Positive Political Theory: An Introduction (6 credits)
Period: 21th September 2010 – 29st November 2010
Instructor: prof. Francesco Zucchini (Università di Milano) francesco.zucchini@unimi.it
Office hours (Zucchini): Monday 17.00-19.00, room 308, third floor, Dpt. Studi Sociali e Politici
Course aims and objectives
The course is an introduction to the study of politics from a rational choice perspective.
Students are introduced both to the analytical tools of the approach and to the results most relevant
to the political science. We will focus on the institutional effects of decision-making processes and
on the nature of political actors in the democratic political systems.
Prerequisites and assessment
All students are expected to do all the reading for each class session and may be called upon at any
time to provide summary statements of it. Evaluation is based upon the regular participation in the
classroom activities and a final written exam.
Chapters of books to copy from original versions
21st September 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(1) Course introduction: Studying institutions in a rational choice perspective (1)
Thomas H.Hammond, (1996) Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance, Governance n.2
pp 107-185
23th September 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(2)Studying institutions in a rational choice perspective (2)
:
George Tsebelis “Nested Games. Rational choice in comparative politics”, 1990, “In defense of the
rational choice approach”
MacDonald Paul K. (2003) “Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological
Foundations of Rational Choice Theory” in American political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4
(Nov., 2003), pp. 551-565
28th September 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(3) Spatial theory of voting.
Shepsle Kenneth & Bonchek Mark “Analyzing Politics. Rationality Behaviors and Institutions””
Chap. 4, 5
30th September 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(4) Spatial theory of voting and Herestetics
Shepsle Kenneth & Bonchek Mark “Analyzing Politics. Rationality Behaviors and Institutions””
Chap. 6
Riker William “Art of Political Manipulation” chapt 1, 2 and 11.
5th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(5) The Veto players approach:
Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP. 1 and 2
7th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(6) Principal-agent theory in political science
Lupia Arthur “Delegation and its perils” in Strom, Mueller & Bergman (eds) “Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy”
Moe Terry “The New Economics of Organization” in American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
28, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 739-777
12th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(7) Forms of representative government: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: what (if)
makes the difference ?
Strom Kaare (2003), Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation in Strom, Mueller & Bergman (eds)
“Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy
Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP 3
14th October 2008 (10.30-12.15)
(8) Law making in Congress: legislative institutions explain policy output.. (1)
(2 presentations)
Required
Krehbiel, K., (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking Chicago,University of Chicago
Press CAP 2°
Keith Krehbiel “Pivots” in In Donald Wittman and Barry Weingast (eds.), Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cox G. & Mathew McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Cambridge University Press, (2005) cap.2-3
19th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(9) Law making in Congress: legislative institutions explain policy output.. but what explains
legislative institutions ? (2)
Weingast Barry and W. Marshall, (1988). The Industrial Organization of Congress, Journal of
Political Economy
Aldrich John H., (1995) Why Parties ?, The University of Chicago Press, pp 24-45
Keith Krehbiel Legislative Organization in Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 18,
Number 1—Winter 2004—Pages 113–128
21th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(10) Making and breaking (parliamentary) governments (1)
Laver M. and Schofield N. (1991) Multiparty government, Oxford University Press 1991: 1-13.
Laver M. and Shepsle K., (1996) Making and breaking governments, Cambridge University Press
(p. 61-89) or
,
Schofield, N. 1993. Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments, European Journal
of Political Research 23: 1-33.
26th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)
(11) Making and breaking (parliamentary) governments (2)
Tsebelis G. (2007) Coalition theory: a veto players approach (mimeo)
Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP 9
28th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(12) Law making in Parliament: what makes the Cabinet powerful or weak?
Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP 4 and 7
Cox Gary W (2006) The Organization of Democratic Legislatures, In Barry Weingast and Donald
Wittman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Press.
4th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(13) Cabinet, delegation and lawmaking
Thies, Michael F. 2001. "Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition
Governments." American Journal of Political Science 45: 580-598.
Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review."
American Political Science Review 99: 93-106
9th November 2010 (8.30-12.15)
(14) Cabinet governance
Lupia Arthur & Kaare Strom 2008 “Bargaining , Transaction costs and Coalition Governance” in
eds Strom, Mueller and Bergman Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining:The Democratic Life Cycle in
Western Europe” , Oxford University Press
Mueller Wolfgang & Kaare Strom 2008 “Coalition agreements and Cabinet Governance” in eds
Strom, Mueller and Bergman Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining:The Democratic Life Cycle in
Western Europe” , Oxford University Press
11st November 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(15) Bicameralism and Referendum
Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP 5 and 6
16th November 2010 (8.30-12.15)
(16) Veto players and macroeconomic effects.
Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
CAP 8
18th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(17) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence
political outcomes? (1)
Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press
Ch.10
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. (2002) Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.4, 7.
)
23 November 2010 (8.30-12.15)
rd
(18) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence
political outcomes? (2)
Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank
Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." American Political Science Review 97, no.
3 (2003): 407-23
Shipan, Charles R. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of
Congressional Influence." American Political Science Review 98: 467-480.
25th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)
(19) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence
political outcomes? (3)
Steunenberg, Bernard. 1997. "Courts, Cabinet and Coalition Parties: The Politics of Euthanasia in a
Parliamentary Setting." British Journal of Political Science 27: 551-571.
30th December 2010 (8.30-10.15)
Final/intermediate exam