The letter below is an example of a planning objection sent to a

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The letter below is an example of a planning objection sent to a Planning Authority.
This objection focuses only on the lack of need for the proposed incinerator, and
includes references to specific local policies. Please note that specific information
relating to a specific proposal will differ from one proposal to another.
For other relevant resources from UKWIN see: http://ukwin.org.uk/resources/
[Name]
[Address]
[Telephone]
[E-mail]
[Date]
[Name]
Planning Case Officer
[Local Authority]
[Address]
Sent by e-mail to: [Planning Case Officer @ Local Authority]
Dear [Name of Planning Case Officer]
Notwithstanding the matters raised regarding the deficiencies of the applicant’s
Environmental Statement, as outlined in my letter dated [date], I write to object to
application reference XX/YYYY/ZZZZ for a proposed incinerator at [Location].
Whilst there are many valid planning reasons to refuse planning permission for this
proposal, this planning objection relates primarily to the lack of need for this facility,
and covers the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
European Context
National Context
Regional and Local Context
Planning Policy Context
Note: The use of the term ‘incineration’ in this planning objection relates to all
facilities defined as ‘waste incineration plant’ in the Industrial Emissions Directive,
including the type of facility proposed for [Location].
Of course I reserve the right to make further submissions, especially in light of any
responses that might be issued by the applicant in relation to any Regulation 22
questions that might be posed.
I would be grateful if you would acknowledge receipt of this planning objection.
Kind regards,
[Name]
1
1.
European Context
1.1. In relation to waste management, a clear indication of the trajectory envisaged
by the European Commission is provided by the Roadmap to a Resource-Efficient
Europe, which was published on 20th September 2011 by the European
Commission.
1.2. The Roadmap’s 2020 Milestone for ‘Turning waste into a resource’ is
described as follows: “Milestone: By 2020, waste is managed as a resource. Waste
generated per capita is in absolute decline. Recycling and re-use of waste are
economically attractive options for public and private actors due to widespread
separate collection and the development of functional markets for secondary raw
materials. More materials, including materials having a significant impact on the
environment and critical raw materials, are recycled. Waste legislation is fully
implemented. Illegal shipments of waste have been eradicated. Energy recovery is
limited to non recyclable materials, landfilling is virtually eliminated and high quality
recycling is ensured” (emphasis added).
1.3. This is followed by the statement that: “The Commission will [in 2014]:
...Review existing prevention, re-use, recycling, recovery and landfill diversion
targets to move towards an economy based on re-use and recycling, with residual
waste close to zero...” (emphasis added).
1.4. Indeed, a European consultation is already underway that includes the
prospect of a Europe-wide 10% per-stream cap on incineration, alongside increased
requirements for the separate collection of food waste, e.g. for composting /
anaerobic digestion.
1.5. The Roadmap was endorsed by the European Parliament in its 24 th May 2012
resolution on a Resource-efficient Europe, Action 33 of which reads: “[The European
Parliament] Calls on the Commission to streamline the waste acquis, taking into
account the waste hierarchy and the need to bring residual waste close to zero; calls
on the Commission, therefore, to make proposals by 2014 with a view to gradually
introducing a general ban on waste landfill at European level and for the phasing-out,
by the end of this decade, of incineration of recyclable and compostable waste; this
should be accompanied by appropriate transition measures including the further
development of common standards based on life-cycle thinking; calls on the
Commission to revise the 2020 recycling targets of the Waste Framework Directive;
is of the opinion that a landfill tax – as has already been introduced by some Member
States – could also help achieve the above ends” (emphasis added).
1.6. Achieving the aspirations set out above would mean that by 2020 there would
be less waste arisings, far less residual waste, and that incineration would be limited
to non-recyclable non-compostable material. It also points towards the recycling
target of 50% by 2020 being increased and the increased separate collection of food
waste from households and businesses.
1.7. Further indications that Europe is moving away from reliance on incineration
are provided by the following illustrative comments:
2
1.7.1. “We have to have a circular economy concept, so it’s highly important that
we’re pumping back materials into the economy rather than burning or burying
them.” – William Neale, member of cabinet for European Environment Commissioner
with responsibility for waste. Resourcefully efficient (November 2012). Available
from: http://www.resource.uk.com/article/Sustainability/Resourcefully_efficient-2449
1.7.2. “The big challenge is to reduce the amount of waste that is sent for
incineration which could be recycled instead. In the UK there is a decrease in the
proportion of waste that is going to landfill, which is good, but this is still a high
proportion of the total waste…To solve this, the UK should look to reuse and
recycling and not to over capacity of incineration – Countries like Denmark and
Switzerland are burning much more than they should and that’s not good. There is
an opportunity for the UK to take positively; I hope they will move in the right
direction.” – European Commission spokesman. UK edges up European recycling
league table (1 March 2012). Available from: http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latestnews/waste-management/uk-creeps-up-european-recycling-league-table
1.7.3. "...member states such as Germany and Denmark which are heavily reliant on
incineration need to change their focus too, by sending more waste for recycling and
composting..." – Michel Sponar, policy officer with the European Commission’
environment directorate. Commission calls for move up waste hierarchy (16 May
2012).
Available
from:
http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latestnews/legislation/commission-calls-for-move-up-waste-hierarchy
1.7.4. “…There are two major objectives we need to pursue. Obviously, landfill rates
must go down as quickly as possible, but it is also important to switch from energy
recovery to increased recycling. Plastic recycling rates are far too low across Europe
with an average of just 24 per cent. Today, even in countries with high recovery
rates, there is simply not enough plastic available for recycling because most of it
goes to energy recovery. A dominance of energy recovery over recycling is not
acceptable in the medium-term…” – European Environment Commissioner Janez
Potocnik. Any Future for the Plastic Industry in Europe? (21 September 2012).
Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/632&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
1.7.5. “But energy recovery remains far from the top of the waste hierarchy. That is
why we are clear that we must continue to work towards burning only that waste
which cannot be re-used or recycled. Incineration can be one element of a waste
management strategy, but it is not optimal, particularly in the medium term. Member
States seeking to move from the bottom of the waste hierarchy should be careful not
to create over-capacity in incineration by investing heavily in such infrastructure
without creating the conditions for waste reduction, recycling and composting” –
European Environment Commissioner Janez Potocnik Making waste a resource and
moving towards a truly circular economy (7 March 2013). Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-211_en.htm
1.8. Incineration overcapacity in parts of Europe has already resulted in the
closure of some high-profile incinerators, such as the one that used to operate in
Rotterdam, and a dramatic fall in gate fees for incineration in European countries
3
facing overcapacity such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, resulting in a
surge of exports from the UK.
1.9. Before being exported, waste is converted into Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF)
through a process that typically includes drying to reduce moisture content, and this
process reduces its weight. Because the process of converting residual waste into
RDF reduces its weight by on average 25%, the tonnage of RDF reported as being
exported represents only around 75% of the tonnage of waste required to feed these
Continental facilities.
1.10. According to UK Government figures, more than 2 million tonnes of RDF was
permitted for export from the UK in the year ended 31 st March 2012, with even more
export licenses granted in the following financial year. It is clear that many
Continental incinerators need waste from the UK to provide feedstock to meet
shortfalls, and this indicates that there is less need for domestic incineration capacity
in the UK.
1.11. Indeed, Letsrecycle published an article on 12th July 2013, reporting that “A
strong warning against building more energy from waste plants in the UK has come
from one of Germany’s largest waste management companies...Figures produced by
Remondis show the big capacity gap that is now being met by the export of large
volumes of refuse derived fuel from the UK including to companies such as SITA and
Shanks who need the supply of material for their energy from waste plants in
Holland...” This article is available from: http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latestnews/waste-management/rdf-exports-2018benefit-recycling2019
1.12. The article mentioned above focuses on the overcapacity currently being
experienced in Germany and The Netherlands. Northern European incineration
overcapacity is an established fact. I note, for example, that the International Solid
Waste Association (ISWA) website includes the following from 2010: "In the
Netherlands the currently existing incineration plants and those under construction
already provide an overcapacity...Most German studies show an overcapacity
estimated between 2 and 4 million tons...In Sweden the incineration capacity grew
from 2 million to 6 million tons in the last 10 years. In the 2012 the overcapacity will
reach 2 million tons...Van Gansewinkel Groep closed one of its AVR incinerators in
Rotterdam as of 1 January 2010” – Berthoud, M. / Suez Environnement Group
(2010), Final treatment of MSW and C&I waste in Germany and neighbouring
countries. How to cope with emerging overcapacities? Available from:
http://www.iswa.org/uploads/tx_iswaknowledgebase/Berthoud.pdf
1.13. An implication of the situation described above is that, within a European
context, there is no justification for additional UK incineration capacity. Increased UK
incineration capacity would go against the direction of travel being pursued at a
European level.
2.
National Context
2.1. The national waste context is one of falling waste arisings, with anticipated
continuing decreases in residual waste from households and businesses, and
therefore decreasing domestic incineration feedstock. As mentioned above, this is
coupled with increasing RDF export.
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2.2. In February 2013 Defra published a guide that highlights key environmental,
technical and economic issues to raise the level of understanding and debate around
energy from waste. The EfW Guide (“Energy from waste: a guide to the debate”)
acknowledges the Continental incineration overcapacity issue outlined above, stating
that: “...several EU countries currently have overcapacity with more infrastructure
than feedstock”.
2.3. At a nation level, the Guide gives expression to Government policy, stating
that: "In future we are aiming to prevent, reuse and recycle more of our waste, so the
amount of residual waste should go down..."
2.4. The Guide goes on to state: "It is predicted that declines [in waste arisings]
will continue going forward, with government modelling suggesting total waste
generation will fall gradually in the short to medium term, with the pattern varying by
waste stream".
2.5. Similarly, the UK Bioenergy Strategy (DECC, April 2012) states that: “The
amount of residual waste from municipal and commercial sources is expected to
decline gradually to 2030 as policies to encourage better environmental and energy
outcomes succeed (i.e. waste prevention, reuse and recycle)…”
2.6. The Government’s Forecasting 2020 paper (“Forecasting 2020 Waste
Arisings and Treatment Capacity”, Defra, February 2013) includes a conservative
central forecast for overall household and commercial & industrial (C&I) waste falling
by 2020.
2.7. To meet the Government’s goal of One Planet Living expressed in Waste
Strategy 2007, waste arisings would actually have to fall significantly further than the
levels estimated in Forecasting 2020.
2.8. The Forecasting 2020 paper’s central forecast anticipates that by 2020 total
C&I waste arisings will have fallen by around 10% compared with the 2009 baseline,
and the lower forecast anticipates that by 2020 C&I waste will have fallen by more
than 20%. This analysis was used as the basis for the Government’s decision to
withdraw PFI funding for three incinerator projects in February 2013.
2.9. With falling waste arisings and increasing recycling and composting rates, we
can expect quantities of residual waste to decline. National waste policy supports the
notion that waste that can be recycled or composted should not be incinerated.
2.10. The 2007 Waste Strategy for England explicitly states, at Annex K, that:
“…WS2007 makes clear that energy should be recovered only from residual waste
that cannot viably be recycled...”
2.11. The Government Review of Waste Policy in England 2011 (Defra, June 2011)
maintains this policy, stating that: “Our aim is to get the most energy out of genuinely
residual waste, not to get the most waste into energy recovery”.
2.12. The Government has made it clear that it is important to consider whether or
not there will be enough genuinely residual combustible waste of the right
composition to burn throughout the lifetime of a proposed incineration facility.
5
2.13. The Government Review of Waste Policy explains how: “Waste infrastructure
has a long lifetime and therefore changes in the composition and potential volumes
of waste in the future cannot be ignored in the development and selection of
technologies now”.
2.14. This is echoed in the Government’s EfW Guide as follows: "Energy from
waste infrastructure has a long lifetime and changes in the composition and biogenic
content of residual waste over time can affect both how efficiently a plant operates
and its relative environmental impact..."
2.15. With regard to anticipated changes in waste composition, the EfW Guide
notes that: "The composition of waste changes over time as consumption patterns,
reuse, recycling and separate collection practices change", and that: "Some wet
wastes e.g. food are not particularly suitable for energy from waste [incineration]".
2.16. The Guide also acknowledges that: "The potential for energy from waste to
consume materials which could otherwise be managed higher up in the waste
hierarchy is a legitimate concern. This applies to prevention and reuse but is most
commonly identified in relation to recycling..."
2.17. This matter was previously highlighted in a Government statement at the
House of Commons which explained that: “Following the logic of the waste
hierarchy, it is reasonable to ask whether, if we are burning waste, we need not
recycle it...” (Richard Benyon MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. HC Deb, 16 February 2011, c1102).
2.18. The point is, much of what is currently in the residual waste stream is not
genuinely residual, as it could be recycled or composted were the correct
infrastructure to be in place.
2.19. As the EfW Guide puts it: “It is readily acknowledged that many waste
materials that could theoretically be recycled are not currently, and go to energy
recovery or landfill. It is important that the presence of energy recovery as an option
does not diminish efforts to overcome the range of barriers to capturing and recycling
these...”
2.20. As far back as September 2008 the Audit Commission, at paragraph 140 of
their report entitled “Well Disposed”, pointed out that: “Around 70 per cent of
household waste is readily recyclable…”
6
2.21. This is in line with comments made more recently by Phillip Ward, Nonexecutive Chair of Resource Futures, who stated: “…black bag waste is not a single
material. Resource Futures are the holders of comprehensive information about its
composition and their study – published by Defra – shows that it is largely made up
of regular recyclable materials and much of it is non-combustible” (Reshuffling the
waste hierarchy. Phillip Ward, September 2012).
2.22. Drawing on Defra’s Municipal Waste Composition: A Review of Municipal
Waste Component Analyses, published in March 2009, Eunomia’s Peter Jones
commented that: “Defra composition data on household waste shows that nearly
50% is made up of dry recyclables: paper, plastics, glass, card, metals and textiles.
A further 18% is food waste and 14% garden waste. All of this material should
reasonably be regarded as recyclable or compostable” (Reading the resource
roadmap. Peter Jones, July 2013).
2.23. Waste consultancy Eunomia Research & Consulting Ltd. publishes biannual
reports modelling the quantity of residual waste generated against existing and
forthcoming treatment infrastructure to determine where capacity gaps exist across
the UK. The fourth issue of Eunomia’s Residual Waste Infrastructure Review was
published in June 2013.
2.24. According to Eunomia’s Principal Consultant and lead author of the Review,
Adam Baddeley: ”The data presented in the Review draws upon Eunomia’s in-house
research, which is updated on an on-going basis. Eunomia’s databases hold
information on every residual treatment facility in the country, including those in the
planning system, and has data on facility capacity, current feedstocks and local
authority collected (LAC) waste contracts held”.
2.25. The June 2013 Residual Waste Infrastructure Review shows that in the UK
there is approximately 18.2 million tonnes of residual waste treatment capacity either
‘operating’ or ‘under construction’.
2.26. If one combines Eunomia’s central forecast with the 2015 and 2020 central
trends for English waste arisings set out in the Government’s Forecasting 2020
paper then it is forecast that there will be more residual waste treatment capacity
than residual waste arisings by 2015. This is demonstrated by the chart overleaf.
7
2.27. The chart above is adapted from Figure 4 of Eunomia’s report, with the red
and blue lines added to take account of the Forecasting 2020 trend. The red line
applies the total waste arisings trend based on the central trend of the Government’s
Forecasting 2020 paper. The blue line and circle shows that this figure will match all
of Eunomia’s treatment capacity forecasts by 2015.
2.28. Eunomia’s approach to calculating residual waste treatment overcapacity is
based on assessing the forecast arisings for a given year alongside the forecast
treatment capacity for that year, and calculating whether residual treatment capacity
is higher than available waste.
2.29. An alternative approach is to compare existing/anticipated residual waste
treatment capacity with anticipated future quantities of available combustible
genuinely residual waste. As there is currently significantly more incineration
capacity (operational and under construction) than current and future available
combustible genuinely residual waste, then in accordance with this approach we can
conclude that there is already incineration overcapacity in the UK.
2.30. As residual waste arisings in the UK are expected to continue to decline, there
will be increasingly less feedstock available for incineration, and increasing problems
associated with domestic overcapacity. As such it is vital for any proposal for new
incineration capacity to be required to robustly demonstrate the availability of
feedstock throughout the anticipated lifetime of the proposed facility.
2.31. The applicant fails to demonstrate need for their proposed incinerator. It is
reasonable to conclude that in relation to the waste context in the UK, the proposed
incineration facility is not needed for the management of residual waste.
8
2.32. Lessons can be learned from the experience of incineration in Sheffield,
where despite the fact that Veolia’s Sheffield incinerator is part of a long-term waste
management contract with the Local Authority, and despite the involvement of a
major waste company (with resources and contacts far in excess of those available
to the applicant), and despite the dampening effect of the Sheffield incinerator on
Sheffield’s recycling rates, the operator has experienced feedstock shortfalls that
they could not make up through the use of commercial and industrial waste.
2.33. In 2002 Onyx (now Veolia) promised the city of Sheffield that incineration
capacity of 225,000 tonnes was essential to manage primarily household waste
arising in Sheffield. Sheffield residents never produced the predicted quantity of
waste for incineration, and so Veolia attempted to top-up with Commercial and
Industrial (C&I) waste.
2.34. Veolia’s 225,000 tonne per annum Sheffield incinerator opened in 2006. In
2008 an application was made to amend Planning Condition 3 which limited them to
taking no more than 10% of its input from outside the city.
2.35. Veolia failed to find sufficient C&I waste from Sheffield, or from further afield,
i.e. within a radius of more than 15 miles from Sheffield, and so in 2008 Veolia
returned to Sheffield City Council's Planning Committee with an application to vary
their planning condition so that Veolia could accept household waste from
Rotherham, Barnsley, Doncaster and parts of North Nottinghamshire and North East
Derbyshire.
2.36. In relation to Veolia’s 2008 application to vary the planning condition they
were asked for clarification by Sheffield City Council, which Veolia responded to in a
letter dated 13th May 2008.
2.37. In response to the question: “The submission should review the original
incinerator capacity assumptions and clearly explain the reasons why the actual
throughput as turned out to be different. Is this all down to the growth in recycling?” it
was stated by Veolia that: “With planning permission granted in 2002 for the now
operational Sheffield Energy Recovery Facility, it is evident that waste arisings have
not grown as quickly as was assumed at the time the planning application for that
development was made. Recycling rates have exceeded projections and will
continue to do so particularly with Sheffield City council's desire to increase recycling
well beyond 25%”.
2.38. In response to the question: “...When the original application was considered
the incinerator capacity was tested against higher recycling rates, up to 45%. It was
argued that if this were to occur the (sic) that the capacity gap could be filled with up
to 80,000 tonnes of commercial waste. It is now being arguing that this level of
commercial waste is a problem” Veolia replied that: “...The composition [of]
commercial wastes today do not reflect the circumstances which prevailed in 2001”.
9
2.39. The letter from Veolia also explained how they were experiencing difficulties
obtaining incinerator feedstock from nearby Waste Authorities because those
Authorities were contractually bound to send their waste elsewhere, and that the
Sheffield incinerator experienced notable inefficiencies to the energy generating
process due to burning unsuitable C&I waste.
2.40. In December 2010 Veolia was granted temporary permission by Sheffield City
Council to “receive up to 50,000 tonnes of waste from outside of the Sheffield Waste
Disposal Area, namely Rotherham, NE Derbyshire, Barnsley and Chesterfield” for six
years from the 23rd May 2011 (ref. 10/03861/FUL).
2.41. In 2012 Veolia returned once again to the Council to ask for permission to
import an additional 15,000 tonnes to be taken from outside of the Sheffield Waste
Disposal Area. Veolia were subsequently granted planning permission to import
65,000 tonnes a year from further afield, including from Doncaster, Bolsover,
Bassetlaw, Newark and Sherwood, Amber Valley, Derbyshire Dales, High Peak,
Ashfield and Mansfield, and this variation was made permanent to reflect Veolia’s
anticipation of on-going difficulties sourcing feedstock for the Sheffield incinerator.
2.42. According to Veolia’s 2012 planning application (ref. 12/03137/FUL): “As part
of the 2010 Planning Variation a report was commissioned...to attempt to establish
an accurate volume of C&I waste which could be used to inform the likely future
inputs to the ERF [Energy Recovery Facility]. This report concluded that in 2006/7
(the latest available data at the time) Sheffield businesses produced an estimated
654,000 tonnes, of which it is estimated that following recycling/composting only
130,500 tonnes of C&I waste would be suitable feedstock material at the ERF…This
theoretical figure is, however, considered to be an absolute maximum…The
theoretical figure however fails to recognise the significant competition for a limited
volume of waste from other competitors within Sheffield – competitors both big and
small who are competing for the same tonnage. This also involves competitors
coming into the Sheffield area from neighbouring districts such as Doncaster,
Rotherham, Bassetlaw and Chesterfield. As a consequence only around 60-70,000
tonnes per year of the potentially suitable C&I waste feedstock [i.e. only about 10%
of the total C&I arisings] is assessed as being available to the ERF”.
2.43. Veolia’s submission went on to state that: “…As set out previously, VES
previously commissioned a study conducted by RPS...which estimated that only
45,000 tpa of Sheffield’s suitable C&I waste is actually available to the ERF…Of the
C&I waste that is landfilled, it is acknowledged that a proportion of it would not be
suitable for use at the ERF…In view of the success of MSW recycling and waste
minimisation initiatives within Sheffield, the facility has had to increasingly rely upon
top-up C&I waste (trade waste) feedstock. However, owing to a combination of a
drive to minimise wastes and recycle greater volumes, allied with the economic
slowdown, along with the unrestricted and highly competitive nature of the C&I waste
market in Sheffield, the amount of suitable C&I waste available to the ERF has fallen
to approximately 45,000 tpa. It is anticipated that the C&I waste arisings may fall
further as landfill diversion initiatives are rolled out across the City”.
10
2.44. In December 2012, in response to questions from Sheffield City Council,
Veolia argued that diverting C&I from landfill to incineration was fraught with
difficulties: ”…The estimated 2012 inputs to Parkwood Landfill are largely unsuitable
for the ERF with approximately 80k tpa of waste which is clearly unsuitable for ERF
(including non-combustibles, sludges, soils, glass and other inerts) and around 136k
tpa of residues from waste treatment processes (derived from waste across the UK)
including some non-combustible residues and other residues which have historically
been shown to be unsuitable for the ERF (eg due to its high Cv [calorific value]
content). Much of this material is derived from other facilities/businesses operated by
the landfill operator and, even if it is technically suitable for the ERF, is effectively not
commercially available...”
2.45. Veolia concluded that: “Without considering the commercial issues and
existing catchment restrictions, the RPS 2011 study which accompanied the 2011
Application to Vary Condition 3 of the Planning Permission estimated that only
around 10% of Parkwood’s Landfill inputs in 2006 were suitable for the ERF….”
2.46. Whilst Veolia cite higher than anticipated recycling rates in Sheffield as one
explanation for their incinerator feedstock shortfall, the Local Authority Collected and
Household recycling rate for Sheffield City Council is amongst the worst in England.
Incineration
rate ranking
(of 123)
Recycling
rate ranking
(of 123)
% incinerated
% recycled
Council of the Isles of Scilly
1
120
80%
20%
Westminster City Council
2
123
78%
13%
Lewisham LB
3
122
74%
17%
Birmingham City Council
4
118
71%
24%
Slough Borough Council
5
107
63%
30%
Western Riverside Waste
Authority
6
117
62%
24%
Portsmouth City Council
7
114
62%
28%
Kirklees MBC
8
103
60%
35%
Southampton City Council
9
116
60%
25%
Redcar and Cleveland Borough
Council
10
79
60%
38%
Stockton-on-Tees Borough
Council
11
105
59%
34%
Sheffield City Council
12
111
58%
28%
North East Lincolnshire Council
13
98
57%
35%
Dudley MBC
14
101
56%
35%
Nottingham City Council
15
106
56%
32%
City of London
16
119
56%
23%
Coventry City Council
17
92
55%
37%
Middlesbrough Borough Council
18
102
55%
35%
11
2.47. Indeed those Local Authorities with the highest rates of incineration are
consistently amongst the poorest performers for recycling, as per Defra Local
Authority Collected and Household Waste Statistics 2011/12 (see table on page 11).
2.48. With regard to the Local Authority Collected Waste Management Statistics for
England – Final Annual Results 2011/12, used for the table on page 11, Defra
commented that: “At Local Authority level, individual recycling rates ranged from 14
per cent to 69 per cent…lower rates could result from an authority focusing on
avoiding landfill by investing in incineration and targeting its waste management
policies on that treatment solution, rather than poor recycling awareness or
initiatives”.
2.49. This is consistent with the statement in Defra’s EfW Guide that: "At the more
local level the risk that energy from waste can compete with, not complement,
recycling does exist..."
2.50. Lessons that can be learned from Sheffield and applied to the proposed
incinerator include the notion that applicants for incineration facilities can significantly
overestimate the supposed need for their proposed facility, e.g. through inaccurate
predictions and assumptions about future waste arisings, with future reductions in
residual waste arisings underestimated and the availability and suitability of
alternative sources of feedstock for the proposed facility overstated.
2.51. As such, claims about the purported need for a proposed facility confidently
made by applicants at the time of an initial planning application should be given little
or no weight.
2.52. An implication of the national situation described above is that, within a
national context, there is no justification for additional incineration capacity in
[Location].
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3.
Regional and Local Context [This example is based on a proposed
gasification-type incinerator in the North West Region, and requires
substantial change to apply to other regions and technologies]
3.1. The Merseyside and Halton Waste Partnership (MHWP) comprises St Helens
Metropolitan Borough Council alongside partners Halton Borough Council, Knowsley
Metropolitan Borough Council, Liverpool City Council, the Merseyside Recycling and
Waste Authority, Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council and the Metropolitan Borough
of Wirral.
3.2. MHWP recently announced that Sita was selected as their preferred bidder for
the 30-year Waste Resource and Recovery Contract. This Contract obliges St
Helens to send Local Authority Collected Waste (LACW) to facilities managed by
Sita. Sita’s proposal includes sending St Helens’ residual LACW waste to an
incinerator at the Wilton International site in Teeside.
3.3. Furthermore, the other Local Authorities within the North West Regional
already have their own plans for managing LACW, and these do not include sending
residual waste to the proposed incinerator.
3.4. It is therefore reasonable to assume that no LACW from Merseyside and
Halton Waste Partners, or indeed from any Local Authority in the North West Region,
will be available to feed the proposed incinerator.
3.5. As very little construction and demolition waste is actually combustible, it is
reasonable to assume that the only potential source of incinerator feedstock would
be from Commercial and Industrial (C&I) sources.
3.6. In this regard it is noteworthy that the Environment Agency's March 2010 C&I
waste survey of the North West Region concluded that: “…the recorded data
suggests that up to 97.5% of the C&I waste landfilled in the [North West] region
could be recycled if the correct facilities and services were available” (North West of
England C&I Waste Survey 2009 for the Environment Agency. Urban Mines, March
2010).
3.7. As UK law now requires C&I waste be managed in accordance with the waste
hierarchy, there is no justification to expect quantities of C&I waste to be available to
feed the proposed incinerator.
3.8. The proposed gasification-type incinerator would be designed to burn RDF.
The process of converting residual waste into RDF reduces its weight by on average
25% (and in some cases up to 50%, depending on the moisture content and
moisture loss). As such, the quantity of ‘pre-RDF’ waste that would need to arise to
feed the proposed incinerator would need to be higher than the proposed facility’s
RDF-burning capacity.
3.9. Incinerators will only operate under certain feedstock conditions, and these
conditions are far more restricted for gasification than for mass burn incinerators. As
such, the proposed facility would require feedstock of a narrow range of
compositions, calorific values, etc.
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3.10. Not only has the applicant failed to demonstrate that there would be sufficient
quantities of suitable feedstock available for incineration at their proposed facility, but
they have also failed to provide a description of the qualities that that feedstock
would need to exhibit.
3.11. As the September 2011 report produced by Urban Mines, entitled “Rubbish
Economy – A Review of Business Waste production in England: Past, Present &
Future”, explains: “…increasing recycling from residual waste is likely to remove high
calorific value materials from that waste stream, such as paper, plastics, wood, etc.
This would reduce the calorific value of residual waste over time, potentially
changing its suitability for energy recovery”.
3.12. Of course, the potential feedstock that might be available for the proposed
facility depends not only on the availability of genuinely residual combustible material
of a suitable composition, but also on the ability of the would-be operator to secure
that waste. The existence in the North West Region of operational, underconstruction and consented competing facilities casts doubt, as does the robust
Continental market for RDF detailed above.
3.13. A consideration that is material to the determination of this planning
application is therefore the existence of other facilities that could manage the same
material. It is therefore worth noting that in the North West Region alone there is
around 2.5 million tonnes of residual waste treatment capacity either operating or
under construction, and around 3 million tonnes of further capacity that has received
planning permission.
3.14. The applicant, Waste to Energy (NW) Ltd., does not have a proven track
record when it comes to securing large quantities of C&I waste, and indeed neither
does gasification. As the Government’s EfW Guide says in relation to gasification:
"Its advanced use with a mixed waste feedstock has not been proven on a
commercial scale".
3.15. In addition to suffering from all the usual problems associated with
incineration, gasification is particularly ill-suited to meeting waste treatment or energy
needs because the technology does not work for the intended feedstock, with
existing demonstrator projects only demonstrating that it is unlikely ever to work. This
is evidenced by the catastrophic failures of the Batch Oxidation Gasification System
in both Scotland and Iceland.
3.16. Even if there were a need for additional residual waste treatment capacity to
treat C&I waste in the North West Region, it has not been demonstrated that the
proposed facility is a viable, let alone optimal, residual waste management solution,
especially in light of the proposed facility’s position at the very bottom of the Waste
Hierarchy (see below).
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4.
Planning Policy Context
4.1. The applicant makes repeated references to the Regional Spatial Strategy,
which was in fact revoked on the 20th May 2013. This increases the importance of
compliance with both national and local planning policies.
4.2. One of the most important planning policy considerations regarding the
determination of this application is the proposed facility’s rightful position within the
Waste Hierarchy.
4.3. If the facility is a disposal operation, then not only does it sit at the very bottom
of the Waste Hierarchy, at the same level as landfill, but it brings Paragraph 25 of
PPS10 into play.
4.4. Paragraph 25 of the Planning Policy Statement on Waste (PPS10) states that:
“In the case of waste disposal facilities, applicants should be able to demonstrate
that the envisaged facility will not undermine the waste planning strategy through
prejudicing movement up the waste hierarchy”.
4.5. In this instance the applicant has not even attempted to argue that their facility
would not displace incineration activities that would qualify as recovery, let alone
provide evidence that all of the waste that the facility is intended to process could not
be reduced, re-used, recycled or composted.
4.6. As such, it is clear that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the facility
would not prejudice movement of waste up the waste management hierarchy in
contravention of the waste planning strategy, and therefore the proposal goes
against national planning policy.
4.7. Despite intimations to the contrary, advanced by the applicant, the proposal is
for a disposal facility, and not for a recovery facility (as defined in planning policy and
associated Directives, legislation and regulations).
4.8. To quote once more from the EfW Guide: "The distinction between having R1
[recovery] status or having a plant being classified as a disposal facility is important
for planning purposes and in the application of the proximity principle. It is therefore
important that operators strive towards demonstrating that energy from waste is a
recovery operation according to the WFD [Waste Framework Directive] definitions.
Interested operators should contact the relevant competent authority who, based on
an application from the operator, will assess whether or not a municipal solid waste
combustion facility meets or exceeds the threshold and can be considered a
recovery operation".
4.9. As the EfW Guide makes clear, the Environment Agency (EA) is the
competent authority for England that decides whether an incinerator qualifies for
recovery (R1) status, and that in the absence of a determination from the EA that the
proposed facility is a recovery operation, that facility is classified in law as a disposal
operation, and incineration at such a facility would be disposal under the waste
hierarchy.
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4.10. Plan-makers and decision-takers should not assume that incineration is, or
would be, ‘recovery’ in the absence of mechanisms to ensure that the incinerator
would in fact be a recovery operation.
4.11. If, and only if, the applicant has provided an appropriate provisional R1
recovery certificate, or undertakes to provide one prior to construction (with an
appropriate planning condition requiring this), and agrees to a condition that requires
the facility to remain an R1 operation throughout its operation, then the planning
consultation and subsequent planning decision can proceed on the basis of treating
the proposed incineration facility as a recovery operation. Otherwise, the proposed
facility must be consulted upon and decided on the basis that the proposal is one for
a disposal operation (with all of the relevant planning and policy implications, e.g. in
relation to PPS10 Paragraph 25).
4.12. In this case the applicant has not provided a provision R1 Certificate, has not
accepted a planning condition requiring that they obtain such a certificate prior to
construction (let alone a condition that they could not operate the facility in the
absence of full R1 certification), and has not provided the technical information that
would be necessary to determine that the facility would be likely to operate as a
recovery operation (e.g. that it would meet or exceed the R1 threshold).
4.13. As such, the development should be considered a disposal operation and the
fact that the facility is at the bottom of the waste hierarchy should be taken into
account in any consideration of need (although if the facility were recovery it would
still not be needed).
4.14. As the applicant concedes: "Policy WD1 of the St. Helens Unitary
Development Plan (UDP) states that applications for waster transfer, treatment and
disposal facilities will only be permitted if they meet several criteria, one of which is a
demonstrable need for the facility".
4.15. Paragraph 2.120 of the 2013 Joint Waste Local Plan (covering Halton
Council, Knowsley Council, Liverpool City Council, Sefton Council, St.Helens Council
and Wirral Council) states: "...the Merseyside and Halton districts need to be
satisfied that they do not become net importers of waste on a significant scale".
4.16. At Paragraph 5.65 of the 2013 Joint Waste Local Plan we read: “Merseyside
and Halton is in the unusual position of having a significant amount of consented and
available EfW capacity within the sub-region which exceeds the identified EfW
management need by over 450,000 tonnes of refuse-derived fuel (RDF). Whilst there
is no guarantee that all the consented capacity for EfW will either be built or be
available to Merseyside and Halton, there is sufficient capacity to meet the identified
needs".
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4.17. These policy statements weigh heavily against the proposal, as does Policy
WM 14 - Energy from Waste:
“1. All proposals for EfW facilities will be assessed in relation to
operational and consented capacity within the Plan area and the
requirement for new facilities. Planning applications for such proposals
must demonstrate that existing operational and consented capacity
cannot be accessed to meet the identified need or in the case of Local
Authority Collected Waste that it is not suitable for the purposes of
MRWA.
Account must be taken of: The contractual position for Local Authority
Collected Waste and the outcome of any MRWA procurement process to
meet the treatment needs of the Plan area; Operational EfW capacity
within the Plan area, and; Existing consents for EfW within the Plan area
and availability of that consented capacity to meet the needs of the Plan
area.
2. EfW proposals must meet the waste management needs of the Plan
area and will be required to provide combined heat and power unless it
can by demonstrated that this requirement would prevent important
waste infrastructure being brought forward.
3. All proposals for EfW must comply with policies WM12 and WM13”.
4.18. Paragraph 5.68 of the Joint Waste Local Plan makes explicit that: “...the
evidence base...clearly demonstrates that Merseyside and Halton has sufficient EfW
capacity to meet its LACW and Commercial and Industrial Waste (C&I) needs, and
that it also has some capacity to contribute to regional capacity needs."
4.19. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that their proposed facility would meet
an identified local or regional need, and as such the application should be refused.
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