[A note: This is a very rough draft of the paper which needs revision. The draft focuses
too much on how the blind ecstasy on the rise of China has undercut China’s long
overdue effort to introduce meaningful political reform. When presenting I will focus
more on how the arrogant publicity of the so-called China model by the propaganda
machine of China may deepen the concern held by some of the American opinion makers
over a potential clash with what they see as a much flawed Chinese “civilization”.]
The Rise of China and Its Consequences1
Yawei Liu
The China Program, The Carter Center
APSA Preconference 2011
Panel Proposal
The Political Communication of Threat and the New Public Diplomacy:
Prospects for China-US relations
Abstract:
At the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1987, Secretary
General Zhao Ziyang laid out an executable plan to launch China’s political reform. If
implemented, this plan would have put Deng Xiaoping’s dual-track reform into action.
After all, Deng Xiaoping believed that without political reform all other reforms would
eventually fail. The 1989 incident derailed the plan, sent Zhao Ziyang into political exile
and almost terminated China’s economic reform as well. Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992
managed to revive the economic reform but he was never able to put political reform
back on track. He had no political capital nor determined personnel to realize his vision.
In the next 15 years, through Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, despite a very brief trial with
direct township magistrate elections, political reform was largely shelved. But the
economy has soared and China is now the 3rd largest economy in the world. This
tremendous economic growth without tinkering the political system has changed China’s
discourse on the necessity of political reform and emboldened many Chinese officials and
scholars to declare that the China model (or the Beijing consensus) is not only a solution
for China but can be the key of development for all developing countries. This
developmental hubris will further delay China’s long overdue political reform that may
eventually make the glorious China model unsustainable.
This chapter argues that a political reform plan was always part of the initial reform
package but its priority on the CCP agenda has been in decline as China’s economic lot
continues to improve. When Joshua Cooper Ramos introduced the Beijing consensus, the
Chinese who are always suspicious about political reform seized and turned it into a
perfect weapon of agenda slaughter. While Westerners are largely dubious about the
meaning and significance of the China model, many Chinese scholars have joined the
efforts in packaging and publicizing it. The campaign to pitch the China model to both
domestic and overseas audiences is so intense and effective that the need to debate
political reform has been swept aside. It is uncertain how many countries will adopt the
Beijing consensus in the near future; in the long term, this blind belief in China
exceptionalism will put China on a collision course with the entire Western world. A true
clash of civilizations will be unleashed. It is another Cold War that may be equally long
but a lot harder to settle which side will eventually win.
The slow decline of CCP’s interest in political reform
By the time Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, China was inching toward a general
political and economic paralysis if not a dire collapse. Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng,
did realize that China’s modernization must be put on the front burner but he was not able
to move away from the “two whatevers”. In a series of shrewd political maneuvers,
Deng Xiaoping managed to assert himself into decision-making process of the Party, the
state and the military.2
With senior CCP leaders coming to a tentative consensus, Deng Xiaoping presided
over the historic Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress of the CCP in December
1978 and made the momentous decision to disengage in irrational class struggle and
focus on economic development. The foundation for the launch of the so-called reform
and opening up in December 1978 was the gigantic effort to swing back to pragmatism
although it was still couched in the rhetoric of building a new socialist country of Chinese
characteristics.
The next 10 years saw phenomenal economic development and impressive
improvement of living conditions of the Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping had another
reform agenda on his mind. He believed economic reform efforts would eventually be
bottled up if political reform was not initiated. He had a strong feeling that without
reforming the political structure, 1) the accomplishments of the economic reform could
not be protected; 2) further deepening of the economic reform could not be secured; 3)
productivity would be blunted; and 4) the four modernizations of China would be not
achieved.3
But Deng Xiaoping also understood how important a politically correct ideological
façade was in order to deepen the reform. To move forward, he had to put himself in a
politically unassailable position first. On March 3, 1979, in a speech to CCP’s theoretic
work, he introduced the concept of insisting on four cardinal principles, namely 1)
insisting on the socialist road; 2) insisting on the proletarian dictatorship; 3) insisting on
the leadership of the CCP and 4) insisting on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought. This was as good as a political cover as one could ever get but to make each
and every decision in accordance with the “four cardinal principles” alone would be selfdefeating. A new framework had to be developed and it was called “one core and two
fundamentals”. The core was “developing the economy is the top priority” and the two
fundamentals were 1) “four cardinal principles will always be adhered to” and 2) “reform
and opening up cannot be abandoned”.4
By the fall of 1986, Deng Xiaoping began his push for political reform. At the 6th
Plenum of the 12th National Congress of the CCP, details of the political reform began to
emerge. One Chinese scholar believes that Deng had identified two main areas for the
proposed political reform, namely separation of the CCP and the state in decision-making
and transforming the role of the government. Another scholar lists three areas that were
of extreme concern to Deng, source of legitimacy, concentration of power in the hands of
the CCP and lack of a checks and balance system.5 The final package was put out by
Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the CCP at the first session of the 13th CCP National
Congress. In the political report submitted to the Congress on October 25, 1988, Zhao
listed eight tasks in the soon-to-be-launched political reform. Four of the eight were the
most important: 1) initiate separation of the CCP and the state apparatus, 2) improve
cadre selection procedures, 3) establish mechanisms for societal consultation, and 4)
perfect the system of democratic politics.6
The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 derailed the long planned political reform.
Zhao Ziyang was removed from his position and put under house arrest. Jiang Zemin
was abruptly promoted to be CCP’s new General Secretary. Jiang would be in this
position until 2002 for a total of thirteen years. Busy consolidating his power and
scrambling to deflect attacks from the left, Jiang made a hard turn to the left. Collapse of
the Communist regimes in Eastern European countries and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union convinced the CCP top leadership that the train of reform had to be slowed
down. Not totally sidelined but losing political clout as a result of the crackdown, Deng
felt powerless and was not able to intervene and reverse the rising tide of political
conservatism. Not only political reform was tabled; his economic reform was to be
frozen as well.7
In 1992, at the age of 87, isolated and not often consulted in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping
headed south, visiting Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai where he talked to local
officials. Initially, his tour was not even reported by the Beijing media outlets. When
newspapers in Shenzhen and Shanghai began reporting Deng’s visits and his remarks the
top Chinese military leadership vowed to escort reform and opening up. This “southern
tour” jumpstarted the stalled reform.8 This was the second time that Deng pulled the
government back to the middle from the left using pragmatist approach. He said there
were only three measures that could determine if a policy was right or wrong: 1) if it was
beneficial to increase socialist productivity; 2) if it was conducive to increase the
comprehensive power of the nation; and 3) if it was helpful in improving the living
conditions of the people. Deng’s tour caused a panic in Beijing. Jiang and his supporters
stopped their turn to the left and decided to come back to the center, returning to the
reform and opening up started by Deng Xiaoping back in 1978.9 Unfortunately, Deng
Xiaoping was no longer in a position to oversee the launching of the political reform. His
ideas, well defined by Zhao Ziyang in 1988, were diluted beyond recognition. China
moved into a new era of economic liberalization and political tightening, a development
that later would be a salient component of the so-called China model.
Political reform did not come to a complete stop. They were continued in ways that
could not and would not even leave a dent on the supremacy of the CCP. According to
Xu Yansong, a Tsinghua University political scientist, political reform since 1992 has
followed four trajectories: 1) improving the administrative efficiency of the government
through restructuring; 2) introducing a civil servant system; 3) extensive research on
source of power and its legitimacy; and 4) promoting rule of law.10 At the same time,
direct village elections were mandated by the Organic Law of the Villager Committees of
the PRC, promulgated on provisional basis by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in
1986 and made into a basic law in November 1998.11
Jiang Zemin presided over three CCP National Congresses but no new platform on
political was ever introduced. The 14th CCP Congress was held in 1992 after Deng
Xiaoping’s southern tour. It pledged to continue the reform. Five years later, in the
political report of the 15th CCP Congress, Jiang Zemin declared that CCP would build a
socialist China with rule of law.12 Before and after the 16th CCP Congress, there was a
flurry of activities. First, Jiang invented “the three represents”, effectively changing the
mission of the CCP, which used to be to represent the industrial workers and farmers in
China. Second, there were talks of adding “political civilization” to the two existing
civilizations that CCP had vowed to build, namely “materialistic civilization” (economic
activities) and “spiritual civilization” (ideological purification). In his political report
delivered on November 18, 2002, Jiang Zemin outlined the tasks of political reform as
the following: 1) adhere to and perfect the socialist democratic system, 2) strengthen the
construction of the socialist rule of law, and 3) reform and improve CCP leadership.
Jiang further added that political reform means “perfecting democratic system, enriching
democratic formats, expanding channels for citizens’ orderly participation in politics,
guaranteeing people’s entitlement to democratic election, democratic decision-making,
democratic management and democratic supervision, making more rights and freedom
available to the people, and respecting and defending human rights.” He also said that
only by adhering to and perfecting the people’s congress system could laws and decisions
represent the will of the people. Lastly, other democratic parties in China could only
provide consultation under CCP leadership.13
After Jiang delivered his swan song report, Hu Jintao was “elected” by members of
the CCP Central Committee as the new Party Secretary. In March 2003, he was
“elected” by deputies to the NPC as president of China. This was the first smooth change
of top leadership in the CCP history, a sign of political progress and a more
institutionalized transfer of power. However, not until 2004 was Hu able to assume the
chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). What many had hoped
to be a new deal began to emerge quickly. Hu Jintao acted quickly to deal with the case
of Sun Zhigang, abolishing an old regulation designed to detain and deport migrants in
the cities and enforced accountability through removing the mayor of Beijing for failing
to prevent the SARS epidemic. However, the long anticipated political reform was not
launched.
Observers of Chinese politics tended to believe Hu could not do anything in the area
of political reform until he was able to consolidate his power. Since he was not able to
get the CMC chairmanship until 2004, he did not have time and resources to plan for a
systemic overhaul of China’s political system. All hope was pinned on the 17th CCP
Congress. But the 17th CCP Congress came and went without a big bang proposal in
Hu’s report. In terms of the significance of conducting political reform, Hu said that
expanding socialist democracy was to serve the purpose of defending people’s interests
and maintaining social fairness and justice. Without political reform, China would
become politically disoriented, the Party and the state would lose their vitality and the
initiative of the people could not be unleashed. On how to proceed with political reform,
Hu listed a total of seven tasks, including expanding people’s democracy, promoting
grassroots democracy, implementing rule of law and building a service oriented
government.14
Parallel to the increasingly vague discourse on political reform in China a new
concept began to emerge. This is the concept of “peaceful rise”. In 2003, at the Boao
Forum, Zheng Bijian, former secretary of Hu Yaobang and vice president of the Central
Party School, gave a speech entitled “The New Road of China’s Peaceful Rise and the
Future of Asia.” In the speech, Zheng described the nature of China’s development.
First, China has 1.3 billion people and this will make China a developing nation for a
long time to come. Second, in the 25 years since the launching of reform and opening up,
China has invented a new model of development. Third, this new model could be
characterized as actively participating in globalization, being independent, and not
seeking conquest and hegemony. China’s peaceful rise will not only solve the
development issue for the most populous nation in the world but also make an enduring
contribution to peace and prosperity of the world. However, in order for China not to
deviate from this path, there are three strategies that have to be adopted. 1) Economic
and political reform had to move forward simultaneously because market economy and
political democracy are the twin engines of China’s growth. 2) There must be courage
and vision in absorbing all advanced achievements of the mankind since China’s rise
needs spiritual pillars. 3) Maintaining the balance of different interests groups, keeping
the harmony between mankind and nature and reducing friction between domestic
political need and international demand are all too important to be neglected.15 It must be
noted that Zheng was giving equal emphasis to both market economy and political
democracy. In other words, political reform is not only needed; it is a must for China to
sustain its growth.
Two years later, in an article that appeared in the overseas edition of the People’s
Daily, Zheng Bijian tried to define the nature and orientation of the CCP. First, the CCP
is different from the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. It does not seek
conquest and denounces wars. Second, it is economic globalization that has contributed
to China growth miracle. Therefore, destroying the existing power balance and
challenging the United States are not in the best interests of the CCP. Third, seeking
three “和 s” [peace] is the paramount mission of the CCP: pursuing peace outside China,
building harmony domestically and seeking reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait.
Zheng emphasizes that Moscow and Beijing took divergent roads largely because it was
against the very essence of the Chinese culture to use force or violence to expand
territorially, develop economically and influence ideologically. Yes, China is a socialist
nation but its unique socialism is to increase productivity at home and wage peace abroad.
CCP’s mission does not go beyond protecting territorial integrity and securing
development and modernization for China.16
To a certain extent, Zheng advanced what later became a trademark of Hu Jintao, the
idea of harmony. Obviously, one of Zheng’s goals was aimed at dismissing the China
threat theory in general and disarming the Americans who felt uneasy about China’s
phenomenal growth in particular. In the process, he actually hit something that was
bigger. His treatise on China’s peaceful rise was the first step toward defining am
emerging China model, building a new consensus and identifying the uniqueness of
China’s development.17 However, Zheng did not discredit the necessity of political
reform. He was one of a few CPP thinkers that have had access to the top leadership.
Like all leaders at the top, they are only absorbing ideas from their advisors selectively.
Hu Jintao likes the idea of harmony but appears to dislike Zheng’s emphasis on the
urgent need to carry out political reform and economic development with same force and
determination. In October 2006, at the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress, a resolution
was adopted to go all out in pursuit of social harmony.
The idea of harmony is a new turning point for the CCP engineered by Hu Jintao.
The first generation of the CCP leaders applied the ideas of continuous revolution and
class struggled in pursuit of an egalitarian world. They ran into a dead end with gigantic
social and human cost. Deng Xiaoping put brakes on that frenzied quest for the
Communist utopia and swung the nation onto a path of creating material wealth for the
people. His efforts to secure economic development through political reform were
derailed by the unforeseen event in 1989. After a few years of wavering and hesitation,
Jiang Zemin began to deepen the economic reform without giving too much thought to
political reform. China’s GDP soared. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came in with a new
playbook. They understand reckless pursuit of revolution was as bad as reckless pursuit
of GDP. While it was glorious to be rich back when Deng first started the reform it was
dangerous if the gap between the haves and have-nots becomes too wide. A harmonious
society by way of focusing more on the people’s affairs is the way to go. Although
democracy remains part of the package, it is moved to the backburner.
All in all, there is a precipitous decline of interest in political reform on the part of
the CCP top leadership. 18 It is still on the lips of CCP leaders and flowing from the
articles penned by scholars from thinks tanks to universities. But, as CCP is completing
its historic transition from “war and revolution” to “peace and development”, less and
less attention is being given to political reform. Deng’s success was to instill the CCP
with the idea that development is the hard truth. Hu’s achievement is to inject a notion of
social justice and equitable development into Deng’s formula. Deng had intended to use
political reform to prepare the CCP and the government for new challenges down the
road. Hu probably feels the same goal can be attained without overhauling the political
system. All he needs to do is to make small adjustment and get CCP officials to pay
more attention to people’s concerns and make them happy, feel indebted to the CCP and
thank the top leadership for everything.
The China model/Beijing consensus talk surfaced against this backdrop. It has
become increasingly high-pitched since 2008. In January 2008, there was a severe
snowstorm that paralyzed most of Southern China but the Chinese government responded
quickly and no riot took place. In May, the Chinese nation rallied to provide relief to the
people victimized by the disastrous earthquake in Sichuan. Throughout the spring, the
negative response to China’s Olympic torch relays in Europe and the United States
triggered an unprecedented patriotic fervor. In August, the Beijing Summer Olympic
Games awed the world. China’s economy has not sunk too low like everywhere else
since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. These events have
provided nutrition that feeds the China model frenzy. Before we look at this new
discourse we need to look at the origins of the Beijing consensus/China model and the
international reaction to it.
The origin of “the Beijing consensus”
Chinese officials, scholars and reporters are very adept at inventing new terms to
describe and define CCP or state policies but “the Beijing consensus” or “the China
model” was not invented by them. It was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a partner at
the consulting firm Kissinger Associates. In 2004, Ramo wrote a paper entitled “The
Beijing Consensus”. In this paper, Ramo identifies three underlying grids of the Beijing
Consensus, namely 1) a strong commitment to innovation and experimentation; 2) a nice
combination of increasing per capita GDP and securing sustainability and equitable
distribution of wealth; and 3) a firm adherence to national self-determination which
guards against Western financial encroachments and adopts an asymmetrical military
strategy.
19
It seems Ramo has coined the term “the Beijing Consensus” to deliberately
offer an alternative to the so-called Washington Consensus. He writes, “China is
marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply
how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way
that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices
in a world with a single massively powerful center of gravity.”20
Since its inception, the nice and neat formulation of China’s development has been
warmly received not only in China but also in many corners of the developing world.
With China’s economy enjoying double-digit growth in the almost three decades and
Washington’s advice of privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization and fiscal
austerity leading to economic disasters in countries like Argentina, the Beijing Consensus
has gained more attraction in both intellectual and policy making circles in Asian,
African, Latin-American capitals. In praising the Beijing Consensus, more ideas and/or
policy options are thrown into the formula. Andrew Leonard, a contributor to Slate,
quoted a Nigerian journalist in his article “No Consensus on the Beijing Consensus”:
The Chinese government knows what is good for its people and therefore shapes its
economic strategy accordingly. Its strategy is not informed by the Washington
Consensus. China has not allowed any [IMF] or World Bank to impose on it some neoliberal package of reforms ... their strategy has not been a neo-liberal overdose of
deregulation, cutting social expenditure, privatizing everything under the sun and
jettisoning the public good. They have not branded subsidy a dirty word. 21
A Brazilian professor who studies China tells Chinese reporters that the China model
is made up of several things, including the initiatives of the top Chinese leadership, the
trust the Chinese government has in its people and the decision to build the nation up first
before it opens to the outside world.22 Vishwanath Pratap Singh, former Indian foreign
minister, told the famous Chinese political scientist Fang Ning that the he sees the China
Model as being characterized by “open-mindedness, competition and focused
approach”.23 To Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy
Carter, the China Model could be seen in the talent and innovation of the Chinese people
and how the Chinese government manages successfully to unleash it without triggering
any political violence and social instability. With this model in place, China will be
ranked one of the top three powers in the next thirty years.24 In a recently released book
(in Chinese and German) called China’s Megatrends: The Eight Pillars of A New Society,
eighty-year old John Nesbit identifies, among other things, ideological liberalization,
global integration, policy experimentation and seeking liberty and fairness as unique
traits of China’s quest for reform. He said during a recent interview that what China does
now is brand new in social structuring, economic development and political
establishment. What he wants to describe in the book is the unprecedented and brave new
world China is building.25
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, an American who wrote the definitive biography of Jiang
Zemin and was given unlimited access to Chinese leaders at all levels in the past few
years, is even more hyperbolic when talking about the China Model.
In his view, the
financial crisis has shattered the global power balance and the era of China is dawning.
China used to be part of the dire problems in the world and it is now part of the much
needed solution to the global crises. What is even more important is China’s mission to
build and sustain harmony both at home and abroad. The pursuit of harmony has taken
the breath out of those Westerners who whine about a China Threat and made the China
Model much more attractive.26
There are other foreigners who see the China Model with trepidation and even
question its validity. James Mann, a former reporter stationed in China for the Los
Angeles Times, wrote a scathing piece in May 2007 entitled “A Shining Model of Wealth
without Liberty”. According to Mann, China “has been coming into its own as the first
full-blown alternative since the end of the Cold War to Washington's model of free
markets and democracy. As the U.S. model has become tarnished, China's has gained
new luster.” Mann credits the rise of the China Model to two parallel developments. The
first has been the foreign policy failures of the United States. “U.S. foreign policy has
been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power and has tied the
spread of democracy to the use of force. Not only has this failed, it has also undermined
support for democracy. U.S. attempts to export free markets and political liberty by force
have been unable to bring even security, much less prosperity” to Iraq and other
countries. “The second key development has been the staying power and economic
success of the Chinese Communist Party.” Mann sees the success and appeal of the
China Model through the lens of national security for the United States. He writes,
“Above all, we should approach China through the lens of our national interest. That
includes not just security and prosperity but our interest in a world with open political
systems and the freedom to dissent. If we don't take China's new model as seriously as
the rest of the world does, we could find that we're the ones on the wrong side of history.
”27
Ian Buruma issued a warning similar to that of James Mann. In a piece entitled “The
Year of the China Model,” he writes, “To come back from near destitution and bloody
tyranny in one generation is a great feat, and China should be saluted for it. But China’s
success story is also the most serious challenge that liberal democracy has faced since
fascism in the 1930’s.” While Buruma does not argue with China’s success he sees
something is glaringly missing: “While individuals have regained many personal
freedoms since the death of Maoism, they are not free to organize anything that is not
controlled by the Communist Party.” What worries him even more is the appeal of the
China model to nasty political players in other parts of the world: “African dictators –
indeed, dictators everywhere – who walk the plush red carpets laid out for them in
Beijing love it. For the model is non-Western, and the Chinese do not preach to others
about democracy. It is also a source of vast amounts of money, much of which will end
up in the tyrants’ pockets. By proving that authoritarianism can be successful, China is an
example to autocrats everywhere, from Moscow to Dubai, from Islamabad to
Khartoum.”28
David Shambaugh, another influential American China watcher, attributes China’s
success to the Chinese Communist Party. In his words, this is “a party that is full of
wisdom and that conducts ceaseless self-reflection on the reasons for failure of other
Communist countries with a firm determination not to follow the same downfall.”29 . In
the cover story for Time entitled “China’s Road to Prosperity”, he writes, China’s
“hybrid model of quasi-state capitalism and semidemocratic authoritarianism —
sometimes dubbed the ‘Beijing Consensus’ — has attracted attention across the
developing world.” However, Shambaugh does question the cost and even danger of the
China model. The China development model is causing both short-term and long-term
problems for China and for the world. They include but not limited to dire environmental
pollution, huge greenhouse gasses emission, serious water poisoning, severe ethnic
tensions, growing gap between the city and the countryside, rising Gini coefficient and
incessant riots in all corners of the nation. Shambaugh still believes the CCP will have
strong grip of the power because it is “remarkably adaptable and open to elements from
different countries and political systems”. It is a hybrid political party “with elements of
East Asian neo-authoritarianism, Latin American corporatism and European social
democracy all grafted to Confucianist-Leninist roots.” 30
Ezra Vogel, former director of the Fairbank Center at Harvard University, was
recently interviewed by a Chinese reporter. During the interview, he was pushed
repeatedly to discuss the China model. Although less severe than Man and Buruma in
expressing his concerns, he does make it clear that he has very strong reservations about
the China model. First, he believes to call China’s development pattern a model is as bad
as labeling America’s rise to power a model. Both nations have different culture,
political system and economic elements. Second, China’s success comes against a
backdrop of little freedom and liberty for individual citizens. It is similar to the situation
in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore when their economy took off. Third, China’s
influence in the world is so much bigger than it was before but China’s appeal to the
outside world will remain limited as long as China does not address political reform
issues. Finally, China’s pursuit of harmony and assumption of responsibility in the world
are very good but the perceived arrogance of China and its large military budget is
causing grave concerns outside China.31
Arif Derlik, a professor of Chinese intellectual history at University of Oregon, does
not think highly of Ramo’s crystallization of the Beijing Consensus. He describes
Ramo's plan as a "Silicon Valley Model of Development" that ignores the fact that the
exploitation of China's labor force by foreign countries is a major part of the Chinese
development. In his critique paper, Derlik does not see this China model has any
sustainability; on the contrary, he sees its possible demise in a short period of time.
Derlik focuses his repudiation of the China model on its economic development and its
political consequences. Toward the end of his critique paper, Derlik writes:
The undeniable success of the development of the Chinese economy should not blind
us to the problems created by the very same success—problems which ironically are in
those very areas that attract the admiration of outsiders. The PRC economy is by no
means integrated but suffers from severe uneven development in both spatial and social
terms. Levels of pollution have reached such severity that they have become an
additional cause of public suffering and disturbance. While there has indeed been a
remarkable growth of wealth in certain sectors of the population, and an explosion in the
size of the urban class, the majority of the population has experienced a decline in basic
welfare.32
Although the Chinese media is working hard to inform the Chinese people that 1) the
Beijing consensus is now being acknowledged by both foreign officials and scholars and
2) it is winning more and more people around the world, its acceptance is dubious at best,
its appeal somewhat questionable and its potential spread a source of grave concern.33
The strange career of “the Beijing consensus” in China
It must be pointed out at the outset that the well informed Chinese do not seem to
accept the idea of a well-defined and well received China model. The People’s Daily on
line launched a poll on the China model in March 2009 during the Second Session of the
10th NPC. The numbers of the ongoing poll clearly shows there is no consensus among
the netizens on the so-called Beijing Consensus. The first question is “Do you believe in
the existence of China Model?” Over 65% (1487) of those who took the poll answered
“no”. Only 369 (16%) believe the China Model has matured.34 If the informed Chinese
public is not engaged in this discourse, who are then telling the epic story of China
providing an alternative to the Washington Consensus? How has it evolved in China?
It is beyond the scale of this paper to map the rise of the China model theory. My
brief survey of the literature seems to suggest that it began as a response to Western
theories such as “China will quickly collapse” and “China is a threat”. In the process, the
Chinese scholars began to develop a new theory to counter these ill-intentioned
prediction of China’s collapse and evil-spirited description of China as a threat, they have
settled on Chinese uniqueness (or China exceptionalism). In 1994, only two years after
Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Justin Lin, an economics professor at Peking University
and current vice governor of the World Bank, and two other scholars published a book
entitled The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. The notion of
a China miracle was first introduced in this book. Five years later, Tsinghua University’s
economist Hu Angang put out an article on China’s economic reform in the journal
Strategy and Management. Hu believes that China possesses a very sound strategy to
develop and sustain its economic development. In 2003, Kang Xiaoguang published an
article in the same journal in which he declares that China’s miraculous success is due to
its “successful transformation” and “successful conservatism” respectively. “Successful
transformation” refers to China’s adoption of the market economy and “successful
conservatism” to China’s strong adherence to the one party rule.35
This discovery of China exceptionalism coincided with the collapse of Communist
powers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European nations and China’s economic
assertiveness. It was also a time when the Washington Consensus introduced by John
Williamson in 1989 did not succeed in reviving developing nation’s economy and when
Westerners began to feel uneasy about an increasingly more powerful China.
Furthermore, there was an urgent need to solve the China riddle: how can one explain
China’s economic development, lifting hundreds of millions of its people from poverty
and sustaining a double digit growth for so long when it resisted successfully changing its
political structure? Joshua Cooper Ramo’s paper came out in 2004 to fill the theoretic
void. Between 2004 and 2005, there were many articles in the Chinese media outlets on
the decline of the Washington Consensus and the rise of the Beijing Consensus. An
article in the 23rd issue of China Economic Weekly in 2004 predicted that the debate of
Ramo’s theory would be become increasingly prominent. A newspaper forum orgainzed
by the 21st Century Economic Report, a newspaper in Guangzhou, invited prominent
scholars such as Justin Lin, Joseph Stiglitz, Fan Gang, Tang Min and Li Daokui to share
their views on both the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus. An article in
the China Reform Forum on April 16, 2005 described the clash of the two consensuses
and its impact on China’s reform.36
By 2008, in the wake of the snow storm in the South, the earthquake in Sichuan, the first
space walk conducted by Chinese astronauts and the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing,
the China model/Beijing Consensus talk has solidified among the Chinese scholars. In
December 2008, Pan Wei, a US-educated professor teaching at Peking University
organized an international conference called “PRC at 60 and the China Model”.37 In the
same month, Wang Shaoguang, another US-educated professor teaching at the Hong
Kong Chinese University, published his speech at the conference at the China Review
web site, defining the China model as PRC government’s keen desire to learn and skillful
capacity to adapt.38
2009 marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Efforts to drum up the
China model pick up momentum.39 In January 2009, Red Flag Article, a journal
affiliated with CCP’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth ran an article on the status of
research on the China model. According to the authors, foreign scholars began to
examine China’s development model since the 1960s. Half way through China’s
economic reform, many of these scholars began to question if an old and autocratic
political system can coexist with a vibrant market economy. However, the advantage and
strength of China’s national mobilization model (juguo tizhi) is so brilliant in overcoming
the difficulties caused by the snowstorm, providing relief to earthquake victims and
hosting the summer Olympic Games, the international suspicion has resided and
criticisms decreased tremendously. 40 In same month, a Chinese national living in France,
Song Luzheng, put out an article that was circulated widely on many Chinese online
portals. He declares in the article that democracy is not invincible but China model is.41
In May, People’s Daily reporter filed a story from the United Nations, using his interview
with a Harvard business school professor to underscore the point that China model is
challenging traditional development theories.42 In June, a Guangming Daily article was
called “Why is the China model so attractive in the world?”43 In July, Zhang Wei-wei,
who once was Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and currently does research in a couple of
European universities, was invited to the People’s Daily online to talk about the China
model and its impact on problems of the world. In his view, the China model is political,
economic and cultural. It is a cornucopia of solutions to most of the problems in the
world.44
Into the summer and early fall, as the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s
Republic draws near, there has been a full court press in the Chinese media to publicize
the China model. In August, the New China News Agency changed the title of an article
penned by Francis Fukuyama in a Japanese journal into “More countries favor the China
model”.45 The cover story of the September issue of Liaowang Newsweekly, one of
China’s most famous current affairs magazines, was on the China model. The article
tries to explain why China is the only nation in the world that has edged out of the
economic downturn and making a huge effort to help other nations to weather it. The
China model works and it may be universal.46 On September 26, Hu Wei, professor and
dean of the School of International Affairs and Public Administration at Shanghai
Jiaotong University, published an article in Jiefang Daily, Shanghai’s Party newspaper,
on China’s model’s special place in the world. Hu Wei writes that the China model is not
only a model for economic development but also a model for political development. It is
the logic result of mankind’s democratic political processes. It is the responsible gift of a
rising power to the troubled world.47
No top Chinese leader has ever been recorded of referring to the China model or the
Beijing consensus in their official speeches or writings. However, this does not mean
they are not approving or endorsing this idea.48 Since 2008, CCP leaders seem to more
and more acknowledge or imply the China model in their speeches and remarks. In
February 2009, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, made some remarks that shocked
the world. When meeting with Chinese Mexicans when visiting Mexico, Xi said that
China did not export revolution, did not export hunger and poverty, and did not create
problems for any countries. Those foreigners who kept nitpicking China should have
better things to do. Although some Chinese intellectuals were upset by the cockiness of
the remarks, many interpreted this as a reflection of growing confidence in the China
model.49
On March 9, 2009, in his speech to the NPC annual session, Wu Bangguo declared that
the socialist political development road of Chinese characteristics is the only correct road
for the Chinese people under the CCP leadership. “While actively absorbing useful
achievements of political civilization of the mankind, we will never ever copy the
Western style of politics, never ever adopt a multiparty system, checks and balances and
a parliament divided by two chambers.”50 Again, Wu, who ranks second in the powerful
Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, did not use the term China model but who can
deny that he sees a vibrant China model in operation?
On January 1, 2009, Qiushi magazine published Hu Jintao’s speech on the outlook of
scientific development. Hu writes that in the article that raising high the flag of socialism
of Chinese characteristics is a must for every CCP member in the nation.51 In July, the
newly created China mega think tank, the China Center for International Economic
Exchanges headed by former State Councilor Zeng Peiyan, had its inauguration meeting
with a specific focus on examining the meaning of the China model during worldwide
economic downturn. In endorsing the conference that was attended by think tank
representative around the world, Vice Premier Li Keqiang delivered a keynote speech52.
In a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on September 20, 2009, President Hu Jintao
says which road of political development a nation chooses is decided by the nature and
circumstances of this particular nation. The socialist road of political development of
Chinese characteristics is a road that has been traveled by the Chinese people under CCP
leadership. It is a road that fits China’s circumstances, follows the global trend,
maintains CCP supremacy, makes people masters of their own country and upholds rule
of law. He repeats what Wu Bangguo said back in March: China does not reject working
governance formula from other countries but will never adopt Western political system in
a wholesale manner.53
Four days later, Hu Jintao was addressing the general assembly of the United Nations.
He mentioned “three insistences” in his speech, namely insisting on making decision in
accordance with Chinese circumstances, insisting on taking the socialist road of Chinese
characteristics, and insisting that building a China that is civilized economically,
politically, socially and ecologically through continuous reform. He says that the more
developed China is the more contribution it will make to the world and the more
opportunities it will provide to the world.54
This brief review indicates that the chorus of the China model/Beijing consensus inside
China is orchestrated by the Chinese government. Many Chinese scholars and media
workers have participated to broaden and deepen the campaign. The top CCP leadership
not only endorses the China model talk but also speaks collectively on the uniqueness of
China’s development model. But why do most of the people polled not support this
brave new model? In fact, a few Chinese scholars have openly criticized the China
model, its impact on China and its possible application outside China. On what grounds
have they rendered their critique? We need to take a quick look at the contents of the
China model/Beijing consensus as specified by the Chinese scholars.
The goods in the Beijing consensus basket
When Chinese officials and scholars describe the China model/Beijing consensus, they
go far beyond Ramo’s initial definition. They simplify the Washington consensus as a
combination liberal democracy and market economy and frame the China model as the
very opposite of it. During a recent interview, Ma Zhengang, China’s former ambassador
to the United Kingdom and president of the Chinese Institute of International Affairs,
said the core of the Western model is political democratization and economic
liberalization. Without political democratization, economic development can be secured.
China has taken a different path and scored big successes. That was why Westerners are
dumbfounded, upset and scared. He then said two very important components of the
China model are a strong and firm CCP leadership and the people’s keen desire to see the
rise of China.55 Fang Ning, director of the Institute of Political Science under the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said that two fundamental characteristics of
the China model are 1) protecting people’s right to pursue happiness and 2) centralizing
power at the top. The first has unleashed people’s energies and initiatives and the second
is the key in improving decision-making process and marshalling resources to achieve
predetermined goals.56 Some scholars go as far as saying that the shaping of the China
model is merely the outcome of applying Marist theory to the special circumstances of
China. Xu Chongwen, a CASS senior researcher said in a recent interview that China’s
contribution to the world is to have sinifyied Marxism and solved problems that cannot
be effectively dealt with by any other ideology or political system in the world. This is a
new path in pursuing progress of civilization, producing a developmental alternative to
the one offered by developed nations whose rise was built on hurting other nations
politically and economically, and securing global harmony and world peace. What else
can explain China’s achievement in becoming the third largest economy and reducing
poverty in such a dramatic manner?57
Hu Wei is more interested in examining the political component of the China model. He
outlines two Western theories in his recent article. One, according to Hu Wei, is that
China is doing relatively well economically but its political development is quite
backward. The other theory is that China cannot sustain its economic growth without
liberalizing politically. He uses Nesbit’s recent book to buttress his view that China has
not only managed to adapt to economic globalization but also weathered the political
challenge from the West. Whereas Western nations have horizontal democracy China
has introduced vertical democracy. Since all democratic nations have different formats
of democracy, China is by all means entitled to have its own democratic system. The
China model should not be narrowly defined as one-dimensional. It includes a unique
political system that will enrich the arsenal of democracy in the world.58
Some scholars see the China model as an epic battle to crush the Western monopoly on
the discourse of development and human progress and to secure a safe place for the
China development experience that can be easily identified and understood by other
developing nations. Wang Hui, a Tsinghua University professor, feels the key to the
success of this battle is CCP’s courage to maintain independence and focus on
developing China in its own unique way.59 Zhang Wei-wei summarizes the China model
as “strong government”, “pragmatic approach”, “people focused” and “gradual reform”.
He even challenges both Chinese scholars and Western experts to identity a single nation
that has used Western political system to have successfully turned itself into a more
advanced nation. In his views, there are two benchmarks to measure if a nation is
successful: elimination of corruption and achieving modernization. He sees three major
trends in the world in the past thirty years. The first is the rise of radical Islam which has
led the current war on terrorism. The second is the so-called third wave of
democratization. Countries that have become democratic during this wave, particularly
Eastern European nations, are now facing serious challenges. The third is the
modernization drive led by China. It has triggered seismic reactions and will eventually
impact the political landscape of the world.60
Other scholars see other unique aspects of the China model. He Xuefeng, an influential
researcher on China’s rural development, believes that China’s economic takeoff is due
to the artificial and deliberate division of urban centers and the countryside. Farmers can
migrate to the cities when jobs are available and return home when life becomes
unbearable. The availability of this large army of cheap labor and the fact that their land
provides a safety valve give China a unique master key to open the door of development
without paying too high a price.61 Zhang Yu, an economics Professor of Renmin
University of China defines China model as 1) combining strong and large state owned
businesses with a vibrant private sector, 2) running a market economy that is subject to
tough state regulations, and 3) opening to the outside world gradually with state control.62
Many believe China model is a comprehensive tool box that can solve different problems,
a set of experiences and practices that can be borrowed and applied by different nations
facing different challenges, and a new paradigm shift whose impact is going to be felt in
many years to come. Pan Wei, who early this year called Chinese scholars to declare war
on the Western civilization, divides the China model into three sub-models, social,
economic and political. The four pillars that support the political sub model are 1) the
adept application of populist democracy, 2) a leadership group that is progressive,
unselfish and unified, 3) a meritocratic civil servant system, and 4) a system of effective
checks and balances and efficient self-corrective capacity. These four pillars make up the
brain of modern-day China. China’s different social structure constitutes the body. The
economic sub model provides two strong feet and huge wings for China.63
Finally, the China model/Beijing consensus is not something that suddenly burst into
China and became the beacon for its development. It is the cumulative learning,
adaptation and exploration by several generations of CCP leaders. It began with Mao’s
heroic effort to choose and pick what was useful for China from the classics of Karl Marx
and Vladimir Lenin. It moved a step further with Deng Xiaoping placing bricks of
pragmatism in Mao’s theoretical warehouse. Jiang Zemin came along and supplied “the
three represents” to the CCP inventory. Hu Jintao introduces the outlook of scientific
development and harmony to this development treasure house. None of the four have
severed the relationship with Marxism but all have made creative and positive
adjustments and contributions.64 As indicated by the CCP Resolution adopted on
September 18, 2009 at the 4th Plenum of the 17th CCP National Congress, 88 years after it
was founded, 60 years after it came to power, and 30 years after it launched reform, the
CCP has transformed China from a weak, poor and pathetic country into a great power of
peace, prosperity and harmony. This is an unprecedented achievement of CCP through
understanding and transforming the world. This is an unsurpassable glory of changing
China and making contributions to universal human progress. Without the CCP, there
would have been no new China, no socialist road of Chinese characteristics. In other
words, the China model is undeniably a CCP invention.65
The lingering doubt about the China model
The China model talk is largely an intellectual exercise conducted away from most of the
informed Chinese. From the CCP perspective, it is something that is very useful in
injecting a sense of pride to the Chinese people and strengthening the legitimacy of the
government. It may also be useful in competing with the West in the area of
development discourse, which used be monopolized by Western scholars and experts. It
further builds a wall against any sinister attempts of “Color Revolution” by evil
Westerners led by Washington. Zheng Yongnian, a China policy analyst and director of
the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore detects Western fear of
the China model. According to Zheng, this fear originates from two primary sources.
First, the rise of China is different from the rise of any other Western nations. Second,
Westerners consider their values as universal and applicable to other nations. When
China rises from a different path, they are concerned that their value system as well as
their way of making economy work and government clean will eventually be replaced by
the China model. Westerners, particularly Americans, are mission oriented. They have
spent large quantity of resources, used huge manpower and even conducted military
operations to expand their democratic system to other countries. When China rises, it has
begun to expand to developing nations with no strings attached. A world fixated on the
China model is a different and possibly scary world. Zheng also sees a third source of
fear which is the simplification of the China model. Many Westerns draw an equal sign
between the China model and China’s poor human rights record, neglect of individual
liberty and non-interference in nations where there are abuses of human rights or
abundant corruption. However, Zheng feels that Westerners should not be terribly
worried by the rise of China and the development path associated with this rise. They
should understand that China’s rise is largely due to a global system established by
Westerners and that each nation is entitled to its own way of developing the economy and
building legitimacy for its government.66 Zheng does not believe the West can contain
the spread of the China model. In his analysis, to block the expansion of the Beijing
model is as futile as the earlier attempt by the West to block China’s economic rise. It is
understandable that British professor Martin Jacques predicts the rise of the middle
kingdom and the end of the Western world but the West can do what China has done in
the past thirty years, i.e. learning from the West while preserving what is still working in
China. Managing international relations is not a zero sum game. If China and the West
work together, a gentler and kinder world may emerge. 67
Not all Chinese scholars are as optimistic as Zheng Yongnian. A few of them have
serious issues with the China model. Some have raised their concerns in a very public
manner. Others may not have the courage or platform to have their voices heard. Ding
Xueliang, a US-educated professor at the Hong Kong Institute of Technology wrote an
article in September 2008 raising the concern that the China model cannot be easily
promoted outside China. Ding centers his concern on two questions: 1) What did this
model achieve? and 2) How did it get there? He believes that the social cost of the China
model is so high that it is impossible for any other nation to adopt it. This sky high cost
is shown in three areas: lack of social justice and fairness, environmental degradation and
administrative cost. Ding writes that in no normal nation where collective bargaining is
not allowed. But in China those who try to bargain and defend their interests will go
straight to jail. Industrial workers are not respected and farmers’ interests are not
protected at all. Under the doctrine of maintaining stability is paramount any Chinese
who dares to take on the government will be harassed and silenced. Environmental
degradation is so serious that it is doubtful if China can overcome its water crisis any
time soon. China’s governance through national mobilization is effective all right but its
cost is mind-boggling and can never be applied in any country where spending taxpayers’
money requires debate and approval. The cost of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was
four and five times higher than that of the Athens and Sydney Summer Games and this
does not include expenses paid by other government agencies in China. Ding uses Hu’s
outlook of scientific development to issue his serious warning: it is perfectly all right to
acknowledge the amazing achievements of the thirty-year-old reform but it is criminal to
be blind to the gigantic cost of these achievements. Without lowering the cost, not only
the China model will be irrelevant to other nations the sustainability of China’s own
reform may be questionable.68
An article in Study Times, a journal edited and published by the Central Party School,
echoes Ding Xueliang’s view. According the author, Qiu Gengtian, there is a price for
any successful experiment. What attracts the world about the China model is the scale
and speed of the economic development; what the world has yet to notice is the high
price China has paid for this economic development. China’s wealth and progress have
indeed come at a huge expense of human and environmental degradation. This is neither
acceptable to China nor tolerable to the world. China must seek a low-cost development
road. Otherwise, the global warning of yet another China threat will be just around the
corner.69 Yu Keping, vice president of the CCP Central Bureau of Translation, does not
think the China model is a finished model. First, China is still in the process of finding
new solutions to sustain its economy. Second, China’s circumstances are so special this
model cannot be easily applied to other nations. 70 Li Jianhua cautions Chinese scholars
not to be so enthralled by the China model and lose perspective. According to him, it is
absurd to try to spread the China model through a think tank summit. It is ironic for a
nation that has always denied universality of any development models to trumpet the
China model as an attractive model to other nations. China itself has suffered a great deal
in adopting development methods from the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand why so
many Chinese officials and scholars are in such a hurry to sell the China model. It is a
dangerous business.71
Wang Jingjun, a doctoral student at Peking University, thinks that there are key
differences between the Beijing consensus and the Washington consensus. Whereas
Beijing consensus is designed to explain what China has done in the past the Washington
consensus is basically a forward looking formula intended for reform and reconstruction.
The Beijing consensus connotes experiences of a developing nation but Washington
consensus sheds light on the practices of a developed nation which is the sole superpower
in the world. While it is hard to say with certainty that the two consensuses are on a
collision course, it is easy to see that the Beijing consensus has the tendency to deny
individual aspirations that are built on universal values such as liberty and equality. 72
Can China move from economic reform which deals with people’s physical survival and
improving living standards to political reform that respects human rights and political
liberty?
The most serious criticism of the China model rendered by the Chinese scholars is the
absence of political reform/democratization components. Gao Ren, a columnist for the
China elections & governance web site, declares that it is a violation of the Hu Jintao
Doctrine of scientific development to say that the China model is perfect for China and
the world. The China model is just going through the stage of primitive molding. It was
not introduced until a few years ago. As it stands now, it is a model that saves no place
for political reform. Without meaningful political reform, this model creates inequitable
distribution of wealth, expands the gap between the rich and the poor, breeds rampant
corruption and turns the Chinese government into an agency that believes superficial
stability is consent to legitimacy.73 In 2006, Yang Guang published an article in the
Journal of Contemporary China in which he questions the absence of political reform in
the China model. In the conclusion of his paper, he writes, “In today’s China, there will
be very few people believing that there is absolute no need for political reform. Political
reform will be launched sooner or later in China and its breakthrough probably will come
when people realize the China model cannot be sustained exactly because it shuns
political reform.74
Tentative conclusions
If we compare the Soviet reform to the China reform, the key difference is that Moscow
began its reform in the political arena and Beijing refused to put political reform ahead of
economic reform. From the Chinese perspective, that is exactly why the Soviet Union
quickly collapsed and China has territorial integrity, one-party supremacy and economic
development miracle. But, this priority shift only came after 1989. When reform and
opening was launched in 1978, Deng had a two-step plan and he believed the success of
all reforms would hinge on the success of political reform. 1989 not only saw the plan of
political reform dashed but also witnessed a hard left turn in the economic sector. This
retreat from reform was finally reversed by Deng in 1992 by which time he was too old
and too tired to push forward his political reform. As China’s economic performance
continues to shine year after year, the CCP, whose top leadership and many rank and file
members are afraid of any real political reform, has begun to push political reform to the
side. The China model/Beijing consensus provides a perfect theoretical framework and a
practical excuse to postpone political reform or even to declare it totally unnecessary.
This is something Joshua Cooper Ramo probably has never expected when he first
introduced the Beijing Consensus in 2004.
The China model/Beijing consensus is neither a sound theory nor a good set of
benchmarks to design reform and measure its success. It is a highly effective system
under the domination of one political party through which resources can be marshaled,
dissent silenced or crushed, land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, international events
paid and organized without looking into any human or ecological cost as long as the
outcome of the activity makes the state and the Party look good. It is a system whose
declared mission is to serve the people but whose possible abuse of power cannot be
checked and balanced. It is a system responsive to the people when pressured but it
always blames the people for all the problems in the society. It is a system whose output
has awed many foreigners, delighted millions of Chinese and appealed to leaders and
elite in other developing countries but the cost of this “miraculous” output is staggering
and long-term. It is a system that does not acknowledge the existence of universal values,
trashes democratic arrangements to hold government officials accountable and sees a
constant Western conspiracy to destroy people’s China. It is a system that recognizes
constant talent at the top, demands total obedience at the bottom and uses incentives or
fear to rein in those in the middle. It is a system that may elevate China to the global
stage of national wealth and power but it will not be able to make China a nation where
individual pursuit of happiness is guaranteed and protected. It is a system that cannot
resolve the tension between an autocratic government and the people who want more say
in their quest for individual rights. The China model is an effective weapon to shatter
political reform need into pieces. The Beijing consensus is an artificial consensus that
democratization will bring about harm and even destruction to China.
Scholars and media workers both inside and outside China have played a very important
role in building the myth of the China model/Beijing consensus. We praise those who
constantly question the validity and applicability of the China model and raise doubts
about its usefulness. We are appalled by those who have joined the China model chorus
without sound judgment or with no judgment at all. When scholars are working with the
state and party apparatus to advance something that may eventually hurt the wellbeing of
the nation and erode the liberty of the people, they are colluding with power in a reckless
way. Many Chinese and Western scholars are trumpeting the China model which, unless
it is modified significantly down the road, will hurt both China and those nations which
decide to experiment with it.
The China miracle is not just an outcome of the China model, of China’s unique political,
economic, social and cultural peculiarities. To a large extent, China’s successes, as
pointed out by Zheng Bijian, are due to existing economic globalization and rule of law,
all achievements of the West currently under the leadership of the United States. The
China model should not be the opposite of this system, defined by the Washington
Consensus. The two development models should complement each other and benefit
from each other. Many Chinese scholars have shown a rare arrogance in describing the
significance of the China model and downgrading the usefulness of the Washington
consensus. What they may not be aware of is that China’s political system and treatment
of its people cannot be easily accepted as it is by the developed Western nations and even
by developing countries. China may never collapse but its way of life can pose a threat to
Western countries and their values. In other words, if China does not change course and
deviates from the now fixed path called the Beijing consensus, it may certainly be on a
collision course with the Washington consensus. It is difficult to predict the fallout of
this collision but it is not going to be pretty. It will be an economic confrontation, a
cultural clash and a war between political systems. For China to avoid this clash, it is
necessary to revive the political reform that was on the CCP agenda but rendered inactive
by the China model. Yes, China will have a democratic system different from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Republic of France, South Africa, Japan or South Korea but
it has to have a system that can be defined as truly democratic.
1
In this paper, the China model and the Beijing consensus are used interchangeably. Sometimes, they are
put next to each other.
2
“Two whatevers” refers to Hua Guofeng’s declaration that 1) Whatever Mao has decided we will carry
through and 2) whatever Mao has said we will obey”. For details of Deng and his supporters’ epic battle to
move China away from old ideology and quest for socialist purity, see Su Shuangbi, “Liangge fanshi shi
zenme bei fouding de” [How the “two whatevers” were negated], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], July 21,
2008.
3
See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. III, p. 164 and 176.
4
For the Chinese language description of the pillars of Deng’s reform, please see “Sixiang jiben yuanze”
[Four cardinal principles] at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_698005.htm; accessed
September 18, 2009.
5
See Xu Yansong, “Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige zhihou de yuanyin fenxi” [Analysis of the lack of
progress of China’s political reform], August 20, 2003 in the China elections & governance web site at
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18837; accessed September 17, 2009. For details of
Deng’s political reform agenda, Xu cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping],
Vol. II, p. 176 and p. 213. The second scholar, Cao Youqin’s article is entitled “Chaozhe deng Xiaoping
sheji de zhengzhi1gaige fangxiang qianjin” [March toward goals of political reform set by Deng Xiaoping],
Zhonggai luntan [China Reform Forum], at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=103302;
accessed September 5, 2009. Cao cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Vol. II, p. 328 and Vol. III, p. 131,
6
The section on political reform in Zhao Ziyang’s historic political report is available at
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=157257; accessed on September 17, 2009.
7
See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.
8
For details of Deng Xiaoping’s talking points during his southern tour, see “Deng Xiaoping nanxun
tanhua yaodian” [Summary of Deng Xiaoping’s talks during the southern tour], People’s Daily online,
February 6, 2006, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=39777; accessed on September 23,
2009.
9
See Qin Xiaoying, “Deng Xiaoping lilun yu hexie shehui” [Deng Xiaoping’s theory and the harmonious
society], Ta Kung Pao, January 26, 2007.
10
See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.
11
For details of the history of direct village elections in China, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of village
elections,” China Perspective, Fall Issue, 2000.
12
For details for China’s slow move toward political reform in terms of changing ideas and adopting new
thinking, see Yu Keping, “Sixiang Jiefang yu zhengzhi jinbu” [Mind emancipation and political progress],
Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], September 17, 2007.
13
For details of political reform advanced by Jiang Zemin at the 6th CCP Congress, see
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=17193; accessed September 17, 2009.
14
Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th CCP Nationa Congress is at
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=120321; accessed September 20, 2009. To see
differences of the political reform agenda of the 13 th CCP Congress and 17th CPP Congress, see Wang Xiao,
“Shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao de bijiao” [Comparing the political reports of the 13th CCP Congress
and the 17th CCP Congress], http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118807, November 16,
2007; acceded September 16, 2009.
15
Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo heping jueqi xindaolu he yazhou de weilai” [The new road of China’s peaceful
rise and the future of Asia], November 23, 2003,
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=157366; accessed September 22, 2009.
16
Zheng Bijian, “Zhonguo gongchandang zai ershiyi shiji de zouxiang”, Renmin ribao [People’s Daily],
November 22, 2005, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=42130; accessed September 19,
2009.
17
See Hong Zhaohui, “Zhongguo tesulun yu zhongguo fazhan lujing” [China uniqueness and China’s path
of development], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 2, 2004 at
http://www.chinayj.net.
18
Qian Gang wrote in his article “Where is ‘political reform” that one of the most prominent developments
was the disappearance of the term “political reform” in current CCP rhetoric. Qian came to this conclusion
through looking at the use and frequency of key words related to political reform in the Party reports,
resolutions and speeches. According to him, “political reform” appeared in the political reports of the 13 th,
14th, 15th and 16th CCP National Congresses but was replaced by “democratic politics” in the political
report of the 17th CCP National Congress. See Qian Gang, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zai nali”,
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118562, November 11, 2007, accessed September
21, 2009.
19
See details at http://joshuaramo.com/beijing-consensus/; accessed September 1, 2009.
20
Quoted in http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/09/15/beijing_consensus/; accessed September 10,
2009.
21
Ibid.
22
Quoted in Zhongguo wei quanshijie tigong le yangben [China has supplied a model for the entire world],
in http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2009-09/07/content_18477114.htm, accessed September 15,
2009.
23
Quoted in Tang Yaoguo, “Jiema zhongguo moshi” [Deciphering the China model], Liaowang xinwen
zhoukan [Outlook Magazine], September 8, 2009.
24
Jiang Guopeng and Kui Jing, “Interview with Brzezinski”, Huanqiu [Globe Magazine], August 12, 2009.
25
Wu Bo and Weng Tianbing, “Nesbit: China Megatrends”, Guangzhou ribao [Guangzhou Daily],
September 9, 2009.
26
Mei Zhiqing and Cao Si, “Zhongguo yi wancheng xiandaihua shishi de sanfenzhier” [China has
completed two thirds of its epic modernization], Nanfang ribao [Nanfang Daily], September 16, 2009.
27
James Mann, “A Shinning Model of Wealth Without Liberty”, Washington Post, May 20, 2007.
28
Ian Buruma, “The Year of the China Model”, Project Syndicate, January 2008, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/buruma8; accessed September 27, 2009.
29
Quoted in Sunny Lee, “Why Chinese Communist Party Lasts”, Korean Times, September 18, 2009,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/09/117_52097.html; accessed September 18, 2009.
30
David Shambaugh, “China’s Road to Prosperity”, Time, September 28, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1924366,00.html; accessed September 18, 2009.
31
Zun Zhongxin, “Hafo zhongguo tong tan zhongguo yanjiu yu zhonguo moshi” [A Harvard China watcher
talks about China research and the China model], Zhongguo shehui kexue xuebao [The China Social
Science Journal], September 21, 2009.
32
http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Position2pdf?fn=PP_Dirlik_BeijingConsensus; accessed
September 18, 2009.
33
A lead article on September 18, 2009 in the tabloid Global Times entitled “The 4th Plenum and PRC 60th
Birthday attracts global attention to the CCP” cites so many quotes to support this claim. It is interesting to
note that when they used David Shambaugh’s series of books to make the point of him warming up to the
idea of China exceptionalism, the word “atrophy” was dropped from the title of his most recent book. See
Ding Gang, et. al., “Quanqiu jujiao gongchandang”, Global Times, September 18, 2009.
34
I used the term “informed Chinese” to include Chinese who are not only well educated but also frequent
the web sites. There are four questions in the poll. Only a significant number of people chose to answer
the first question “Do you believe in the existence of the China Model”. The other three questions are on
the nature and contents of the China model and have been barely answered. The numbers to the first
question on September 24, 2009 are as follows: there is a China model (369, 16.2%); it is a model still in
development (400, 17.5%); there is China model but yet to win official recognition (28, 1.2%) and there is
no China model (1487, 65.1%). The result is at
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/9033838.html; accessed September 24, 2009.
35
For books and articles on China’s possible collapse and China as a threat, see Bill Gertz, The China
Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publisher, 2000)；
Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New
York: Vintage Books, 1994)；Nicholas Kristof, “The China Threat?”, New York Times, December 20,
2003, Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House，2001), Richard
Berstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf，1997). Lin Yifu
et. al., Zhongguo de qiji [China’s miracle] (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), Hu Angang,
“Zhongguo jingji zhengzang de xianzhuang, quanqi qianjing ji changqi qushi”[The current status, shortterm and long term prospect of the Chinese economy], Zhanglve yu guangli [Strategy and Management],
Issue 3, 1999 and Kang Xiaoguang, “Zhongguo teshulun”[Chinese Exceptionalism], Zhanglve yu guangli,
Issue 4, 2004. For a summary of the theory of China exceptionalism, see Hong Zhaohui, “China
Exceptionalism and China’s path for development”.
36
Zhao Xiao, “Cong huashangdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi” [From the Washington Consensus to the
Beijing Consensus], China Economic Weekly, Issue 23, 2004; Wang Zi, “From the Washington Consensus
to the Beijing Consensus”, Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao [21 st Century Economic Report, March 28, 2005];
and Xie Minggan, “Cong huashengdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi jiantan zhongguo gaige jingyan
jiaoxu” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus and lessons of the Chinese reform],
China Reform Forum, April 16, 2005,
http://www.chinareform.org.cn/cirdbbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=2&ID=52455; accessed September 25, 2009.
37
Minutes of this conference were published at Kaifang shidai [Open Times], Issue 4, 2009, pp. 140-148.
38
Wang Shaoguang, “Lun zhongguo zhengfu de xuexi jizhi yu shiying nengli” [On Chinese government’s
mechanism of learning and capacity to adapt],
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=143268; accessed September 22, 2009.
39
A search for articles that contain “China model” in the title at the China elections & governance web site
in 2009 (www.chinaelections.org) generates more than forty entries.
40
Zhuang Junju and Zhang Xili, “Jinqi youguan zhongguo moshi yanjiu guandian zongshu” [A
examination of viewpoints in recent research on the China model], Hongqi wengao [Red Flag Articles],
January 21, 2009.
41
Song Luzheng, “Minzhu bisheng haishi zhongguo moshi bisheng” [Is democracy or China model
invincible], http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=143294, accessed September 23, 2009.
42
Wu Yun, “Zhongguo moshi tiaozhan chuantong lilun” [China model is challenging traditional
development theories], People’s Daily on line, May 8, 2009.
43
Wang Jiabo, “Zhongguo moshi yuanhe dui shijie chongman meili” [Why is the China model so attractive
in the world], Guangming ribao [Guangming Daily], June 27, 2009.
44
Zhang Wei-wei, “Zhongguo moshi beihou de linian ji dui jiejue shijie wenti de1 yingxiang” [The ideas
behind the China model and its impact on solving problems of the world], People’s Daily on line, July 17,
2009.
45
See the Xinhua story at http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=155493; accessed
September 20, 2009.
46
Tang Yaoguo, “Zhongguo jiazhi--Jiema zhongguo moshi: quanqiu weiji zhong de zhongguo re ”
[Deciphering the China model: the China wave amidst global crisis ], Liaowang Newsweekly, September
2009.
47
Hu Wei, “Zhongguo moshi de shenceng hanyi yu shijie yiyi” [The deeper meaning of the China model
and its global significance], Jiefang Ribao [Lieberation Daily], September 26, 2009.
48
When the term “peaceful rise” was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, it was wildly popular. However, it
eventually became “peaceful development” in official speeches and writings. As a Chinese scholar told the
author, Hu Jintao felt the term “peaceful rise” sounds arrogant. By the same token, for top Chinese leaders
to echo China model or Beijing consensus in their speeches does not project an image of modesty. After
all, by many measures, China is still a developing country.
Qin Henhai, “Xi Jinping tong pi” [Zi Jinping criticizes harshly], ifeng.com,
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=143465; accessed September 22, 2009.
50
Wu Bangguo, “Gongzuo baogao” [Work report], xinhuanet.com, March 9, 2009.
51
Hu Jintao, “Guanche luoshi kexue fazhan guan” [Carry out and implement the outlook of scientific
development], Qiushi [Seeking truth], January, 1, 2009.
52
Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], July 4, 2009
53
Hu Jintao, “Zai qingzhu zhengxie liushi zhoiunian dahui shang de jianghua”[Speech on the occasion of
the 60th anniversary of the founding of CPPCC], xinhuanet.com, September 20, 2009.
54
Hu Jintao, “Tongzhou gongji gon chuang weilai” [Let’s build a brave new future together],
chinanews.com.cn, September 24, 2009.
55
See Tang Yaoguo.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
See Hu Wei.
59
See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.
60
See Zhang Wei-wei.
61
See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Yan Shuhan, “Zhongong daolu de shijie yingxiang” [The global impact of the Chinese Road], Liaowang
[Outlook newsweekly], September 8, 2009.
65
CCP Central Committee, “Guanyu dangjian luogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Several major decisions
on CCP construction], September 18, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10128293.html;
accessed September 27, 2009.
66
Zhang Yongnian, “Xifang weihe jupa zhngguo moshi” [Why the West is afraid of the China model],
Liahe zaobao [International Herald Tribune], April10, 2009
67
Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo moshi neng bei xifang weidu ma” [Can the West contain the China
model?], Lianhe zaobao [United Daily], September 9, 2009.
68
Ding Xueliang, “Zhongguo moshi weishenme bu hao tuiguang” [Why is it difficult to promote the China
model], Financial Times Chinese online edition, September 19, 2009.
69
Qiu Gegntian, “Zhongguo moshi de didaijia fazhan zhilu” [The low-cost development road of the China
model ], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], September 14, 2009.
70
Yu Keping, “Zhongguo moshi bing meiyou dingxin” [The China model is yet to be completed], Jiaoyu
yuren [Journal for the Teachers ], Issue 9, 2009.
71
Li Jianhua, “Bubi mangzhe gei fazhan zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo moshi” [No need to busy
ourselves selling the China model to developing nations], Changjiang Ribao [Yangzi River Daily], June 30,
2009.
72
Wang Jingjun, “Zhongguo moshi he zhongguo fazhan zhilu” [The China model and China’s
development road], March 5, 2007, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=103943;accessed
September 18, 2009.
73
Gao Ren, “Mei ren weidu zhongguo moshi” [No one is containing the China model], September 10,
2009, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=156655; accessed September 20, 2009.
74
Yang Guang, “Zhengzhi gaige: zhongguo moshi de nandi” [Political reform: the difficult issue of the
China model], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 10, 2006.
49