Sep of Powers – Attack Sheet – Peterson – Fall 2011 Introduction Formalism (set rules) v. Functionalism (basic principle w/changing rules) Power of each branch (statutory authority, no statute, statutory restrictions) Executive and the Courts Marbury v. Madison o Court power to decide if a law/executive action is constitutional o Art. 3 jurisdictional limitations (case/controversy, appellate system, precedents, jury) Limitations on judicial power: (1) textual/practical limitations, (2) political question doctrine Role of government lawyer: president’s advocate or independent lawyer? Executive and Congress Inherent executive power o In Re Neagle & In Re Debs: Power to makes sure laws are enforced needs no statute o Inherent exec. Power Restrictions: (1) External restrictions (Amds.), (2) Explicit adjacent powers (textually committed to other), (3) Implicit adjacent powers (e.g. appropriations) Congressional Acquiescence: US v. Midwest Oil (expansion of exec. power thru acquiescence) Youngstown Sheet & Tube: President’s inherent power is limited (can’t legislate, seize property) Combining Powers in the Executive or in Courts Nondelegation Doctrine (intelligible principle, concerns: aggrandizement, pol. accountability) Mistretta v. US: majority (delegation ok; sentencing traditionally shared by branches) o Scalia: Congress can’t delegate strictly legislative powers Congressional Aggrandizement Legislative Veto Ban: INS v. Chadha (requirement of bicameralism and presentment) o Peterson’s Theory: substantive laws affecting ppl outside Cong. need bicam & present. Bowsher v. Synar: Can’t delegate executive power to legislative official (Comptroller General) MWAA v. Citizens: Can’t restrict officer conditions so only Congress can fill role Presidential Veto Authority Veto power: Presentment ensures Presidential participation in legislative process o Political Constraints: fear of override o Signing statements: Congress can’t override; only ok w/something like legis. veto Pocket Veto: Barnes v. Kline (inter-Congress PV ok, intra-Congress PV ineffective) Ban Line-Item Veto (can’t change compromise of bicameralism and presentment) o Clinton v. City of NY (Dissent/Scalia—NDD/delegation of legislative power issue) o Discretionary spending ok v. Line Item Veto ban (purpose of discretion: changed circum) Congress’s Power of the Purse Antideficiency Act (w/o appropriations, govt can’t spend $, unless authorized by law/essential) Miscellaneous Receipts Act (settlement $, other $ earned by govt goes to general treasury) Judgment Fund (guarded from raid by DOJ, can’t go to broken contracts) o Pigford (can’t use J. fund to correct injustice where govt has a solid case) Brown v. Califano (thru appropriations, Congress can restrict pres. to use specific const. remedy) Judicial Task Forces (Congress can restrict tastk forces thru appropriations, but can’t restrict internal affairs of courts) Lincoln v. Vigil (Congress can only change [unreviewable] spending discretion through statute) Impoundment, City of New Haven (leg. Veto in Impoundment Control Act not severable) Limitations on mandatory spending (can’t take over duties textually committed to President) Impeachment Definition of High Crimes and Misdemeanors (Madison says “maladministration too vague”) Judges and Impeachment (good behavior and impeachment clauses) Judicial Review of Impeachment and Congressional Expulsion Impeachment: Nixon v. US (Senate’s “trial” ok: either political question or decided on merits) Expulsion: Powell v. McCormack (House exclusion reviewable and restricted to 3 requirements) Congressional Immunity: Speech or Debate Clause Gravel v. US (aide and member treated as one, informing public not core legislative duty) Ability of Congress to Investigate: must justify through core legislative purpose Davis v. Passman (remedy is damages for sexist firing, can’t force rehire) o Now S & D clause would protect legislature’s core function of personnel management Executive Immunity Reasons: (1) avoid distractions, (2) need for candor, (3) respect for office, (4) avoid caution for fear of suits, (5) president is easy target for suits Nixon v. Fitzgerald (pres. absolute immunity for actions within outer perimeter of official funcs.) Clinton v. Jones (no immunity for non-official civil suits) Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald (aides don’t have same immunity as pres; aides have good faith immunity which is an objective reasonable aide standard) Mitchell v. Forsyth (no absolute immunity, even w/nat. security matters; get qualified immunity) Informational Privileges US v. Nixon (president gets presumptive, not absolute privilege; must balance interests) Congressional Subpoena of Documents (president must assert privilege; parties usually negotiate) Nixon v. Administrator of GSA (see if doc. release hinders president from doing his const. duties) Olson & Cooper Memos (Congress can’t mandate prosecution for contempt of congress for refusal to produce documents; can’t have imbalance in consequences for 2 branches) Appointments Buckley v. Valeo (Congress can’t give itself appts power, appts clause has subs. meaning) FOMC (FOMC w/great economic power has some private appt, yet no one challenges this) Morrison v. Olson (appt of independent counsel by special division ok; IC is inferior officer; Congress wants to avoid pres. conflict of interest; special division is a court of law) Free Enterprise Fund (SEC is head of depart., PCAOB is inferior b/c it has a supervisor) Removals Myers v. US (Art. 2 vesting mandates presidential control over removals—president must supervise and control executive branch) Humphrey’s Executor (for-cause removal okay; FTC is a legislative/judicial branch) Bowsher v. Synar (Congress can’t exercise executive powers) Morrison v. Olson (removal restrictions must balance congressional need with president’s ability to do his constitutional duty) Meaning of For-Cause Removal (untested: competency? Consistency with executive?) Free Enterprise Fund (double layer of for-cause removal not okay, no political accountability)