17 June 2005
“The European Union's Proposed Intelligence Service”
The Maastricht Treaty seized the opportunity in 1991 to catalyze the European Union
intelligence-sharing process when the Treaty laid the foundations for a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.) including the eventual framing of a common defense. In
addition, on November 14, 1995, in Madrid, assessments were investigated and promises
made to contribute towards enhancing European security and intelligence arrangements
with the conclusion that the development of intelligence cooperation was important for
operational capabilities.
Most important, at the British-French Summit at St. Malo in 1998, it was stated that
intelligence was fundamental to the success of the European Union, and that it must be
given appropriate structures and a capacity for the analysis of situations, sources of
intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning without unnecessary
duplication. This notion was also reinforced in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 in order to
create a policy of planning and an early warning unit.
Moreover, intelligence and security analysts in the European Union member states who
promote the idea of a European common intelligence policy argue that intelligence
collaboration is already taking place successfully around the world: in the E.U. Satellite
Center in Spain; the Situation Center at the United Nations in New York; and the
informal gathering of the Club of Berne in Switzerland. However, the toughest challenge
for the European Union has been the highly sensitive area of intelligence-sharing. The
European Union has decided that from January 1, 2008, any information available in
one country should be available in all other 25 member states. [Emphasis added.]
The Role of an Intelligence Service within the European Union Mechanism
Improving intelligence cooperation is a top priority but, in the long-term, the root causes
of conflicts must be understood and addressed. An emerging intelligence service in the
European Union should have as its most important task the analysis of overtly gathered
information and preparing it for use by policymakers. A first step towards improving
intelligence sharing was the establishment of the Joint Situation Center (SITCEN) for
intelligence analysis within the Council Secretariat. One of its goals is to bring together
experts from both the intelligence and security services.
An emerging intelligence service in the
European Union should have as its
most important task the analysis of
overtly gathered information and
preparing it for use by policymakers.
How a European Union intelligence service might fit in the overall European Union
mechanism and what its shape and role might be is a prospective challenge for the
member states in the coming decades. Eventually, by establishing an intelligence service,
Europe might be able to foresee a situation which could be threatening to the European
Union states such as a crisis in the Balkans or prospective religious turmoil or
biochemical attacks to terrorist acts; the Council of Ministers should be involved as well
by informing appropriately their national intelligence services.
Since the Council of Ministers is the official decision-making body of the European
Union, it should receive reports and analyses from the European Union intelligence
service. However, the problem here is that a minister of foreign affairs might have
difficulties and conflicts in dealing with the foreign affairs of his own country and that of
the European Union at the same time. Of course, there are ways around this; for instance,
the creation of a Committee on European Intelligence could refer directly to the European
Union Commission.
On the other side, the European Parliament would be the one to approve the budget of the
European Union intelligence service. In the U.S., Congress is also responsible for the
approval of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. The European Parliament
could in the future also become the institution to provide oversight over the European
Union's intelligence service operations comparable to U.S. Congressional oversight over
the intelligence community in the United States.
Since the European Union member states address the possibilities of a future European
Army, even if it remains simply a peacekeeping facility, it can be reasoned that they
should also address the creation of an intelligence policy. Reduced duplication and closed
cooperation among the member states offers an opportunity for efficient intelligence
cooperation.
Analyzing the Reasons for a European Union Intelligence Service
The European Union as an entity has become an increasingly important factor on the
Continent since the revival of the European Community through the Single European Act
(S.E.A.) signed in 1986. S.E.A. is the official name for the 1992 program for the opening
up of borders among its members. The European Union, together with the United States
and the United Nations, has also become a force of some importance outside the
European continent.
But the instability of the North African region, as well as in the former Soviet states, will
affect the enlarging European Union. Islamic fundamentalism is reemerging in the North
African states, alongside an increase in terrorism. Southern European Union member
states such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are facing the effects of demographic
trends (via illegal immigration).
The European Union's interior and justice ministers were clearly reluctant to hand over
any major national intelligence function to a European government at a time when ad hoc
arrangements among the major national intelligence services in the European Union -and with the United States -- are currently in the forefront in the campaign against alQaeda and related Islamic extremist groups.
Eventually, the European Union's interior and justice ministers did agree on closer
cooperation on certain security issues, and discussed the appointment of a new counterterrorism coordinator. An important point of agreement between the ministers at the
meeting was to "create a clearinghouse, where for the first time investigating judges,
police, and intelligence services can direct sensitive information which would become
available in real time to all members."
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An important point of agreement
between the ministers at the meeting was
to "create a clearinghouse, where for the
first time investigating judges, police,
and intelligence services can direct
sensitive information which would
become available in real time to all
members."
The various forms of cooperation so far have been based on the secret services of the
major countries. Owing to this fact, it is not surprising that small states deprived of their
own effective intelligence services, which would be capable of recognizing and
neutralizing terrorist threats, are insisting on the creation of a European intelligence
organization. Those small states are also unsatisfied with the present cooperation with the
states bearing such services. On the other hand, the countries with effective intelligence
services, such as the so-called "Big Five" (Italy, U.K., Germany, France and Spain)
which together with the Netherlands and Sweden participate in SITCEN, are against
revolutionary changes in the present system of intelligence cooperation in the European
Union.
Moreover, the Belgian and Austrian governments have suggested creating a European
Union intelligence service modeled on the Central Intelligence Agency in order to fight
terrorism; the interior ministers from the top five European countries were unwilling to
agree on how to share intelligence with all 25 members and other states. And the
European Union's past unwillingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism has caused strain,
in particular with Washington, because of U.S. demands to collect personal data on
airline passengers.
The next step in the process of creating an intelligence service in Europe would be to
distribute tasks according to the operational and informational capacities of a given
national service. For instance, French intelligence has been traditionally interested in
Africa, and Spain in South America, while new members in the European Union are to
some extent experienced with the former U.S.S.R. countries as well as the Balkans and
the Middle East. It would also be possible to make of wider use by the European Union's
analytical and intelligence units of the following: information and non-governmental
analyses as well as research centers, private, scientific and related to economics, which
rely upon open source intelligence.
It would also be possible to make of
wider use by the European Union's
analytical and intelligence units of the
following: information and nongovernmental analyses as well as
research centers, private, scientific and
related to economics, which rely upon
open source intelligence.
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Overcoming Obstacles to the Development of the European Union Intelligence
Structure
European intelligence cooperation to date has been hampered by emphasizing national
sovereignty over shared intelligence. The cooperation that does exist has been largely
confined to imagery collection and analysis using the European Union Satellite Center.
Imagery intelligence is a necessary capability, but an effective European Union
intelligence service will also require cooperation in signals intelligence and human
intelligence, and be able to integrate them in all-source intelligence products.
The second obstacle to integration is the fear of spoiling privileged relationships. Many
N.A.T.O. countries have individual intelligence sharing agreements with the United
States. The French, determined to reduce their dependence on U.S. intelligence
capabilities, are the driving force behind the drive for European autonomy. France
developed the Hellios system with Spain and Italy, and has struggled to obtain German
cooperation in the Hellios 2 program. Leading the intelligence gathering assets are the
Helios series satellites which are optical reconnaissance satellites providing photographic
images down to approximately one-meter resolution. The Helios system is a joint French,
Italian, and Spanish venture and provides data initially to the three participant states.
Institutional obstacles also stand in the way of increased intelligence cooperation.
Intelligence organizations generally believe that no other organization's analysis is as
reliable as their own, which leads them to place more faith and confidence in their own
work. These organizations also tend to view international relations as a zero-sum game,
and may not agree with a cooperative approach to security and defense integration.
Furthermore, the conservative nature of intelligence agencies, coupled with the
bureaucratic lethargy of the European Union, will also act to slow European intelligence
cooperation.
Conclusion
After the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the
concept of considering a European intelligence service becomes more complicated. E.U.
member states will be more hesitant to share intelligence among other member states
under a central intelligence network in the European Union institution.
Nevertheless, a lack of knowledge about potential conflicts on the European continent
could be more costly than maintaining a viable European Union intelligence structure.
The eastern and southern peripheries of Europe are regions with considerable instability.
The Balkan and Persian Gulf crises have been sufficiently traumatic to convey the
message that if the European Union is serious about achieving the objective of a common
foreign, security, and defense policy, the requirement for a common European Union
intelligence policy is critical.
The main tasks of this intelligence structure would be gathering information from the
E.U. states' intelligence services and analyzing it independently. This analysis would
allow the intelligence organization to advise the Commission and the Council on foreign
relations and security issues for prospective conflicts.
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Report Drafted By:
John M. Nomikos
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[21 June 2005]
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