Lycan, Intro to Philosophy of Language
p.80 Moore thought that there were two categories, propositions and non-propositions. Russell thought
they were eternal, but said little else about them. Frege constructed an elegant Proposition Theory, but
held that there is nothing to understading what a proposition is but understanding the role played by
"propositions" in the theory. Meaningful sentences stand in an expression relation to a proposition
according to Russell and Moore.
p.82 "Most Proposition Theorits hold that propositions have interna structure; they are composed of
abstract conceptual parts. The word "snow" is a meaningful expression, but it is no meaningful in virtue of
expressing a proposition; just by itself it does not express af ull proposition." ""Snow" does not express a
complete thought, but it expresses something that is part of many thought—a concept, or a type, or an "ida"
in the abstract rather than the mental sense. "Concept" is the usual term used to mean an equally abstract
constituent of a larger abstract proposition.
p.83 The Proposition view is the leading entitye theory of meaning. The referential theory tells us that
sentences name them as does the Referential Theory.
p.84 (Objections) Since they aren't in space-time they have no causal properties (doesn't seem the we have
to say they're outside of time, just eternal; this assumes that being spatial is a necessary condition for
causing something. But my soul isn't spatial and it causes my body to do all sorts of things).
p. 85 Harman thought that the Proposition Theory was trivial and uninformative, saying no more than that
a sentence meaningful in saying that it expresses a proposition. [This seems clearly false to me].
Objection: meanings clearly do have causal power—e.g., we react to things people say.
See chapters 10 & 11
References
G.E. Moore 1953/1962 Some Main Problems of Philosophy New York: Collier. p.71 Norlin Stacks
B1647.M73 S6 1962
Frege criticizes ideation theories in favor of the Proposition Theory ("The Thought" in Mind, 65:289-311.)
Frege seems to distinguish between ideas and thoughts, the latter being propositions (p 300).
Russell offers a classic proposition theory in "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean" in
R. Marsh (ed.) (1956) Logic and Knowledge, London: Allen & Unwin. —requested via e-mail 4/12 to
retrieve from storage.
PASCAL OFFSITE
B1649.R93 L6 c.4
Quine criticizes the Proposition Theory. See Gilbert Harman "Quine on Meaning and Existence, I," Review
of Metaphysics, 31:124-51, particularly 124-7 (141-7 are also relevant). See
PER ROOM
105 R325 v.31 no.121-124 1977/78
AVAILABLE
Lycan "Could Propositions Explain anything?" Candadian Journal of Philosophy, 3:427-34 is a rejoinder
of behalf of the Proposition Theory. See
PER ROOM
B1 .C3 v.3 no.1 1973/74
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