PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
Analysis and Assessment for
Peacekeeping Operations
Sir David Ramsbotham
There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a
manner that information ... can be synthesised with political
indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to
analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to
alleviate it.1
The need to satisfy the UN’s requirement for reliable
information and intelligence gathering capability is important if
peace enforcement operations are to be successfully carried
out.2
Of all the producer policy-maker relationships discussed in the original volume,
none are more fraught with difficulty than those connected with peacekeeping.
Behind the two statements quoted above lies the paradox that, for all too long,
because of its association with secret services and covert activities,
‘Intelligence’ has been regarded as a ‘dirty word’ in UN parlance.3 To a soldier
this is quite extraordinary, because, in military doctrine and practice,
intelligence is a significant, vital and basic ingredient of every operation.
Moreover, peacekeeping missions include military operations for which the
forces involved require an understanding of those people who wish to maintain
and those who may wish to disturb, the peace and why. Some may call that
information, and some intelligence, but it is fact, and it is no coincidence that
the chapter from which UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s quote is
taken is headed ‘Fact Finding’. Without such basic facts at their fingertips,
peacekeepers cannot hope to be able to carry out their tasks in an impartial and
progressive way. Therefore, to regard ‘intelligence’ as a dirty word in relation
to peacekeeping, when the information gained is essential for those who have to
conduct peacekeeping missions, is to be blind to both necessity and reality.
281
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
The dictionary definitions of the word intelligence could be said to satisfy all
parties, depending on what one wants to read into them. Intelligence, as a noun,
is ‘The action or fact of mentally comprehending something, understanding,
knowledge: mutual conveyance of information, communication: a piece of
information or news, the obtaining of information, the agency for secret
information’.4 Intelligence, as a verb, is ‘To bring intelligence of (an event,
etc,), to inform (a person), to convey intelligence: to tell tales’.5 For the
purpose of this article an intelligence operation will be defined as ‘the
collection, analysis and dissemination of information relevant to the
peacekeeping mission between all interested parties’.6
The aim of this article is to examine the role of intelligence analysis and
assessment in support of peacekeeping operations in a changing world.
Necessarily, this means the article wil1 focus on what I perceive to be the
inte1ligence needs of the United Nations, because its global responsibilities ‘to
maintain international peace and security’7 make it the primary ‘employer’ of
peacekeeping forces. That said, a ‘health warning’ is necessary because it is
essential to examine any issue involving the UN against the background of two
major deficiencies that affect its operational ability: the lack of political will in
the global community to provide the organisation with what it needs to enable it
to act effectively on the community’s behalf and an inadequate and fragile
internal co-ordinating machinery. It is not useful to consider any one part of the
UN in isolation, because each function and element impacts on others.
This article will attempt to suggest what policymakers, both at UN
Headquarters and UN missions in the field require in the light of the demands
that this imposes on the possible producers. Because this is a rapidly
developing subject, and outsiders can only be as up-to-date as their latest
information, some of what is treated here as desirable may already have been
implemented. But that does not affect the utility of an overview of the
requirement for a coherent and robust intelligence system, capable of satisfying
the needs of all involved in peacekeeping, before, during and after each
mission.8 The article will examine the intelligence needs of the three types of
missions included under the generic term peacekeeping: preventive action,
conflict resolution (whether traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement),
and post conflict reconstruction (or peace-building), each of which will be
examined in turn.
282
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
Preventive Action
In peacekeeping, there is much to be said for the saying that ‘a stitch in time
save nine’, Early, or preventive deployment, such as that intended by NATO’s
multi-national Allied Mobile Force, is the best example of what I mean in
military terms. UN preventive action includes both ‘Preventive Diplomacy’, the
title of the relevant chapter in Agenda for Peace, which also mentions
‘Preventive Deployment’. The early arrival of a representative body,
ostentatiously making the point that any threat to peace in a particular area is a
threat against all members of the global community, accompanied by a
vigorous public relations campaign amongst the people in the threatened area,
is an outward and visible symbol of international resolve, particularly if it is
mandated by the Security Council. An example of the efficacy of such action
was the preventive deployment of UN troops to Macedonia under Security
Council Resolution 795 of December 1992, made possible by the fortuitous,
temporary availability of Canadian troops. Subsequently staffed by an
American battalion from July 1993 and a mixed force of UN observers, this
operation thus far, has prevented the trouble in Bosnia spilling over that
emotive border.9
However, preventive action can only be taken following early warning, and
early assessment of that warning, which requires the willingness and cooperation of member states to make essential information available. It also
requires the recipients of such information to be willing to listen to and act
upon it. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali puts it ‘Preventive steps must be based upon
timely and accurate knowledge of the facts’. Beyond this, an ‘understanding of
developments and global trends, based on sound analysis, is required’.10 The
UN should not develop its own intelligence gathering machinery, or put its own
satellites up into space, not only because of the expense involved, but because
member nations already possess what is required. What the UN needs is an
effective intelligence co-ordination mechanism, capable of analysing what it is
given or is gleaned on its behalf, informing the decision making process, and
passing essential information to all UN departments and agencies who have
functional responsibility in any possible operation. The mention of member
states brings into sharp focus the principal problem faced by the UN, namely
that of obtaining intelligence, or information, from them. For entirely
understandable reasons, governments are unwilling to release information about
themselves that might fall into what they regard as wrong hands, or which
283
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
might be used, to alleged advantage, against them. Traditionally, nationa1
intelligence services collect, analyse and use intelligence for their own national
purposes, retaining it under national control, and sharing it only with those
whom they wish to share it.11
The UN, however, which ought to qualify as a friendly government, requires
intelligence for the good of the international community, and, in the spirit of
that integrity and impartiality that it seeks to maintain, must be quite open about
what it needs, and why. If there are no secrets about what is required and why,
then in theory, there should be no reason why member nations should withhold
information, because no member state need feel threatened by a UN acting on
its behalf. But as Hugh Smith points out, ‘such a system is unlikely to emerge
of its own accord. The UN needs to establish a clear conception of how it wants
intelligence to develop in the context of peacekeeping, and (perhaps also) of
‘preventive diplomacy’.12 I would argue that there is no ‘perhaps also’ about
the need to develop a concept of intelligence in the context of preventive action,
because it is so essential if such action is to be successfully triggered.
Preventive action needs should establish the credibility of the development of a
coherent UN intelligence operation, because, although it is on1y one element in
the peacekeeping continuum, its intelligence needs are the same as those of the
other two, only more acute in terms of time. But how could the UN convince
the global community of the integrity and impartiality of a UN intelligence
operation? The answer may lie in a practical suggestion based on experience in
another field.
Commanders Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR)
In the early 1980’s, when NATO faced the Warsaw Pact across the German
border, commanders at all levels became increasingly concerned at the amount
of information available, from a wide variety of sources, and how it could be
prioritised and filtered.13 Accordingly an exercise called the ‘Commanders
Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR)’ was initiated, in which they were
invited to think through each phase of war, relating it to the ground over which
they might have to fight, and determine what information they regarded as
critical to the success of their particular operational aim within the overall
operational context. Such an appreciation was carried out at each level of
command, because triggers or indicators were different for each level,
Commanders also needed to know the operational aims of their superior
284
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
commanders, because their own appreciation had to be related to them, to
ensure coherence of the overall intelligence plan. Each CCIR list was used, by
intelligence staffs, to filter that part of the take which had to be passed
immediately to their commander, thus preventing him from being swamped.
The process also helped to refine collation, and prioritise the tasking of
surveillance.
But the key word in the whole process is the first one, commander. Each CCIR
list is a commander’s personal assessment of what he needs to know in order to
carry out his mission, resu1ting from his analysis of the situation with which he
is faced. To achieve this he needs to ensure that all necessary intelligence is
made available to him, from whichever source is capable of providing it. If
such a source is not under his command or immediately available to him, it is
up to an immediate superior to obtain what a subordinate requires. Although
designed for a very different purpose, I believe that this process could be the
key to helping the UN overcome the reluctance of national governments to
provide intelligence support to the internationa1 organisation.
CCIR application in UN operations
Although it may be, and seem, ad hoc, there is a command and control structure
for each and every UN operation, starting from the Security Council and the
Secretariat and spreading down to individual units on the ground, be they civil
or military. The nature of modern peacekeeping requires that, included within
it, there must be a properly structured, trained and equipped intelligence staff at
each level.
The Security Council establishes the aim for every mission. It is then the
responsibility of the force commander, and subordinate commanders at all
levels, to determine their own intelligence requirements, and draw up their own
CCIR list re1ated to it. Requests for mission elements should be passed back up
the chain to UNHQ in New York, which would be responsible for obtaining it
from wherever it is available, including member nations. The tag ‘Mission
Specific’ or ‘Mission Critical’ attached to these requests, emphasising that the
information is critical to the success of a mission being carried out for the
global community, should (in theory) satisfy those governments and
intelligence services who may be concerned about any altruistic intentions
amongst those seeking information that they regard as sensitive to their own
285
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
national interests. The procedure has the additional merit of putting
commanders through the discipline of thinking through, and asking only for
what they need for the execution of their mission. It also provides a disciplined
framework within which intelligence staffs can work, which in turn must help
those working in ad hoc environments.
The only way that the intelligence needs of a preventive action mission will
differ from any other is in terms of time. Early warning of possible threats to
peace, particularly forecasting communal or intra-nation conflict, may prove to
be the most sensitive area of all for individual nations when it comes to
releasing information about themselves for someone else to analyse. However,
for the global community preventive action represents the cheapest and most
timely action that the UN can take on its behalf, and it should encourage all to
co-operate.
But the process of keeping a UN ‘intelligence watch’ on potential trouble spots
is as much political, economic and social as military in direction. ‘Threats to
the security of a nation must now inc1ude anything, anywhere on the globe,
which threatens the health, economic well-being, social stability and political
peace of its people.’14 That is not to say that the military should not be included
in the analysing process, but that the ‘inte11igence watch’ should be conducted
by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), in concert with the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), on the assumption that they work closely
together anyway. The UN will always seek a long-term political solution to a
problem, although deliberately tasked military and humanitarian means may be
the short-term expedient by which this is achieved. Relating this to the CCIR
process, it should be the DPA, under direction from the secretary-general, that
determines what particular factors should be watched in which countries, and
what circumstances warrant information being laid before the Security Council.
This requires a properly established and structured analysis and assessment
staff, in New York, international in content, working on the input from all
sources, inc1uding member nations. This ‘internationalisation’ is a key
ingredient in satisfying national sensitivities.
There is, of course one wild card in all this, which is the ability of the media to
pre-empt preventive action by emotive presentation of situations of a1leged
crisis or near chaos. Graphic images of tragedy can provoke ‘Do Something’
286
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
cries from the global community, prompting a knee-jerk UN response that is
reactive rather than preventive in content. In the conclusions to an important
1994 study, Nick Gowing, the Diplomatic Editor of the UK’s Channel 4 News,
makes the point that:
It is estimated there is the potential for 2000 ethnic conflicts in
Africa and 260 conflicts in the Russian ‘Near-Abroad’. If the
battle lines of the future are being already drawn and the
‘bloody conflicts’ have already begun, is rea1-time television
merely highlighting conflicts, which western governments
ultimate1y have no ability to prevent, or political will to solve?
The evidence is not encouraging. The answer is probably yes.15
Those horrendous statistics alone suggest that the UN needs a monitoring
system, to ensure that preventive diplomatic or deployment action,
humanitarian and/or military can be considered and possibly taken in time, with
the media being encouraged to publicise what the UN is doing rather than not
doing.
Preventive deployment can be either humanitarian or military in content, since
the early introduction of specifically required aid may be just as appropriate in
some situations as the arrival of troops in others. This highlights another and
significant part of the intelligence debate, namely that information provision
and dissemination is not solely the business of member states. Both UN
Agencies and Non-Government Organisations (NGO) have a significant part to
play as well. They too need early warning of what is required of them, and were
information exchange a more accepted activity, the delivery of aid would be
more effective. Moreover, during their activities, routine and on missions,
humanitarian agencies also gather information that could be useful to others.
Culturally and procedurally they are not good at passing this on, which is not
only inefficient but, on occasions, dangerous to others. Not only should all
agencies, UN and NGO, be given the necessary information on which to
prevent action, but they shou1d also be prepared to make available to the UN
analysts any indicators of possible trouble that they come across, to ensure that
the preventive action which they applaud may be mounted in time to be
successful. They point, quite understandably, to the number of times that
warnings from them have been ignored by UN officials and others who were
287
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
not prepared to listen let alone act. But both the need and their concern suggest
that a change of culture is essential and will have to be encouraged.
Conflict Resolution
When the focus of discussion shifts to conflict resolution, one is on more fertile
ground from an intelligence operational perspective, because some of the
necessary conditioning material already exists in published Mission Analyses
and Lessons Learned by Force Commanders. These invariably mention the
need to improve peacekeeping intelligence operations. The comment arising
from the operation, quoted at the outset of this essay, is a case in point.
Within the UN
The basic relationship between UN Secretariat policy makers and the member
state producers remains the same as for preventive action, but there is a curious
paradox contained in a UN as opposed to a national chain of command. At the
strategic 1evel, UNHQ is the overall policy maker, and a force commander is
both an intelligence producer and an operational executive. At the mission
level, however, the force commander is the operational policy maker, and
UNHQ one of the intelligence producers. In national operations, or those
conducted by an operational alliance such as NATO, a force commander
receives strategic direction and intelligence down a clearly defined command
chain. UN Security Council resolutions, however, tend to contain neither
strategic direction, nor intelligence, not least because the Military Staff
Committee, which the UN’s founding fathers intended should provide this, does
not exist. As a result, force commanders have to carry out their own analysis
and risk assessment, which is not satisfactory when global issues are at stake, as
several of them have testified.16
Recent and current experiences demand that the UN must improve its ability to
respond to crises, as well as to determine when to refuse to do so. As part of
this process it needs, in particu1ar, to improve its contingency planning
capability, as well as its ability to mount and sustain operations. The UN’s
initial task is to determine what assets will be needed to execute a possible
mission, for which very specific intelligence is required, Contingency planners
need to know details of the infrastructure of any country in which an operation
may be being considered, road, rail, air and port capacity, the availability of
288
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
vital items such as food, water and fuel, communications structures and medical
services.17
Rather than having to obtain this information afresh for each mission, it could
be he1d in a database, built up from answers to requests put by the UN to each
member state in the form of a questionnaire. On mounting and sustainment
there is a need to know what military and logistics forces nations may be able
to provide. Thanks to the recently completed Stand By and Logistics studies,
the UN staffs are now better placed to assist this phase of planning. Of course,
each mission is subject to the recommendations of a detailed reconnaissance,
but the subsequent and inordinate time it takes to establish UN contingents
could be reduced by better contingency planning. The spectre of national
sensitivity can be mitigated if every member state is invited to make available
the same type of information about itself.
Within UNHQ, peacekeeping operations need to be monitored, with an
intelligence staff available to process requests from force commanders. In 1993
a Situation Centre was established. It operates round the clock, seven days a
week, with a staff of 24. Two officers are on duty at all times. A DHA desk is
included. Although it has a research and information cell that interprets data
obtained from a wide variety of other sources, the centre is not a
‘comprehensive intelligence unit’ in its own right. Its task is to provide
information about current operations,18 which is particularly timely and useful
to those responsible for conf1ict resolution, and hopefully will become more
and more part of the UN culture. But it does not obviate the need for a proper
analysis and assessment capability to serve the policy-makers, and provide the
secretary-general and the Security Council with a UN overview, to supplement
the national views that will be reflected by national Permanent Representatives.
UN Mission requirements
In his article about the need for UN peacekeeping intelligence, Hugh Smith
includes specific requirements for:19
Strategic intelligence is obviously required to understand the
political situation between the parties to a conflict prior to UN
involvement and, once peacekeepers are deployed, to anticipate
the political moves of governments or factions, especially if
289
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
there is a risk of violence. The fundamental importance of
political intelligence is self evident, for the UN is seeking to
produce a desired political outcome. Information about the
economy and society of the country will also be valuable.
Operational intelligence is required to plan the most effective
deployment of resources and to carry out the UN mandate. It
will be particularly important in fluid military and political
situations.
Tactical intelligence is needed by troops on the ground to
support peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring cease-fires
or border areas and to alert personnel to potential dangers. The
management of intelligence at the tactical level, moreover, can
be influential in maintaining or losing the UN’s credibility
among the parties to a conflict. At the tactical level, too,
counter-intelligence may be necessary if there are elements
hostile to the UN.
The credibility issue lends weight to Smith’s argument that ‘the concept of UN
intelligence promises to turn traditional principles on their heads. Intelligence
will have to be based in information that is collected primari1y by overt means,
that is by methods that do not threaten the target state or group and do not
compromise the integrity or impartiality of the UN’.20
At the head of every mission will be a Special Representative of the secretarygeneral (SRSG), with a team of political and economic advisers. The SRSG is
supported by a military force commander, with a headquarters into which all
military elements will be linked, and a DHA humanitarian co-ordinator, with a
headquarters linking all of the humanitarian agencies. The SRSG, who is
responsible for implementing the overall aim of the mission, delegating
particular operational responsibilities to his military and humanitarian
commanders, will need an intelligence staff to analyse political, economic and
social affairs. The force commander requires a more military intelligence staff,
including trained analysts, as well as collators and collectors. The efficacy of
the military intelligence operation will depend on the quality of the force
commanders’ CCIR assessment.
290
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
In peace enforcement operations, proven operational intelligence operational
procedures should be followed, possibly under a ‘lead nation’ to ensure
commonality. ‘Desert Storm’, for example, was essentially a US-led operation,
with NATO procedures predominating. UNOSOM II was, in many respects, an
example of how not to do it, with specific intelligence deliberately being denied
to certain partners, encouraging resentment and suspicion.21 However, the most
important result of these experiences has been the application of the ‘lessons
learned’ process, with wide circulation of analyses of the deficiencies,
illustrated by practica1 examples. It is now up to the international community
to rectify these to ensure that they are not repeated in future operations.
In all peacekeeping operations, every national contingent can be expected to
bring its own intelligence staff to handle national matters, and through whom
information will be passed up and down the command chain. This is important,
as often the Humint that national contingents gain, as part and parcel of their
day-to-day responsibilities, is an important contribution to the overall picture.
Nationa1 contingents can also act as information exchanges for UN Agencies
and NGO’s operating with them, and with whom mutual operation, because it is
locally focused, is often easier and closer.
However the DHA should be encouraged to develop its own intelligence or
information gathering capabi1ity. Frequently, it is those engaged in
humanitarian activities who are in closest touch with indigenous people, and
their analysis of the situation, and warning of likely problems, is therefore a
vital part of the whole. Their contribution needs to be handled sensitive1y,
quickly and efficiently. Sensitivity is vital because of the need to convince
NGO’s and others that their knowledge is valuable to the achievement of the
mission, and will not be used for other purposes. That is why it wou1d be better
for the humanitarian operations co-ordinator to conduct his/her own collection
operation, passing what has been gathered and analysed both upward to the
SRSG and sideways to the force commander. That way functional sensitivities
can be dealt with up functional chains, co-ordination taking place where most
appropriate. But, having said that, it must be made quite clear what items are
critical to the mission as a whole, as well as critical to each part of it.
For practical illustration of the need for this the report on UNOSOM II offers
another significant observation:
291
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
Many senior political advisors, especially on sensitive political
issues, lacked experience and knowledge of UN peacekeeping
practices and were insensitive to the local culture’s
requirements.22
Local cultural information, so vital to the success of a mission, should be
disseminated to all participants, military and humanitarian. But all this activity
depends on communications, an essential of any C3I process. This has become
much more efficient with the acquisition of the American Joint Deployable
Intelligence Support System by the UN’s Situation Centre.23
Post Conflict Reconstruction or Peace Rebuilding
These tasks are included in the continuum in order to complete an overview of
the whole UN Policy Maker/Producer relationship. The Security Council
should mandate post-conflict reconstruction just as it does preventive action or
conflict resolution. There is, after all, no clearer expression of international
commitment to assist a country emerging from conflict or chaos than the help
given to enable it to take up or resume its place in the international community.
As with conflict resolution, this requires the international community to
establish what needs to be done and then enable it to happen with appropriate
aid. In order to determine what is needed both to restore a damaged
infrastructure and to regenerate a damaged economy, policy makers require a
political, social and economic intelligence operation, quite separate from any
associated conflict resolution operation in content, but not in time. Concurrence
is the key, so that purposeful reconstruction can start the moment conflict is
ended. That is why I advocate the appointment of a third co-equal subordinate
to an SRSG, namely a Director of Post Conflict Reconstruction, from either the
DHA or the UN Development Programme (UNDP), to supervise the analysis
and assessment.
A principal part of this whole process will be an appreciation of which agency
can do what, in the best interests of the country concerned. In the case of
Mozambique,24 for example, the UN needed to know, among other things, what
was required to clear minefields and to rebuild the internal communications
system so that normal economic life could resume. It also needed a financed
plan for demobilising and disarming the assessed numbers of former
combatants, who will remain a threat to peace until something is found for them
292
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
to do and they can be reintegrated into norma1 society. Job creation is the key
to this and one source of employment involves the sugar industry, a major
contributor to the Mozambican economy before the war. The estates on which
this sugar was grown are now derelict and the selection and training of severa1
thousand former combatants to restore the infrastructure to the estates is the
first step to the rehabilitation of the ex-soldiers. Then the private sector will
come in to start up production, requiring the training of many more former
guerrillas to work on the estates. This process will fulfi1 a double mission:
providing constructive work for idle armed combatants and helping to ‘kick
start’ the economy. Money from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund is required to prime the process, as well as national aid. But the
important point is that such a plan can only be determined if all potential
participants are brought into the reconstruction assessment and analysis
process, another UN policy maker/producer relationship, to establish what is
best for the country and what it will cost.
Conclusion
What I have tried to illustrate is that the continuum of peacekeeping presents
the international community with an increasing number of intelligence tasks
and priorities. These may seem obvious when examined against needs, and
none of them are new to nationa1 intelligence authorities, because they
replicate what is demanded of them in their day to day responsibilities. But the
concept of mounting intelligence operations is new to the UN, as is the need for
national communities to meet their responsibilities to the international
community by providing essential intelligence resources. It was mentioned at
the outset that lack of nationa1 political will and a fragile and inadequate coordination machinery were the biggest single factors preventing the UN from
fulfilling its unique global responsibilities. It can, after all, only do what the
resources it is given will allow. Hitherto resources have always been discussed
in terms of men, money and machines. The producer policy maker re1ationship
for peacekeeping described above demonstrates that planning for peacekeeping must also include intelligence analysis and assessment, an essential
ingredient for success.
293
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
Endnotes
1
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (NY: UN, 1992), p.15.
UN S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, p.47. Report of the Commission of Inquiry established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on
UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.
3
Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN peacekeeping’, Survival, 36/3 (Autumn 1994),
pp.174, 190 n.l, citing Int. Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (NY, 1984), p.39.
4
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 1089.
5
Ibid.
6
This is consistent with standard definitions of intelligence, which emphasise the
several phases of intelligence production. See Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare:
Understanding the World of Intelligence (NY: Brassey’s, 199I), p.2.
7
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of 1he International Court of Justice (NY
Dept of Public Info.), p, 1,
8
On this, see Mats R. Berdal, Whither UJV Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281
(London: IISS, Oct. 1993), p.44; John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra, A Draft Concept of
Second Generation Mul1inational Operatians1993 (Providence, RI: Thos. J. Watson.
Inst. for Int. Studies, 1993), pp.37-38.
9
Canada, Senate, Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation
of Peacekeeping: Report of the Sandieg Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (Ottawa,
Feb. 1993), p.45.
10
Boutros-Ghali (note 1) p. 14.
11
E.g., Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, the commander of UNPROFOR, was not cleared for
intelligence from NATO Sources: Smith (note 3), p.177.
12
Smith (note 3), p.175.
13
On this see, Paul B. Stares, Command Perforrnance: The Neglected Dimension of
European Security (Washington, DC; Brookings, 1991), pp.87, 90–4, 98–9.
14
Quoted in The Independent (London) 24 March 1994, p,11.
15
Nick Gowing, Real time television coverage of armed conflicts and diplomatic
crises: does it pressure or distort Foreign Policy decisions? John F. Kennedy School of
Government Working Paper Series 94-1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni,, June 1994),
p.85.
16
Smith (note 3), p. 177.
17
Ibid., p.176.
18
Ibid,, pp. 178 – 9.
19
Ibid., pp. 175 – 6 (my emphasis).
20
Ibid., p.175.
21
Ibid. p.178; Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, ’UN and the US Military Roles in Regional
Organisations in Africa and the Middle East’, Dennis J. Quinn, (ed.), Peace Support
2
294
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 16—David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment’, INS 10/4 (Oct 95)
Operations and the US Military (Washington DC: Nationa1 Defence Uni. Press, 1994),
p. 158.
22
UN S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, p.47.
23
Smith (note 3), p. 184.
24
The author is currently involved in reconstruction in Mozambique.
295