Given how important it is to successfully interpret facial expressions in our daily
interactions with each other, it is intriguing to consider how the audience engages
with puppetry, when puppets lack facial expressions. So important are facial
expressions considered that the person voicing the parts (tayu) in some puppetry
theatres (e.g., the Japanese form of Banraku) is made visible to the audience, so the
tayu’s face can be seen demonstrating the facial expressions lacking on the puppets.
For other forms of puppetry this is not the case, and yet people find themselves
entertained despite a lack of emotional facial expressions. In considering how this is
possible, I have drawn from my background in cognitive psychology, and here I will
make some suggestions drawing from recent research in neuroscience.
One possibility is suggested by the question’s reference to “exaggerated body
language”. It might be that the puppets’ caricatured body movements compensate for
the lack of facial expression. In fact, just as we are extremely good at facial
recognition (e.g., we have a specialized area in the brain called the fusiform face
area), we are also talented in reading bodies. For example, studies in neuroscience
have indicated that the brain has body-selective areas in the occipitotemporal regions
dubbed: the extrastriate body area and the fusiform body area. It has been proposed by
researchers (such as Downing & Peelen, 2011), that these areas provide a perceptual
framework that “allows other cortical systems to exploit the rich, socially relevant
information that is conveyed by the bodyi”.
However, even if the body movements do compensate for lack of facial expression, it
is likely that a number of factors contribute to our ability to relate to puppets. Two
other factors that may lead to successful engagement in enjoying puppet theatre are
the brain’s mirror neurons, and our level of motivation and attention.
I’ll start by discussing mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are a type of brain cell that
have been found to respond both to a person’s action and to their observation of
someone else performing the actionii. For example, these cells will fire (become
active) when I grab a glass of water and also when I see you grab the glass of water.
This means if I watch you pick up the glass, both you and I have these cells firing,
even though you alone are performing the action. It is as if my cells “mirror” your
actions. The implication is that these cells may help account for our ability to
empathize, as not only do they mirror the behaviour, they can also distinguish
between intentions. So if you pick up the glass in order to take a drink, as opposed to
picking it up in order to clear the table, these neurons also detect thisiii. Furthermore,
research with human participants indicates that there is automatic imitation, where
reaction times reveal that “healthy adult humans are prone, in an unwilled and
unreasoned way, to copy the actions of othersiv”. In a sense, we are also puppets!
If we then consider this information in the context of a person watching puppet
theatre, we can see how empathy may well occur for the puppet despite its lack of
facial expressions. The puppets exaggerated movements are going to be clearly
noticed by the audience and their mirror neurons are going to fire in response. If a
puppet is seen to fall over, the audience’s mirror neurons fire just as if they had
experienced the calamity, leading to sympathy for the fallen.
While these mirror neurons can help us understand the audience’s ability to read
intentions and empathize, we also need to consider the audience’s own intentions,
including their motivation and attention to the puppet theatre. The poet Samuel Taylor
Coleridge coined the term “suspension of disbelief” when he wrote of his idea for the
Lyrical Ballads:
"…my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural,
or at least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human
interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which
constitutes poetic faith."
In the case of viewing puppet theatre, the audience (especially adults) will be fully
aware that the puppets are not real, but by choosing to attend a show they are
engaging in the drama, and a willing suspension of disbelief takes place that allows
for the puppets to be accepted for real during the performance (even when strings are
clearly visible). Hence, the audience is motivated to believe or have poetic faith. This
motivation will then direct their attention to the theatrically relevant details, such as
the puppets actions, and away from irrelevant details, such as the puppets strings.
Inattentional blindness research has shown that when people focus attention on
relevant details, irrelevant details are inhibited and often fail to reach awareness v.
Hence, clues that might appear to reveal the fiction are likely to be ignored.
In summary, I have presented three factors that can help explain why audiences are
successfully entertained by puppet theatre, despite exaggerated movements and lack
of facial expressions. The first factor is that we have brain areas specialized to
recognise bodies and body movements, so the exaggerated movements may
compensate for facial expressions. The second factor is that we have mirror neurons
that detect actions as if they were our own, including recognising intentions. This may
explain our ability to empathize with the puppets. Finally, the third factor is that
audience members are motivated to suspend disbelief. This directs their attention to
relevant details critical to the story, while ignoring irrelevant details that might
otherwise compromise belief.
These considerations come from considering the knowledge provided by cognitive
psychology, but I’m sure there are many other factors that contribute to this
phenomenon, and that other perspectives may shed further light.
i
Downing, P., & Peelen, M. (2011). The role of occipitotemporal body-selective regions in person
perception. Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 186-226.
ii
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding motor
events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 91, 176-180.
iii
Blakeslee, Sandra, (2006). Cells That Read Minds, New York Times, Science, January 10,
iv
Heyes, C. (2011). Automatic Imitation. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 463-83
v
Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.