Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy
By Andrei P. Tsygankov1
San Francisco State University
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 58, No. 1, March-April, 2011, pp. 28-44.
Abstract
Russia has been creating flexible international coalitions in order to achieve its central
objective of becoming an independent center of power and influence.
Russia is never as strong as we fear and never as weak as we hope.
Klemens von Metternich
1. Introduction
From Europe to the Middle East and Asia, scholars and politicians are
increasingly recognizing the prominent role of Russia in international affairs. From a
weak and inward-looking nation of the 1990s, Russia has emerged into a power that is
capable of defending its international prestige using available economic, military, and
diplomatic means. It has exploited its energy clout to expand Russian relations abroad
and cemented its military presence in the strategic area of the Southern Caucasus by
defeating Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia. By mobilizing its soft power, the Kremlin
has also contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
After being seriously hit by the global financial crisis, Russia has quickly recovered as an
important international player.
Russians themselves have often presented their successes as the historically
inevitable return of Russia to the rank of a great power. At least until the global economic
crisis, and certainly immediately following the crisis in the Caucasus, such rhetoric was
supported by the official declarations that projected Russia to become the world’s fifth
largest economy, free from dependence on exports of oil and a full-fledged member in a
multi-polar international order, by 2020. As far as Western observers of Russia are
concerned, they remain divided. While some view Russia as weak and unable to form a
coherent strategy, others warn that the Kremlin is increasingly effective in challenging
the West’s position in the world. The United States’ attempt to “reset” relations with
Russia has yet to change this dualistic perception of Moscow’s motives.
The argument pursued in the paper is neither nor skeptical, nor alarmist. I argue
that since the 2000s, Russia’s central objective has been to become an independent center
of power and influence by creating flexible international coalitions. The country has
largely recovered from the chronic illnesses of the 1990s by gaining a greater confidence
and reviving important attributes of a great power. Using various foreign policy tools, the
Kremlin has succeeded in building pragmatic alliances within the former Soviet region
and across the world. As successful as this strategy has been, Russia is not in a position to
become a rising great power relative to growing international challenges, such as the
continued expansion of the Western and Chinese influences in Eurasia. The fact that
Russia continues to muddle through is not a guarantee that such will be the case in the
1
future. I arrive at this conclusion by evaluating Russia’s international objectives against
the tools and outcomes of its foreign policy. Following the literature on grand strategy
and foreign policy, I analyze both the hard and soft dimensions of Russia’s power.2
Traditionally, grand strategy has been viewed as a long-term plan to match military and
economic capabilities,3 yet scholars have also paid attention to domestic and institutional
aspects4 and, more recently, to ideas and visions5 behind grand strategy.
In my assessment, Russia’s success may only be preserved if the Kremlin acts on
some existing opportunities and if it is more effective in explaining these objectives to the
outside world. Assertive in defending its core interests, Russia must also serve as an
advocate of multilateral arrangements towards achieving international peace and security.
If Russia is to succeed in escaping the alternative -- an unstable society, dwindling
population and truncated sovereignty – the Kremlin should learn how to better combine
assertiveness and international recognition.
The article is organized in six sections. The next section reviews the Western
debate on Russia’s strategy. I then describe Russia’s objectives by focusing on consensus
within the foreign policy elites, views of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, and the
official documents. The following two sections analyze key tools available for
conducting Russia’s strategy and offer a preliminary assessment of it, respectively. In my
assessment, the tools of Russia’s foreign policy are impressive, yet prescribe a greater
reliance on soft, rather than hard, power in achieving global and regional influence. The
final section reflects on the prospects of Russia’s strategy in the light of existing
international challenges.
2. The Debate on Russia's Strategy
Western observers of Russia’s international policy may be divided into Skeptics
and Alarmists. The two groups are not irreconcilable, but emphasize different aspects of
Russia’s foreign policy.
Skeptics
The Skeptics don’t believe that the Russia’s leadership is able to and interested in
designing a grand strategy or a coherent long-term plan with appropriate institutional,
material and intellectual support. They are convinced that Russia remains fundamentally
weakened by the competition of rival clans within the Kremlin and the overall political
class. For example, Celeste Wallander argues that Russia’s grand strategy is “neither
grand, nor strategic, nor sustainable,” and “whether Russia will survive as a great power
in the 21st century is an open question”6 because it practices the culture of patronage and
corruption that continues to reveal the ineffectiveness of the state. Dmitri Trenin makes
the point by emphasizing the narrow base from which Russia formulates its international
policy, standing “for a small group of people who own the country and hold political
power.”7 For these reasons, write Raja Menon and Alexander Motyl, Russia’s
international assertiveness is a bluff to conceal the nation’s chronically weak
fundamentals.8 Although the arrival of Barak Obama to power has given the United
States a dose of realism about its international abilities, the Skeptics remain influential.
"The reality is, the Russians are where they are," Vice-President Joseph Biden said in the
midst of the global financial crisis. "They have a shrinking population base, they have a
withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able
2
to withstand the next 15 years, they're in a situation where the world is changing before
them and they're clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable."9
The argument by Skeptics is overstated. Although Russia is not a strong state, the
relatively smooth transition of presidential power in the Kremlin from Putin to Medvedev
does not fit the Skeptical perspective and may be viewed as a testament to the ruling
elite’s growing consolidation. As a result of such consolidation, Russia's foreign policy
too became more consistent and predictable. However narrowly formulated, such policy
is widely shared within the political class and the broader society. The Kremlin's
principal actions in world politics from the early 2000s – including opposition to the
United States' invasion of Iraq, resistance to expansion of NATO and deployment of
Missile Defense System in Europe, promotion of energy-based relations with European,
Asian and Middle Eastern countries, and military intervention in the Caucasus – have all
found a broad domestic support. These actions have proceeded from a coherent
worldview that must be reconstructed if we are to understand Russia's future international
behavior.
Alarmists
Russia’s successes did not come without a price, and many in the West have
grown concerned over what they view as Russia’s unilateral and confrontational style.
The second group, the Alarmists, maintain that Russia is increasingly capable of
formulating a coherent grand strategy, but such a strategy is anti-democratic and antiWestern in its main orientations.10 Assisted in it by some of Russia’s own pro-Western
thinkers and activists11 a number of Western observers have insisted that Russians are
longing for a Soviet restoration and developing an essentially Stalinist outlook, which
will lead to the further cultivation of an external enemy’s image and possibly even
another cycle of state-organized violence.12 The Alarmists argue that this neo-Soviet and
KGB-controlled country must be economically isolated and expelled from all Western
institutions, but they are also worried that Russia has gone too far for such isolation to
work. “Our biggest weakness is money,” lamented former Economist correspondent
Edward Lucas. “Until that changes, we have little chance of resisting the Kremlin - and
even less of persuading ordinary Russians that their corrupt, cynical, brutal and
incompetent rulers are harbingers of disaster, not triumph.”13
The problem with the Alarmist position is that it misrepresents Russia’s
essentially defensive posture and fails to understand the roots of the Kremlin’s
international assertiveness. Contrary to the claims about the anti-Western and imperialist
nature of Russia’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s objectives are mainly driven by domestic
considerations. These objectives include securing geographic borders, improving political
and economic conditions, and gaining international recognition as a power with an
important voice in international affairs. The Kremlin seeks to be guided by a vision that is
suitable to Russia and not unacceptable to the West. Although Russia’s foreign policy is
not controlled by liberals, it is also far from being shaped by anti-Western hard-liners.
Security elites have indeed gained a greater presence in commercial companies,
especially those energy-related, and now are in a more prominent position to influence
Russia’s foreign policy. However, the security elites do not constitute a homogenous
group and have diverse preferences vis-à-vis the West,14 which helps to understand why
the insufficiently consolidated state did not become a hostage to influences. Overall, the
3
majority of the country’s political class has come to think about international realities in
terms of adjustment and stabilization, and not confrontation.15 Most Russians also have
no illusions either about balancing the West's global power or restoring the Soviet-like
empire in Eurasia. Polls indicate that the general public predominantly connects the great
power status with economic development, rather than military buildup or revision of
existing territorial boundaries.16
3. Russia's Strategic Objectives
Russia’s Strategic Consensus
Russia has formed its strategy in response to activities of first two foreign
ministers, Andrei Kozyrev and Yevgeni Primakov. Their example is rather negative,
however. From the former, Russia learned how to not formulate its international
objectives, and from the latter how to not allocate resources for meeting the objectives.
Soon after his appointment, Primakov proclaimed the objective of returning to world
politics as an independent power thereby ending the era of Kozyrev's infatuation with the
West at the expense of Russia's national interests. However, Primakov's means of
achieving the proclaimed goals proved unnecessary costly, and the Kremlin soon had to
devise a less expensive strategy of defending the country's interests.
By the time of arrival of Putin, Russia's political class had already formed a
consensus regarding the country's grand strategy. The consensus included two central
definitions of Russia's international objectives – the preservation of global influence as an
independent power and dominance in the former Soviet region. It also assumed that
Russia must be "pragmatic" in devoting the country's scarce resources to those objectives.
Global influence was to be exercised via Russia's diplomatic activism and institutional
visibility, rather than the projection of material power. Regional dominance was also
viewed by the Kremlin in soft power terms, rather than as imperial control over its
neighbors' domestic and international priorities. The Kremlin assumed that Russia would
have sufficient economic, diplomatic, institutional and cultural capacity to regionally
negotiate the preferred international postures of the former Soviet states. Yet Russia was
to limit economic subsidies and military activities abroad and to rely mainly on marketbased tools of international influence.17 Through diplomatic activism and economic
means, the global and regional components were supposed to reinforce each other,
moving Russia on the path of becoming an independent center of power and influence in
the world.
The foreign policy consensus regarding Russia's key goals and means has not
been principally challenged since 1999. Politicians and pundits debate the country's
priority relations with Europe, China, the United States, or the states in Eurasia, but they
rarely question the value of reviving global influence and doing so in pragmatic
("nezatratnyi") way. The former liberal Westernizers and supporters of Andrei Kozyrev's
course have long migrated into the camp of Statists or those defending Russia's global
independence, rather than integration with Western institutions and policy priorities. For
quite some time, the latter choice has been advocated only by marginalized politicians,
like Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemstov. Statists value stronger relationships with
Europe or the United States but not at the expense of Russia’s ability to act independently
and develop ties with non-Western countries. In Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s terms,
4
solutions for Russia should come from “network diplomacy rather than entangling
military-political alliances with their burdensome rigid commitments.”18
Putin and Medvedev: Differences of Emphasis
A product of the broad political consensus, Russia's grand strategy cuts across
various administrations and groups within the ruling establishment. Putin and his
successor Medvedev diverge in emphasis and style, but they share the principal elements
of the above-articulated strategy. After his speech at the Munich Conference on Security
Policy, Putin frequently demonstrated an aggressive rhetorical style in relations with the
United States. Scholars also noted his skepticism regarding the Barak Obama-initiated
“reset” of U.S.-Russia relations as well as Putin’s hesitation regarding support for a new
strategic arms accord and sanctions against Iran.19 In one interview, for example, he
stated that the bases for his skepticism include the United States’ continuous “re-arming”
of Georgia and its unchanged intent to deploy elements of a Missile Defense System in
Europe.20
For his turn, Medvedev has demonstrated a softer style, with an emphasis on the
importance of improving relations with the Western nations. He has established a good
rapport with Obama and cooperated with the United States on Iran and the new nuclear
treaty. Medvedev has also avoided tough language and worked on improving the image
of Russia in Western business circles. In his address to the Federation Council in
November 2009, Medvedev insisted that the effectiveness of foreign policy must be
"judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?"21 In June
2010, he traveled to the United States in part to facilitate investments and cooperation in
the information technology sector, and in his meeting with Russia’s ambassadors in July
2010, Medvedev further highlighted the need to establish “modernization alliances” with
the United States and other Western nations.22
These differences of style and emphasis do not undermine the established
strategic consensus. Both leaders are not satisfied with the currently “unipolar” structure
of the international system that diminishes Russia’s global influence. Both seek to
position their country for a successful competition in the world economy, including by
capitalizing on Russia’s rich energy reserves. Both remain pragmatically focused on
exploiting opportunities outside the West and are eager to build flexible coalitions to
promote Russia’s global interests. Finally, both are on record for defending Russia’s right
to “privileged interests” in the former Soviet region and are unapologetic about
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the August 2008 war
with Georgia.
Key Official Documents
The relevant official documents also emphasize the need for Russia to preserve
global influence and play the role of an important regional center, but only by
“pragmatic” means. Ever since Putin’s arrival to power, the definition of international
objectives has shifted from attempting to balance the West toward exploiting it to
Russia’s advantage. Russia seeks more actively to shape the world’s political and
economic system and be recognized in such efforts by the Western nations. The thinking
indicates an important change since the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, which explicitly
5
warned of a threat of “a unipolar structure of the world under the economic and military
domination of the United States.”23
The Foreign Ministry report “A Review of the Russian Federation’s Foreign
Policy” of 2007 embraces the objective of multi-polarity based on “a more equitable
distribution of resources for influence and economic growth,”24 and presents Russia as
ready to actively shape international relations. However, the report is not anti-American
and defends the notion of collective leadership and multilateral diplomacy in
international relations. In the same spirit, the National Security Strategy of 2008 states
that Russia continues to aspire to “defend national interests as a subject of multipolar
international relations,”25 but refrains from identifying the “unipolar” structure of the
world as a key threat to Russia. Similarly, the Military Doctrine of 2010 identifies NATO
enlargement as an external danger (opasnost’), but not as a threat (ugroza).
Commentators interpreted this as indicative that Russia was afraid not of being attacked
by the Western alliance, but of not participating in a NATO-centric system of European
security.26
Over time, Russia’s strategy has been increasingly influenced by economic
considerations reflecting Putin’s understanding of the contemporary world expressed in
the early years of his presidency: “The norm of the international community and the
modern world is a tough competition—for markets, investments, political, and economic
influence.”27 As it is evident from the 2008 National Security Strategy, Russia seeks to
obtain a greater influence by becoming one of the world’s largest economies and
liberating itself of excessive dependence on exports of oil by 2020.28 The 2008 Foreign
Policy Concept further recommends that Russia remain true to a “balanced multi-vector
approach” in the light of the Western gradual departure from the world’s economic
center.29 The Foreign Ministry document prepared for the President in February 2010
also seeks to strengthen Russia’s economic position.30 By reflecting the realities of the
global financial crisis, the document builds on Medvedev’s notion of “modernization
alliances” and provides detailed recommendations for attracting Western investments and
creating favorable conditions for Russia’s technological modernization. Rather than being
a deviation from the described strategic consensus, the document is a time-specific
reflection of it.
4. The Toolkit of Russia's Foreign Policy
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policy capabilities
declined so much that some scholars assumed the country’s irrelevance and inability to
“make it,” with Western help or without it.”31 Russia lost one sixth of its territory, its
economy shrank by some 50% and the state was divided by powerful individuals
practically losing the ability to govern. By the mid-2000s, however, Russia demonstrated
an internal recovery and the intent to have a coherent external policy. The tools of such
policy include energy, military power, diplomacy, cultural/historical capital, and
technological expertise. Within a predicable geopolitical environment these tools may be
sufficient for carrying out Russia’s generally defensive strategy of preserving
international influence.
Energy
6
Energy is a tool of domestic modernization and international influence. In
addition to developing nuclear energy, Russia is an important oil and gas producer,
preserving its status as a major transit country through which to carry energy from the
Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe. With 13% of the world’s known oil reserves and
34% of its gas reserves,32 Russia remains set to play a key role in the world’s energy
markets. Russia's main markets are in Europe, and European countries are expected to
considerably increase its consumption of national gas over time. According to estimates
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Russian gas will account for about 33-34%
of European demand compared with the current 25%.33 Although the dependence on
energy production for growth is a problem, Russia can hardly afford not to rely on
exports of raw materials in its modernization strategy.34 If global demand for energy
continues to be high, then in the mid-term perspective Russia should again be able to take
advantage of the situation if it is successful in developing its own reserves. Outside
European markets, Moscow hardly has a choice of not developing its capacity as a global
middleman by coordinating its production with other key energy producers and offering
its expertise in building energy infrastructure across the world. With such capacity also
comes influence in Asia, the Muslim world and the former Soviet region.
Military
A key advantage for Russia remains the absence of a major war that would most
certainly derail its defensive security orientation. NATO and a rising China are only
hypothetical threats to Russia, and they may become real only with time’s passage and
only if the sides mismanage their relationships. The threat of terrorism and political
instability in the regions adjacent to Russia and the former Soviet world – Central Asia,
the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and the Middle East – is serious, but manageable with the
involvement of other powers in the region and without having to invest new massive
resources to address the problem. As the August 2008 conflict in the Caucasus has
demonstrated, the Russian military, even while suffering from corruption and poor
training,35 can still be effective. The Russian army needs to be reformed and adequately
funded, but it may not require a major rearmament program. Contemporary Russia is
driven by considerations of military sufficiency, and it is no longer committed to the
Soviet-like objectives of achieving parity with Western armies.36 If the economy grows at
a relatively fast rate, a relatively low level of military spending, about 3% of GDP may be
sufficient for modernizing much of the military equipment.37
Diplomacy and International Organizations
Russia continues to possess important diplomatic resources which it has already
used effectively to resolve several violent conflicts in the region, such as those in
Tajikistan and Moldova in the 1990s.38 Apart from the Caucasus and the issue of
terrorism, Russia is not likely to rely on coercive tools without appropriate diplomatic
preparations. Globally, Russia seeks to position itself as a maker of new rules, articulate
its concerns using its membership within existing international organizations, and
develop flexible coalitions. Over time, it may seek to devise collective security systems
in both Europe and Eurasia. In the former Soviet region, Russia may continue to build on
the examples of its cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. Unable on its own to effectively respond to
7
security challenges from NATO, Russia is likely to continue to exploit non-Western
institutional vehicles, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and develop soft
alliances with selected European countries, such as France, Germany and Italy, as well as
China and Iran. On the other hand, in response to China’s rise, Russia will also continue
to build ties with the European Union, the US, India, South Korea and Japan.
Medvedev’s proposal of a pan-European treaty to establish a new security architecture, in
which Russia would become a fully-fledged participant, may be also viewed as in this
context of flexible coalition tactics.
Cultural and Historical Capital
Russia possesses an incomparable historical experience and cultural capital for
pacifying the volatile territories from in the former Soviet area. The nations of Eurasia go
back centuries and have developed similar cultural experiences. During the Soviet era,
they shared external borders, fought the same enemies, and were subject to similar
linguistic and cultural policies. Russia’s soft power potential in the former Soviet world
remains important and includes the attractiveness of its economy, historical, linguistic
and cultural ties, as well as educational and technological products, such as software and
DVDs.39 In addition, Russia serves as a state-building example. Although it is in no
position to offer viable competition to the United States’ liberal democratic ideas, Russia
has been perceived by many as generally successful in accomplishing other state-building
tasks, such as providing citizens with order, basic social services and protection against
external threats. This explains why ordinary people and many politicians from Central
Asia to Ukraine have often rated Russia’s current leaders higher than their own.40 Even
outside the former Soviet region, the influence of Russia’s state-building experience is
considerable. For instance, the report by the European Council on Foreign Relations
provides evidence of Russia and China’s ability to attract votes at the United Nations.
The report notes that since the late 1990s, support for Russian positions has risen from
around 50% to 76% today, while support for the EU and US fell from over 70% and 75%
to around 50% and a mere 30%, respectively.41
Technological Expertise
Although Russia has much to learn from advanced countries in the area of
technology, the country also has some comparative advantages. During the Soviet period,
Russia was known for the quality of its energy expertise and military equipment. It
continues to sell expertise abroad in energy infrastructure and weapons, in part to raise
revenue for domestic modernization.42 Russia’s departments of mathematics and
computer science continue to supply programmers across the world.43 Russia’s future is
in reviving the education system that had made these achievements possible. An educated
labor force is a critical advantage in the global technological age, and the state can make
an important difference by re-training labor and investing in reforming the country’s halffunctioning education and health care systems.
5. The Preliminary Record
Russia’s record of acting on its strategic consensus is a mixed one. Since the
1990s, the country has gained a greater confidence and developed important attributes of
an influential power. Global activism has served the country well by assisting it in
8
solving some important regional tasks, which, in turn, have helped to improve Russia’s
global standing. However, the country has not become and is not in a position to become
a rising power relative to growing expansion of the Western and Chinese influences in
Eurasia.
Regional Influence
Russia’s record of influence in the former Soviet region has been that of steady
growth relative to the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. During the 1990s, Russia tried
to retreat from the region, only to realize the impossibility of breaking away from the exrepublics. After misguided attempts to re-integrate the region around Russia by using the
tool of generous financial subsidies, the Kremlin finally abandoned reintegration as an
important priority. Not in the position to become the center of regional integration,
Russia instead emphasized “pragmatic” bilateral ties and issue-specific multilateral
contacts. By capitalizing on high oil prices, it strengthened its presence in neighboring
economies; it demonstrated its military ability in the overwhelming defeat of Georgia,
using several armored battalions, air power and marines. No less importantly, Russia
contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which the
Kremlin viewed as dangerous for Russia and destabilizing for the larger region.44 In both
countries, anti-Kremlin governments were replaced with those in favor of strong ties with
Russia.
The preservation of Russia’s influence in the region would have not come without
the country’s attempts to act globally and win at least some support for its policies from
established powers in the West and rising non-Western powers. For example, the Kremlin
would not have been as successful in its offensive against the United States’
“unilateralism” were it not for France and Germany’s tacit support that had resulted from
the three’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Were the two Western European states to
support NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, it would have taken longer for the
colored revolutions to run out of steam. In addition, Russia probably could not have been
as successful in its war against Georgia were China to take a strong critical stance toward
it. Although Beijing refused to endorse Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia’s independence, the Chinese informally supported Russia during the crisis in the
Caucasus, and the issue has not complicated the two nations’ relations.45
However, Russia’s increased influence has not translated into stability in the
region. The reversal of the colored revolutions has yet to bring more order to Eurasia.
Evidence of instability has included the tense atmosphere in the Caucasus following the
war with Georgia, renewed terrorist attacks, the persistent failure of Western forces to
stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug
lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Moldova and
Ukraine.46 Despite the relative recovery of the economy, Russia could ill afford efforts to
single-handedly stabilize and pacify the region. At best, the Kremlin could defend its core
interests in regional settings and begin to escape the alternative of a declining security
and truncated sovereignty. The global economic crisis has further revealed the tenuous
nature of Russia’s regional influence and the remaining weaknesses of its power base.
With GDP felling by around 9% in 2009, Russia was hit hard and had to spend a
considerable portion of its reserves to bail out domestic enterprises and to scale down its
activist foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus.47
9
Preserved Global Influence
Globally, Russia’s influence is evident in growing ties with Western European
nations, China and the Middle East. Relationships with Europe have been growing since
the establishment of the coalition against the war in Iraq and Russia’s recovery as a
leading energy supplier. The relationships have survived Russia’s heavy-handed
approach in Chechnya, energy wars with Ukraine, and the August 2008 crisis in the
Caucasus. Not only has Russia preserved the existing level of ties with France, Germany
and other Western European nations, but Moscow has worked to strengthen these ties.48
European leaders reciprocated by proposing to establish the EU-Russia Political and
Security Committee as an institution to consult on strategic issues on the continent.49 On
the economic front, Russia-European ties were solidified via the construction of new
strategic pipelines, like the North Stream, and the joint development of energy fields,
such as Arctic oilfields.50 The United States’ attempts to “reset” relations with Moscow
have further assisted the continuous development of EU-Russia ties.
Russia’s standing in the non-Western world has also improved. Moscow has
played an important role in establishing international coalitions, such as the SCO
(Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The
relations with China, Russia’s largest neighbor, have obtained a strategic dimension in
the areas of commerce and regional security, and the two have demonstrated an increased
convergence in perceiving global priorities and proposing solutions to existing issues in
world politics. In September 2010, Russia completed an oil pipeline connecting to
northeastern China, and two gas pipelines are planned.51 In the Middle East, Russia has
worked to develop relations across the region, sustain its influence on Iran, and has
considerably expanded ties with Turkey and Israel.52 Turkey has emerged as an
especially important to Russia, with the two converging on perceptions of world order,
developing ambitious energy plans, and cooperating on improving security in the Black
Sea area.53
The increased global influence of Russia was greatly assisted by its domestic
recovery and improved regional standing. Without the energy capabilities and readiness
to defend its core security interests in Eurasia, Russia would not have been taken equally
seriously by Western and non-Western powers. While Moscow’s heavy handed approach
to political and energy disputes undermined its image of a status quo power and reliable
energy supplier, it strengthened the perception of Russia as determined to be recognized
in its international aspirations. Moscow’s active diplomacy also contributed to Russia’s
success by often serving to soften tough policies and compensate for lacking material
capabilities. For instance, after each crisis with neighbors, Russia was quick to do
damage control in relations with larger powers. It is largely due to this active diplomacy
that Russia has succeeded in not marginalizing itself from global politics, with all
meaningful powers needing Russia for cooperation – the West for Afghanistan and Iran,
China for energy and stability in Central Asia, and Turkey for economic and political
security in the Caucasus.
Remaining Weaknesses54
While achievements of Russia’s strategy must be given their dues, the strategy of
preserving regional and international influences continues to suffer from lagging internal
10
capabilities and inability to explain its objectives abroad. Although the nation has become
stronger and more confident since 2000, it is challenged by the growing international
competition and domestic constraints on its development. It is catching up with some
European economies, but is unable to narrow a widening gap with China and India.
Although largely successful relative to the fifteen years of decline, Russia is only
modestly successful relative to the rising challenges ahead. This pattern is noticeable in
multiple areas of its development. Russia can report some successes in economic and
military development, demographics,55 strengthening ties with neighbors, and fighting
crime and corruption, but none of these successes warrants calling Russia a rising great
power. In addition, the country has progressed in some areas, but continues to stagnate
and fall behind in others. Russia has met some of its economic and security challenges,
but it has also perpetuated an insufficiently diversified economic structure and weak
social infrastructure.
Having recovered from the longest economic depression in its history, Russia now
has a functioning economy and improved living standards. However, much of the
recovery was due to high oil prices, which slowed down the government’s work to reduce
reliance on energy exports. Russia’s overall growth during the seven years preceding the
recent financial crisis was impressive, but its share of global GDP is a mere 2.3%, and
will only rise to 3.5% by 2020.56 In terms of GDP size, Russia’s gap with the United
States is not likely to be narrowed in any meaningful way, and will continue to widen
relative to China and India (see Table 1). As far as Russia’s military expenditures are
concerned, they have been growing by about one third each year,57 but are not matching
those of China, France, and some other nations, not to mention the United States (see
Table 2). Russian military doctrine acknowledges these defense limitations by allowing a
limited use of nuclear weapons – a way of admitting the Kremlin’s unwillingness to
embark on expensive programs of conventional weapons to reduce the gap with the
United States and NATO.
[TABLES 1, 2 HERE]
Russia has an aging and rapidly declining population, which can only be reversed
by massive state intervention and years of sustained economic growth. Russia’s
indicators of life expectancy and infant mortality have been deteriorating since the late
1980s. These indicators have begun to improve since 2005, but only marginally so
relative to the late 1980s.58 Similar dynamics of insufficient improvements can be
demonstrated by referring to Russia’s human development index, which is yet to reach to
the level of 1990 – in contrast to the steady improvement in neighboring Poland.
Another problem is the administrative weakness of the Russian state. Special
interests are excessively important in the formation of official policies, including foreign
policy. During the 1990s Russia was on the verge of becoming a failed state, and its
current state is not sufficiently consolidated, lacking both the legitimacy and capacity to
isolate pressures of special interests. Although Putin and Medvedev are popular with the
general public, they have yet to translate their political capital into effective
administrative reforms. For example, the available statistics indicate state weakness in
curbing crime, corruption and suicides. In particular, the crime rate only began to decline
in 2006 and remains high relative to the 1990s, let alone the 1980s. The government
record of combating corruption also remains dismal, and corruption levels remain
steadily high since the Soviet breakup.59
11
Finally, after the disintegration of the communist system, Russians live in an
ideological vacuum, and the Kremlin has failed to develop the soft power component of
its foreign policy. At home, Russians are beginning to revive their traditional moral and
spiritual values. For example, the number of self-identified religious believers in Russia
has grown three times since the early 1990s, the number of churches and monasteries has
multiplied, and the Orthodox Church has been one of the most trusted institution in the
country.60 However, the Kremlin is yet to articulate Russia’s values and translate them
into a foreign policy capital. While claiming a moral ground for its international actions,
Russia remains perceived by many in the world as a corrupt power with the ruling elite
preoccupied with political survival and personal enrichment, not the advancement of
national ideals. Phenomena of corruption, street crime, and violent ethno-nationalism
continue to reflect Russia’s deep spiritual crisis and inability to offer attractive soft power
projects for its neighbors.
Thus far, the state has abstained from attempting to articulate a response to the
ideological and spiritual questions of our time, and the Kremlin has been more
comfortable with describing Russia’s interests in terms of increasing the size of GDP and
the middle class. Even in the regions not attracted to the Western soft power language –
most prominently Central Asia and Belarus – the Kremlin has failed to propose an
attractive strategic vision. Relying on traditional tools of buying political supporters and
using coercion against opponents, while successful in some respects, cannot offer longterm solutions or substitute for a foreign policy philosophy. Criticism of the West’s
double standards is also no substitute for Russia’s own consistency in defending its
international objectives. Examples of such inconsistencies include recognizing the
independence of Georgia’s breakaway provinces, but not Kosovo, or supporting friendly
political forces in the former Soviet states, while attacking the United States for funding
the colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
6. The Future of Russia’s Strategy
Future international challenges may make it more difficult for Russia to preserve
its successes and not to descend into the ranks of a secondary power. These challenges
include the continued Western expansion in the former Soviet region, the rise of China,
and the volatility of world oil prices. Against Moscow’s wishes, Washington pursues
military cooperation with Russia’s neighbors and works to undermine Russia’s energy
influence in the region. China presents Russia with another challenge of progressive
power differentials. As Russia continues to supply China with energy and weapons, and
as China grows at a considerably higher rate than its northern neighbor, the risk of
Moscow becoming a junior partner in a Beijing-led coalition increases. Finally, there is
the challenge of oil markets, as Russia remains dependent on their stability for its
continued modernization. In order to successfully meet these challenges, the Kremlin will
have to improve domestic governance and seize new international opportunities.
Reviving the State Governance
Neither modernization, nor international strategy is possible without reviving the
state ability to make decisions independently from pressures of special interest. The
formally dualistic power structure, with Medvedev as President and Putin as Prime
Minister, has done an important service to the country by integrating within the elite
12
circles liberals, who place a greater emphasis on civil society and the rule of law, and
conservatives, who are concerned with preserving stability, governance and
independence. Nevertheless, the structure is also excessively dependent on personalities
and needs to be reformed further to establish a reliable mechanism for the transfer of
power. Only an administratively strong state can concentrate on solving Russia’s
formidable demographic and institutional problems. Within the next five to ten years, the
state must not only continue to conduct an active foreign policy, but facilitate reversal of
the unfavorable demographic balance across regions and in the country as a whole, offer
new programs for educating and re-training labor for the global technological age, and
reform the country’s education and health care infrastructure. Although energy remains
the country’s important comparative advantage, a realistic outlook requires that the
Russia is more aggressive in investing in non-energy areas and human infrastructure.
Building Continental Alliance in Europe
A number of Russian statesmen, beginning with foreign ministers Nikolai de
Giers and Alexander Gorchakov, have historically favored a strong continental alliance
with France and Germany, viewed as essential for preserving peace and continuing with
modernization at home. Although Russia has tragically failed to sustain their vision,
history may be giving it another opportunity to build strong relations with European
powers. Today Russia and the European states may be in a position to qualitatively
strengthen their ties, assuming that the new continental alliance is not advanced at the
expense of other important countries, such as the United States and China. In addition to
continuing with strengthening economic and energy relations, Moscow should work to
develop political and military relations with the two nations outside the NATO
framework. The latter seeks to remain central to defining European security and is not
likely to engage Russia as an equal participant.61 So long as this is the case, Russia is
better off cooperating with France, Germany and other continental states on bilateral
basis, as well as experimenting with new multilateral formats. The list of issues that
Russia and Europe may try to tackle jointly includes the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus
and Moldova, instability in Central Asia, and energy supplies.
Developing Special Ties with Non-Western States
It is equally important for Russia to continue to be active in developing ties with
the non-Western states. In the context of the West’s relative decline, stronger economic
and political ties with Iran, Turkey and Israel are essential for preserving influence in
Europe and the former Soviet region. In addition to trying to establish a new collective
security system in Europe, Russia should seek to devise a similar arrangement in Eurasia.
Unable on its own to effectively respond to the activities of the United States and NATO,
Russia may continue to exploit non-Western institutional vehicles, such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and develop bilateral security ties with selected non-Western
countries, such as China, Turkey, and Iran. Although China’s rise requires that Russia
continue to build relations with other states in East Asia and beyond, it is critically
important that Moscow not fall behind in strengthening ties with Beijing. An
insufficiently engaged China is more likely to show expansionist tendencies than a China
which is a participant of collective security arrangements with Russia, Europe and other
powers.
13
Preserving a Definitive Voice in the Post-Soviet Region
The post-Cold War Russia seeks to act globally mainly to secure its status of a
regional great power.62 It has no veto power in defining its neighbors’ foreign policies,
but Russia also cannot feel secure surrounded by unfriendly countries and will seek to
preserve a definitive voice in structuring the region’s security architecture. For example,
if Georgia is not satisfied with the neutral status of Finland or Moldova, it faces the
perspective of Russia’s permanent military presence on what Tbilisi sees as its legitimate
ethno-territory. For the same strategic reasons, Russia is within its rights to monitor
military build-up in China and, if necessary, strengthen Russia’s military presence in the
Far Eastern region.
Although Russia is likely to act assertively in defending its core security interests,
the key to regional influence is in mobilizing economic and cultural tools. Without trying
to challenge other powers, Russia should offer a vision that is sensitive to its history and
current tasks. For example, instead of challenging the notion of liberal democracy, Russia
may contextualize it as a necessary, but insufficient condition of successful statebuilding. As some scholars have argued,63 development of democracy is a part, but hardly
the center, of the state-building process. In addition to democracy, the government must
provide its citizens with order, basic social services and protection against external
threats. If such vision of a responsible state is formulated, it has an opportunity to be
promoted abroad, especially among the nations that are solving similar state-building
tasks. As Russia’s grand strategy partly depends on its acceptance by the outside world, it
is imperative that Moscow continue to explain its objectives and the means of achieving
them. With a clear vision and a confident moral authority, Russia is also less likely to rely
on coercion and tough talk in defending its interests abroad.
Although Russia has completed the transition from communism and found a
coherent international strategy, the future challenge is to assemble the will to act on it.
Globally, Russia seeks to preserve and consolidate the successes it has already achieved.
Improving economic and security standing by capitalizing on national energy reserves,
integrating with the world economy and strengthening the military remain sound
objectives. At home, a formerly “incomplete superpower”,64 Russia has much work ahead
to become more “complete” by developing non-military aspects of its great power status
– economic, demographic, institutional and cultural. The described conditions do not
dictate the non-use of coercive tools, but they suggest a limited reliance on such tools
without appropriate diplomatic preparations.
14
Table 1. Individual Countries’ Share of Total World Gross Domestic Product at
Purchasing Power Parities*
25000
USA
20000
15000
China
10000
Germany
India
5000
Russia
Brazil
0
1986
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
2115
*Purchasing Power Parities reflect changes in the country’s nominal exchange rate and
the price level. Russia’s share is indicated with the thick dotted line
Source: IMF Data Mapper, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
15
Table 2. Military Expenditures, Constant ( 2005 ) US$ million
600
500
400
USA
300
200
Russia
100
China
France
Germany
0
1989
1991
1993
199
5
199
199
9
2001
2003
2005
*Russia’s share is indicated with the thick dotted line
Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/
16
2007
Notes
1
Professor of International Relations and Political Science at San Francisco State
University. The paper was originally presented at an annual meeting of International
Studies Association, New York, February 13-16, 2009. The paper’s discussant, William
Wohlforth, and the panel’s participants provided helpful reactions. The paper also
benefited from detailed comments of the three anonimous reviewers. For additional
reactions to ideas contained in the paper, I would like to thank Nadezhda Arbatova,
Aleksei Bogaturov, Andrei Kortunov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Sergei Medvedev, Tatyana
Shakleyina, Valeri Solovei, Eduard Solovyev, Dmitri Trenin, Pavel Tsygankov, and Igor’
Zevelev. The responsibility for the article’s content remains entirely my own.
2
On soft power, see especially Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Building on Nye’s work, I use a
broader definition of soft power that combines internal aspects, such as national spirit and
ideology, with external aspects that include political legitimacy, economic and cultural
attractiveness. The latter can captured with the general concept of reputation and further
promoted through public relations and propaganda campaigns.
3
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1986); John Mearsheimer’s The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
4
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds.
The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
5
Peter J. Katzenstein, eds. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking
the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2005).
6
Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia: The Domestic Sources of a Less-then-a-Grand
Strategy,” in Strategic Asia 2007-2008: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy,
edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (The National Bureau of Asian Research,
2007), p. 140.
7
Ibid, p. 163.
8
Raja Menon and Alexander Motyl, “The Myth of Russian Resurgence,” The
American Interest, 2, 4, March-April 2007, pp. 96-101. For an earlier argument about
Russia’s chronic weakness, see William E. Odom, “Realism about Russia,” National
Interest Fall 2001.
9
Vice President Joe Biden’s Interview to Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal, July
23, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124846217750479721.html> According to
my interviews in Moscow in the summer 2010, a number of experts in Russian foreign
policy community generally share Biden’s characterization and are skeptical regarding
the Kremlin’s ability to have a grand strategy.
10
Richard Cheney, Vice President's Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference The
White House, Office of the Vice President, May 4, 2006, at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>; Ariel Cohen, “Domestic Factors Driving Russia’s
Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Policy Brief, November 2007; Janusz Bugajski,
Dismantling the West: Russia's Atlantic Agenda (Potomac Books, 2009); Janusz
17
Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization,” Caucasus Review of International
Affairs 4, 1, 2010; “Russia's Expanding Influence,” Stratfor.com, 4 parts, March 9, 10,
11, 12, 2010.
11
For some examples, see Vladimir Ryzhkov, “A plea to save Russia from an
enemy within,” Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 2007; Garry Kasparov, “Don Putin,”
Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2007; Garry Kasparov, “Our Struggle Against Tyranny in
Russia,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2007; Oleg Kozlovsky, “Putin's Gulag
Stability,” Washington Post, May 19, 2008; Lev Gudkov, Igor Klyamkin, Georgy
Satarov, and Lilia Shevtsova, "False Choices For Russia", Washington Post, June 2009;
Sergei Guriev and Aleh Tsyvinsky, “Modernization 1937,” Moscow Times, November
25, 2009; Lilia Shevtsova, Lonely Power (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2010).
12
Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: The Future of Russia and the Threat to the
West (London: Bloomsbury, 2009); David J. Kramer, “Medvedev Is No Democrat,”
Moscow Times, July 26, 2010; “Oppression in modern Russia,” Editorial, Washington
Post, August 30, 2010. For analysis of American phobias of Russia after the Cold War,
see Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign
Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
13
Edward Lucas, “Why kowtow to brutal, cynical Russia?” The Times, February
5, 2008.
14
Both Russian and Western analysts have speculated that the security class has
become omnipresent in policy making. See, for example, O. Kryshtanovskaya and S.
White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs 19, 4, 2003; Daniel Treisman, “Putin’s
Silovarchs,” Orbis, Winter 2007. For alternative perspectives on the objectives and the
role of the security class, see Sharon Werning Rivera and David W. Rivera, “The Russian
Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois? Post-Soviet Affairs 22, 2, 2006 and Bettina
Renz, “Putin’s Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of Siloviki in Russian Politics,”
Europe-Asia Studies 58, 6, 2006.
15
For documentation of this change in Russian elite belief system see, for
example, Leon Aron, “The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and Its
Domestic Context,” in: Russia’s New Foreign Policy, edited by Michael Mandelbaum
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russia's
International Assertiveness: What Does It Mean for the West?” Problems of PostCommunism 55, 1, 2008; Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia's
Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 2009); Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The
Washington Quarterly 32, 4, 2009.
16
For instance, according to a poll by VTsIOM (All-Russia Public Opinion
Research Centre) taken on 14-15 August, 2010, 49% of Russians believe that main
obstacle on the path to achieving the status of a great power is the lag behind leading
countries in economic development versus 26% linking it to powerful Armed Forces and
7% to receiving control over the territories of the former USSR (“Russia must overcome
lag in economic development to become great power – poll,” Interfax, October 12, 2010).
17
Such was the meaning of the "liberal empire" as Russia's key objective in the
region introduced by Russia's former privatization tsar Anatoli Chubais' (see his “Missiya
18
Rossiyi v XX veke [Russia’s mission in the 20th century],” Nezavisimaya gazeta, October
1, 2003), p. 1.
18
Interview of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs with the BBC Russian
Service, April 23, 2009.
19
Dina Rome Spechler, “Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin Presidency:
The Impact of Competing Approaches,” Problems of Post-Communism 57, 5, 2010, p.
46.
20
Vladimir Putin, “Dayu vam chestnoye partiynoye slovo [I give you my party
word],” Kommersant, August 30, 2010.
21
Dmitri Medvedev, Poslaniye Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoi Federatsiyi
[Address to Federation Council of the Russia’s Federation], Kremlin.ru, November 12,
2009.
22
Dmitri Medvedev, Speech at meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent
representatives in international organisations, Kremlin.ru, July 12, 2010.
23
Vneshnyaya politika i bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossiyi [Foreign policy and
security of contemporary Russia], edited by Tatyana Shakleyina (Moscow: ROSSPEN,
2002), vol. 4, pp. 110–11.
24
Obzor vneshnei politiki Rossiyskoi federatsiyi [Review of foreign policy of the
Russia’s Federation], March 27, 2007 <http://www.mid.ru>
25
Kommersant, December 25, 2008.
26
Mikhail Tsypkin, What's New In Russia's New Military Doctrine? RFE/RL,
February 27, 2010; Alexei Pushkov, “Moscow Should Not Play by NATO's Rules,”
Moscow Times, June 30, 2010.
27
Vladimir Putin, “Poslaniye Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy
Federatsii” [Address to Federation Council of the Russia’s Federation],
Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ 5, 2002, p. 4.
28
Kommersant, December 25, 2008.
29
The Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation, Kremlin.ru, July 12,
2008.
30
Programma effektivnogo ispol’zovaniya vneshnepoliticheskikh faktorov v
tselyakh dolgosrochnogo razvitiya Rossiyskoi Federatsiyi [Program of effective use of
foreign policy factors to assist long-term development of Russia’s Federation], February
10, 2010 <http://www.runewsweek.ru/country/34184>
31
Jeffrey Tayler, "Russia is Finished", The Atlantic Monthly, May 2001; William
E. Odom, “Realism about Russia,” National Interest 65, Fall 2001. Many observers
referred to Russia during the 1990s as being on the verge of becoming a failed state (see,
for example, Willerton, J. P., M. Beznosov, and M. Carrier, “Addressing the Challenges
of Russia’s ‘Failing State’,” Demokratizatsiya 13, 2, 2005).
32
Arbatov, A., M. Belova and V. Feygin, “Russian Hydrocarbons and World
Markets,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2006
<http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/14/1004.html>
33
“Alternative gas threatens Gazprom's operations - paper,” RIA-Novosti, March
10, 2010.
34
Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia after the Global Financial
Crisis,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 51, 3, 2010.
19
See, for example, Dale Herspring, “Russia's Military In The Throes Of
Change,” RFE/RL, December 16, 2008; Pavel Podvig, “The truth about Russia's military
‘resurgence’,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 29 January 2008.
36
During the Cold War, the Soviet military budget consisted of 15-20% of GDP
and roughly 40% of the overall budget in the 1980s (Stephen G. Brooks, and Wlliam C.
Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” International Security,
25, 3, 2000/2001, fn. 41).
37
Robert Thornton, “Russian Military Reform,” The Russian Analytical Digest,
No. 17, March 20, 2007, p. 12.
38
Russia’s involvement was essential for negotiating peace in both states. Peace
agreements over Transdniestr conflict and Tajik civil war were signed in July 1992 and
June 1997, respectively (Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and
Continuity in National Identity, 2nd edition [Rowman & Littlefield, 2010], pp. xv, 80,
115-116).
39
Fiona Hill, “Moscow Discovers Soft Power,” Current History, 2006; Andrei P.
Tsygankov, “If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign
Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 7, November, 2006.
40
Even in democratic Ukraine, as a prominent scholar acknowledged during
Ukrainian presidential elections in 2009, “Vladimir Putin is popular … and many would
vote for a ‘strong hand’ as an alternative to disorder” (Andrew Wilson, “Yatseniuk loses
fresh-face label, popularity after his financial backers exposed,” Kyiv Post, Oct 22, 2009
<https://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/51159/#ixzz1CaU1iIl8>
Available polls by VTSIOM in 2008 further demonstrate that 74% of Belarussians, 58%
of Ukrainians, 49% of Moldovans, 82% of Armenians, and 67-89% of Central Asians
view Russia as a friend and ally. Moreover, 56% of Belarussians and 47% of Ukrainians
would like to unite with Russia, while 25% and 22% favor the EU, and 18% and 25%
favor independence, respectively. Some 51% of Kazakhs favor Russia and 32%
independence (For a summary of VTSIOM’s polls and perceptions of Russia by the
former Soviet states in 2008, see Anatoly Karlin, “Russia isn't hated by (most of) its
neighbors,” Sublime Oblivion, June 8, 2010
<http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/06/08/russia-isnt-hated/>)
41
R. Gowan and F. Brantner, A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of
European Power at the UN (Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), p.
26.
42
The main customers of Russia’s armament are global and include India, China,
Algeria, Venesuala, Malaysia and Syria.
43
Many of the specialists Medvedev met during his trip to Silicon Valley in June
2010 have originally come to California from Russia and the former Soviet Union. Two
recent Russian Nobel laureates in physics – Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov –
now work at the University of Manchester. Graduates of the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology, they had to leave Russia due to financial difficulties and neglect at
home (Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Nobel laureates in physics left Russia due to financial
problems, neglect at home,” Itar-Tass, October 6, 2010).
44
On Russia’s actions to reverse the colored revolutions, see Dmitri Trenin,
“Russia in the Caucasus: Reversing the Tide,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no. 2,
35
20
2009; Jeanne D. Wilson The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and
Foreign Policy, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 57, no. 2, 2010, pp. 28-31; Stephen
Blank, “Russia-Ukraine pact leaves EU all at sea,” Asia Times, April 29; Philip P. Pan,
“Russia helped fuel unrest in Kyrgyzstan,” Washington Post, April 12, 2010; Steve
Gutterman, “Russia, U.S. at odds on Kyrgyzstan's future,” Reuters, October 6, 2010.
45
As Elizabeth Wishnik write, “Prior to the recognition, Chinese media coverage
largely echoed Russian positions, and, even afterwards, Chinese experts sympathized
with Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion” (Elizabeth Wishnick, Russia, China, and
the United States in Central Asia [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, February 2009], p. 41).
46
For elaboration, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Heartland No More: Russia’s
Weakness and Eurasia’s Meltdown,” ms. under review.
47
Jeffrey Mankoff, “Internal and External Impact of Russia’s Economic Crisis,”
Proliferation Papers, No. 48, March 2010.
48
For example, the Kremlin has proposed to conclude a new pan-European
security treaty and begin discussions of it using the format of the OSCE (Dmitriy
Medvedev, Interview of the President to the Spanish Media, Kremlin.ru, March 1, 2009).
Europe’s reaction to the proposal has been generally skeptical (Robert Bridge, “Moscow
looking for European "re-think" at Munich Security Conference,” Russia Today, October
21, 2010).
49
Judy Dempsey, “Russia Wants to Formalize Relation With E.U.,” New York
Times, October 18, 2010; Katrin Bennhold, “At Deauville, Europe Embraces Russia,”
New York Times, October 19, 2010.
50
“Instant view: BP, Rosneft in share swap, exploration deal,” Reuters, January
15, 2011.
51
Gillian Wong, “Russia wants to supply all of China's gas needs,” AP,
September 27, 2010.
52
For Russia’s growing ties within the Middle Eastern region, see Mark N. Katz,
"Russia's Greater Middle East Policy: Securing Economic Interests, Courting Islam,"
Russie.Nei.Visions', No. 49, April 2010; Richard Sakwa, "Russia and Turkey: Rethinking
Europe to Contest Outsider Status," Russie.Nei.Visions', No. 51, June 2010.
53
Anna Smolchenko, “Medvedev hails 'strategic' Turkey ties,” AFP, May 12,
2010.
54
This and next sections partially draw on my “Russia in the Post-Western
World,” Post-Soviet Affairs 25, 4, 2009 and “Russia’s Power and Alliance in the 21st
century,” Politics 30, 4, 2010.
55
For example, in 2008, Russia's population decline slowed down by 50%,
relative to 2007 (“Russia's population shrinks by 113,300 in 10 mths,” Interfax,
December 19, 2008). In 2009, the decline went down by 31% (“Natural population
decline in Russia down by 31% in 2009,” RIA Novosti, February 16, 2010).
56
Andrew Kuchins and Robert Weitz, Russia’s Place in an Unsetled Order –
Calculations in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: The Stanley Foundation, November
2008), p. 6.
57
Robert Thornton, “Russian Military Reform,” The Russian Analytical Digest,
No. 17, March 20, 2007, p. 12.
21
For statistics on Russia’s life expectancy and infant mortality until 2007, see
Russia’s Analytical Digest, Russia and the Financial Crisis, No. 48, October 17, 2008, p.
20.
59
For data on Russia’s crime rate and corruption level after the Soviet
disintegration, see see Russia’s Analytical Digest, Russia and the Financial Crisis, No.
48, October 17, 2008, p. 19 and Russia’s Analytical Digest, The State of the Russian
Economy, No. 38, April 2, 2008, p. 24.
60
Dmitry Solovyov and Oleg Shchedrov, “Russians bid farewell to Patriarch at
grand funeral,” Reuters, December 9, 2008.
61
Alexandr Khramchikhin, “Chto nam vse-taki sleduyet delat’ s NATO” [What
should we do with NATO], Novoye voennoye obozreniye, October 15, 2010.
62
For development of this argument, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russia’s Power
and Alliances in the 21st Century.
63
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
64
Paul Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower (University of Illinois
Press, 1986).
58
22