that the state and market are unable to provoke.
But, the Chinese government understands that public participation could become independent
force that obtains potential to threaten the regime, as the 1989 Tiananmen Square events
(political protests that escalated to thousands of deaths) showed, and therefore imposed strict
legal and administrative controls over these groups, to ensure cooperation from them and to
minimize eventual danger. Such restrictions result in number difficult-to-define variations of
societal organization.
NGOs might exist in China in the form of ‘registered intermediate organizations’,
which are legal established groups “mediating among members within certain sector of
society, as well as between sector and the state”. There are three types of registered groups,
according to Chan –
 ‘social organizations’ (shehui tuanti), registered under Regulation on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations (1998) and defined as non-profit organizations
voluntarily established by Chinese citizens to pursue common goals;
28
 ‘non-profit organizations’
(minban feigiye danwei)
registered under the Provisional
Regulation on the Registration and Management of Mass Non-enterprise Units (1998)
and defined as organizations providing not-for-profit social services. They include
organizations like schools, social service agencies, museums, etc.;
 the third type includes foundations
(jijin hui)
registered under the Management Method
of Foundations (1988). It is defined as ‘mass not-for-profit organizations that exercise
management over funds’ with Chinese or foreign origin. They assist the development
of scientific research, education, social welfare, etc. (Zhang 1995).
Besides the registered groups, there are two types of NGOs that are not registered with the
civil authorities.
One variation is ‘patronized intermediate organizations’
(guakao)
that are sheltered by
official government, private or social units. They either limit their scoop of activities within
the certain unit, or, if find themselves unable to meet registration requirements, seek to avoid
the strict procedure and regular inspections. Nevertheless, the subsidiaries can be under strict
scrutiny from their umbrella organization.
Another
type
is
‘unregistered
intermediate
organizations’
that
are
mostly
nongovernmental and illegal. Such organizations can be: ‘traditional groups’ and ‘advocacy
groups’ supported from communities and local authorities and thus not in need to obtain legal
status; ‘loose friendship or regional organizations’ that refuse to become formalized; and
‘underground organizations’ whose existence may be prohibited by the authorities. 48
The reason that the Chinese government tolerates such groups is because it uses them to
help meet the emerging social and economic needs. This, however, is not to say that the state
is not cautious that they might turn into challenging independent political forces.
Preventively, the state employs some guarantees. According to the Chinese party-state
regulations, specified by He Baogang, associate at East Asia Institute, each social
organization is required to obtain formal approval by registering with the appropriate
department of the Social Affairs Ministry. In order to do this, the organizations must connect
with government agency or department, working within similar field, which becomes
‘superior’ or ‘official sponsor’. By that, only a limited number of representatives are chosen
in each administrative sector. 49 This shows that the Chinese government is promoting a form
of social administration similar to what is defined by some as ‘corporatism’, “a system of
48 Chan, K., The development of NGOs under a post-totalitarian regime. The case of China, in Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia, Routledge, 2005
49 He, B., The Making of a Nascent Civil Society in China, in Civil Society in Asia, Ashgate, 2003
29
interest representation in which a limited number of constituent units are created and
recognized by the state as monopolizing representatives of their respective sectors”. 50
The exact number of CSOs existing in China is unspecified and some authors give
considerably differing data. However, if we wish to talk numbers, we could look at the
official national report of China to the UN Human Rights Commissioner: “China
encourage[s] NGOs to play a full role in promoting and protecting human rights with over
400,000 NGOs currently registered. They [are] active in such fields as poverty alleviation,
health, education, environmental protection, and the safeguarding of citizens’ rights, and
have a growing influence on China’s political and social life.”51
It is noticeable that there are no CSOs exclusively recognized as being concerned with
individual or collective civic-political rights, as well as that the official rhetoric does not
demarcate NGOs and CSOs.
Hence, the idea of semi-civil society should be introduced. As probable solution to the
ongoing debate that deliberates on whether a civil society has emerged in China and whether
the Western conceptualization of civil society is applicable to Chinese conditions, He
Baogang proposes the ‘more nuanced’ notion of ‘semi-civil society’ that is more suitable if to
understand the progress of associational life in China. In Chinese terms, social associations
are ‘banguan banmin’ - half-official, half-nonofficial. The autonomy of the organized civil society
is ‘merely a matter of degree’ (Gold 1990 and White 1994 in He) that in the Chinese spectrum
varies “from relatively independent, to semi-dependent, to overlapping with the power of the
state”. The characteristic ‘overlapping structure’, within which “state corporatism coexists
with elements of civil society” leads to a distinction of “enduring pattern of relations between
state and society”. This model connects civil society with the state in such a way that the
development of the former depends on the power of the latter. This relationship involves
interdependence, which, to some extend, empowers civil society. It may obstruct a radical
transition to democracy, as the ‘simplistic view’ points out, but “it may also provide pressures
and checks on the state if members of civil society play an acceptable role within many levels
of the polity”. 52
Chan brings to our attention one of the most difficult problems faced by the Chinese
NGOs, namely, lack of funding. Pressed by this very first need, some organizations are
consciously willing to exchange their autonomy in order to secure themselves resources and
50 Chan, K., op.cit.
51 http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/CN/A_HRC_11_25_ CHN_E.pdf
52 He, B., op.cit.
30
thus acquire ‘semi-official’ character which will “open the access to direct subsidies or
political connections”. This can be read in the sense that the state sets the access to subsidies
as back-up control of its relationship with the civil sector.53
The constrained financial situation is reinforced by what Sharon Liang, contributor to
China Rights Forum, points as ‘financial requirements for registration’, according to which
national level organizations must have on their disposal a minimum of 100,000 yuan, while
local organizations must have at least 30,000 yuan in order to complete the procedure. This
occurs to be an obstacle that many organizations could not overcome. 54
Moreover, the social organizations find it difficult to raise funds from donations due to
lack of civic consciousness and lack of will from the state to provide tax deduction or other
institutional support that holds the people back from making donations. Some oppose to this
opinion the evolving trend expanding middle class and private sector to become significant
source for funding. This is supplemented by widening of participation in voluntary services.
This tendency would mean a qualitatively new direction in civic participation in China we
could be witnessing in the future.
Meanwhile, another trend is getting clear, there are organizations that as being
‘resources driven’ seek for funds from their communities and overseas. Hence, some official
and semi-official associations are turning into nongovernmental to achieve this purpose.
When it comes to funding coming from developed countries to Chinese NGOs, is
worth mentioning that twofold process has been going on, concerning the role many
international NGOs have played in the Chinese development. As a major player in most
crucial international issues, China has become the focus of many international NGOs
(INGOs), so a process of localization of international NGOs and of internationalization of
local organizations, has been observed. In sum, foreign NGOs have made substantial
contributions in financing the establishment and maintenance of many NGOs in China
ranging from women’s issues, environment, poverty, education, to public health and so.
Except for the direct beneficial effect, this funding has also been preventing some
organizations from having to turn themselves into semi-official organizations, or even has
inspired the reverse process. Foreign support as well improves the NGO management by
sponsoring training programs for expertise personnel and by pushing China’s NGO sector to
53 Chan, K., op.cit.
54 Liang, Sh., Walking the Tightrope: Civil Society Organizations in China, China Rights Forum, #3, 2003,
http://www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.3.2003/Sharon_Liang.pdf
31
meet international standards in their procedural, accountability and transparency systems. 55
The relations between international organizations and local ones are marked by increasing
expectations for gradually occurring change from ‘providers-receivers’-type relations to
partnership. In the light of this, despite of the local groups’ continuing need for support from
INGOs, they are no longer the objects of general capability building, as the analysis will
subsequently prove especially in regard with the support coming from EU.
To wrap up I would use some recent findings about civil society belonging to
contemporary Chinese scholars and studiously collected in the paper “30 Years of Civil
Society”.
Considering China’s realities, Wang Ming, director of Qinghua University NGO
Research Institute, comes to the conclusion that “the Chinese civil society has become an
indispensable ally and partner of the institutional reform, with considerable public space and
influence in public governance and service”.56
To what extend this statement resolves the dilemmas ‘Has the long-awaited civil
society come into being in China’ and ‘What characteristics does it bear’? From historical
stand, the Chinese progress “in establishing public space and individual freedom” is
undeniable. Furthermore, Kang Xiaoguang, Professor of Regional Economics and Politics at
Renmin University of China, notices that the societal sector has gained some obvious Western
characteristics. For example, there are many new organizations launched at grassroots level;
the organizations are more autonomous and structured; the resources come from both home
and abroad; the scope of activities are wider; more focus is placed on participation, equality
and voluntary activities.57 And still, this transformation has certain Chinese particularities.
“The overall role of the … organizations in reflecting people’s position, in balancing interest
groups power, especially in representing the interests of the less-privileged groups, and in
empowering citizens, is limited.” (Jia Xijin in Fu) Many NGOs tend to directly meet social
needs, and to join activities in the name of philanthropy, instead of initiating and guiding
public policies.
According to the more moderate estimate of the EU, stated in China National
Indicative Programme 2005-2006, “civil society in China is still weak but is expanding”.
Most NGOs are considered performing “less of a policy advocacy role and more of a social
55 Chan, K., op.cit.
56 Fu, T., 30 Years of Civil Society, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2009
57 Fu, T., Ibid.
32
service and support role”, which is justified with ‘regulatory intricacies’ and ‘poor
understanding of the importance of a balanced relationship between the state and civil
society’. Nevertheless, the Union notices ‘political signs’ that a greater role for civil society is
increasingly being recognised. The Union considers ‘institutional weaknesses’, ‘the search for
replacements of disappeared familiar organisational structures’, and ‘an increasing awareness
of civil society’s role’ to have facilitated the inception of ‘an increasingly autonomous civil
society’ that “provides valuable support to disadvantaged groups and have actively
contributed to preventing social unrest”. 58
3. Analysis
3.1. Methodological approach
What we have been doing so far was collecting ‘material’ so that we could enrich the
fabric of the text. On the next operational level we employ some theoretical sets in order to
lay down a conceptual background, on which the analysis will be carried out.
We use theories as a means to gain an a priori understanding of the phenomenon under
examination. Therefore, to select appropriate ones, we should appraise how much and how
efficient they can explain particular facts and processes. This guarantees that put to the test in
the empirical reality, the chosen theories will vindicate their assumptions. However, the
extent to which the theories justify the assumptions reflects their proximity to reality without
necessarily to prove them all right or all wrong. And even though they are not expected to
provide full explanation of the phenomenon, yet they are expected to satisfy those gropings of
ours while through the perplexity of the issue.
Our selection of theories is due to the factual richness of the matter and to the
theoretical complexity required for entering the analytical stage. The theoretical framework of
the thesis incorporates the systems of liberalism and of communitarianism, as introduces the
latter as a critic to the former. In fact, having been through multitude of resources, concerning
China’s societal pattern, we gained the impression that a discussion between these two
theoretical forms is notably interfering both the Western formulations for China’s societal
realm and the Chinese response to the imposing of Western theoretical sets. Additionally, as
far as China is concerned, no theoretical embracement that pretends to be explanatory for the
58 National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China, op.cit.
33
Chinese context could be entirely free of the dominant Confucian tradition. This interweave
seems to be needed since by unfavourable conditions one or another theory remain with partly
unrealized potential; and also in order to overcome setbacks one theory encounters while
trying to apply in diversified surroundings where the problem arises.
Hence, the theoretical set-up of this paper follows throughout the interweaving of their
key assumptions, conceded relevant to the matter of concern, in its attempt to further
supplement the research. In the light of this, we position the theories at the entrance of the
analytical section so that they could channel the haunting expectations in a discourse we
would want to form and follow eventually.
The subsequent analytical section will benefit from the empirical worth accumulated
while establishing the leading postulation of the project, namely - the execution in priority
area ‘Support to Civil Society’ has been inconsistent and has eventually led to shift of the
priority’s objectives. Moreover, the analysis takes into consideration the theoretical findings
made previously, which facilitate our understanding of the theme. Accordingly with the
expressed insights, the text proceeds to its next stage attempting to compile various objectives
that all can be seen as causes for the disruption. Those are exhaustively presented on the
pages below and they are meant to be looked at as compound parts of a common reasoning.
More precisely, we would ask the reader to imagine, let us say, multitude of ‘dots’,
gravitating in the space – these are our assumptions. As drawing lines between them, they can
be connected, so that they form various combinations, i.e. particular assumptions get
combined and create reasoning, explaining the studied process. However, the shape of the
combinations is given by the one holding the ‘pen’ and depends very much on his/hers
approach, purpose and viewpoint.
This exercise could figuratively show our intention to make numerous claims about the
reasons that have led to disturbance of the cooperation process. Unavoidably some of these
claims will reveal the EU as the one more responsible for the disruption; while some others
rather blame it on the Chinese side. Must be underlined, however, that this distinction does
not aim to compare whose guilt is greater. Because, as getting relatively clearer at the end, no
single factor precedes over others, but they all take part in the final outcome.
3.2. Theoretical framework
To draw some hints about how the theoretical frame will be introduced, we need to
declare that the following chapter is largely constructed on the ground of Daniel A. Bell’s
34
compilation entitled “Communitarianism” and published in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. The choice of this source is due to Bell’s prominence in theoretical research,
specifically in the field of the communitarian theory and its justification in withstand to the
liberal theory. Besides torn by these two systems, Bell’s study is very much influenced by the
theory of Confucianism, as in this case Confucianism overlaps with number of communitarian
statements.
In Richardson’s wording (James L. Richardson is Professor of International Relations
in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University) the
“liberal international relations theory relates to democracy and peace, commercial
liberalism/economic interdependence, and international institutions and regimes. The first of
these highlights the significance of the absence of war between democratic states, the second
the positive consequences of commerce and interdependence, and the third the increasing
role of international institutions.” These liberal values get discredited in unfavorable social,
cultural and/or economic conditions, which may turn formal democratic institutions
practically ‘meaningless’ and distort the setting for realisation of liberal values.
Challenged, the existing liberal theory is ‘unable to realise [its] potential’ within the
frame of the contemporary international relations. “This can be ascribed to the narrowness of
its focus [to the version currently promoted by Western governments,] and its insistence on a
total separation between the empirical and the normative.” This explains the necessity of
rethinking the meaning of liberalism in a ‘globalising’ world characterised by extreme
economic inequality, social tensions and vindication of cultural differences; and the need of
answering the questions ‘whether and how liberal values can at all be realised in such a
world’. 59
The dilemma of liberalism played a role of incentive for inception of the
communitarian theory. It is given to have begun in the 70’s as number of political
philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael
Walzer offered an alternative to the liberal theory. Citing Bell, in the system of
communitarianism certain core claims could be distinguished: 1) methodological claims about
the importance of tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, 2) ontological
59 Richardson, J., Critical liberalism in international relations, Working Paper, Australian National University, 2002, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02-7.pdf
35
or metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self and 3) normative claims about the
value of community.
1) The first argument is in defence of the cultural particularism vs. the universalism of
the liberal theory. Communitarians oppose the perception of universality of ‘the standards of
justice’ (Rawls) to the apprehension that these standards must be found in forms of life and
traditions of particular societies and hence they depend on particular contexts.
The theory of communitarianism argues the self-perception of the liberalism as the one
political alternative all rational people should ascribe to if they had opportunity. Although,
over the years, the Rawlsian liberalism admits (1993) that it ‘may not be exportable at all
times and places’ and acknowledges existence of ‘decent, well-ordered’ societies that are
justifiable in the international realm, this still remains to be regarded as a second best to be
tolerated and perhaps respected, but not idealized or emulated.
However, 1980s communitarian critique of liberal universalism could not fully
promote the vision of non-liberal societies, since they did not provide any attractive ‘counterexamples to modern-day liberal-democratic regimes’.
By the 1990s, the serious troubles facing the developing world gave a ‘sober’
assessment of the difficulties of implementing liberal practices outside the Western world.
And yet, the liberalism sees them as ‘an obstacle that may delay the end of history when
liberal democracy has finally triumphed over its rivals’, but will not challenge its ‘ideal’.
But the challenge did emerge – came from the East Asian region. In the 1990s, the
notion of ‘Asian values’ provoked the ultimate Western civil and political freedoms. The
‘system’ of ‘Asian values’ opposes the ‘chaotic and crumbling’ societies of the West to the
family and social harmony in the East, with the implication that the West should think twice
about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting human rights and democracy. Asians are
certain that they have ‘little doubt that a society with communitarian values, where the
interests of society take precedence over that of the individual, suits them better than the
individualism’ (Lee Kuan Yew in Bell). China in particular looks all set to become an
economic and political counterweight to the hegemony of Western liberal democratic values
in international fora.
However, Bell insists that the theoretical debate on Asian values has not been really
confronting to the dominant Western political setting, but rather ‘a ploy’ used by authoritarian
Asian governments in attempt to justify their rule. Of course, it would be ignorant to neglect
various contributions from East Asia that challenged the liberal universalism from the
position of their own cultural traditions:
36
 cultural factors can affect the ‘prioritizing’ of rights in different societies;
 cultural factors can affect the ‘justification’ of rights, which should be justified from the
inside, from specific examples and argumentative strategies that East Asians themselves use
in the moral and political debate;
 cultural factors can provide moral foundations for ‘distinctive’ political practices and
institutions.
Realizing this, the communitarianism foresees the need for ‘cross-cultural dialogue’
(Taylor 1999) between representatives of different societal traditions, who rather than argue
for the universal validity of their views, should imagine that their own beliefs may be
mistaken and this way learn from each others' ‘moral universes’.
2) Going back to the core claims of the communitarianism stated above, we now
continue with the next argument - the debate over the self.
The communitarian theory deems the liberal conception of the self as ‘overly
individualistic’ in its assumption that the individuals are mainly concerned with ‘shaping,
pursuing, and revising’ their personal life-plans and thus disregards the genuine need of the
individuals to define and constitute themselves ‘by various communal attachments (family
ties, cultural belonging, religious tradition, etc). Therefore, the communitarianism announces
that the politics should facilitate sustaining and promoting of ‘the social attachments crucial to
our sense of well-being’.
This, furthermore, clarifies the third major string of the communitarian thought –
3) The Politics of Community
A second wave of 1990s communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and William Galston
turn to a more practical political dimension, which is meant to stop the erosion of communal
life in an increasingly fragmented society through enhancing social responsibility and
promoting community-oriented policies. Bell is definite that the modern welfare state ‘with its
universalizing logic of rights and entitlements’ has undermined family and social ties in civil
society by assigning excessive obligations to communities. Thus, the author concludes,
‘community is valuable’. So, the Western societies try to sustain and promote various forms
of communities through civil society participation.
Bell’s insights are esteemed to the present research as the author analyzes the
‘substantial overlap’ between the philosophies of communitarianism and Conficianism. As he
37
points out, they both appraise the importance of associations among the people as well as
‘stress the importance of education and non-coercive modes of moral education with legal
rights as last resort fall-back mechanisms’. However, although the communitarian theory was
conceived in the individualistic West, it can still supplement the rich and diverse local
philosophy as reminds it that its assumptions may be more appropriate in certain spheres than
in others. One reason can be that Confucianism’s contemporary relevance has been
questioned by ‘its apparent endorsement of immoral practices and patriarchal values’.
Nevertheless, some core Confucian values - commitment to the family, to the material wellbeing of the people, to meritocracy in education, and this-world outlook - may be more
beneficial for modern societies than many other philosophies.
The communitarianism may contribute to solve Confucian limitation to ‘the family as
the only (or main) catalyst for moral learning’ as introducing the civil society as a space for
moral education, all the more that Confucians agree that it is possible and desirable ‘to extend
family values outside the family’.
Another aspect is that the Confucian emphasis on meritocratic rule by the most
talented and virtuous members of the community may discourage political activity on the
sufficient part of citizens. So, Confucians can look to communitarianism for insights about
values and practices that allow citizens’ contributions to the political process.60
Embraced in so established theoretical frame, the project proceeds to the stage of
essential analysis of the causality that brought the EU-China cooperation process in area
‘Civil Society’ to disruption.
3.3. Analysis
Following the lead that has been initiated with introducing various perspectives on
civil society, we open the analysis, elaborating on the irreconcilably differing concepts
between the West and the East. Hudson reminds that the European political, economic and
social theories need to be applied ‘with great caution’ in Asia. European theories, being
constructed in the distinctively emerged Western civil societies, cannot be simply transferred
to Asia, where societal structures are in a process of being formed. However, the author does
not say that the European background is not relevant or in some sense ‘illuminating’. But, any
concept exported to another country should give an account of the particularities of the
60 Bell, D., Communitarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/
38
country concerned. It cannot be assumed that the civil society is ‘democratic per se’ or
‘desirable per se’. It may be mistake to impose ossified Western notions of public and private,
state and society, sovereignty and autonomy into the analysis of contemporary Asian political
and economic life. Moreover, there is no genuine ground to take some traditional associations
(kinship, racial or religious organizations) out from the conception of civil society, especially
that ‘universal requirements’ to subordinate civil society with ‘modernity’ or modernization
or capitalism or ‘bourgeois society’ are proving unjustifiable.
61
In the Chinese context, specifies Herberer the civil society is viewed as the emergence
of public sphere beyond the party-state where the state plays an activating role for ‘latent civil
society’ top-down. Thus, a public space within which people may pursue their interests exists
only in a restricted way. A civil society requires structures and institutions and the Chinese
party-state is facilitating these prerequisites in order to solve major social and political
problems. This does not automatically lead to a vigorous civil society, but may enable
democratic structures and thus the transition to civil society in the future. This is to claim that
besides Western concepts, there are other existing ‘settings’ in which civil society could be
built. In support to this, let us remind Heberer’s claim that Chinese social and political
conditions differ from these of the Western countries. In China we find strong interweaving
between state and society and the party-state not only integrates the existing associations into
bargaining process but also strictly controls them. In reverse, the society via its associations
infiltrates the state and thus initiates ‘processes of change’ and socio-political advance. 62
In order to cooperate with Chinese CSOs, it is necessary to know their particular
characteristics, especially, as neither in China or in Europe the term ‘civil society’ has fixed
meaning. This reflects a major obstacle to promote Western concepts. The main difference to
Western applications of that term is perhaps the rejection by Chinese authorities of the
democracy potential civil society bears. They do not want to see the application of the term as
describing citizens’ autonomous movements which could challenge their authority. Therefore,
the four aspects of civil society as described by Merkel, Director of the research unit at Social
Science Research Center Berlin, and Lauth, Professor in political science at the University of
Würzburg, – the protection against state arbitrariness (Locke), the support to rule the country
by law and checks-and-balances (Montesquieu), to train citizens as well as political elites in
61 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., op.cit.
62 Heberer, Th., op.cit.
39
democratic thinking, solidarity and participation (Tocqueville) and to institutionalize a public
space for critical discussion (Habermas) - are not applied in the Chinese context.
The officially accepted Chinese understanding of civil society is not focused on a statesociety dichotomy; it rather sees civil society organizations as innovative social forces which
help to shoulder responsibilities in accordance with the state. According to Kang Xiaogang
the government uses them to meet the society’s needs and therefore as a functional substitute
by additionally replacing the Western connotation of civil society as citizens’ society. 63
The prominent political scientist and sinologist Pye argues, that Chinese rules of
civility have elaborate standards of personal civility, but they are weak in the areas of
impersonal interaction; Chinese have vivid standards for superior-inferior relations, but few
guidelines for the behaviour of equals; and they demonstrate over-sensitivity to any sign of
antagonism, which is a serious obstacle to any legitimisation of political competition.
Nonetheless, China’s NGO community, no matter how ineffective it is judged to be from the
standards of an “authentic” civil society of a liberal democratic style, does in general have
democratic implications in challenging those traditional rules of civility and non-liberal brand
of social capital. 64
According to Feng Zhongping, Professor and Director at China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations’ Institute for European Studies, the difference between
EU and China mainly exists over political freedoms. These differences have not been caused
by different ideologies, but by different cultures and different stages of socio-economic
development. Human rights are still a luxury for developing countries. China’s culture on
human rights is not the same as Europe’s. China will look for its own style of democracy.
China will probably not have multiparty democracy, but it will pay more attention to its
people’s wishes.65 In this sense, the democratising impact of the Chinese CSO community
may not seem significant if one applies the dominant analytical model often used when
discussing civil society’s contribution to the process of democratisation. But, claims the
Professor in International Relations in East Asia Chen, the “semi-civil society” has its
democratising implications. Just the ultimate threshold is too high in the Chinese case, for
which a more realistic but still meaningful perspective should be adopted. 66
63 Fu, op.cit.
64 Pye, L., Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: three powerful concepts for explaining Asia, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1999
65 Feng, Z., lecture at BICCS, http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/index.php?id=158
66 Chen, J., Transnational NGO Community in China, China Perspectives, 2006, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document3083.html
40
The spectrum of this perspective should be set accordingly with the degree to which
an autonomous civil society is a civilization demand for the Chinese development.
Due to the manner the Chinese social realm is built in, the necessity of ‘active’ civil
society is not realized as imperative. It is difficult to assess the importance of enhanced
participation and associational life for a civic culture in China due to the practice the state to
function as a ‘political architect’. It is the state, Heberer continues, that fights the lack of civil
consciousness and heightens the emergence of civic culture (forms of voluntary participation,
civic awareness, a sense of citizens’ duty and a public spirit of the people). He goes even
further claiming the party-state to play a role of a ‘teacher’ who teaches skills of participation
in social affairs and therefore sets the structural frame for civil society. 67
In this sense, the ‘semi-official groups’ seem to be alternatives to NGOs and should
not be overlooked, simply because they do not fit the Western conception of NGOs. In fact,
one study argues that many of these semi-official groups are embedded in civic culture, while
many autonomous or illegal groups lack social consciousness.68
The lacking urge for ‘autonomous’ civil society is explained by Freeman and
Geeraerts, researchers at Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies, with the different
focus of Chinese governance. “China has … stuck to this simple truth that economic and
social rights have precedence over civil and political rights. Other rights can be enjoyed once
the basic rights have been fulfilled, and China has still barely advanced beyond being in a
position to satisfy even all of the rights to subsistence, hence to focus discussion on the rights
to which Europeans give priority is premature at the very least.” It is obviously, therefore,
that the Chinese government has not put democracy and respect for human rights on top of its
list of priorities. 69
The prediction worth of mentioning is that in the long run, the future of NGOs in
China rests on how the Chinese people understand the importance of civil society in
preserving and promoting their values, rights and interests, to solve public issues that are
beyond the reach of the state and families and to help begin the transition to democracy.
As depicted in Annex 9, Chinese Civil Society Index Research was carried out by
NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University from 2003 to 2005 to assess the status of civil
society in four dimensions, namely the structure, environment, values and impact. The results
show characteristics of limited citizen participation, low levels of CSOs membership, and
67 Heberer, Th., op.cit.
68 Hudson, W., op.cit.
69 Freeman, D., and Geeraerts, G., Europe, China and the Expectations for Human Rights, BICCS,
http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/Asia%20papers/20100130%20%20Human%20rights%20final.pdf
41
limited organisation of CSOs in networks, umbrella and apex bodies and the inadequacy of
resources.
Generally speaking, the circumstances for CSOs operations have not seen any substantial
change, and thus the effect of their participation and the sustainability of their social
influence, are yet unclear.70
However, as Fu Tao - Editor of the Chinese language edition of China Development
Brief, publication that aims at promoting the development of Chinese civil society - claims,
scholars hold different opinions on whether the Third Sector will influence China’s future,
whether the civil society can serve as an independent governing and binding power which
cooperates with the government and the market. 71
As previously established, in China the capability for develop such civil society
capacity, which could be adequate counterpart to European partners is absent.
Recalling Heberer, China is still in a process of both state- and institutions- building of a
rationalized socio-political system. There is a ‘strong lack’ of civilizational competence, i.e.
deficiency of a complex set of rules, norms and values, of a law system and civil liberties.
Among people, groups and organizations there is a lack of respect for the law, a mistrust visà-vis authorities, deficiencies in terms of institutionalized rules, etc. In such atmosphere, the
state exercise an overpowering control and monitors and restricts the activities of its citizens.
We can, therefore hardly expect the existence of an ‘autonomous’ civil society, even less to
place it as a conditionality over cooperation. Nevertheless, although it is debatable whether
under authoritarian conditions civil society structures is likely to thrive, the real question
should be whether key patterns of a civil society can also evolve under different political
systems. 72
Tao Jin, civil society researcher, takes on another perspective. He stresses that “the
development of civil society organizations is not only restrained by the government’s power
space, a more important factor is the organizations’ structural ability to cooperate.” Due to
insufficient bottom-up power, grassroots organizations cannot achieve an effective balance
70 NGO Research Center, SPPM, Tsinghua University; Civil Society Index Report for China: Executive Summary; 2006;
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_China_Executive_Summary.pdf
71 Fu, T., op.cit.
72 Heberer, Th., op.cit.
42
with the government. The government’s strong dominance and the internal lack of abilities of
the NGOs are two sides of the same coin.73
Hence the observation, that the Chinese CSOs are structurally unable to
adequately answer EU’s conditionality. Plus, the organizations with state participation are
designed to implement party-state’s political discourse and at that follow the official line.
Thus, fulfilling outer conditionality may confront their mission. On the other hand, the partner
also realizes this side of the common cooperation and acts reluctant towards. Due to the sociopolitical structure in China, Chinese CSOs do not deal with the most significant social and
politically sensitive issue areas such as human rights and the free movement of labour. Thus,
any autonomous citizen groups are predominantly concentrated in what the authorities deem
as less threatening areas of social service provision, economic development, gender equality
and domestic violence, environment, migrant workers, children, disabled persons and animal
protection. The restrictions on the nature and scope of domestic CSOs naturally translate into
the transnational relations between Chinese and European groups. Thus transnational projects
of Chinese CSOs cannot occur in any politically sensitive issue area and cannot work for
political change.
Julia Bentley, who manages an US Ford Foundation’s NGO capacity-building
program in China, does acknowledge that Chinese societal actors nowadays can acquire a
significant niche for themselves in the authoritarian state; and by addressing social problems
to achieve political implications. And yet, the principal challenges encountered by Chinese
CSOs in influencing policy relate to their unstable status and immature nature, to the Chinese
government’s variable willingness to consider the views of those outside government in
policy matters, and to the relative novelty of civil society actors attaining roles in representing
constituencies. Chinese CSOs thrive in a political and regulatory environment that in many
respects is not supportive for development of a vibrant civil society and is fenced within the
country’s political system, which can hardly be influenced by the limited impact the CSOs
create. Although, it seems accepted fact that development is not possible without including
participation of interest groups in the political reforms, the Chinese organizations are far from
welcomed advisors to the governmental bodies. In China, CSOs have not reached a stance of
being able to deliver independent, critical and reliable background information and policy
proposals of great significance.
73 Fu, T., op.cit.
43
And whereas relatively few Chinese CSOs define their objectives in political terms,
the crucial question for the European NGOs remains and sets their determination to work for
civil society capacity building - whether the results from the exchanges influence policy
making at the end of the day and whether adequate NGO participation is possible.74
The lacking commitment for the implementation of the priority activity from Chinese
side is a direct consequence of the Chinese CSOs concept and practice but also of some
additional reasons that are to get further clarified. In order to accomplish this, we use the
reasoning of Sausmikat and Fritsche in the paper “Civil Society in European-Chinese
Relations” in their attempt to identify the reasons for the sluggish exchanges between
European and Chinese societal organizations.
Chinese CSOs do not refer to Europe or European states as a reference point for
their aims. It is generally assumed that except for some academic and business associations,
there is not Chinese CSOs which exclusively deals with European issues. To back up this, the
first Chinese policy paper on the EU appeared in 2003, whereas the first EU one goes back to
1995. This unequal treatment is also mirrored in the perception of the EU by Chinese CSOs.
For Chinese CSOs, the EU is only perceived as one among many donors, and in this function
as one whose application procedures are among the most exhaustive and lengthy. 75
Additionally confusing, the blur European CSOs administration, haunting somewhere
around the complicated labyrinth of EU bureaucracy, entangles the Chinese counterpart and
further burdens the cooperation. As Daniela Irrera, researcher at the University of Catania,
writes, in the EU system, the concept of CSOs appears ‘extremely flexible’, as it presents
diversified in nature interests pursued with similar methods of pressure and dialogue with EU
institutions. There is a strong presence of organizations variously organized and willing to be
heard in traditional issues, relevant for the social dialogue within the European system, as
well as in issues, which represent ‘beyond borders’ interests.
The EU political arena is spread over several levels of government, involves various
capacities and a high quantity of actors, and follows very complex procedures. This perplexes
CSOs’ engagement in political participation, representation, and accession to the decisionmaking processes of the Union and correlates with the civil society capability to influence the
external policy of the EU. However, the growing participation of NGOs in distribution of
74 Bentley, J., Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2004,
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/art_1.htm
75 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.
44
foreign aid is part of the NGOs struggle for ‘effective international actorness in world
politics’.76
Having said this, a reasonable question should follow - Do Chinese CSOs really have
an interest in EU-China relations? And another point - they have received many diverse cooperational and funding opportunities through the EU - but operating within a system that is
considerably closed up for CSOs activities, do they get to have make a use of these
opportunities?
Even leaving this aside, we have to take into account also Chinese civil society may
turn to be a already taken niche since various cooperations already exist between US
governmental and societal organizations and Chinese associations. They carry out research,
hold seminars, and disseminate publications on security, governance, legal reform, energy and
environment. Hemant Kumar Adlakha, Professor at Centre for Chinese & South East Asian
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, claims there are many groups outside China pushing
for democracy within the country. Most are based in the US, often supported by private
American foundations, and many include prominent Chinese exiles (Kumar in Chen)77. So,
the EU’s influence needs to be isolated from that of the other international actors.
European politics and EU policy in particular as well as European civil society and its
organizations do not perceive Chinese CSOs and their positions in a sufficient manner.
Sausmikat and Fritsche’s findings help us to proceed revealing some problems of the
cooperation between Chinese and European CSOs.
The researchers generally state that the overall interest of European NGOs in China is
not really big, hence, EU conducts contradictory policy towards China. The growing
societal attention to China contrasts with the limited number of European NGOs whose work
concerns China. Organizations from different interest areas do not have an explicit focus on
China but rather apply an international perspective. As a result, aside from funding
organizations and the big multinational organized NGOs, only a few have regular connections
to organizations from the mainland. One reason Sausmikat and Fritsche find in the fact that
internationally working European organizations traditionally concentrate more on Latin
America and Africa. Not to forget that the most of the European NGOs are very EU-focused
or concentrated on national policies. Also, there are no cross-cultural associations dealing
with China, which could support a better understanding between the parties. Besides, some
76 Irrera, D., EU and Civil Society: the Case of NGOs and Humanitarian Intervention; http://www.globalpolicy.org/
77 Chen, J., op.cit.
45
internationally working European NGOs are very distant when it comes to deepening the
dialogue with Chinese organizations, the interest in inner-Chinese developments seems to be
insignificant. The reasons can vary - could be the work overload of the staff working in
European NGOs that makes them hesitant to deeper involvement, or, could be the little
amount of cooperation due to the fact that it is unknown how to develop contacts and
cooperation.
In the light of this, another barrier is the lack of knowledge about the peculiarities of
the Chinese CSOs. The EU organizations establish cooperation contacts with Chinese
branches of world-wide groups or limit themselves by following ‘the herd type of model
cooperations’ with one and the same organization in the same region. On the grassroots level
do exist some informal dialogue contacts, especially in the field of human rights and labor
exchange. But on the European NGO level, dialogues with Chinese networks are not
sufficient up to today.
There is small number of activities organized by NGOs with China-focus on the
European level, apart from the already established 24 official sectoral dialogues. Not to
underestimate another fact - the coordination and communication among European NGOs is
also ‘weak’, in scholars’ wording. The diverging views of the European societal groups on
China may be responsible for this. One reason may be the lack of active partner organizations
in China. Another could be the dim transparency of the negotiation process inside the
European institutions. Whatever it is, it is clear that among EU’s and China’s societal
organizations besides short-time sporadic collaborations based on project-basis, long-term
partnerships or networks practically do not exist. Also, inside each EU-member state NGOs
with China-focus do not exchange experiences or develop a common strategy. Sausmikat and
Fritsche explain this by the specific history of social movements in Europe that still influences
the ideologically different European NGO landscape.
Depending on the areas of interest which European CSOs belong to, they have their
specific relations to the state and political institutions. This could get them bound politically
or financially and could assign certain objectives to their work. This is to mark the NGOs
positioning between social advocacy and assigned governmental responsibilities.
A threat for European NGOs is the semi-incorporation into EU consultation processes.
By functioning as advisors for European policies for China, this could contradict with the
initial role of critically monitoring existing policies or mobilizing the public. Thus, also on the
European side, there is the danger that NGOs will be incorporated into national, inter- and
46
trans- national politics. This line of thinking could explain why the European NGOs may be
reluctant to cooperate with Chinese side.
The history and the organizational status justify different working strategies for
different types of European organizations. They have different goals, differing assessments of
China and thus, differing working methods. A common denominator is their reluctance to be
considered supportive to the party-state regime.
The NGO scene in Europe fails in a kind of ‘Chinese dilemma’: shall the NGOs engage in
“underground work” by cooperating with ‘illegal’ Chinese associations or shall they risk
being involved in collaboration with GONGOs? And, is that really a matter of preference,
since in some areas it is unavoidable to work with certain GONGOs? It is important aspect
that GONGOs can eventually help the cause of Western NGOs. For example, the Chinese
Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), which is the body that most of the foreign
NGOs have to cooperate with, is officially a NGO. At the same time, it performs as a control
organ channeling all the foreign money, contacts and project into a semi-state institution.
On the other hand, if the critic voice, inherent for NGOs, gets misinterpreted by the officials
as an attack on their authority, they could set hurdles for NGOs’ work or pose a danger for
Chinese partners.
But again, a non-confrontational cooperative approach which takes into account the
contradictory development in China, could lead to accusations in Europe that this type of
cooperation only strengthens the Chinese government, but restricts and thereby betrays the
self-determined goals of the organizations. Even just a possible risk, this already does not
match with the conception of “giving the weak a voice” and thus shift the objectives
European NGOs are thought to be working for.78
Making a use of the findings in the report "European NGO, China and the European
Union’s policy on China: Civil society perceptions, approaches and perspectives under the
microscope", we stipulate that the EU’s policy on China is contradictory in its fluctuations
between economic and political interests, between economic calculation, human rights
rhetoric and substantive human rights initiatives. There are many contradictions even in the
field of economics. European civil society organizations are challenged to find answers to this
multiple contradictory situation.79
78 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.
79 Workshop Report "European NGO, China and the European Union’s policy on China: Civil society perceptions, approaches and perspectives under the microscope":
http://www.eu china.net/web/cms/front_content.php?idart=432
47
Anyhow, one thing is evitable – ‘the civil-society capacity establishment’ is not a
subject EU could allow itself to worsen its relationship with China over and it will not
become the bone of contention between the parties. The Union does not seek
confrontations with China, but rather prefers conformism on issues that do not concern its
‘mercantilist’ interests. So, the European actors pledge on trade and development policies to
work as a “powerful tools for promoting reform … [and] contributing to better governance
through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures”. (European
Security Strategy)80
Kin-man Chan makes us familiar with the difficulties, which accompany the
cooperation between European and Chinese counterparts. For the Chinese organizations,
cooperating with Western NGOs often can be problematic, since the foreign presence is
equalized with foreign influence. The Chinese government believes that Western NGOs are
contributing to an unfavorable image of China among its population, concerning subjects such
as human rights, or China’s ecological footprint. The utility of transnational exchanges can
also be argued for their role in diluting traditional nationalistic restraining sentiments by
offering pluralistic alternatives. Cooperation between societal organizations is considered ‘a
way of attacking China's domestic policies or even of undermining China's domestic
stability’. Being very insecure in dealing with Western NGOs, Chinese government also bears
suspicions of European NGOs influencing national or European policies in a negative line.
This is viewed as a tactic for criticizing China's domestic conduct or a strategy aimed at
forcing China to comply with EU’s foreign policy preferences.
Thus, Chinese CSOs are constantly being confronted with the fact that their Western partners
follow their political agenda of a system change, and are unable to accurately judge the local
circumstances; which places the Chinese organizations under enormous pressure.
Foreign subsidies to these CSOs are welcomed as long as they do not fundamentally
disrupt the strict legal and administrative measures the state imposes to control the sector.
This also depends on whether the Chinese government trusts these foreign foundations and on
China’s changing foreign policy discourse. The government has witnessed the global
mobilization of both Falun Gong and Tibet’s independent movement and keeps a close watch
80 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., China and Europe: The Myth of a Postmodern World, Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2007,
http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/documents/Asian_paper_Holslag_Jonathan_and_Gustaaf_Geeraerts_2007_China_and_Europe.pdf
48
on beneficiaries receiving foreign assistance. The downside of this support from global civil
society is that CSOs receiving foreign support risk suspicion from the state. 81
To this another pitfall for CSOs’ cooperation has to be added – conditionality, which
is posed by the EU on its counterpart. Fritsche illustrates the questionable effectiveness of
such conditionality with a recent call for proposals for "EU-China Civil Society Dialogue” by
EuropeAid, the institution in charge of EU development aid. The goal of this call is to support
the development "of a structured ongoing dialogue between European and Chinese civil
societies". The activities envisioned intend to encourage what is described as an "increasingly
vibrant civil society sector in China."
On close inspection is evitable that we can hardly speak of a European-Chinese
dialogue when it concerns only the situation in China and does not involve the European side
as a subject. Even contrary, the EU’s call for proposals idealizes European civil societies,
presents them as role models, and limits "dialogue" to the development of civil society in
China. In this vein, it states, "The Chinese civil society is facing challenges that were familiar
to its European counterparts in the past, and would greatly benefit from lessons learned from
the EU side while looking together with EU counterparts for a Chinese version of approaches
used." 82
It can be generally said that the Western partners are often not interested in small pilot
projects, but rather want to see fast and considerable results. On the other hand, such
expectation cannot be covered by the mostly smaller independent Chinese NGOs, or by many
of the Europeans.
Politically even more problematic is that such calls for proposals fail to take the
difficult situation of Chinese NGOs into consideration. They do not have only difficulties in
dealing with the modalities of financial reporting required by the EU – a constant source of
complaints – but also face the question of whether they can afford to take a public stance by
participating in such a proposal. 83
From what has been said so far, we would like to deliberate some more on the matter
of Europe’s ‘egocentrism’.
In the publication “China and Europe: The Myth of a Postmodern World”, Holslag
and Geeraerts, researchers at Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, claim that
81 Chan, K., op.cit.
82 Fritsche, Kl., EuropeAid: Civil Society Dialogue between Europe and China a False Promise, 2010-06-01, http://asienhaus.de/public/archiv/statement-call-eu-china.htm
83 Fritsche, Kl., Ibid.
49
Europe believes it represents ‘the [superior social and political] model China should aspire
to’. An article in the Maastricht Treaty states: “The Union is founded on the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law
... [and its] one boundary is democracy and human rights”. Europe assumes that China must
aim for the same goals if it wishes to develop in a sustainable fashion. The European
Commission continues: “China today is experiencing challenges which Europe started to
tackle a number of years ago… The EU is demonstrating its willingness to share this
experience with China. And China has the interest ‘importing’ parts of the ’EU model’ in
these areas”. This message is reinforced by Mr. José M. Barroso’s, President of the European
Commission, compulsory advice: “We are of the opinion that the further improvement of
human rights, good governance and the rule of law and the development of a strong civil
society are key elements for the sustained success of China's reform process” (Barroso in
Holslag and Geeraerts). 84
Anyhow, argue the authors, it is unrealistic to deem that Beijing will conform to
Europe’s discourse. Moreover, being categorized as a state, for which the national interest
exceeds the ‘internationalism’ trends, China is by no means tempted to meet European
expectations. Robert Cooper, British and later EU diplomat, argues that Europe ‘must learn to
live with the idea of double standards’ (Cooper in Holslag and Geeraerts). 85
All the more that EU has no power positions to impose conditions on China.
Western Europe apprehend itself as an attractive partner with a proper sense of values, but it
is becoming increasingly difficult to market these values abroad. Especially as from a Chinese
point of view, as declared by Dr. Jian Junbo, International Studies Professor at Fudan
University, the EU does not weigh as heavily as China had expected it to do in the
international affairs nor satisfies China's major interests in many areas (such as the
establishment of a more equitable economic order, recovery from the global financial crisis,
climate change and the environment, and nuclear non-proliferation), so Beijing is reassessing
the importance of Europe for China's strategic interests.
Compared with East Asia and the US, the EU's contribution to China's economic
growth and scientific and technological advancement, has become increasingly less important.
As for security concerns, the EU's influence is not significant perhaps due to the geographical
84 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.
85 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., Ibid.
50
distance between Europe and China and the relative lack of historical and cultural ties.86 Even
the economic dimension of the relationship is uncertain indicator, since, in Holslag and
Geeraerts wording, Europe’s economic influence decreases because other countries are
intentionally fine-tuning their policies in accordance with their expectations vis-à-vis China.
This way an important diplomatic tool is lost and the last sign of European power seems to be
‘the soft power’, or rather ‘the art of seduction’. 87
It is generally accepted that the EU’s ability to exert a direct and concerted influence
on China is now limited as well as the fact that any such effort may be counter-productive. In
the light of this, it appears clear that the criteria to judge about the influence of European
NGOs concerning the China policy are very much idealized. Many European NGOs would
wish to be as influential as they were thought to be by some Chinese officials.
However, Dr Jian organizes the objectives influencing the Sino-Europe relationship
into two categories - functional conflicts and structural conflicts.
In general, functional conflicts derive from substantial, temporary or urgent issues that
can be solved through bargaining or cooperation between the EU and China. These include
the trade imbalance, competition for economic and political influence in Africa, the EU's arms
embargo on China, recognition of China's market economy status, and issues such as
technical standards, etc.
Structural conflicts, on the other hand, relate to the field of culture and values, and
here there are long-standing divergences that affect the China-EU relations. These will likely
persist, and no dialogue is able to solve those avoiding complications. Meanwhile, the
functional conflicts will be irritated since the structural cannot be handled properly.
Both China and Europe have ancient civilizations, and each cherishes its own values
as embedded in their political systems and foreign policies. However, while the EU wishes to
expand its values to the rest of the world - including to China - Beijing resists any spread of
so-called "universal values" by coercion. Given some bitter historical chapters in its recent
past, China strongly believes in political and cultural independence. 88
Listed in an interconnection with the disturbances in priority area ‘Support to civil
society’, none of these objectives could be proved as distinguishably more responsible for the
86 Jian, J., China sizes up EU's new face, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KL03Ad01.html
87 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.
88 Jian, J., op.cit.
51
unfavourable result than the others. They all gravitate around some hypothetical assumptions:
for failure of the concept of the priority due to irreconcilable differences in the
conceptualization of civil society by both parties; or for failure in the implementation by the
institutions entitled, by the groups involved, by the approaches used; or for failure caused by
lacking commitment of the actors, regarding how they value eventual benefits of the
cooperation, etc. Anyhow, on the sides of this paper, every hypothesis would be partial by
itself but more comprehend in a combination, because the factors do not exceed each other,
but rather interfere in each other.
4. Finale
4.1. Methodological approach
For a finale of this elaboration on the causality that justifies the disturbance in area of
cooperation ‘Civil society’ we intend to accomplish few steps which will lead to closure of
the research. At first, we evaluate the employed theories as operational tool that has helped us
approaching the topic. This goes in accordance with the overall appraisal of whether the
execution lived up to the expectations, as postulating project’s mission.
The final part of the project will further tend to unfold two complementary to one another
dimensions of the study that has been carried out. On the one hand, the section will aim to
evaluate the project’s scientific worth to add to the clarification of the EU-China cooperation
in a specific area. By presenting notions considered most relevant and adequate to the
problem, the paper fights for its informative value. Beside that, by enlightening about the
reasons for disturbance, the texts gains more functional worth – to envisage path forward. We,
furthermore, touch upon some ongoing developments in the cooperation in the area and finish
with an open end that leads to further discussions.
4.2. Warts and all …
The chosen theories, moreover the method of complementary application, incorporate
passably within the analysis and prove to be fruitful in explaining actors’ behaviour. In the
dispute between liberalism and communitarianism China’s firm prioritizing of some values
over some others gets elucidated. China’s ‘Asian values’ could oppose ultimate Western civil
52
and political freedoms in international fora, which proves that even if a social composition
has another connotation in other conditions, it still might obtain moral foundation for
disparate political practices and institutions. This additionally explains why there are
difficulties implementing Western societal patterns outside the Western world. As much as
this strikes the deeply influenced by the liberal political tradition EU, it also grounds troubling
misunderstanding. This is what communitarianism offers a cure for – a cross-cultural dialogue
between the moral universes of the partners – is the recommended future prospect.
Besides, the communitarian theory clicks well with the non-individualist nature of the
Chinese citizens and the type of society they build and further elaborates on the ‘politics of
community’ where individual obligations are transferred on the community instead of on the
family – also a trend in the Conficianism of 21st century. In the light of this, Conficianism
could look at communitarianism for some more insights about values and practices that allow
citizens’ contribution to political process.
Altogether, even though the theoretical frame satisfies us, there are still dimensions it
could not cover. A more throughout examination of Confucian thought would have had strong
explanatory power for the Chinese context, which would have interpreted better the logic in
Chinese society and its inclination to associate. However, considering the scope limitation,
namely to focus on seeking the rational behind disrupted cooperation in a specific area, such a
profundity was not necessary.
While approaching the subject, its expected outcome was narrowed to the intention of
disclosing number of objectives that stood behind the disturbance of EU-China cooperation.
Additionally, it would have added worth as capturing some of more distinctive findings
made in the field by experts from both European and Chinese background and this way it
would have clarified, as far as we understood, an understudied branch of the overall
cooperation between partners.
We believe, the paper accomplishes its initial stipulations and moreover gives us
foundation to envisage some future prospects.
In the post-Lisbon treaty era, Jian Junbo does not see the EU's position likely to strengthen
when it comes to negotiations and cooperation with China. China and the EU will continually
face functional and structural conflicts. In this situation, to make concrete steps towards a
53
strategic partnership, both sides should build mutual trust at political as well as at societal
level. 89
What is clear for now is that Brussels is stimulating contacts between European and
Chinese business people by means of numerous conferences and several business schools. It
is estimated that 60,000 Chinese students were enrolled at European institutes of higher
education in 2005, who then go back to China with a clearer insight into European society. 90
Barroso goes with this line, claiming that: “[a] fundamental task is precisely to broaden and
deepen cultural understanding by fostering people-to-people exchanges … [T]he success of
our engagement depends on understanding - on holding an open dialogue, and learning about
each other and from each another.”91
Learning partnership requires networking and exchange between the parties
concerned. European NGOs should foster the intensification of debates and therefore
contribute to transmitting an image of China that takes into account the contradictory
development within the country. This requires not only to work on but with China. The
exchange of representatives of CSOs from China and Europe must be promoted. Still more, it
is important to include discussion regarding European responsibilities towards developments
in China with respect to social and ecological standards and human rights. All this has one
incentive – working for mutual understanding. This is characterized by Sausmikat and
Fritsche as endeavour to ‘walk on a tightrope’. It takes much effort to consciously realize the
possible problems and confront them, instead of just withdraw. But in return, collaboration
with Chinese CSOs can be of great benefit to both sides. 92
On Chinese side, according the Heberer, new rules of social behaviour will have to be
learnt and internalized. A public sphere, which exercises control on the state bodies, a process
of ‘civilizing’ the way of dealing with co-citizens, and a state which treats its citizens
respectfully are still lacking.
However, it is recognized by the researchers that improvements have been made,
mainly due to party-state inability to operate all societal tasks, thus it is encouraging
engagement in social activities as activating citizenship top-down and accepting the formation
of private associations. Propagating the notion of ‘citizens’, which bears the connotation of
legal and participation rights, is a trend that is very needed to be followed. 93
89 Jian, J., op.cit.
90 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.
91 Barroso, J. M., Peoples of yesterday, peoples of tomorrow: 35 years of EU/China relations, Tsinghua University Beijing, 30.04.2010
92 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.
93 Heberer, Th., op.cit.
54
The increasing globalization will make necessary for both parties to enhance their
bilateral relations through coordinating responses to contemporary issues related to global
governance, particularly issues such as climate change, international terrorism, the global
financial crisis and reconstructing the world's economic order. At this, the civil society matter
should not be overlooked. Because, as Edwards writes, civil society is ‘collective action’
across society that provides counterweight to individualism; civil society is ‘creative action’,
which moderates the cynicism infecting the political sphere; and civil society is ‘values-based
action’ that balances between the overwhelming influence of state authority and the
temptations and incentives of the market. And even though the notion of civil society does not
provide ‘the tidiest of explanations or the most coherent of political theories’, it still remains
‘compelling’. Because it enables the best in us – the collective, creative and values-driven
core of the active citizens - to create societies that are ‘just, true and free’.94
94 Edwards, M., op.cit.
55
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