Name: ______________________________ Date: _________________ Block: ____________________
AP US Government and Politics
Dr. East
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
The Federalist Papers are a collection of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay from
October 1787 to May 1788. The essays were published in newspapers in an effort to convince the state of New York to
ratify the Constitution. Considered one of the greatest works in American political history, this collection of essays helps
us clearly understand what the Framers of the Constitution had in mind when they drafted the document over 200 years
ago. Directions: READ the excerpts from The Federalist Papers and answer the questions that follow on a SEPARATE
sheet of paper (you may consult neighbors for help AFTER reading).
Excerpts from Federalist Paper No. 10—James Madison (topics: factions and representation in government)
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority of the whole, who are untied and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens… The latent causes of faction are thus
sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, government, and many other points… an
attachment to leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflames them with mutual animosity,
and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good… One effect of
government by representatives is . . . to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
people themselves, convened for the purpose. . . . The question is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the
election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter. . . As each representative will be
chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large [federal] than in the small republic [state], it will be more difficult for
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the
people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and
established characters… The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be
brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders
factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be
found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in
a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their
own strength, and to act in unison with each other. . . .
Questions:
1) What are the “factions” that Madison is referring to?
2) How will the average citizen have a voice in this new system?
Excerpts from Federalist Paper No. 45—James Madison (relationship of state to federal gov., elections)
Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to
be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States... The
State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government… Without the intervention of
the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his
appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it[idea is that states hold federal elections]. The Senate
will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures [by legislatures he means voting people of a state]. Even the
House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class
of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal
branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must
consequently feel a dependence…. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for
the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity o f the
State… The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the
State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the
State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal
powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their
ascendancy over the governments of the particular States.
Questions:
3) List several ways states have influence on the national government.
4) How will the powers of state governments differ from the powers of the national government?
Excerpts from Federalist Paper No. 51—James Madison (Various ways of separating powers; checking
power of government; preventing tyranny)
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will
of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the
appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments
for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the
people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several
departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some
additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the
constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because
peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which
best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that
department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them…. But the great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counter
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.
Questions:
5) Which branch appears to be an exception to the separation of powers norm? Why is this the case?
6) What seems to be Madison’s view of human nature and how does it affect his plan for the new republic?
7) What is the “great difficulty” in framing a new government for a better republic?
Excerpts from Federalist Paper No. 78—Alexander Hamilton (Role of Judiciary in protecting against laws that harm
people)
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no
bills of attainder [A legislative act that singles out an individual or group for punishment without a trial], no ex post facto laws
[Latin for "after the fact," which refers to laws adopted after an act is committed making it illegal although it was legal when
done, or increases the penalty for a crime after it is committed. Such laws are specifically prohibited by the U. S. Constitution,
Article I, Section 9], and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of
courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this,
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing… Some perplexity respecting the rights of the
courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine
would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of
another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in
all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable… If then the courts of
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will
afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that
independent spirit in the judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of arduous duty… This independence of the
judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors… or the
influence of particular conjectures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give
place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
Questions:
8) What are ex post fact laws and bills of attainder? Why should people be worried about preventing these things?
9) What does Hamilton mean by “permanent tenure of judicial offices?”
10) Why does he say that an “independent spirit of judges” is essential for them to do their work?