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National Missile Defense: A Retreat
from Dr. Strangelove or How I Learn
to Stop Worrying and Love MAD
Dr. Willie Curtis
The Cold War mentality that clings to the premise that the mere threat
of retaliation is enough to deter countries possessing missiles capable of
carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads is strategically outdated. As Keith Payne argues, “[g]iven the proliferation of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both the need to deny regional challengers their deterrent . . . , and the recognition that deterrence policies
may fail, suggest important new roles for missile defense.” 1
The primary threat to the United States is no longer a calculated strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Among the new threats are accidental or unauthorized missile attacks by rogue states, terrorists, or irresponsible leaders. Indeed, clinging to the notion that Cold War instruments and policies can solve the security challenges of the twenty-first
century is illogical.
In testimony before the Senate Committee, Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor, stated, “I cannot imagine what an American president would say to the American public if there should be an attack and if
he would have to explain that he did nothing to prevent or defeat the resulting catastrophe.”2
The acquisition of WMD by states of concern (rogue) or potentially
other non-state actors have changed the nature of the strategic game. In
the new strategic game, rogue challengers possessing WMD and delivery
systems complicate U.S. deterrence goals.
The issue of National Missile Defense (NMD) must be placed in the
proper context. The new post-Cold War strategic environment is different,
therefore a new context and new perspectives must guide United States

Associate Professor, Political Science Department, United States Naval
Academy; Ph.D, University of Delaware.
1. KEITH B. PAYNE, DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE 143
(1996).
2. See Baker Spring, Missile Defense: Back to Reality, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION V IEWS 2001 (Feb. 14, 2001) at http://www.heritage.org/
views/2001/ed021401.html.
795
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policy makers in developing a proper response to the new threats in a
world of strategic multipolarity. “The term ‘strategic multipolarity’ refers
to an international system in which an increasing number of regional powers acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”3
Critics argue that deployment of a National Missile Defense system
would: (1) undermine the strategic logic of our deterrence policy; (2) negate the provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and (3)
generate an arms race with Russia and China. In this article I will advance
the following arguments for deploying a National Missile Defense system.
First, the current reliance on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a basis for deterring the emerging threats posed by development and spread of
WMD and the means of delivery by ballistic missiles is based on illogical
assumptions left over from the Cold War era. Second, the ABM Treaty
perpetuated MAD, and while it was the best arrangement during the Cold
War, its utility in the decade of the 21st century may be limited. Third,
deployment of a Limited National Missile Defense system would enhance
deterrence and provide a basis for further reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons, while shifting the focus of our deterrence from MAD to an enhanced defensive oriented deterrence strategy.
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD): A STRANGELOVEAN
CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE
While Americans may take some comfort that the threat of instantaneous nuclear annihilation has receded, the fact remains that the international security environment in which policymakers seek to advance U.S. interests and provide national security can be characterized as quasi-anarchic at
best, for the world is still a dangerous place. “While Russia and perhaps
one or two other countries will retain . . . the ability to devastate the United States, Moscow’s behavior will be conditioned by the same cold calculus of deterrence that kept the peace during the years of East-West confrontation.”4
The cold calculus of deterrence of the Cold War decades reflected a bipolar bias for strategic deterrence that was conceived and evolved in an
international environment dominated by two opposing ideological oriented
superpowers. This calculus mandated a reliance on strategic forces that
reinforced a strategic balance between the two nuclear armed adversaries,
3. Willie Curtis, The Assured Vulnerability Paradigm: Can it Provide a
Useful Basis for Deterrence in a World of Strategic Multi-Polarity, 16 DEFENSE
ANALYSIS 239 (2000).
4. ZALMAY ZHALILZAD & IAN O. LESSER , SOURCES OF C ONFLICT IN THE
21 ST CENTURY: REGIONAL FUTURES AND U.S. STRATEGY 18 (1998).
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thus emphasizing mutual assured destruction; a rather Strangelovean concept of deterrence based on the capability of both superpowers to insure
the destruction of the other’s society.
Indeed, in this strategic environment, the two “‘superpowers’ condition
closely resembles that of two scorpions in a bottle, each poised to strike,
yet prevented from doing so by the knowledge that if either struck first,
the other would respond and the demise of both were assured.”5 Today’s
strategic environment is characterized by a shift from strategic bipolarity
to one of strategic multipolarity in which the strategic assumptions underpinning the deterrence strategy of the Cold War decades must be reexamined.
What is clear is that the bipolar international system that produced an
international environment conducive to an aversion to risk-taking on the
part of the two nuclear armed superpowers and the strategy of MAD will
not suffice to provide a credible strategic deterrence in the twenty-first
century world of strategic multipolarity.
The transformed international strategic landscape clearly suggests that
the current reliance on MAD as a basis for deterring the emerging threats
posed by the development and spread of WMD and the means of delivery
by ballistic missiles is based on illogical assumptions left over from the
Cold War era. The major assumptions underpinning this Strangelovean
concept of deterrence include a policy described by Keith Payne as the
Assured Vulnerability Paradigm. 6
Payne explains that in the strategic bipolar environment of the Cold
War “[t]he superpowers, calculating rationally and sensibly, would refrain
from extreme provocation because of the ultimate possibility of nuclear
retaliation.”7 Thus, the implicit assumptions of this Strangelovean approach to deterrence were based on (1) the capability of both superpowers
to inflict unacceptable levels of destruction on each other and (2) that Soviet and U.S. leaders were rational decision makers willing to make policy
decisions using dispassionate, rational, cost-benefit calculations.
Indeed, the absence of a nuclear war between the two superpowers
Curtis, supra note 3, at 239.
See PAYNE, supra note 1, at 70-78 (discussing the Assured Vulnerability
Paradigm). Payne argues that
[t]his theory, the Assured Vulnerability theory [MAD] of deterrence
was popularized in the 1950s and 1960s, finding tremendous receptivity
on Capitol Hill, among Academic Commentators, and think tank specialists, journalists, government officials, and eventually in the military.
It became the prevailing paradigm … [a]s applied during the Cold War,
its basic precept was that threats of nuclear retaliation could provide a
reliable basis for deterrence.
Id. at 60-61.
7. Id.
5.
6.
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lends credibility to these assumptions; therefore, many strategic analysts
and policymakers are convinced that the reliability and predictability of
the MAD paradigm remains a desirable framework for strategic deterrence
in the twenty-first century. However, Payne challenges this assumption
and argues that, “[t]he Assured Vulnerability [MAD] paradigm assumes
the character of the opponent and the context to be amenable to deterrence
policies, and therefore it largely sets aside important contextual factors to
focus on the character of the strategic balance . . . .”8
The question becomes, will this Strangelovean concept of MAD provide
an effective deterrence, despite the dramatic changes that have and are still
occurring in the contemporary international environment? If one proceeds
from the premise that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile technologies is inevitable in a world of strategic multipolarity, one must posit that several regional powers, with hostile intent to
the interests and goals of the United States will become a part of the strategic landscape.
Within the context of strategic bipolarity, the logic of the principle assumption of the MAD paradigm of rational decision-making on the part of
the two superpowers was valid, for in a bipolar world in which both the
Soviet Union and the United States held similar views, experiences, and
knowledge of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, one might argue that they shared similar western perspectives on the use of force during the nuclear induced stability of the Cold War decades. However, can
we infer that a similar condition will exist in a world of strategic multipolarity, with several regional nuclear powers having dissimilar cultural and
decision making processes?
Michael O. Wheeler explains the implications of culture for rational decision making in his White Paper on Deterrence. He suggests that
“[t]raditional deterrence theory assumes a human actor who can reason,
communicate, anticipate and assess consequences, weigh them against
interests and values, form intentions, assess risks, balance gains and losses, and act accordingly — an actor who knows his own mind, keeps emotions out of his decisions . . . .”9
In a world of strategic multipolarity, one essential task is to be aware of
the impact of culture on perceptions of rationality from one culture to another. While this element of policy awareness was not a critical factor in
deterrence calculations between the two superpowers during the Cold War
decades, it is essential in a world of strategic multipolarity. Therefore,
Id. at 70-71.
Michael O. Wheeler, White Paper on Deterrence, Weapons of Mass
Destruction in Regional Equation: The New Deterrence Equation 18-19 (SAIC,
1995).
8.
9.
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“instead of thinking in terms of a general theory of deterrence,” Wheeler
argues, “we need to develop culture and society specific theories of deterrence.”10
Another factor that must be given critical analysis is one of the risktaking propensities of regional leaders armed with WMD and the means of
delivery. In a world of strategic multipolarity, an understanding of the
impact of culture on the propensity for regional leaders to take risk is critical.
In his study of risk-taking in decision-making, Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger
notes that
[c]ulture plays a role in molding perceptions of risk and in defining risks as
acceptable or not. ‘Culture would seem to be the coding principle by which
hazards are recognized. The cultural standards of what constitute appropriate
and improper risks emerge as a part of this assignment of responsibility.’ 11
The assumption of rationality as a key factor in the MAD theory of deterrence is also questionable because it is clear that a leader’s propensity for
risk-taking is linked to culture. Understanding this will be a key factor in
responding to the new strategic environment. Indeed, Vertzberger concludes that “[n]ot only is risk assessment culture-bound, but the preferred
strategy of coping with risk sometimes depends on attitudes nested in cultural norms about the desirability of risk-acceptance and risk aversion.”12
As an example, Vertzberger contends that “[i]n cultures that put a high
premium on life, decisions involving risk to lives produce a risk-averse
propensity, whereas in cultures that put a low premium on life, similar
decisions do not preclude a risk-acceptant propensity.”13
It is not the intent of this article to provide an extensive analysis of the
role that risk-taking plays in deterrence. Further research is necessary to
develop the data for understanding the many factors that played a minor
role in the calculus of the MAD theory of deterrence during the Cold War.
Given the new strategic environment, the assumption of a generically ra-
10. Id. at 37. Wheeler cites as an example: “It is worth recalling that Saddam Hussein’s closest and most culturally similar neighbors didn’t believe until
the last minute that he was serious in the gulf crisis of 1990.” Id. at 21. Indeed,
Wheeler cautions that “what is rational behavior may be quite complicated to figure out, even within one’s own culture much less across culture.” Id.
11. YAACOV Y.I. VERTZBERGER , R ISK TAKING AND DECISIONMAKING :
FOREIGN M ILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS 61 (1998)
12. Id. at 62. Vertzberger elaborates on the influence of culture in shaping
the leader’s perception of risk. He explains that “[b]y proving filters through
which people look at the world, culture may affect the assessment of all three
components of risk.” Id. at 61. He cites as an example the fact that, “the value of
human life varies across cultures.” Id.
13. Id.
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tional opponent model is not feasible. Therefore, consideration of the cultural implications for risk-taking is essential.
While an understanding of the motivations for the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction will depend on factors in addition to culture, it is important to remember the words of Albert Einstein:
“the atomic bomb has changed everything except the nature of man.” 14
Within the contexts of the new strategic environment, the assumptions of
the MAD strategy are at best of questionable utility in deterring future
regional leaders armed with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies.
Whereas, the analogy of the two scorpions in a bottle depicted the situation in a world of strategic bipolarity during the decades of the Cold War,
in a world of strategic multipolarity, the image may best be represented by
two large scorpions surrounded by several smaller, yet just as deadly scorpions. 15
MULTIPLE SCORPIONS IN THE BOTTLE: THE NEW CHALLENGE
FOR DETERRENCE AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE ABM TREATY
Critics of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system also argue that
deployment would undermine the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which they see as the cornerstone of the nuclear relationship between the
U.S. and Russia. They further insist that the ABM Treaty is critical to preserving strategic stability. The fact is that in the new strategic game, the
ABM Treaty is rapidly becoming an anachronism that only permits the
U.S. and Russia to mutually annihilate each other, thereby mutually deterring each other through the strategy of MAD.
Indeed, the ABM Treaty perpetuates MAD because it prevents both the
U.S. and Russia from protecting themselves against nuclear retaliation. In
the new strategic environment where proliferation of WMD and ballistic
missile technology is spreading, it is questionable if the MAD strategy is
appropriate, and thus whether the ABM Treaty, which was devised to cope
with a bipolar, rather than multipolar world, is appropriate as well. As
Henry Kissinger suggests:
Whatever, tenuous plausibility the MAD theory may have had in a twopower world evaporates when eight nations have tested nuclear weapons
and many rogue regimes are working feverishly on development of nucle-
14. MARGOT A. HENRIKSEN, DR. STRANGELOVE ’ S AMERICA: SOCIETY AND
CULTURE IN THE ATOMIC AGE xvi. (1996).
15. Willie Curtis, The Assured Vulnerability Paradigm: Can it Provide a
Useful Basis for Deterrence in a World of Strategic Multi-Polarity, in SEARCHING
FOR N ATIONAL S ECURITY IN AN NBC WORLD 239 (James M. Smith ed., 2000).
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ar, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as on
the ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. 16
He further argues,
[t]he contrast between the security situation of 1972, when the ABM Treaty
was signed, and today is stark. One signatory, the Soviet Union, has disappeared as a legal entity. Missile technologies have evolved in sophistication
and proliferation [in] nations (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan) not
considered likely candidates for advance military technology when the
agreement was concluded.”17
Kissinger concludes, “[a]s for the argument that national missile defense runs counter to the long-standing strategic concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, a reassessment of that doctrine is long overdue, whatever the view regarding missile defense.18
While not a common practice in nation-state relations during the twentieth century, it remains legal under international law to withdraw from a
treaty when it no longer serves the interests of the contracting parties. 19
The ABM Treaty is a bilateral treaty between the Soviet Union (now its
successor state, Russia) and the United States. Its provisions provided a
framework for a measure of security in the bipolar era of the Cold War
decades.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the demise of the nuclear threat that characterized that period, suggest that the 1972 ABM Treaty
is rapidly becoming an anachronism in the multipolar world of the twentyfirst century. The fact is that one consequence of reliance on MAD and the
ABM Treaty constraints is that “efforts of so-called rogue states to acquire
long-range missiles are encouraged by banning significant missile defenses.”20
While the ABM Treaty affected strategic relationships across the international system, altering or withdrawing from the Treaty has the potential
not only of “replacing deterrence with offense -- defensive arms races,
16. HENRY KISSINGER , DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY ? TOWARD A
DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 66 (2001).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 65.
19. See David E. Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. to Pull Out of Arms
Treaty, Clearing the Path for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at
A14. The argument may be a moot point because President Bush announced that
the United States would exercise its options under Article XV of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. See id. Article XV provides that either party, with six months
notice, may withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events r elated to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” Id.
20. J AMES J. WIRTZ & J EFFERY A. LARSEN, R OCKETS ’ R ED G LARE: MISSILE
DEFENSES AND THE FUTURE OF W ORLD POLITICS 6 (2001).
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[but more importantly,] it also has the potential to initiate a transition
away from deterrence based on mutual vulnerability to missile attacks and
towards a global strategic defense regime on other cooperative national
security policies.”21
Finally, it defies strategic logic to continue reliance on MAD and the
ABM Treaty to provide for deterrence in a world of strategic multipolarity. These bilateral agreements and perceptions of security needs were
based on a paradigm whose assumptions are questionable in the new international security environment of the twenty-first century. Therefore, the
critics of NMD should at least concede that while the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that perpetuates MAD might have been the best arrangement
during the bipolar decades of the Cold War, its utility in the present world
of strategic multipolarity is questionable at best.
ESCAPING THE NUCLEAR SPECTRE: DEPLOYING A LIMITED
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
The notion proposed by the rare heretic, that a proliferation of deterrents would magnify the influence of deterrence, was treated only as further proof that it takes all kinds to fill an asylum. But any real Strangelovean—one who loved the bomb in the purity of his heart—could only
see proliferators as potential converts to the noble goal of demilitarized
warfare in a disarmed world.22
In his book, Dr. Strangelove and the Hideous Epoch: Deterrence in the
Nuclear Age,23 John Renaker cites the case of Theodore B. Taylor, a
nuclear scientist working at Los Alamos weapons laboratory in the 1950s.
Taylor composed a letter home as a kind of apologia for his choice of
profession:
I think that there is only one realistic way to avoid war, and that is to make
the world really afraid of it …. If A-bombs in their present form will make
another war something which mankind cannot bear, and if most people don’t
realize this, then, I say, therefore is only one thing to do: develop a bomb
which will leave no doubt in anyone’s mind. 24
MAD, as a condition and strategy sought to accomplish Taylor’s vision
of creating an aversion to war for it is based on the threat of assured destruction of the two superpower’s societies. However, the question becomes: is this feasible in a world of strategic multipolarity, or is it un-
21. Id. at 7.
22. J OHN R ENAKER , DR. S TRANGELOVE AND THE HIDEOUS EPOCH:
DETERRENCE IN THE N UCLEAR AGE, 292 (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 318.
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thinkable to assume that policymakers in the United States and Russia will
grant that same status to a nuclear armed Iraq or Iran or other potentially
hostile regimes?
What then are the requirements of deterrence in a world of strategic
multipolarity? Should the United States continue to rely on MAD and the
ABM Treaty to provide for strategic stability or should National Missile
Defense become a part of the strategic equation? To answer these questions, let us revisit the scorpions in the bottle analogy. The requirements
of deterrence have become increasingly more complicated and specifically
the military requirements of deterrence under the Strangelovean concept
of MAD “would require that all scorpions in the bottle maintain an ability
to retaliate against all of the remaining scorpions, including the largest
ones.”25
In a world of strategic multipolarity with the inevitable proliferation of
WMD and ballistic missile technologies, it is prudent for both the United
States and Russia to move beyond reliance on MAD for deterrence. Leaders of regional states with small intercontinental ballistic missile forces
may not be risk-aversive to the extent that they find credible a threat of
nuclear retaliation and may be quite willing to risk massive destruction to
obtain regional objectives and regime survival.
RETREATING FROM DR. STRANGELOVE OR HOW I LEARN TO
STOP WORRYING AND LOVE MAD
In scene six of that 1960s classic film, Dr. Strangelove: Or How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,26 General Ripper explained
to Group Captain Lionel Mandrake the answer to the question—”Do you
recall what Clemenceau once said about war?” 27
He said war was too important to be left to the generals. When he said
that fifty years ago, he might have been right. Now war is too important to
be left to the politicians. They have neither the time, the training nor the
inclination for strategic thought.28
The fact that we are entering a world of strategic multipolarity where
regional states are acquiring WMD and the means of delivery suggests
that the inclination to think strategically about deterrence in the new strategic game is becoming essential despite the end of the Cold War. The
25. Curtis, supra note 3, at 245.
26. DR. STRANGELOVE: OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE
THE
BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1963).
27. R ENAKER, supra note 22, at 394.
28. Id.
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new strategic game must not be assessed within the context and concepts
of the Cold War paradigms and assumptions, for during the first decade of
the 21st century nearly thirty countries have ballistic missiles. Moreover,
fourteen of those countries produce and export those missiles to some of
those regional states that are considered rogue or states of concern.
The new concepts of deterrence should include a multi-track approach
that will address the new threats and consist of the following: (1) continued testing and eventual deployment of a Limited National Missile Defense System; and (2) shifting to a Multilateral rather than a bilateral treaty approach in limiting the size of the arsenals of the United States, Russia, Peoples Republic of China and potential regional nuclear states.
Continued testing and eventual deployment of a limited NMD system
has the potential to enhance deterrence and provide a basis for further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, while shifting the focus of our deterrence from a reliance on MAD to an enhanced defensive oriented deterrence strategy.
“Deployment of even a limited national missile defense system consisting of between 20 to 100 interceptors may discourage countries from acquiring ballistic missiles and help to persuade potential adversary that
blackmailing or coercing the United States will not succeed.” 29 A limited
national missile defense system of this nature would not present a threat to
Russia or China. As Wirtz argues:
this deployment option poses no realistic threat to Russian or Chinese ability
to strike the United States with warheads carried by intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM). This option would provide the United States with significant denial capability, however, against an emerging North Korean missile
threat to American territory. 30
Wirtz discusses three scenarios for consideration: Threshold Capability
1, Limited Defense in a Cooperative Setting; Capability 3 Plus, Enhanced
Defenses and the Limits of Cooperation; and Unlimited Defenses, Unconstrained by Treaty.31 The Threshold Capability Option “provide[s] the
United States with a capability to protect itself against an accidental missile launch or very small, deliberate attacks that approach U.S. territory
29. W IRTZ & LARSEN, supra note 20, at 9.
30. Id. For an extended discussion of the various NMD deployment op-
tions, see Charles L. Glaser & Steve Fetter, National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 26 INT’ L SECURITY 40 (2001).
31. The Threshold Capability 1 of NMD “consider[s] a ‘threshold’ deplo yment of between 20 and 100 interceptors in a new base located in central Alaska
…. The lowest level that the threshold system could engage is a maximum of
somewhere between five and ten warheads flying towards the United States over
the North Pacific Ocean.” W IRTZ & LARSEN, supra note 20, at 9-10.
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from the northwest.”32
The deployment of this version of a limited missile defense system
should be undertaken with an equal emphasis on diplomatic means to acquire multilateral agreements with Russia and the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) to limit their long-ranged strategic missiles to a level that is
not threatened by a limited U.S. national missile defense system.
The first step of this multilateral diplomatic approach is for the United
States and Russia to agree to further reductions of strategic missile forces
to a level of 1,000 single warhead missiles. The second step is to engage
the PRC in multilateral arms limitation discussions 33 and then seek further
reductions once they are confident that they are not threatened by NMD
deployment. This should provide each state with protection from potential
threats from regional nuclear states in a world of strategic multipolarity
(the multiple scorpions in the bottle dilemma). A third diplomatic approach would be to engage other regional nuclear states and potential
states in strategic arms limitation talks to further reduce the size of their
strategic nuclear forces.
These steps should be considered a start on the long path to shifting the
security of the United States from a reliance on MAD. While it would be
overly optimistic to assume that this will be accomplished in this decade,
the fact that we are entering a world of strategic multipolarity -- regional
powers will acquire WMD and the means of delivery -- suggests that
prudence demands this two-track approach to providing security in the
21st century. By continuing the testing and eventual deployment of a
limited NMD system, and starting the process of engaging Russia and the
PRC in multilateral negotiations to limit their strategic nuclear weapon
systems, diplomatic engagements will enhance the possibility of shifting
from MAD to a defense oriented deterrence strategy.
In the meantime, given the nature of the strategic environment, the advice of that wise American, Will Rogers, should be heeded: “[d]iplomacy
is the art of saying ‘nice doggie’ until you can find a rock.” 34 In a world of
strategic multipolarity, the rock may indeed be a limited national missile
defense system.
32. Id.
33. Initially, in the case of the PRC, consideration must be given to increa s-
ing their strategic forces to 1000 single-warhead missiles.
34. TOM C LANCY, OP C ENTER: ACTS OF W AR 149 (Berkeley Books, 1997).