Huma:660 Student name: Hui Hung Hing Patrick Topic: National interests’ and Ideology’s role to the outbreak of the Korean war: a study of the decision-making process. The outbreak of the Korean War led to direct military confrontation between China and the United States. More than twenty years Sino-American relations improved. Historians were still studying about the causes of the war. Was it an invasion well planned by Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao tse-tung? Or, misperception and miscalculation brought about this tragedy. How national security concern and ideology contributed to the outbreak of the war. This paper tried to answer these questions. It would examine the role played by China, the Soviet Union, the United States in this war since they were major actors in this war. Certainly, war could only be make out by more than one party. Thus, it was necessary to analysis the rationale of decision-making process among China, the Soviet Union and the United States. Firstly, China’s decision to enter the war was examined. Secondly, the played by the Soviet Union was examined. Thirdly, the United States response to Korean situation. Fourthly, the interaction among the three parties consideration. To China, Korean peninsula was vital to its national security. The memory about how Japan made use Korean peninsula as a springboard to invade China during the 1 First Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 was unforgettable to Chinese leadership. It was understood that since the Korean War was broke out, the CCP was alarmed that foreign imperialist countries replaced Japan as the major foe to China and its Northeast territory which was the base of heavy industries and rich in natural resources was seriously threatened. As a result, scholars argued that it was reason that China decided to intervene into the war. Was it the whole story? Were there other considerations when the CCP decided to enter the war. How did ideology interplayed with national security. From newly disclosed documentary evidence, China neither did not expected another was in foreseeable future nor had prepared for a war with the United States. In fact, Mao believed that the United States military intervention into China on behalf of the KMT had diminished significantly. As the CCP troops were pursuing the KMT troops along the coastal areas in early 1949, especially when the PLA crossed the Yangtze river and took Nanjing the next day, and seized Shanghai on 27 May 1949, the U.S. troops had not intervened as Mao expected. To account for this, Mao believed that the U.S. military and strategic concern were in Europe and limited resources and support from allies did not allow the U.S. to play an active role in the Far East. Mao’s worry was further relieved after the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made public that Taiwan and South Korea were not included in the U.S. 2 Western Pacific defense perimeter in January 1950. In addition the U.S. president Truman stated that the U.S. military forces would stay out of the Chinese Civil War. From this perspective, Sino-American confrontation even was possible but not imminent. In addition, China had neither prepared nor willing for another major war. In reality, China needed to recover its war-torn economy. More important, the CCP should stabilize its new regime. To defeat those remaining of KMT and reactionaries at home and liberate Taiwan were the primary and immediate goals for the CCP. In fact, Mao was optimistic. What the U.S. did not intervene. Even on the day before the outbreak of the Korean War. The People’s Daily published the closing speech made by Mao at the Second Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, that Mao announced: “we have basically passed the test of war.” In military aspect, large scale of demobilization process further convinced that China did not intend and ready to combat any adversary. In May 1950, the CCP central committee decided to demobilize the PLA from 5.4 million to 1.4 million. The target number was further increased in June. Even on 30 June 1950, five days after the outbreak of war, the Central Demobilization Commission further continued the process. However, in spite of its internal difficulties, Many argued that China did assist 3 Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea. The most persuading evidence was that China agreed to return back 14,000 North Korean communists with their arms to North Korea. Accordingly, they had fought with Chinese Communist against KMT during the Chinese Civil War. In fact, the figure was possibly larger than expected. As Chen Jian believed that there were as many as 50,000-70,000 Korean-nationality PLA soliders returned to North Korea. Nevertheless, it should be prudent with this argument. Undoubtedly, such decision strengthened the North Korean communist troops’ combat capacity. Yet, it could not say that Mao deliberately cooperate with Kim in order to invade South Korea or Mao prepared to intervene Korean affairs. At least, it was not true in the short run. Firstly, Mao was preoccupied by internal political and economic difficulties as mentioned above. Moreover, the relationship between China and North Korea was close but they had not further strengthened such intimate relationship. For example, not until 6 October , 1949, did China officially set up an official embassy in Pyonyuang and the China’s Ambassador to Pyonguang, Ni Zhiliang was still on sick leave in Wuhan and resumed his duty since late August 1950 that Korean War was broke out for more than two months. In addition, the only Chinese insitution in Pyongyang was the commercial Representative office of the Northeast China Adminstration Committee. Obviously, if Mao had planned in advance to assist Kim to invade South Korea, it was logical and necessary to establish 4 communication channels between the two parties. In short, Mao did not expect war occurred soon in Korea. In addition, newly disclosed documentary evidence indicated that early in January 1950 when Mao was discussing with Stalin about the terms of Sino-Russian treaty, Kim was also in Moscow, Kim requested Stalin’s assistance about his unification plan. Afterwards, Stalin sought Mao’s opinion. According to Khruschev, Mao had not shown his stance clearly. But he agreed to Kim’s plan in principle because he believed that American military intervention was unlikely. Meanwhile, Stalin approved Kim’s plan to unify Korea by military means and agreed to provide the necessary military supplies and equipments. Their boldness was based on the calculation that the U.S. would not intervene if the war was quickly ended. Although Kim told his plan to unify Korea by military means to Mao. However, Kim did not let Mao know neither the date of invasion nor the detail of his plan. Kim visited China secrety in 13-16 May, 1950 via his trip to Moscow in April 1950. Again, Kim told Mao about his intention to unite Korea but not the details of the attack. Like before, Mao agreed with Kim in principle. However, Mao believed that it was not appropriate at that time to invade the South Korea. The war did broke out in 20 June, 1950. Certainly Mao was surprised and so did Truman. Both sides respond swiftly and decisively. At this moment, mutual 5 misperception and miscalculation about the other’s motives and demands increased mutual suspicions and security dilemma. Also, deterrence and assurances did not work at all. Accordingly, China entered the war reluctantly. On 7 and 10 July, 1950, one week after the outbreak of war, the CCP held two urgent meetings to discuss the Korean situation. To prepare the mishaps, China decided to reinforce defense capability in Northeast Korea by transforming the Thirteeth Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army into the Northeastern Border Defense Army (NEBDA). By early August, more than 250,000 troops had taken position along the Chinese-Korean border” Obviously, China was only held a defensive position. Yet, after the U.N. successfully landed at Inchon on 15 September and the North Koreans troops were in a very disadvantage position, China decided to prepare itself to enter the war if the UN. troops moved northward especially across the 38th parallel. In fact, China predicted successfully that the UN troops possibly landed at Konsan and Inchon in order to attack North Korean troops from the rear. After UN troops landed at Inchon, China accelerated the process to decide whether to enter the war. As Chen Jian put it: “ It is apparent that after Inchon the question for Chinese leaders became not if China should send troops to Korea, but when and under what circumstances. Thus, the CMCC decided on 17 September to send military officers to Korea in order to survey 6 Korean topography and situation. In the meantime that, Chinese leaderships worried most was U.S. intervention in the Taiwan strait. Mao perceived that the U.S. China policy had been changed from a conciliatory to a confrontation at stance. As a matter of fact, the U.S. administration re-emphasized the strategic importance of Taiwan after the Korean War was broke out. Firstly, General Douglas MacArthur visited Taiwan without authorization in Spring 1950. He explicitly pointed out that Taiwan was an “ unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tenders”, which opposited to Dean Acheson’s official view. Chinese leadership took these changes seriously. Mao’s speech at the Central People’s State Conference could illustrated this clearly. He said: “ Truman proclaimed on 5 January of this year that America would not interfere in Taiwan; now he has proven that was false. Moreover, at the same time (he) tore up all international agreements (stating that the U.S. would) not intervene in China’s civil war. By doing this America has exposed its own imperialist face.”According to Chinese leadership’s analysis, if both Korea peninsula and Taiwan fell to American, China’s national security was under serious and constant threat. On one hand from Korea peninsula, the U.S. could launch attack to Northeast China where was China’s heavy industry base and rich in natural resources, the U.S. could cooperate with KMT troops and launch on an attack toward east and southeast coast of China like Shanghai and Tietsin on the other. In fact, Zhou 7 En-lai expressed the same worry. He linked the Korean and Taiwan issue together. He emphasized that: “ For us, the Korean question is not simply a question concerning Korea, it is related to the Taiwan issue. The U.S. imperialists have adopted a hostile attitude towards us and set up their defence line in the Taiwan strait while paying lip service to non-aggression and non-intervention. From the information we got, they wanted to calm China first and after occupying North Korea, they will come to attack China”. From this moment, China had to prepare itself to enter the war. Yet, it was doubtful whether China would enter the war if the UN. troops did not cross 38th parallel and move toward the Yalu river. On 2nd October 1950, two days after the third Division of the South Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel, the CCP convened an urgent meeting of the Party Politburo Standing Committee and decided to enter the war. As Mao declared to his comrades: “ the question now is not whether we should send troops to Korea or not, but how fast we can do this. One day’s difference will be crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions―when should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander.” In fact, during the meeting between Mao and Kim on 16 May, about the terms of treaty of friendship and alliance between China and North Korea, Mao indicated that unless the imperialist countries crossed the 30th parallel China would not intervene into Korean internal 8 affairs. Since Mao’s greatest concern was the physical security of the newly established regime, it was logical that China would intervene in one way or the other. Would China decide not to enter the war if the U.N. troops did not cross the 38th parallel? Definitely, it could not be complety known. What we know from these new evidence was that after U.S. troops occupied and altered its policy toward Taiwan, Mao perceived that the Sino-American confrontation could not be avoided. As Thomas J. Christensen said: “ Mao believed war was inevitable after the earlier American reversal on Taiwan policy and the crossing of the 38th parallel.” Even before the Inchon landing, Mao had told his comrades the reasons why China should prepare at a politburo meeting on 4 August 1950 that: “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could bee further decided, but we have to prepare for this.” Again on 13 October, Mao explained his decision to enter the war more clearly to his comrades. He said that: “If we are able to eliminate several puppet divisions in this stage, the Korean situation would take a turn for our favour. The above positive policy will be very advantages to China, to Korea, to the East, and even to the whole world. If we do not send off our troops, and allow the enemy to reach the Yalu River, the 9 enemy will be swollen with arrogance. This will result in a variety of disadvantages to us, especially to the Northeast area. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army will be tied down there, and electric power in South Manchuria will be controlled (by the enemy), In short, we think that we should enter the war, we have to enter the war. To enter the war will be very rewarding, not to enter the war will be extremely harmful.” Besides, Mao’s decision included the internal political situation. Mao believed that American reactionary behaviour would stimulate those reactionaries at home. This was a serious threat to the new regime. Thus, it was necessary for China to enter the war and to punish foreign imperialist countries especially the U.S. Michael H. Hun judged the situation correctly : “ An unchecked American advance in Korea would draw wavering countries and classes to the side of the U.S., strengthen the resolve of reactionaries at home and abroad and encouraged the U.S. to send troops to other points along Chinas broder.” If war was unavoidable, China would be better to choose the place to fight against foreign foe. According to Mao’s analysis, the U.S. troops could invade mainland China from three areas. They were Vietam, Taiwan strait and Korea. Mao believed that China should took the initative to stage an offensive war against foreign foes in Korea where hilly areas made logistic difficult for enemies. In addition, it was close to China and Soviet Union’s Far East that it was convinent for China to transport necessary supplies to the ba ttle field. 10 Moreover, China’s decision should be put in the context of Sino-Soviet relations. Although Stalin send limited military forces to Korea, the Soviet Union played an important role in the war and Mao’s calculation. Precisely, Stalin had several strategic concerns over Korea up to late 1949. firstly, Stalin did not want to see either a re-militarized Japan or the United States dominated Korea that the Soviet Union’s Far East territory would be seriously and constantly threatened. Thus, Stalin helped North Korea to establish its government and trained its cadres. Secondly, as the leader of the socialist camp, Stalin wanted to exert its influences in the Far East but avoided military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. In order to achieve these objectives, Stalin took a cautious Korea policy. Stalin adopted former Tsarist or pre-1905 strategy over the Far East, that was the balance of power among actors so that the status quo and Soviet’s interest could be maintained. Stalin agreed trusteeship for Korea at the foreign minister conference held in Moscow in December 1945. Stalin tried to maintain a socialist and friendly regime in the North. Also, he was uncomfortable with a hostile government set up by Syngman Rhee. Other Soviet leadership including foreign minister Andrei Moscow in December 1945. After Stalin felt safe, he ordered Soviet troops to withdraw from Korea Peninsula by the end of 1948, seven months earlier than the U.S. At the same time, Stalin turned down Kim’s request Soviet’s assistance to unify Korea during Kim’s visit to Moscow in March 11 1949. In fact, other Soviet leaders including foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and defense Minister Nikolai Bulgonin opposed Kim’s plan to unify Korea by force. They believed that: “ an advance to the South by the People’s Army can give the Americans a pretext to raise this issue at the UN Session, to blame the government of the PPRK for aggression and get the consent of the General Assembly for the introduction into South Korea of Americans troops.” In this context, Stalin instructed his ambassador in Pyongyong, Terentii F. Shtykov, that he should obstruct Kim to provoke an assault to the South. In addition, Stalin ordered to dismantle the Soviet naval base in Chongjin and the air force liason officies in Pyongyang and Konggye, Yet, Stalin like Mao and Kim misperceived that the U.S. planned to lessen commitment to Syngman Rhee’s government. The U.S. adminstration published the NSC-48 in December 1949 which pronounced that the U.S. defense perimeter only included Japan and Philippines but not Korea Peninsula in Western Pacific. Due to decrease in risk of U.S. intevention Stalin increasing inclined or eager to assist Kim to unify Korea by force although she still feared that such a move would drag the Soviet Union into direct conflict with the U.S. In fact, the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty on 6 January 1950 and he recognized Ho Chi Minh’s government in Vietnam. All these policies indicated that Stalin took an more active role in the Far 12 East.. In order to show his sincerity, Stalin even sent a military advisory group led by Lieutenant General Bashiler, a hero of the German-Soviet War, to North Korea and helped to draft the military plan for Kim to pursue his ambitious goal. Accordingly, the military plan entitled Preemptive Strike Operational Plan.”. Obviously, at that moment Stalin endorsed Kim’s long request plan to invade the South. Even though Stalin adopted an more aggressive policy in Korea, he was cautious that it would not lead to the U.S. intervention. Thus, he urged Kim to seek assistance from Mao. . The UN. troops landed at Inchon successfully was a serious blow to Stalin’s optimistic calculation. Immediately, Stalin urged Mao to rescue Kim’s fate. Stalin rehtorically used national security consideration to persuade Mao that: “ If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.” Clearly, Stalin was extremely worried that the Soviet Union would be dragged into the war and comfront directly with the UN. troops. So, China’s intervention was vital. And after Mao notifed Stalin his decision to enter the war, Stalin was reliefed. In order to guarantee Soviet Union’s non-involvement, Stalin ordered that all Soviet’s ships and aircrafts were not allowed to intrude into battlefield. In addition, he refused to offer air protection for Chinese troops across the Yalu River. 13 Even in later stage, Soviet aircrafts had limited operation in Korea, Stalin ordered those pilots to wear North Korea uniform and not to communicate in Russian. More important, they were not allowed to fly across the 38th parallel. Not only did American reaction an important factor influencing Stalin’s consideration, Sino-Soviet relationship was also an important factor. As, Kathryn Weathersby believed that: “ Stalin’s relationship with Mao affected his decision regarding Korea because if Stalin were to refuse to support Kim Il Sung’s perfectly reasonable goal of reunifying his country, which was comparable to what Mao had just accomplished in China, then Stalin would again he open to the charge of hindering the cause of revolution in the East. His position as the leader of the communist camp would be weakened while the authority and prestige of Mao, to whom Kim would obviously turn and who had a blood debt to support the Korea communists, would rise. “ Moreover, Adam Ulam estimated that Stalin could make use this war to put China more dependent on the Soviet Union. He put that: “ It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Korean imbroglio was instigated by the Russians for the specific purpose of discouraging the Chinese Communists from breaking away from Soviet tutelage.” . Mao understood Stalin’s caution so that he tried to show Stalin his faith and 14 loyalty to the socialist bloc. And he was not pursuing titoism. Also, Mao needed Soviet’s protection and supplies especially air umberlla over Chinese coastal territory and Korea. In fact, by late 1950, the Soviet Union had sent two air force divisions to defend the Yalu river bridge and the major transport line 100 kilometres south of the Yulu river. Although Mao needed Soviet’s supplies, he also tried to compete with Soviet’s over revolutionary leadership. Mao put the Korea crisis into an East Asian affair. From Mao’s telegram to Zhou dated 2nd October 1950 about his decision to enter the war, his ideological concern was clearly illicited. Mao stressed: “ We think this is a necessary step because if we allow Korea to be occupied by the Americans, the Korean revolutionary forces will be completely destroyed. We will then see the American invaders more rampant which will be very unfavourable to the whole East.” Even Mao was notified by Zhou who was negotiating on military support with Stalin in the Black Sea, that Stalin would not offer air protection for Chinese Reople Volunteers (CPV), Mao still implemented his decision. As he told Zhou that Korea’s fate was not only vital to China but also the destiny of an Eastern and world revolution. Finally, what role did the United States played in generating the war. Similar to Mao’s concern, Truman perceived serious Soviet’s threat in the earlier stage that he 15 approved to rescue South Korea and, more important, to contain the spread of communism in the Far East. In fact, Korea, unlike Japan and Philippines, had limited strategic importance to the U.S. Yet, after the Soviet Union acquired the first atomic bomb in August 1949 and Soviet’s tense relations with west over Germany and Eastern Europe, the U.S. adminstration felt insecure. Moreover, the victory of Communism in China furtheer increased the power of the socialist bloc in the Far East. Thus, the U.S. government approved the NSC-68 in the Spring of 1950. Accordingly, the U.S. offered $100 million economic and military aid to South Korea. Thus, the sudden attack by North Korea to the South was interpreted as a serious challenge to the U.S. interest in Asia that the U.S. should respond firmly and rapidly. Based on earlier bitter experience between the U.S. and China like the ward case and red scare atmosphere initiated by politicians like MaCarthy Truman and Acheson had difficultly to alter China policy that was to drive communist China away from the Soviet Union. As Thomas J. Christensen said: “ the CCP’s anti-American policies must strongly constrained the adminstrations” options by amplifying domestic criticisms of any proposal for change in China policy. “ To make the matter worse, mutual distrust added with lack of communication channel due to non-recognition policy pared the way of confrontation 46 i. P. 271. Firstly, the U.S. did not pay much attention to China’s warning and determined to 16 push through the 38th parallel. On 2nd October, although China had already decided to enter the war, Zhou still warned the U.S. not to cross the 38th parallel through Indian Ambassador to China Panikkar, otherwise China would enter the war and fight with the North Koreans. Eventually, since U.S. wanted to win the war as quickly as possible and underestimated the determination of Chinese leaders. Truman authorized MarArthur to cross the 38th parallel and approach to the Yulu river. At that moment, direct military confrontation between China and the U.S. was unavoidable. 17