Finding a Civilizational Idea:
“West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia’s Foreign Policy
Civilizations are imagined, rather than real, and nations undergoing identity crises
typically represent themselves through multiple civilizational visions. Scholars of
geopolitics can hardly understand foreign policy without analyzing those visions and
social contexts, in which they rise and fall. The paper selects for analysis three distinct
civilizational ideas of Russia – “West”, “Eurasia” and “Euro-East” – associated with
Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin, respectively. Russia’s foreign
policy is best understood as reflecting those civilizational ideas rather than merely
economic and material power conditions.
By Andrei P. Tsygankov
Associate Professor
San Francisco State University
International Relations and Political Science
San Francisco, CA
1600 Holloway Ave. HSS
San Francisco, CA 94132
Tel: (415)-338-7493
E-mail: andrei@sfsu.edu
http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov
in Geopolitics, 2007, Vol. 12, No. 3
November 2006
1
Finding a Civilizational Idea:
“West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia’s Foreign Policy
Fundamentally, we Russians have nothing in common with
Homer, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Germans; all that is
completely foreign to us … we do not belong to any of these
systems of the moral universe.
Pyort Chaadayev1 (1831)
Above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major
European power. Achieved through much suffering by European
culture, the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy
have for many centuries been our society's determining values.
Vladimir Putin (2005)
1. Introduction
In the early nineteenth century, the Russian philosopher Pyetr Chaadayev had
famously expressed his ambivalence regarding his nation’s belongingness to Europe, the
latter being commonly assumed by his contemporaries. Since then Russia was in, of and
for Europe, as it was outside and against it. In attempting to preserve what they saw as
their lifestyle, Russian rulers successfully adapted to growing power of Christianity,
while preserving the ambivalent attitude toward the European civilization. In the early
1
As cited in: Kohn, 1955, 46.
2
twentieth century, the Bolsheviks made the key identity choice by pronouncing Russia
the Soviet Union and proclaiming a break with the “bourgeois” Europe. The Soviet
disintegration revealed the situation of identity crisis in which a nation with seemingly
European roots is attempting to reconnect with its significant Other after decades of a
lacking recognition from it.
This situation of cultural ambivalence has stimulated a resurgence of civilizational
thinking in Russia. Several schools or perspectives have emerged to define Russia’s
civilizational status and to determine its appropriate goals and international strategy.
Some argue that the “return” to Europe is the only available option and that, in itself, it
constitutes a viable civilizational project. Others caution that cultural integration with
Europe cannot come true without sacrificing a considerable part of Russia’s own values
that include strong state, Orthodox religion, and collectivist economy. This debate has
deep intellectual and historical roots, and it delineates what may be seen as Russia’s
civilizational dilemma: how can one connect with European Other, while preserving its
own Self?
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to understanding how Russia struggles
to resolve the identified dilemma through analysis of its international behavior. Although
Russia’s foreign policy has been studied from different angles, most scholars have
focused on geostrategic and security dimensions.2 Yet foreign policy is not limited to
security and must be seen as a product of broader social environment that imbues a nation
with a purpose and direction of development.3 The recently revived civilizational analysis
2
See, for example, Shearman, 1995; Blank and Rubinstein, 1997; Mandelbaum, 1998; Black,
2000; Trenin, 2001b; Fawn, 2003; Black, 2004; Arbatov and Dvorkin, 2006.
3
In my earlier work, I classified Russia’s strategies toward the former Soviet region and the
outside world (Tsygankov, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2006a) without explicitely engaging social/civilizational
3
in international studies (Huntington 1997; Jackson 1999; O’Hagan 2001) usefully
specifies this environment as a collection of supranational, although not global, ideas that
extend across time and space. A part of a broader movement that emphasizes role of
culture and identity in world politics,4 the civilizational analysis conceptualizes
international behavior differently than the so-called rationalist approaches. Instead of
assuming foreign policy to be a calculation of gains in power or resources, civilizationists
see it as a nation’s desire to be recognized by its larger cultural community.
The paper takes issues with essentialist accounts of civilizations which present
them as “real” entities with clearly demarcated borders.5 Civilization, as Arnold Toynbee
wrote, “is a movement and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour” (Toynbee 1948,
55). Civilizations are imagined, rather than real, and nations undergoing identity crises
typically represent themselves through multiple civilizational ideas. Seeking to respond
to their nation’s borderland location between Europe and Asia, Russia’s leaders pursued
diverse civilizational strategies. Boris Yeltsin’s choice was decisively pro-Western, and
he sought to integrate Russia with Western institutions. However, the second foreign
minister Yevgeni Primakov thought of Russia as a part of “Eurasian”, rather than
European, continent. His civilizational priorities included restoration of Russia’s great
power status and dominance in the former Soviet region, more restrained relations with
the West, and strengthening of ties with non-Western nations. Finally, president Putin’s
policies reflect the vision of Russia as a European nation with great power capabilities
perspectives that ispired those strategies. This paper attempts to bring the civilizational dimension to the
center of analysis.
4
The necessary limited and not fully representative list would include Onuf 1989; Finnemore
1996; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999; Oren 2002; Hopf 2002.
5
The most known proponent of this approach is Samuel Huntington (1997). For a similar
perspective, see also, Gress 1998; Buchanan, 2002; Blankeley, 2005. Overwhelming majority of Russian
scholars of civilizations also work within the essentialist tradition (See especially, Danilevski [1884];
Eurasianism 1926; Gumilev 1990; Zyuganov 1998; Orlova 1998; Yerasov 2002).
4
and special relations outside Europe. It is important to recognize each of the identified
vision as a product of intellectual and political imagination invented in the 19th, the early
20th, and the early 21st century, to assist Russia in its cultural self-identification. Although
these visions proved powerful enough to serve as foreign policy inspiration, none of them
was destined to have such influence. Rather, civilizational ideas rise and fall depending
on how well they meet interests of political elites and engage spatial and temporal aspects
of a national psyche.
The paper first considers benefits of civilizational approach for studying foreign
policy. It then describes the roots and the nature of Russia’s civilizational dilemma.
Section 4 analyzes three distinct civilizational visions of Russia—“West,” “Eurasia,” and
“Euro-East”—and foreign policies that each of these visions produced. Section 5
summarizes social and political factors responsible for changes in the identified
civilizational perspectives. The conclusion summarizes my findings and discusses their
implications for civilizational analysis.
2. Civilizational Ideas and Foreign Policy
A successful foreign policy is never fundamentally disruptive to the existing
system of cultural values. While protecting a nation’s security, economy, and social
lifestyle, a state must rely on these values by reshaping and mobilizing them in the
manner that furthers the nation’s interests and assist the nation in accomplishing its
principal goals. It is this cultural dimension of foreign policy that is at the center of this
article. Following Weberian central insight, we assume that social action can only be
understood if investigators take into account its meanings for those involved (Weber
5
1978).6 A culturally sensitive foreign policy reflects the already established historical
patterns and usually has the popular support with regard to the relationships with the
nation’s culturally significant environment. In international studies, civilization is
understood to be a part of this environment. It is a cultural form that normally transcends
more than one nation and/or ethnic group.7 For the purpose of this article, civilization is
defined as an idea-based community that extends beyond a nation and is reproduced
across time and space. Civilizations form in response to various historical developments
and may be expressed in religious traditions, social customs, economic, and political
institutions. Ideas-based, civilizations are not static, but constantly evolve.8
Each civilization then has a build-in capacity to reproduce its cultural
cohesiveness by connecting across time and space.9 The time connection refers to
civilizations’ abilities to reproduce the existing mental constructions by mobilizing intergenerational memory. The spatial dimension means that civilizations are able to
successfully disseminate their values across their socially defined space. Due to
conducive institutional arrangements, repetitive historical practices,10 and activities of
cultural entrepreneurs, the civilizational meanings become consolidated within a certain
discursive area thereby confirming their status relative to more particularistic values. The
6
Recent works studying foreign policy from culture and identity perspective include, but are not
limited to Hudson 1996; Katzeenstein 1996; Hopf 2002; Nau 2002; Oren 2002; Fischer 2003; Larson and
Shevchenko 2003; Tsygankov 2006a.
7
Scholars typically refer to civilizations as “encompassing a certain number of nations” or
“broadest cultural identification” (Huntington 1997, 41, 43). However, some large states have been defined
as civilizations “pretending to be states.” For instance, such was Lucien Pye’s reference to China, his object
of study.
8
For similar definitions of civilization that emphasize ideas and claims that hold them together by
reproduction and defense over time, see Cox 1995, 11; Jackson 1999, 143; O’Hagan 2001.
9
Scholars of civilizations frequently point to these “spatial” and “temporal” dimensions of
civilization-building: Braudel on “successive generation” (Huntington 1997, 41) and “spatial” and
“temporal” (Rajaee 2000, 49); Mossafari and Weber (Ibid, 52)
10
Some scholars identify repetitive historical practices as “double backing of social process”
(Alker 1997, 390) and others as “repertoires of social categories” (Laitin 1998, 17).
6
more intensive the resulting intra-civilizational ties are, the stronger the civilization’s
cultural fabric is and the more likely the civilization is to successfully adjust to challenges
of external and internal nature. Thus the currently ongoing globalization has a potential of
undermining some civilizational systems, but not others. Some research indicates, for
example, that increased economic openness is not always accompanied by reduction of
intra-regional ties (Stalling 1995; Mansfield & Millner 1997; Helleiner and Pickel 2005).
For civilizations that are local, this may an evidence of their successful adjustment to new
global conditions without resorting to some more traditional isolationist tactics.
Such understanding of civilization should be differentiated from essentialist
approaches.11 Essentialists tend to view civilizations as real ontological entities, with
distinctive cultural boundaries between them, and predisposition to impose their values
on those outside their moral universe. Some scholars go as far as to identify intercivilizational geographic borders therefore treating civilizations as large states and
expressing skepticism regarding their possible cooperation and learning. Samuel
Huntington, for instance, identifies several distinct civilizations and even provides a
geographic map of their clearly demarcated locations. He argues that since non-Western
civilizations increasingly have the “desire, the will and the resources to shape the world
in non-Western ways” (Huntington 1993, 26), cultural conflicts are likely to occur
between Western and Orthodox Christianity in Europe; between Orthodox and Muslim
people in Europe and Eurasia; between Muslims and Hindu in Asia; between China and
America; and between Japan and the United States on the global scale. Many scholars,
however, took issues with Huntington’s perspective and argued that civilizations (1) are
more perceived than real; (2) often overlap and rarely have clear cultural, let alone
11
See sources in fn. 3.
7
geographical boundaries; (3) historically have interacted and learned from each other at
least as often as they fought.12
As with other cultural entities, civilizations are not always stable. They change,
break, and disappear, and scholars are correct to argue the significance of social forces
behind these civilizational transformations.13 In contrast to what essentialists tend to
assume, civilizations are not uniformly cohesive. They are neither single-minded
promoters of their cultural values akin with the West-triumphant “end of history”
perspective (Fukuyama 1989, 1992), nor isolationist entities preparing to “clash”
(Huntington 1997) with other civilizations. More commonly, civilizations preserve their
identities by borrowing from others ideas that suit their cultural needs. They develop out
of situations of uncertainty which put intellectual and political elites in a position of
choice. More stable cultural communities are characterized by dominance of some ideas
over others, but no discourse is homogeneous or entirely hegemonic; instead it is always
composed of both hegemonic and recessive trends.14 Various ideas compete for achieving
dominant or hegemonic status, and their contestation becomes especially intense at stages
of deep civilizational changes. For instance, while some social forces favor a radical
cultural renovation and borrowing from other civilizations, others prefer a more gradual
change and greater reliance on their own civilizational experience. To the extend the
12
For details of such critique of essentialist arguments, see, for example, Alker 1995; Cox 1995;
Sen 1998; Rajaee 2000; Said 2001; Tsygankov 2004; Bassin 2005. For other prominent studies of
civilizations, see Toynbee 1948; Walker 1984; Wallerstein 1991; Sanderson 1995; Collins 1999; O’Hagan
2001.
13
For instance, Cox (1995, 25) includes “marginalized social forces whence contestation and
innovation may come” in his definition of civilization.
14
For examples of such analyses of discourse, see Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi 1989; Wight
1992.
8
choice is controlled by elites, the role played by policy actors and intellectuals in
reshaping their nation’s civilizational identity is critical.15
3. The Russia’s Civilizational Dilemma
Nations face different civilizational challenges. Some strive to preserve their
national identity. Others are eager to learn from outsiders. Russia’s dilemma is a special,
because it seeks to meet both challenges simultaneously. In perception of many members
of Russia’s political class, today’s challenge is to re-connect with Europe as the old
“significant Other,” while retaining those historical values that have defined Russia as a
nation.16 The roots of this civilizational dilemma can be traced back to the developments
before the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917. At the time, Europe played the role of
Russia's "significant other", and, at least since Czar Peter the Great, figured prominently
in Russia's debates on national identity. It was Europe that created the larger meaningful
environment in which Russia's rulers defended their core values. Although Europe’s
recognition of Russia as one of its own was never unproblematic (Neumann 1998; Malia
1999), all Russia’s leaders identified with European ideas. Some rulers––most
prominently Alexander II––attempted again to redefine the country's identity in line with
15
The literature on ideas and intellectual influences in shaping cultural identities is large. See, for
instance, Manheim 1936; Habermas 1973; Wolfe 1989; Said 1993; Neumann 1996; Suny 1998; English
2000; Oren 2002; Tsygankov 2004.
16
Russia’s debate on belongingness to Europe is centuries-old (Neumann 1996). Today’s schools
of viewing Russia’s relations with Europe continue the old debate. Conservatives, such as Natalya
Narochnitskaya (2004) argue that Russia is European by virtue of its Christian identity. The supporters of
great power identity point to the historical role played by Russia in preserving international order in
Europe. They claim that Russia must continue to play its essentially European role of a stabilizer in the
volatile post-Soviet region and that no reform can be successful without such stabilization (Tretyakov
2004; Migranyan 2006). Finally, there are those advocating Russia’s Europeanness of the ground of
developing common values and institutions, such as democracy, human rights, private property, and rule of
law (Trenin 2006).
9
the new European ideas of Enlightenment, Constitutionalism, and Capitalism. Others
sought to defend the old Europe and preserve the basic features of the autocratic regime.
However, when the egalitarian ideas of the French revolution of 1789 split Europe
into progressive and anti-revolutionary camps, Russia had to decide between the two. The
Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 reflected the struggle of the two Europes and the
resulting crisis of Russia's external identification. In the absence of the czar's ability to
answer the newly emerged identity questions, it was the Bolsheviks who made the key
identity choice by proclaiming Russia's break with its "bourgeois" past and in 1922
pronouncing it the Soviet Union. Unlike some previous critics of the two Europes, the
Bolsheviks adopted not merely a non-European, but an anti-European identity.17 Their
socialist identity vision implied the perceived superiority of Russia relative to the liberal
and autocratic Europes.
Over the decades of revolutionary transformations, the Soviet system indeed
obtained qualities of a distinctive civilization.18 Its disintegration in 1991 signified a
collapse of the previously established system of values, and not just of hierarchically
established political relations between the core and the periphery (empire). That system
of cultural values reflected a belief in common destiny of Russia and other nationalities
living in the geographical space of the former USSR, and that belief was widely shared
by peoples across that space. Even in the highly politicized discourse of Perestroika,
many polls of general public demonstrated resilience of this civilizational thinking and a
17
In response to the crisis of European identity, some Russian intellectuals began advocating a
break with both the old––nationalist and new––liberal Europes as early as in the 1840s–1850s. Alexander
Herzen, for instance, grew disappointed with European conservative restorations and––long before the
Bolsheviks––turned to socialism arguing for Russia's own, non-European way of "catching up"
economically and socially. The Bolsheviks pushed this line of thinking to its extreme.
18
On the Soviet system as a distinctive civilization, see Kotkin 1990; Sinyavski 2001; Kara-Murza
2002.
10
potential for its continuous support. For instance, during the referendum on 17 March
1991, which has taken place in the context of Gorbachev’s struggle for a renewed Union
and was conducted in all of the Soviet republics except the three Baltics, Armenia,
Georgia, and Moldavia, 147 million people voted and 76.4 percent approved the
preservation of the union.19 Prominent intellectuals and politicians on both conservative
and reformist sides, too, showed their commitments to preserving core elements of this
civilizational system. Gorbachev himself signaled his support for newly reformulated
civilizational idea and renewed union of Eurasianist nature.20
Because of this historical dualism, Russia’s contemporary civilizational crisis has
both European and anti-European roots. Its key dilemma is how to re-connect with its
European roots while remaining a distinctive cultural entity. This dilemma has two interrelated dimensions. The first one is temporal and concerns finding a historically sensitive
solution to the question of Russia's national identity. This is a daunting task given that
many Soviet values, such as command economy and single party rule, have been
19
The wording of the question was as follows, “Do you support the preservation of the union as a
renewed federation of sovereign republics in which the rights of a person of any nationality are fully
guaranteed?” The Yeltsin-led Democratic Russia has actively campaigned against the referendum (Kotz
and Weir 1997, 147).
20
On several occasion, Gorbachev used the term Eurasia in his speeches and writings. For
example, in October 1988 in his welcoming message to foreign guests attending the Asia-Pacific Region
conference in Vladivostok, he stressed that “the Soviet Union was a Eurasian state … to serve as a hopeful
bridge bringing together two great continents” (as cited in Hauner 1990, 249). And in his Perestroika book
of 1987 edition he upgraded his “common European home” formula by adding the Asian dimension, “The
Soviet Union is an Asian, as well as European country” (Ibid, 11). Gorbachev’s principal foreign policy
advisor Georgi Shakhanazarov wrote later about his regret that the post-Soviet Commonwealth of
Independent States was not named “the Commonwealth of Euro-Asian States,” which “would have
emphasized the unique feature of our country that for centuries has been a bridge between the two great
continents and civilizations” (2001, 486). Gorbachev’s liberal foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze too
referred to the Soviet Union as a “great Eurasian space” and a “world of worlds” (mir mirov). Citing the
Russian philosopher Georgi Fedotov, Shevardnadze said Russia had to politically live in a complex world
of both European and Asian nations (Cit. in Otunbayeva 1991, 186-187). Gorbachev’s difference from
conservative opposition was about methods of unifying the Soviet space, rather than about the principal
need to have such unity. Among the Westernizers, Andrei Sakharov defended the notion of Eurasia and
even has written his own project of “Constitution of the Union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia”
(Sakharov 1990, 266-276).
11
discredited, and the generational memory of the pre-Soviet experience is virtually nonexistent. This temporal dimension is intrinsically connected to the spatial one. For until
Russia knows what it is and until it clearly defines its post-Soviet values, it cannot
successfully pose, let alone solve, the question of its larger civilizational identification.
The Soviet collapse revealed the eagerness to re-joint Europe from which Russia has
been isolated for almost the entire twentieth century. But the “return” to Europe is
difficult because Europe is yet to accept Russia as it is, and the Russian society has yet to
develop its strong identification with Europe.21
Russia therefore finds itself at a cross-road. At least three different schools
compete in the national discourse each proposing different solution to the Russia’s
civilizational dilemma. One of these schools argues the “natural” affinity of their country
with the West based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free
market. Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin’s vision of “integration” and “strategic
partnership with the West” assumed that Russia would develop liberal democratic
institutions and build a market economy after the manner of the West.22 The Westernizers
were weaker on making a temporal cultural connection and offering the nation productive
historical parallels for reconnecting with its past. Their preferred emphasis was on
radically innovative and anti-Soviet nature of their civilizational project.
In reality, however, the Westernist vision had important historical roots. The early
Westernizers were not liberal and, instead, sought to present Russia as a loyal member in
21
Some data strongly indicate that the Russian public is well aware of the society's cultural
distinctiveness from the West. In December 2001, according to the respected polling agency VTSIOM,
71% of Russians agreed with the statement that "Russia belongs to the special "Eurasian" or Orthodox
civilization, and therefore cannot follow the Western path of development". Only 13% counted Russia as a
part of the Western civilization (VTSIOM, 2001).
22
For important statements by Russian Westernizers, see Kozyrev 1995; Gaidar 1997; Trenin
2001b; Trenin 2006.
12
the family of European monarchies. A different group of Westernizers identified with the
West of constitutional freedoms and political equality. After the era of Great Reforms and
Russia shifting its relations from Germany to France and Britain under Alexander II, the
Czarist government seemed more willing to embrace the new European values of
constitutionalism. Even Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing
too far apart from Europe by placing the emphasis on social-democratic ideas. For
instance, one of Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking was that Soviet Union had to
“purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of
socialism (gumannyi sotsializm).
Westernizers are opposed by the so-called Eurasianists, who view Russia as a
land-based civilization with strong ties in the former Soviet region, Asia, and the Muslim
world. The group’s main spatial connection is therefore with non-Western nations, and it
seeks to rebuild Russia’s historical identity by emphasizing the notion of great power
(derzhava) and distinctive cultural values, such as religion, strong state, and collectivist
economy.23 Eurasianist roots are in Russia’s traditionalist philosophy that has always
seen Russian values as principally different from—and often superior to—those of the
Western civilization. This philosophy dates back to the dictum “Moscow is the Third
Rome” adopted under Ivan the Terrible. In the nineteen century, traditionalists defended
the notion of Slavic unity, and their ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the czar’s
foreign policy decisions. The socialist traditionalists challenged the West by promoting
their own idea of the new civilizations. Thus, the Lenin-Trotski’s doctrine of the world
23
The literature of Eurasianism is growing. For some key statements, see Panarin 1998; Zyuganov
1999; Dugin 2002.
13
revolution was developed out of the belief in the Soviet civilizational superiority relative
to the “decadent” and “rotten” Western capitalist civilization.
Westernizers and Eurasianists represent polar poles of Russia’s civilizational
identification. Spatially, they relate to the West and non-Western nations, respectively.
They also offer radically different perspectives of Russia’s past. While Westernizers have
a tendency to be nihilistic toward the national history, Eurasianists are prone to
exaggerated sense of pride, even glorification of the Russian past. Between these two
extremes are multiple perspectives. Their representatives search for ways to demonstrate
their cultural commitment to Europe and Russia simultaneously. Vladimir Putin’s vision
of Russia as a “normal great power” is an example of such cultural synthesis. President of
Russia genuinely believes that his country is a “normal” European nation that
relinquished “imperial ambitions” (Donaldson and Nogee, 2002, p. 341). Yet he also
claims that “Russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays as
a great power” (Putin, 2003). For Putin, a great power status is not a goal in itself for
Putin; rather its role is to create a necessary condition for Russia’s more advanced
engagement with the world. The term “normal” signals support for Westernizers, whereas
the concept “great power” culturally reconnects with the historical perspective of
Eurasianists.
Putin’s vision is not principally new. For instance, in the late 19th–early 20th
century, the so-called New liberals, such as Pyetr Struve, Pavel Novgorodtsev, and Sergei
Gessen, saw Russia as both a European and a distinctively strong socially responsible
state. This vision differed from the one defended by the Old liberals of primarily
constitutionalist orientation, such as Boris Chicherin and Pavel Milyukov. The New
14
liberals moved somewhat closer to Slavophiles’ perspective on the state and its role, but
they remained committed to Europe and did not share anti-European attitudes held by the
late Slavophiles, such as Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev.24
More recently intellectuals and politicians have developed civilizational visions
with similar dualistic meanings. Thus a parliamentarian Vladimir Lukin (1994) and
presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich (1994) introduced the notion of Liberal Statism
arguing that market economy and political democracy should be viewed as compatible
with distinct state interests. The philosopher Aleksandr Panarin pioneered the idea of
Civilized Eurasianism, which too was respectful of democracy and human rights, but saw
Eurasianism as the Russia’s cultural and geopolitical distinctiveness.25 The political
consultant Gleb Pavlovski (2004a, 2004b) coined another term —“Euro-East” which
seeks to position Russia as culturally European, yet poised to preserve a special influence
in the former Soviet region. Along the same lines, the former Yeltsin’s privatization tsar
and currently the head of the Russia’s state electric company Anatoli Chubais (2003)
wrote that Russia’s main goal in the twenty first century should be to build up a “liberal
empire” through the strengthening of its position in the former USSR. In their own way,
“Liberal Statism,” “Civilized Eurasianism,” “Euro-East,” and “Liberal Imperialism,”
each have sought to address the identified civilizational dilemma by proposing a way to
connect with Western/European cultural values, while preserving a historically special
national identity. Let us now turn to how the identified visions affected Russia’s
international behavior.
For analyses of Russia’s liberal currents, see especially Fisher 1958; Walicki 1992; Wiedle
Russia’s Liberal Project 2000.
25
See, for example, Panarin 1994, 1995. After 1996, Panarin’s views became closer to radical
Eurasianists and Traditionalists. See especially, Panarin 2000, 2001.
24
15
4. Civilizational Ideas in Action
“West”, or the Civilizational Objectives of Boris Yelstin and Andrei Kozyrev
The revolutionary changes in the Gorbachev’s Russia and the subsequent Soviet
disintegration provided the context for the victory of Westernizers. In the polarized
environment of elite competition, liberal Westernizers defeated Gorbachev and his vision
of a distinct Soviet identity. In contrast to Gorbachev, the new Russia’s leaders saw their
country as an organic part of the Western civilization, whose “genuine” Western identity
was hijacked by Bolsheviks and the Soviet system. In their perspective, during the Cold
War Russia had acted against its own national identity and interests, and now it finally
had an opportunity to become a “normal” Western country. Thus, Kozyrev (1995, 16)
argued that the Soviet Union was not merely a “normal” or merely “underdeveloped,” but
a “wrongfully developed” country. Russia was now to correct the distortion by accepting
the priority of the individual and the free market over society and state in order to
develop what was referred to as a “natural partnership” with Western countries (Kozyrev
1992). This vision was a clear product of a long tradition of Russia’s Westernist thinking.
Such eminent 19th century historians, as Vasili Klyuchevski and Pavel Milyukov, saw
Russia’s national characteristics, but insisted that their country would nevertheless
develop in the same direction with the West and go through the same stages of
development. Westernizers therefore sought to sidestep the temporal aspect of Russia’s
civilizational dilemma. Rather than trying to identify historically specific aspects of
Russia’s development, they insisted that now Russia simply had to “join” the West.
16
Having won a considerable part of the elites on their side and using the
momentum after the failed coup of August 1991, the new liberal coalition moved to
implement its civilizational vision through a pro-Western international policies. In the
aftermath of the coup, Yeltsin had first formulated and pursued the idea of
Westernization as a matter of international strategy. The idea included radical economic
reform, the so-called “shock therapy,” gaining a full-scale status in transatlantic
economic and security institutions, such as the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, International Monetary Fund, and G-7, and separating the new Russia from
the former Soviet republics economically, politically, and culturally. The Westernist
vision shaped the new foreign policy concept prepared in the late 1992 and signed into
law in April 1993. The concept was heavily influenced by the documents and charter of
the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and favored the
promotion of Russia’s interests in the first place through participation in different
international organizations. It seemed as if the new civilizational identity was finally to
take roots in Russia.
“Eurasia” and the Foreign Policy of Yevgeni Primakov
But the celebration was premature, as the Westernist vision proved to be
unsustainable. Soon it was met with a formidable opposition, which advanced a different
civilizational identity for Russia. Led by presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich and then
the Chief of Foreign Intelligence Yevgeni Primakov, the new coalition included military
industrialists, the army, and the security services, and it advocated the notion of Russia as
a distinctly Eurasianist great power. Although the notion was hardly new, to many
17
Russians it had the virtue of reinvigorating familiar historical parallels, such as victory
over Nazi, that were a source of national pride. Without implying the confrontation with
the West, the new group sought to defend the image of Russia as a power-holder striving
to preserve its own civilizational distinctness in the world.
As an intellectual and political movement, Eurasianism emerged during the 1930s
to reflect the perceived need for Russia to emphasize its relative cultural and geopolitical
independence, or “self-standing” (samostoyaniye in Russian).26 It is a concern with
stability of borders and accommodation of ethnically diverse Euro-Asian periphery and
domestic population, as well as the sometimes uncooperative stances of seemingly alien
Westerners, that has always laid at the heart of Eurasianist political philosophy. It is the
same concerns, albeit under the new post-Soviet geopolitical situation, that has given
Eurasianism a new life in today’s Russia. Eurasia has been conceptualized as a
civilization distinct from both Western and Asian worlds. Although Eurasianists are
diverse and have no agreement on the civilization’s geographical boundaries, they share
the belief that Russia constitutes its Heartland27 and should be viewed as the state
responsible for organizing and stabilizing the post-Soviet region. Over time, the new
civilizational coalition grew strength and was able to challenge the emerging and still
nascent “commercial class” that promoted the Westernist image of Russia’s identity. The
Eurasianist coalition greatly benefited from 1993 and 1995 elections, in which
nationalists and communists did well compelling Yeltsin to modify the liberal agenda.
26
See, especially, Eurasianism 1926.
The term “Heartland” was introduced by the 19 th century geographer Halford Mackinder. On
Russian contemporary readings of Mackinder, see Bassin and Aksyenov 2006.
27
18
His appointment of Primakov signified the victory of the new identity and new
civilizational strategy for Russia.28
A different civilizational commitment prescribed a different foreign policy.
According to Primakov, the fact that “Russia is both Europe and Asia” had “to play a
tremendous role in formulation of its foreign policy.”29 In the mid-1990s, the foreign
policy had visibly changed. The key priorities included improving relations with nonWestern countries and integrating the former Soviet region under a tighter control of
Moscow. Aware of Russia’s weakness, Eurasianists worried about becoming dependent
on the strongest and wanted to pursue “multi-vector” policies, aiming to preserve what
they saw as Russia’s civilizational uniqueness and develop more balanced relations with
the West. They also warned against Russia unequivocally siding with Europe or the
United States at the expense of relationships with key participants of Eurasian continent,
such as China, India, and Islamic world. Such thinking was adequately reflected in
official documents. The country’s National Security Concept of 1997 identified Russia as
an “influential European and Asian power” and, it recommended that Russia maintain
equal distancing in relations to the “global European and Asian economic and political
actors” and presented a positive program for the integration of the CIS efforts in the
security area.30
The Civilizational Dimension of Putin’s Foreign Policy
Primakov’s Eurasianist beliefs firmed up during his long career of a Middle East specialist and
policy maker. During the Soviet time, the future minister worked in several Middle Eastern countries as a
correspondent of the leading communist newspaper Pravda. He also served as director of the Institute of
Oriental Studies and, later, of another prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
29
Yevgeni Primakov’s (1992, 104) presentation at the conference “Preobrazhennaya Rossiya”
held at Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1992.
30
National Security Concepts and Foreign Policy Concepts are available in: Shakleyina 2002, Vol.
4, 51-90, 110-111. For analysis, see Kassianova 2001.
28
19
The arrival of Vladimir Putin as the new president marked yet another change in
Russia’s foreign policy and a renewed interest to engaging the West. This departure from
Primakov’s Eurasianism had more to do with new civilizational vision promoted by the
president, than with changes in Russia’s structural position. Putin embraced the earlier
articulated vision of Russia as a part of the West. Yet he articulated the European
dimension as especially prominent in his foreign policy, and he insisted that Russia was a
country of European, rather than Asian, identity.31 At the heart of Putin’s vision is his
conviction that Russia “was, is and will, of course, be a major European power” (Putin
2005). In his programmatic speech delivered to the Federation Council in March 2005,
Putin declared that he sees Russia moving toward the same values that are shared by
others in the European continent -- “the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and
democracy” (Ibid)
“For three centuries, we – together with the other European nations – passed hand
in hand through reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging
parliamentarism, municipal and judiciary branches, and the establishment of
similar legal systems. Step by step, we moved together toward recognizing and
extending human rights, toward universal and equal suffrage, toward
understanding the need to look after the weak and the impoverished, toward
women's emancipation, and other social gains” (Ibid)
In the former Soviet region, this translates into the doctrine of “continuing the
civilizational role of the Russian nation in Eurasia” (Ibid). Responding to charges of
“imperialism” toward post-Soviet nations in the wake of the “colored revolutions,” Putin
“We are a part of the Western European culture. No matter where our people live, in the Far
East on in the south, we are Europeans.” (Putin 2000, 169).
31
20
insisted that Russia seeks not the post-Soviet states’ territory or natural resources, but the
human dignity and the quality of life of its citizens, whom it regards as its own cultural
compatriots.32
Putin is clear, however, while moving in the same direction of freedom and
democracy with Europeans, Russia does so at its own pace and given its own conditions.
In the same speech referring to the Western role in the colored revolutions in Georgia and
Ukraine, Putin insisted on Russia’s right to “decide for itself the pace, terms and
conditions of moving towards democracy", and he warned against attempts to destabilize
political system by "any unlawful methods of struggle.” The motive of non-interference
in Russia’s domestic developments from outside has only become stronger over time.33
This vision has been consistent with Putin’s overall foreign policy philosophy.
Throughout his presidency, he has advocated a greater integration with the West, while
continuing to insist on Russia’s great power status and viewing such status as a necessary
geopolitical condition for domestic economic and political development. While insisting
on Russia’s own interests in many areas of world politics, Putin attempted to frame those
interests as compatible with strategic commitments to Western values, such as
international law, personal freedoms, and market economy.
Putin’s supporters interpreted his vision using the idea of “Euro-Eastern”
civilization, which should be differentiated from the earlier discussed “West” and
“Eurasia.” Intellectuals and political consultants, such as Gleb Pavlovski (2004a; 2004b;
“Russia, traditionally linked with the former Soviet republics, and now newly independent
states, by history, the Russian language and great culture, cannot stay away from the common striving for
freedom.” In this same speech, Putin also called for granting Russian citizenship to legal aliens from the
FSU. The newly appointed head of the Kremlin’s special department for Interregional and Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries Modest Kolerov elaborated on the last point in his interview (Kolerov,
2005).
33
In his address to the Federation Council in May 2006, Putin put an even greater emphasis on
values of sovereignty and strong national defense (Putin 2006a).
32
21
2005; 2006), articulated three components of the new civilizational idea. First, the
countries of Euro-East, such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, share with Europe
values of market economy and growing middle class. Second, because of their
preoccupation with domestic economic and social modernization, the Euro-Eastern area
is in a special need for maintaining political stability. Growing middle class and political
stability should not be viewed, however, as in conflict with development of democratic
institutions. Rather, according to Pavlovski, each nation in the region should be given a
right to experiment with its own democratic model that fits its national and international
conditions. To him, Kazakhstan, a country that is typically viewed as lacking democracy,
is too in process of finding its model of democratic development (Pavlovski 2004b).
Finally, domestic transformation of the Euro-Eastern nations requires preservation
of political sovereignty and defense from attempts by outsiders to exploit internal
resources of the nation of the region. Russia – by the virtue of its size and capabilities – is
in a special position to greatly contribute to providing the collective goods of security,
sovereignty and stability in the region. Kremlin’s ideologists and theorists sympathetic to
the official agenda have developed concepts of “sovereign democracy”and “sovereign
economy” (Tretyakov 2005; Surkov 2006; Tsipko 2006) insisting on need for Russia to
protect its path of development and natural resources. Furthermore, they argued that by
upholding values of sovereignty Russia preserves European values that Europe itself
cannot always sustain when confronted with political pressures from the United States
(Sobel 2006). In attempting to emphasize Europe’s independence, Pavlovski (2006) has
criticized the concepts of “West” viewing it as “an anti-European” and only relevant for
understanding of the Cold War.
22
In line with his European vision, Putin strengthened energy ties with European
countries, especially Germany, France, and Italy. Russia’s energy markets were primarily
in Europe—they accounted for forty percent of Russia’s foreign trade relative to mere
five percent of trade with the United States. The new Kremlin’s leadership also worked to
develop a global security perspective that would be compatible with those of large
European nations. During the crisis over the American decision to go to war against Iraq,
Russia joined the anti-war coalition and argued for the United Nations as the only
legitimate body to sanction the use of force. In siding with Europeans, Putin was firmly
supported at home, but he was also careful not to present his views as anti-American,
positioning himself instead as a voice of moderation and even reconciliation between the
American and the European side in the West. Finally, Putin made efforts to bring Russia
and Europe closer culturally. During the celebration of St. Petersburg’s three hundred
years anniversary, he went as far as to suggest that visas between the European Union
(EU) countries and Russia be abandoned altogether by the year 2006.
At the same time, the Kremlin insisted on Russia’s great power status and
preservation of the strong state (Putin 1999). While declaring commitment to European
values, Russia maintained distance from Brussels in those issues where the new
leadership perceived European powers to be infringing upon Russia’s interests. Most
symptomatically, there was relatively little of cooperation in the area of security,
particularly in the former Soviet region. Rather than working with Europeans, Russia has
worked through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – with China and Central Asian
states as prominent members – to address threats of terrorism. Moscow hardly
coordinated with the EU any of its policies in the region. It rejected European ideas for
23
joint peace-keeping missions in the former Soviet states, such as Moldova. Putin also
replaced Primakov’s geopolitical emphasis with aggressive projection of Russia’s soft
power and geoeconomic interests in the region.34 As some states questioned Russia’s
domination in the region following the “colored revolutions,” the Kremlin was
determined to secure economic gains. It introduced sanctions on various products and
raised prices for oil and gas supplies that were particularly steep for countries seeking to
challenge Russia (Torbakov 2005).
In addition, Putin insisted on his country’s “energy sovereignty” and refused to
ratify the European Energy Charter, which would require Russia to open access to its
pipelines. Instead, the Kremlin insisted on long-term contracts with European consumers
and pursued bilateral energy ties with countries, such as Germany (Putin 2006b). Finally,
Russia maintained that it would develop at its own pace and not tolerate attempts by
Europeans to shape domestic political developments. In response to the “colored
revolutions”, in which Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a
prominent role in training and financing opposition, the Kremlin tightened regulations for
functioning of foreign NGO’s at home (Herd 2005). All this indicated that Russia
continued to differ from its European counterparts in evaluation of national interest and
security threats. In their turn, Europeans continued to be suspicious of Russia remaining
critical of its independent foreign policy and declining its proposal to have visa-free
arrangement with the European Union.
Table 1 summarizes Russia’s civilizational ideas.
[TABLE 1]
34
On Russian soft power in Eurasia, see Hill 2004; Tsygankov 2006b.
24
5. Explaining Rise and Fall of Russia’s Civilizational Ideas
Neither rationalism, nor essentialism can satisfactorily explain the described
changes in Russia’s civilizational ideas. Some essentialists characterize Russia as a “torn
country” divided between European and Eurasian orientations,35 but they view this
division as a historically predetermined and non-receptive to change. The position of
political elites and their competition for cultural and ideological influence is not taken by
essentialists as of great significance. On the other hand, rationalists devote their primer
attention to calculations of benefits by political elites, but tend to abstract from the social
context of elite competition. Ultimately, both theories are incomplete in identifying
origins and process of civilizational ideas guiding Russia’s political elites. What matters
in explaining their rise and fall are 1) local conditions that either strengthen or undermine
a dominant civilizational idea; and 2) contemporary behavior of Europe/West toward
Russia that vindicates or erodes their earlier established civilizational images. While the
former may assist nation in making cultural connection across time, the latter can
facilitate spatial relations with the significant Other. In addition, each civilizational
coalition, whether European or Eurasian, must work hard to make use of available
material and institutional resources in the society and to respond to the population’s most
pressing concern. With this in mind, let us summarize the dynamics of the aboveidentified civilizational changes.
The Rise of Westernist Vision
The Westernist civilizational perspective emerged and grew its strength in the
context of Russia’s national-democratic revolution and recognition extended to it by the
35
Huntington 1997, 43.
25
Western nations. Gorbachev’s Russia no longer sought to be recognized for its strength.36
Instead, the emphasis was made on gradually bringing domestic institutions closer to
those of the West. As the West was consolidating its liberal institutions after the second
world war, liberal thinking was returning to the Soviet Union preparing the ground for
possible future changes. Gorbachev’s arrival signaled that the Soviet liberalism had
grown strong enough to challenge the tenets of the old thinking.37 After the Soviet
collapse of 1991, Yeltsin and his foreign minister Kozyrev seized an opportunity to
fashion foreign policy consistently with their Westernist civilizational vision. Although
the population’s support for the Soviet Union was still strong, the new Westernist
coalition sought to integrate with the West directly, even at the expense of ties with the
former Soviet republics (Pikayev 1996).
Externally, Yeltsin and Kozyrev drew their inspiration from the West’s growing
criticism of Gorbachev’s socialist reform and encouragements to build a “genuinely” proWestern system of market democracy. The economic and political rise of the West was
single powerful force that shaped the worldview of the new post-Soviet leadership. As
early as in 1989 the arguments about communism as “the grand failure” won the support
of the mainstream discourse in the West,38 and Westernizers in Moscow were well
familiar with these arguments and endorsed them. They, too, believed that Russia had
exhausted the list of alternative development projects, and they fully expected that their
36
Ringman 2002.
Brown 1996; Neumann 1996; Checkel 1997; English 2000; Larson and Shevchenko 2003.
38
Brzezinski 1989. The leading establishment journal Foreign Affairs soon issued the verdict that
“the Soviet system collapsed because of what it was, or more exactly, because of what it was not. The West
‘won’ because of what the democracies were—because they were free, prosperous and successful, because
they did justice, or convincingly tried to do so” (Pfaff 1991, 48). This vision was finally legitimized on the
highest policy level when President George H.W. Bush announced the cold war “victory” of the US in his
1992 State of the Union message.
37
26
civilizational drive would finally establish Russia as a country with Western system of
values.
The Westernist coalition in Russia fully shared the belief in the superiority of the
Western system. In addition to liberal-minded leadership, intellectuals, and human rights
activists, the coalition included some members the former Communist nomenklatura.
United by Yeltsin, members of the new elite wanted to accomplish different but
compatible goals. Reformers wanted fast economic and political change that would bring
Russia in line with the politico-economic standards of Western countries within a limited
period of time. They saw the West’s victory in the Cold War as the opportunity of the
new liberal era, were inspired by the Western promises of support, and they expected to
“join” the West within a few years. Members of the former party nomenklatura—those
who realized that the return to the Soviet past was no longer possible and had lost faith in
the Soviet, as well as any other, form of socialism39—wanted to obtain control over state
property they had managed under the leadership of the Central Committee.
Westernism to Eurasianism
However, the pro-Western civilizational perspective proved to be unsustainable as
the domestic and external conditions that brought to prominence liberal Westernist vision
were to soon to be change. The domestic context of growing disorder, corruption, and
poverty that had resulted from the Yeltsin’s Westernist reforms was simply not conducive
to sustaining the chosen civilizational direction. The Soviet disintegration further added
to the growing sense of anxiety and humiliation experienced by Russians. In addition to
39
Some of course never gave up on the idea of socialism, including Gorbachev, as well as some of
his former supporters, such as Nikolai Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachev.
27
creating a security vacuum and the emergence of a whole series of new conflicts in the
Russian periphery, the breakup of the USSR greatly exacerbated the sense of cultural
identity crisis.40 The new local conditions played in hands of Eurasianists, who
traditionally place the emphasis on values of order and security over those of freedom
and democracy. Eurasianists stimulated the rise of new civilizational and geopolitical
thinking in Russia, which became extremely popular.41 The emphasis on values of
stability and sovereignty had particular cultural appeal and discursive advantages.
No less importantly, Russia’s Westernist vision stumbled over a relatively
sanguine reaction from the West, its own significant Other. Westernizers were hoping for
rapid and massive assistance from the West. After all, Russia was decisively breaking
with its Soviet past. In the words of Russia’s first foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, the
country’s very system of values was to be changed, and the expectation was that such
change would assist Russia greatly in bringing it to the front rank status of countries, such
as France, Germany, and the United States, within ten to twelve years. The implications
of the new liberal thinking were fundamental. Russia was presented as a “naturally” proWestern nation, and its success was predicated on support and recognition from the West.
However, the West’s reaction was often excessively cautious or insensitive.42 The
decision made by the Western nations to expand NATO eastward excluding Russia from
the process is a case in point. The decision came as a major blow to the reformers and
brushed aside Moscow’s hopes to transform the alliance into a non-military one or to
40
See Sperling, Kay, and Papacosma 2003 for greater details.
For some overviews of Russia’s new civilizational imagination, see Kolossov and Turovsky
2002; Tsygankov, 2003.
42
See, for example, Rutland 1999; Gould-Davies and Woods 1999; Black 2000.
41
28
admit Russia as a full organization’s member.43 It strengthened the sense that Russia was
not being accepted by the Western civilization as its own, and it provided the Eurasianist
coalition with required ammunition for constructing an image of external threat and
questioning the objectives of the new government. As a result, the spatial aspect of the
Westernist vision remained mobilized insufficiently at best.
The new Eurasianist coalition included military industrialists, intellectuals, the
army, and the security services. Its members had somewhat diverse interests, but were
united in sharing the new civilizational vision of Russia. Some members of the coalition
shared the vision out of hurt pride for the significant loss of territory and world status
brought by the Soviet collapse. Others became disappointed with failure of partnership
with the West to bring any visible improvements in people’s living standards and to
pacify military conflicts in the Russian periphery. Still others saw the largely ignored
potential to generate revenue through development of new technologies and export of
conventional weapons.44 The Eurasianist great power entrepreneurs were quite successful
in exploiting state weakness and mobilizing various informal channels to influence policy
making. They argued their case publicly—in national parliament, media, and various
conferences—and through informal and non-public channels, such as the Security
Council, Presidential Administration, and non-governmental organizations. Just like the
liberal coalition had once used various institutional advantages to challenge Gorbachev,
43
In addition, some influential foreign policy experts in the West spoke of “the premature
partnership” with Russia (See, for example, Brzezinski 1994).
44
In one of its documents, the influential non-governmental organization Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy expressed the attitude typical of great power circles, when it described the militaryindustrial complex as “a key, possibly, the key factor of Russia’s struggle for a dignified place in the
twenty first century.”“Strategiya Rossiyi v XXI veke,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 18, 1998.
29
the great power coalition too took advantage of the relatively weakly centralized political
system.
Why Eurasianism Fell and Putin’s Vision Rose
However, the Eurasianist vision was soon subjected to powerful criticisms at
home as overly ambitious and excessively anti-Western. Intellectuals schooled in the
Westernist thinking led the way and charged that Eurasianist priorities—reviving the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a vehicle of the post-Soviet integration,
resisting the eastern expansion of NATO, developing military cooperation with Iran, and
trying to build a Russia-China-India security axis—were fundamentally misplaced. In
addition, they insisted that the policy of playing Europe or China against the United
States and not siding firmly with the West earned few foreign policy dividends
(Fyodorov, 2001; Trenin, 2001a). By that time, Russia’s commercial ties with Europe
grew stronger, and liberal thinking became better established in the national discourse.
The growing foreign policy consensus was that Primakov-inspired Eurasianism was
outdated, financially exorbitant, and potentially confrontational.45 It proved inadequate in
addressing Russia’s civlizational dilemma the resolution of which required that Russia
redefine itself as a European power. Although rhetorically Eurasianists acknowledged the
necessity to build market economy and democratic institutions, in practice they remained
focused on power and geopolitics.46
45
The new foreign policy consensus was summarized in the document of the influential Council
for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) entitled “Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President—2000”
(SVOP 2000).
46
Primakov made it explicit that his main focus was on building a “multipolar world” and
recovering from the geopolitical defeat of the Soviet disintegration. He was hoping that, after rebuilding the
economy, Russia would “return” to the world politics, and he saw his foreign policy as reminiscent of State
Chancellor Aleksandr Gorchakov’s “concentration” course after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war
30
The arrival of Putin and his vision of Russia as a European great power signaled
yet another shift in a civilizational idea. Putin’s vision reflected new domestic and
international changes. Domestically, he continued to exploit the great power connection
to Russia’s past. Here, his case rested on new threats to Russia which were defined by the
new leadership as those of terrorist nature. For instance, in August 1999 Chechen rebels
led by Shamil Basayev and the Arab fighter Khattab had occupied parts of the
neighboring republic Dagestan. Also in August, two bombs exploded in Moscow’s
residential buildings killing hundreds of civilians. In addition to security considerations,
Putin argued that for the same considerations of survival, Russia must succeed in
rebuilding its economy. The latter became more feasible as Russia begun to recover from
its 1998 default and take advantage of growing oil prices.
These two realities—terrorism and energy opportunities—informed Putin’s
strategy and tied together a coalition of commercial and security interests. The two parts
of the coalition held different views on Russia’s civilizational identity. Commercial elites
defended Russia’s ties with the West especially Europe to which Russia exports greatest
share of its energy. Westernist commercially-oriented elites rose to prominence in the
context of supporting Yeltsin’s bid for reelection in 1996 and growing national criticism
of Primakov’s unnecessary expensive foreign policy that greatly relied on state subsidies
to the former Soviet republics. At the same time, military and security elites promoted
self-sufficiency and great power status which made some of them favoring, at least
(Primakov 1998; For a more extended analysis, see Splidsboel-Hansen 2002). The preoccupation with
geopolitics emboldened hard-line Eurasianists who challenged Primakov to go farther in resisting Western
influences (See, for example, Ivashev 1995; Dugin 1996; Zyuganov 1998). A more liberal version of
Eurasianism existed (Gefter 1991; Panarin 1994, 1995), but remained marginalized. In addition,
Primakov’s thinking further pushed away some of the former Soviet states that otherwise might have been
more inclined to cooperation with Russia.
31
instinctively, the Eurasianist perspective. Although the members of new coalition were
committed to principally different worldviews, at the time they agreed on Putin as the
most preferred leader of the state. The relative recovery of Russian economy in the post1998 period further improved the position of Westernist commercial elites, and
intensification of terrorist activities in the Caucasus and worldwide strengthened
positions of great power supporter.
Changed international conditions and renewed support of the West assisted the
new leadership in keeping the mixed coalition together. Both Russian economic recovery
and renewed threat of international terrorism made Russia important in the eyes of the
Western leaders. Russian intelligence was now available to assist in American efforts to
crush terrorism in Afghanistan and wider Central Asia after the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the United States, and Russia’s energy supplies were becoming critical in
European economies. For a while, Russian and Western concerns were quite similar.
What the United States experienced on September 11, 2001 and Spain on March 11,
2003, Russians had already known from their own recent history of explosions in
residential buildings and various public places. Although the Chechnya war had its own
specifics and the Chechen rebels made their own demands for Russia that were different
from those of Al Qaida for the West, many Russians saw parallels between the two. So
did the Western leaders, who softened their rhetoric regarding Russian violations of
human rights in Chechnya and acknowledged the significance of Russia in fighting the
threat of international terrorism. This recognition by the West greatly assisted Putin in
boasting his credibility at home and abroad. By relying on Russia’s historic great power
identity, Putin obtained a wide public support to his vision at home. He also made a
32
considerable use of the renewed Western support strengthening the spatial connection
with Europe and the United States. Putin has further transformed the political spectrum
and is now in the broad middle of it, integrating creative impulses from supporters of
liberal integration with Europe with the urgings of those who defend the idea of Russia as
a counter-balance to the West’s power ambitions. This combination of temporal and
spatial cultural ties created a discursive room for formulating and promoting the EuroEastern civilizational perspective.
Table 2 summarizes my explanation of changing civilizational ideas in Russia.
[TABLE 2]
6. Conclusion
Civilizations are not essentialist entities. Rather, they are ideas or visions
facilitated by social conditions and continuously reproduced by political and intellectual
elites. National elites seek to preserve socially favorable conditions by promoting cultural
connections across time and space. Making the temporal connection assists elites in
maintaining the society’s cohesiveness through mobilization of national memory. When
elites’ strategies are successful, they obtain a wide support in the society. Making the
spatial connection is no less important, and—if successful—allows winning necessary
moral and material support from the significant Other. Russia’s efforts to solve its
civilizational dilemma by reconnecting with Europe have only been partially successful.
The early “Westernist” vision failed to win the required recognition at home.
Dramatically changed local conditions and the decision of Western nations to expand
NATO eroded the vision of Russia as a part of the West. The vision of “Eurasia” too was
33
hardly successful. Although the notion of great power resonated with the general public,
the spatial connection with “Eurasianist” nations, such as China and India, was not
successfully established.
Putin’s new civilizational vision of Russia as a European great power has sought
to remedy deficiencies of the two earlier perspectives. However, it may not be successful
if the vision’s two components—Europeanness and great power status—remain relatively
unengaged. For instance, there is a considerable tension between the “Euro” and the
“East” how these are interpreted by Pavlovski and his supporters. While Europe is often
defined by commitment to democratic political participation, Russian Euro-Easterners
tend to emphasize market economy and great power at the expense of elections and mass
participation in politics. Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections showed that, when such
interpretation is adopted, the “Euro” and “East” become sharply separated and can no
longer be parts of the single civilizational perspective. Unless democracy and great power
are successfully bridged, Russia’s new civilizational objectives are likely to be perceived
by outsiders as a new imperialist project similar to the old Eurasianist one.47
If Russia is going to develop a viable civilizational identification, the “East”
should be redefined in democratic and institutional, rather than merely geopolitical,
categories. For instance, one way of reconnecting with the past could emphasize
egalitarian social and economic policies. Many of the Soviet policies were of egalitarian
nature, which continues to resonate with the Russian public and is compatible with
European social democratic practices. A greater commitment to democratic principles
might also mean more balanced relationships with the neighboring states that would
47
Such, for example, are perceptions by some Ukrainian scholars (Malenkovich 2004; Yakhno
2004). Threatened by prospect of Moscow’s geopolitical patronage, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have
been working to strengthen their own regional organization and to join Europe directly.
34
involve ties across the political spectrum, rather than exclusive rapport with existing
governments.48 In the absence of renewed democratic commitment, Russia’s new
civilizational vision is likely to become a hostage of a narrow-defined modernization
repeating the errors of Nicholas II. While geopolitical factors cannot be removed from
international politics, they rarely provide insight and imagination that imbue politics with
meaning and sense of direction.49
Russia’s success is also predicated on Europe, its significant Other. If the notion
of great power is to be combined with the idea of Europe, it would require that both sides
work together as trusted partners. If one side defines its values in terms of superiority
over those of the other, the dialogue is not likely to last. For instance, Pavlovski’s
(Kashin 2005) insistences that Russia somehow is a “better European than Europe itself”
and that Russia is in the best position to promote stability and Europeanness in the space
of the “Euro-Eastern” countries (Pavlovski 2004a) can hardly facilitate such dialogue. On
the other hand, European criticisms of Russia’s democracy deficit may undermine this
nation’s further movement toward Europe if such criticisms fail to appreciate the
complexity of local conditions and to offer a working strategy of engagement. In a
constantly changing world, developing civilizational affinities is never complete as a
process, and it requires that Self and Other tirelessly reach out to one another.
It seems that Kremlin’s technologists have already learned this lesson. In his remarks after the
Orange revolution in Ukraine, Pavlovski (2005) pointed to the need for the Kremlin to communicate with
political movements across the spectrum of the neighboring countries. It is important, however, that the
need to maintain contacts with opposition is not interpreted exclusively through geopolitical lenses.
49
Putin (2005) understood this when he moved away from Primakov’s Eurasianism by adopting a
more inclusive civilizational approach. Today much more is necessary to make the new civilizational vision
viable. Some of Putin’s supporters are alarmed by Russia’s unimaginative policies in the former Soviet
region and advocate change (Kosachev 2004; Tretyakov 2004) Others, however, are defensive (Nikonov as
cited in Torbakov 2005) and may further develop a “siege mentality” if confronted with regime changes in
Belarus, Central Asia, and elsewhere.
48
35
Table 1. Russia’s Civilizational Ideas
“West”
“Eurasia”
“Euro-East”
Spatial
connection
United States and
Western Europe
China, India,
Islamic World
Western Europe
Temporal
connection
---
Great power
Great power
Source of
threat
West-hostile states
The West
Terrorism
State weakness
Implied
foreign policy
Integration with
the West
Balancing against
the West
Cooperation with
the West
Defense of great
power status
Representative
politicians
Boris Yelstin
Andrei Kozyrev
Yevgeni Primakov
Vladimir Putin
Intellectual
influences and
representative
authors
Liberalsconstitutionalists
(Pavel Milyukov)
Slavophiles and
Eurasianists
(Nikolai Danilevski)
New liberalssupporters of a
strong state
(Pyetr Sruve)
36
Table 2. Conditions Explaining Russia’s Civilizational Ideas
Local Conditions
Nationaldemocratic
revolution
Post-cold war
support
Behavior of
Europe/West
NATO
expansion
Post-9/11
Support
Economic
depression
Political
instability
Economic
recovery
New security
threats
“WEST”
“EURASIA”
“EURO-EAST”
37
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