Bush Doctrine versus Madman Diplomacy:
The Korean Issue
Introduction
The Korean peninsula is one of the global hot spot in IR studies today. Both the North
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the South Republic of Korea are
heavily armed, the situation is potentially explosive. Since the 1953 armistice a series of
diplomatic efforts had been launched to pacify such situation. Promising progress was
seen in the 90s, thanks to the initiative of Clinton’s administration. The 911 incident deals
a serious blow to these efforts and DPRK were labeled as one of the “Axis of Evil”. The
relationship between the two is deteriorating. Recently the North Korean nuke crisis
strikes the fear of war deep into the peninsula. In this article, we will examine the
different guiding principles of the US and DPRK, namely ‘Bush Doctrine’ and ‘Madman
Diplomacy’ respectively. We will also study the imminent conflict of these two
principles in the diplomatic arena.
Korean Issue: A Game Theory approach
Game theory is used for studying the strategic interactions between the two parties or
more. By presenting the situation in game models, we will know the problem in a more
systematic way and deeper insights can be drawn. The US and the North Korea will be
the two major players in the game models. Under the US protection, the South Korea
follows the major lines of US foreign policy and plays a lesser role than US in the
confrontation with the North Korea. In view of this we can exclude the South Korea from
our models without hurting our analysis.
For all the games in this essay, we have two strategies: ‘Comply’ and ‘Defy’.
‘Comply’ means cooperation for example having the peace negotiation. ‘Defy’ means
some hard-line diplomatic or even military actions. The meaning of such two strategies
will be the same for both US and North Korea.
Bush’s Doctrine: Preemption
The American foreign policies had been dominated by her Unilateralism since Bush
came to power. Bush Doctrine then became the guiding principle of American diplomatic
behaviors after 911. Bush Doctrine suggests that the American national security should
be best upheld by preemption. Preemption in the case of North Korea means that tougher
US policy should be adopted instead of Clinton’s ‘Normalization policy’. North Korea’s
development program of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) worries the US most.
In this sense US should move first to out power North Korea, no matter militarily or
diplomatically. Under the grand strategy of ‘Anti-Terrorism War’, US even can justify
any action intervening other countries’ sovereignty, a preemptive strike on North Korea
is possible.
Game theory is applicable to examining Bush’s Doctrine. In fact, perceived by the
US, it is a game of preemption with North Korea. Here preemption means the US should
be a first mover to adopt the Bush’s Doctrine. The doctrine may not need to be a military
strike. It is a kind of uncompromising attitude shown to the North Korea that US will
stick to the Bush Doctrine no mater North Korea chooses to defy or comply. The
implication is threatening to North Korea. In the face of the doctrine, weighting the gain
and cost, it is not wise for the North Korea to defy as it may bring the total destruction of
the state (as seen as the largest negative payoff of the game) so it is likely that the North
will be forced to comply. Such outcome serves best to the US strategic interests in the
peninsula.
Figure 1 Bush’s Preemption Game
USA
North
Korea
Defy
Comply
Defy
-1, -1
2, 0
Comply
0, 2
1, 1
North Korea’s Madman Diplomacy
North Korea has long tradition of ‘Madman Diplomacy’. Their diplomatic behaviors
seem to be irrational and hard to comprehend. These actions include bombing a South
Korean jet liner right before the Seoul Olympics, its abrupt withdrawal of the Non
Proliferation Treaty, sudden missile test against Japan, and surprisingly some warm
engagements with the South sometimes. The crisis now escalates and the North even
claims to have nukes. Yet to our knowledge such ‘Madman Diplomacy’ does have some
rational political implications. Under shrewd calculations the North breaks the regional
order and plays its own way to maximize its national interests. We will interpret the
‘Madman Diplomacy’ as a dominant strategy of the North to deal with hard-line US
policy. The general pattern of such diplomacy can be observed: seeking the world
attention as the first step and pushing her demands to the US as the next.
In the language of game theory, North Korea is playing a Chicken Game. The
‘Madman Diplomacy’ serves as signal to the US and North Korea’s defiance. Such
defiance would mean a total war if it clashes with the Bush’s Doctrine. To avoid such
explosive situation the US will be forced to comply.
Figure 2 North Korea’s Madman Diplomacy
USA
North
Korea
Defy
Comply
Defy
-1, -1
2, 0
Comply
0, 2
1, 1
The situation: Prisoners’ Dilemma
Foreign policy as an instrument is greatly affected by the perception of policy
makers. The US and the North Korea may think they are playing different kind of games.
However we will argue that the situation in the peninsula is a typical Prisoners’ Dilemma
from a game-theoretic point of view.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma suggests that it’s hard for both parties to cooperate (i.e.
cell [Comply, Comply]). Without mutual trust and understanding of each other such
cooperative outcome will be impossible to enforce. While one party cooperates the other
may be tempted to defy secretly for greater interests. Due to the simultaneous defiant
actions by both parties, in such game [Defy, Defy] will be the equilibrium eventually.
Therefore we can see the difficulties in the Korean peace process. That accounts for the
extremely high tension in the Korean Peninsula.
Figure 3. The Prisoners’ Dilemma
USA
North
Korea
Defy
Comply
Defy
-1,-1
2,0
Comply
0,2
1,1
Path to peace and security
The major task of both parties is to move from the uncompromising outcome [Defy,
Defy] back to the cooperative outcome of [Comply, Comply]. The theoretical solution for
this dilemma is coordination and cooperation. Here we propose both active containment
and engagement can help to defuse the explosive situation.
In face of such North Korea’s ‘Nuclear Blackmail’, complete US compromise will
mean something bad for all. Containment can be used to largely disable the ‘Madman
Diplomacy’ as an instrument. Resources should be dedicated to facilitate ground and
communication surveillances done by satellites and other electronic devices. North
Korean import and export activities of weapons, military technology, illegal goods and
materials should be contained. This can be done by joint- country custom and excise
effort. Both China and Russia has their own stakes on North Korea. They can check and
balance North Korea’s ‘Madman Diplomacy’.
On the other hand engagement is needed. Creative diplomatic solutions can bring
new hope to the peninsula: the ‘Sunshine Policy’ is one of them. Here we propose the US
should lessen her role in negotiation with the North Korea. Instead the South Korea
should play a larger role. The US should only provide some necessary military and
economic backup to support South Korea in the negotiation. The two Koreas should be
on their own to solve their problems. To overcome the in-built problems of the Prisoners’
Dilemma, sincere cooperation and open negotiation as suggested is needed to enforce the
peace.
Facing the nearly complete collapse of her economy, we can understand why the
North Korea plays ‘Madman Diplomacy’. In the long run economic activities will open a
new dimension to the end of the Korean Issue. Being isolated from the world for more
than five decades, efforts should be dedicated to invite the North Korea back to the
international society. The future trade and development done will help the North to stand
on their own. The military solution will become less favorable for her.