Pushing towards exit: Euro-rejection as
a ‘populist common denominator’?
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis
European University Institute
Fiesole, 28-29 November 2013
Andrea L. P. Pirro and Stijn van Kessel
Why a ‘populist common denominator’?
Assumptions about Euroscepticism
• Euroscepticism intrinsic predisposition of peripheral parties (e.g.
Taggart 1998; Hooghe et al. 2002)
• Radical parties use ‘Europe’ primarily as an ‘ideological
crowbar’ (Taggart 1998)
• Populist radical right (PRR) parties tend to be ‘Eurosceptic’ rather than
‘Euroreject’ (Mudde 2007)
Hypotheses
‘Euro-rejection’ as a pan-European ‘common denominator’ for the PRR?
• European sovereign debt crisis provides an incentive for populist radical
right parties to…
a) b) • move from ‘Euroscepticism’ to ‘Euro-rejection’;
treat ‘Europe’ as a primary issue;
Motives of radicalisation and increase in salience?
Theoretical framework
• EU-pessimists: do not support the EU as it is at the moment, or are
pessimistic about the direction of its development:
o Eurosceptics: believe in the basic tenets of European integration, critical
attitude towards the current process of integration;
o Eurorejects: fail to support one or more of the ideas underlying European
integration
Research design
• Four case studies (2005-2006, 2010, 2012)
• Qualitative content analysis of party discourses (manifestos; public
statements and interviews)
Hungary: Jobbik and ‘Europe’
• • • • • Programme: clericalism, irredentism, ethnic minorities, corruption,
‘social national’ economics
National elections: 2.2% (2006); 16.7% (2010)
Europe in 2006: pro-withdrawal (threat sovereignty and national
interests, ‘south-Americanisation’); secondary theme (focus on postcommunist transition and globalisation);
Europe in 2010: EU platform for resolution questions national
interest (minorities abroad); more salient theme after entrance EP;
Europe in 2012: return to fierce anti-EU rhetoric (referendum on
withdrawal), only partly referring to monetary issues; greater emphasis
on Europe
Slovakia: SNS and ‘Europe’
• • • • Programme: ethnic (Hungarian and Roma) minorities, traditional values
National elections: 11.7% (2006); 5.1% (2010); 4.6% (2012)
Europe in 2006 and 2010: signs of pragmatism within Eurosceptic
agenda; only secondary importance in party platform
Europe in 2012: bailout of Eurozone countries; explicit appeals to
withdrawal from the EU and end of common currency; primary issue
The Netherlands: PVV and ‘Europe’
• • • • • Programme: anti-Islam, immigration, law and order, patriotism, welfare
chauvinism
National elections: 5.9% (2006); 15.5% (2010); 10.1% (2012)
Europe in 2006: restoring sovereignty; emphasis on economic
cooperation; no call for ‘exit’; secondary theme (Islam dominates);
Europe in 2010: continuity in discourse; Europe as ‘multicultural
super state’; criticism of Greek bailouts;
Europe in 2012: call for ‘exit’; resistance to Brussels dictates and
bailouts; criticism of Greeks and East-Europeans; primary campaign
theme
United Kingdom: UKIP & BNP and ‘Europe’
• • • • • Programme: anti-EU, law and order, patriotism, anti-immigration and
anti-Islam (esp. BNP)
National elections: best results in 2010 (UKIP 3.1%; BNP 1.9%)
Europe in 2005: pro-withdrawal; EU is costly, undemocratic and
harms British sovereignty;
Europe in 2010: continuity in discourse, crisis playing a very marginal
role (absent in manifestos);
Europe in 2012: continuity, occasional remarks (‘hate to say I told
you so’, crisis used by EC as excuse for demanding more power)
The EU issue: salience and position
• As of 2012, EU took centre stage and PRR parties converged on ‘Eurorejection’
o o Process transcends regional divisions and other contextual idiosyncrasies
Membership Eurozone: different motives (i.e. loss of national sovereignty
and monetary issues)
Conclusions
• European crisis as catalyst for Euro-rejection as a ‘common
denominator’ of the PRR across Europe
• PRR parties: concomitant radicalisation of discourse on Europe (‘exit’)
and prioritisation of the issue, irrespective of contextual differences
• Further research:
o o Electoral consequences (demand-side)
Impact on party competition