Cicero’s On Friendship
2/15/2016
Prepared by Taylor Black
Overview of Entire Work:
On Friendship is written in dialogue form, the interlocutors were all friends of Cicero. This work is very
Roman in nature, though informed by Grecian and Asian thought, and would be considered the epitome
of how a noble Roman would view much of life. Cicero is not interested in ideal friendship, but rather
understanding friendship in an everyday sort of way that is most helpful to the man on the street, as it
were. As such he has a few main tenants but the books is primarily a study of friendship in relation to
being a friend directly, a book of maxims and recommendations.
Detailed Explanation:
Part I:
1. Introduction, explains format and dramatis personae: Fannius, Scaevola, & Laelius.
2. Setup for the discussion of Friendship, Fannius explains that Laelius is considered wise. Wisdom
is defined as “looking upon yourself and self-sufficing and regarding the changes and chances of
mortal life as powerless to affect your virtue.” That being the case, F&S ask, how did he handle
the death of his good friend Scipio Africanus (the Younger)? L apparently even missed a
governmental meeting around the time of the death. L explains that he missed the meeting
because he was ill, not because of the death of his friend and that a man should never be remiss
with regard to a duty. He also mentions that he has doubts as to whether anyone can be wise,
but if anyone is wise, their wisdom should be based on their deeds, not their words.
3. L continues saying that he was indeed affected by the death of his friend Scipio “as I think there
will never be again, such as I can fearlessly say there never was before.” He is circumspect about
this loss however, for “To Scipio I am convinced no evil has befallen: mine is the disaster, if
disaster there be; and to be severely distressed at one’s own misfortunes does not show that
you love your friend, but that you love yourself.” L goes on to relate Scipio’s achievements and
states that he had a life anyone would be proud of. L also conjectures that such a life would lead
to the gods rather than to Hades.
4. L continues, “For I am not one of these modern philosophers who maintain that our souls perish
with our bodies and that death ends all. He holds with ancient tradition and older Greek
philosophy. “If, however, the truth rather is that the body and soul perish together, and that no
sensation remains, then though there is nothing good in death, at least there is nothing bad.
Remove sensation, and a man is exactly as though he had never been born; and yet that this
man was born is a joy to me, and will be a subject to rejoicing to this State to its last hour.”
Despite Scipio being gone, L states that, “such is the pleasure I take in recalling our friendship,
that I look upon my life as having been a happy one because I have spent it with Scipio.” F&S
request a fuller account of friendship.
5. L assents but states that he has no formal training in philosophy and that the most he can do is
to “urge on you to regard friendship as the greatest thing in the world; for there is nothing
which so fits in our nature, or is so exactly what we want in prosperity of adversity.” He
continues by saying that “friendship can only exist between good men.” He explains that he is
not going to press to superfluously accurate definitions for those that do “have truth on their
side, perhaps, but it is of no practical advantage.” Gives a working definition of “good people” as
“those whose actions and lives leave no question as to their honor, purity, equity, and liberality;
who are free from greed, lust, and violence; and who have the courage of their convictions…
that to the best of human ability they follow nature as the most perfect guide to a good life.” He
draws a distinction between relationship and friendship saying that affection is necessary for
friendship, but not for relationship.
6. L defines friendship as “a complete accord on all subjects human and divine, joined with mutual
good will and affection.” With the exception of wisdom, nothing better has been given by the
gods to mortal man. Some say the chief good is in virtue, but virtue is the parent and preserver
of friendship, and without it, friendship cannot possibly exist. Again L makes note that he is not
using a precise definition of virtue, but a sort of common man’s definition, and even lists a few
names of a few people who are generally considered virtuous: Nick, Jen, Paul, Veronica, Mother
Teresa, Pope John Paul II, DJ Tiesto, to name a few. L goes on to describe the advantages and
delights of friendship.
7. L explains that as many are the blessings of friendship, the chief blessing is this: “that it gives us
bright hopes for the future and forbids weakness and despair. In the face of a true friend, a man
sees as it were a second self. So that where his friend is he is; if his friend be rich, he is not poor;
though he be weak, his friend’s strength is his; and in his friend’s life he enjoys a second life
after his own is finished.” Ends Part I by saying that there cannot be much more to say on
Friendship and if there is, he cannot say it, but F&S persuade him on.
Part II
8. L continues his discourse on Friendship, saying that friendship has its basis in love and any utility
gained from friendship is secondary for by its nature friendship “admits of no feigning, no
pretence: as far as it goes it is both genuine and spontaneous.” Notes the parallel of animal
feeling and gives examples from history of great friendships and hatreds.
9. Goodness is what excites the desire for friendship. Friendship is not based on a lack, a need for
friendship, but rather it is “when a man’s confidence in himself is greatest, when he is so
fortified by virtue and wisdom as to want nothing and to feel absolutely self-dependant, it is
then that he is most conspicuous for seeking out and keeping up friendships.” L again assures us
that just “as we are not beneficent and liberal with any view of extorting gratitude, and do not
regard an act of kindness as an investment, but follow a natural inclination to liberality, so we
look on friendship as worth trying for, not because we are attracted to it by the expectation of
ulterior gain, but in the conviction that what it has to give us is from first to last included in the
feeling itself.” L explains that any other basis for friendship is impossible and results in some
other kind of relationship.
10. L recalls the many conversations on friendship between Scipio and himself, noting that they
both agreed that the hardest thing in friendship is to keep it alive through life’s trials and
vagaries. Scipio is quoted as saying, “in fact, these fatalities overhang friendship in such numbers
that it requires not only wisdom but good luck also to escape them all.”
11. The question arises, how far should friendship be granted in relation to the moral life? Would
you kill, drive one’s friend to the airport at 4am in the morning or “set fire to the Capitol” for
friendship? Frames the question concretely in the context of recent attempts on the safety of
the Republic.
12. Answers the question in 11 by laying down a rule of friendship: “neither ask nor consent to do
what is wrong. For the plea “for friendship’s sake” is a discreditable one, and not to be admitted
for a moment.” Again, further context for F&S.
13. The first law of friendship is “that we should ask from friends, and do for friends only what is
good. But do not let us wait to be asked either: let there be ever an eager readiness, and an
absence of hesitation. Let us have the courage to give advice with candor. In friendship, let the
influence of friends who give good advice be paramount; and let this influence be used to
enforce advice not only in plain=spoken terms, but sometimes, if the case demands it, with
14.
15.
16.
17.
sharpness; and when so used, let it be obeyed.” Denial of friendships of utility as a basis for
friendship and the absence of friendship as possible.
L reiterates, “The clear indication of virtue, to which a mind of like character is naturally
attracted, is the beginning of friendship.” Further castigation of the theory that utility is the
basis for friendship, rather “it is not friendship that follows material advantage, but material
advantage friendship.”
Material goods are not the basis for a happy life, indeed the only examples we have are of
tyrants and they (especially in Roman culture) have terribly unhappy lives.
What is the appropriate limit for friendship? How much should we love our friends? L notes
three common views: as much as ourselves, exactly the same as they love us, as much as they
love themselves. The first is incorrect because many actions are inappropriate on one’s own
behalf, but quite acceptable on another’s behalf. The second is too mercenary to be tenable or
to be recognized as friendship. The third is inappropriate because friendship requires lifting the
other’s spirits occasionally or bolstering the friend’s idea of self-worth. Final note in this chapter
is that it is impossible to love someone with the view that you may someday hate them (the
anti-prenuptial agreement argument).
The key to real friendship is to be able to discern a person’s character and to pursue as friends
those who are of high virtue and with whom one can have harmony.
Part III: A sort of guidebook for friendship
18. Loyalty is what makes for a lasting friendship. A lasting friend must not be duplicitous or blind to
another’s faults.
19. Don’t let youth or age affect your decision as to whom to choose for friends.
20. Be wise in choosing your friends, not letting affection play too much of a role, letting youths
grow into their full character. Also do not tout your powers and benefits once they are made
known to your friends. They can count on your without you having to constantly remind them of
your attributes.
21. Friendships sometimes end, and in that case break it off sooner rather than later, to “unstitch”
the friendship rather than be torn. Do your best to maintain friendships, but if they break make
the break natural rather than violent, and remain on good terms. Someone worthy of friendship
is one with whom you can blend well.
22. There is a balance in choosing friends, between affection and reason, but in the beginning be
sure to choose a friend based more on reason than love.
23. Without friendship there is no life, thus it behooves a person to not be careless in choosing and
maintaining friendships.
24. Love should be the guiding force in dialogue so as not to let a friend fall to his ruin by too much
compliance, or to drive her away by too much plain speaking.
25. Be truthful and not duplicitous or a flatterer.
26. There ought to be no oratory between friends, but close trust and mutual affection.
27. Virtue creates and preserves friendship. Virtue is first but next to it and to it alone the greatest
of all things is friendship.