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OSHA, EPA And Other Stakeholder Responses To The Conclusions And Recommendations Of
The Chemical Safety Board’s Report On, “Improving Reactive Hazard Management” And
Some Approaches towards Resolving Remaining Recommendation Issues
Isadore (Irv) Rosenthal1, PhD
IMECE2004-60442
I.
Abstract
The USA Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) conducted a study of the chemical
safety risks posed by the class of reactive hazards. This report, “IMPROVING REACTIVE HAZARD
MANAGEMENT” (Report), was issued in October 2002 and its conclusions and recommendations
have had significant impacts on how stakeholders view the adequacy of industry and government
management of reactive hazards. The continued stream of high profile accidents due to reactive
hazards such as Concept Sciences and Toulouse) cause people to also remember that realization of
a reactive hazard also led to the accidents at Bhopal and Seveso and consequent major legal and
social impacts in India, the United States and Europe.
After a discussion of the congruence between the Report’s Objectives and Conclusions and the major
thrusts of the Reactive Report’s ‘Recommendations’, to government agencies and other stakeholders,
this paper will provide an update on the positive impacts that the CSB Report has already had on
activities by professional societies, government and industry and examine some of the major
unresolved recommendations, particularly those directed to OSHA to broaden PSM regulatory
coverage of reactive chemicals.
The paper will conclude with observations on various approaches to broadening coverage of reactive
hazards along the lines recommended by the CSB to OSHA and EPA. Among the approaches
reviewed will be the one embodied in New Jersey’s very recently modified TCPA regulation, selected
proposals in the literature, and voluntary guidelines such as those under development by the newly
formed Reactive Management Roundtable group of AIChE.
II.
Introduction
The number and severity of U.S. process safety chemical accidents demonstrate the need for the
USA Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB or Board).
For example, among just the 15,430 chemical-handling facilities required to file risk management
plans with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1999, 1,205 of these facilities reported
1,970 accidents over the five-year period from 1994 through 1999. These incidents resulted in a total
of 1,897 injuries, 33 deaths to workers/employees and evacuation or sheltering in place of over
200,000 members of the public1. These EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) regulated facilities
are just a relatively small fraction of the facilities that can experience major accidental chemical
releases.
The financial impact of such accidents is also very significant. A recent paper estimated direct
insurance company payouts related to chemical release accidents at about $1 billion per year. Taking
into account indirect losses and losses not covered by insurance companies, overall effects could be
conservatively estimated at $3 to 5 billion annually2.
Reactive hazards3 are a significant cause of these major accidents in the United States and
throughout the industrialized world (Toulouse 4, Concept Sciences5). In the United States, the OSHA
PSM standard defines and covers a class of reactive hazards, but the EPA RMP standard does not.
The EU also treats reactive hazards per se in the Seveso II directive and it sponsors efforts such as
1 Senior Fellow, Risk Mgmt and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 558 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, 3730 Walnut Street’,
Philadelphia, PA, 19104. Though the author served on the five person board governing the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board”, the views expressed in
this paper are his and do not necessarily express the views of any other member of the Board or agency.
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HarsNet6, whose vision is to “Help reduce the frequency and consequences of reactive chemical
incidents”.
As the CSB report on, ”Improving Reactive Hazard Management” (Reactive Report) shows, a
significant fraction of chemical release and process accidents continue to involve reactive hazards
and. the continuing impact of the CSB Reactive Report is reflected in recent editorials and efforts
aimed at developing improved control of reactive materials.
In approaching the subject of reactive hazards, one must keep in mind that reactive hazards are
different in character from either toxic hazards or physical hazards such as force or temperature.
Exposure to a reactive hazard per se causes no injury to people or the environment unless the
substance(s) giving rise to the reactive hazard also present physical or toxic hazards to these subjects
of concern. In short, injury from a reactive hazard requires conversion 7 and exposure8 while injury
from a toxic or physical hazard requires only exposure.
In other words, injury from a reactive hazard depends on whether the hazard is transformed
(processed) in a manner that:
1. Generates concentrations of toxic substances or intensities of energy capable of harming
people or the environment (dependent on processing conditions)
And
2. Fails to prevent contact between injurious doses of a toxic substance or energy resulting from
the transformation and people, property or the environment (dependent on process
containment).
Injury from an intrinsic toxic or physical hazard requires only condition 2
III.
Synopsis of the history, responsibilities and authorities of the CSB9
Following the catastrophic incident at the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India in 1984 and a series
of domestic incidents10 in 1987-1989, the U.S. Congress authorized new chemical accident provisions
through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 11. In addition to new regulatory approaches required
of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and EPA,
Congress mandated an independent Chemical Safety Board.
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is an independent Federal agency
similar to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The CSB mission is to investigate and
promote the prevention of major chemical incidents at industrial facilities. CSB is a scientific
investigatory organization. It has the legal authority required to enter facilities, conduct interviews and
collect other information required in order to conduct a thorough accident investigation. However, the
CSB cannot levy fines nor is it an enforcement body. Furthermore, the Boards investigative findings
cannot be used as evidence in civil litigation.
The purpose, structure, authorities, and responsibilities of the CSB were spelled out by the U.S.
Congress in section 112(r)(6) of the 1990 clean air act amendments 12. In essence, the language in
section 112(r)(6) directs the Board to:
 Conduct root cause investigations of accidental chemical releases that affected or could have
affected members of the public and report on the investigations findings
 “Issue periodic reports to the Congress and pertinent Federal, State and Local agencies” on
“the safety of chemical production, processing, handling and storage”. These Reports should
”recommend measures to reduce the likelihood or consequences of accidental releases” and
may include recommendations to EPA and OSHA on regulatory measures to prevent or
minimize the consequences of accidental releases.
 Establish reporting requirements for chemical incidents within its jurisdiction.
 “Conduct research and studies with respect to the potential for accidental releases whether or
not an accidental release has occurred”.
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IV. The CSB Report; “Improving Reactive Hazard Management” (CSB Reactive Report)
a. Background
1.
Nature of CSB hazard investigations
Findings and recommendations from a field investigation of an accident often reflect very specific
aspects of the facility’s manufacturing operations, which typically use specialized procedures,
equipment, and technologies.
However, occasionally in the course of conducting incident
investigations, the Board may be alerted to significant safety problems related to a common hazard
that could affect a large number of facilities.
In such cases, CSB may choose to conduct a ‘hazard investigation’ or ‘safety study’ with broad
industry-wide applicability.
Findings from such an investigation can lead to a variety of
recommendations, including proposals for regulatory action, as was the case with the CSB report on
“Improving Reactive Hazard Management”.13
2. Morton, NAPP and other reactive incidents relevant to initiation of the CSB Reactive Report
The Morton International plant in Paterson, New Jersey, experienced an explosion on April 8, 1998,
which seriously injured nine workers. The explosion and subsequent fire were caused by a runaway
chemical reaction in a 2,000-gallon reactor used to produce a yellow fuel dye (Automate Yellow 96).
A vigorous exothermic reaction occurred shortly after the two chemicals used to make the dye were
mixed. The temperature in the reactor began to rapidly increase, causing the further exothermic
decomposition of the dye and eventually over-pressurizing and rupturing the kettle. The reactor
contents were released to the air and distributed into the surrounding urban area. The chemicals
released included toxic ortho-nitrochlorobenzene. Fallout occurred as far as 0.5 mile from the plant,
and residents of a 10 square block area were required to shelter in place. Local authorities issued a
health advisory to residents shortly after the incident, though the magnitude of human exposure is
unknown. The plant was repaired, but the company discontinued the production of Automate Yellow
96.
The CSB issued a final Morton accident investigation report 14 on the August 16, 2000 and one of the
recommendations made to both OSHA and the EPA in the CSB Report Morton implicitly committed
the CSB to an investigation of reactive hazards15
3.
OSHA concerns about reactive hazards covered under PSM prior to the CSB Reactive
Report
Even before the CSB issued its report on its investigation of the Morton 16 accident, Stakeholders and
OSHA were already concerned with the issue of whether the provisions in its Process Safety
Management17 (PSM) regulation adequately covered reactive hazards. This concern was generated in
large part by a series of accidents due to reactive hazards, some of which are listed in Table 1 and in
particular to the NAPP18 accident which resulted in five deaths and triggered a petition 19 to OSHA
asking for tighter regulation of reactive hazards under the PSM or by other means. Public pressure on
regulatory bodies was focused more on OSHA than EPA 20.
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Table 1
Reactive Incidents
Facility
Heat of Reaction
≈H cal/g
Are Chemical(s)
PSM listed?
Consequences
Deaths Injury
Morton Intl.21
(4/8/1998)
≈170
No
0
9
NAPP Tech.22
(4/21/1995)
≈190
No
5
4
Condea Vista23
(10/13/1998)
≈120
No
0
5
Terra Industries24
(12/13/1994)
≈40025
No
4
18
Phillips Pasadena26
(6/23/1999)
≈300
Yes
2
2
Concept Sciences27
(2/19/1999)
≈1200
Yes?
(Process Coverage Disputed28)
5
8
Georgia Pacific29
(9/10/1997)
≈180
Yes
(Not as reactive)
1
7
Bartlo Packaging30
South (5/8/199
≈190
3
17
No
-----------End of Table 1-------Examination of Table 1 reveals, that by and large the processes experiencing this series of ‘reactive’
accidents were not governed by the provisions of the PSM (covered). Processes are covered under
PSM if the substance(s) being processed is specifically listed or is a member of a listed class and the
amount being processed is above PSM specified threshold amounts
Reactive hazards are covered as such under the OSHA PSM on the basis of two criteria:
 Is the substance listed in the standard as a ‘reactive’ hazard? 31
 Is the amount of the covered substance to be ‘processed’ greater than the coverage
threshold amount specified in the standard?
None of the hazards leading to the eight ‘reactive’ accidents listed in Table 1 were covered as reactive
hazards under the OSHA standard.
Over the next several years, OSHA developed and discussed a number of alternative approaches
with its stakeholders and developed a draft Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) late in
1999. The ANPR was never issued, but informally shared with some stakeholders. Responses to the
draft ANPR from chemical industry trade associations were not positive,32 and at least one important
group suggested that the OSHA proposals would add a significant regulatory burden for industry with
little return in added safety.
OSHA removed the issue of reactive hazards from its high priority action list in 2002.
b.
Discussion of the Reactive Report’s contents
The Report’s contents, as well as its Objectives, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations need
to be read in order to fully understand the Report. This paper can only try to provide some insight into
some major aspects of the report for those who may not have the opportunity for the careful study the
Report merits. Clearly any attempt to do this introduces unavoidable elements of subjectivity
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This paper will attempt to summarize and analyze two important aspects of the CSB Report:
- Congruence: How well did the Report address its stated ‘Objectives’?
- What are the essential thrusts of the Report’s ‘Recommendations’?
1. Congruence: Did the Report ’Findings’ and ‘Conclusions’ address the Board’s ‘Objectives’?
This question will be addressed by seeing how well the Report’s Conclusions, which of course are
built on and embody the Report’s important findings, address the first four of the Board’s Objectives 33.
In Table 2, the author has assigned each of the Report’s 13 Conclusions 34 to the Report Objective to
which he feels it is most pertinent. The Objectives have been given Roman numbers (they were not
numbered in the Report) to facilitate discussion of our analysis.
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Table 2:
Congruence of Report’s Conclusions and Objectives 2
I.
Determine the impacts of reactive chemical incidents.
1. Reactive incidents are a significant chemical safety problem.
7. Existing sources of incident data are not adequate to identify the number, severity, and causes of
reactive incidents or to analyze incident frequency trends.
8. There is no publicly available database for sharing lessons learned from reactive incidents.
II. Examine how industry, OSHA, and EPA currently address reactive chemical hazards.
5.(b)
Improving reactive hazard management requires that both regulators and industry address the
hazards from combinations of chemicals and process-specific conditions rather than focus
exclusively on the inherent properties of individual chemicals3.
9. Neither the OSHA PSM Standard nor the EPA RMP regulation explicitly requires specific hazards,
such as reactive hazards, to be examined when performing a process hazard analysis. Given that
reactive incidents are often caused by inadequate recognition and evaluation of reactive hazards,
improving reactive hazard management involves defining and requiring relevant factors (e.g., rate
and quantity of heat and gas generated) to be examined within a process hazard analysis.
10. The OSHA PSM Standard and the EPA RMP regulation do not explicitly require the use of
multiple sources when compiling process safety information.
11. Publicly available resources35 are not always used by industry to assist in identifying reactive
hazards.
13. Current good practice guidelines on how to effectively manage reactive hazards throughout the
life cycle36 of a chemical manufacturing process are neither complete nor sufficiently explicit.
14. Given the impact and diversity of reactive hazards, optimum progress in the prevention of reactive
incidents requires both enhanced regulatory and non-regulatory programs
III.
Determine the differences, if any, between small, medium, and large companies with regard
to reactive chemical policies, practices, in-house reactivity research, testing, and process
engineering.
IV.
Analyze the appropriateness of, and consider alternatives to, industry and OSHA use of the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) instability rating system for process safety
management.
2. The OSHA PSM Standard has significant gaps in coverage of reactive hazards because it is
based on a limited list of individual chemicals with inherently reactive properties.
3. NFPA instability ratings are insufficient as the sole basis for determining coverage of reactive
hazards in the OSHA PSM Standard.
4. The EPA Accidental Release Prevention Requirements (40 CFR 68) have significant gaps in
coverage of reactive hazards.
5. Using lists of chemicals is an inadequate approach for regulatory coverage of reactive hazards.
Improving reactive hazard management requires that both regulators and industry address the
hazards from combinations of chemicals and process-specific conditions rather than focus
exclusively on the inherent properties of individual chemicals.
V.
Develop recommendations for reducing the number and severity of reactive chemical
incidents.
_______End of Table 2_______
2 Roman numerals are assigned to the CSB Reactive Report’s five Objectives since they were not numbered in the Report. The Table uses same Arabic numerals used in the
CSB Report to identify each of the Report’s 13 Conclusions.
3 Conclusion 5 covers two diverse points, the second of which is split out as 5(b) and assigned as pertinent to Objective II because it implies that industry and government
should, but do not adequately consider process-substance interactions
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The paper makes the following conclusions and observations in regard to the issues raised in the
Report’s Objectives based on the results of this Table 2 exercise:

The available data on ‘Reactive” accidents does not allow one to arrive at even a good semiquantitativel estimate of their incidence rate though clearly the available information on
notorious accidents such as Seveso, Bhopal, Phillips, Toulouse and less notorious incidents
like those listed in Table 1, indicate that they are of considerable significance.

OSHA, EPA and Industry Practitioners focus on individual unstable individual substances and
often do not appropriately take into account the significant reactive hazards presented by
combinations of ‘stable’ substances.

Many facilities do not adequately use available data to identify and characterize reactive
hazards and OSHA, EPA, and Trade Associations have not done a good job in addressing
this failure.

The process hazard analyses called for in the PSM, RMP and Trade Association guidelines
do not have appropriate guidance and requirements in regard to analyzing and assessing the
impact of processing conditions on the likelihood and magnitude with which reactive hazards
are expressed.
The Report’s conclusions do not comment on differences between small, medium and large
companies with regard to reactive chemical policies, practices, reactivity research, testing,
and process engineering.

The absence of any opinion or comment on the last point is surprising, since it is a common belief
among practitioners that ‘large’ companies handle reactive hazards well on their own, ‘small’
companies do not and they need help.
2.
Major thrusts of the Report’s ‘Recommendations’
To facilitate discussion of both the Board’s Reactive Report recommendations and responses to these
recommendations, this paper has prepared the ad hoc synopsis of Board recommendations shown in
Table 3.
In essence the Report’s major recommendations call for actions in four areas:
1. Make better use of information in the literature and/or testing to screen for and identify substances
that could pose a significant reactive hazard in a facility’s intended operations
2. Perform Process Hazard Analyses (PHA’s) that explicitly evaluate scenarios that could lead to
accidents associated with intended facility operations involving reactive hazards
3. Take measures to improve the collection and availability of better information on the nature,
impacts and incidence of accidents caused by reactive hazards
4. Make your stakeholders aware of the CSB Reactive Report
Examination of Table 3 also shows that by and large the thrusts of the Board’s recommendations
address the issues that the Report concludes affect “the number and severity of reactive incidents” as
called for in Objective 5 of the Report and that EPA and OSHA appear to be the recipients of the
weightiest, most detailed recommendations.
The responses to the Board’s recommendations will be discussed in the next section of the paper
after the reader has had the opportunity of reviewing Table 3.
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Table 3
Major CSB Reactive Report Recommendations
(Ad Hoc Condensation)
To OSHA
1. Extend PSM coverage of reactive hazards to include combinations as well as individual
substances taking process conditions into consideration. Use objective criteria and process
considerations to:
a. Define covered combinations of substances
b. Increase the number of individual substances covered
2. Require better collection and dissemination of literature information relevant to reactive
hazards
3. Require PSM covered facilities to address explicit aspects of reactive hazards when they do
presently required PHA’s)
4. Collect and make available better information on the nature, impacts and incidence of
accidents caused by reactive hazards
To EPA
1. Extend RMP coverage of reactive hazards to include combinations as well as individual
substances taking process conditions into consideration. Follow the approach used by
OSHA.
2. Modify the accident reporting requirements in RMP*INFO to collect and make available
better information on the nature, impacts and incidence of accidents caused by reactive
hazards
To National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
1. Develop and implement a publicly available database containing reactive hazard test data and
information gathered from the literature, academia, business and government sources.
To Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)
1 Publish comprehensive guidance on model reactive chemical management systems for
companies primarily in the processing of reactive hazards and also for companies engaged
primarily in the storage of reactive substances.
To Industry trade associations: American Chemistry Council (ACC), Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) and also with some modification to National
Association of Chemical Distributors (NACD)
1. Improve the Responsible Care Program in regard to the management of reactive hazards and
collect better information on reactive incidents and lessons learned from incidents
2. Work with NIST in developing and implementing a publicly available database for reactive
hazard test information
To International Association of Firefighters, Paper Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy
Workers International Union (PACE); The United Steelworkers of America; Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE); United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union; American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE); American Industrial
Hygiene Association (AIHA)
1. Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.
--------------------End of Table 3-----------------
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V. Developments after issuance of the CSB Reactive Report
a.
Status of responses to the Board’s Reactive Report Recommendations
Table 3 contains this paper’s ad hoc synopsis of the Board’s Reactive Report’s recommendations to
stakeholders. The purpose of this synopsis, as noted, is to facilitate discussion of the major thrusts of
the Board’s recommendations and the status of the responses received by the CSB on its
recommendations.
As of February 6th, 2004, there have been few formal responses to the Board by the organizations to
whom the Board’s recommendations were made.
Early in November, OSHA did respond to the Board and outlined a number of initiatives it proposed to
take in regard to recommendations 1 to 3, but the Board 37 did not feel the OSHA response was
acceptable. OSHA’s response stated that it would revise its PSM guidance and compliance Directives
to indicate the need to better address recommendation items 1 and 2, but that it had not decided
whether to amend the PSM per se, and it declined to act on item 3.
OSHA also indicated that it would take other actions such as:
1. Making the CCPS Guidelines on “Practices for Managing Reactive Hazards” available to
employees, employers and other interested persons free of charge,
2. Foster efforts in its “Alliance Program” with trade, business, labor, government and
professional organizations,
3. Participate in the Reactivity Management Roundtable (RMR) which is discussed below in
this paper.
On March 30, 2004, OSHA and EPA formally launched the Alliance program38 with the formal signing
of the alliance by the American Chemistry Council, the American Institute for Chemical Engineers'
Center for Chemical Process Safety, the Chlorine Institute, Inc., the Mary Kay O'Connor Center for
Chemical Process Safety, the National Association of Chemical Distributors, and the Synthetic
Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association. At the signing ceremony, the following goals and
Alliance activities were set forward:
“The Alliance's goal is to offer a means for the group to provide information, guidance and
access to training resources to their members, customers, contacts and others involved in the
manufacture, distribution, use and storage of chemicals. Together, each organization will strive
to provide chemical reactivity hazards management information, methods and tools to a variety
of audiences while, at the same time, gain experience in the use of methods and tools to
continuously
improve
identification
and
management
of
the
hazards.
Alliance members will work with OSHA to provide expertise to deliver training addressing
chemical reactivity hazards to be delivered at conferences, meetings, and through OSHA's
Training Institute Education Centers. OSHA and Alliance members will develop and disseminate
information through both print and electronic media and from each organization's respective
websites, including electronic assistance tools. For example, participants will disseminate and
raise awareness of the Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) publication Essential
Practices
for
Managing
Chemical
Reactivity
Hazards.
The Alliance also calls for the participants to speak, exhibit or appear at various conferences
hosted by each organization and to convene or participate in forums, roundtable discussions, or
stakeholder meetings on chemical reactivity hazards to help forge innovative solutions in the
workplace or to provide input on safety and health issues.”
NIST has not indicated how it would act on the recommendation that specifically asked it to:
“Develop and implement a publicly available database for reactive hazard test information.
Structure the system to encourage submission of data by individual companies and academic
and government institutions that perform chemical testing”.
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EPA appears to have taken action39 on the recommendation made to it in regard to item 2, but it has
not apparently notified the Board of its action. No action would be expected in regard to
recommendation (1) on improving coverage of reactive hazards under RMP, until OSHA acts, given
that the Board suggested and there is general agreement that EPA should follow OSHA’s lead in this
matter.
Based on the response to queries the author made to the CSB, Trade Associations such as ACC and
SOCMA who were asked to modify their association programs such as “Responsible Care” and to
increase attention to items 1 to 3 also have not formally responded to the Board.
b. The impact of the CSB Report on issues related to reactive hazards.
As is evident in the paper’s discussion of responses to the Board’s recommendations, there is
reluctance by significant stakeholders to accept some of the recommendations with the greatest
potential to reduce accidents due to reactive hazards.
This is not unusual. One needs to remember that in spite of strong societal reactions to the horror of
the Bhopal accident, these feelings did not translate into preventive actions immediately. While there
were significant actions by industry and government, it took multiple domestic chemical accidents in
the late 1980s, including many reactive incidents, before passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 resulted in actions that:
 Prompted OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations (1992),
 Led to EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations (1996), and
 Established the Chemical Safety Board (1998).
However, in spite of the obviously less than complete agreement on implementing the Board’s
recommendations, the Reactive report has had important impacts in other ways. This section of the
paper will discuss three examples of such impacts.
1. Regulatory action on reactive hazards in New Jersey
As the CSB Reactive Report was being developed, the State of New Jersey was engaged in a
required re-examination and regulatory reauthorization of its “Toxic Catastrophic Prevention Act
Program (TCPA). The original program was enacted in 1986, in part in reaction to the Bhopal
accident. It was aimed primarily at reducing the frequency and impact of accidental chemical process
releases on the public. In this sense it was more closely related to the EPA RMP regulation than to the
OSHA PSM regulation which focused on worker impacts.
When the TCPA was revisited by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) in
1998, the full repercussions of the NAPP and Morton accidents, both of which occurred in NJ had
apparently not fully registered. However, as shown by the following extract from a NJDEP notice 40 of a
proposed March17, 2003 public hearing on the re-adoption of a modified TCPA program, these
accidents and the CSB Reactive Report had changed the climate of opinion. The issue of reactive
hazards was now of paramount concern:
“Significant Proposed Program Changes
The most significant program change is the Department’s proposal to list certain reactive
hazard substances as extraordinarily hazardous substances at N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3, thus
making them subject to the TCPA rules at listed threshold quantities. Investigations of the
accidents at two New Jersey companies, NAPP Technologies in 1995 and Morton
International in 1998, identified reactive substances as contributors to the root cause of
these accidents and raised concerns about reactive hazards to a national level. In
addition, as reported in its October, 2002 publication, the United States Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board concluded that of 167 incidents that occurred between
1980 and 2001, over 50% involved reactive hazards. Reactive hazards are not currently
regulated under the State’s TCPA rules or the federal ARP program. The Department is
proposing to add reactive hazard substances to the EHS list at Table I, Part D at N.J.A.C.
7:31-6.3.”
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Note: Author has used italics for emphasis in the above quotation.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) now evidently felt that the revision
of the TCPA should address the issues raised in the CSB reactive report and should cover reactive
hazards and processes similar to those that were involved in the reactive accidents at NAPP and
Morton. In order to accomplish this, the NJDEP felt they needed to cover reactive hazards posed by
both individual substances and also mixtures of substances that were being intentionally transformed
physically or chemically. The NJDEP proposed 41 and then accomplished this in its adopted regulation
published 2004 by:
1) Preparing a list of substance(s) that would be covered as reactive hazards based on
historical and technical considerations
2) Defining a class of ‘reactives’ (mixtures or individual substances) whose members met
three requirements:
 The facility planned to ‘intentionally’ chemically or physically transform the
substance(s) itself or admixed with other substances
 The substance(s) had one or more of the specified functional groups,
 The amount of energy (-∆H) released using prescribed procedures exceeded 100
Calories/gram of the mixture over a specified temperature range. The prescribed
procedures allowed ∆H to be determined by acceptable calorimetric tests,
calculations or literature data
2.)
The CSB/EPA/OSHA Roundtable on Reactive Hazards
On June 10th 2003, the CSB, OSHA and EPA sponsored a Roundtable discussion focused on the
following Question:
“If OSHA and EPA were to accept the CSB recommendation on broadening regulatory
coverage of reactive hazards under the PSM and RMP standards using objective
criteria, what methodology would you recommend they should use to achieve this
broadened coverage”.
The Roundtable attendees (about 50 persons) represented a cross section of industry, labor and
government with some academic and public interest group participation as well.
The rules established for the Roundtable mandated that there would be no attribution of the remarks
or presentations made during the Roundtable. Four papers were presented, one by a labor
representative, two by employees of chemical companies and one by an academic. The papers were
asked to address the question posed above.
After the papers were presented, the Roundtable was opened for general discussion.
As might be expected, answers to the posed question were diverse. They ranged from:
1) Requiring that all substances to be processed undergo a hazard analysis that was thorough
enough to uncover any reasonably possible hazard due to reactivity
To:
2) Basing coverage on a list of covered materials with specified functional groups that also
exhibited rapid, high energy release under specified conditions.
To the author, the latter approach does not appear to be different in kind from that proposed by the
NJDEP (see above) and is in a sense a limited class approach.
The discussions in the afternoon were far ranging. Some parties felt the problem could be addressed
almost entirely by trade association action to improve industry voluntary guidelines, others felt that a
new OSHA standard designed specifically for reactive hazards was needed, a few felt that an
enhanced HAZCOM standard was an important tool and some were proponents of better OSHA
enforcement of an enhanced General Duty Clause, etc.
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There was also an interesting, widely held set of opinions to the effect that, while reactive hazards
may not be a serious problem for the ‘better’ firms, OSHA needed to reach out to ‘small’ firms,
variously characterized as, ‘lacking technical expertise’, ‘resources’, ‘time’, etc.
It appeared to the author, that the only area of near agreement was that OSHA needed to find an
approach for dealing with reactive hazards that was better than their present ‘simple’ list approach. As
a long time observer of the regulatory scene, I sensed some movement away from rigid positions that
existed before the CSB Reactive Report was issued.
3
The AIChE Reactive Management Roundtable
Shortly after the CSB/EPA/OSHA held their Roundtable on reactive hazards, a group of American
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) members, many of whom were present at this Roundtable
organized a meeting in conjunction with the AIChE Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems
(DIERS) committee in Las Vegas to discuss the issue of improving the Management of Reactive
hazards. There were about 40 persons present at the meeting, and they spent the day discussing
whether the problem of reactive hazards was being adequately managed by existing government,
professional societies, trade associations, etc. or if there was a need for an additional group to focus
on this issue.
This group of professionals, employees of a variety of private firms, government agencies and labor
unions decided that the need to do an additional ‘something’ about the risks posed by reactive
hazards existed. They felt that managing reactive hazards was a significant problem inadequately
addressed by existing institutions and that this was particularly true in regard to smaller firms with
limited financial and/or technical resources.
Under the cover of an interim ‘charter’ granted to the organizers of this exploratory session by AIChE,
they formed themselves into the Reactivity Management Roundtable (RMR) with the objective of
developing a reactive management system work-product aimed at this class of firms with limited
financial and/or technical resources. In this regard it is interesting to compare the RMR evaluation of
customer need with the following statement by HarsNet 42:
“The main objectives of HarsNet are a consequence of the urgent need to introduce
hazard assessment techniques for reactive chemicals into the normal working
procedures of small and medium enterprises”.
The RMR group has now been in existence for about four months. Its efforts have received support
from Labor. the CSB, EPA and OSHA though the bulk of its members are industry. As noted above,
OSHA Secretary Henshaw has signaled the importance that OSHA attaches to the RMR’s efforts by
listing their support of the RMR as a tangible step towards addressing the issues raised in the Board’s
recommendations to OSHA.
The RMR has held multiple teleconferences aimed at firming up its strategic objectives, arriving at a
better definition of its ‘work’ product’s customers and settling on its relationships with sister AIChECCPS group. Presently, the RMR is scheduled to meet again sometime in May, 2004 in order to
review the planning work done to date, decide on how to proceed with accomplishing the planned
work and finalizing the charter under which it will work within the AIChE.
The effort put forward by individual professionals on this effort is evidence of how seriously working
professionals view the problem of reactive hazards. In the author’s opinion, and also that of several
key organizers of the RMR, it is also further evidence of the contribution of the CSB report on reactive
hazards to the reduction of industry risks associated with such hazards.
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VI.
13
Concluding Observations
1) Accident prevention and attention
Regardless of whether or not substantially all of the CSB Reactive Report’s recommendations are
adopted in a timely manner, the Report will continue to have an important positive impact on
decreasing the likelihood of ‘reactive’ process accidents by increasing practitioner attention.
Attention is a very scare commodity. It is generally accepted that most accidental chemical releases
and injuries from the realization of process hazards occur in spite of the fact that the knowledge
needed to prevent the accident is known to practitioners or is reasonably available to them if they
choose to look for it (see for example, Kletz43 and Belke44 ). Unfortunately, many practitioners’
attention tends to be focused on the many immediate crises they face daily rather than on the
seemingly postpone-able factors that increase the likelihood of Low Probability - High Consequence
(LP-HC) accidents. For this reason an effective Process Safety Management System needs measures
to ensure that process safety matters requiring action are not dependent on any single practitioner’s
or manager’s attention focus. Unfortunately building and even more so, maintaining effective safety
management systems also require this same scare attention.
2) The impact of CSB Reports on increasing attention
The tragic events often portrayed in CSB Reactive and other investigative reports can, and often do
cause practitioners and their managers to pay this needed attention to process safety management
systems. However, the scarcity of management and practitioner attention also leads the author to
believe that 12 to 20 CSB investigation reports per year may be a cost-effective prevention effort;
obtaining good value from significantly more reports would be very difficult.
Stakeholder attention to reactive hazards will continue to be higher than normal even after the initial
spurt of attention that followed issuance of CSB Reactive Report passes. One can expect news
stories and discussion each time future expected events enabled at least in part by the CSB Report,
such as the following, occur:

Issuance of reactive management guidelines by the RMR group of AIChE

Implementation of the reactive hazard portions of its TCPA standard by the NJDEP,

CSB reports on the status of responses to reactive recommendation,

Actions by the ‘OSHA-EPA Alliance’ on non-regulatory alternatives for improving reactive
safety
Events related to the CSB report have a significant impact on the raising the awareness of the public
and practitioners about the danger posed by reactive hazards via the generation of news stories. For
example, Burrell’s clipping service reported that over 500 newspaper web sites in the U.S. and abroad
picked up the AP story on the Board’s recent news release on its conclusions regarding the OSHA
response to Board’s reactive recommendations and a recent editorial in Occupational Health & Safety
45 scolded OSHA for its failure to respond more responsively to the CSB reactive recommendations. A
very strong case can be made that OSHA-EPA March 30th action on the Reactive alliance, a positive
step towards attracting practitioner attention to reactive hazards, occurred largely because of the CSB
recommendations to OSHA and EPA.
3) Regulatory approaches to complement industry’s increased efforts to improve management
of reactive hazards.
The author believes that relying solely on regulation is not the optimum way to control most hazards.
Cooperative action by well intentioned firms is vital and actions such as the OSHA-EPA Reactive
Alliance and the RMR Roundtable are very positive steps. At the same time, experience has also
taught us that OSHA and EPA need to develop a cost/effective regulatory approach that will in
essence define minimum acceptable practice for firms that are marginally viable, technically limited or
are simply trying to gain short term competitive advantage by disregarding minimally acceptable
practices.
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14
There are a number of papers that have outlined a basis for such minimally acceptable practice.
Some of these minimally acceptable practices were put forth at the CSB/OSHA/EPA Roundtable as
noted above and the author and one of his associates have published a specific proposal 46 couched in
the language of the PSM (Appendix 1 contains the regulatory language that this paper puts forward).
The basic elements of this approach call for OSHA to extend coverage of its existing PSM standard to
a class of Highly Hazardous Reactive Mixtures (HHRC) defined as:
“ any combination of one or more substances that is intentionally introduced or produced in a
process and can generate more than 100 calories per gram when tested as specified over a
temperature range from 25 o C to either 400oC or 100oC higher than the maximum projected or
observed process temperature.”
PSM coverage would be rebutable and only applied when more than a “sufficient” quantity of the
HHRM is intentionally processed unless
the facility can demonstrate that a ‘catastrophic release’ will not result from their processing of a
HHRM under the reasonable worst-case process conditions specified in Appendix (a)(1)(iii), taking
into account passive mitigation measures, will be exempt from all provisions of the PSM standard
except as specified.
Examination of Table 1 shows that the use of the proposed 100 calories per gram heat of reaction
coverage criterion would have brought all of the these important accident cases under the PSM
standard, if the hazards had been present in ‘sufficient quantities’, an issue discussed in the author’s
paper referenced above and addressed in the NJDEP amendments of the TCPA.
While some of the government Agency people present at the CSB/OSHA/EPA Roundtable had hoped
for participant agreement on one or more of these approaches, other observers noted that there never
has been a specific major regulatory approach on which Labor, Industry and NGO’s agreed.
Nevertheless, the existence of specific proposals on how industry and government can better control
accidents due to reactive hazards and a heightened awareness of problem created by the Board’s
Reactive Report will speed up the necessary negotiations by labor and industry, OSHA and EPA.
Unfortunately, this negotiation will probably not start seriously until there is another major accident in
the United States caused by an unregulated reactive hazard.
--------------------------APPENDIX47 1
1.
A ‘Pragmatic Coverage Example’ to broadening PSM coverage of reactive substances and
mixtures
Changes to the PSM standard that embody the thrust of the ‘Pragmatic Coverage Example’ would be
accomplished by adding a new paragraph (iii) to sub-section (a)(1) of the ‘Purpose’ section of the
standard, together with associated paragraphs containing related definitions and exemptions. These
text additions will be shown below in italics.
The ‘Pragmatic Coverage Example’
“ § 1910.119 Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.
Purpose. This section contains requirements for preventing or minimizing the
consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals.
These releases may result in toxic, fire or explosion hazards.
(a) Application. (1) This section applies to the following:A process which
involves a chemical at or above the specified threshold quantities listed in
Appendix A to this section;
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i.
15
A process which involves

a flammable liquid or gas (as defined 48 in §1910.1200(c) of this part) on site in one
location,

in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more
except for:
[A]. Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel (e.g., propane
used for comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a
process containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard
[B] Flammable liquids stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below
their normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration.”
ii. A process which involves

A ‘highly hazardous reactive mixture (HHRM)’ (as defined in Appendix (a)(1)(iii) to
this section) on site in one location,

In a ‘sufficient quantity’ as calculated by the method in Appendix (a)(1)(iii).
except for:
[A]. Processes which involve only the receipt, storage and reshipment of a ‘highly
hazardous reactive mixture’ in a covered amount absent any reformulating or
repackaging. Such processes are only required to be in compliance following provisions
of this Standard49: (see previous endnote for provisions OSHA might consider))
[B]. Facilities that demonstrate50 that a ‘catastrophic release’ will not result from their
processing of a HHRM under the reasonable worst-case process conditions51 specified in
Appendix (a)(1)(iii), taking into account passive mitigation measures52, will be exempt
from all provisions of the PSM standard except as specified 53.
(2) This section does not apply to:
(i)
Retail facilities
(ii)
Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations; or
(iii)
Normally unoccupied remote facilities.”
Appendix (a)(1)(iii):
Definition of “Highly Hazardous Reactive Mixture (HHRM)”:
An HHRM is any combination of one or more substances that is intentionally introduced or
produced in a process and can generate more than 100 calories per gram when tested as
specified over a temperature range from 25 o C to either 400oC or 100oC higher than the
maximum projected or observed process temperature.
In lieu of the specified test, data for determination of whether a reactive mixture is a “Highly
Hazardous Reactive Mixture (HHRM)” can be calculated or obtained from the following
sources: (suitable sources and methods of calculation to be determined by OSHA)
Calculation of ‘sufficient quantity’: 54 a ‘sufficient quantity’, is the amount of an HHRM,
calculated by the methods in Appendix (a)(1)(iii), sufficient to propagate a blast wave that
creates an overpressure of 2.3 psi (15.85 kPa) or more to a flat surface perpendicular to the
direction of the blast wave at a distance of 100 meters from the point of origin,”
REFERENCES
1 Paul R. Kleindorfer, James C. Belke, Michael R. Elliott, Kiwan Lee, Robert A. Lowe, and Harold I. Feldman, “Accident
Epidemiology and the U.S. Chemical Industry: Accident History and Worst-Case Data from RMP*Info, Risk Analysis, Vol. 23,
No. 5, 865-881, 2003 .http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/wp/wplist02.html
2 Estimating Chemical Accident Costs in the United States: A new Analytical Approach, Collins, L., D’Angelo, C, Mattheissen,
C., and Perron, M., in Process Industry Accidents, Center for Chemical Process Safety, New York City, pp, 467 – 471, 2000
3 Reactive hazard : The author uses the following definition of Reactive Hazard: A substance or a mixture of substances with
the potential for a chemical transformation that generates energy or substances capable of causing harm to people,
ecosystems or property. The CSB used a closely related definition: Reactive properties and physical conditions of a single
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16
chemical or mixture that have the potential to generate heat, energy, and gaseous byproducts that have the potential to do
harm. (Definition used in CSB Report, ”Improving Reactive Hazard management,http://www.csb.gov )
4 http://www.uneptie.org/pc/apell/disasters/toulouse/home.html
5 Case Study, Concept Sciences, http://www.csb.gov/
6 http://www.harsnet.de
7
Conversion: The process capable of transforming the reactive hazard into toxic substances or energy in an
amount and intensity able to result in undesired outcomes (injuries, deaths, environmental damage) to subjects of
concern (workers, members of the public, ecosystems)
8
Exposure: A sequence of events resulting in interaction between the subjects of concern and substances or
energy in a manner that allows their potential to cause undesired outcomes to materialize in the subject of
concern..
9 For additional information on the history and function of the CSB, see presentation on,” THE ROLE OF THE CHEMICAL
SAFETY BOARD IN PREVENTING CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS , Hazards XVI, 11/06/0i, Manchester, UK Gerald V. Poje, Ph.D.,
and Isadore Rosenthal, Ph.D,
10 Among these incidents were:: Phillips Petroleum in Pasadena, TX, Arco Refinery in Channelview, TX, Marathon Oil in Texas
City, TX, Shell Petroleum in Norco, LA.
11 Clean Air Act, 42 USC 7412
12 Ibid reference 5
13 The CSB Safety Bulletin, “Hazards of Nitrogen Asphyxiation” is another example of CSB dealing broadly with a hazard. This
bulletin dealt with the nature and prevention of practices leading to employee asphyxiation from the use of nitrogen during
inerting operations.
14 http://www.csb.gov/reports/2000/morton/morton_01.htm
15 “Recommendation 2. to OSHA and EPA Participate in a hazard investigation of reactive chemical process safety conducted
by the CSB”, (see report 1998-06-I-NJon the Morton Chemical incident,, p. 60).
16 The Morton incident resulted from an exothermic runaway reaction involving ortho-nitrochlorbenzene, 2 ethyl-hexyl amine,
and automate yellow #96
17 The major U. S.A. regulation covering the impact of poor process safety on employees is the, OSHA Process Safety
Management (PSM) Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) promulgated in 1992.
18 . The NAPP incident involved the water-reactive materials: aluminum powder and sodium hydrosulfite.
19 Six labor unions (Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE); United Steelworkers of America
(USWA); Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers (OCAW); American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO); International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF); and International Chemical Workers Union (ICWU)) petitioned
OSHA for emergency revision of the PSM Standard, stating that it failed to cover reactive chemicals. In a follow-up letter, the
labor unions asked OSHA to consider the following issues in any revision of the standard:

Addition of NFPA category “1” and “2” reactives to the list of highly hazardous chemicals.

Hazard evaluation, including the conditions for use of highly hazardous chemicals.

Adequacy of the NFPA ratings process.

Synchronization of the OSHA PSM and the EPA RMP lists; and expansion of worker/union involvement.
20 Section 112(r) also required EPA to develop regulations to prevent the accidental release of substances. However, EPA
efforts were directed primarily at accidental releases which could have serious effects on the public or the environment. It was
only in 1996, about four years after the PSM was in place, that EPA promulgated its Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management Programs (RMP); 40 CFR 68 in response to this congressional mandate. The RMP standard
was aimed primarily at protecting the public and the environment from the impact of accidental chemical releases. RMP
established new requirements with regard to assessing the potential consequences of accidental releases outside of a facility’s
fence line, public notification, emergency response, and accident reporting. The EPA RMP standard covered some facilities not
covered by PSM, as well as many already covered by PSM and it incorporates requirements for managing process safety that
are essentially the same as those of the OSHA PSM Standard. The RMP ‘covers’ substances by listing them and it generally
covers many of the same processes and substances covered by the PSM except that RMP does not cover reactive hazards as
such and it has different threshold amounts for many of its covered materials.. .
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17
21 This incident resulted from an exothermic runaway reaction involving ortho-nitrochlorbenzene, 2 ethyl-hexyl amine, and
automate yellow #96. See, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2000. Investigation Report, Chemical Manufacturing Incident, Morton
International, Inc., Paterson, New Jersey, April 8, 1998, No. 1998-06-I-NJ.
22 This incident involved the water-reactive materials: aluminum powder and sodium hydrosulfite. See, USEPA, 1997.
EPA/OSHA Joint Chemical Accident Investigation Report, Napp Technologies, Lodi, NJ. EPA 550-R-97-002.
23 A runaway reaction was initiated by the introduction of steam into a reactor containing sludge, aluminum, and aluminum
chloride. See, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2001. Safety Bulletin, Management of Change, No. 2001-04-SB, August 2001.
24 Ammonium nitrate mixed with free nitric acid and became sensitized from a pH drop, titanium piping, and prolonged heating
to about 400 F (from 200 psig steam), resulting in a decomposition reaction which caused an explosion. See, USEPA, 1996.
EPA Chemical Accident Investigation Report Terra Industries, Inc., Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility, Port Neal, Iowa.
25 Terra Industries Inc. self assessment report, July 17 1995, Exhibit 3.
26 In this incident a runaway chemical reaction occurred when a batch reactor was mischarged with butadiene and catalyst
during a reactor cleaning operation.
27 This incident involved concentrated hydroxlamine solution. See, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2002a. Case Study, The
Explosion at Concept Sciences: Hazards of Hydroxylamine, No. 1999-13-C-PA, March 2002.
28 The court reviewing OSHA citation of Concept Sciences under the PSM standard, sided with Concept Sciences position that
OSHA had not established that their process was covered under the PSM standard.
29 An 8,000 gallon reactor exploded due to overpressures generated by a runaway reaction during the production of phenolformaldehyde resin. This incident involved phenol, formaldehyde, catalyst and phenol-formaldehyde resin. See, USEPA, 1999.
How to Prevent Runaway Reactions - Case Study: Phenol-Formaldehyde Reaction Hazards. EPA 550-F99-004.
30 When placed against or close to a hot compressor discharge pipe, bulk sacks of Azinphos methyl (AZM) 50 decomposed
generating flammable vapors that then ignited, causing an explosion. See, USEPA, 1999. EPA/OSHA Joint Chemical Accident
Investigation Report, BPS, Inc., West Helena, AK. EPA 550-R-99-003.
31 One of the major considerations in the OSHA listing of a substance as a “reactive hazard’ was an NFPA instability rating “3”
or “4” in the 1975 version of NFPA 49, Hazardous Chemicals Data. An NFPA instability rating of “4” means that materials in
themselves are readily capable of detonation or explosive decomposition or explosive reaction at normal temperatures and
pressures. A rating of “3” means that materials in themselves are capable of detonation or explosive decomposition or
explosive reaction, but require a strong initiating source or must be heated under confinement before initiation.
32 In February 1996, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council - ACC) and the American
Petroleum Institute (API) submitted a letter to OSHA on issues raised in the draft ANPR. It indicated support of PSM as an
effective standard, but reflected an opinion that expanding PSM in the ways proposed would greatly increase compliance costs
without substantial benefits and that a large amount of the additional cost would fall on small businesses.
33 The fifth objective which focuses on developing recommendations for reducing the number and severity of reactive incidents,
will dealt with in separately since it results from the type of analysis of conclusions that this section addresses.
34 The Report has 14 Conclusions. However two of them, 8 and 12 are identical.
35 NOAA’s The Chemical Reactivity Worksheet, ASTM’s CHETAH, and Bretherick Database of Reactive Chemical Hazards.
36 “Life cycle” refers to all phases of a chemical manufacturing process–from conceptualization, process research and
development (R&D), engineering design, construction, commissioning, commercial operation, and major modification to
decommissioning.”
37 Letter from Merritt to Hensaw Press release, 02/05/04, http//:www.csb.gov
38 http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=10762
39 Part V Environmental Protection Agency 40 CFR Part 68 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Program Requirements Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Amendments to the Submission Schedule and Data
Requirements; Proposed Rule, July 31, 2003
40 http://www.state.nj.us/dep/enforcement/relprev/tcpa/tcparulefinal.pdf
41 In the summer and fall of 2002 the NJDEP proposed the following approach to the NJDEP revision workgroup, an informal
group of individuals chosen by the NJDEP to provide inputs on revisions under development for the Year 2003:
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
18
“’Reactive Hazard Substance’ or RHS means an ‘extraordinarily hazardous substance’ (EHS) that is a substance,
or mixture of substances, which individually or when combined, is capable of undergoing chemical transformations
producing energy and causing an extraordinarily hazardous accident.” RHSs are identified at N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a),
Table I, Part D, Group I.

“’Reactive Hazard Substance Mixtures’ means a chemical substance or combination of EHSs that is intentionally
mixed in a process vessel and is capable of undergoing a chemical reaction producing toxic or flammable EHSs or
energy. The negative value of the heat of reaction of an RHS mixture is greater than or equal to 100 calories per
gram of RHS mixture (when the intended combination is tested under adiabatic conditions in an acceptable
calorimetric test over a temperature range that is 300 C higher than the maximum projected or observed
processing temperature). Reactive Hazard Substance Mixtures include a reactant, product, or byproduct that is a
chemical substance listed in Table I, Part D, Group I or a mixture of substances having one or more functional
groups specified in Table I, Part D, Group II.”
Part D, Group I is a fairly conventional list of highly reactive materials culled from lists such as NFPA 49, 325 and 432 and DOT
lists 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Part D, Group II is a list of some 43 functional groups. This NJ ‘functional group’ approach appears to
have been constructed in order to establish a de facto class of reactive mixtures that will be compatible with the enabling NJ
law’s apparent injunction that the NJDEP regulate only ‘listed’ chemicals. The aspect of these NJ considerations that is more
important and relevant to our discussion is the planned use of H Mixt as a criterion to define coverage (section 7.31-6.3 (b) of
the draft proposal) and to classify any intentionally charged Reactive Mixtures that can produce more than 100 calories per
gram as a Reactive Hazard Substance Mixtures. “
42 http://www.harsnet.de
“Improving Engineering Practices”, 2nd Ed., Trevor Kletz, Hemisphere Publishing Co., 1990, p. 136.
“Recurring Causes of Recent Chemical Accidents”, J. C. Belke, International Conference on Workshop
Reliability and Risk Management, San Antonio TX , 1998, p. 464
43
44
45 "Chemically Challenged", Lewis, J, Vol. 73, No. 3 p. 4, 2004 Occupational Health & Safety, Stevens Publishing.
46 “Improving Coverage of Reactive Hazards Under the OSHA Process Safety management Standard”, Rosenthal, I. and Poje,
G., Proceedings of the AIChE Process Plant Safety Symposium, 2003, New Orleans, pp 1 –26.
47 “Improving Coverage of Reactive Hazards Under the OSHA Process Safety management Standard”, Rosenthal, I. and Poje,
G., Proceedings of the AIChE Process Plant Safety Symposium, 2003, New Orleans, pp 1 –26.
48 The definitions of flammable liquid or gas in §1910.1200(c) is as follows:
"Flammable" means a chemical that falls into one of the following categories:
(i) "Aerosol, flammable" means an aerosol that, when tested by the method described in 16 CFR 1500.45, yields a flame
projection exceeding 18 inches at full valve opening, or a flashback (a flame extending back to the valve) at any degree of
valve opening;
(ii) "Gas, flammable" means:
(A) A gas that, at ambient temperature and pressure, forms a flammable mixture with air at a concentration of thirteen (13)
percent by volume or less; or
(B) A gas that, at ambient temperature and pressure, forms a range of flammable mixtures with air wider than twelve (12)
percent by volume, regardless of the lower limit;
(iii) "Liquid, flammable" means any liquid having a flashpoint below 100 deg. F (37.8 deg. C), except any mixture having
components with flashpoints of 100 deg. F (37.8 deg. C) or higher, the total of which make up 99 percent or more of the
total volume of the mixture.
49 Exemptions might be provided to qualifying storage processes from items such as quality control for raw materials, much of
the information requested about process design and equipment, and some requirements of the PHA, while retaining mandated
consideration of pertinent scenarios such as those involving fire, water damage, accidental admixture with other stored
materials following loss of package containment, etc.. At a minimum, many of present requirements should be framed in a
simplified form allowing for answers such as ‘not applicable’. Emphasis should be placed on provisions for Emergency
Response plans and appropriate training for employees. OSHA needs to develop the details of this material and consider
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19
incorporating guidance from institutions such as NFPA and the National Association of Chemical Distributors (NACD) into the
standard.
50 Facility should be required to use OSHA specified methodologies for this demonstration.
51 OSHA could specify that the reasonable worst-case conditions or scenarios that must be considered are combinations of
the following events: miss-charging of intended ingredients, heating on, cooling off, stirring off, power off, contamination by
equipment cleaning agents, substances processed immediately before or after the intended ingredients under consideration or
by any substance contained in lines connected to the process unit.
52 Facilities can take into account specified passive mitigation measures such as hardened control rooms, explosion barriers,
DIERS-type venting, etc.
53
One might want to require that ‘exempt’ facilities be subject to management of change requirements, repeat the
demonstration that a ‘catastrophic’ release will not result under the specified reasonable worst-case process conditions at
specified intervals, retain process records that indicate near misses, furnish annual reports on any injuries or property losses
resulting from process releases, even if they do not meet the ‘level of ‘catastrophic’ as defined by OSHA, etc.
54
See discussion in referenced paper on the adequacy of using 100 meters as the distance at which the specified
overpressure is to be calculated.
19