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MILITARY/POLICE DICHOTOMY 1NC SHELL ................................................................................................. 2-5
WITHDRAW POLICE LINKS ................................................................................................................................. 6-7
WITHDRAW MILITARY LINKS ......................................................................................................................... 8-10
DICHOTOMY LINK ............................................................................................................................................ 11-13
“AND” LINKS ........................................................................................................................................................... 14
“AND/OR” LINKS...................................................................................................................................................... 15
IMPACT EXTENSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 16-18
ALTERNATIVE EXTENSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 19
DISCOURSE KEY ................................................................................................................................................ 20-21
KRITIK TURNS CASE ........................................................................................................................................ 22-24
A2: distinction between police and military key ......................................................................................................... 25
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A) Link: The Affirmative’s PLAN TEXT re-enacts the dichotomy of military and police,
assuming the two terms to be distinct—this framing lens obscures the common core of
uncategorizable violence and renders resistance to this new strategy and technique of
justifying war and murder
Kraska 2007 (Peter B. Kraska. Professor and Senior Research Fellow, College of Justice and Strategy, Eastern
Kentucky University, USA. “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” December 13,
2007. Policing Journal (2007): pam065v1-pam065.
http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pam065v1#B15. MR)
This work examines the blurring distinctions between the police and military institutions and between war and law enforcement. In this article,
the author asserts that understanding this blur, and the associated organizing concepts militarization and militarism, are essential for accurately
analyzing the changing nature of security, and the activity of policing, in the late-modern era of the 21st century. Simplicity is comforting.
Modernity's basic dichotomies such as fact/value, private/public, and national/international simplify our thinking
and lull us into intellectual complacency. Police academics in the United States, with only a few exceptions, have been quite
comfortable with the military/police dichotomy. The US military handles external security through the threat and practice of war.
The civilian police handle internal security through the enforcement of federal and local laws. Most assume that studying the police
and military is a mutually exclusive undertaking. Taking this dichotomy for granted is understandable given that
the clear demarcation between the police and military has been considered a preeminent feature of the modern
nation-state (Giddens, 1985). The failure of a government to clearly demarcate the two is usually seen as an
indicator of repressiveness and lack of democracy. My research and writing has been challenging this dichotomy since the late
1980s. Its central thesis has remained steadfast, and may be viewed at this point in history as an obvious point to the keenly observant: we have
been witnesses to a little noticed but nonetheless momentous historical change–the traditional distinctions between military/police,
war/law enforcement, and internal/external security are rapidly blurring. Over the past 15 years, I have researched and traced the evolution
of two interrelated trends that embody this blur: the militarization of US police and crime control, and the policeization of the US military. Empirical indicators of these converging trends include the following:the significant erosion of
the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act by the United States, which previous to the early 1980s prohibited the military involvement in
internal security or police matters, except under the most extreme circumstances, leading to an unprecedented level of US
armed forces' involvement in internal security matters; the advent of an unprecedented cooperative relationship
between the US military and US civilian police at both the highest and lowest level of organization, including
technology transfers, massive military weapons transfers, information sharing between the military and police targeted at
domestic security, a close operational relationship in both drug control and terrorism control efforts, and a high level
of cross-training in the area of special weapons and tactics team (SWAT) and counter-civil disturbance, counterinsurgency, and
antiterrorism exercises; the steep growth and normalization of police special operations units (e.g. SWAT teams) that are
modelled after (not identical to) elite military special operations groups; a growing tendency by the police and other segments of
the criminal justice system to rely on the military/war model for formulating crime/drug/terrorism control rationale and operations; and a
redefining of criminality to ‘insurgency,’ and crime control to ‘low-intensity conflict’—requiring counterinsurgency measures carried out by both the US military and civilian police . This article submits that understanding this
blur, and the associated organizing concepts militarization and militarism, are essential for accurately analyzing the changing nature of security,
and the activity of policing, in the late-modern era of the 21st century. Police leaders, in particular, will have to be increasingly cognizant and
wary of the implications and potential consequences of this convergence, and the attendant social forces of militarism and militarization. The
aim of this article, then, is to expose and sensitize the reader to what we might call a martial theoretical orientation.
The idea here is to employ this orientation as a type of conceptual lens, or interpretive construct, which when
peered through, will help us assess and accurately make sense of current trends in the police institution, the
activity of policing, crime control, and warfare. The concepts in which I have centered the bulk of my work are ‘militarization’
and ‘militarism.’ Despite these terms' pejorative undertones for some, they are most often used in academe as
rigorous organizing concepts that help us to think more clearly about the influence war and the military model
have on different aspects of society. Assessing whether a civilian police force, for example, is becoming ‘militarized’ should not be
viewed as an antipolice or an antimilitary pursuit.
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B) Impacts: This new uncategorizable violence culminates in “infinite wars” of genocidal
violence – Turns case
Duschinski, 2009 (Hayley, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Ohio University, “Destiny Effects:
Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley.” Anthropological Quarterly volume 82,
issue 3, Accessed Project Muse, Written 2009, accessed 1 June 2010) SS
The post-cold war era has been heralded as the age of triumphant neo-liberalism, marked by global shifts to privatization, deregulation, and free
market orientation that are frequently assumed to bring about a more equitable and just world order. These expansions of neoliberal
market economies have been tied to the emergence of new forms of inequality, dis-enfranchisement, and violence,
with national security states increasingly using interlinked strategies of militarization and penalization to exercise
coercive control over marked segments of their populations. Such techniques of governance may be initially posed
through legal provision as states of emergency—temporary and provisional measures for managing an urgent or
exceptional problem—but they linger indefinitely as infinite wars, wars without end, with crippling consequences
for local people. The political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his discussions of sovereignty and the exception, identifies such
paradoxical state practices as "legal civil wars" that allow for the elimination of political enemies as well as entire
segments of the population that cannot be integrated easily into the political system (2005:2). In this article, I examine the
ongoing legal civil war in Kashmir Valley in India in order to demonstrate how the militarization of everyday life allows for the elimination of
those segments of the population identified as "threats to national order" and incarcerated, literally and figuratively, as prisoners of the state.
These processes of exclusion cast Kashmiris as enemies existing simultaneously inside and outside of the national political community with
questionable and suspect loyalties, motivations, and inclinations. The suspension of rights to this marked category of the
citizenry is legitimized—legally, politically, and culturally—through the totalizing logic of indefinite warfare that
is built upon fear of infiltration and terrorism and supported by the machinery of permanent war. [End Page 692] This
analysis builds on recent anthropological examinations of how deeply-entrenched patterns of militarization
produce real social suffering for particular local communities while simultaneously being obscured and rendered
invisible through popular rhetoric of protecting national security, promoting national interests, and maintaining
law and order. Militarization may be defined as "the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society
organizes itself for the production of violence" (Geyer 1989:79). As Catherine Lutz (2001) has demonstrated,
militarization, which encompasses a range of discursive and material processes through which societies prepare for
war, has become pervasive in the lives of contemporary national security states, spinning out through multiple
related institutional domains—political, economic, juridical, familial—to intersect with existing social inequalities
and cultural tensions, thereby impacting combatants as well as noncombatants who are not otherwise caught up in
military endeavors and preparedness routines. These persistent patterns of militarization are predicated on, and justified through,
ideological logics of order and disorder, and insurgency and counter-insurgency, that effectively shape the contours of national identity and
national history "in ways that glorify and legitimate military action" (Lutz 2002:723). In a recent review article, Hugh Gusterson (2007:165)
calls for anthropological examinations of militarism(s) in relation to nationalism, late modern capitalism, media culture, and the state by
considering the ways in which these interlinked processes remake communities, public cultures, and individual subjectivities in various local
social worlds. Such studies shed light on processes through which national security states differentially structure the socioeconomic conditions
of everyday life for various categories of civilian and non-civilian populations, leading to the sedimentation of inequalities through deprivation,
dispossession, and death. Patterns of war emerging in particular local worlds are tied to larger transformations in political-military economies
of violence operating on a global scale (Lutz and Nonini 2000:79). The expansion of neoliberal market capitalism since World
War II has fed the growth of permanent war economies while also creating large surplus populations that are
considered peripheral to the workings of capitalist economies. "State armies, multilateral armed forces (IFOR, the
United Nations), private armies, militarized police, and parasitical militias have come to wage a systematic form of
'low intensity warfare,' often against stigmatized populations 'outside the grids' of global capitalist activity and
superfluous to labor, [End Page 693] capital, and consumption markets" (Lutz and Nonini 2000:78). These interlinked
processes of neoliberalism and privatization, ethnic and racial discrimination, and jingoism and militarism have
led to the proliferation of infinite and indefinite wars that consolidate collectively imagined national communities
at the same time that they violently exclude certain categories of people from participation in the life of the nation.
As Victoria Sanford argues, national security states are based, not on the outwardly focused defense of national
territory, but rather on a national security ideology that " is grounded in the recourse of coercion and has no room
for the participation or consent of civil society" (2003:394-395). Through such ideological work, national security states erase the
everyday realities of violence and power their shadow zones and sensitive peripheries in the name of national integrity and cohesion and in the
Continued next page..
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This state practice of carving out differential patterns of citizenship through the waging of
perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between "crimes of war" and "crimes of peace," producing a
continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces, such as emergency rooms,
court rooms, prisons, detention centers, and schools, to the spectacular violence of hot zones, such as border
clashes, ethnic conflicts, and frontiers in the global war on terror (Scheper-Hughes 2002, 2008). These sites of exclusion
and concentration provide for the encapsulation and confinement of those forms of political life that have been
stripped of rights, cast into a "zone of social abandonment" (Biehl 2005), and subjected to the brutal violence of
the state. Such conceptual tools enable us to move past distinctions between " the exception" and "the rule" and
examine patterns of militarization that define forms of social suffering for communities living in various domains
of threat and "legitimate" destruction: marginalized peasants cast as indigenous rebels in the Oaxaca and Chiapas regions of
interest of wartime profit.
contemporary Mexico (Stephen 2000); Latino communities cast as drug runners and illegal immigrants along the US-Mexican border
(Nagengast 2002); foreign nationals cast as enemy combatants in US military prisons in the War on Terror (Feldman 2005); Catholic
nationalist women cast as paramilitary insurgents in the prisons of Belfast (Aretxaga 1997); Black youth cast as criminals in post-Apartheid
South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006); and Puerto Rican men cast as gang members in the barrios of East Harlem (Bourgois 2002).
Comparative ethnographies of the political and juridical [End Page 694] conditions that similarly delimit
possibilities of life in these and other heavily militarized zones leads to a better understanding of "how dominant
representations of the dangerous, the subversive, the worthless, the marginal, and the unimportant become linked
to making particular groups of people susceptible to violence abuses that allow them to be treated with less than
human respect and dignity" (Stephen 2000:823).
C) Alternative: Lifting the veil that cloaks this dichotomy and recognizing the common
core of this violence is the only hope for combating violence and reimagining alternative
vocabularies of resistance
Duschinski, 2009 (Hayley, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Ohio University, “Destiny Effects:
Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley.” Anthropological Quarterly volume 82,
issue 3, Accessed Project Muse, Written 2009, accessed 1 June 2010) SS
This analysis of the Indian state's production of a highly militarized site of punitive containment through the legal
suspension of the juridical order must be considered within the context of the consistent set of exclusions and
exceptions that characterize late modern national security [End Page 712] regimes. In a recent article, Avery Gordon (2006:52)
argues that permanent war and permanent abandonment have become increasingly routine means by which
national security states relegate potentially angry, rebellious, and demanding populations " to a remote and closed
place where they are civilly disabled and socially dead." Citing Ruth Wilson Gilmore's definition of abandonment as the " rigorously
coordinated and organized setting aside of people and resources ," Gordon argues that the political economy of the national security
state is fundamentally focused on the permanent abandonment of certain "captive populations" that are indelibly
marked as threats to the neoliberal order. Approached as similarly-constituted social facts, militarization and
penalization work hand in hand to produce patterns of captivity in which a particular society's " rubbish people"—
those not fully human and better off dead—are subjected to the waste disposal strategies of control and
surveillance in what Loic Wacquant (2008) has termed "concentration camps for the dispossessed": the super-max prison, the interrogation
facility, the war prison, the refugee camp. These similarly constituted logics of punitive containment that produce
real patterns of social abandonment and social death not only have consequence for communities targeted as
enemies of the state; it impacts all members of the society by drawing the entire political body of rights-bearing
citizens into the field of state violence. The liberal discourse of " the right to life" that constitutes the foundation of
the rule of law privileges the same notion of justice that is mutually imbricated with the violence that resides
quietly, almost furtively, at the heart of the national security state. After all, states seeking to protect the integrity
of their national borders through military violence against resistance movements, secessionist factions, and
political rebellions use this same concept of rights to distinguish between those lives that are worthless,
expendable, and disposable, and those that are worth living. This is how empires, through the militarization of all
domains of social life, imprison, not only the bludgeoned and brutalized peoples occupying the margins of state
life, but all state subjects, and state rulers as well. Lifting the veils of coercion and consent and persuasion that
mask this reality from society at large to reveal the stark violence of the state may seem to leave few options for
citizens concerned about acts of dehumanization perpetrated in their names, but it is also necessary, for it opens up
space for the work of collective imagination, prompting dreams of [End Page 713] escape from this all-encompassing
carceral condition, produced by weaponry as well as persuasion, that constitutes " the imprisonment of absolute
power" (Ghosh 2005:31).
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Finally, discourse is uniquely key in this context of violence
KRASKA, 01 (Peter B., Professor and Senior Research Fellow at College of Justice and Strategy at Eastern
Kentucky University, “Crime Control as Warfare, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The
Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, Page 14, 15) SS
Someone steals a bike; another sells a hot gun to a delinquent; someone else bashes the head of a rival into a car door; another kills his ex-wife
after stalking her for months; and yet another ignores safety regulations at a factory, resulting in an employee's death . There can be no
doubt that crime is a problem. It is also a problem easily exaggerated, but even if it is not that bad statistically,
most Americans still want a concerted reaction. How do we organize our response? Ericson's quotation above observes
that we have relied heavily on military ideology and practice, yet this fact has been almost completely ignored by
crime and justice academics. If the language we use to characterize our response to law breaking is any indication,
this is a serious oversight. We fight crime, conduct a war on crime and a war on drugs, crack down, raid private
residences for contra¬band, conduct street sweeps, have zero tolerance for law breakers, detain people in boot
camps, and even execute the enemy (death penalty). Is this language mere media-driven rhetoric meant only in a
figurative sense? The language we use to frame our solutions to the crime problem matters. Martial language—
while not necessarily being the cause of an aggressive, militarized reaction—can intensify society's response.
Moreover, and most importantly, the language we employ serves as a good indicator of the values and beliefs we
use to structure our crime control actions and policies. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the role of
militaristic language in crime control efforts and provide a much needed update on the two central organizing
concepts used throughout this book—militarization and militarism. Highlights of the chapter include the development of the
concept "high-modern militarization," the role of the war metaphor in crime campaigns in U.S. history, and an
example of the power of language through examining military analysts' reframing of the crime problem as one of
"insurgency" requiring "counterinsurgency" measures.
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The military will pick up where the police are left off—they only deal with one component
of the dichotomy, allowing martial power to continue under a different guise
Kraska 2007 (Peter B. Kraska. Professor and Senior Research Fellow, College of Justice and Strategy, Eastern
Kentucky University, USA. “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” December 13,
2007. Policing Journal (2007): pam065v1-pam065.
Police administrators using SWAT teams to aggressively patrol hotspots and conduct investigatory drug raids viewed this as wholly consistent
with Wilson and Kelling's vision. These police agencies are integrating a military-model approach—occupy, suppress
through force, and restore the affected territory—with second strand CP ideology, which emphasizes taking back the neighborhood,
creating a climate of order, and aggressively enforcing minor law and order infractions; all in an effort to cultivate healthier communities.
Consistent with the quote from the chief of police above, militarized police units and tactics do the weeding, thereby
providing the opportunity for other programs to seed the community. (This of course is similar to the tact taken by
the US military in the Iraq conflict). Viewing these developments through the lenses of militarism and militarization demonstrates
that despite efforts to do away with the military-professional approach of the mid-1900s, the specter of the military model still haunts the real world of contemporary policing.
Militarism is obviously an enduring and flexible presence that can adapt to changing external forces. We should also note the remarkable ability of police practitioners to maneuver through the
tensions and pressures of external influences. It is not uncommon for them to have to amalgamate seemingly contradictory messages so that their real-world thinking and practice exhibit a
That the US military is currently operating more as a
police force than a military one should be obvious to those familiar with the postinvasion conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The bulk of its security work involves routine patrol operations, house-to-house searches (including
no-knock contraband raids), and arresting law breakers. Its ‘rules of engagement’ (use of force policies) are more similar to police work than they are for
level of coherence and harmony that makes sense to them. Police-icizing the American military
warfare. Serious questions have been raised about the extent to which military soldiers trained for traditional warfare are capable of effectively enforcing domestic peace in a foreign land.
Police and military share the same practices, technology, data processing, and ideologies.
The military will fill in where the police are removed
Herzog, 2010 Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
Mainly during the first half of the 20th century American police departments tended to adopt a military organizational
structure and pattern of work due to a gradual process within them of professionalization and consequently
militarization. In the 1960s this approach started to draw criticism, leading to a demand for the development of a more 'civilian' rather than
'military' model of policing. Paradoxically, a renewed trend of milit- arization was simultaneously taking place in the
police departments. Changes in more recent years suggest a similar demilitarization trend in the Israeli police, bringing about a 'policing
revolution'. This study analyzes the organizational and social characteristics and sources of these two consecutive trends in these two different
policing models and countries. Police departments throughout the modern world tend to share an essentially military
organizational structure and pattern of work. Among
the features that are self-evident and already inseparable from typical police work (Bittner, 1980) are a
centralized organizational structure, a hierarchical chain of command, authoritative leadership, uniform outward appearance, top-down communication by means of orders and directives and
down-up action reporting, and internal control over rank-and-file by commanders through strong internal discipline (Bittner, 1995; Bordua and Reiss, 1966; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993;
This military influence on police organization is hardly surprising. First, stemming from a common
social necessity of organized physical defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces, these two
institutions are the only ones authorized in modern Western demo- cracies to use physical force (including
weapons) against people in the name of the state. The military usually apply force against outside enemies, who must be neutralized by aggressive means.
Walker, 1999).
The police force use it against internal ones, civilians who sometimes are suspected of crimes or public disturbances and must accordingly be arrested and investigated, within judicial
this dichotomy has not been
always clear-cut: the army is sometimes called to assist the police in internal security and public disturbance
functions, and the police sometimes assist the army in paramilitary functions (Hills, 1995). Second, the importance of the military as a
process restraints - such as the use of minimal reasonable force - which protect their constitutional rights (Dunlop, 1999). However,
model and a source of agents, ideas, and work patterns for bureaucratic institutions in general (see Weber, 1968), and particularly for modern criminal justice systems (see Foucault, 1977;
the application of military principles and patterns to police work is as old as its
own history.1 This social phenomenon whereby police forces (like other hierarch- ically modeled organizations)
assume attributes that are characteristic of the armed forces may be defined generally as militarization of the
police. In this study, militarization refers to a broad social phenomenon whereby a part of the population (in this case police forces) becomes socially, organizationally, institutionally,
Rothman, 1971), is com- monly recognized. In the latter,
and/or ideologically dependent on, or controlled by the military itself or by military principles, usually without direct military participation or initiative (see Enloe, 1980:132). In many cases,
this phenomenon is not expressed solely by the external, superficial adoption of military organizational or
administrative prin- ciples; it is based on the internalization of an ideology of militarism, the value and belief
system providing the conceptual and ideological rationale supporting militarization. This ideological message
emphasizes military values such as physical force, aggressiveness, order, discipline, and self-sacrifice as
appropriate and desirable for the resolution of problems, for example, police problems. It glorifies military means
such as military power, sophisticated equipment, and advanced technology for the achievement of goals (Ben
Eliezer, 1998; Haggerty and Ericson, 1999; Kraska; 1994; 1996; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).2
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Government interchanges military and police to foster trust from the public while
increasing control over a region—leads to collapse of democracy.
Dunlap 01 Colonel Charles Dunlap Jr. “The Thick Green Line: The Growing Involvement of Military Forces in
Domestic Law Enforcement.” Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System. P34. MR
What we have seen in the last twenty years is a growing tendency to look to the armed forces to perform tasks that
are essentially law enforcement. To many Americans the use of the military for these purposes is of little concern. The armed
forces consistently lead public opinion polls as the most trusted institution in American society, topping even
organized religion and the Supreme Court. Moreover, as John Hillen, then an analyst for the Heritage Foundation, put it in 1996:
"Why do politicians want to use the military for police duties? To take advantage of one of the few parts of the
federal government that actually works."29Notwithstanding the seeming acquiescence of the public, this growing trend bears
further analysis. In truth, there are few instances in modern times where the military effectively conducted a police-
like internal security mission consistent with both the maintenance of an authentic combat capability and
democratic values. That said, the issues with regard to using the armed forces for law enforcement can usefully be divided into
practical problems and philosophical ones.
Military used in police capacity justifies labeling common prisoners as terrorist
extremists—this rhetoric spills over to judicial systems—leads to perpetual military
conflict, death, and on civil liberties.
Hornberger 2010 Jacob G. Hornberger. Founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation. “When
the Military Serves as Police.” February 4, 2010. http://www.fff.org/comment/com1002b.asp. MR.
Bush refused those conditions and emphasized that his demand for bin Laden was unconditional. The Afghan government refused. At that
point, the United States attacked Afghanistan. Thus, that involved the U.S. military in two separate actions: a war against the Afghan
government for refusing to comply with Bush’s extradition demand and a police action to apprehend Osama bin Laden. The action against the
Afghan government constituted war, like World Wars I and II. It was a conflict between two nation states. Clearly it was an illegal war, given
that it was waged without the congressional declaration of war required by the Constitution but it was a genuine war nonetheless. Not so,
however, with respect to the military action intended to apprehend bin Laden. Like our examples regarding Ramzi Yousef, Al
Capone, and the Latin American drug gangs, that action remained a police action, one in which the military was being used in
a foreign country to employ its overwhelming force to bring a suspected criminal to justice . The problem arose when
the U.S. government made no attempt to distinguish between legitimate prisoners of war and suspected terrorist
criminals. Instead, it intentionally conflated the two and then defaulted into making all them — Afghan soldiers and al-Qaeda
members alike as “illegal enemy combatants.” At the same time, of course, was the massive war-on-terrorism propaganda that the Bush
administration issued after the 9/11 attacks. In the fear-laden environment of post 9/11, federal officials embarked on a big
hype campaign in which they convinced people that this particular criminal offense was either a criminal offense
(which is precisely why they indicted and prosecuted 9/11 co-conspirator Moussasoui in federal court) or an act of war, at the option of
U.S. officials. At the same time, by conflating the prisoners of war taken captive in the war against Afghanistan with
suspected members of al-Qaeda taken captive, U.S. officials succeeded in confusing the separate issues of war and
criminal justice in people’s minds. Thus, we have the horribly muddled situation today, one in which some people are
saying that some suspected terrorists should be treated as criminal defendants, while others are saying they should be treated as illegal warriors,
while others are saying that the government should continue to have the option of treating them either way. Perhaps the most bizarre suggestion
came from those who said that the Detroit bomb suspect should have been turned over to the military for torture and then returned to the Justice
Department for criminal prosecution in federal court. We now also have a warped dual-track judicial system with respect to
suspected terrorists. One track involves criminal prosecution in the federal judicial system established by the
Constitution, where people are presumed innocent and the Bill of Rights applies. The other track involves criminal
prosecution in an alternative, competing military tribunal system established by the Pentagon, one in which people
are presumed guilty of terrorism, subjected to torture and abuse, and tried in kangaroo proceedings where the Bill
of Rights does not apply.
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US police in foreign countries have adopted military means of aggression against crimes—
allows government to interchange the forces: the police will take over where the military
has left off
Herzog, 2010. Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
Developments in the US, as the dominant political, economic, cultural, and even military power, typically
influence policies and practices in other countries; this applies to the police field also (Haggerty and Ericson, 1999: 234).
Moreover, the scope, the experience, the absolute and relative number of different police forces and programs, and the range and depth of
pertinent research and scholarly work, clearly place the American police reality and at the forefront of the policing field . Generally, recent
American poli- cing ventures have been characterized in both rhetoric and in practice as moving away from a paramilitary, professional model
of policing to a less-military and more sophisticated kind of professionalism. This new approach - community policing - realigns police tasks,
redefines and broadens police roles, and seeks a wider mandate to allow more mean- ingful interaction with citizens (Friedmann, 1992: 159).
Still, while perhaps predominant, this trend is certainly not the only one. A simul- taneous secondary trend exists, towards an even more
militarized model of policing than before, mainly for handling serious crimes and public order disturbances. In it, the usually clear limits
between military and police forces are currently becoming constantly less distinct . The second model, serving as the main
focus of this study, is the unitary and very militarized and centralized Israel National Police (INP). This model exemplifies an attempt to shift
from a highly quasi-military model, with a sharp combat-security inclination, to a general demilitarization in the national police, suggesting an
apparent 'policing revolution' in Israel. The chief purpose of this study is to describe these demilitariza- tion trends in the INP, with the
American trends taken as the reference. They are analyzed within the frame of social processes experienced by the societies in which these
police forces operate. TRENDS IN AMERICAN POLICING The militaristic character of police work was less prominent prior to World War
I. During that period, police forces adopted external military work patterns without parallel internalization of the ideological mess- ages of
militarism. This was a period in which a significant part of police work concentrated on providing social/public services to the local community, in the frame of broad local political control over the police activities (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisenhorn, 1995:423). However,
the proximity among police officers, citizens, and local politicians often led to local corruption and excessive political intervention (Peak and
Glensor, 1996; Walker, 1999). Influenced by the progressive movement and by the growing American emphasis on
bureaucracy in business and industry, at the start of the 20th century the police as an institution underwent a
gradual process of professionalization. It aimed at transforming the police into an effective and professional body
free of political influences and local corruption, hence greater militarization. These processes were reflected in the
adop- tion and implementation of essentially military organizational and administrative principles and in the
dissemination of the institutional ideological messages of militarism among police officers. According to the newly
defined 'professional' police goals, law enforcement became the exclusive and main specialization area of the police, to be formu- lated
in terms of the intentionally quasi-military metaphor, "war against crime' (rather than a campaign or a struggle against it) by
aggressive military means. The new image of the police was characterized by operational and technological
sophistication, independence from external and political intervention, tight discipline according to a clear
hierarchical scale of powers, obedience to orders and directives, internal control of police activities, and structural
division into highly-specialized units (Bittner, 1995; Fogelson, 1977; Klockars, 1985; Mawby, 1990).3 This militarization trend
started coming under fire in the 1960s.
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US military acts in a police capacity in Afghanistan. This allows government to act outside
enforcement laws
Waters 07 Tony Waters. The author, most recently, of When Killing is a Crime (Lynne Rienner, 2007), and a
Contributing Editor at Current Intelligence. “Differentiating Between Police And Military Action.” 4-5-10.
http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2010/4/5/differentiating-between-police-and-military-action.html. MR.
Eric Randolph's article "Al Qaeda: When Any Attack Will Do," (The Agenda, March 23, 2010) implicitly raises the question about
differences between police and military action. This is an important distinction to draw, but is rarely dealt with in
discussions about the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. Most importantly, Randolph points out that much of the American
response in Afghanistan (and presumably Iraq) is about the need of American citizens to "feel safe," rather than a
need to combat the actual threats presented by Al Qaeda, etc., per se. Both the military and police seek to make their home
countries feel safe, albeit in very different ways. The police do it by enforcing a pre-existing set of laws using pre-existing legal structures
emerging from a civilian legislative process. The military does not necessarily need to act within these boundaries, and is used in situations
where the strength of the government to administer civilian rule is effectively challenged. Feeling safe, though, is an emotion, albeit an
important one with serious consequences, as American policy since 2001 demonstrates. The policy problem raised in Randolph’s essay really
is: how do you manage the emotions of your public (with respect to fear)? Notably, making a citizenry feel safe is not necessarily
the same as trying to disable decentralized terror networks (whose disruptive violence generates panic). In the
case of Al Qaeda, the American response is that using the military to attack "them" elsewhere is what makes us
feel safe, and that it so important that it can be done outside the rule of law. Both the Bush and Obama
administrations generally favor the use of the military for dealing with Al Qaeda and its networks. Implicitly this means that they
concluded that civilian and diplomatic channels were damaged by the attacks, along with the US government’s
capacity to respond conventionally. Military violence also has the advantage of satisfying a fearful American
public's demand to “do something”, which trumped the use of police authority anchored in the rule of law. When it
comes to taking apart the long-term threat of a decentralized terror network focused on sporadic attacks, perhaps the police and courts are
better, as Randolph writes. Is this the most effective long-term response? After all, Al Qaeda, while inflicting some damage and
a lot of fear, has never really posed an existential threat to the United States in particular, Europe, or any other country
or region of appreciable size. Nevertheless, both the Bush and Obama administrations are reluctant to use the power
of police and courts to assuage such fears, presumably because trials do not have the same immediate cathartic
effect among the American population as do drone attacks and other Flash Gordon-style wizardry. This is too bad,
because trials are cathartic for fearful publics in ways that wars half way around the world are not . Indeed, if the goal
is to assuage American fears and calm waters abroad, exposing the ridiculousness of terrorist ideologies with its underwear bombers, shoe
bombers, teenage black widows, etc., in open court calms fears more effectively as drone attacks conducted from Langley. It also has the
advantage of making the perpetrators look ridiculous to the home-constituency they seek to impress. Trials of such characters are why
Americans are no longer fearful of the incoherent ideologies of Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, the DC sniper, the Unabomber, or even
Zacarias Mousawi. Or, as Eric Randolph summarized it: "it's also vital that we encourage a little skepticism, as an antidote to the hysteria that
Al Qaeda’s random acts provoke."
Police use same infrastructure as military to fight terrorism—the two forces are
interchangeable
Herzog, 2010 Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
Militarization of American policing is usually associated with proclama- tions of all-out war against crime; in Israel,
militarization was mainly influenced by the necessity for effective police deployment to deal with permanent problems of internal security and
public order. As already noted, these problems have constantly taken priority over other areas, including social
problems such as crime, traditionally seen as pertaining to the micro-social level and therefore less important
(Gamson and Yuchtman, 1977: 202-203; Hod, 1996; INP, 1956). This extraordinarily heavy burden took its toll on effective and efficient
policing in the area of traditional police functions: many resources were allocated to building up effective
professional units whose mission was to prevent terrorism and minimize risks and hazards for public order . Note
that the tradition- ally low priority assigned to crime problems was not only based on ideo- logical considerations. Due to the security
situation, much of the social stress linked to crime in the western world was not seen as a major prob- lem in Israel, either on the national or
on the police level, at least not 8 In 1999 a new system to make the police commanders more accountable to their community and to
achieving their objectives was implemented; it was based on the COMPSTAT method used by New York City Police. The Inspector-General
holds bi-weekly meetings with a specific area commander. He sets out and maps statistical information to pinpoint areas and patterns of crime
that have to be addressed until the 1970s (Rahav, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). Moreover, in the early years of the state, a great part of the population,
both Jewish and Arab, was organized in local communities, especially in rural areas. Events related to crime were treated informally within
these communities, if possible without-an approach to the police (Weisburd etal., 1997:114-115).
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US police in foreign countries have adopted military means of aggression against crimes—
allows government to interchange the forces.
Herzog, 2010. Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
Developments in the US, as the dominant political, economic, cultural, and even military power, typically
influence policies and practices in other countries; this applies to the police field also (Haggerty and Ericson, 1999: 234).
Moreover, the scope, the experience, the absolute and relative number of different police forces and programs, and the range and depth of
pertinent research and scholarly work, clearly place the American police reality and at the forefront of the policing field . Generally, recent
American poli- cing ventures have been characterized in both rhetoric and in practice as moving away from a paramilitary, professional model
of policing to a less-military and more sophisticated kind of professionalism. This new approach - community policing - realigns police tasks,
redefines and broadens police roles, and seeks a wider mandate to allow more mean- ingful interaction with citizens (Friedmann, 1992: 159).
Still, while perhaps predominant, this trend is certainly not the only one. A simul- taneous secondary trend exists, towards an even more
militarized model of policing than before, mainly for handling serious crimes and public order disturbances. In it, the usually clear limits
between military and police forces are currently becoming constantly less distinct . The second model, serving as the main
focus of this study, is the unitary and very militarized and centralized Israel National Police (INP). This model exemplifies an attempt to shift
from a highly quasi-military model, with a sharp combat-security inclination, to a general demilitarization in the national police, suggesting an
apparent 'policing revolution' in Israel. The chief purpose of this study is to describe these demilitariza- tion trends in the INP, with the
American trends taken as the reference. They are analyzed within the frame of social processes experienced by the societies in which these
police forces operate. TRENDS IN AMERICAN POLICING The militaristic character of police work was less prominent prior to World War
I. During that period, police forces adopted external military work patterns without parallel internalization of the ideological mess- ages of
militarism. This was a period in which a significant part of police work concentrated on providing social/public services to the local community, in the frame of broad local political control over the police activities (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisenhorn, 1995:423). However,
the proximity among police officers, citizens, and local politicians often led to local corruption and excessive political intervention (Peak and
Glensor, 1996; Walker, 1999). Influenced by the progressive movement and by the growing American emphasis on
bureaucracy in business and industry, at the start of the 20th century the police as an institution underwent a
gradual process of professionalization. It aimed at transforming the police into an effective and professional body
free of political influences and local corruption, hence greater militarization. These processes were reflected in the
adop- tion and implementation of essentially military organizational and administrative principles and in the
dissemination of the institutional ideological messages of militarism among police officers. According to the newly
defined 'professional' police goals, law enforcement became the exclusive and main specialization area of the police, to be formu- lated
in terms of the intentionally quasi-military metaphor, "war against crime' (rather than a campaign or a struggle against it) by
aggressive military means. The new image of the police was characterized by operational and technological
sophistication, independence from external and political intervention, tight discipline according to a clear
hierarchical scale of powers, obedience to orders and directives, internal control of police activities, and structural
division into highly-specialized units (Bittner, 1995; Fogelson, 1977; Klockars, 1985; Mawby, 1990).3
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The Affirmative’s definitions of Militarization are inherently wrong; the police military
dichotomy that has obfuscated the blurring between police and military and created the
subsequent harms
KRASKA 01 (Peter B., Professor and Senior Research Fellow at College of Justice and Strategy at Eastern
Kentucky University, “Crime Control as Warfare, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The
Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, Page 15 - 17 ) SS
Traditionally, war has been conceived of as state-sanctioned armies attempting to take over each other's territories
using lethal violence. Militarization was merely the preparation for this activity. Militarism is a cultural pattern of beliefs
and values supporting war and militarization that comes to dominate a society (e.g., Nazi Germany) These early conceptions and their
brutish connotations help explain why sociology, despite the central place war and militarization have played
throughout U.S. history, has traditionally eschewed them in theorizing society. They refer to crude, highly violent, and
antiquated state activity better left to war historians and political scientists.2 With contemporary theories of social control emphasizing a
decline in state physical viole11ce and an ascendance of softer controls—those rooted in mundane regulations, ideology, and surveillance
controls, for example— resurrecting organizing concepts such as "militarization" may even seem misplaced in this "high-modern" society.
However, scholars have begun to develop a more current and nuanced understanding of martial concepts and an
appreciation for the central role these phenomena play in the makeup of contemporary society.3 Indeed, it is the
lack of attention paid to the influence of the military and the military model that has left organizing concepts such
as "militarism" and "militarization" undeveloped, even though their influence thrives. Just as the medical field and
the criminal law institution have transformed strikingly as they have modernized, so has militarism and the
processes of militarization, particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons, and now in the post-Cold War era. The nature of the
state's use of violence and the maintenance of its security have not avoided the same high-modern developments in
our medical or legal systems. Indeed, much of what we consider to be "high-modern" has its origins in the military
complex. An antecedent to examining the militarization of criminal justice, therefore, is the updating of traditional
martial concepts. Militarization, for instance, can be defined in its broadest terms as the social process in which
society organizes itself for the production of violence or the threat thereof. As chapter 4 so convincingly demonstrates,
technology and information have become a central aspect, if not the predominant feature, of this production process. Militarism is merely
militarization's supporting ideology. It is a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve
problems and gain political power. It glorifies military power, hardware, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools. What we
think of as traditional "war" is less relevant in today's militarization. In the scramble to define a new post-Cold
War mission, "security specialists"—an amalgam of military think-tank analysts, defense industry experts, military
academicians, and Pentagon officials—have given up on the "communist threat" as their basis of legitimacy. In its
place they have constructed a new narrative justifying the military's preeminence relying not on the notion of war
but rather on such terms as "low-intensity conflict" (LIC), "operations other than war" (OOTW), and the "gray
area phenomenon" (GAP). LIC, OOTW, and GAP refer to internal difficulties facing governments not readily
solvable by traditional war but still supposedly requiring some sort of military response. Examples abound in a
rapidly changing geopolitical environment: terrorism, nongovernmental paramilitary forces, information systems
security, famine, environmental destruction, civil unrest, ethnic cleansing, immigration problems, and natural
disaster relief. An important development, therefore, in our high-modern society, is the reframing of certain social
problems as amenable to direct military intervention. Tangible indices of this sort of high-modern militarization
and militarism are found throughout this book. A summary would include: A blurring of external and internal security
functions leading to a targeting of civilian populations, internal "security" threats, and a focus on aggregate
populations as potential internal "insurgents". An avoidance of overt or lethal violence, with a greater emphasis placed on
information gathering and processing, surveillance work, and less-than-lethal technologies. An ideology and theoretical framework
of militarism that stresses that effective problem solving requires state force, technology, armament, intelligence
gathering, aggressive suppression efforts, and other assorted activities commensurate with modern military
thinking and operations. Criminal justice practices guided by the ideological framework of militarism, such as the
use of special-operations paramilitary teams in policing and corrections, policing activities that emphasize military
tactics such as drug, gun, and gang suppression, and punishment models based on the military boot camp. The
purchasing, loaning, donation, and use of actual material products that can be characterized as militaristic,
including a range of military armaments, transportation devices, surveillance equipment, and military-style garb. A
rapidly developing collaboration, at the highest level of the governmental and corporate worlds, between the
defense industry and the crime control industry. The use of military language within political and popular culture
to characterize the social problems of drugs, crime, and social disorder
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Police and military share the same practices, technology, data processing, and ideologies.
Their dichotomy allows government to use military for police work and vice versa.
Herzog, 2010. Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
Mainly during the first half of the 20th century American police departments tended to adopt a military organizational
structure and pattern of work due to a gradual process within them of professionalization and consequently
militarization. In the 1960s this approach started to draw criticism, leading to a demand for the development of a more 'civilian' rather than
'military' model of policing. Paradoxically, a renewed trend of milit- arization was simultaneously taking place in the
police departments. Changes in more recent years suggest a similar demilitarization trend in the Israeli police, bringing about a 'policing
revolution'. This study analyzes the organizational and social characteristics and sources of these two consecutive trends in these two different
policing models and countries. Police departments throughout the modern world tend to share an essentially military
organizational structure and pattern of work. Among the features that are self-evident and already inseparable from typical police
work (Bittner, 1980) are a centralized organizational structure, a hierarchical chain of command, authoritative leadership, uniform outward
appearance, top-down communication by means of orders and directives and down-up action reporting, and internal control over rank-and-file
by commanders through strong internal discipline (Bittner, 1995; Bordua and Reiss, 1966; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993; Walker, 1999).
This military influence on police organization is hardly surprising. First, stemming from a common social
necessity of organized physical defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces, these two institutions
are the only ones authorized in modern Western demo- cracies to use physical force (including weapons) against
people in the name of the state. The military usually apply force against outside enemies, who must be neutralized by aggressive
means. The police force use it against internal ones, civilians who sometimes are suspected of crimes or public disturbances and must
accordingly be arrested and investigated, within judicial process restraints - such as the use of minimal reasonable force - which protect their
constitutional rights (Dunlop, 1999). However, this dichotomy has not been always clear-cut: the army is sometimes called
to assist the police in internal security and public disturbance functions, and the police sometimes assist the army
in paramilitary functions (Hills, 1995). Second, the importance of the military as a model and a source of agents, ideas, and work
patterns for bureaucratic institutions in general (see Weber, 1968), and particularly for modern criminal justice systems (see Foucault, 1977;
Rothman, 1971), is com- monly recognized. In the latter, the application of military principles and patterns to police work is
as old as its own history.1 This social phenomenon whereby police forces (like other hierarch- ically modeled
organizations) assume attributes that are characteristic of the armed forces may be defined generally as
militarization of the police. In this study, militarization refers to a broad social phenomenon whereby a part of the population (in this
case police forces) becomes socially, organizationally, institutionally, and/or ideologically dependent on, or controlled by the military itself or
by military principles, usually without direct military participation or initiative (see Enloe, 1980:132). In many cases, this phenomenon is
not expressed solely by the external, superficial adoption of military organizational or administrative prin- ciples;
it is based on the internalization of an ideology of militarism, the value and belief system providing the conceptual
and ideological rationale supporting militarization. This ideological message emphasizes military values such as
physical force, aggressiveness, order, discipline, and self-sacrifice as appropriate and desirable for the resolution
of problems, for example, police problems. It glorifies military means such as military power, sophisticated
equipment, and advanced technology for the achievement of goals (Ben Eliezer, 1998; Haggerty and Ericson, 1999; Kraska;
1994; 1996; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).2
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Crossing of police and military justifies loss of liberties and social disobedience and
cultivates into perpetual warfare and violence—creates a veil
Mansfield 06 Nick Mansfield, Associate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in
Sydney. He is the author of Masochism: The Art of Power and Subjectivity: Theories of the Self From Freud to
Haraway. “War and Its Other: Between Bataille and Derrida.” 2006.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.4mansfield.html. MR.
Reauthorising the Patriot Act on March 9, 2006, President George W Bush said that this "law allows our intelligence and law enforcement
officials . . . to continue to use tools against terrorists that they used against -- that they use against drug dealers and other criminals"1. The
difference between national hostility and social disobedience collapses in the face of the deployment of common
techniques and even agencies to fight both. This loss of difference resorts to a logic of displaced justification.
What was acceptable as policing becomes by simple translation justified as warfare. Dealing with the enemy
becomes a mere extension of police work. In return, the domestic street is notionally militarized. This slippage
allows both war and policing to be justified as mere analogies to one another: how can you contest the war against
terror when it is really just a version of the police work that makes you feel safe in your home? And inversely, how
can you possibly doubt the legitimacy of policing when it is really a version of the war fought against those who
despise liberty and threaten innocence? It is a truism to say that each war redefines the nature of war itself, due to changes in arms
technology, military organisation or geo-strategic history. The long war of terror is no exception, but what is most new about it, and what
makes it most fit its age, is that it promises the erasure of the difference between war and peace, and concomitantly between war and civil
society: terrorists and criminals swap identity, emerge anywhere at any time and are imputed to share a hostility to the whole Western way of
life. This rhetorical slippage, however, confirms what many theorists of war have been proposing in different ways
for a long time. We will no longer have war and peace in the future, but ever more complex entanglements of one
in the other, where social policy, diplomatic manipulation and military strategy exchange characteristics,
contriving enemies at home, representing political antagonists abroad as criminals, and abolishing not only the
idea of a military frontier, but of warfare itself as simply a matter of literal or possible armed conflict. In the future,
the question will be not "Why did we choose war instead of peace?" but "What configuration of the peace-war complex embroils us now? "
Discussing what is new about the "new wars," Herfried Munkler argues that in the wars that have developed in the decolonised world: "military
force and organised crime go increasingly together."2He goes on: "The new wars know no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, nor are they fought for any definite goals or purposes; they involve no temporal or spatial limits on the use of violence."3In the
low intensity, asymmetrical conflicts Munkler sees as typical of contemporary war, war is without limits, and has no identifiable outside, either
in space or time.
The inverse of this argument is Martin Shaw's identification of one of the key attributes of "the new Western way of war":
"The key understanding, therefore, is that warfighting must be carried on simultaneously with 'normal' economics, politics and social life in the
West. It is imperative it doesnot impact negatively on these."4Western publics only tolerate a war that can be co-ordinated seamlessly with
peace. This is not an alienation of war from social life, but its absolute co-ordination with it. It is not here a question of war being
kept hidden behind a screen of peaceful social advancement from one day to the next. Instead, war under this
dispensation becomes completely compatible with what we conventionally understand as peace. In the end, this is
what allows the complete saturation of society by war: the ability to represent the normal unfolding of social life as
relatively undisturbed.
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“AND” LINKS
The use of the word “and” means you are defending each as independent
Putman, 2008 (William H, Professor of Legal Studies at Central New Mexico Community College, Legal
Analysis and Writing, p 264)
Specific Words: Problem Areas: Some words are commonly misused. You can avoid problems of misuse by following some basic
rules. 1) Affect/Effect Affect is a verb meaning “to influence.” Effect is either a verb or noun. As a verb, it means “to bring about or cause”; as
a noun, it means “result.” For example: “His actions will not affect (not effect) the outcome of the case.” The meaning of affect is “to
influence.” “He tried to effect (not affect) an agreement.” Here, the meaning of effect is “to bring about.” 2) And/Or When the word and
is used in regard to a list of words, all the items listed are included and required. For example: “The case law requires the
plaintiff to prove duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.” The use of and means that all four elements must be
proved. All the listed items are included in the requirement.
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Saying “and/or” still creates a dichotomy
Merino et al, 1987 (Barbara D., Prof of Accounting at the University of North Texas, “Historical Analysis – A
Diagnostic Tool for Events Studies”, The Accounting Review Vol LXII, Is 4, October, JStor)
The classification criteria are than an event occurred that “significantly affected market assessment of its probability of enactment and/or the
stringency of its accounting requirements.” Thus, a date was “favorable” if an event occurred that “increased the Act’s assesses probability of
enactment and/or accounting stringency” and unfavorable if an event occurred that “decreased the Act’s assessed probability of enactment
and/or accounting stringency” The test period also includes a 40 day control period with a control date being a date on which there was no
report in the WSJ concerning securities legislation. Chow’s classificatory criteria ignore the role that compromise plays in legislative process in
the US. This omission appears to confound his favorable/unfavorable classifications. The problem rests with the and/or
categorization. A decrease in stringency of a controversial provision often reflects compromise which increases the
probability that some form of legislation will pass. The and/or dichotomy precludes such a possibility ; Chow’s criteria
mandate a direct relation between stringency and probability of passage, whereas compromise would suggest that the relationship might be
inverse. While decreased compliance costs might result in increased stock market prices, if the compromise made the probability of passage
more likely, this would be expected to result in decreased stock market prices. The overall effect is indeterminate, but historical analysis does
enable us to examine an event and to make an informed judgment about the net impacts it might have had on stock market prices. We examine
Chow’s one “unfavorable period, based on the decreased stringency of the accounting provisions of the 33’ Act, to highlight the complex
nature of the classificatory problem.
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The military creates a system of Otherization and destruction, guaranteeing no value to life
and destruction of the immediate region
COMD, 2009 (Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft, “About Militarism”,
http://www.comdsd.org/militarism.htm last edited on 04/30/2009, accessed 6/21/2010) SS
Militarism is a value system that stresses the superiority of some people over others. Under militarism, the people
deemed inferior are dehumanized as enemies who must be overpowered by any means necessary. Those who deem
themselves superior are permitted to take whatever they want from others — land, freedom, natural resources,
cultures, lives — by force. Militarism derides cooperation, equality and nonviolence, and instead enforces strict
hierarchical relationships. Hierarchical systems create a winner at the top and render all others losers, so in a
desperate attempt not to be a loser, each individual or group struggles to keep others down. As long as it is
possible to see someone else as inferior, even those victimized by the hierarchy believe it is beneficial and
continue to endorse it. This same value system creates racism, sexism, homophobia and other types of
discrimination. It is not surprising that these types of discriminatory behavior are inherent in military systems. The
artificial creation and dehumanization of an "enemy" is used to manufacture hatred of certain groups of people and
fuel wars. The system is so powerful that it does not stop with the enemy: within the military itself, women, ethnic
minorities, gays, lesbians and others are treated as inferior due to their religion, language, nationality or other
identities.
This process of devaluation outweighs any possible scenario for nuclear war or extinction;
it also sets the stage for those impacts to occur
Berube, 1997 (David, Proffessor of communications at South Carolina State University, "Nanotechnological
Prolongevity: The Down Side," Nanotechnology Magazine, Vol. 3, Iss. 5,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm) SS
Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire resultant worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial
science. This would involve valuing people as means. Moreover, there would always be a superhuman more super than
the
current ones, humans would never be able to escape their treatment as means to an always further and distant end.
This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity.
They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on
record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For
that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horse man of the Apocalypse.... Behind the
genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the
cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be
possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of
humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual
benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it.
Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become
things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once
justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.
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This paramilitarism is a new and unique form of violence: now we have a military in search
of problems to solve, ensuring perpetual violence
KRASKA, 01 (Peter B., Professor and Senior Research Fellow at College of Justice and Strategy at Eastern
Kentucky University, “Crime Control as Warfare, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The
Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, page 22) SS
The most ideologically compatible and thus most popular battle front for the new military has been social
problems amenable to actual security strategies and tactics, such as urban violence, illegal drugs, and illegal immigration.
Not surprisingly, these new military targets are touted by security specialists as emerging trends necessitating the
military's involvement. Clearly these problems existed previous to the end of the Cold War; hence, what we have
are not problems in search of a solution but a solution in search of problems. Klare calls the military's
encroachment into civilian affairs the national security syndrome: "the tendency to expand the definition of national
security to require ever-greater control over national life."17 The impetus for this syndrome stems from the construction of
certain internal difficulties as so "threatening" that the only option left is resorting to military power. Colonel Dunlap interprets
this development in the post-Cold War environment as a type of "postmodern militarism," characterized by “a growing
willingness of an increasingly militarily-naive society to charge those in uniform with responsibilities that a
democracy ought to leave to civilians. It is a product of America's deep frustration and disgust with elected
government's inability to work effectively, or to even labor honestly. . . . Embattled politicians are ever more
frequently turning to the military for quick-fixes: Can't stop drugs? Call in the Navy. FEMA overwhelmed?
Deploy the Airborne. Crime out of control? Put Guardsmen on the streets. Troubled youths? Marine role models
and military boot camps.”
The Neopraetorianism of the affirmative neccestates a state of securitization of crimes; a
person stealing a bike is no longer committing a crime, but rather creating a threat against
national security that must be destroyed through a militaristic mindset
KRASKA, 01 (Peter B., Professor and Senior Research Fellow at College of Justice and Strategy at Eastern
Kentucky University, “Crime Control as Warfare, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The
Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, page 22) SS
Moreover, within the ranks of military officials, epitomized in a political figure such as General Colin Powell, is a
growing "neopraetorian culture," defined as a desire to refashion a deteriorating society in the image of military
society (e.g., orderly, disciplined, efficient, respectful). Neopraetorian-ism arises when the armed forces perceive
themselves not only as protectors of what is right in civil society but also as the self-appointed and, importantly,
unelected makers and implementers of the same. "Neopraetorianism is marked by the military's flawed notion of
its own cultural superiority and its seeming inability to grasp the merits of civil society."19 From "postmodern
militarism," the military's "neopraetorianism," and a rudderless military establishment has arisen an incremental
reframing of law breaking as a "social threat" justifying the employment of the armed forces. The language used in
LIC, GAP, and OOTW is designed in part to reconceptualize law breaking and social disorder as "national
security" issues. In a peculiar application of what has normally been a leftist interpretation of crime, security
specialists promoting these doctrines are politicizing crime and social disorder by redefining them as a type of
insurgency, so as to legitimate a "counterinsurgency" approach.
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IMPACT EXTENSIONS
The martial violence at play internationally is modeled domestically—such state force leads
to tyranny, violence, human rights abuses, and war.
Kraska 2007 (Peter B. Kraska. Professor and Senior Research Fellow, College of Justice and Strategy, Eastern
Kentucky University, USA. “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” December 13,
2007. Policing Journal (2007): pam065v1-pam065.
http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pam065v1#B15. MR)
As many security analysts predicted (and some strongly advocated for), the line between war and law enforcement efforts has
blurred considerably. In conducting operations known in military circles as ‘low-intensity conflict,’ distinctions between police and
military mean little. What is less known is the long history—predating the terrorist event of 9/11—of the US military's mission of creeping
into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of police (Dunlap, 2001). Elsewhere I have documented the history of the US military's
high level of involvement, both abroad and domestically, in drug control efforts beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s
(Kraska, 1993). This was an unprecedented shift in the role and function of the US military—an attempt to make the military more ‘socially
useful’ by engaging in drug control efforts. Military officials initially resisted this change until it was clear that the post-Cold War era would
provide few justifications for continued funding. By 11 September 2001, then, the stage was thoroughly prepared for a rapid
acceleration of the military-police blur. The mission sprint of the US military into law-enforcement functions involved entirely new
levels of cooperation and collaboration between civilian police and the armed forces, and the military has become a central player in
a host of homeland security and war-on-terror initiatives. With little objection or discussion, the US Congress passed legislation
that established the military as a central feature of homeland security known as Northcom. Its most controversial role, besides establishing
close operational and training ties with civilian police, is a surveillance and information program that is currently the largest federal domestic
surveillance initiative outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pincus, 2005). The purpose of this article is to use the concepts of
militarism and militarization to illuminate and make more accurate theoretical sense of some disquieting trends in contemporary police and
policing. Before I conclude with some final observations, I want to concede upfront that the positive virtues the military model brings to the
policing table have not been discussed. As I have written elsewhere:The debate on paramilitary policing in the British literature illustrates
clearly that normative concerns play a central role in assessing its desirability (Jefferson, 1990; Reiner, 1992). This issue involves heartfelt
beliefs, values, and morals. To many people, even among academics, the military model represents constraint, discipline, honor, control,
competence, and a type of patriotism. To others it stands for tyranny, state violence, human rights abuses, war, and an
ideology which sees social problems as being best-handled through state force (Kraska and Cubellis, 1997:627). Please note
that my analysis does leave room for the military model in policing (e.g. the original and essential reactive function of SWAT teams).
This is unavoidable given that the foundation of police and military power is the same—the ability to threaten and
use force, lethal if necessary, to accomplish State objectives. It would be foolish to take an either-or position. However, the
cautionary tone is justified if we keep in mind the importance of what has been and should be a central tenet of democratic policing: strive to
keep the police as far left on the militarization continuum as possible. Whether these two converging trends outlined—the militarization
of police and the police-ization of the military—are alarming to the reader or encouraging, they are real. We are in the midst
of a historic transformation—one that both police practitioners and academics should acknowledge and remain
cognizant of. Attempting to control the crime problem by routinely conducting police special operations raids on
people's private residences is strong evidence that the US police, and crime control efforts in general, have moved
significantly down the militarization continuum. Moreover, the normalization of PPUs into routine police work, the
patrol function, and in so-called ‘order enforcement campaigns,’ points to an enduring internal militarization not
likely to recede anytime in the near future. Of course, these developments were occurring previous to the 9/11 tragedy. Two recent
wars, and the security crisis in Iraq, signal the dawn of a new era of serious armed conflict. The eerie stability provided by the Cold War and
the specter of the Vietnam War has vanished. The on-going war on terrorism is accelerating dramatically the blurring distinction between the
police and military, between internal and external security, and between war and law enforcement. Any broad-based academic analysis that
relies heavily on these traditional demarcations will soon seem misplaced and obsolete. In the midst of this perpetual war-footing, I think it is
also plausible to assume that government officials entrusted to keep us secure from terrorism, will more readily gravitate toward the ideology of
militarism—both for internal and external security threats—when problem-solving and administering justice.
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ALTERNATIVE EXTENSIONS
Finally, only our alternative opens up a space for meaningful resistance—we must
challenge the assumptions of their discourse to open up a space for alternative forms of
politics to emerge
Owen, Prof @ Lancaster, 1994 (David, Maturity and Modernity)
We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and
‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but
rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of
thought the practices we accept rest.’ This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s point is intelligible if we
recognise his concern to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This
emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A
transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the
same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. The genealogical thrust of
this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evidence is no longer
accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very
difficult, and quite possible. The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is
embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the
humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this
account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legitimate a universal determination of ‘what is
right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are
as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for a reposing of the question ‘who are we?’ The role of the
intellectual is thus not the speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space
within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves.
A veiled military occupation is the worst form of violence and destroys all remnants of a
culture—rejecting the occupation mentality is the pre-requisite to resistance
Shapira et. Al 2010 (Amnon Shapira,Professor of Religious History at Ariel University, written along with Dr.
Youssef Nasser, Sheikh Maher Assaf, Authors from The Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation,
“Religion and the justification of violence”, www.rhr.org.il/pdf/english3.pdf, Accessed 6//22/2010, published 2010)
SS
Occupation is one of the most hideous forms of violence. It includes the occupation of land, culture, identity, and
traditions. Military occupation is a process seizing land, either in part or entirely; practiced by the army of a state
against another during invasion or war and sometimes even in the post- war period. It represents one of the most
ancient and evident forms of colonialism and the most agitating factor of violence and bloody conflicts. The
Islamic doctrine, however, prohibits aggression in all its forms . Allah says: "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but
help ye not one another in sin and rancor" (Surat Al-Maidah, verse 2). Occupation is a heinous crime that pushes men to
madness, delirium, and gossip. People who are under occupation say meaningless things and behave differently to
express their objection to invasion and its inhumane and immoral effects . The Holy Koran demonstrates that driving people
out of their lands and nations is a prohibited form of aggression and is viewed as offensive. Allah says: "After this it is ye, the same people,
who slay among yourselves, and banish a party of you from their homes; assist (their enemies) against them, in guilt and transgression; and if
they come to you as captives, ye ransom them, though it was not lawful for you to banish them. Then is it only a part of the Book that ye
believe in, and do ye reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this, but disgrace in this life?" (Surat AlBaqara, verse 85). No one can accept occupation, for it means the extinction of human civilization of the occupied
people. Submitting to occupation is not acceptable. History provides us with numerous examples of how those
exposed to occupation, rushed to defend themselves, their land, and civilization with all methods and resources
possible. The rights of freedom, independence, and self-determination are among the rights sanctioned by all
nations. The support provided by other nations to any occupying force is an action of drawing a veil over
occupation and oppression.
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DISCOURSE KEY
Discourse is vital in the context of militarism
Lutz 2010 (Catherine Lutz, American Anthropologist University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. “Making War at
Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis.” Jstore. New Series, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002),
pp. 723-735. Accessed: 21/06/2010 20:38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3567250 MR)
By militarization, I mean "the contradictory and tense social proc- ess in which civil society organizes itself for the produc- tion of
violence" (Geyer 1989:79). This process involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military
purposes, including the shaping of other institu- tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simultaneously a
discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use
of force, the organization of large stand- ing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization
is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of militant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of hu- man potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender,
and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action (Bernstein
1999; Linenthal and Engelhardt 1996). While it is often called by such names as "military strength," or framed as a tool to defend
freedom, militarization is a process that helped spawn the violence of September 11 and the violent response of
October 7: To understand militarization, so many must hope, is to put some impediment in its deadly path. While militarization has been
shaped within innu- merable states, corporations, and localities, the United States is now the largest wellspring for this global
process.
Discursive performances construct reality—we must critique these practices to eliminate
the social norms they entrench and resist domination
Bagshaw 2003 [Director of the Conflict Management Research Group at the University of South Australia, 2003
[Dale, “Language, Power and Mediation,” Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management
2003 Conference, June 15-18 in Melbourne, Australia, http://www.leadr.com.au/BAGSHAW.PDF]
Poststructuralists seek to understand how power and ideology work through systems of discourse and how words
and their meaning play a part in shaping attitudes and behaviours, or ‘performances’ , for example of race, class and
gender. From this perspective words carry intentionality and can serve to harass, disparage and marginalise people from
relatively powerless groups such as women and children, people from culturally and linguistically diverse
backgrounds, indigenous people, lesbians and gay men. Hartman, a social work academic, stresses that practitioners can never
discount the power of language (as discourse) to inflict irreparable harm. To quote: indeed, we, along with the people who are
oppressed must continue to challenge the dominant discourses that attempt to marginalise groups on the basis of
such categories as colour, sex, age or sexual orientation (Hartman, 1991: 275). In my recent research work with women who have
been subjected to domestic violence (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000; Bagshaw, Chung, Couch, Lilburn, & Wadham, 2000) and with adolescents
involved in conflict in schools (Bagshaw, 1998; Rigby & Bagshaw, 2001) the majority of subjects surveyed and interviewed reported that
verbal abuse can be far more damaging to their self-esteem in the long-term than other forms if abuse, including physical abuse, posing a
challenge to the prevailing ‘sticks and stones’ myth. In fact if one views the ‘sticks and stones’ playground taunt in its entirety, there is a hint
that it may involve defensive posturing and that words may in fact be more hurtful than the first two lines of the rhyme suggests: Sticks and
stones will break my bones But names will never hurt me. When I’d dead and in my grave, Think of the names you called me (Turner,
1969:76). This is why I chose to focus on verbal abuse for my PhD thesis at the University of Melbourne. My thesis topic is Verbal abuse and
adolescent gendered identities - I am investigating the role and function verbal abuse plays in the social construction of masculinity and
femininity in two South Australian schools. From the interviews I have conducted with year 9 students (13-15 years) over the past two years it
is clear that language and discourse plays a powerful role in defining their gendered identities. Along with the participants in prior research
studies, they also report that professionals pay far more serious attention to physical abuse than they do to verbal abuse, in spite of emerging
evidence that the latter is potentially more harmful, especially in the longer term. Language as Discourse and Discourse Analysis In the early
1970’s, Michel Foucault reconceived language as discourse – the producer of meaning, not the reflector of reality
(Foucault, 1972). He views discourse: as a social and political entity, the means by which what we know of the world can be created (rather
than simply represented) (McHoul & Grace, 1993:13). A ‘discourse’ from Foucault’s perspective is whatever constrains or
enables writing, speaking and thinking within specific historical limits. Thus for Foucault, discourse analysis became
a
powerful strategy for change. From Foucault’s perspective discourse analysis should examine how access to forms
of language and how ways of using language have become ‘normal’ and dominant through complex historical
processes. He highlighted that in any given historical period we can only speak or think about a given social
practice (for example madness, domestic violence, child abuse or sexuality) in certain specific ways and not others. A discourse
can therefore be defined as the production and interpretations of sets of related utterances … which effect and
sustain the different categorizations and positions [for example] of women and men (Black & Coward, 1998:111).
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DISCOURSE KEY
Representations predetermine our possibilities for interacting with the world, our kritik
must come first
Anand 07 [Dibyesh Anand PhD (Bristol), MA (Hull), BA Honours (St Stephen’s College, Delhi), Reader in
International Relations Centre for the Study of Democracy, Westminster University, London, Geopolitical exotica:
Tibet in western imagination p. 12-16 2007]
WORLD POLITICS AS THE POLITICS OF IMAGINATION Social and cultural identities by their very nature have always been discursively
constructed. What is new and peculiar to modernity is the desire and ability to construct a bounded identity based on a
fixed and autonomous idea of self. This has been paralleled by the power of representations to construct identity
and by highly unequal access to discursive and representational resources at a global level. Representational practices
feed the dominant knowledge regimes and structures and shape the very identities they seek to represent . The best-known
example of this is the ideational construct of Orientalism, which reflects the close connection between particular modes of cultural representations, anthropology, and European imperialism
(see Said 1978). In the process it also creates the categories of “Oriental** and “Occidental” people. Representation and Critical IR Within IR, it is important to look at Western cultural
Representations populate the world with specific subject positions
within which concretized individuals are then interpellated (sec Wcldcs T999). Identity claims of various non-Western
communities thus operate within power relations put in place by the West. This does not deny non-Westerners their agency,
representations of non-Western people. This is so for various reasons.
for there is always space for resistance and accommodation. But it emphasizes differential access to the creation and molding of discursive
(both material and nonmaterial) resources. It offers ways of challenging and denaturalizing modes of representation that
abet domination by “making it acceptable and coherent within the dominant ethos that constructs domestic selves
and exotic Others” (Shapiro 1988, 122-23). Recognition of the productive dimension of representation implies that the very basis of world
politics—identity—is challenged. The recognition of the salience of Western representations of the non-West in world
politics also questions the conventional view of international studies as a social “science” that has little to do with
culture, morality, society, and the like. It underlines the importance of culture as a factor in molding, sustaining, and questioning political practices. It recognizes world politics as a process of cultural interactions in which
the identities of actors (including their values and visions) arc not given prior to or apart from these interactions. Instead, they are shaped and constituted in the complexes of social practices that make up world politics. Rather than
denying the importance of actors in enacting and reshaping the social practices in which they are embedded, it focuses our attention also on the social construction of actors. Thus, representation is an inherent and important aspect
of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. “A whole range of analyses in IR have taken this [Said's] idea up and mapped the different ways in which the West constructs the non-western world”
(Diken and Laustsen 2.001, 768).This comment is surprising given that IR, including critical IR, with few exceptions (see Biswas 2001; Doty 1996b; Gustcrson 1999) has more or less ignored the questions raised by Orientalism
critique. The question of representation has historically been excluded from the academic study of international relations and the “price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is
perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations” (Doty 1996b, 171). The focus on representation within critical IR has been mainly on the
the inscription of
otherness was linked to American foreign policy and the enframing of American identity: At one time or another,
European and American discourse has inscribed women, the working class. Eastern Europeans, Jews, blacks,
criminals, coloreds, mulattos, Africans, drug addicts, Arabs, the insane, Asians, the Orient, the Third World,
terrorists, and others through tropes that have written their identity as inferior, often in terms of their being a mob or horde (sometimes
constitutive function of representation in generating and sustaining particular policy regimes {sec Dory 1996b) and on the identity politics of the representee For instance, Campbell argues that
passive and sometimes threatening) that is without culture, devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, incapable of achievement, prone to be unruly, inspired by emotion,
whatever “we” are not
given to passion, indebted to tradition, or . . .
. (iyy8b, 8y) In Weldes (1999) as well as Weldes et al. (1999), representation is analyzed as a central
concept of international relations and foreign policy. As in Campbell, it is the foreign policy regime sustained by particular representational practices and the identity of the repre-senter (the
United States) that is under investigation. Doty (1993, 1996a, 1996b) provides effective analysis of representation as foreign political practice. Similarly, Neumann studies the “use of ‘the
Hast’ as the other” (1999; emphasis added) as a general practice in the identify formation of Europe; Klein examines NATO “as a set of {representational] practice by which the West has
the Soviet Union was constructed as a dangerous Other
in order to produce an ideological rationale for the U.S. national security state -In all these studies of Western representation
of the Other, the focus is on either its rationalizing role in some foreign policy regime or on its productive effect on
dominant identity discourses within the West. These works have not dealt with the poetics and politics of Western representations of the non-West from the vantage point of the latter. The focus has
constituted itself as a political and cultural identity” (1990, 313); and Dalby (1988) analyzes how
remained largely on a critique of Western practices, not on its productive and restrictive impact on the non-West. This is at best an incomplete step in the right direction. While recognizing the significance of representation of the
Other for the representee we must identify and analyze the impact on the identity of the represented. Chapters 4-6 focus on the productive dimension of representations vis-a-vis the represented through the empirical study of the
identity of Tibet and Tibetans. My emphasis is on the ways in which particular encounters between the West and the non-West have shaped the latter. Representations support not only particular politics of the representor toward
the represented but, significantly, they construct the very identities of the actors involved, especially the Other. Representations are productively linked with identity discourses of all kinds. The conventional idea that representation
draws upon a pregiven identity is turned on its head, for it is identity that is fashioned out of particularized representations. In the case of Exotica Tibet, then, representational discourses are not reflective of, but actually productive
of, Tibetan identity. Within critical 1R, the paucity of serious consideration of the “how,” “why,” and “what impact” questions of Western representations of/on non-Wcstcrn communities shows that the task of provincializing the
They do
not argue that the material world does not exist but that it acquires meaning only through the mediation of
language and discursive systems. Though such a discursive approach characterizes the work of many scholars, no one has been more prominent than Foucault (1970,
West has only just begun. Theorizing Representation Constructionist theories (Hall 1997b, 15-74) are best suited for a contextualized understanding of social and political concepts like representation and identity.
1971, 1980, 1984, 1986) in shaping it. Foucault is concerned with the production of knowledge and meaning not through language but through discourse. Discursive practices have their own
Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of
concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices. (Foucault 19X6, 199) Foucault’s reformulation of discourse also calls for
inclusionary and exclusionary aspects.
recognition of the explicit linkage between knowledge, truth, and power. Identification of the knowledge-power (pouvoir/savoir) nexus reveals the linkage of truth claims with systems of power: Truth isn’t outside power, or
lacking of power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating
Truth is a thing of the world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint . {Foucault 1980, Z91)
The recognition of the constructed character of truth facilitates a critical political positioning. Nothing is sacrosanct. However, this docs not
undermine the impact of truth claims on the lives of people. All knowledge, once applied in the “real” world, has real effects
and in that sense becomes true.1′ This Foucauldian identification and exploration of the link between power, knowledge, and truth is radical in its implication. It shifts the terrain of inquiry from the
themselves.
question “What is truth?” to the question How do discursive practices constitute truth claims?” In terms of representation, we may see the implication as a shift in the focus from some core reality beneath/behind representations to
The question is no longer whether a representation is true or false but what discursive practices
operate to render it true or false. It is not about how representations reflect some subjects but, more crucially, how
subjectivity itself is constructed within discursive practices, how representational regimes are productive of
subjectivity. Discourses then are “practices which form the objects of which they speak ” (Foucault J972., 49). Adopting this approach to
the modalities of their functioning.
Tibetan identity, the pertinent question shifts from “How far do representations (both Western and self-) of Tibetans reflect their identity?” to “How do representational regimes affect the discursive production of Tibetanness?”
This helps us look at Tibctanness as a politicized identification process, instead of some pregiven, essentialzed, fixed object.
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KRITIK TURNS CASE
Police will take up military approaches and vice versa
Morales, 2010 (Frank, Founder of the Campaign to Demilitarize the Police, “The Militarization of the Police”,
http://www.covertaction.org/content/view/95/75/, Last edited on June 22, 2010) SS
Historical instances of collaboration between the police and the military reveal not only the operational aspects of
such "transfers," but political and ideological ones as well. The current NYPD Street Crime Unit, along with the former Civic
Affairs Unit in Philadelphia, active in the targeting of political prisoner Mumia Abu-Jamal for his spirited and informed defense of MOVE (see
sidebar), grew out of the anti-radical "red squads" of the sixties. These police units, laden with the most dedicated and brutal white
supremacists, adapted, over time and changing circumstances, their hatred of radicals to a hatred of "druggies and criminal perpetrators."
This change coincided with the broader criminalization of protest, the boom in drug busts, and the ideological and
practical dehumanization of certain people, especially Blacks (as in the promotion of books like The Bell Curve, the move to
"workfare" neo-slavery, the depiction of Black and Latino youth as born into a violent "underclass," etc.). Thus, by the 1980s, "the
police were confronted with charges of brutality in the treatment of Blacks, but not in a context of racial or
political protest."17 Organizations like the Street Crime and Narcotics Units are the spearhead of politicized police
departments and carry on the strategies of yesterday's "red squad" war on radicals. In addition, these police units
have become, and remain, the chief beneficiaries of generous military largesse. Throughout the seventies, the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration facilitated these military "transfers" through the creation of entities like Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) units which were modeled on the U.S. military's Special Forces.
In the 1970s, the NYPD's Bureau of Special Services (BOSS)
functioned in this role. It "bore a distinction akin to that of the Green Berets."18 Seeing themselves in a "war for survival," BOSS targeted the
Black and Latino liberation movements in NYC as "part of a trade-off to appease elements in the police that threatened self-help and
vigilantism unless punitive courtroom measures were taken against the ghetto militants"19 Hardline police factions like the Law Enforcement
Group orchestrated a 1968 mob attack on a Brooklyn courtroom demanding the removal of the judge hearing a case involving three members
of the Black Panther Party. When Mayor Giuliani told a rally of police officers on the steps of City Hall some years ago during the Dinkins
administration, "I love the New York City Police Department," Black and Latino politicians were roughed up.
In December 1997, two
former NYPD undercover detectives told the story of one of the most secretive units within the Police Department. The unit, which functioned
as a "Black Desk" beginning in the mid-1980s, "aimed at investigating dissident Black groups and their leaders." The unit worked out of the
Protective Research Unit, which was in the Public Security Section of the NYPD's Intelligence Division, headed at the time by Deputy Chief
Robert Burke. Black groups that were targeted included the Patrice Lumumba Coalition and the December 12th Coalition, then known as the
New York 8. "Historically, the department's political surveillance unit has held some of the NYPD's most closely guarded secrets. It was
nicknamed the Red Squad, because it had investigated supposed Communists and political activists in the McCarthy era. In the 1960s, the unit,
known as the Bureau of Special Investigations, turned its attention to Malcolm X and later to the Black Panthers...." These units were, and
continue to be, outfitted with the latest in surveillance ("stealth") and weapons technology.20
The recent upsurge in popular
resistance to incidents like the Diallo shooting has spawned much debate on the problem of a runaway militarized
police. Soon after the shooting, NYC Police Commissioner Howard Safir ordered the commander of the Street Crime Unit to have daily
discussions with his officers about the use of firearms. Patrick E. Kelleher, first deputy commissioner, said at a news conference that "what
we are doing is taking a close look at our training procedures and ways police officers communicate among each
other in enforcement situations."21 Mayor Giuliani, for his part, "set aside $15 million for sensitivity training for officers.22 The
Mayor and his Police Commissioner popped into Harlem's 32nd Precinct one recent morning touting their wallet-sized politeness cue cards.
"The police officers listened politely, in a way that members of paramilitary organizations are obliged to listen. "23
One often hears of the need to "sensitize" the police, presumably by making them feel at home in the ghetto. Discussion of issues regarding
police training usually assume some form of humanistic behavior modification. The assumption is that the few bad apples need only to read a
manual or two and talk to a counselor. In fact, the police have been trained to kill. The only role psychiatric behavior
modification is playing is to assist in the brainwashing required to create a killer through conditioning, cultivating
in the officer a near instinctual reaction to a programmed stimulus, and a "manufactured contempt" for the "perp."
Ron Hampton, a retired police officer and executive director of the National Black Police Association, told Amnesty International in 1988 that
"in a training video, every criminal portrayed is Black."24
22
MGW 2010
Gothbret/Thomas Lab – K lab
Military Dichotomy K
KRITIK TURNS CASE
The Military and Police perform the exact same tasks – they are interchangeable and the
aff impacts will therefore continue
Cowper, 2000 (Thomas, J., Contributor to the Police Quarterly, New York City Police, “The Myth of the
“Military Model” of Leadership in Law Enforcement”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 3,
http://www.policefuturists.org/pdf/The_Myth_of_the_Military_Model_ofLeadership_in_Law_Enforcement.pdf,
September 2000, Accessed 6/22/10) SS
Police organization and military organization attempt to accomplish very similar ends. Both involve the
application of governmentally sanctioned force, in the ultimate sense, in the form of a combined use of men and
mate- rials organized and structured to solve a myriad of problems concerning
conflictswithandresistancetothatgovernment’sdeterminedwill.Bothuse a variety of means other than direct force to
accomplish their respective mis- sions while maintaining continuum of force options as a last resort. Both employ
a wide assortment of specialists and units against multiple oppo- nents simultaneously. Both engage in operations
such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and life saving, as well as the direct and forcible inter- vention in the
affairs of others. Both must deal effectively with the civilian populations in and around their areas of operation and
solve problems to succeed. And both are constrained in their efforts by externally applied Rules of Engagement
that limit the amount of force they can apply at a par- ticular time and place based on the totality of existing
operational and politi- cal circumstances as perceived and determined by civilian decision makers and the law.
Kritik takes out solvency: The ignorance of the combination of the military creates
inefficiencies in their duties; military put in the place of police officers needlessly kill and
destroy citizens, while police put in the military position exercise too much restraint in
dangerous situations.
Dunlap, 2001 (Colonel Charles J. Jr., Deputy Judge Advocate General at the United States Airforce, “The Green
Line”, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police,
Edited by Peter B. Kraska, pages 34-35) SS
What we have seen in the last twenty years is a growing tendency to look to the armed forces to perform tasks that
are essentially law enforcement. To many Americans the use of the military for these purposes is of little concern.
The armed forces consistently lead public opinion polls as the most trusted institution in American society, topping
even organized religion and the Supreme Court. Moreover, as John Hillen, then an analyst for the Heritage Foundation, put it in
1996: "Why do politicians want to use the military for police duties? To take advantage of one of the few parts of
the federal government that actually works."29 Notwithstanding the seeming acquiescence of the public, this growing trend bears
further analysis. In truth, there are few instances in modern times where the military effectively conducted a policelike internal security mission consistent with both the maintenance of an authentic combat capa¬bility and
democratic values. That said, the issues with regard to using the armed forces for law enforcement can usefully be
divided into practical problems and philosophical ones. One of the principal reasons that many military leaders
have long resisted employing their troops as police forces relates to the practical concern that doing so diminishes
combat prowess. Despite what the casual observer may think, there are surprisingly few synergies between law enforcement and military
missions. Examining the border shooting incident provides an illustration. There the Marine Corps insisted that the patrol acted in accordance
with the "JTF-6 rules of engagement which include the inherent right of self-defense."30 Though resolution of the specific facts of that case is
beyond the scope of this article, it is easy to see how a dichotomy might arise. Military forces operating in a domestic situation,
where the rules of engagement limit the use of force to "self-defense" situations, might still have an interpretation
of the scope of the term that differs from that of local police forces. Under military practice, force may be used in
self-defense to "decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S.
forces." Moreover, under certain conditions, engagement is permitted "until hostile force no longer presents an
imminent threat."31 However, state law, not military doctrine, governs when military forces are acting domestically against civilian
suspects outside of a federal enclave. Accordingly, the legal authority to use deadly force in such situations may be available to any citizen (as
opposed to law enforcement officer) in a par¬ticular jurisdiction.32 Thus, state legal requirements that mandate actions such as "retreat to the
wall" before the use of deadly force is permitted are unknown in military practice and unlikely to be well understood by troops in the field.33
Indeed, using military forces for tasks that are essentially law enforcement requires a fundamental change in
orientation. To put it bluntly, in its most basic iteration, military training is aimed at killing people and breaking
things. Consequently, military doctrine has forces moving on a target by fire and maneuver with a view toward
destroying that target. Police forces, on the other hand, take an entirely different approach. They have to exercise
the studied restraint that a judicial process requires; they gather evidence and arrest "suspects." Where the military
sees "enemies" of the United States, a police agency, properly oriented, sees "citizens" suspected of crimes but
innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. These are two different views of the world.
23
MGW 2010
Gothbret/Thomas Lab – K lab
Military Dichotomy K
KRITIK TURNS CASE
Obama’s new discursive strategy demonstrates how the government blurs distinction
between police and military in order to commit urban warfare against civilians
Kouri 2009 Jim Kouri. Law Enforcement Examiner. “Obama blurs line between military and police.” December
9, 2009. http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2009m12d9-Obama-blurs-line-betweenmilitary-and-police. MR.
When the Obama administration announced that enemy combatants and terrorists will be given Miranda Warnings when they are captured,
many Americans wondered how that would improve our warfighting in Afghanistan, Iraq or other terrorist havens. However, upon examining
this latest directive by President Barack Obama, perhaps there is an ulterior motive for his directive. Blurring the lines between law
enforcement and the military appears to be the goal sought by Obama and the progressives. More federal control of
local law enforcement while at the same time cross-training soldiers to perform the police function within the U.S.
In a recent report released to the US Congress, analysts assessed what they termed “preparedness tests” between the U.S. military and
government agencies at the federal, state and local levels. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) exercises to test preparedness to perform
its homeland defense and civil support missions. The Government Accountability Office was asked to assess the extent to which NORTHCOM
is consistent with Department of Defense guidelines for training and exercise requirement involving interagency partners and states in its
exercises. NORTHCOM’s exercise program is generally consistent with the requirements of DOD’s Joint Training System, but its exercise
reporting is inconsistent. Since the command was established in 2002, NORTHCOM has conducted 13 large-scale exercises and generally
completed exercise summary reports within the required time frame. However, those reports did not consistently include certain information,
such as areas needing improvement, because NORTHCOM lacks guidance that specifies exercise reports’ content and format, potentially
impacting its ability to meet internal standards for planning and execution of joint exercises, and to compare and share exercise results over
time with interagency partners and states. “While the rationale for using the US military domestically had been debated for years, President
Barack Obama appears intent on using our military at least until he can create his promised 'Civilian Security Force' which he said would be as
big and powerful as the military,” said political strategist Mike Baker. “The fact that the military — in this instance
NORTHCOM — is being trained to operate with our borders should be setting off alarms throughout this nation.
But it’s being ignored even by those who profess to be conservatives,” he said. Nineteen federal agencies and organizations
and 17 states and the District of Columbia have participated in one or more of the seven large-scale exercises that NORTHCOM has conducted
since September 2005. However, NORTHCOM faces challenges in involving states in the planning, conduct, and assessment of its exercises,
such as adapting its exercise system and practices to involve other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that do not have the same practices or
level of planning resources. Inconsistencies with how NORTHCOM involves states in exercises are occurring in part because NORTHCOM
officials lack experience dealing with states and do not have a consistent process for including states in exercises. Without such a process,
NORTHCOM increases the risk that its exercises will not provide benefits for all participants, impact the seamless exercise of all levels of
government, and potentially affect NORTHCOM’s ability to provide civil support capabilities. "It is up to the residents of individual states to
tell their governors they do not want the federal government intruding on law enforcement and public safety issues," said former NYPD
detective and Marine intelligence officer Sid Frances. "This is especially true if their governors share the same political philosophy as the
President and his minions in Washington," he added. NORTHCOM has a systematic lessons learned and corrective action program to improve
preparedness, but gaps remain with collecting and sharing lessons with agency and state partners and managing corrective actions. Access to
the system NORTHCOM uses for managing exercise observations is limited for non-DOD participants, and DOD believes that the Homeland
Security Department's system is not adequately protected from unauthorized users. NORTHCOM’s mitigation steps have not resolved the
issues. In addition, about 20 percent of the corrective actions tracked by NORTHCOM were being closed prematurely due to gaps in oversight.
Closing issues prematurely increases the risk that issues will reoccur and limits the knowledge gained and value of the exercise. The
Government Accountability Office is making recommendations to DOD to direct NORTHCOM to consistently involve the states in planning,
executing, and assessing exercises and improve oversight of corrective actions. The GAO is also recommending that DOD define when
NORTHCOM should use planning and documentation requirements. DOD agreed or partially agreed with the recommendations and cited
ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the recommendations’ intent. DOD did not fully address a recommendation on training to NORTHCOM
staff on specific state emergency management structures. GAO believes such training would benefit NORTHCOM personnel in advance of a
crisis and for exercise planning. The first active-duty unit dedicated to supporting US civilian authorities in the event of a nuclear, biological or
chemical attack is wrapping up three days of intensive training in tactics to be used within the continental United States, according to Armed
Forces Press Service representative Donna Miles. Ms. Miles reported to news reporters, bloggers and Internet journalists that troops from the
3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team are at the Naval facility located in Indian Head, Maryland getting hands-on training in skills
they would depend on to provide support during a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incident, known here as a
CBRNE. However, not everyone is happy about this latest military development coming so close to the transition from the Bush White House
to the Obama Administration. Some observers believe this plan is part of a deal between President Obama and the current Secretary of Defense
who remained in his current position even after the Bush-Obama transition. “While Obama and his team are making it sound as if
they will use the military in a non-combative roll, part of the training being conducted is in urban warfare,” claims
Mike Baker. “Obama appears oblivious to Posse Comitatus and to the US Constitution when it comes to using the
military against civilians within US borders,” he added. While the military experts in Obama's pocket appear excited about this use of
soldiers within the borders of the United States, many military and police commanders and officers are less enthusiastic. “I cannot understand
why the federal government is so intent on using such military force within our borders. It reminds me of the Branch Davidian
massacre in Waco, Texas when the feds used excessive deadly force against men, women and children. And they
used that deadly physical force based on false information,” warns former Det. Frances. “While I've served in the military and
continue as a reservist, as a [New Jersey] cop I'm troubled about the use of federal troops coming into our communities during any
emergencies,” said Detective Lieutenant Stephan Rodgers
24
MGW 2010
Gothbret/Thomas Lab – K lab
Military Dichotomy K
A2: distinction between police and military key
Flipshield—we can’t undo the militarization of policing: Empirically, demilitarizing
policing is ineffective—militaristic practices become habits too hard to break.
Herzog, 2010. Sergio Herzog, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. “Militarization
and demilitarization processes in the Israeli and American police forces: Organizational and social aspects.” Online
publication: 07 May 2010: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964861. MR
That both the American and Israeli police forces are currently under- going a process of attempted
demilitarization is quite evident. This trend, which is supported by their police administrations and many social
scientists, seems to constitute a natural development, based on broad social processes in both societies, towards
decentralization, liberalization, improved relationships with the public, and customer orientation. However, these
factors do not assure the successful insti- tutionalization of the change or its persistence in the long term. At the
beginning of the 21st century it is still too early to assess its impact. As in the American situation (Greene and
Mastrofski, 1991; Hunter and Barker, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1994; Walker, 1999), many programs of community
policing in Israel may still be perceived as traditional anti- crime, anti-drug efforts. In some police stations and
regions there is little more than rhetoric, while demilitarization efforts are still applied as a way of appearing to
be progressive and innovative without actual abandonment of traditional militarized policing. A major obstacle to
real change common to both countries seems to be the police organizational culture. Police officers on every
police level are habituated to act and to think according to militaristic principles and find it difficult to adopt
'civilian' thought and work patterns. These factors may lead them to oppose and even to sabotage the process
(Landstrom and Savage, 1992; Peak and Glensor, 1996; Shalev and Yehezkeally, 1997; Skolnick and Bayley,
1986). Willingness to change is therefore a fundamental require- ment for demilitarization implementation: police
agencies must modify their organizational culture. Some additional obstacles seem to be more particular to Israel.
For example, there is a lack of local cooperative tendencies (unlikely ones) in Israeli society that could facilitate
active participation in com- munity policing. Apart from religious Jewish communities, some Arab communities,
cooperative and collectivist villages, and even ideological settlements in-the territories, there is very little sense of
community in Israel-(Gimshi, 1999; Weisburd et ah, 1997:117-118).9 This obviously raises the question of how may the Israeli high police
command estab- lish community policing if one cannot clearly identify communities there. An answer is given by Bensinger (1998):
community policing (like organizational and administrative decentralization, and civilianization of police positions) is just 'another' artificial
application of 'American solutions to American problems' in Israel, akin to others applied in Israeli society in general, and in its criminal
system in particular. Moreover, Israeli media coverage of eventual 'municipal police forces' has already created a fear of political involvement
and use of the police by local politicians (Yehezkeally and Shalev, 1996: 36). An additional particular obstacle to Israel is the fact that despite
the aforementioned organizational changes, the INP continues to work as national police, subordinated to central government and acting
according to broad national, rather than local considerations. Police policy is still deter- mined by the Ministry of Internal Security
and operationalization is still the responsibility of the Inspector-General (Gilboa, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). As a result, the
military character of the police is likely to prevail as long as severe problems of internal security and public order exist. In
conclusion, continued monitoring will be required to assess demilitar- ization trends in both countries on the operational level.
If these developments towards demilitarization in the police rest on broad social changes, what may be said about the
secondary trend of renewed militarization in the US? Compared with the earlier trend, this change seems to be more worrying.
Kraska (1999:213) raises some possible consequences: does it actually reflect a trend towards a new form of totalitarianism?
Or is it perhaps an advance towards new forms of technological and intelligence surveillance, especially of targeted 'internal
threats'? What is more clear is that the blurring of limits between the military and the police force has always been
disadvantageous 9 The same may be said of some young American cities that have grown rapidly in recent years
and also of highly disintegrated poor neighborhoods, where organized community life is usually non-existent
(Peak and Glensor, 1996; Walker, 1999for the public whom the latter is supposed to serve. As Dunlop (1999:
227) concluded, 'A military organization adept at destroying targets and undermining enemy command and
control structures is not neces- sarily the best organization to do such work in a democracy".
25