G:/programmes/development/46.4 articles/Iyer
4217 words
Religion, Reproduction and Development in Contemporary India
Sriya Iyer
Abstract
Sriya Iyer explains inter-group differences in demographic and development
outcomes in India. She evaluates the role of religion in demography and development
with reference to Hinduism and Islam, religious institutions, and the manner in which
textual theology is interpreted at the local level. She shows the influence of socioeconomic characteristics on fertility, from a study among Hindu and Muslim women
in Karnataka, India. On the basis of this theoretical and empirical evidence, she argues
that economic circumstance rather than religion explains fertility differences between
religious groups in India.
Keywords: religious institutions; demography; Islam; Hinduism; socio-economic
differentials; poverty
Economics and fertility in India
In contemporary India, religion is linked not only with the economics of survival, it is
also fundamentally and inexorably linked with the politics of fertility. The interaction
between religion, reproductive behaviour and development in India is complex. It is
influenced by religious ideology, the nature of collective identity-formation in India’s
history, and the competitive nature of India’s political process. More significantly,
inter-religious differences in demographic and development outcomes are affected by
economic circumstances, which are often more important than the content of religious
beliefs per se.
The debate about faith and fertility in India has proceeded in parallel with the rise of
the ‘communalism’ phenomenon and an increased incidence of religious conflicts,
particularly between Hindus and Muslims. Scholars of development are aware that the
‘communalism’ phenomenon is one that uses religion not merely as a set of beliefs or
ethical values, but as a means to establish the identity of a social community in order
to attain economic or political ends. But religion performs many roles in a society: it
may act as a means to construct an identity, and it can function as a tool of dissent.
Historically, religion in India has long been used as a tool of dissent. For example, the
Bhakti movement in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mobilized popular
support against the ritualistic and dogmatic finality characteristic of Hinduism and
Islam at the time. Religion also promulgates norms within religious groups, fostering
networks and the development of ‘social capital’ among co-religionists. Religious
institutions are significant examples of non-market institutions that may substitute for
what economists term ‘missing markets’ in developing societies. Religion also acts as
a force for group-mobilization in a developing society, facilitating the competition for
economic rents in the process of development: this is because religion exercises
legitimacy both in the eyes of the masses and in the perception of the state. All this
brings sharply into focus the role that religion plays in the development of poor
societies.
Development economists and practitioners have focused on the economic and
political factors that underlie religious conflicts, such as the insecurity of the poor or
inequality between classes (Bagchi, 1991). Demographers postulate that religion can
affect reproductive behaviour specifically in terms of a ‘pure religion effect’ where
the intellectual content of religion affects fertility, secondly in terms of a
‘characteristic effect’ where socio-economic attributes of individual members of
different religions matter, and finally in terms of a ‘minority group status effect’
where a religious group exhibits higher fertility as a response to its minority status in
a society. Consequently, the implications for development of the demographic
differences between religious groups in developing countries such as India have been
the subject of much recent popular and academic debate (see, for example, Moulasha
and Ramarao, 1999; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2002; Iyer, 2002).
Differences in fertility among religious groups in India
The empirical evidence suggests that Hindu and Muslim fertility differs in India. In
terms of distribution, Hindus form over 80 per cent of India’s population and Muslims
form about 12.5 per cent. There is a difference of one child per woman, on average, in
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) between Hindus and Muslims at national and state level
(Sharif, 1999). According to the most recent National Family Health Survey, the TFR
for Muslims is about 3.6 and that for Hindus is about 2.8 (IIPS and ORC Macro
International, 2000). The differences between Hindu and Muslim fertility are also
more pronounced in the northern states of India as compared to the south. Thirty six
per cent of India’s Muslim population live in the north Indian states of Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh. The fertility rate for both Hindus and Muslims in the southern states is
less, relative to their counterparts in the north, although there are significant withinstate variations. Data on age-specific fertility rates also show that Muslim women
have larger numbers of children at earlier ages than Hindu women, or indeed any
other religious group in India (Sharif, 1999). Hence, the empirical data suggest that
the all-India TFR for Muslims is considerably higher than that for Hindus; that
Muslims are bearing larger numbers of children at earlier ages than are any other
religious group in the population; and that this difference is approximately one child
on average. May we attribute these differences to a ‘pure religion effect’, or
alternatively may they be explained better in terms of the socio-economic
‘characteristics’ of individual members of different religions (Iyer, 2002)? Two
possible explanations for inter-group differences in fertility in India are considered:
the influence of religious theology and religious institutions, and the importance of
socio-economic characteristics.
Religious theology as an explanation for inter-group differences in fertility
While a cursory view of Islam and Hinduism suggests two very different religions, a
more detailed investigation, specifically in the context of demography and India,
suggests many similarities between them. The literature on Muslim and Hindu
theological positions related to demography is derived from a number of sources. The
institutional requirements of Islam are specified in the Sharia or Islamic law, based on
the Koran and the Sunnah, which are the interpretation of the words of the Prophet
Mohammad. Other writings relevant to Islamic demography include those of Al
Ghazzali (1058-1111), a medieval theologian who summarized Sunni and Shia
positions, especially on birth control. In the case of Hinduism, there are a number of
scriptural writings: religious texts such as the Vedas and Upanishads, the epic poems
Ramayana and Mahabharata, social commentaries such as the Arthasastra of
Kautilya, and verse-poems in praise of Hindu goddesses such as the Lalitasahasranama and the Sri-sukta.
Demographic studies of Islamic societies have investigated whether the particular
philosophical content of Islam affects demographic behaviour in the Arab nations
(Obermeyer, 1992). Anthropological evidence from the Bijnor district in north India
suggests that Muslim fertility is higher than Hindu fertility (Jeffery and Jeffery, 2002).
The Mysore Population Study conducted in 1961 concluded that Hindu religious
traditions in Indian society favoured having many children (United Nations, 1961).
This theological, demographic and anthropological literature provides the basis on
which to compare Hindu and Muslim textual theology and its impact on fertility.
Both Hinduism and Islam encourage marriage and tolerate polygyny. In Islam, the
remarriage of divorced and widowed women is highly encouraged. Classical Hindu
texts such as the Nitimanjari argue ‘Home is not what is made of wood and stone; but
where a wife is, there is a home’, and proceed to outline eight different kinds of Hindu
marriage (Radhakrishnan, 1947: 149). Classical Islamic law does not require
husbands to obtain permission from a court or from a current wife in order to
undertake a second marriage. But a Muslim woman can legally have only one
husband; in India if she marries a second man she is liable for bigamy under the
Indian Penal Code. The classical provisions in Islamic law for the sanction of
polygyny are rooted in a demographic fact of twelfth century Arabia. Frequent tribal
wars at this time implied that many Muslim men were killed in battle, leaving behind
widows and orphaned daughters. The Fourth Sura and third verse of the Koran
therefore counsels: ‘If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans,
marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four’ (Azim, 1997: 171). It is important
to note that the provisions for polygyny were motivated by economic circumstance,
and that in their original intention did not apply to all women in general, but only to
widows or orphaned girls. Hinduism also tolerates polygyny but usually in the
absence of male offspring. This theological toleration for polygyny, however, is not
reflected empirically in India. The 1961 Indian Census showed that multiple
marriages are practised least by Muslims and most by tribal communities. Jeffery and
Jeffery (2002) conclude that in rural Bijnor polygyny is relatively rare, and occurs
equally among Hindus and Muslims.
Both Hinduism and Islam also permit divorce. Kautilya argues in the Arthasastra:
If the husband is of bad character, or is long gone abroad, or is guilty of high
treason, or is dangerous to his wife, or has become an outcast, or has lost
virility, he may be abandoned by his wife. (Radhakrishnan, 1947:181-2)
But equally, in the Mahabharata, Vyasa argues that a man can also divorce his wife if
she ‘acts as she pleases’,’gives birth only to daughters’ or if ‘her children die young’
(Iyer, 2002: 39). In Islam, many different kinds of divorce are permitted. In some
situations these are unilateral, for example the talaq al-bida, or the ‘divorce of
innovation’, consists of the husband unilaterally dissolving the marriage. Some
Islamic scholars in India have argued that a woman in Islam is also allowed to initiate
a ‘delegated divorce’: here the husband authorizes the wife to divorce herself from
him (Azim, 1997: 198).
Both Hinduism and Islam set great store by procreation for religious, social and
economic reasons. Numerous anthropological studies of Islamic societies and of
South Asia have shown the importance of the family ideal and son-preference. Indeed,
the Hindu scriptures outline the ‘three debts’ which individuals are required to pay: to
the sages by Vedic study, to the gods by sacrifices, and to the ancestors by offspring
(Radhakrishnan, 1947: 150-1). Both religions also ascribe a lower status to women
than to men. In scriptural Islam men were awarded a more prominent position than
women and sons were typically given twice the inheritance of daughters. In scriptural
Hinduism, women are viewed as being equal to men within the family to a greater
extent than in scriptural Islam: the Rg Veda goes so far as to argue that ‘The wife and
the husband are equal in every respect’ (Radhakrishnan, 1947: 61). But in reality,
Hindu women appear only unequally ‘equal’ with scripturally few independent roles
assigned to them outside the domestic sphere. Sayana, a commentator on the Rg Veda,
describes that while a man can take to ‘worldy pursuits’, a woman is capable of ‘selfcontrol and self-denial’ (Iyer, 2002: 40). This essentially religious notion of a
woman’s self-sacrifice is reflected even today in unequal intra-household allocations
of resources between men and women, or sons and daughters, in India.
Specifically in India therefore, Hinduism and Islam are broadly similar with respect to
their theological positions on marriage, children and the position of women. Where
they appear to differ most is on the control of births. In Islam, this is the most
controversial reason for high fertility: it is commonly believed that Islam forbids
family planning in any situation. But demographers have challenged this view,
arguing that the interpretation of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence is
important (Obermeyer, 1992). Sunni and Shia positions on birth control derive from
the writings of the medieval theologian Al-Ghazzali, who outlines many situations
where birth control within Islam is permissible such as if a disease is likely to be
passed on to offspring or if there is concern for the wife’s health. Demographers of
Islamic societies also argue that the distinction between the different schools extends
to whether or not they permit abortion, and the use of terminal versus non-terminal
methods of family planning (Obermeyer, 1992). But this variability implies space for
alternative interpretations of Islam at a practical level. In Hinduism limiting births is
neither explicitly condoned nor castigated, possibly related to notions of ‘purity and
pollution’ in the practice of traditional Hinduism (Iyer, 2002: 39). Activities that
involve the reproductive functions of women such as menstruation or childbirth are
viewed in scriptural Hinduism as making women temporarily ‘impure’. Notions of
‘impurity’ in Hinduism may then lead to lower fertility if sexual abstinence is
practised during menstruation and after childbirth. There are also indirect references
in Hindu scriptures to the control of births but they are explicitly in the context of
norms about abstinence and multiple partners.
So, the question that concerns demographers and development practioners in India is
this: is there any significant difference in the ‘pure religion effect’ of Hinduism and
Islam on fertility in India? The analysis suggests that in the specific context of India,
perhaps not. But the observed differences in fertility outcomes depend on different
interpretations of scriptural content and adherence by individual Hindus or Muslims
in real-life situations, reinforced by religious institutions such as the clergy and the
state which may support, oppose or counteract fertility.
Interpreting textual theology and the role of religious institutions: Karnataka,
India
If it is accepted that Hinduism and Islam in India are both pronatalist in terms of their
theological doctrine, differences in fertility outcomes need to be explained by locallevel interpretations of the textual theology of religion and the role of religious
institutions. In the academic discussions on religion and development in India, locallevel surveys are rare. A micro-demographic sample survey conducted in villages in
Ramanagaram taluk in the South Indian state of Karnataka examined the manner in
which Hindu and Muslim women translate the textual theology of Hinduism and
Islam into practice, and whether or not this is significant for their fertility decisions
(Iyer, 2002). The 201 women surveyed were asked a range of questions about the
religious determinants of marriage and birth control. The findings are illuminating:
‘God’s will’ was not an important direct reason for marriage and it was cited by less
than 2 per cent of Hindu or Muslim women. Women considered 15 years to be the
‘normal’ age at marriage, even though national legislation in the form of the Child
Marriage Restraint Act of 1978 sets the legal minimum female age at marriage in the
region at 18 years. Remarriage and divorce were not popular among either Hindu or
Muslim women, suggesting that women were guided by local norms that did not
encourage remarriage or divorce, rather than religion. Questions on birth control such
as ‘Does your religion permit contraception?’ and ‘Do you agree with the position of
your religion on birth control?’ yielded interesting differences across religious groups:
4 per cent of all Hindus but 32 per cent of Muslims disagreed with the position of
their religion on contraception. A leading Muslim social worker explained the position
of Islam on contraception thus:
Everyone is having an operation. The Koran says that we can take pills when
the womb is empty but when there is a conception, we can’t take the tablets.
We need to reconsider this. (Iyer, 2002: 143)
Irrespective of the theological debate, therefore, the perception among Muslim
women in Ramanagaram is unambiguously that Islam does not permit birth control.
Women also made distinctions between various permanent and temporary methods of
contraception, clarifying that any prevailing opposition to contraception was
specifically towards sterilization. Both these perceptions were most likely to have
been influenced by the local Islamic clergy: the mullah of the area, when interviewed,
stated that he strongly objected to women using contraception, ‘which is against the
Shariat’ (Iyer, 2002: 166).
Questions on women’s status, their decision-making and intra-household resource
allocation showed that women were more autonomous when it came to decisionmaking within the household than decision-making about income-earning work or
money. The role of ‘custom’ was deemed significant in dictating these decisions.
However, decisions about sending children to school were taken jointly by both
husbands and wives. In general, over 60 per cent of women in the sample believed
that religion-based conflict between men and domestic violence between men and
women had increased over the previous 10 years. There were 33 per cent of women
who wanted another child but religion was not a significant factor in this decision:
God’s will was cited by less than 3 per cent of the sample. The demand for children
was governed mainly by their contributions to household and market work. In terms
of allocating food, education or health-care between children, there was not a single
woman in the sample who said that she would prefer to give her girls more compared
to her sons.
Hence, while it is useful to examine the textual theology of Hindusim and Islam, it is
of even greater consequence to understand the manner in which it is interpreted at the
local level. While women in Karnataka express relatively ‘progressive’ views about
marriage and birth control, they are less likely to put these into practice as reflected in
their decision-making about money or allocating resources between sons and
daughters. And this behaviour does not vary a great deal with religion. The
exceptional context when women cease to play a purely religiously or traditionally
defined role is in making decisions about children’s education. Education, then, is the
only choice variable that breaks tradition with custom. And this simple qualitative
finding compels development economists to consider the ‘characteristics’ hypothesis
as an explanation for religious differences in fertility in India.
Socio-economic characteristics as an explanation for inter-group differences in
fertility
Religious differences in demographic outcomes in India are also reflected more
widely in differences between religious groups in their socio-economic status.
According to data presented in the Human Development Report, 53.3 per cent of
Hindus aged 7 and above are literate, compared to 49.4 per cent of Muslims, and 80.8
per cent of Christians (Sharif, 1999). Female illiteracy among both Hindus and
Muslims is very high: 61 per cent among Hindus and 62 per cent among Muslims.
Religious differences in family size which affect indicators of income and poverty
also show that the Muslims are economically disadvantaged compared to other
religious groups. For example, the average annual income per capita for Muslim
households at Rs.3678 ($78) is considerably lower than for Hindu households at
Rs.4514 ($96) or for Christian households at Rs.5920 ($126). There are 64.5 per cent
of Hindu households who own land compared to 56.5 per cent of Muslim households
and the average size of landholding is 3 acres for Hindu households compared to 2
acres for Muslim households (Sharif, 1999). A head count ratio estimate of poverty
among religious groups also depicts that the incidence of poverty is greater among
Muslims than among Hindus and Christians (Sharif, 1999). There are, however,
curious paradoxes about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of
Muslims and Hindus in India, which are often overlooked. Although fertility rates
among Muslims are higher than among Hindus, infant mortality rates among
Muslims, at 59 per 1000 births, is much lower than among Hindus, at 77 per 1000
births (IIPS and ORC Macro International, 2000). If we compare the two communities
in terms of income inequality, the Gini coefficient of relative dispersion of incomes
depicts a lower degree of inequality in Muslim households (0.40) compared to Hindu
households (0.43) in all of India (Sharif, 1999). These data suggest that the whole
relationship between religion, economic circumstances and development outcomes
needs further consideration.
The data also suggest that the socio-economic characteristics of religious groups
might be more important than religious theology in explaining inter-group
demographic outcomes. This is borne out at the local level: a study on the Karnataka
households examined whether religion had an impact on fertility after controlling for
a range of socio-economic characteristics, and whether the effect of different socioeconomic characteristics was different for the three religious groups (Iyer, 2002). The
findings are illustrative of factors that may also be relevant at the national level. The
main finding was that the effect of religion was insignificant for fertility decisions
after controlling for socio-economic status. This is a crucial finding of the research
because it indicates that religion does not exercise a pure ‘theological’ effect in this
population in South India after controlling for the effects of other socio-economic
characteristics. But more significantly, the effect of different socio-economic factors
was different for the three religious groups (Iyer 2002: 194-204). For example, a oneunit increase in education exercised a negative effect on fertility and it decreased
fertility for Muslims significantly more than for Hindus. A son born later in the birth
order significantly raised fertility for all three religious groups but the effect was
greater for Hindus and Christians. Greater access to water and fuel infrastructure
reduced fertility, and this effect was particularly strong for Muslim households. The
presence of one more female extended family member in the household decreased
fertility, but this effect was significantly greater for Muslims than for Hindus. This
finding supports more qualitative information from the Ramanagaram interviews. For
example, Devamma, a mother of 3 sons and 2 daughters, aged 51 remarked:
I encouraged my daughters and daughters-in-law to have two children quickly
and go in for an operation. Then they are not troubled any more. There is no
problem as with the pills, which they may not remember to take. After all,
why should they be burdened with so many children as I? (Iyer, 2002: 142)
If different socio-economic factors affect the religious groups in different ways, these
findings have important implications for population policy in India in particular and
for development policy more widely.
Implications of religious differences in fertility for development policy
Religious differences in fertility may not be due to a ‘pure religion effect’ because the
effect of the theological content of Islam and Hinduism for demography in India is
similar. But community interpretations of theology may be more important than the
actual philosophical content of the religion. As shown in Karnataka, these
interpretations may also be at some variance with individual women’s views. Rural
Hindu and Muslim women in India do not accept uncritically the textual theology on
marriage and birth control. But equally they are not translating these personally-held
views fully into actual practice as reflected in their household decision-making or
allocations of resources between children. This suggests that development policy
needs to target and to integrate religious leaders in various ways that might influence
women’s fertility, for example, by enlisting their support to enforce the Child
Marriage Restraint Act of 1978. Socio-economic characteristics are important and
indeed the influence of religion may perhaps be acting through them, but the socioeconomic characteristics of different groups need to be targeted in different ways. So,
for example, in Ramanagaram taluk Muslim women’s and men’s education needs
more emphasis, Hindu attitudes to son-preference can be countered by media
campaigns, and family planning needs to be made more reliant on temporary methods,
particularly in minority-dominated areas.
Religion, reproduction and development in contemporary India need to be viewed in
the context of the wider historical evolution of inter-group differences in population
numbers, coupled with an awareness of the threat that the ‘communalism’
phenomenon poses for India’s development. It is often observed by commentators that
in religion-based conflicts, disciplines which are unrelated to religion are routinely
wheeled out as part of the armoury in the confrontations, verbal or otherwise, over
temples and mosques, seats in educational institutions, government jobs, or political
office. Demography in India has been used similarly: religious differences in fertility
have been subject to many different claims and counter-claims which have
exacerbated inter-religious conflicts in India in the past. This needs to be redressed by
development theorists and practitioners with demographic, economic and
anthropological evidence. The qualitative and quantitative findings from Karnataka
presented suggest a framework within which the role of religion can be considered.
One way to integrate religion into development analysis is to use an inter-disciplinary
perspective which encompasses a careful understanding of the theological literature,
the manner in which it is interpreted locally, and how this combines with economic
methods. Such analysis could have far-reaching implications for both policy and
politics not only in India but also in other societies characterized by religious
pluralism.
Acknowledgement
I acknowledge the support of the British Academy which provided the funding for
this research. I am particularly grateful to Geoff Harcourt and to Chander Velu for
their comments on this paper.
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