Russia’s Afghanistan Debate: Managing Fear of and in the West
By Andrei P. Tsygankov1
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 60, no. 6, November–December 2013, pp. 29–41
1. Introduction
The Kremlin’s attitude toward the West has influenced Russia’s Afghanistan
policy. Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West combines elements of both cooperation and
assertiveness, and that combination is found in Russia-West relations from Europe to
Middle East. Russia has assisted the United States and Europe in Afghanistan by
providing airspace and over-land transportation, as well as authorizing joint counternarcotics operations. The Kremlin has also approved NATO’s use of an airport in
Ulyanovsk as a transit point for moving soldiers and cargo to and from Afghanistan.2
However, Russia’s political class has been divided over cooperation with the Western
nations due to phobias over the West’s intentions in the region. In the view of the former
Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin, the Western alliance remains driven by
fear of Russia. "No matter what Russia may be – imperial, communist or democratic –
they see us with the same eyes as they did in the previous centuries."3 Rogozin went as
far as to propose blocking the alliance supply routes to Afghanistan should the West
refuse to alleviate Russia’s concerns over deployment of U.S. ballistic missile defenses in
Europe.4 The more recent U.S.-Russia tensions over the Magnitsky Act also have
potential to jeopardize the cooperation over Afghanistan.5
The Russian-Western mistrust persists due to historical and cultural
developments. The constructivist theory of international relations assists us in
understanding the two sides’ relationship by pointing to the significance of “the other” in
the process of forming self-identity.6 Both Russia and the West feel uneasy about each
other’s intentions. Allies for only the brief period of the Second World War and enemies
for almost half a century, the two sides cannot overcome some of the old perceptions and
stereotypes of viewing each other as potentially dangerous. Although scholars frequently
view human actions as if they were designed to meet rationally determined objectives, it
is beliefs and emotions that define what is a “good” and “virtuous” course of action vis-àvis the relevant other.7 The post-Cold War imbalance of power served to exacerbate the
problem of Russian-Western mistrust. That the United States emerged as the world’s
superpower removed some of the older constraints for acting on perceived fears of
Russia.8 Russia too mistrusted the West, the difference being that Russia’s undermined
capabilities dictated a defensive, rather than a hegemonic response.9
Our understanding of the future extent and durability of Russia’s cooperation
depends on how accurately we interpret the meaning of the Kremlin’s actions. In
attempting to uncover such meaning, the paper explores the national and international
context of Russia’s policy toward Afghanistan. I ask why, despite the traditionally strong
mistrust in the West’s intentions, Russia has chosen to cooperate on Afghanistan. Should
Russia’s actions be interpreted as signaling the Kremlin’s ability to manage its phobias of
the West and develop a stronger cooperation over multiple issues? Or do Russia’s fears
remain unchallenged and its actions conceal a desire to win time and prepare for a
renewed competition with the Western nations? By seeking to understand Russia’s
1
perception, I study the interplay of ideas on three related levels: state-based, societybased, and international. By focusing on how officials themselves justify their policies
and how these policies are then perceived in broader social and international settings, we
have an opportunity to develop a better understanding of a particular state action, as well
as tentatively assess the chances of this action’s success or failure.10
While focusing on Russia-West relations over Afghanistan, I recognize that the
West does not fully determine Russia’s relations with Afghanistan and that Russia has its
own priorities vis-à-vis the country. In addition to counter-terrorism, these priorities
include struggle with narco-traffic and strengthening economic and cultural ties. My main
contention is that Russia’s cooperation over Afghanistan rests on shaky domestic
foundations with political elites’ overall wariness regarding the West’s international
objectives. Such cooperation became possible due to efforts by some segments within
Russia’s political class to reach out to the Western nations and the West’s policy of active
engagement. President Barak Obama’s policy to “reset” relations with Russia became
critically important for such cooperation to develop. The actions by the West, Russia’s
significant Other in the constructivist sense, assisted Moscow in managing Russia’s
traditionally strong mistrust in of the Western nations. However, Russia’s political class
remains ambivalent and the engagement may only survive and be extended to other
security areas if the West continues to act in a manner that is viewed by Moscow as
respectful of its interests in the region.
This paper is organized in five sections. The next section reviews Russia’s
Afghanistan diplomacy by identifying its evolution before and after the arrival of
President Dmitri Medvedev who emphasized the need for a renewed cooperation with
Western nations. After recording state actions, I proceed to their interpretation in the
national and international context. The next three section seek to establish the official
meaning of Russia’s actions and document their reception in national and international
settings. The final section summarizes the analysis, offers a comparison to other relevant
cases, and draws lessons for policy.
2. Russia’s Afghanistan Diplomacy
Russia’s Afghanistan diplomacy has been marked by three related developments:
a growing cooperation with NATO on counter-terrorist strategies; signals of concerns and
criticisms regarding the West’s intentions and behavior in Afghanistan; and steady
development of Moscow’s own relations with Kabul.
Growing Cooperation with NATO
Russia’s cooperation with the West on Afghanistan begun soon after September
11, 2001.11 President Vladimir Putin was among the first to call President George W.
Bush to express his support and pledge important resources to help America in its fight
Putin offered America broad support for operations in Afghanistan that included
intelligence sharing, opening Russian airspace to relief missions, taking part in searchand-rescue operations, rallying Central Asian countries to the American cause, and
arming anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan.
The cooperation continued after the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March
2003, despite Russia’s decision to oppose the war. In December 2005, Russia and NATO
agreed to a program to train narcotics control officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia
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to help stem the increased flow of drugs from the region.12 October 2010 marked the first
serious instance of counter-narcotics cooperation with the two countries successfully
conducting an operation that destroyed more than 2,000 pounds of heroin.13 In April
2008, Russia opened a transport corridor through its territory for International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) missions. In July 2009, during a summit meeting in Moscow,
Russia agreed to U.S. military fly-overs with 4,500 flights per year. Although NATO
initially relied mainly on the Pakistani route, by the end of 2011 more than 50% of the
international force’s logistics took place via the Northern Distribution Network through
Russia and Central Asia.
The two sides also cooperated on military supplies for Afghanistan. In January
2010, Russia and NATO formally resumed military ties after the interruption stemming
from Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008, when Russian Chief of Staff held talks
with NATO counterpart.14 In 2011, the United States agreed to purchase 21 military
helicopters from Russia to be supplied to Afghanistan.15 The Kremlin also approved the
transit of Afghanistan bound armored vehicles.16 Finally, in March 2012, Russia agreed
to NATO’s proposal to use an airport in Ulyanovsk as a transit point for moving soldiers
and “non lethal” supplies to and from Afghanistan. Ulyanovsk is a city in the Volga
region, the birthplace of Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, and a stronghold of
Russian communists. The Vostochnyi airport was developed for the Soviet-era Buran
space shuttle project. It remains one of the best airfields in the country and can process up
to 30 NATO cargo flights a day.17
Criticisms of the West
Despite the growing cooperation with NATO, Russia has been critical of the
alliance’s strategies in Afghanistan. The Kremlin’s criticisms have concerned three areas:
NATO plans to maintain military bases in the region, the lack of cooperation with
regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and overall priorities in counter-terrorist
operation.
The issue of Western military presence came into the spotlight soon after Russia
withdrew its objections to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s decision to grant NATO’s
request for cooperation. When Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated in October 2003
that Russia expected Western withdrawal from the region immediately after completion
of the Afghanistan mission,18 the feeling had already been widely shared within the
political establishment. State Duma factions, the media and the general public reacted
critically to the American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Retired generals,
including one of Yeltsin’s former defense ministers published a series of “open letters”,
accusing Putin of “selling out” the country and “betraying” the nation’s vital interests.
Federal Border Guard Service head Konstantin Totski issued a typical statement
maintaining that if U.S. forces remain in Central Asia after the counter-terrorist operation
in Afghanistan, “we are unlikely to remain friends.”19
That feeling of insecurity was partly sustained by West’s own actions and
statements. For instance, in early 2011, the United States made public its plan to develop
several military bases in Afghanistan “on a long term basis.” The Russian Foreign
Ministry reacted by asking “Why will Afghanistan need the military bases of the United
States if the terrorist threat will no longer be relevant?” And given that "until recently,
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Kabul and Washington have been assuring the international community that all foreign
armed forces would be removed from the Afghan territory before the end of 2014.”20 In
October 2012 Nikolay Korchunov, Russia's acting ambassador to NATO threatened that
Russia will stop cooperating over Afghanistan after 2014 if the alliance acts without
United Nations Security Council authorization for its training mission in the country. 21
The second line of criticism involved NATO’s decision not to grant Russia’s
requests to cooperate with CSTO on development of a joint counter-terrorist policies and
assessment of threat.22 The Secretary-General of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha on several
occasions called for cooperation with NATO on Afghan drug trafficking, terrorism and
other issues, yet without eliciting any response.23 The Kremlin also sought to counter
NATO’s presence in the region by engaging in several activities. In addition to gaining a
basing right in Kyrgyzstan, Russia coordinated with China perception of the alliance and
future policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.24 Russia also pressured Kyrgyzstan not to
renew its military agreement with the United States.25 Along the same lines, the Kremlin
wanted to consolidate its military presence by constructing a new antiterrorism center
under CSTO auspices in the southern part of the country.26 In Tajikistan, Moscow
negotiated a re-deployment of 6,000 troops to patrol the border with Afghanistan in
exchange for promise to rearm the Tajik army.
Finally, Russia grew increasingly critical of the Western strategies of stabilizing
Afghanistan. In particular, the Kremlin did not approve of NATO’s attempts to engage in
negotiations with the Taliban. By citing the Taliban’s narrow ethnic base and past violent
practices, Russia’s officials frequently referred to NATO’s negotiations as leading to “a
Pashtunization” of Afghanistan. In addition, the Kremlin was very critical of the West’s
lack of attention to the growing threat of narcotics. Western officials such as U.S. war
commander General Stanley A. McChrystal explained that they did not want to deprive
Afghan peasants of income and that their priorities in stabilizing the country included
training its army and security forces.27 In Moscow’s perception such attitude was
precisely responsible for the sharp growth of opium and its trafficking from the country
to Russia and other regions.28 In particular, the Head of State Anti-Drugs Service Victor
Ivanov pointed to “distinct correlation between the dynamics of militarization and an
increase in drugs production in Afghanistan”.29
Relations with Kabul
Partly out of frustration with Western policies and partly out of desire to
strengthen ties with a neighbor, the Kremlin launched its own policy in Afghanistan.
Russia’s relations with the country begun to improve soon after removal of
Taliban from power. Already in May 2002, Foreign Minister Igor’ Ivanov visited
Afghanistan. In August 2007, Russia cancelled $10 billion of debt to Afghanistan left
from the Soviet era. During the next year, economic relations boomed and trade rose
from $70 million in 2007 to $180 million in 2008 with Afghanistan’s imports from
Russia comprising 90% of the total.30
Since 2010, Russia’s policies in the region became more independent and were
occasionally at odds with those of NATO and the United States. At the time when the
White House expressed its frustration with Hamid Karzai and engaged in negotiations
with Taliban, Russia insisted that Karzai was the only legitimate leader worthy of
support. In November 2010, Moscow hosted his visit by promising political support and
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donating 20,000 Kalashnikov rifles to Afghanistan Interior Ministry. In 2011, by
embarking on series of infrastructural and housing projects, Russia described its ties with
the former foe as the best in 20 years.31 In May 2011, the Kremlin also hosted a three-day
visit by Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari with the two sides expressing agreement that
Afghanistan’s peace process should be driven by internal, rather than external, forces.32
In addition, the Russians stepped up their consultations with India, another key country in
the region.33
3. The Official Meaning
How should we interpret Russia’s seemingly contradictory position? Is the
Kremlin signaling its desire to deepen cooperation with the West or is Russia merely
avoid complicating its relations with NATO? This section offers an interpretation of
Russia’s behavior and addresses possible objections to it.
Seeking Equal Cooperation
Russia seeks to deepen cooperation with NATO without jeopardizing its own
interests in the region. The Kremlin’s central message is to be: “we are fully prepared to
cooperate on equal terms, but will resort to balancing tactics if such equality is not
respected by the West.” The Russians associate equal cooperation with reciprocity and
mutual recognition of interests. In particular, they want more cooperation in fighting
proliferation of narcotics, conducting training and exercises jointly with CSTO and SCO,
and supporting the central government of Afghanistan.
In numerous statements by Russia’s officials, the desire to deepen cooperation
with NATO has been made clear. Such desire is justified by a potential destabilization of
the region, should the U.S. and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. In 2007, the Foreign
Ministry report “A Review of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy” stated, “if the
Afghan campaign ends in failure and the U.S. and NATO leave, the Central Asian
countries and Russia will be left face to face with the consequences of the aggravated
Afghan problem, primarily the drug and terrorist threat, with an upsurge of
fundamentalist sentiments and the destabilization of the region.”34 In June 2008, Russia’s
representative at NATO Dmitry Rogozin criticized the alliance’s strategy in Afghanistan,
yet stated that “We are ready to continue helping, because if NATO admits defeat in the
future … this may lead to a strengthened enemy [Islamic extremism], emboldened by
success, standing on the threshold of our home.”35 In 2010, writing in New York Times
former commander of the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan General Boris Gromov and
Dmitry Rogozin stated Russia’s position: “A ‘successful end’ to the operation in
Afghanistan will not come simply with the death of Osama bin Laden. The minimum that
we require from NATO is consolidating a stable political regime in the country and
preventing Talibanization of the entire region.”36 Indeed, with the passing of time Russia
became so worried about possible destabilization after NATO’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan that high-ranking Moscow officials insisted on the alliance’s completing its
mission of before leaving.37
The Russians have also argued that the cooperation with NATO may only be
effective if the alliance respects the other side’s view. According to them, the alternative
is not merely the destabilization of Afghanistan, but destruction of NATO as an
organization. As Gromov and Rogozin warned, “If the alliance does not accomplish its
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task, the mutual commitments of its 28 member-states would be undermined and the
alliance would lose its moral foundation and raison d’être. … Withdrawal without victory
might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.”38 The Russians indicated
that without changing its approach NATO will increasingly confront problems in
Afghanistan. The Kremlin signaled preparedness to exploit Western vulnerability by
launching an independent strategy in the region and even threatening to block the alliance
supply routes.39
The recent Russian decision to grant NATO access to Ulyanovsk’s airport may
also reflect the Kremlin’s desire to obtain additional leverage in negotiating better terms
for cooperation with the West. As stated by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a
speech to the Russian Duma, “The main criteria of our assistance to the coalition in
Afghanistan is national interests of Russia.” “It's in our interests that the coalition
achieves a success before withdrawing and makes sure that the Afghans are capable of
defending their country and ensuring an acceptable level of security … We want those
who are fending off threats directed at Russia to efficiently fulfill their tasks.”40
Such preference for cooperation “on equal terms” in Afghanistan is consistent
with Russia’s overall objectives as defined by the relevant official documents. Ever since
Putin’s arrival to power, the definition of international objectives has shifted from
attempting to balance the West toward exploiting it to Russia’s advantage. Russia seeks
more actively to shape the world’s political and economic system and be recognized in
such efforts by the Western nations.41 The Foreign Ministry report of 2007 embraced the
objective of multi-polarity based on “a more equitable distribution of resources for
influence and economic growth,”42 but also defended the notion of collective leadership
and multilateral diplomacy in international relations. Similarly, the Military Doctrine of
2010 identified NATO enlargement as an external danger (opasnost’), but not as a threat
(ugroza). Commentators interpreted this as indicative that Russia was afraid not of being
attacked by the Western alliance, but of not participating in a NATO-centric system of
European security.43
Medvedev’s Contribution to Strengthening Cooperation with the West
Medvedev’s presidency assisted cooperation with the Western nations over
Afghanistan and other issues by creating a new political atmosphere in relations with
Europe and the United States. Medvedev began his term by articulating a broad
perspective on Europe “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” and proposing a new allEuropean treaty to establish a new security architecture by moving beyond NATO
expansion and the conflict over Kosovo.44 Although Moscow’s conflict with Georgia
over South Ossetia of August 2008 created new tensions in Russia-West relations,
Medvedev saw the conflict as an opportunity to strengthen his case. According to him,
the fact that neither NATO, nor the OSCE were able to prevent the military confrontation
indicated the need for an improved security framework in Europe. In November 2009,
Russia published its proposal for a new security treaty by pledging to legally restrict its
unilateral use of force in exchange for European nations and the United States doing the
same.
Although Medvedev’s European vision did not receive the international support
he was looking for, the president kept on trying to improve relations with the West on
other fronts. Despite being critical of the United States’ unilateralism in world politics,
6
Moscow continued to defend the notion of collective leadership and multilateral
diplomacy and refrained from any concerted effort to undermine the U.S. global position.
Concerned about Washington’s plans to deploy elements of the missile defense system
(MDS) in Europe, Medvedev sought to address the issue by establishing a good rapport
with Barak Obama, cooperating with the United States on Iran and the new nuclear
treaty, and proposing to develop MDS jointly. Russia’s president also worked on
improving the image of Russia in Western business circles, and he traveled to the United
States in part to facilitate investments and cooperation in the information technology
sector.
Since 2011 Medvedev grew visibly frustrated with what he viewed as luck of
reciprocity on part of the West. By insisting on equal cooperation, he now spoke of a new
“geopolitical situation”45 and his overall tone on issues from MDS to Middle East
became less hopeful and more tough. In his address to the Federation Council, Medvedev
stated “we are open for a constructive dialogue and specific work with our partners if
they learn to listen to us.”46 In the same address, he revived the notion of strategic
balance and threatened a series of steps to defend Russia from the perceived MDS threat.
Medvedev was still prepared to cooperate with the West on the Middle East and in March
2011, he instructed the Russia Ambassador to the United Nations to abstain on the Libya
resolution allowing the no-fly zone to take place and recalled Russia’s Libya Ambassador
for criticizing Moscow’s decision.47 However, after several months Medvedev reversed
his position by opposing the Libya-style resolution on Syria. In February 2012 Russia
acting jointly with China, vetoed the Syria resolution in the UNSC instead arguing for
negotiations between Bashar al-Assad and the military opposition.
Opposing Views
Not all observers agree that Russia is engaged in a conditional cooperation with
the West. Some experts view NATO-Russia cooperation as becoming more robust and
difficult to reverse. Others remain skeptical of the sincerity of Russia’s declared
intentions to cooperate and point to its deep fears of the West.
The Optimists place the emphasis on the similarity of Russia-NATO interests in
stabilizing Afghanistan and tend to downplay the possibility of another crisis in their
relationships. They also deny that Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin as president
may lead to another round of Russia’s assertiveness similar to that which manifested
itself in the war with Georgia in August 2008. As Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev
wrote before Russia’s presidential elections in March 2012, if the U.S. remains
committed to stabilizing Afghanistan, NATO-Russia relations are likely to be
strengthened further. “The United States is the critical variable for Russia and its relations
with the United States, not Putin’s return.”48 However, many in Russia remain skeptical
of the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts. As Putin stated, "the international forces
are playing a positive role in Afghanistan" yet “they are perhaps acting not very
efficiently, especially in terms of combating the drug threat.”49 If the Russians are
justified in their skepticism, then future developments may indeed complicate RussiaNATO relations over Afghanistan. Outside Afghanistan, issues such as MDS will
continue to have a considerable potential to derail the relationships.
There also those who do not believe that Russia is interested in deepening
cooperation with NATO. The Skeptics are convinced that Russia’s anti-democratic and
7
anti-Western attitude is strengthening and cannot be reversed.50 For instance, according
to one observer, “Moscow may not desire a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, but sees this
as a much lesser danger to itself than a permanent American military and political
presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. … The Kremlin leaders see the world almost
exclusively in zero-sum terms: America’s loss is Moscow’s gain, and helps undermining
the ‘unipolar world’ and restoring ‘multipolarity’.”51 Another observer wrote about “the
cynical way in which Moscow will use its paltry assistance to ISAF as leverage with the
West in negotiations over other matters, from NATO expansion to human rights, sphere
of influence in Central Asia, and missile defense.”52 The Skeptics are therefore against
continuing the United States’ efforts to improve ties with the Kremlin and warn against
what they see as “overreliance” on Russian supply routes supporting the NATO
mission.53 Prominent politicians, such as Republican House Speaker John Boehner and
the presidential candidate Mitt Romney argued against the Barack Obama’s "reset" policy
and for a tougher approach to Russia.54
Such readings of Russia’s intentions offer a one-sided assessment of the
Kremlin’s complex and ambivalent attitude. As the previous section showed, the
Medvedev-associated part of the political class wants to strengthen cooperation with the
Western nations over a number of issues with Afghanistan being only one. The next
section will show that, although Russia’s foreign policy discourse is not controlled by
pro-Western liberals, it is also far from being shaped by anti-Western hard-liners.
4. The National Reception
The debate on Afghanistan should be understood in the context of Russia’s
phobias of NATO and the West. To the Kremlin, the relationships with NATO emerged
as the defining security issue soon after the end of the Cold War and the sides’ mistrust,
as one scholar observes, “is not simply a remnant of the Cold War but also the result of
post-Cold War interactions.”55 After the United States had made a decision about the
alliance’s eastern expansion, Russia viewed its security and foreign policy from the
Balkans to Iraq and Georgia largely through the NATO lens.56
Russia has developed several distinct schools of thought about the self and the
world. Attitudes toward the West are frequently defining the differences among these
schools.57 Westernizers place the emphasis on the country’s similarity with Western
nations and view the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the world.
Westernizers have consistently supported Russia integration with Western security
institutions and even advocated gaining membership within NATO. Statists equate
successful foreign policy with that of a strong independent state and emphasize the state’s
ability to respond to external threats to Russia’s security. In the context of the rising
China, some Statists advocate stronger ties with the West, whereas others call for
bandwagoning with China. There are also civilizationists or those who tend to view the
Russia-West relationship in terms of cultural oppositions and are especially fearful of
NATO’s role after the Cold War because of the Western values the alliance represents. In
particular, Eurasianists and Communists view Russian values as diametrically opposing
those of the West. In terms of policy influence, the position of Statists – especially those
of moderate disposition – carry the greatest weight, whereas those of Westernizers and
Civilizationists are relatively marginalized. Westernizers largely lost their influence in
the 1990s, although their views remain popular with the West-oriented private sector. The
8
views of hard-line Statists, Eurasianists, and Communists have been marginalized since
the early 1990s and are held within some military and defense industrialist circles.
Westernizers
Westernizers include members of Russia’s political class with strong ties to the
West. Analysts at think tanks, such as the Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC) and the
Institute of Contemporary Development, are often supportive of liberal reforms and proWestern foreign policy. This group does not harbor any phobias of NATO and advocated
for strong cooperation with the West based on a joint understanding of security threats.
According to Aleksey Arbatov, a CMC scholar and the head of the Centre for
International Security of the Institute of Global Economy and International Relations of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, in Afghanistan such threats include return of the
Taliban to power and the broader destabilization of Central Asia. According to him,
“After coming to power the Taliban won't stop at the Afghan borders” and “Russia will
have to confront them directly in Central Asia, then in Kazakhstan and later, perhaps, in
North Caucasus and Siberia."58 To NATO, the problem is no less serious both in terms of
prestige and security in the region. Therefore, Arbatov believes that on the basis of
stabilizing Afghanistan as the “most important common interest” for both sides, Russia
and NATO should strive to develop an alliance-like relationships.
This assessment is not commonly supported by the Kremlin, but is widely shared
within the Westernizers’ circles.59 While sharing the view, members of the school of
thought diverge with respect to the assessment of the likelihood of stabilizing
Afghanistan. Some, like Alexander Golts of Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal, do not believe that
stabilization of the country is possible without addressing security threats in the larger
Central Asian region. Rather than focusing on Afghanistan, NATO and Russia should
therefore “agree on the much larger threat – the threat of instability … in Central Asia
after U.S. forces leave Afghanistan” and address the threat by building economic projects
and overcoming poverty in the region.60
Moderate Statists
Statists define Russia’s interests as distinct and not convergent with those of the
Western nations. In particular, such interests include addressing the drugs problem in
Afghanistan, preserving influence in Central Asia, and involving other regional powers in
the process of stabilizing the region. This position is strongly supported in the Kremlin.
The widespread feeling in Russian political circles is that the United States acts out of a
perception of Russia as an irrelevant power. As a result, the Kremlin has lost influence in
strategically important areas in Eurasia. After several failed attempts to engage the
United States and other Western nations in a mutually advantageous partnership –
Mikhail Gorbachev's, Boris Yeltsin's, and Vladimir Putin's – Russia now wants to be sure
Washington does not overstep its boundaries in the region. In the words of Mikhail
Margelov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee in the Federation Council,
“Russia has very mixed feelings about a greater U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
On the one hand, Moscow would like to see the chaos end in Afghanistan and a peaceful
regime established. … On the other hand, the United States' and NATO's predominate
influence in that region will infringe upon Russia's interests there, including its influence
among the former Soviet republics. This is why Russia suggests expanding the circle of
9
countries involved in finding a peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan conflict -- above
all by inviting nations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”61
Statists are divided on the issue of cooperating with the West in Afghanistan. The
dividing line is whether the traditional threat from NATO is more or less significant than
that from the prospect of the Taliban’s return. Moderate Statists are closer to the Kremlin
and concede that Taliban is a greater threat. Given the West’s dependence on Russia, they
recommend cooperating with NATO conditionally by gradually granting its requests
while pressing ahead with Russia’s own interests and preparations. As summarized by
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, "The consensus of Russian experts
is that there is no winning strategy for the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan … It means we
need to work with the Americans, and find common approaches, but we need to make our
own preparations, too."62
Hard-Line Statists
To hard-line Statists, the NATO threat exceeds that from the Taliban. This group
is very critical of the Kremlin and opposes Russia’s cooperation with the Western nations
in stabilizing Afghanistan. Some hard-line Statists view such cooperation as leading to
Russia’s own involvement in the war with Taliban.63 Others go farther by arguing that
NATO’s whole strategy in the region has nothing to do with stability. Instead, such
strategy is predicated on preservation of a chaos that would justify the alliance’s presence
in Afghanistan. The presence of NATO is viewed in geostrategic terms, as serving the
objective of containing influences of other powers in region – China, Russia, Iran,
Pakistan, and India.64 For example, military and energy experts such as General
Makhmut Gareyev, General Leonid Ivashev and Konstantin Simonov, director of the
National Energy Security Fund, stated that regional instability – including proliferation of
heroin – "is already turning into a weapon of mass destruction against Russia" and a tool
for making sure that no energy projects are implemented through Afghanistan.65 Unlike
Westernizers and moderate Statists, hard-line Statists do not believe in the threat of the
Taliban’s expansion to Central Asia, much less Russia.66 Russia therefore will do well to
pressure NATO out of the region and develop strong, independent ties with regional
powers and Afghanistan.
Eurasianists and Communists
Finally, communists and Eurasianists also oppose any cooperation with NATO
and side with recommendations by hard-line Statists to contain Western influences in the
region. Eurasianists expect a greater instability in Afghanistan and Central Asia as
resulting from the United States’ and NATO’s international involvements.67 According to
Eurasianists, the West’s underlying objective is to destroy Russia’s historic unity with
peoples of Eurasian region by radicalizing Islam and weakening Russia’s position in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. By creating conditions for NATO’s lasting military
presence in Afghanistan, the Western nations aim to undermine the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), which serves as a “civilizational platform” for asserting
independent policy in the region.68
Russian Communists too harbor traditionally strong animosity toward NATO and
are worried about threats to “national security” as presented by growing ties with the
Western alliance. Despite the Cold War’s end, they continue to defend the Soviet
10
invasion of Afghanistan as “strategically justified and well-calculated step” to “protect
our southern border.”69 In their view, the West’s “capitalist” presence in the country
fundamentally undermines interests of the Afghan people and threatens the security of
Russia.70 In response to the Kremlin’s decision to grant NATO access to Ulyanovsk’s
airport, Russia's Communists – the country's second largest political party - declared in
their public statement that “for the first time in the history of the Russian Empire, the
U.S.S.R. and the Russian Federation, a foreign military base would appear on our soil... a
base of a military bloc that the majority of our population view as hostile.” The statement
added that the party “decisively condemns the intention to ensure a permanent foreign
military presence in the heart of Russia and demands that the Russian leadership stop the
implementation of this idea.”71
Overall, Russia’s debate on Afghanistan reveal radically different positions from
proposing to tackle the threat of Taliban and instability jointly with the West to opposing
any cooperation with the Western nations on the ground of their incompatibility with
Russian values. Such ambiguity is indicative of Russia’s still highly contested national
identity.
Russia’s national debate on Afghanistan is summarized in table 1.
Table 1. A Summary of Russia’s Afghanistan Debate
Westernizers
Moderate Statists
Hard-Line Statists;
Civilizationists
Taliban
Taliban and West
West
Support for cooperation Strong
with NATO
Conditional
No support
Recommended actions
Toward the West
Limited cooperation
Containment
Main threats
Alliance
5. The International Recognition
The external environment has served to preserve Russia’s ambivalence regarding
cooperation with the West. After the Cold War, Russia was unable to secure recognition
of its foreign policies. Many in the West have interpreted the end of the Cold War as a
victory over the USSR and felt that Russia was too weak to merit equal treatment.72
Alongside its limited economic support, the Western nations were simultaneously
pursuing policies of expanding NATO and containing Russia in the security context.
The United States’ decision to focus on stabilizing Afghanistan undermined the
position of the Russia irrelevance school. More than on any other matters, Russia
emerged as a country important to the West and its success in the region. Despite
Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008, the newly elected president Barak Obama
quickly moved to improve relations with Russia and establish strong ties with Russia’s
president Dmitri Medvedev. By proposing to “reset” relations with Russia, the U.S.
11
opened a new way of engaging it directly and bilaterally, thereby recognizing the
country’s importance in the world and empowering those favoring cooperation with the
West in Russia. The “reset” diplomacy alleviated the Kremlin’s fear of NATO expansion
and the region’s destabilization in response to Washington’s strategy of global regime
change. In exchange for initiating the new Russia policy, Western leaders obtained the
Kremlin’s willingness to assist NATO in Afghanistan.
Policy makers in the United States and Europe expressed their growing
satisfaction with Russia’s assistance. Western leaders were also pleased with Medvedev’s
decision to attend the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 and his agreement to
help transport the alliance’s cargo to Afghanistan, supply helicopters, and train Afghan
pilots and counter-narcotics units .73 In 2011, American officials responsible for the
“reset” credited the policy for Russia’s cooperation and dismissed attacks from
opponents. In Vice-President Joe Biden’s words, “the benefits to both our countries - and
to international security - are clear, including: the new Start Treaty that further limits
strategic nuclear weapons, cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
collaboration on Afghanistan that facilitates the flow of soldiers and supplies, and the
most stringent sanctions ever on Iran and North Korea for their pursuit of nuclear
weapons.”74 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the alliance’s
military commander, U.S. Adm. James Stavridis, both expressed their satisfaction with
growing ties with Russia and indicated interest in expanding cooperation.75
Still, from the perspective of many in Russia the “reset” has not amounted to
recognition of the Kremlin’s objectives. The cooperation in Afghanistan did not lead to
NATO’s change of priorities in counter-terrorism by focusing on fighting drugs, as
Russia wanted. Nor did it produce a joint strategy of isolating the Taliban and
strengthening Karzai’s government. NATO also refused to recognize the potential
contribution of CSTO and SCO as viable partners in stabilizing the region. Outside
Afghanistan the situation was even less promising, as a number of important issues
between Russia and NATO remain unresolved. The Kremlin is critical of the U.S.
proposal to develop the Missile Defense System jointly with the Europeans but separately
from Russia. The Western nations are rhetorically supportive of the former Soviet states’
bid for NATO membership, whereas Russia maintains its right to protect its interests in
Georgia and elsewhere in the former Soviet region. At the end of 2010, Moscow shelved
its initiative to negotiate a new security treaty with European nations after not getting any
support from NATO officials and the United States. The Kremlin also criticized
the West's handling of the Middle Eastern crisis by going after regime change in Libya
and Syria. Even Russian Westernizers such as Dmitry Trenin noted, “Beyond
Afghanistan, and to some extent Iran, the United States sees Russia as a low-value
partner. … it is basically ignoring Russia, whose presence and influence there are
considered negligible.” The assessment by Russian Statists was even harsher.76
In December 2012, the U.S.-Russia relationship suffered from a crisis over
the Magnitsky Act. While repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the U.S. Congress
passed the Magnitsky Act, which denies visas to Russian officials presumed responsible
for human rights violations and freezes their assets. The Russia’s State Duma retaliated
by passing the "Anti-Magnitsky Act," which targets U.S. citizens who Russia considers
to be violators of human rights, and banning the adoption of Russian children by U.S.
citizens. The crisis provoked speculation of a new cold war in the making with U.S.-
12
Russia relations being jeopardized by a weak presidency and the activities of the antiRussia lobby in Washington.77 Obama did not initially support the Magnitsky Act, but
signed it because the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment was attached to it and
because there was so much support in both chambers of Congress for the bill.
Overall, the picture is mixed and consists of a conditional cooperation on part of
Russia and a limited recognition of the Kremlin’s efforts by the West. The problem is that
the two sides do not have an overarching strategic vision they could share. As Thomas
Graham, a former senior director for Russia in the Bush White House wrote, the 'reset'
has no answer to "what the two countries should aspire to now so as to foreclose a return
to dangerous geopolitical rivalry and hold open the promise of mutually advantageous
strategic partnership." He warned that in this context, Russia-NATO cooperation in
Afghanistan should not be overestimated: "The Russians are supporting the Northern
Distribution Network in the hope that the United States will remain engaged in a conflict
from that Americans increasingly want to withdraw from. Is this an achievement?"78
6. Conclusions
The paper studied how traditional fears of the Western nations shaped the
Russia’s debate on Afghanistan. Uncovering the meaning of the Kremlin’s policy
remains a challenge. Russians themselves, even those politically close to Putin, are
frequently confused by his actions and rhetoric. For instance, anti-NATO demonstration
in Ulyanovsk were, ironically, organized by the pro-Putin’s party United Russia, not by
Communists. Putin’s supporters seem to have taken his anti-Western election rhetoric too
seriously.79 However, as Putin explained in Ulyanovsk after the election, “We are helping
NATO … [because such policy] corresponds our own national interests.”80 By
researching relevant national and international contexts of the country’s Afghanistan
diplomacy, I have argued that the Kremlin is indeed prepared to deepen cooperation with
NATO in the region. My analysis does not support the view of Russia aiming to primarily
strengthen its leverage and undermine the West in the region. However, the Russians do
not see their relationships with the West as a cooperation of equals and are not satisfied
with the level of recognition by Western nations.
These conclusions apply to Russia-West relations outside Afghanistan. Russia’s
readiness to cooperate on equal terms is consistent with the Kremlin’s proposals to
develop MDS jointly, conclude a pan-European security treaty, and build stronger
economic ties with Western companies. Critical of the United States’ unilateralism in
world politics, Russia has not called for any concerted effort to undermine the U.S. global
position and, instead, has defended the notion of collective leadership and multilateral
diplomacy in international relations. These policies offer additional support to the
interpretation of Russia’s Afghanistan diplomacy as aiming to strengthen Russia’s
relations with Western nations, rather than undermine their unity.
Nevertheless, Russia’s overall progress in managing its phobias of the
West should be recognized as limited. As promising as Afghanistan might have been in
improving Russian-Western relations, they relationships remain unstable and crisis-laden.
Both sides bear responsibility for such unattractive outcome. In Russia, hard-line schools
dismiss any possibility of cooperation with NATO by viewing it as the number one
threat. Although the Kremlin is not dependent on these groups’ preferences, it has to take
into account their feelings, which are shared by considerable domestic constituencies. In
13
the West, members of the Russia irrelevance school and critics of Obama’s Russia policy
remain too powerful to be ignored by decision-makers. Even if the leaders of Russia and
Western nations were committed to transforming their relationships, they would be in a
difficult position to achieve it.
This analysis contains implications for Western policy makers. Because Russia’s
interests in Afghanistan are to a significant degree constructed by relationships with the
West, the larger context of Russia-West relations matter. The emotional reaction to future
unfavorable developments may prompt Russia to change its definition of national
interests by making it difficult for the West to pursue its international objectives. The
policy of leveraging human rights in Russia, as demonstrated by the Magnitsky Act
crisis, is not going to bring any short-term dividends to the Western side and has a strong
potential to derail the relationship further. Russia and the West have been through this
cycle of frustration and anger before and are still recovering from its consequences. If the
Western nations are successfully to withdraw their forces via the Ulyanovsk Vostochny
Airport, then in addition to finding a politically sustainable formula for leaving
Afghanistan without losing face,81 they must preserve working relations with Russia.
Considering the magnitude of the undertaking – some 300,000 soldiers, 70,000 vehicles,
and 120,000 containers must go through Ulyanovsk82 - the United States and NATO
officials should be prepared to make some difficult trade-offs. Although the exact nature
of these trade-offs is difficult to determine, the required approach would need to avoid
missionary claims and recognize the two sides’ mutual dependence of economic and
security interests. Engaging Russia will require both devising a new framework for a
dialogue and a steady flow of reciprocal actions to sustain such dialogue. Progress in the
relationship, if it is to be made, is likely to be slow and incremental.
Notes
1
Presented at the 53d International Studies Association Convention, San Diego,
April 1-4, 2012. For comments and reactions, I am grateful to the discussant Ted Hopf,
all panel’s participants, anonimous reviewers, and the editor of Problems of PostCommunism. Chris Haire was an able research assistant.
2
“NATO Base in Russia 'Pragmatic Decision' Analysts,” RIA-Novosti, March 21,
2012.
3
“NATO Still Fears Militarization of Germany, Doesn't Like Russia – Rogozin,”
Interfax, December 26, 2011.
4
Alan Cullison, “Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes,” Wall Street
Journal, November 28, 2011.
5 Anne Gearan, “Sour U.S.-Russia relations threaten Obama’s foreign policy
agenda,” Washington Post, January 13, 2013.
6
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics
of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Roxanne Doty, Imperial
Encounters: Patterns of Representation in North/South Relations (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International
Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell
14
University Press, 2002); Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations
and the Problem of Difference (London: Routledge, 2004); Anne L. Clunan, The Social
Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009); Vincent Pouliot, International
Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
7
For a sample of scho larship on identity, beliefs and emotions in international
politics, see Donald C. Klein, "The Humiliation Dynamic: an Overview," The Journal of
Primary Prevention, 12, 2, 1991; Blema S. Steinberg, "Shame and Humiliation in the
Cuban Missile Crisis," Political Psychology, 12, 4, 1991; Netta Crawford, "The Passion
of World Politics: Proposition on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International
Security, 24, 4, 2000; Robert E. Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the
Revenge Motif in International Politics," International Politics, 37, 2000; Richard Ned
Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great
Power Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Paul Saurette, "You Dissin
Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics," Review of International Studies, 32,
2006; Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," Security
Studies, 17, 2008; Khaled Fattah and K. M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of
Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," European Journal of
International Relations, 15, 1, 2009; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko,
“Status-Seekers. Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International
Security, 34, 4, 2010; Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” International Organization,
64, 2010; Tuomas Forsberg, “Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy: Causes and
Cosequences of Anger,” Workshop on Subjective Dimension of Russia’s Partnership
with the West, Hamburg, 15-16 September 2011; Regina Heller, “Is there an emotional
pattern in Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the West?,” Workshop on Subjective
Dimension of Russia’s Partnership with the West, Hamburg, 15-16 September 2011;
Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and disrespect in international politics. The significance of
status recognition,” International Theory 3, 1, 2011; Hanna Smith, “Russian foreign
policy thinking and the concept of ressentiment,” Paper delivered at the International
Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, April 1-4, 2012.
8
For analysis of the U.S. side, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russophobia: AntiRussian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
9
The literature on Russia’s relations with the West after the Cold War is rapidly
growing. In addition to items listed in the previous footnote, see Henry Trofimenko,
Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia. (London: Ashgate, 1998); J.
L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? (Boulder:
Rawman & Littlefield, 2000); James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and
Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War. (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003); Michael Bowker, Russia, America and the Islamic World.
(London: Ashgate, 2007); Christian Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign
Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct Towards the West. (London,
Palgrave, 2008); Helen Belopolsky, Russia and the Challengers: Russian Alignment with
China, Iran, and Iraq in the Unipolar Era. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Jeffrey Mankoff,
15
Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. (Boulder, CO: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009); Marcel De Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century:
Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. (London: Routledge, 2010); Domestic and International
Dynamics: Agency and (Re)action in Russian Foreign Policy. Special Issue, edited by
Roger E. Kanet and Maria Raquel Freire. International Politics, 49, 4, June-July, 2012.
For Russian contributions, see especially Anatoli Utkin, Vyzov Zapada i otvet Rossiyi
(Moscow: Algotitm, 2002); Natalya Narochnitskaya, Rossiya i russkiye v mirovoi istoriyi
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2005); Dmitri Trenin, Integratsiya i
identichnost’ (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2006); Vadim Tsymburski, Ostrov Rossiya
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007); Sergei Kortunov, Stanovleniye natsional’noi identichnosti:
kakaya Rossiya nuzhna miru (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009); Kamaludin Gadzhiyev,
Geopoliticheskiye gorizonty Rossiyi (Moscow: Ekonomika, 2011).
10
For an extended discussion of the approach, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Contested
Identity and Foreign Policy: Interpreting Russia’s International Choices,” International
Studies Perspective, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 2013, forthcoming.
11
For some analyses of Russia-West relations in the context of Afghanistan, consult
Nebojsa Bjelakovic, Russian Policies and Views Related to Afghanistan. (Ottawa:
Defense Research & Development, 2007); Valentin M. Yakushik, “The Influence of
Afghanistan on Russian Foreign Policy toward Central Asia after September 11, 2001,”
Nаukovi zapiski 95, 2009; Stephen Blank, “What Does Moscow Want in Afghanistan?”
Perspective, 19, 1, April 2009; Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, “Russia wants a
positive outcome in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April
27, 2010; Richard J. Krickus, The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in the U.S.-Russia
Relations. (Carlisle, PA : U.S. Army War College, The Letort Papers, 2011); Marlene
Laruelle, Beyond the Afghan Trauma: Russia's Return to Afghanistan. (Washington, DC:
The Jamestown Foundation, August 11, 2009); Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s strategies in
Afghanistan and their Consequences for NATO. (Rome: NATO Defense College,
Research Paper. No. 69, November 2011); Ekaterina Stepanova, “Afganistan:
perspektivy politicheskogo uregulirovaniya,” in: Puti k miru i bezopasnosti. (Moscow:
IMEMO, 2012); Andrei Kazantsev, “Politika Rossiyi v Tsentral’noi Aziyi posle vyvoda
voisk iz Afganistana,” Afghanistan.ru, October 15, 2012; Mikhail Molchanov, “Russia,
Central Asia, and Afghanistan,” Paper delivered at the International Studies Association
Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, April 1-4, 2012.
12
Robert Smigielski, Afghanistan in Foreign Policy of Russian Federation. (The Polish
Institute of International Affairs, March 19, 2010).
13
Michael Schwartz, “Russia Joins Drug Raid in Afghanistan, Marking Advance in
Relations with U.S.,” The New York Times, October 29, 2010.
14
Slobodan Lekic, “NATO, Russia formally resume military ties,” AP, January 26, 2010.
15
Vladimir Solovyev, “Rossiyskiye vertolety prizemlyatsya v Afganistane,” May 27,
2011.
16
Laruelle, Russia’s strategies in Afghanistan, p. 2.
17
Fred Weir, “US-Russia 'reset' gets a boost with Russian offer of airbase,” Christian
Science Monitor, March 15, 2012.
18
Thomas Shanker, “Russian Official Cautions U.S. on use of Central Asian Bases,” The
New York Times, October 10, 2003.
16
Katrina Vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, “Endangering US Security,” The
Nation, April 15, 2002.
20
Dmitry Babich, “Permanent American Bases in Afghanistan?” Russia Profile, February
19, 2011. For analysis of this ambivalence regarding NATO plans, see Andrei Serenko,
“’Bazovyeye’ raskhozhdeniya ODKB,” Afghanistan.ru, March 22, 2012.
21
Adrian Croft, “NATO must have U.N. mandate for post-2014 Afghan mission –
Russia,” Reuters, October 10, 2012.
22
As revealed by a cable from U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ivo H. Daalder to Washington dated September 10,
2009, the Alliance views as "counter-productive" to deal with the CSTO, "an
organization set up by Moscow to diminish American and NATO's influence with postSoviet countries." According to Daalder, "the CSTO has proved itself inadequate and
ended up being split. Its recognition by NATO might promote legitimacy of this
withering organization" (WikiLeaks diplomatic archives as cited by Joshua Kucera, “U.S.
Blocking NATO-CSTO Cooperation,” Eurasianet.org, February 12, 2011).
23
See, for example, Nikolai Bordyuzha, “Sotrudnichestvo ODKB i NATO povysilo by
uroven’ bezopasnosti,” RIA Novosti, November 24, 2011; Nikolai Bordyuzha, “Popytki
ODKB sotrudnichat’ s ES i NATO poka rezul’tata ne dali,” Izvestia, May 15, 2012.
24
Ahmed Rashid, “Russia and China eye role in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” BBC News, June 6,
2012.
25
In November 2011, the newly elected Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev pledged
to finally close the U.S. base in Manas by 2014 (Kirill Zubkov and Igor’ Yavlanskiy,
“Kirgiziya menyayet amerikanskuyi bazu na Yevraziyski soyuz,” Izvestia, November 1,
2011).
26
Bruce Pannier, “Russia's Star On Rise Again In Kyrgyzstan,” RFE/RL, April 8, 2011.
27
Vladimir Skosyrev, “NATO potvorstvuyet proizvodstvu opiuma v Afganistane,”
Nezavisimaya gazeta March 22, 2010.
28
The Head of State Anti-Drugs Service Victor Ivanov called Afghanistan a drug state
and claimed that, “The opiate production has increased 44 times since the U.S.
military contingent was brought into the country in 2001" (“Afghanistan has turned
into drug state – FSKN director,” Interfax, December 3, 2008). Russia is the largest
market for Afghan heroin with about 2-2.5 million people addicted to drugs, 90% of
which depend on Afghan opiates (“UN report: Russia becomes largest market for Afghan
heroin,” Russia Today, October 23, 2009).
29
“Nato's Big Presence In Afghanistan Enables Opium Growing - Russian Drugs Tsar,”
RIA-Novosti, June 8, 2011.Russian experts noted that top officials within the State AntiDrugs Service welcome the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as the development that
will reduce the threat of narcotics for Russia (Kazantsev, “Politika Rossiyi v Tsentral’noi
Aziyi”).
30
Smigielski, Afghanistan in Foreign Policy.
31
Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Russia eyes bigger role in Afghanistan, wants to rebuild:
envoy,” Reuters, June 17, 2011.
32
M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan seeks solace in the Kremlin,” Asia Times, May 6, 2011.
33
The head of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, stated after visiting India
that the two countries were ready to help the Afghan government in training security
19
17
officials (“Afghanistan unprepared for NATO pullout - Russian Security Council,” RIA
Novosti, June 6, 2011).
34
Obzor vneshnei politiki Rossiyskoi federatsiyi [Review of foreign policy of the Russia’s
Federation], March 27, 2007 <http://www.mid.ru>
35
Roger McDermott, “Russia’s View on Afghanistan: Does ‘Size Matter’?” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, July 8, 2008.
36
Boris Gromov and Dmitri Rogozin, “Russian Advice on Afghanistan,” The New York
Times, January 12, 2010.
37
Andrei Ilyashenko, “NATO owes the UN an explanation,” Russia Beyond the
Headlines, April 16, 2012.
38
Gromov and Rogozin, “Russian Advice.”.
39
Rogozin as cited in fn. 4; Paul Richter, “Russian warns of blocking Afghanistan supply
route,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 2012.
40
Sergei Lavrov, Address to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, March
14, 2012
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/4eebe065400
9296a442579c100488e87!OpenDocument.
41
The thinking indicates an important change since the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept,
which explicitly warned of a threat of “a unipolar structure of the world under the
economic and military domination of the United States” (Vneshnyaya politika i
bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossiyi [Foreign policy and security of contemporary Russia],
edited by Tatyana Shakleyina (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), vol. 4, pp. 110–11).
42
Obzor vneshnei politiki Rossiyskoi federatsiyi.
43
Alexei Pushkov, “Moscow Should Not Play by NATO's Rules,” Moscow Times, June
30, 2010.
44
Dmitri Medvedev, Speech in Berlin. Izvestia, June 6, 2008.
45
Dmitri Medvedev, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, the Kremlin,
December 22, 2011 <www.kremlin.ru>
46
Ibid. It is important to note that this sentence and any references to “geopolitical
situation” and Medvedev’s previous statement on MDS were not included in English
translation of the address.
47
Former Russian Ambassador to Libya Chamov on Dismissal, Situation There, UN
Vote, Zavtra, March 30, 2011.
48
Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev, “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in
Change,” The Washington Quarterly, 35, 1, 2012, p. 159.
49
“Putin views NATO operation's role in Afghanistan as positive,” Interfax, November
14, 2011.
50
For some general statements, see Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: The Future of
Russia and the Threat to the West. (London: Bloomsbury, 2008) and Janusz Bugajski,
Dismantling the West:Russia’s Atlantic Agenda. (Potomac Books, 2009).
51
Svante Cornell, “Why a Russian ‘Reset’ Won’t Work,” Real Clear World, April 03,
2009. For a similar argument, see Jakub Kulhanek, “Russia as the West’s Elusive Ally in
Afghanistan,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, 3, 2010.
52
James Kirchick, “The Russians Return. Russia's back in Afghanistan, this time in
cooperation with the West -- but do objectives really align?” Foreign Policy, November
18
10, 2010; Jakub Kulhanek, “Moscow Plans for a Post-NATO Afghanistan,” New
Atlanticist, September 16, 2011.
53
As reported by Eugene Ivanov, a Congressional report was criticical of the Pentagon
for such “overeliance” (“Pravda On The Potomac-22 [What The Washington Post Wrote
About Russia In December 2010],” Part 2. The Ivanov Report, January 4, 2011
http://theivanovosti.typepad.com )
54
John Boehner, Speaker Boehner on Reasserting American Exceptionalism in the U.S.Russia Relationship. Washington, DC, October 25, 2011; Luke Johnson, “Mitt Romney:
Russia Is 'Our Number One Geopolitical Foe',” The Huffington Post, March 26, 2012.
55
Pouliot, International Security in Practice, p. 107.
56
On Russia-NATO relations, see Pouliot, International Security in Practice; Andrei P.
Tsygankov, “The Russia-NATO Mistrust: Ethnophobia and the Double Expansion to
Contain ‘the Russian Bear’,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 46, Nos. 1-2,
June 2013.
57
Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004) and Russia’s Foreign Policy:
Change and Continuity in National Identity (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
For similar classifications of Russian schools of foreign policy thinking, see Clunan, The
Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence; Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy; Kuchins
and Zevelev, “Russian Foreign Policy.”
58
“Russian Pundit Views Importance Of NATO Possible Defeat In Afghanistan,” RIANovosti, January 31, 2011.
59
For similars assessments, see, for example, Trenin and Malashenko, “Russia wants a
positive outcome in Afghanistan; Viktor Litovkin, “Novaya bitva na Volge,”
Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 23, 2012.
60
Alexander Golts, “Forget Missile Defense, the Threat Is Afghanistan,” Moscow Times,
June 29, 2011.
61
Mikhail Margelov, “Russia's Silver Bullet for Afghanistan,” Moscow Times, February
9, 2009. For a similar assessment, see Nikolai Patrushev, “Real’nyye ugrozy dlya
Rossiyi, SshA i ES – v nyneshnei nestabil’nosti,” Kommersant, January 12, 2012.
62
Fred Weir, “Moscow again eyes Afghanistan 20 years after retreat,” Christian Science
Monitor, February 16, 2009.
63
Aleksei Fenenko, “Afganskiye grabli dlya Moskvy,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 27,
2011.
64
Mirvais Tarin, “Importnyi mir,” Afghanistan.ru, April 12, 2012. For an argument that
the United States seeks to exploit Afghanistan in a future war with Iran, see Omar Nessar,
“Bitva bez pobednogo kontsa,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, May 25, 2012.
65
“Russian state TV says Afghan drug trade, instability beneficial to USA,” BBC
Monitoring, May 17, 2010. In Ivashov’s words, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is
directly related to a sharp increase of narcotics’ supplies to Russia (Leonid Ivashov,
“Ideya blizka k bredovoi,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 30, 2012).
66
Alexander Knyazev, “Chaos as an Instrument of Control,” Oriental Review.org,
February 25, 2010.
19
Geydar Dzhemal, “Impact of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 2011 Hot Spots
Predicted,” Svobodnaya Pressa, January 8, 2011; Alexander Dugin, “Yevraziyskaya
strategiya obshchei pobedy,” Yevraziya, September 19, 2012.
68
Andranik Derenikyan, “Rossiyskaya positsiya ne zayavlena chetko i vnyatno,” Russkiy
zhurnal, February 13, 2009.
69
Gennadiy Zyuganov, “Bol’ i pamyat’ Аfganistana,” Pravda, February 14-15, 2012.
70
Ibid.
71
“NATO Base in Russia 'Pragmatic Decision' Analysts,” RIA-Novosti, March 21, 2012.
72
The Clinton administration then drew the analogy between Russia and the defeat of
Germany and Japan in the World War II. “We were the victor nation, they were the
defeated nation, and therefore they should be supplicant and subordinate to the United
States,” wrote one observer (Stephen Cohen Interviewed by Washington Profile, January
26, 2007).
73
Andrei Fedyashin, “Russian assistance in Afghanistan: A price to pay,” RIA Novosti,
November 3, 2010.
74
Joseph R. Biden, “The Next Steps in the U.S.-Russia Reset,” The New York Times,
March 14, 2011. See also Statement of Michael McFaul, Ambassador-Designate to the
Russian Federation Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 12, 2011 for a
similar laudatory assessment.
75
Lekic, “NATO, Russia formally resume military ties.”
76
Dmitri Trenin, “The U.S.-Russian Reset in Recess,” The New York Times, November
29, 2011. “Russia considers the reset to have fostered significant concessions to the
United States, - writes Andranik Migranyan (Andranik Migranyan, “How Russia Views
the Reset,” The National Interest, November 24, 2011). - These include the compromise
on Libya, the help in Afghanistan and the pressure on Iran.” “What did Russia get in
return [for its concessions]? – echoes Alexei Pushkov. - Nothing but changes in nuances
of the dialogue. There are more smiles and handshakes now than there were before”
(Aleksei Pushkov, “Under-reload: Moscow delivers, Washington stalls,” Argumenty i
Fakty, No 1, January 2011).
77
Stephen F. Cohen, “America's New Cold War With Russia,” The Nation, February 4,
2013; Gearan, “Sour U.S.-Russia relations”; Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Anti-Russia Lobby
Controls Obama,” Moscow Times, January 16, 2013.
78
Thomas E. Graham, The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations. (New York: Carnegie
Council, June 3, 2011). For another critique of the “reset” for lack of strategic
perspective, see Stephen F. Cohen, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?”
The Nation, June 1, 2011.
79
Weir, “US-Russia 'reset' gets a boost.”
80
Kira Latukhina, “Pust’ sidyat i voyuyut,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 3, 2012.
81
Mark N. Katz, Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).
82
Christian Neef, “The Logistical Nightmare of Leaving Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, April
3, 2012.
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