TALIBANIZATION AND TERRORIST ATTACKS
IN THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP):
THE LOCAL POLICE RESPONSE AND SOME
RECOMMENDATIONS
Paper Presented At
“VOICES ON AFGHANISTAN: AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT”
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS-SAN ANTONIO (UTSA)
USA
JANUARY 15 - 17, 2008
FASIHUDDIN (PSP)
Deputy Commandant,
Frontier Reserve Police (FRP) N.W.F.P, Peshawar (Pakistan)
Phone No: 0092-91-9210566 /9210060
Cell: +92-300-5954055
Email: fasih68@hotmail.com
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
INTRODUCTION

SUICIDAL ATACKS__AN ESTABLISHED WEAPON

ANTITERRORISM RESPONSE __SOME SHORT AND LONG-TERM MEASURES

Mobilization and Re-allocation of Existing Paramilitary and Reserve Forces

Research and Religious De-Programming at Hot-Spots

Arrangement for Immediate Judicial and Legal Remedies

Poverty Alleviation in Tribal/semi-Tribal Areas

Coordination Amongst Intelligence Agencies

Establishment of National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)

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THE LOCAL POLICE–CONSTRAINTS AND RESPONSE

ANNEXURE
A
Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) Operation-Leading Events (JanJuly 2007)
B
American and Pakistani Statements
C
Organizational Structure of NCTC, Islamabad
D
Information Process of NCTC, Islamabad
E
Military-Cum-Police operation in Swat (Malakand Division): Leading Events

ABOUT THE WRITER
TERRORISM–A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING
POLICE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM–A COMPARATIVE STUDY
TALIBANIZATION AND TALIBAN INFILTRATION INTO THE SETTLED DISTRICTS OF
NWFP
AGREED POLITICAL SOLUTION
IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL MILITANTS
POLICE AND RELIGIOUS HARMONY
REMOVING CONCEPTUAL AMBIVALENCE OF US THINK-TANK VIS-À-VIS PAKISTAN
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
TALIBANIZATION AND TERRORIST ATTACKS
IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP):
2
THE LOCAL POLICE RESPONSE AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
(A)
INTRODUCTION:
Terrorism, though vaguely defined, is a now a ‘glocal phenomenon’ ___both global and local.
Pakistan as a country of ‘first line of defence’ has greater contribution in the ongoing ‘war on terror’ in
Afghanistan and in the adjacent tribal territories of Pakistan, called FATA1___ Federally Administered
Tribal Agencies. Taliban is a plural word meaning ‘the students of Islamic seminaries’ called
‘madrassahas’. After the withdrawal of the then USSR forces from Afghanistan and after the inter-necine
war and factionalism of ‘Mujahideen’ (the fighters), the students of Islamic schools rose to power in
Afghanistan. However, instead of promoting human rights and working for the development and
reconstruction of the war torn country, these students-cum-rulers (now collectively called Taliban)
resorted to severe and stringent administrative measures and thus aggravated the already existing friction
and distrust amongst the various religions and sects. However, their simplicity and speedy dispensation of
justice won them a good deal of reputation in the illiterate masses of Afghanistan and tribal communities
in Pakistan, who are still not exposed to the modern way of life and democracy. Taliban took on
themselves to export their own model of governance to other people and even went on war with the
western world.
Pakistan became a staunch ally of the modern world in the ‘war on terror’ and has lost more than
a thousand (1000) army personnel in chasing the foreign and local militants in the tribal areas adjacent to
Afghan borders. Pakistan has deployed about 90,000 of her forces to check and fight against every
terrorist activity in the tribal areas. But, due to the use of sophisticated weapons, modern communication
techniques, and after displacement from their hideouts after military operations, these religious fanatics
have started creeping into the urban cities of the country__ mostly next to the tribal areas. Their way of
life, their unbending attitude and their inhuman actions of terrorism are now known as a process of
‘Talibanization’. Pakistan has ratified/acceded to 10 out of 13 UN conventions relating to terrorism.
Pakistan is a signatory to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (Palermo
Convention). Pakistan has also signed and ratified the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism and the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism 1999. Domestically, we have
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts Act) 1992. Moreover, bilateral
agreements and MOUs are also signed with many brotherly nations.
Police in Pakistan, as a ‘first line of defence within any civil society’ are now facing a terrible and
dejecting wave of ‘talibanization’ in the urban cities of the country, especially in the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP)2, Pakistan. These terrorist activities in the crowded urban places include bomb blasting,
explosions, target killings, suicidal bomb attacks, mortar/missile attacks from unseen places and
spreading a sense of extreme insecurity in the general public through dissemination of intimidating letters
and articles by religious miscreants. Currently, I am collecting data on the sacrifices of the local police in
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). There occurred in the settled districts 44 bomb
blasts/explosions, 6 suicidal and 95 rocket launcher/missile attacks from unidentified places in the year
2006. The figures for 2007 are higher than the previous year. At the present, police, including senior
officers, are the first target of these terrorists. The terrorist attacks and sabotage activities in the tribal
areas are more severe and heart-rending with greater human and material losses but that is not the subject
of this paper.
As a law-enforcement agency, the local police are struggling very hard against this situation and
despite many resource constraints and technical weaknesses, the police are evolving a new approach to
1
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)___ total area 27220 sq.km with a total population of four million.
These agencies are seven in number, viz, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram, Momand, Bajaur, Khyber
and Orakzai. Malakand is now neither fully integrated into settled area, nor a part of FATA but a hotchpotch of the
two.
2
NWFP is one of the four provinces of Pakistan, with a total area of 4521 sq.km and a total estimated population of
fourteen millions.
(See District map of NWFP and FATA)
3
combat such terrorist attacks. The international community is requested to extend all possible help to the
local police of NWFP (Pakistan) and an empirical, analytical and comparative research is needed to fully
comprehend the current situation of ‘talibanization’ in the country. The philosophy of the ‘Enlightened
Modernization’ as envisioned by President Pervez Musharraf as an alternative choice to the philosophy
and movement of talibanization needs to be critically evaluated and explored. The local police have to
work hard; enhance their professional capabilities and mobilize and reinforce their ranks in order to put a
halt to this increasing infiltration of ‘taliban-friendly activities’ into the cities, called by a journalist as
‘the creeping coup’ of informal ‘taliban-style policing’. Police need a drastic overhauling, huge financial
support, capacity building and a realistic model of intelligence-led policing.
After these incessant and deadly terrorist attacks in the urban districts, the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies in general and the police in particular came under severe criticism from all corners,
including top government and opposition leaders. A series of mutual blaming and accusation started
amongst the various departments. The local police were not fully aware of the terrorist activities, the
conceptual understanding of terrorism and the responses, preparedness and strategies of the police in
other parts of the world, who had confronted terrorist attacks in the recent past. This paper was written for
the officers of local police department and the decision-makers and policy-planners in the provincial
government on a pattern of a situation-analysis so that they know about the theoretical underpinnings and
practical implications of the phenomenon of terrorism, especially in the context of police response around
the world. This was an educative and informative essay, which was well received by the local police
department. Many good points were taken as guidelines for internal police mobilization, allocation of
additional resources, provision of modern equipments, new recruitment, new training centers and inter
and intra agencies cooperation.
4
(B)
TERRORISM - A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING:
5
Terrorism, though still not unanimously defined3, is a global phenomenon with a variety of kinds
like religious terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, environmental terrorism, narco terrorism, international
terrorism, domestic terrorism, nuclear terrorism, etc. The term terrorism is used with many theoretical
underpinnings and with different phenomenal expressions.
“Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly
move forward to survive and indeed to succeed. Although survival entails obviating the
governmental counter measures designed to unearth and destroy the terrorists and their
organization, success is dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security
barriers designed to thwart attack. In these respects, the necessity for change in order to
stay one step ahead of the counterterrorism curve compels terrorists to change-adjusting
and adapting their tactics, modus operandi, and sometimes even their weapons systems as
needed. The better, more determined, and more sophisticated terrorists will therefore always
find a way to carry on their struggle.”
(Gus Martin, 2004)
The underlying conceptual paradigm vis-à-vis terrorism and terrorists is of increasing interest to
academics and researchers involved in the field of criminological studies. Its theoretical and tactical
contours are intensively studied and some recent empirical findings have given rise to certain hypotheses
formulation:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
First, it should be recognized that terrorism is, always has been, and always will be
instrumental, planned, purposeful and premeditated. The challenge that analysts face is in
identifying and understanding the rationale and inner logic that motivates terrorists. To
effectively fight terrorism, a better understanding of terrorists and terrorism must be gained
than has been the case in the past.
Second, it must be recognized that terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological
warfare. Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational and emotional response. The countermeasures
response should be psychological as well as physical; diplomatic as well as military and
economic as well as persuasion.
Third, as personal freedom and civil liberties in a democratic system attract the terrorists, so
the public, the political leadership and especially the judiciary must have realistic
expectations from the law-enforcement agencies that how to protect the general public
against the hidden enemies in any open and free democratic society.
Fourth, incessant recruitment and fresh induction into the ranks of terrorists, must be taken a
strong point in the long-term planning, at least to effect and influence successor generations
of would-be terrorists, even if the current generation has already been missed.
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations__ “The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)
Current U.S. National Security Strategy __ “Premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents.”
U.S. Department of Defense__ The “calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or
intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”
The British Terrorism Act 2000__ “Defines terrorism so as to include not only attacks on military personnel, but
also acts not usually considered violent, such as shutting down a web site whose views one dislikes.”
A 1984 U.S. Army Training Manual __ “Terrorism is the calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence, to
produce goals that are political or ideological in nature.”
Brian Jenkins__ “Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.”
Vice President’s Task Force__ “Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to
further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or
groups, or to modify their behaviour or politics.”
James M. Poland__ “Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the
innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an
audience.” (Quoted in Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, 2007)
3
6
(v)
Finally, terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle with its adaptability to adjust to challenges
and countermeasures. It has existed for 2,000 years and is never ending. For success against
terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent. (Gus
Martin, 2004)
The list of these ‘hypotheses’ is not ended, and with the passage of time is likely to be added with
new findings and observations. Besides variation and differences in definition and explanation of
terrorism, there are some common points in all major and minor terrorist activities. According to
criminologist Gwynn Nettler, all forms of terrorism (national/international) share six characteristics:
 No Rule. There are no moral limitations on the type or degree of violence that terrorists can
use.
 No Innocents. No distinctions are made between soldiers and civilians children can be killed
as easily as adults.
 Economy. Kill one, frighten 10,000
 Publicity. Terrorists seek publicity, and publicity encourages terrorism.
 Meaning. Terrorist acts give meaning and significance to the lives of terrorists.
 No Clarity. Beyond the immediate aim of destructive acts, the long-term goals of terrorists
are likely to be poorly conceived or impossible to implement. Terrorism that succeeds
escalates. (Frank Schmalleger, 2007)
(C)
POLICE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM—A COMPARATIVE STUDY:
The very phrase of ‘war on terror’ signifies that terrorism is generally equated with war or warlike situation, though it ranges from a major criminal behavior to a fight in the battlefield. After the 9/11
incidents, many countries changed or modified the role and structure of their law-enforcement agencies in
addition to new legislations or establishment of new units with modern and sophisticated facilities. Some
have enhanced the capacity of their regular police force and others have assigned the responsibilities of
counterterrorism to the military units, even in the western world. The modernization and expansion of
intelligence agencies got the priority in all the western/developed nations and huge financial allocations
have been made to them for their greater role in the newly evolved Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) or
Intelligence-Driven Policing (IDP) as it is now commonly known in the developed world. Examples are
many and can be looked in the available literature on terrorism, criminology, policing and organized
crime. First, I would like to quote the example of the USA, the leading country in the war on terror.
“The New York Police Department (NYPD),in response to the terrorist attacks, set up
barricades and vehicle checkpoints and mobilized heavily armed officer especially trained in
antiterrorism tactics to patrol the city. The local police must prevent the attacks and respond
when attacks occur, offering critical evacuation, emergency medical, and security functions
to help stabilize communities following an incident. The NYPD lost 23 of its officers in the
9/11 attacks. It has now created a special bureau headed by a deputy police commissioner
responsible for counterterrorism training, prevention and investigation. One thousand
(1000) officers have been reassigned to antiterrorism duties, and the department is training
its entire 39,000-member force in how to respond to various terrorist attacks. The NYPD has
also assigned detectives to work abroad with law enforcement agencies in Canada, Israel,
Southeast Asia and the Middle East to track terrorists who might attack New York City. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has announced its Taking Command
Initiative, an aggressive project to assess the current state of homeland security efforts in
the USA, which will identify the flaws in the existing security arrangements.”
(Frank Schmalleger, 2007)
Since 11 September 2001, interest in the study of terrorism has increased dramatically, both
globally and locally, and particularly in the US. I have heard of the ex-president of the American Society
of Criminology, Prof. Gary La Free, saying that ‘we are receiving a dozen of books on terrorism every
month but we do not see a good empirical research on any single terrorist attack’. (His speech to the 14th
World Congress of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA, 2005). This
7
unpreparedness in the US is still a matter of concern in the academic circles. We, in Pakistan, are also
facing extremely demoralizing terrorist attacks on the local police these days and we, too, have not done
any tangible groundwork to counter the future attacks___ technologically, professionally, socially,
politically and even religiously. The criticism against US-unpreparedness holds good for our policymakers also.
“State security agents had been aware for years of the growing problem of Islamic
extremists and Hindus and related problems in Colombia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Indonesia, or
the Philippines. And yet, nothing significant was being done about ‘terrorism’ or about the
increasing global social, political and economic issues that might have mitigated or
prevented violent confrontations such as attack on the Twin Tower. Indeed, prior to the Twin
Tower incident, despite the state’s ostensible focus on terrorism, critical research on
terrorism was in decline.”
(Annamarie Oliverio and Pat Lauderdale, 2005)
Terrorism has been a problem with other nations and the way it was tackled by them is a point of
academic interest for policy options or locating the best practices and alternatives. Even the US police
were not fully aware and equipped to respond to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the earlier anthrax boxes
and letters; neither the UK or Spain or Turkey police did prevent the attacks in the first instance.
Throughout the world, the police have never been trained or equipped to be indulged in a war-like tactics.
It is only after the ‘war on terror’ that the police are confronted with the problems and entrusted with
responsibilities of national security issues. The criminologists have now identified terrorism prevention
and investigation as a ‘core responsibility’ for some police departments and a ‘concern for all’ in policing.
Michael D.White, dilates upon this new and evolving police role for responding to and preventing
terrorism and its implications for police officers and the police department as,
“Departments have been forced to revise training, deployment, and communication
strategies and to create counterterrorism units within their departments. Police now
provide extra patrol and guard around critical infrastructures such as power plants, food
and water sources, and transportation hubs. Police departments now receive briefings
from federal authorities in the FBI and Homeland Security about potential threats and
terrorist plans garnered through electronic surveillance and interrogations of
incarcerated terrorists.”
(Michael D. White. 2007)
Another interesting example of this ‘police-awareness’ can be seen in the letter of Bruce
Glassock, former president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), who, shortly after
the 9/11 incident, wrote to the membership of the organization as,
“The United States has begun air and group strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan,
taking the war against terrorism home to its instigators. But the war against terrorism is
not limited to actions overseas, or even restricted to military actions. The fight against
terrorism begins in our own backyards-our own communities, our own neighborhoodsand police chiefs need to prepare themselves, their officers, and their communities-the
people they have sworn to protect-against terrorism.”
(Quoted in Michael D. White. 2007)
Pakistan, unfortunately, didn’t timely equip or train her police forces for these impending
challenges of terrorism. The Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) is still a dream for Pakistan, as intelligence
agencies had never developed a joint working-apparatus with the police for this purpose. Mere
Information Reports (IRs) or Source Reports (SRs) issued to the effect that ‘security should be tightened;
threats are there; sensitive points should be secured; attacks are expected; unidentified terrorists have
moved into cities, etc’, are of little practical importance to the local police. These reports will rarely tell
you who will attack; at what point; what methods could possibly be adopted by the terrorists, and what
8
precautionary measures the police and other agencies should take timely and promptly. This lack of
coordination and the quality of information ultimately result in a poor response, both politically and
technologically /professionally. Even the America’s intelligence failure was identified as a major factor in
the 9/11 attacks. L. Paul Bremer, III explicitly says,
“In the wake of the September 11 attacks, it has become clear that America’s intelligence
failure was mirrored in many other countries: more seemed to be taking enough the clear
declarations of war by bin Laden, and none was sufficiently attentive to the activities of
suspicious people. Clearly, no matter how good its intelligence organization, no one nation
alone can hope to gather enough specific information on a worldwide terrorist network.”
(Quoted in Gus Martin,2004 page-48)
The response of the police should be ahead of terrorists’ techniques. Police need an awareness of
how to enhance their operational capabilities in the changed security environment. I would like to quote
the example of Northern Ireland in this regard. Analysts of international fame have enumerated a few
lessons for the rest of the world from Northern Ireland’s conflict as:
 Authorities must pursue every effort to make political compromises with dissidents before
violence becomes institutionalized.
 Authorities cannot achieve a military victory over terrorists and still maintain civil liberties and
democratic institutions.
 Counterterror techniques by authorities that kill, injure, or frighten noncombatants provide
support for terrorist groups. Indeed, revolutionary terrorist groups depend on the authorities to
perpetrate provocation and outrages against noncombatants.
 Terrorist groups can be devastatingly effective with very few members, given the worldwide
availability of sophisticated weapons and explosives.
 Terrorist groups can sustain community support by using both the latent sympathy of citizens as
well intimidation.
 Even the most technologically sophisticated, well-organized, well-financed, and highly
motivated counterterrorist methods can be frustrated by a small group of terrorists that have
some community support.
(Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, 2007)
The above conceptual background is concluded by a remark of the same authors as,
“The world does not appear to be any safer since the advent of the War on Terrorism. We
are at war against an unknown and unseen enemy who wants nothing less than the seeming
destruction of democratic societies. Where is the middle ground? How do we get to the
point where negotiation can take place? Wars have a beginning and an end, although we
see no end to the War on Terror. With whom can we negotiate a lasting peace?”
(Page –556)
Besides the ‘war on terror’ at international level, it is noticed that enormous qualitative and
quantitative changes were brought to the US internal security apparatus. Federal government initiatives to
combat terrorism include the enactment of various laws designed to reinforce security in the United States
and elsewhere. Chief among these initiatives are the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001,
the US Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act
of 2003 (commonly referred to as USA Patriot Act II) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission), cited systemic failure and blamed that the elected and appointed government officials in
the Congress, the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the CIA, and the FBI
all failed to grasp the seriousness of terrorism as an imminent threat. The commission recommended, inter
alia, the creation of a single, high-level intelligence director to supervise and oversee 15 intelligence
agencies of the United States and an improved homeland security with 180,000 employees. But the
researchers’ quest is that all such activities and changes must address the following issues also: -
9
1. Is counterterrorism the responsibility of public law enforcement? If so, to what extent?
2. Who else is responsible for the prevention of terrorist acts?
3. What impact might centralization of the United States intelligence functions have on individual
rights and civil liberties? (P.J. Ormtemeier, 2006)
It is of interest to the readers that the 9/11 Commission was created on November 27, 2002 and
released its report on July 22, 2004. During this period, the members of the Commission reviewed more
than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 people in ten countries. The report
was compiled on 585 pages. As a comparison, we should ask ourselves whether we have the same level of
commitment, insight and academic output while looking for the causes, response and overall situation
analysis of terrorism ___of which the worst kind of its domestic wave is being experienced by the people
of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). We should also study and learn from the organizational
structure of the federal Department of Homeland Security, which started operations on March 1, 2003 and
which coordinates the activities of 22 disparate domestic agencies by placing administration of those
agencies under five ‘directorates’ or departmental divisions, namely Boarder and Transport Security,
(BTS), Emergency Preparedness, and Response (EPR), Science and Technology (S & T), Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Management.
The most important ‘First Responders’ to terrorist attacks at operational/tactical level are the
police departments, fire departments, and local and state health providers. In the United States, like many
other countries, the lack of inter or intra-agencies cooperation amongst the first responders has always
been a serious problem. Instead of cooperation, the various agencies have sought to control each other and
“to be in charge” at the scene of crime. Also information is not shared among them timely and adequately.
An officer remarked, ‘we see it [in-coordination] in every level of government. The CIA does not tell the
FBI. The FBI does not tell the NYPD, and the NYPD does not tell the FDYN.’ (James A. Fagin 2007).
However, the US initiatives at all levels significantly addressed these issues like the ones mentioned
above, and many more like the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the Joint Local-Federal
Counter Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and many informal intelligence networks. It should also be noted
that despite such larger national initiatives, the local police resources are strained beyond limits on
increased physical security infrastructures. The police officers need the training and equipment to respond
effectively and to protect themselves against the potential hazards of terrorist attacks.
“Although federal authorities have assumed much of the responsibility for preventing
another major 9/11 aviation-tape terrorist attack, the responsibility and costs of providing
everyday security to the average citizen as he or she goes about his or her business in the
city has fallen primarily on local police.”
(James A. Fagin 2007)
In addition to their ‘hearts and minds’ campaign which is directed to counter radicalization of
Muslims in Britain, strengthening moderate elements and preventing mosques from being taken over by
extremists, the British government has reorganized its overall counter-terrorism effort. Four joint police
and M15 regional offices are being established to strengthen counter-terrorism work outside London. The
Home Office is gradually losing responsibility for probation and prisons to a separate ministry of justice,
freeing it, in theory, to focus on security, terrorism and immigration. Within the department a special
office for security and counter-terrorism has been created, while the prime minister will chair monthly
meetings of a national security committee. More than 100 people are currently awaiting trial in Britain on
terrorism charges. Recognizing the real worth of intelligence in counter-terrorism strategies, the M15 is
expanding substantially, from 1,800 staff in 2001 to a projected 3,500 in 2008. Despite these measures,
Peter Clarke, the head of the counter-terrorism branch of London’s Metropolitan Police said, “the only
sensible assumption is that we shall be attacked again.” The M15’s recently departed head Dame Eliza
Manningham-Buller said in November 2006 that her service was tracking more than 1,600 known active
militants (up from 250 in 2001, according to a parliamentary report).(The Economist, May 5th –May 11th
, 2007). Researchers and scholars will soon start comparing the Spain police efforts in the post-Madrid
10
bombing with post 7/7 UK-policing and post-bombing legislation in Turkey. All such initiatives need a
comprehensive comparison in terms of their desired results.
The Saudi authorities announced in April 2007 that seven separate Al-Qaeda cells have been
busted in recent months, netting no fewer than 172 suspected operatives as well as big stashes of weapons
and $5 million plus in cash. The Economist (May 5th –May 11th, 2007) regarded the ‘sweep as stricking
in the kingdom’. But to me the most striking and beneficial move is the de-indoctrination of the jihadis.
Like Yemen, the authorities in Saudi Arabia, send scholars into prisons to try to convince jihadis
detainees that their actions run counter to Islamic jurisprudence.
The continuous fierce fighting and civil resistance against the US forces in Iraq have compelled
the commanders and policy makers to look for some other conventional but non-military intervention
which could more possibly prevent the incessant recruitment into the ranks of combating jihadists. At
camp Cropper, the high-security facility in Iraq that once held Saddam Hussein, the US forces have 3,800
detainees, 747 of them juveniles. They are given different levels of education, including de-programming
experiments and de-radicalization. The officer Maj.Gen. Douglas Stone doesn’t kill Al-Qaeda but says, “I
am trying to kill the idea of Al-Qaeda.” (Barak Deghhanpisheh, 2007). This ‘de-indoctrination and reintegration policy’ is seen in the measures adopted by the Philippines where the Abu Sayyaf group has
been fighting to create a fundamental Islamic state (in the Mindanao region, particularly the islands of
Sulu and Basilan) since 1991. In July 2007, Human Rights Watch blamed the extremist group for the
deaths of almost 400 civilians in Mindanao alone. Despite the military operation called ‘Oplan
Ultimatum’ or the CMO (the Civil-Military Operations), the Manila has moved from brutal and
overwhelming actions to a more subtle and sophisticated tactics, which has resulted in no serious attacks
in 2007. Basically, the Manila’s strategy is designed on the pattern of what Indonesia is hotly pursuing
after the Bali attacks of October 2002 in which 202 people were killed, mainly foreign tourists. Not only
Indonesia developed its underfunded, ill-equipped and poorly trained forces with the aid from the US,
Australia and Britain which included advisers, high-tech surveillance equipment and funding for training
schools, forensics and DNA-testing facilities but also established two armed counter-terrorist units,
known as Detachment 88 and Team Bomb, which are now considered as model units and have racked up
impressive arrest records. However, the greatest success is that of the significant change in behaviour and
approach of the security people and investigators. Jakarta realized it could accomplish more with a velvet
glove than a mailed fist, so it instructed police to use much gentler interrogation tactics than they had in
the past. The suspected terrorists in custody were given special treatment if they agreed to cooperate,
including money for their wives and children and phones to call home. Coercive methods like shouting,
beating and sleep deprivation were strictly forbidden and largely abandoned. The goal? To persuade
terrorists to help the police and to deprogram them from radical Islam. (Joe Cocharne, Criselda Yabes and
Marites D. Vitug, 2007)
This de-indoctrination process is what I suggest for the religious scholars of my country to go to
the tribal areas and persuade the present and potential ‘recruits’ that inflicting injuries to themselves and
others is not a religious or divine duty by any standard of religion or law. The efforts of the Saudi
authorities are laudable in this context:
“A state-sponsored ideological campaign, promoted by formerly radical preachers,
appeared to mute public expressions of support for jihadism. Police also say they
convinced some 1,000 extremist detainees to repent through religious re-education and
financial incentives. Some former radicals, including 65 released from American custody in
Guantanamo Bay, have benefited from $ 30m in state aid, including monthly stipends, cars,
dowry payments and wedding presents.”
(The Economist, May 5th–May 11th , 2007)
At times, community policing is interpreted in terms of encouraging citizens to be forthcoming
with information useful to counterterrorist measures. To sustain public partnership and advocate public
satisfaction as the basis of community policing is a real challenge for the state and local police forces
11
who are already facing a serious criticism for this terrorist-oriented mission and close association with
military and intelligence agencies which obviously accelerate their militarization and isolation. The
utility of community policing in this context has been called by one police chief as ‘terrorist-oriented
policing’ (Stephen Mastrofski, 2006). It seems that the advocates for community policing deliberately
link it with the ‘war on terror’; may be as a justification for budgetary allocations, which are not less than
billions of dollars. Hence, a new name of ‘ terrorist- oriented policing’.
Legislation should not escape our attention. It is generally noticed that tougher legislation, strict
rules and stringent policies are announced in the post-terrorist attacks. The developments in the USA and
other countries were quoted above. In the UK, a debate for new policing i.e; policing in the post 7/7
attacks has now got its place even in the text books of criminology.
Though we have copious literature on this point, for example Eugene Mclaughlin’s The New
Policing wherein a special chapter is written under the title of ‘Policing the New Terrorism.’ This chapter
dilates on the situation and intelligence statements, both the pre 7/7 bombing and the post 7/7 London
Police response. The writer elaborates the counter-terrorist protocol of ‘shoot-to-kill-to-protect’, which
resulted in the death of a 27 year old Brazilian electrician, mistakenly fired by the London police as a
suspected suicide bomber. The writer raises questions like ‘what kind of police force do we want’, and
‘what kind of police service do we want’. (Eugene McLaughlin, 2007)
However, what is more important for the researchers and practitioners is to predict and evaluate
the genuine effects of and the potential reactions to such new policies and laws. Some regard it
‘overdoing’ or ‘overreaction’ and some are pacified with the awakening of the governments and their
preparation for the future safety of their people. In either case the police are overburdened with new
responsibilities of enhanced record compilation and increased checking, patrolling, and of course, going
through the ordeals of new training and courses. The police subsequently adjust themselves, especially,
when they get more funds, new equipments and new posts or upgradation of their existing status.
However, the general public seems to be uneasy with the new developments, particularly, when the initial
phases of demanding strict laws are faded away and when they are back home or return to their usual
jobs. Legislation is of no effect when not substantiated by adequate resources for prompt implementation.
Pakistan is an obvious example of that. The new Anti-Terrorist Act of 1997 has not stopped the incessant
terrorist attacks in our cities, as noted in the subsequent pages. In May 2007, Ankara was hit by a severe
terrorist attack__not the first of its kind in the country. The police are going to ‘enjoy’ more powers
through legislation, for example, police will be able to use force against people and vehicles that don’t
stop when ordered to. The use of force will be possible without prior warning depending on the degree
and amount of resistance shown. The legislation also enables the police to take into custody those who
refuse to make their identity clear. People applying for different licences or post will be fingerprinted.
Fingerprints and photographs will be kept by the police department for 10 years. The police will also have
the authority to conduct preventive searches and use any source to gather intelligence. But all these
developments are not well received by the human rights advocates and have regarded the bill as a huge
step backward and an infringement on rights and freedoms. A former Istanbul Bar President Yücel
Saynon remarked, ‘This new authority is the same type of authority a totalitarian police state would
provide for its police.’
(Turkish Daily News, 29 May, 2007)
(D)
TALIBANIZATION AND TALIBAN’S INFILTRATION INTO THE
SETTLED DISTRICTS OF NWFP:
“A parallel system of Taliban-like administration is taking hold in many southern districts of
the Frontier province. The influence of local vigilante groups is increasing in Kulachi, a
tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank district and its frontier region, district Lakki Marwat, as
well as in the surrounding areas of Bannu. Darra Adamkhel, a semi-autonomous frontier
region about 35 kilometers south of Peshawar, which is known for its arms industry, also
appears to be sliding into the hands of militant Islamic Groups. All these groups call
12
themselves ‘taliban’ although they have no direct links to, and are distinct from, the student
militia that once ruled Afghanistan.”
(Shafiq Ahmad, 2007)
Taliban is a plural word meaning ‘the students of Islamic seminaries’ called ‘madrassahas4’.
After the withdrawal of the then USSR forces from Afghanistan and after the inter-necine war and
factionalism of ‘Mujahideen’ (the fighters), the students of Islamic schools rose to power in Afghanistan
and captured Kabul in September 1996. However, instead of promoting human rights and working for the
development and reconstruction of the war torn country, these students-cum-rulers (now collectively
called Taliban) resorted to severe and stringent administrative measures, thus aggravated the already
existing friction and distrust amongst the various religions and sects. However, their simplicity, easy
availability, tribal affinities, local familiarity and speedy dispensation of justice, initially won them a good
deal of reputation in the illiterate masses of Afghanistan and tribal communities in Pakistan, who are still
not exposed to the modern way of life and democracy. Taliban took on themselves to export their own
model of governance to other people and even went on war with the western world.
Taliban’s ascendancy in Afghanistan and the subsequent US-Nato attacks to chase Bin Laden had
tremendous implications for Pakistan and caused serious effects on the simple and religious-loving
masses of the country, who were taught in their social and academic institutions that Pakistan came into
being in the name of Islam in 1947. After the destruction of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the foreigners
and local fighters scattered into other parts of Afghanistan and are now engaged in a sort of guerrilla war
with the Allied Forces. According to Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, a former chief secretary of the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) and ex-ambassador to Afghanistan, ‘the taliban of Afghanistan should
not be mistaken with the taliban of tribal/semi tribal areas of Pakistan’. In an interview with a TV-channel
he said, ‘the taliban in Afghanistan want the Allied Forces to go back to their countries whereas the
taliban of Pakistani territories want the establishment of an Islamic polity, based on the early teachings of
Islam, with the sole aim of implementing God’s word on His earth which is characterised by the quick
dispensation of justice and bringing order and peace to the world, as it happened fifteen centuries ago.’
Their simple and straightforward way of doing things and their quick decisions and resolution of disputes
made taliban popular in the tribal and semi-tribal areas, where the general population is religious minded,
humble, and ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of their religion, honour, land and tribe. However,
their gradually forcible imposition of a certain kind of life, their unbending attitude and their inhuman
actions of terrorism are now known as a process of ‘Talibanization.’ In my view, ‘talibanization’ is a
“phenomenon of spreading religious fear amongst the civil society through misleading teachings,
horrible propaganda and armed conflict with the law-enforcement agencies for realization of a hidden
political agenda, the limit and scope of which is still undetermined.”
Though, to some extent, I agree with the analysis of Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, yet no one can
approve of the anti-state activities of such militant groups, no matter how naive or religiously motivated
they may be. Taliban and their supporters may claim it for a divine cause, but which most of the sensible
segments of the society do not agree with their claim. A journalist Shafique Ahmed, who traveled in the
districts where pro-taliban forces are gaining ground, tells the story of the overall situation as:
“In the opinion of many people, the police have lost control of the district Tank and are
confined to police stations and roadside pickets. I, too, did not see any police patrol during
4
According to the National Education Census conducted by the government for the first time in 2006, there are
altogether 13,805 madrassahas in the country, the highest number being in the Punjab. There are 1.5 million students
enrolled in them, which is like a drop in the ocean when you count the number of students in the supposedly secular
institutions-33.3 million. (Zubeida Mustafa, Daily Dawn, May 9, 2007, Islamabad). Unfortunately, Pakistan didn’t
pay enough attention to the reformation of these mushroom grown religious schools since its independence in 1947.
However, the present regime of President Pervez Musharraf has launched a series of Madrassah Reforms, including
the Amended Society Registration Act of 1860 and an allocation of Madrassah Reform Program of Rs. 5.759 billion
(US $= 92144000/-)
13
the two-hour journey. Four Taliban groups belonging to the Bhittani tribe virtually govern
Tank and its adjacent frontier region, which extends to Bannu. Each group is in charge of a
designated area and all four coordinates with each other. These groups take up criminal
cases and issue wide-ranging decrees for the Bhittani tribesmen. A similar group has also
started activities in district Lakki Marwat. Earlier this year, it even hijacked over a dozen
containers carrying goods to the allied forces in Afghanistan and has warned owners of
audio -video shops and internet club in Naurang town to close down their ‘immoral business
activities.”
(Herald, Karachi, March 2007)
“This over increasing influence and interference in local administration and even the personal
affairs of the local population, has caused many people to leave the area for some civilized place
to live. A political party activist attributed this social dislocation to the increasing number of
local taliban and the police inefficiency.”
(Herald, Karachi, March 2007)
Contrary to the government stance or the views of Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, other hold a
different viewpoint which also deserves to be taken into consideration and analysed empirically and
impartially. Najum Mushtaq puts the two viewpoints as:
“The basic flaw in the anti-extremism policies of Musharraf is conceptual. His government
officials regularly describe the Tabliban as an ‘Afghan problem’ and make spurious
distinctions between Islamic freedom fighters, especially those active in Kashmir and
international al-Qaeda type terrorists. And yet they berate domestic sectarian terrorists.
This categorization is both facile and false because all of them are chips of the same block…
Almost all the ‘jihadi’ organizations banned by the government are plying the trade by other
names. Many of them appear in the guise of charitable organizations and have earned praise
from the highest functionaries of state for their relief work after the 2005 earthquake.”
(Najum Mushtaq 2007)
A more gruesome situation is the targeted bombings of CDs shops and barbershops, and threats to
girls’ schools. Taliban firmly believe that listening to music or shaving beards is against the true Islamic
injunctions and the people, therefore, should refrain from it. Compulsory observance of burqa (veil) and
restraining from co-education are the other important points on their agenda. In an editorial, daily The
News has called this scenario as ‘The Dark Ages’. It says,
“The bombings in Charsadda and Mardan are part of a calculated and larger goal, to
eliminate the presence of ‘Western’ and ‘morally corrupt’ practices through terrorizing
and intimidating the general public. In short, it is part of the drive to Talibanise
Pakistani society…As a matter of fact, the NWFP government’s credibility would be
bolstered if it manages to check this growing Talibanisation since not doing so would
mean condoning criminal and violent behaviour. Action against fanatics is essential to
send a strong message to them that they cannot go about forcing their flawed and
pernicious interpretation of religion on everybody else. Or else we should not complain
as the nation continues to slide into the Dark Ages.”
(Daily The News, May 8, 2007)
It is because of these illegal activities of taliban and their self-styled morality imposition that has
led to severe criticism by international community. Regardless of the above discussion that whether
taliban in the territories of Pakistan are local people, or are different from the fighters against the ruling
establishment in Afghanistan, the representatives of international community are not satisfied with these
explanations anyway. They have firm belief that taliban on both sides are of the same species and have
many things in common, in terms of anti-western agenda, war tactics, training and support. Some even
link taliban to Al-Qaeda, whereas others think it too far a correlation. The views of British High
14
Commissioner to Pakistan, Robert Brinkley at the ‘Guest Hour’ programme of the Peshawar Press Club is
a typical example of the concerns of the international community.
“We do have concerns that some Al-Qaeda leaders are still able to hide in and operate from
areas along the border… There was great concern that extremists in Britain were in contact
with terrorist leaders in the border area, from where they get guidance, ideas and in some
cases training for (terrorist) operations. We had better understanding of how extremists in
Britain got in touch with terrorist leaders in the tribal region and received guidance and
training since the 7/7 bombing and the failed plot to blow up transatlantic flights.”
(Daily Dawn, May 11, 2007)
This is also an issue with the international community that how taliban in this part of Pakistan and
Afghanistan are infusing their co-religious people in Iraq and the Muslims in the western world,
especially their second and young generation. Though we don’t find any empirically tested conclusion of
this speculation, yet there is a general perception that the Muslims in the western world and the militants
in Iraq are getting inspired ideologically at least, from the fierce resistance of taliban against NATO/US
forces. Moreover, some suspect their taking control of the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals if they succeed
forcibly or democratically to capture the government, but this is just an accusation and mere speculation.
Taliban are not that much powerful to either overthrow an elected government or get themselves elected
through popular vote. Even the taliban-friendly religious government in the North-West Frontier Province
and the Province of Baluchistan will find it impossible to return to office in the general elections of 2008.
These religious parties have lost tremendous political ground due to their failure to deliver and redress the
public problems.
The Economist in its issue of April 14th – 20th, 2007 has termed Pakistan’s tribal areas as ‘a safe
haven for terrorists.’ The detailed story by The Economist is not a different one from the views of other
western writers. Initially, they had confusion between the taliban of Afghanistan and the taliban of
Pakistan, but now they have equated all taliban with terrorists. This over simplification or generalization
has led to conceptual ambiguity in some parts of the country. The public, in general, do not see the
students of Islamic schools as terrorists, and they think that perhaps the west is determined to destroy
these schools in the name of ‘taliban-cum-terrorists’ of Afghanistan. These schools provide free and low
cost education to thousands of poor people. Some observe that we should make a distinction between the
peace loving students who are poor and indifferent, and the well-trained fighters, called taliban, before we
announce a value-loaded judgment.
However, the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) debacle in Islamabad is a significant deviance in this
regard where not only male but female students of the Islamic school of Jamia Hafsa resorted to illegal
and coercive imposition of the Islamic laws in a self-styled moral policing which ultimately led to an
eight day severe military operation, giving rise to hundreds of deaths. The events of the Red Mosque are
tabulated in Annex: A which shows that how the students of an Islamic school gradually developed into
militants. This case should be analysed and a well-documented critical research is to be carried out on the
said Red Mosque, which is a sharp contradiction to the other Islamic schools and mosques.
Bruce Riedel, in his account of the recent fighting between taliban and the Afghan forces inside
Afghanistan5, has used the word taliban and Al-Qaeda interchangeably. Most of the writers now use the
word taliban as synonymous with Al-Qaeda and no distinction is made amongst the taliban of
Afghanistan, of Pakistan and Al-Qaeda. Bruce Riedel, with his 29 years of experience in the CIA and an
ex-special assistant to the President of the United States, observes no distinction between the
developments in Afghanistan and the military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This is one of the
most important debates, which needs clarification on the part of the academics and policymakers. In an
5
Taliban attacks rose from 1, 632 in 2005 to 5,388 in 2006, according to the U.S military, and suicide operations
grew from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. NATO troops held on to the major towns and cities but suffered significant
losses, including over 90 dead. (Bruce Riedel, 2007)
15
attempt to summarize all these ‘nomenclature difficulties’, I have shown the interrelationship of various
taliban and some important facts about them in the following diagram No. 1.
16
Potential control on Pakistan nuclear weapons
Effects on Muslims in the Western
World (esp. 2nd Generation)
TALIB/TALIBAN
TALIBAN OF AFGHANISTAN
TALIBAN OF PAKISTAN
•
•
•
•
•
•
Taliban in
Islamic
Seminaries/
Madrassahs
Taliban in
Settled/Urban Areas
Mostly invisible
Taliban in
Tribal/FATA/
Frontier Region
Mostly visible
IRAQ (Reportedly Reinforcement)
• Miscreants/Outlaws/Proclaimed
offenders
• Smugglers/Drugs Pushers
• Foreigners (Chechen, Uzbek,
Tajik)
• Foreign-intervention (India,
Israel, etc)
Infiltration form Afghanistan after US-attack
Pak-Afghan Border—1500 miles
Pak-Army Deployed at the border=90,000
Total check posts at various points=l 100
Military Operations against Taliban=>100
Death Toll in Operations= 1700 (600militants
+100 Tribal Chiefs + 1000 Army)
• Militants handed over to US=600
• Pakistan-Afghanistan Grand Jirga (Consultative Body)
• Govt-Tribal Treaty in N. Waziristan= Sept 2005
(Revoked on 15 July. 2007)
• Govt. Tribal militants peace Agreement in Bajaur
Agency =August 2007
• Govt. Militants Agreement in Momand Agency =August 2007
• Baluchistan/FATA — Safe-Haven for Al-Qaeda
(US-intelligence/media)
• Current operation—US - Do More Policy.
• Pakistan has ratified/acceded to 10 out 13 UN Conventions
related to Terrorism + Regional (SAARC) Convention
• Spill-over effect from FATA/Afghanistan__Creeping Coup?
• Self-Motivation for Islamic Cause & Life
• Lack of containment at urban-tribal borders by the
Frontier Constabulary (18000 force)
• Dual Administration in FATA—FR—NWFP—
(Responsibility Factor)
• Intelligence Failure—Federal & Provincial Govts
Differences
• Fear and Suicidal Attacks — Forceful infiltration
• Police — Inefficiency?
• Treaty with TNSM (defunct) leaders in District Swat-May 23,07
• Private Radio Stations by militants
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Total Madrassahs = 14000 (Registered) +
> 200,000 (Un-Registered)
Total Students = 1.5 million
Amended Society Registration Act 1860
Equivalence to other Educational System?
Disorganized/Unsystematic Education &
Administration
A case of Red Mosque in Islamabad. (July
2007)
Madrassah Reform Programme by Govt.
of Pakistan= Rs. 5.759 billions (US $= 92144000/-)
Moreover, the various reasons for taliban’s popularity in certain areas and at certain
period of time and also their de-popularizing activities are briefly enumerated in Table: I
alongwith the weapons they reportedly use in their coercive activities.
Table: I
Taliban’s Popularity Factors
Simplicity and Easy Availability
(Nostalgic Factor for AfghanTaliban)
Quick Dispensation of Justice (FR
Bannu & Lakki Marwat)
Actions Against Local Criminals
(Khyber Agency)
Restoration of Order in the
Locality
Appeal to Islamic Way of Life/
Martyrdom
Tribal Affinities/Familiarity with
the Area/Terrain
Sophisticated Weapons/
Communications/ War/Military
Experience
Support /Donations from Local
/Foreign People
Fresh Recruits from Islamic
Schools
Effective Command and
Obedience to Leaders
Capitalizing on anti-US Feelings
Periodic US Air-Strikes on Tribal
Areas__ Revenge Factor (Bajaur/
N-Waziristan Agencies)
Inflicting Casualties on Pak/USled Armies__Bravery Factor (N/S
Waziristan Agencies)
US Threats/Provocative Statements
against Pakistan/Holy Cities
Frustration of People due to
Poverty, Identity-Crisis, SocialStratification, etc
Illegal Activities Attributed to
Taliban
Targeted Killing
Explosions and bomb blasts
Missiles Attacks__from unseen
places
Forcible Closure of English
Schools
Forcible Closure of NGOs offices.
Threats, blasts and closures of
Audio-Video Shops and Barber
Shops
Warnings Against Women
Freedom/Employment/Education
Kidnapping of Govt/NGOs
Officials
Snatching of Govt/NGOs vehicles
Letters of Intimidation to
Opposition /Un-Islamic Businesses
Attacks on LEAs/Army/Police/
Intelligence Agencies
Snatching of containers and
vehicles for US/Nato forces in
Afghanistan, carrying food and
Commodities
Giving shelter to foreign fighters
like Chechen, Uzbaks, Tajiks, etc
Running illegal Radio stations for
propaganda against Govt
Indoctrinating tender youths for
extremism.
Suicide-Bombing (Human
Bombing)
Weapons of Taliban
 Semi-Automatic Machine Gun
(SMG)
 Rocket-Launcher
 Hand Grenade
 Improvised Explosive Device
(IED)
 G-3
 Explosive Jackets
 Bomb/ Remote Controlled Bomb
 Anti Tank Mines
 Revolver
 Pistol
 Rifle
It should be categorically mentioned that taliban don’t spare any opportunity to capitalize
on the sentiments against US policies. They insidiously wait for every laxity, weakness or any
provocative action like periodic US air-strikes against innocent tribal people in FATA or the
hyperbolic statements of White House aspirants of 2008 like Barak Obama. Every time, these
instigative types of words or work create ripples in the minds of illiterate, unaware and easily
susceptible people who flock around the illusionary saviour of taliban. An example of the US and
Pakistani statements, made at various levels, is given in Annex: B which indicates that how
volatile is the situation on both sides and how badly such statements can affect the public-opinion
formation, especially the threatened tribal community who otherwise have no links with the
taliban but could easily become a prey to taliban’s persuasion and propaganda.
It is at this juncture that we should not ignore the observation and analyses of Tony Blair,
ex-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. His article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, which
appeared in the famous journal Foreign Affairs, carries his critical and thought-provoking
assessment of the current debate on how to fight terrorism. His admission that the war against
18
global extremism should be won at the level of values and ideas, and ideology is really a new but
scholarly strategic approach. While praising the Holy Quran as ‘progressive’ and ‘reforming
book’, and equating ‘fanaticism’ to ‘early revolutionary communism’, Tony Blair openly admits
that the anti-US and anti-West feelings around the world should be earnestly and vehemently
countered with equally emphatic arguments.
“Islamist terrorism will not be defeated until we confront not just the methods of
the extremists but also their ideas. I do not mean just telling them that terrorist
activity is wrong. I mean telling them that their attitude toward the United States
is absurd, that their concept of governance is prefeudal, that their positions on
women and other faiths are reactionary. We must reject not just their barbaric
acts but also their false sense of grievance against the West, their attempt to
persuade us that it is others and not they themselves who are responsible for
their violence………Inaction pushing the responsibility onto the United States
alone or deluding ourselves that this terrorism is a series of individual isolated
incidents rather than a global movementwould be profoundly and
fundamentally wrong.” (Tony Blair, 2007)
Late Ahmed Nadeem Qasmi, a scholar-cum poet, said once, ‘it seems that the words are
coined from fire, the smell of ammunition is now spread by newspapers every day’. Recalling his
words said eleven years ago in a meeting with the young probationer officers in Civil Services
Academy, I took up the famous English newspaper, the daily Dawn and looked for the words of
fire and smoke. English dailies are generally more moderate, selective in news items and avoid
sensationalization, as compared to our other local papers. I checked the paper for one week and
calculated that only the front page, which is usually reserved for more important national or
international news, is full with news related to terrorism and extremism. The space and coverage
is enormous. For the readers I have noted down only the main headlines of all such news stories
appeared on the front page (Table: II). It shows, besides the severity of the events, that out of the
total 59 news items there were 20 items related to terrorist/militant activities (33.9%). The other
local dailies, undoubtedly, portray a more horrible picture than this and even much more horrible
if we consider the inner pages too.
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