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Phil 313—Emotion and Reason
Summer 2010—Syllabus
Instructor: Sanem Soyarslan
E-mail: ss142@duke.edu
Time: 13:40-16:30 M, 12:40-15:30 W
Office hours: By appointment
Prerequisites: None.
Course Description:
Consider the range of emotions that one experiences in a lifetime, from the joy of being
with your loved ones to the fear of losing them, from the thrill of success to the sadness
of defeat. Pleasant or aversive, emotions play a central role in our lives, and are an
integral part of what makes life worth living. Despite their obvious importance, emotions
have been considered by many philosophers to be inferior to another distinctive faculty in
human beings, namely reason. The idea that emotions are primitive, irrational and
dangerous and thus to be controlled and constrained by reason has been embraced by
eminent thinkers from Plato and the Stoics to Kant. In this course, we will focus on the
relationship between reason and emotion in moral cognition and cognition more
generally, and we will investigate how/to what extent reason can be said to be distinct
from and superior to emotion. Are emotions really irrational or non-rational feelings that
should not be allowed to intrude into the mechanisms of reason? How does the nature of
the distinction and/or relationship between reason and emotion bear on moral theory?
What is the primary basis of our moral judgments: reason, emotions, or both? We will
explore these questions as they are asked and answered by philosophers such as Plato,
Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Descartes and Spinoza, and more contemporary authors such as
Martha Nussbaum and Jesse Prinz. In addition, we will look at recent work in psychology
and cognitive neuroscience on the impact of emotion on reason, including that of
Jonathan Haidt and Antonio Damasio.
Grading Policy:
Two short take-home midterm exams. (25% each, 50% in total)
One in-class final exam. (35%)
Class participation. (15%)
Required Readings [All In The Course Pack]:
 Plato, Republic in Complete Works, (ed.) J. Cooper, Hackett, 1997, Book IV, pp.
1052-1077.
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric in Aristotle: Selections, translated by
Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, Hackett, 1995, pp.363-391, pp.398-417, and pp.
334-335.
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Stoics, Selections from A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 1987, The Hellenistic
Philosophers Vol.I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
David Hume, “Morality and Natural Sentiment,” in George Sher (ed.) Moral
Philosophy: Selected Readings, pp.90-110.
Immanuel Kant, “Morality and Rationality,” in George Sher (ed.) Moral
Philosophy: Selected Readings, pp.385-405.
René Descartes, selections from The Passions of the Soul, translated by Stephen H.
Voss (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989).
Baruch Spinoza, selections from Ethics in The Ethics and Other Works (ed.)
Edwin Curley, Princeton University Press.
Antonio Damasio (1994) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, Parts I and II, pp. 3-201 and pp.445-452.
Jesse Prinz (2004), Gut Reactions: a Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, Chapters I-III, pp. 3-78.
Martha Nussbaum (2001) Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter I, pp. 19-88.
J.D. Greene. and J.Haidt (2002) “How (and where) does moral judgment
work?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), pp. 517-523.
J.D. Greene (2003) “From neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral
implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience,
Vol. 4, pp. 847-850.
Jonathan Haidt (2001). “The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social
intuitionist approach to moral judgment,” Psychological Review, 108, pp. 814-834.
Recommended Readings:
 William James (1884) "What is an Emotion?" Mind, 9: 188-205.
 Bernard Williams (1973) "Morality and the Emotions." In Problems of the Self:
Philosophical Papers 1956-1972, 207-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
 Amélie Rorty (ed.) (1980) Explaining Emotions, Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
 Ronald de Sousa (1987) The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 William Lyons (1999) “The Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion,” in Handbook
of Cognition and Emotion, (eds.) Dalgleish T. and Power M., West Sussex: Wiley,
21-24.
Schedule of Readings:
WEEK I
5 July Introduction: What is this course about?
7 July Emotion and Reason in Ancient Philosophy I: Plato, Republic, Book IV, pp.
1052-1077.
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WEEK II
12 July Emotion and Reason in Ancient Philosophy II: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
selections from Books I, II, III, IV, VI, and Rhetoric selections from Book II, pp.363-391,
pp.398-417, and pp. 334-335.
July 14 Emotion and Reason in Ancient Philosophy IIII: Stoics, selections from A.
Long and D. N. Sedley, 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers.
WEEK III
July 19 Emotion and Reason in Modern Philosophy I: Hume, “Morality and Natural
Sentiment,” pp.90-110.
July 21 Emotion and Reason in Modern Philosophy II: Kant, “Morality and
Rationality,” pp.385-405.
WEEK IV
26 July Emotion and Reason in Modern Philosophy III: Descartes and Spinoza,
selections from The Passions of the Soul and Ethics.
28 July Emotion and Reason in Cognitive Neuroscience I: William James (1884)
"What is an Emotion?" Mind, 9: 188-205. (background material)
Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Part I, pp.
3-79.
WEEK V
2 August Emotion and Reason in Cognitive Neuroscience II: Antonio Damasio,
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Part II, pp. 83-201, and
pp.445-452.
4 August Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment I: Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: a
Perceptual Theory of Emotion, Chapters I-III, pp.3-78.
WEEK VI
9 August Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment II: Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Chapter I “Emotions as Judgments of Value,”
pp. 19-88.
11 August Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment III: J.D. Greene. and J.Haidt,
“How (and where) does moral judgment work?” pp. 517-523.
J.D. Greene “From neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral implications of
neuroscientific moral psychology?” 847-850.
WEEK VII
16 August Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment IV: Jonathan Haidt, “The
emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment,” pp.
814-834.
18 August In-class Final Exam