Environmental networks contra agricultural
networks –
A comparative analysis of the political decisionmaking processes regarding land reclamation and
restoration of wetlands
Anders Branth Pedersen
National Environmental Research Institute
Department of Policy Analysis
Grenaavej 12
DK-8410 Roende
Denmark
Tel: +45 89 20 17 08
E-mail: apd@dmu.dk
www.dmu.dk
Paper for the XIth World Congress of Rural Sociology, July 25-30 2004, Trondheim,
Norway, Globalisation, Risks, and Resistance. Working Group 29: Changing
frameworks of agricultural and rural policy.
1
Abstract
Over two centuries (1750-1970) a huge number of land reclamation projects were implemented in
Denmark. Often supported by state grants, rivers were straigthened and lakes and fjords drained, with
the aim of gaining fertile agricultural soil. But, from the mid-1980’s and forward, Denmark experienced
a U-turn. In these two decades the state financed several restoration projects as part of Danish
environmental and nature policies. Using the British policy network theory as a theoretical framework,
an empirical comparative analysis of the decision to regulate the Skjern River in the 1960’s and the
decision to restore the river in the 1990’s – northern Europe’s largest nature restoration project – reveals
that the networks involved (the institutional framework) have undergone major changes. The once
strong policy community consisting of land reclamation interests has disintegrated into a much weaker
type of network, whereas the once weak issue network of environmental interests has integrated into a
stronger type of network. These network changes are making new rural policy regarding land-use in the
wider countryside possible. The network changes can be explained by major changes in the contextual
variables: Socioeconomic context, ideological context, scientific context, institutional context, public
opinion and presence of other networks. Finally, by comparing the Skjern River decisions with the
decision to drain Lake Soeborg and the subsequent scrapping of plans to restore the lake, it is evident
that at the micro-level the timing of the policy entrepreneurs is important.
1. Introduction
Denmark ranks among the world’s most cultivated countries. Today, 63 pct. of
Denmark is registered as cultivated and only 9 pct. as nature1 (Hansen 2003: 36, 313).
The comprehensive cultivation is partly due to numerous land reclamation projects
implemented in the period 1750-1970. Rivers were straigthened out, and lakes and
fjords drained, with the aim of claming fertile farmland. In the name of progress,
many natural or semi-natural areas were transformed into waving fields of corn. In the
beginning of the 1970’s, however, the Danish land reclamation policy entered a
standstill-phase. No new projects were being implemented; on the other hand, no
farmland was being ‘returned’ to nature. This phase lasts until the mid-1980’s where a
complete policy turnaround is evident. The state here started to finance nature
restoration projects, giving reclaimed land back to nature, thereby changing the policy
framework. What has led to Denmark experiencing this U-turn in the rural policy
regarding land-use in the wider countryside?
By focusing on the decisions in the middle of the 20th century to regulate the
Skjern River and Lake Soeborg, the 1987 decision to restore Skjern River, and the
decisions in the 1990’s not to restore Lake Soeborg, it is possible to analyse the
development of Danish reclamation and restoration policy. A characteristic of the
policy process is that interest groups have exercised a striking influence on the
decisions, making it relevant to analyse the policy process within a policy network
framework.
2. Policy network analysis
In explaining the historical radical policy change, the British policy network approach
is useful since the concept is essentially a comparative concept. The approach
addresses the policy consequences of different organisational arrangements and
argues that different sectoral policy network types can be linked with differences in
sectoral policies. Policy networks influence policy choices (Marsh & Rhodes 1992;
Daugbjerg 1998).
The metaphor of a network seeks to direct focus onto the pattern of formal and
informal contacts between government and interest groups, where the involved actors
(politicians, public servants, ministries, municipalities, interest organisations, etc.)
exert influence on the policy agenda and decision making processes (Parsons 1995:
185). Following Bensons (1982) oft-cited definition, a policy network is:
2
.....a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and
distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies.
(Benson 1982:148)
Later, Rhodes (1988) argued, that network types can be differentiated according to
degree of integration. Rhodes & Marsh (1992) demonstrated this idea by setting up a
continuum based on the degree of integration exhibited by the individual network.
Daugbjerg (1998) has described the continuum in a table depicting three dimensions
(table 1).
TABLE 1 HERE
At one end of the continuum the loose issue networks are situated. Access to this type
of network is relatively open, the degree of integration and institutionalisation is low,
power is unevenly distributed and the members are often in conflict over policy
principles. Therefore, this type of sectoral policy network is basically unstable,
making the policy output quite unpredictable. At the other end of the continuum, the
tight policy community is situated. The policy community concept describes a strong,
tight, closed, highly integrated and highly institutionalised network. All actors in this
policy community are in possession of resources, though are still dependent on the
cooperation and resources of the other actors in the network. There is widespread
consensus on policy principles and procedures with which to approach policy
problems. Furthermore, opposing interests/actors are excluded from participation.
This type of sectoral policy network makes policy stability more likely.
By virtue of the nature of the policy community, it is easier for the actors to
influence the policy in question, as a powerful coalition can be formed, thereby
exercising influence on the decisions in a way as to make them privilege those
interests aligned with their own. This is normally not an option for members of an
issue network because the actors, here, fundamentally disagree on policy principles
(Blom Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999:15-16).
Why do networks change? The policy network approach is generally
recognised for its descriptive qualities in periods with policy stability (Marsh
1998:185), but the approach’s ability to explain the dynamic elements of network’s
origin, change, and outcome has been questioned (e.g. Blom-Hansen 1997; Dowding
2001; Peters 1998:26). Marsh & Rhodes were aware of the problem (1992:260-61)
and recommended coupling the policy network concept with micro and macro theory
(Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998:67).
Marsh & Rhodes (1992:257-59), themselves, identified four (very) broad
categories of network environment changes (exogenous changes): Socioeconomic
changes, changes in ideology of the government, knowledge changes, change in
institutions (e.g. EC institutions). Marsh (1998:187-88) later acknowledged that
‘presence of other networks’ and ‘public opinion’ constitute additional important
aspects in the exogenous context. These six exogenous factors can be used in a
dynamic analysis of network changes.
At the macro-level, changes in the network’s exogenous context can result in
network changes by altering the actor’s perception of reality such that it diverges
markedly from the appreciative system of the network (Smith 2000:98), or by
elevating some resources and rendering others obsolete (ibid). Changes in the context
3
have to be transformed to policy changes by the actors. Actors in a privileged network
will fight to prevent any policy changes, while disprivileged actors will use
endogenous transformation mechanisms to strengthen the network and win political
and institutional control.
Grant Jordan (1998) has demonstrated, that Baumgartner & Jones’ (1993)
punctuated equilibrium model of policy change can be linked with the policy network
approach. Interaction between policy image and policy venue can result in policy
change. Policy image can be described as ‘how a policy is understood and discussed’
(ibid: 26). Policy venues are ‘institutions or groups in society [that] have the authority
to make decisions concerning the issue’ (ibid:31). Privileged interests will therefore
try to keep the existing policy image and policy venue, while disprivileged interests,
as an endogenous transformation mechanism, will try attempt to shift them and make
them interact to produce a policy change.
At the micro-level it will, in the following, be assumed that there is bounded
conflict over political and institutional control (Nørgaard 1997:24). The political
actors’ behaviour is goal-oriented, though not motivated only by narrow self-interest,
but by an ambition for political control. This political control can be used to further a
number of other political goals - ideology, prestige, fortune, etc. The political control
is bounded, because in most societies there are limits to what policy-makers can ‘get
away with’. The process will be characterised by conflict, because there will always
be competing interests and ideas (ibid).
The analysis which follows will test whether the changes in Danish rural
policy regarding land-use in the wider countryside can be explained by disprivileged
actors successfully taking advantage of radical changes in the exogenous context, by
connecting a new policy image to a new policy venue.
Danish rural policy regarding rivers, fjords and lakes in the wider countryside
can be separated into three distinct periods through which the policy has undergone
radical change. Two networks from different sectors interact: In the agricultural
sector, a land reclamation network, originally constituting a policy community, can be
observed and in the environmental sector a nature network, who originally constituted
an issue network. Through a complex interplay between changing exogenous factors
and internal actor dynamics, the networks change over the years; the land reclamation
network disintegrates and the nature network integrates, resulting in a radically
different policy output.
3. Land reclamation phase
The agricultural country, Denmark, has a long tradition of straigthening rivers,
and draining lakes and fjords, for the purpose of increasing available farmland. In
particular, after the Danish defeat in the second Schleswig War (1864), where
Southern Jutland was lost to Prussia and Austria, land reclamation was systematised
as a way of winning back lost territory. The establishment of Hedeselskabet (the
Danish Heath Society) by a group of influential men in 1866 created an ‘entrepreneur’
committed to land reclamation on heathland areas. Later, when the engineers of
Hedeselskabet had cultivated most of the heaths, the company moved on to new tasks
in dewatering meadowland, draining lakes, straigthening rivers, etc. (Geckler 1982).
The economic crisis of the 1930’s led to the Council of Unemployment
requesting Hedeselskabet for measures to promote employment, to which
Hedeselskabet responded by suggesting projects to improve waterlogged farmland
4
areas (Geckler 1982:99). In a 1933 political horse-trade, the Liberal Party (Venstre),
originally formed to represent farmers’ and rural interests, secured farmers (and
Hedeselskabet) a new act on state subsidies to land improvement operations in return
for not voting against the Social Democratic led governments social reform (Hansen
2003:23). According to the new act, farmers were entitled to a 50-pct. grant when e.g.
dewatering meadows2, thereby causing draining activities to accelerate.
In 1940, following the German occupation of Denmark, the Council of
Unemployment once again asked Hedeselskabet for measures to promote
employment. This time, the result was an act on the reclamation of land (Lov om
Landvinding af 1940). According to the act, landowners were entitled to a state grant
of two thirds of the costs of establishment, when implementing new land reclamation
projects. The purpose of the act was to promote the production of grain and feed, and
to promote employment. The two acts started a ‘golden period’ 1940-70 for the ‘land
reclamation network’. The network members were:
Hedeselskabet. The entrepreneur implementing the majority of the land
reclamation projects. The company was a private foundation, financed by the state,
with an idealistic and (formally) non-profit purpose of improving heathlands for
agriculture, and a factor of power, e.g. due to its very close connections to the
political system3 (Geckler 1982:128, 145). The board (of thirteen) consisted of three
members appointed by the Minister of Agriculture (the head of department was
normally among the appointed), two members appointed by agricultural organisations
and two members appointed by the employees of the company. The board selected the
remaining members itself – over the years several members of the Danish parliament
have been represented among the board members (Pedersen 2004:75). Furthermore,
Hedeselskabet has been represented in a row of other organisations, e.g. in the Society
for the Conservation of Nature, where the manager of Hedeselskabet was a member
of the central board for several years.
The landowner representatives. The majority of the landowners were usually
in favour of the projects, most of the costs being covered by the state, the farmers
reaping the advantages.
The agricultural organisations. They were in favour of the projects and had
two representatives on the board of Hedeselskabet. Furthermore, local agricultural
organisations were often involved in the preparatory phase of reclamation projects.
The Ministry of Agriculture. There is, in general, a strong tendency for the
development of a close relationship between a bureaucracy and its client interests (e.g.
Jordan 1998:603). The ministry had three representatives on the board of
Hedeselskabet.
The Land Reclamation Board. The act on land reclamation institutionalised
the land reclamation process even further by establishing the Land Reclamation
Board (Statens Landvindingsudvalg), the purpose of which was to recommend
projects to the Ministry of Agriculture upon request from the landowners. The
frequent meetings in the committee represented the pivotal point for the very powerful
policy community. The committee’s members were: The head of department of the
Ministry of Agriculture, one representative from Hedeselskabet, one from the union
of engineers, two farmers and one representative from each of the ministries of public
works, finance, and labour (from 1953 a representative from the Ministry of Fishery
was added4). No actors representing environmental interests were members of the
committee. At the same time, a number of the representatives met in the Central Land
Board (Statens Jordlovsudvalg), this board also engaging in land reclamation (Hansen
2003:47-48).
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The land reclamation network was a classic example of a strong policy
community. Members were few and strong. They had a common view on rational
farming and a common purpose (the benefit of farmers). There was very frequent
interaction among the members, through many meetings in different fora. E.g. the
head of department of the Ministry of Agriculture held a seat in the ministry,
Hedeselskabet and the Land Reclamation Board. Furthermore, the network was
exclusive, critical actors normally being excluded from meetings (Pedersen 2004),
illustrated by the fact that fishing interests were not represented in the board until
1953.
The nature network, in contrast, was very loosely integrated. Nature interests
had, following a trend in Europe and US, been organised in the Danish Society for the
Conservation of Nature since 1911 (Madsen 1978:22-25). The organisation was
allowed to offer statements on land reclamation projects, but in practice had very
limited power (Pedersen 2004).
The Council on Nature Conservation was established when the act on nature
conservancy was implemented in 1917. The five members of the council were natural
scientists and were consulted in business relating to nature conservancy projects of
scientific interest (Madsen 1978:41-43). However, the chairman of the council in the
period 1925-44 came from a leading position in Hedeselskabet (Madsen 1978:80-81).
For many years the scientists in the council often publicly disagreed with the Society
for the Conservation of Nature (Madsen 1978).
In addition, the Danish Ornithological Organisation, professional fishermen’s
organisations, angling organisations, the Danish Outdoor Council and the Ministry of
Fishery, all had some interest in putting an end to the land reclamation projects,
however, they were not in possession of any significant resources (although the
Ministry of Fishery did have a seat in the Land Reclamation Board from 1953).
Moreover, they had a very unstable pattern of contact (if any) and they were not in
agreement as regards the ultimate purpose of fighting land reclamation projects; some
wanted recreational areas with beautiful sceneries, some wanted more fish, etc. Also,
it was not until 1971 that a Ministry of the Environment was established. The nature
network was an issue network.
The decisions to straighten Skjern River and to drain Lake Soeborg illustrate
the fight between the two networks, and the superiority of the land reclamation
network.
3.1 The decision to straighten Skjern River
Skjern River is situated in Western Jutland and constitutes Denmark’s largest
watercourse by volume. The idea of straigthening the river and draining the river
valley to improve conditions for cornfields over those for the cutting of hay, can be
traced back to an engineer of Hedeselskabet in 1880. It was not until the act on land
reclamation was passed in 1940, however, that the idea really gained ground. Local
agricultural organisations appointed a committee to win Skjern River landowners for
the project. Initially, there were some problems convincing landowners, but after
Hedeselskabet was asked to develop a project in the 1950’s, in 1955, landowners were
called to a meeting. Hedeselskabet presented the project and out of 834 landowners,
360 voted for a Skjern River project and 111 against (315 did not show up at the
meeting), resulting in the project being agreed upon (Pedersen 2004). For the next six
years, a concrete project plan was developed in cooperation between Hedeselskabet,
the (local) Landowner’s Committee, and the Land Reclamation Board. In practice, the
6
project came to be considered and recommended by the Land Reclamation Board’s
sub-committee for Jutland. In the deciding phase in 1958, the sub-committee
consisted of three members, who all of whom having a connection with
Hedeselskabet (ibid): 1) The manager of Hedeselskabet. 2) A member of the Danish
Parliament (Liberal Party), a farmer himself, representing the farmers in the
committee and, furthermore, a former member of the board of representatives in
Hedeselskabet. 3) A former employee of Hedeselskabet. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the committee recommended the project proposal from Hedeselskabet
with no objections.
The proposal of straigthening a meandering river, transforming 4000 hectares
of meadows and marsh into arable farmland, was controversial. But when the Society
for the Conservation of Nature in 1955 was asked for a statement, the answer given
was ambivalent. The organisation’s experts responded that from a freshwater
biological viewpoint there were no sufficiently strong arguments for opposing the
project, although the project’s predicted negative impacts on the bird-life were
regretted. From internal communications in the organisation it is evident that e.g. the
executive committee regretted the resultant loss of scenic beauty, but that in view of
the expected economic benefits for the country in a period of recession and high
unemployment, the organisation found it difficult project (Pedersen 2004; Archivefiles of the Society for the Conservation of Nature).
The professional fishermen’s local organisation feared that a project would
cause ochre pollution in the local fjord connected to the river and complained in 1958
to the Minister of Agriculture, a member of the Liberal Party (traditionally the
farmers’ party) and a farmer himself. The ministerial response was that the Land
Reclamation Board had assessed, that the velocity of the river would solve the
problem. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Fishery had a representative in the
board. He pointed out at several meetings that the project had the potential to threaten
fish stocks (e.g. due to ochre pollution), and that more investigations were required.
Finally, a group of 53 landowners protested against the project, fearing the personal
economic consequences (Pedersen 2004).
Towards the end of the 1950’s the Danish economy recovered and the
employment situation improved rapidly. Consequentially, the opposition against the
Skjern River project increased in the public arena. However, after the accept in 1958
from the Land Reclamation Board, the Minister of Agriculture, in 1960, won a
blueprint of the project through with a 17-1 vote in the parliament’s Finance
Committee (Pedersen 2004). The Ministry of Labour placed the expensive project on
hold, but the chairman of the Landowner’s Committee managed to make a local MP
(Liberal Party) persuade the Minister of Labour (Labour Party) to release the money
for the project (Archive-files of Hedeselskabet).
More and more scientists, national newspapers, TV journalists, nature
organisations, fishing organisations, and some MP’s questioned the project in the start
of the 1960’s, claiming that the project would spoil the fishery and the beautiful
scenery (Pedersen 2004). The Society for the Conservation of Nature, a new and more
active president being appointed in 1960, demanded the project be reconsidered,
while, at the time, the motivation to promote employment had retreated. The move did
not meet with success. The Minister of Agriculture referred to the fact that normal
parliamentary procedures had been followed. In March 1962 the excavators started
digging in the steep banks of Skjern River. Meanwhile, the manager of Hedeselskabet
was the initiator behind an initiative forcing the new proactive president of the
Society for the Conservation of Nature to retire. A new president with more of a softly
7
approach, remained in charge of the organisation for the next two decades (Geckler
1982:16; Svold 1989:47). In 1965, Denmark’s largest land reclamation project was
inaugurated. The price was about 33 million euro (today’s prices) (Pedersen 2004).
3.2 The decision to drain Lake Soeborg
The power of the land reclamation network also becomes visible when viewing the
decision to drain Lake Soeborg. Lake Soeborg was a 1200 hectare lake situated in the
northern part of Sealand and was the first Danish large aquatic area at which attempts
to drain were made, in the late 18th century (Petersen & Meyhoff 1986:21). The first
drainage attempt was ineffective and when Count Frijs acquired ‘the lake’ a century
later in 1872, 400 hectares were still covered by water, therefore Frijs improved the
drains (ibid:62). However, drainage was still not optimal and around 1940 the soil
was severely waterlogged. At this point, the Act on Land Reclamation (1940) was
heaven-sent, it offering the possibility of state grants for land reclamation. The act
gave rise to a number of the local landowners asking Hedeselskabet for practical
advice, and, as a result, a comprehensive project was presented at a meeting in 1942
(Archive-files of the Land Reclamation Board).
At the meeting, the Land Reclamation Board’s sub-committee for the islands,
around 150 landowners, Hedeselskabet, the municipality and a couple of other
individuals were present. Many of the landowners spoke out against a new drainage
effort, as they feared the personal economic consequences, despite the potential of
two thirds of the costs to be paid by the state. Two representatives of the Land
Reclamation Board went to the platform. The first, the chairman of the board,
explained that the board was willing to listen to the landowner’s concerns, but added
that the board could go ahead and adopt the drainage proposals even if the majority of
the landowners were against them. This could be the case, as long as the benefits of
the project were at least one third of the costs. The other member of the board, a
former smallholder himself, and at this time an MP for ‘the smallholder’s party’, the
Radical Liberal Party, entreated the landowners to accept the proposal and mentioned
that the current state of affairs in Denmark dictated this action, adding that if he,
himself, had been a landowner, he would have done it for the common good of the
country. After this ‘motive speech’ a vote was performed. Forty landowners voted for
the proposed project, twenty voted against, and there were a large number of blank
votes (Archive-files of the Land Reclamation Board).
A year later Hedeselskabet presented a proposal for the project, which was
much more comprehensive than expected. Some of the landowners complained, their
expected just a bit of digging in the ditches, but instead Hedeselskabet had designed a
huge project with expensive pumping stations. In defiance of the protests, the project
was accepted in 1944 by the Ministry of Agriculture at a price of around 2 million
euro (todays prices) and the last remaining area of lake was drained (Archive-files of
the Land Reclamation Board).
The nature network was almost not present in the decision to drain Lake
Soeborg. When the two first decisions to drain the lake in the 18th and 19th centuries
were decided upon, no environmental interests were organised – no nature network
existed. When the last section of lake was drained in the 1940’s, it appears that actors
from the nature network did not oppose this project either. Here, it can be argued that
the lake was already damaged before environmental interests were organised,
therefore, it was not worth investing resources in securing the remaining section. The
strong agricultural policy community succeeded in advancing the proposal without
competition from other networks.
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In general, the land reclamation network’s policy community had an easy time
advancing land reclamation projects until the end of the 1960’s. In the period 1940-64
alone, land reclamation projects gave 180000 hectares of new farmland to the farmers
(Landbokommissionen 1966:23). Environmental interests began to organise in the
20th century, but were part of a much looser and weaker issue network. The situation,
however, started to change around 1970.
4. Standstill phase (1970-1986)
The straigthening of Skjern River became the last land reclamation project of
significant size. From 1966 the comprehensive state grants diminished rapidly. This
process was started when two commissions were appointed.
From the end of the 1950’s Danish farmers experienced problems in sale of
their produce due to domestic overproduction, and protectionism on the international
market. Therefore, a Land Commission was appointed in 1960 to analyse the
agricultural industry’s structural problems (Porsmose & Bjørn 1997:105-106). One
working group consisting of MPs, representatives from agricultural organisations, and
public servants analysed the economic aspects (Landbokommissionen 1962a: 5-7). In
July 1962, the commission appointed a special committee to investigate and evaluate
drainage activities. Hedeselskabet and the Ministry of Agriculture were represented
(three of the representatives sat on the Land Reclamation Board at the same time), but
also the Ministry of Fishery and the Council on Nature Conservation
(Landbokommissionen 1964:8). The representative from the Council on Nature
Conservation was also a member of the board of the Danish Outdoor Council, this
council having adopted a very critical stance in relation to the Skjern River project
(Pedersen 2004:77). In 1964, the committee recommended a continuation of state
grants for land improvements (Landbokommissionen 1964: 19). A majority of the
committee further concluded that there was no longer an employment related motive
for awarding grants for land reclamation, that state grants should still be granted, but
that the funding should be reduced to 25 pct. of the costs with a possibility of 50 pct.
funding for larger projects and even higher funding if there was an employment
motivation. A committee minority, on the other hand, recommended a halt to the state
grants (Landbokommissionen 1966:5-6). Furthermore, the representative from the
Ministry of Fishery asked for a formal protection of fishery interests, but was denied
by the majority who referred to the agricultural interests being superior to fishery
interests (ibid:115). The representative from the Council on Nature Conservation
proposed, moreover, that the council be represented in the Land Reclamation Board,
however a committee majority refused the proposal (ibid:114).
Along with the Land Commission, a Nature Conservation Commission was
appointed in the autumn of 1961 when a new Ministry of Culture got the task of
reforming the Act on Nature Conservation (Madsen 1978:141-142). This commission
contained representatives from a range of different government ministries, agricultural
interests and environmental interests. Environmental interests outnumbered
agricultural interests in the commission this being evident in the working group for
fresh water (Naturfredningskommissionen 1967:11). The commission described the
scenic beauties and amenities of the sea and the fresh waters, and was in general
negative towards land reclamation projects.
The work carried out by the Land Commission resulted, in 1966, in passage
through parliament of a new act on land reclamation and a new act on land
improvements. This brought land reclamation projects in coastal areas to a stop. With
9
regard to state grants, the recommendation of the Land Commission was followed,
resulting in a comprehensive lowering of grants for (fresh water) land reclamation.
Furthermore, it was decided to revise the act after 5 years (Folketingstidende 1965/66
Tillæg A: sp.2209; Folketingstidende 1965/66 Folketingets Forhandlinger sp.624554).
When the two acts were revised in 1970, they became one (an act on land
improvement and stream regulation) appearing that the parliamentarians having been
inspired by both of the commissions. The purpose of the act was two-sided: It aimed
both to ensure necessary drainage of existing farmland, and to safeguard recreational
areas to meet the public’s growing demand in this area. According to the act, it was
not longer possible to favour projects, which had employment generation
considerations, the state grant being fixed at a maximum of 25 pct. There were to be
no grants for the regulation of lakes, and the grants were to be directed only at areas,
which had already been agriculturally exploited. The act was passed by a significant
majority in the parliament and formally brought the land reclamation era to a halt. A
new era was started. An era (1970-86) characterised by a relatively low degree of
switching status of land.
5. Restoration of wetlands phase
Soon after the comprehensive Skjern River project was implemented towards the end
of the 1960’s, severe ochre pollution problems appeared at the mouth of the river as
anticipated by fisher organisations and the Ministry of Fishery (Geckler 1982). In
1974, a chartered surveyor proposed restoring the meanders in the river, but both the
proposal and the problems were shelved in an ‘ochre committee’ during the 1970’s
(Pedersen 2004:78). However, through the 1970’s acts on protection of rivers, lakes,
and wetlands were implemented, and Denmark signed the Ramsar Convention
(Knuth-Winterfeldt 1990:10-11, 14).
Denmark had become a member of the EC in 1973. During the early 1980’s
the EC experienced serious problems concerning the common agricultural policy,
when huge surplus stocks were building up and marginal farmland was required to be
taken out of production (Pedersen 2004:81). In June 1985, a committee in the Danish
Ministry of the Environment presented a discussion paper analysing how this negative
trend in the agricultural sector could be transformed into an environmental success by
e.g. recreating lakes and establishing wetlands on marginal farmlands
(Fredningsstyrelsen 1985:29). Since then, a number of restorations of drained lakes
and wetlands have been implemented. The decision to restore the Skjern River,
Northern Europe’s largest river restoration project, was the first milestone.
5.1 The Skjern River Restoration
In September 1985, three months after the Ministry of the Environment’s presentation
of a discussion paper, the Society for the Conservation of Nature invited the
parliamentary Radical Liberal Party on an excursion into the Danish countryside.
Inspired by prime minister Poul Schlüter’s simultaneous launch of a plan of
‘economic restoration’ of Danish society, the organisation launched a new word in the
Danish vocabulary, ‘nature restoration’. After the excursion, the leader of the party
asked the organisation to develop a motion for a proposal, and a process was started
(Refn 2001:7).
Meanwhile, Ringkoebing Fjord, severely polluted by ochre, nitrogen, and
phosphorus from the Skjern River, was protected by the Ministry of the Environment
in June 1985, and a Ringkoebing Fjord Committee was appointed to monitor the
10
consequences (Pedersen 2004). On 15 September 1986, the committee convened a
seminar on the pollution of the fjord. The Minister of the Environment (Christian
People’s Party) was giving a speech and was surprisingly explicit, when stating: ‘The
bottom is dead, the fishery and the birds are in a wretched state, the water is dirty and
muddy’ (Ringkjøbing Amts Dagblad 16.09.86). A couple of days later a marginal land
conference, inspired by the discussion paper from the ministry, was convened in
Skjern and a biologist from the ministry told how a restoration of the Skjern River’s
meanders could save the fjord by improving the stream’s oxidation, and by creating
‘wet meadows’, which could reduce the pollution. The mayor (Conservative Party) of
the Municipality of Skjern was attending both the seminar and the conference, and it
would seem that he combined the information from the two events when stating on
national television in November 1986, to the indignation of most farmers, ‘that the
regulation of the Skjern River was a crime against the nature in the river valley’, and
that the meandering course of the river should potentially be restored (Pedersen
2004:79). The mayor (Liberal Party) of the other involved municipality, the
Municipality of Egvad, supported a restoration as well (Ringkjøbing Amts Dagblad
31.12.86). In January 1987, the Social Democratic Party, which was part of what was
termed the “alternative green majority” in the parliament opposing the LiberalConservative minority government, proposed restoration of the meanders in the river,
with the purpose of reducing pollution and improve the amenity. The proposal was
passed with a sizeable majority in parliament in May 1987, and a committee was
appointed to draw up a project. In 1999, the excavators were back in the Skjern River
Valley. However, this time they were not straigthening the river, but instead restoring
its meanders. The farmland was acquired by the state by purchase from or exchange
with the farmers5. A few farmers were expropriated. When the project was finished,
an area corresponding to 4000 football fields was restored. Ironically, cost was the
same as that for straigthening the river in the first place: 33 million euro (Pedersen
2004). But, what had happened to the strong land reclamation network?
The local farmers/landowners were fiercely opposed to handling over
farmland to a restoration project, e.g. claiming either that the project would ruin them,
that the project was an insult towards the hard work carried out by their ancestors in
straigthening the river, or that the project was developed by Copenhageners who
knew nothing about conditions in Western Jutland. Furthermore, they were very
reluctant to take seat in a local committee set up to investigate the pollution problem,
while the unpopular (among farmers) mayor was a member. The farmer’s local
organisation attempted to activate the former strong policy community by asking for
the help of the national agricultural organisation, but did not succeed (Pedersen 2004).
In the working group behind preparation of a particular Skjern River Project, the local
farmers possessed two seats and fought against a comprehensive project. However,
they constituted a minority in the group, which was dominated by pro-restoration
interests. Furthermore, the farmers overestimated their own strength, it not being until
very late in the decision-making process that they organised themselves into a new
landowners committee as previously (ibid).6
The main problem for the land reclamation network was that it was severely
weakened compared with the 1960’s. The restoration decision was prepared, taken,
and implemented in a new policy venue: The Ministry of the Environment. The
former ally, the Ministry of Agriculture, was not involved. The national agricultural
organisations were not particularly helpful either: They were aware, that there was a
problem regarding pollution with nutritive salts; they were aware, that Denmark, as a
member of EC, needed to take marginal farm land out of production, and the farm
11
land of Skjern River Valley was marginal7; environmental problems were high on the
political agenda; and meanwhile they were fighting against the so called Plan for the
Aquatic Environment. Therefore, it appears that the national agricultural organisations
were not willing to invest resources in supporting the local agricultural organisations,
but keeping, rather, a low profile in the matter (Pedersen 2004:80-81). Furthermore,
the powerful Land Reclamation Board was abolished in 1983 (ibid), and
Hedeselskabet was deprived of its state grants (Hansen 2003:50) leading the engineers
in the company to turn their attention to restoration projects instead of land
reclamation projects as source of income (Pedersen 2004:81). Finally, towards the end
of the 1980’s a greater number of politicians supported environmental considerations.
On the other hand, the nature network had strengthened over the years. The
Ministry of the Environment has definitely brought new venues into play.
Furthermore, the ‘nice’ Society for the Conservation of Nature got a new president in
1984, taking on a more aggressive and media-oriented policy style. Soon too, the
public were rating environmental problems very highly on the agenda, and at the time
of introducing the term ‘nature restoration’, the organisation had an impressive
number of members: 245000 (Svold 1989:28,44), with one out of twenty Danes a
member of the organisation. Meanwhile, the organisation was represented on all
important committees regarding the Skjern River restoration. Here, the organisation
joined the civil servants from the Ministry of the Environment and various other
environmental interests. In the most important forum, the Skjern River working
group, which developed the project, five of the members were part of the nature
network, while only two members were part of the land reclamation network. Four
representatives from the municipalities could be considered neutral, but two of them,
the two mayor’s in the involved municipalities, had supported a restoration project
prior to the working group being appointed(Pedersen 2004:82-83). In other fora where
the Skjern River featured, the situation was the same, with environmental interests
outnumbering agricultural interests. In addition, the network was tighter than in the
1960’s. The actors met in different fora and a number of the actors apparently even
had close personal relationships. Furthermore, they agreed on the demands; they
wanted the meanders back (Pedersen 2004). But - what changes at each of the six
levels in the exogenous context of the networks made the policy U-turn possible?
Socioeconomic changes. In the years between the two Skjern River decisions,
the relative importance of the agricultural sector, for both employment and economy,
fell significantly (Jensen 1998). Furthermore, the Danes were much more prosperous
on average, than in the middle of the century, affording them more post material
values.
Changes in public opinion. Through the 1980’s environmental problems won a
more and more central position in the Danish public debate and, in 1987, a majority of
the voters ranked environmental considerations higher on the agenda, than industrial
and agricultural considerations (Tonsgaard 1989: 271, 277).
Changes in ideology. Possibly due to the perceived changes in the public
opinion, the politicians co-opted the environmental issue. For a couple of years in the
middle of the 1980’s, the Conservative-Liberal minority government faced a so-called
‘alternative green majority coalition’ in the parliament, which consisted of the leftwing parties, the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals. On several occasions,
this majority forced the Conservative-Liberal minority governments to adopt certain
environmental policies which they disliked (e.g. Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004). The
formal proposal to restore Skjern River came from the Social Democratic Party,
which was a member of the ‘alternative green majority’. However, when the deciding
12
vote was performed in the Parliament, there was almost consensus, even the farmers’
party, Venstre, voted for the proposal and only the right-wing Progress Party voted
against. In addition, at the local level the two mayors’, a Conservative and a Liberal, a
bit surprisingly, supported a restoration project.
Knowledge changes. In the 1950’s and 1960’s scientists were aware, that
straigthening the river could cause pollution problems, but they did not know to what
extent. In the 1980’s the problems were very visible. Furthermore, new knowledge
regarding agricultural emissions of nitrogen and phosphorous came forth, as well as
more information on the positive effect meanders have on pollution levels (Pedersen
2004).
Change in institutions. Comprehensive changes occurred at the institutional
level. A new Ministry of the Environment was born in 1971 resulting in a new venue.
On the other hand, the Land Reclamation Board was erased as a venue. Furthermore,
Denmark joined the EC in 1973, resulting, once again, in new venues, as well as new
demands on Danish decision-makers (e.g. regarding marginal farmland).
Presence of other networks. As described, two networks conflict regarding the
use of the wider countryside. If no competing network had attempted to privilege their
position, the possibility of policy stability, i.e. continued land reclamation, would
have been greater.
Disprivileged actors in the nature network used the change in context behind a
turnaround regarding the relative positions of two involved networks, and in turn, in
rural policy. Civil servants in the Ministry of the Environment proposed turning
marginal farmlands into lakes and wetlands again. The ‘new’ aggressive Society for
the Conservation of Nature invented the very positive word ‘nature restoration’ and
sold the idea to the Radical Liberal Party, a very important party at the centre of the
left-right cleavage line in Danish politics, but more ‘green’ than the Social Democrats
(e.g. Daugbjerg and Svendsen 2001:59-60). The party, at that time, were part of the
alternative green majority in the Danish parliament. A couple of months later, another
member of the green majority, the Social Democratic Party, proposed a restoration of
Skjern River. For the politicians, it was significant, at the time, that voters rated
environmental considerations exceptionally high on the agenda, and that there was a
new policy image regarding the use of the wider countryside. A new policy image
was coupled to a new policy venue (the Ministry of the Environment) resulting in
policy change. Furthermore, the old land reclamation network had disintegrated. The
crucial venue, the Land Reclamation Board was lost, and the entrepreneur,
Hedeselskabet, had changed perceptions with regard to the wider countryside, in
assesment that there was more income to be generated in restoration projects. The
result was a U-turn in the policy.
5.2 Lake Soeborg – no restoration
The new strong nature network is not, in itself, always successful and did not
succeed in initiating a restoration of Lake Soeborg, despite, since 1987, several
proposals having been brought to the table.
In the beginning of 1987, the forest supervisor in the area where Lake Soeborg
was formerly situated, inspired by the debate on marginal farmland in February 1986,
proposed that the Ministry of the Environment restore 430 hectares of the former lake,
at a cost of approximately 3 million euro. A project was designed by Hedeselskabet
(Politiken 27.02.1987; Archive-files of Danish Forest and Nature Agency). The
proposal was not adopted.
13
In December 1988, Hedeselskabet designed a smaller project (126 hectares).
The price of implementation was less than 1 million euro (Archive-files of Danish
Forest and Nature Agency). The proposal was not adopted either.
In August 1993, the Social Democrats in the Municipality of GraestedGilleleje, where Lake Soeborg is situated, proposed a 600 hectares restoration of the
lake (Berlingske Tidende 26.10.93). The proposal, once again, was not adopted.
In 2001, the private foundation, Aage V. Jensens Foundation, tried to buy a 75
hectares farm in the area with the purpose of implementing a small restoration project
on the land (Politiken 23.02.01). The foundation was not allowed to buy the farmland
and no restoration project was implemented. Why was it possible to implement a
Skjern River, but not a Lake Soeborg, project?
The forest supervisor introducing the first proposal was a member of a
marginal farmland working group, under the Ministry of the Environment, involved in
analysing drained lakes and fjords (Archive-files of Danish Forest and Nature
Agency; Politiken 27.02.87). The project had been designed by Hedeselskabet, the
“deserter” from the land reclamation network, and involved a 430 hectare restoration
of the lake, to the enthusiasm of nature interests. The cost was estimated at
approximately 3 million euro (Politiken 27.02.1987), however, as mentioned above,
the proposal was not adopted. It is apparent that the project entered a vacuum. The
project was proposed directly after the Skjern River project, but before a new act on
nature management, adopted in 1989, which allotted approximately 75 million euro to
nature restoration projects in the period 1989-998 (Madsen 1999). However, the
government did create a 4 million euro pool for restoration projects in the summer of
1987, (Archive-files of Danish Forest and Nature Agency) although the project was
assessed as too expensive (3 million euro) compared with total available funds in the
pool. The project enters a regulatory ‘black hole’, leading to Hedeselskabet
developing a new and smaller project, for which proposals were presented in
December 1988.
This new proposal coincided with the new act on nature management and was
supported by many landowners, the municipality and the county (Archive-files of
Danish Forest and Nature Agency). However, the proposal was refused by the Forest
and Nature Agency, under the Ministry of the Environment. The formal argument put
forward was that it was too expensive compared with the recreational benefits
predicted. There are four possible reasons why the project was denied:
1. The project, in essence, involved ‘too little nature for too much money’.
2. The Liberal-Conservative government forced the agency to reject the proposal,
there no longer being an alternative green majority in parliament (dissolved summer
of 1988).
3. The Forest and Nature Agency was planning implementation of a more
comprehensive project under the new act on nature management.
4. The Agency knew that one of the largest landowners was against the project9 and
therefore wanted to avoid conflict.
Speaking against no. 2. is that most of the farmers apparently supported the
proposal, this making it unlikely that a Liberal-Conservative government would have
rejected the proposal. Furthermore, the Minister of the Environment represented the
Radical Liberal Party, a former participant in the “alternative green majority” 10.
Unfortunately, though, it has yet to be proven which of the three other possibilities
proved decisive.
14
The comprehensive third proposal in August 1993 came from the Social
Democrats in the Municipality of Graested-Gilleleje. The political context, however,
had changed in the municipality and it was now a representative of the farmers’ party,
Venstre, who was the mayor. Where the landowners were fiercely against the
proposal (Frederiksborg Amts Avis 05.10.94), evidently, so were the majority of the
municipality (Archive-files of Danish Forest and Nature Agency). The Society for the
Conservation of Nature actively supported the proposal (Frederiksborg Amts Avis
29.10.93) along with other interests from the nature network, but they did not succeed
in advancing any restoration. In January 1993, a Social Democratic-led majority
government had come to power, giving rise to a possibility of implementing the
project in defiance of the municipality’s and the landowners’ resistance, however the
possibility was not realised.
The final attempt, to date, to initiate restoration of the lake was when a private
foundation attempted to buy a 75 hectare farm in the area, with the purpose of
implementing a small restoration project on the land. The foundation’s general aim
was to conserve nature and protect the wildlife. The foundation did not succeed as the
purchase, according to law, was to be approved by an agricultural commission. The
agricultural commission consisted of two representatives appointed by the local
agricultural organisations and one representative appointed by the local county. Two
of the members voted for the deal, one, a local pig farmer, voted against. Since a
single member in the commission could veto a particular deal, the foundation’s plan
to purchase the land was denied (Politiken 23.02.2001).
The nature network did not succeed in bringing about a Lake Soeborg restoration,
illustrating that despite the privileged position enjoyed by the nature network, today,
the fight against the old land reclamation network cannot always be won. The case, in
hand, demonstrates that timing in relation to the actions of the policy entrepreneurs is
important. Today, both of the networks can be characterised as being at a point on the
continuum between a policy community and an issue network. Policy instability is
more prevalent than back in the middle of the 20th century, where the land
reclamation interests strong policy community reigned. The Soeborg-case reveals that
the timing of the entrepreneur’s pro-restoration of Lake Soeborg was not optimal. The
restoration proposal in 1987 came during a regulatory ‘black hole’ the project being
seen to be too expensive compared with the means – there was an institutional context
difference when compared with the Skjern River project. This, potentially, was the
reason why the second proposal was turned down as well. When a third attempt was
made in 1993, an ideological change had taken place in the municipality, it now being
led by a mayor from the Liberal Party, opposing a restoration, differentiating this case
from the Skjern River projects, where the mayors of the two involved municipalities
supported restoration efforts. The final attempt failed (again), this time due to the
prevailing institutional framework, the agricultural commission having to approve the
purchase of the land for restoration, this not being a factor entering the case of the
Skjern River restoration. However, as a result of the veto in the agricultural
commission, described above, the Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
(Liberal Party) changed the law on agricultural holdings (Lov om
landbrugsejendomme 09.06.2004) which, to an extent, facilitated the purchase of
farms with the purpose of returning the farmland to nature. The composition of the
agricultural commission was also changed, it now comprising five representatives:
One appointed by the county, two appointed by the agricultural organisations and two
appointed by nature organisations. It is, moreover, no longer possible for a single
15
member to veto a decision. The above removes one potential obstruction to a potential
Lake Soeborg restoration. In summing up, when the entrepreneurs proposing the Lake
Soeborg restoration introduced the projects, conditions in the exogenous context were
not as favourable as when the Skjern River restoration was proposed, making it more
difficult to push a Lake Soeborg restoration project through.
6. Conclusion
Denmark has experienced a U-turn in rural policy regarding land-use in the wider
countryside. Until 1970, rivers were straigthened, and lakes and fjords drained, with
the aim of gaining fertile agricultural soil. A strong policy community of land
reclamation interests privileged itself at the expense of nature interests organised in an
issue network. Since the mid-1980’s, numerous nature restoration projects have been
implemented, the Skjern River restoration being one significant example.
At the macro-level the development can be explained by radical changes in the
two networks’ exogenous context, causing the land reclamation network to
disintegrate and the nature network to integrate, forming intermediate-type networks
at mid-points along the continuum. At the micro-level, the disprivileged nature
network took advantage of the changes and was able to capitalise on a new policy
image and a new policy venue to bring about a new policy output.
However, the successive failures to win through projects aimed at restoration
of Lake Soeborg illustrates that, today, rural land-use policy, in the context of this
paper, is characterised by instability due to the character of the two networks
involved. In the case of Lake Soeborg, the nature network did not succeed in initiating
a restoration project as projects were proposed when conditions in the exogenous
context were not as favourable as when the Skjern River Project was adopted. The
timing of the policy entrepreneurs was not optimal.
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18
Table 1:
Extremes on the Policy Network Continuum
Dimensions
Policy community
Issue network
Membership
Very limited number of members.
Large number of members.
Narrow range of interests represented
Wide range of interests represented.
Bargaining and negotiation.
Consultation.
Frequent interaction
Unstable pattern of interaction
Integration
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy principles and
procedures to approach policy problems
Conflict over policy principles and
procedures to approach policy problems
(adopted from Daugbjerg 1998)
1
In EU-25, only UK is a bit more cultivated (64 pct. cultivated)
Several other European countries have a long tradition of giving state grants to land reclamation
projects. E.g. Finland, Switzerland, West Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands
(Landbokommissionen 1966:52-55)
3
A parallel can be drawn to Maas’ (1951) description of the power of the US Corps of Army Engineers
4
The fishery organisations in 1940 plead for a seat to a representative for fishery interests, but were
denied (Landbokommissionen 1966:89).
5
Since 1972 it was by law, due to EC regulation, possible for the state to acquire areas with the
purpose of leisure activity (Knuth-Winterfeldt 1990:10).
6
When the project finally was implemented, most farmers were actually satisfied with the payment for
their land (Pedersen 2004)
7
Farm land in drained river valleys or lakes often becomes marginal as years are passing by, because
the land “sinks”.
8
The money is e.g. spent for buying areas, where nature restoration can be implemented. Later, in
1998, according to the socalled Plan for the Aquatic Environment II, it was decided to take out 16.000
hectares of marginal farmland and make it wetlands (Hansen 2003:253).
9
A very large landowner spoke against the project three weeks after the rejection of the agency
(Archive-files of Danish Forest and Nature Agency)
10
Unconfirmed information, however, points to the fact that one of the largest landowners and most
devoted protesters was a member of the Radical Liberal Party, as was the Minister of Environment.
2
19