On the Necessity of Descartes’ Eternal Truths
Bryan McGillvray
Research Methods
May 11, 2011
2
On the Necessity of Descartes’ Eternal Truths1
Descartes’ Doctrine of the Creation of the Eternal Truths (hereafter referred to as the
“Creation Doctrine”) is perhaps the most interesting and philosophically puzzling aspect of his
entire philosophical system. According to the doctrine, God freely creates the eternal truths. One
of the clearest formulations of this idea is in a letter Descartes wrote to Marin Mersenne where
he says “You ask me by what kind of causality God established the eternal truths. I reply: by the
same kind of causality as he created all things, that is to say, as their efficient and total cause”
(CSMK 25). Included in the set of eternal truths are logical truths (e.g. it is impossible for the
same thing to be and to not be at the same time), conceptual truths (e.g. he who thinks cannot but
exist while he thinks), synthetic a priori truths (e.g. nothing comes from nothing), and
mathematical truths (CSM I, 209). But the doctrine does not end there. Also included in
Descartes’ doctrine is the claim that the eternal truths are necessary. As evidence for this
Descartes writes “the necessity of these truths does not surpass our knowledge” (CSMK, 25).
Therefore, the two central ideas to be formulated according to the “Creation Doctrine” are as
follows2:
(1) The eternal truths are created freely by God.
(2) The eternal truths are necessarily true.
1
In this paper, I will employ the following abbreviations:
CSM= John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
volumes I and II (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). ‘CSM’ is followed by volume and
page number.
CSMK= John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (eds.), The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, volume III (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). ‘CSMK’ is
followed by page number.
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and The Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), p. 2.
2
3
However, there are many commentators, most notably Harry Frankfurt, who argue that
given Descartes’ acceptance of (1), he cannot accept (2). These commentators say that Descartes
must abandon the idea that the eternal truths are necessary if they are freely created by God. The
reasons for this view, and the evidence they use to support it, shall be discussed shortly. It’s my
contention, however, that Descartes can coherently maintain both (1) and (2). Furthermore, not
only do I think Descartes can maintain both (1) and (2), but that he must if he is to avoid drastic
problems in the rest of his philosophy. First, however, we must examine why Descartes offers us
this surprising doctrine. Secondly, we’ll examine the aforementioned objection to Descartes’
doctrine and show how it ultimately fails to refute Descartes’ position. We’ll then look at a
slightly modified version of this objection and see how that too fails. Thirdly, we’ll expound a
proposal on how to reconcile (1) and (2), and we’ll see how this proposal is also lacking. And
lastly, we’ll look at an interpretation which shows how Descartes can maintain both that the
eternal truths are freely created by God and that they are necessarily true, an interpretation which
I think avoids all the pitfalls of the other arguments and clearly allows for Descartes’ “Creation
Doctrine” to stand.
To begin with, we must first understand why Descartes would choose to hold such a
baffling and seemingly incoherent position. For Descartes, to deny that God created the eternal
truths would be to deny his divine omnipotence. Clearly, this is not an option for Descartes. As
Descartes says:
For when we reflect on the idea of God which we were born with, we see that he is eternal,
omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth, the creator of all things, and finally, that he
possesses within him everything in which we can clearly recognize some perfection that is infinite or
unlimited by any imperfection (CSM I, 200).
4
If one were to deny that the eternal truths were dependent upon God, and one were to
insist that God is subject to the eternal truths that he did not create, then God certainly would not
be the supremely perfect being that Descartes says he is. For Descartes to avoid this
consequence, he must maintain that God created the eternal truths freely. He echoes this
sentiment in numerous places:
We must not say that if God did not exist, nonetheless these truths would be true (CSMK, 24).
But just as the poets suppose that the Fates were originally established by Jupiter, but that after
they were established he bound himself to abide by them, so I do not think that the essences of
things, and the mathematical truths which we can know concerning them, are independent of God
(CSM II, 261).
In short, Descartes must assert that God created the eternal truths freely in order for God
to be supremely perfect and have divine omnipotence.
Now that we’ve established a reason why Descartes would say that the eternal truths are
created by God, we must tackle the question of how the eternal truths are necessary.
For a truth to be considered necessary, it appears that it must be the case that the truth
cannot be otherwise, or that its contradictory cannot be true. Based on this definition, there are
many commentators who would say that Descartes is not entitled to the claim that the eternal
truths are necessary. One such interpretation of Descartes’ Creation Doctrine, often called
“Universal Possibilism,” would say that (1) entails (3): For any eternal truth P, God could have
willed that not-P is true. And from (3), those who adhere to Universal Possibilism would say (4):
For any eternal truth P, it is possible that not-P.3 Simply put, “Universal Possibilism” states that
“for any proposition P, it is possible that P”.4 Another way to put the argument would be as
follows:
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), pp.
26-7.
4
Ibid, 26.
3
5
(1) For a truth to be considered necessary, it must be the case that it cannot be otherwise,
or that it’s contradictory cannot be true.
(2) God freely created the eternal truths.
(3) God could have made the eternal truths otherwise; he could have made their
contradictories true (From 2).
(4) Therefore, the eternal truths are not necessary (From 1, 3).
Step (1) would seem to be a self-evident truth. If it were the case that a truth’s contradictory
could be true, then neither the truth in question nor its contradictory would appear to be
necessary. Step (2) is one of the central notions of Descartes’ doctrine, and evidence for the view
has already been given. Step (3) is supposed to follow from (2) and is the central step in the
argument. In fact, step (3) is the main reason that some say Descartes cannot maintain that the
eternal truths are necessary. Evidence for Descartes’ holding (3) can been seen when he says
“God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictions cannot be true together,
and therefore…he could have done the opposite” (CSMK, 235). And again, Descartes says “I do
not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by God. For since
every basis of truth and goodness depends on his omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God
cannot make a mountain without a valley, or bring it about that 1 and 2 are not 3” (CSMK, 358359). Given the evidence for steps (1) thru (3), (4) necessarily follows. A proponent of an
argument very similar to this would be Frankfurt who says “In short, the eternal truths are
inherently as contingent as any other propositions.5 It must be remembered that the argument
does not challenge the claim that God is the creator of the eternal truths; it simply asserts that the
eternal truths are not necessary. Therefore, to salvage Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine,” one must
show how it is that this argument for “Universal Possibilism” fails.
In trying to demonstrate how the previous argument can fail, one must look to explain
away the seemingly overwhelming evidence for step (3). One way to do this would be to suggest
5
Harry Frankfurt, ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’, Philosophical Review 86 (1977), p. 42.
6
that Descartes did not really believe that God could make contradictions true. Jonathan Bennett,
for example, believes that in the passages that discuss God making contradictions true, all that
Descartes is really saying is that we should not say that God cannot make contradictions true.6
This is obviously very different than saying that God can make contradictions true. The point
behind this distinction is that it is Descartes’ belief that we should not affirm anything which we
do not perceive clearly and distinctly. We neither have a clear and distinct perception of a
contradiction being true, nor do we have a clear and distinct perception of God being able to
make a contradiction true. If one were to combine these two statements, we would be left with
the idea that we do not have a clear and distinct perception of God making contradictions true,
and therefore, we cannot assert that he can. In fact, in a previously quoted passage, it’s key to
focus in on what is really being said: “I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it
cannot be brought about by God” (CSMK, 358). Notice that in this passage, Descartes is saying
exactly what Bennett suggests. Further evidence for the view held by Bennett can be found after
the passage indicated above which mentions God making contradictions true. Descartes says
“…even if this be true, we should not try to comprehend it, since our nature is incapable of doing
so” (CSMK, 235). Here, it seems that Descartes is backing away, somewhat, from the assertion
that God can make contradictions true. If one were to accept this interpretation of some of
Descartes’ statements, then it would seem that step (3) in the argument would not hold, and
therefore, the argument would fail to show that the eternal truths are not necessary. However,
there are many philosophers, like Frankfurt, who would not accept this idea because of the
overwhelming textual evidence that Descartes does think that God can make contradictories true.
This means we’ll have to focus in on another reason for deeming the argument unworthy of
acceptance.
6
Jonathan Bennett, ‘Descartes’ Theory of Modality’, Philosophical Review 103 (1994), p. 642.
7
E.M. Curley rightly points out another reason to reject the previously stated argument.
According to Curley, if one were to accept (4) one would be forced to admit that Descartes’
“truth rule” (i.e., that everything I clearly and distinctly perceive is true) is invalid or, at the very
least, a complete understatement.78 Descartes maintains that that which we perceive clearly and
distinctly can be known to be true. And he says that we can be sure the perceptions are true
because God is the author of those perceptions, and he would not deceive us (CSM II, 43).
Furthermore, Descartes also claims that “sometimes we clearly and distinctly perceive the
necessary truth of a particular proposition” (CSM II, 54; CSM II, 83-5).9 With this in mind, Dan
Kaufman tells us that Descartes would hold something like the following:
(A) I clearly and distinctly perceive that it is necessary that a triangle’s three angles equal two right angles
And, by the truth rule, (A) entails:
(B) It is necessary that a triangle’s three angles equal two right angles.
But if “Universal Possibilism is true, then (C) is true:
(C) It is possible that a triangle’s three angles do not equal two right angles.10
So, if (C) is true, then (B) is false, which means that the entailment from (A) to (B) is
false. This means that the “truth rule” is false if “Universal Possibilism” is true. This is
obviously disastrous for Descartes because the “truth rule” is arguably “the second or third most
certain item of knowledge (after only the cogito and the fact that I am a thinking thing) and the
most important epistemic principle in the Meditations, a work that is largely epistemological”.11
If it is the case that the “truth rule” is false, this would spell disaster for Descartes’ Ontological
Argument for God’s existence (CSM II, 45), the cogito (CSM II, 17), and other aspects of his
philosophy as well. Even if it were the case that “Universal Possibilism” did not necessarily
entail that the “truth rule” is invalid, it certainly seems to be the case that the “truth rule” would
E.M. Curley, ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’, Philosophical Review 93 (1984), p. 572.
Jonathan Bennett, “Descartes’ Theory of Modality’, Philosophical Review 103 (1994), p .642.
9
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p. 29.
10
Ibid, 29.
11
Ibid, 30.
7
8
8
be a dramatic understatement. To see why this is the case, one must look to the Argument for the
Real Distinction in Meditation VI.
Descartes, in his Meditation VI Argument for the Real Distinction between mind and
body, says the following:
I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by
God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it…[O]n the one hand I have a clear
and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the
other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking
thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it
(CSM II, 54).
In this passage, we see Descartes actively employing the “truth rule.” What he is
saying here is that “from a clear and distinct perception of P, we can infer that P is at least
possible; that is, we have a clear and distinct perception of our mind existing apart from
body, and thus we know that it is possible that they exist apart; hence, there is a real
distinction between them.12 If it were the case that Universal Possibilism was true, then
Descartes would not need the “truth rule” in order to secure his Argument for the Real
Distinction between mind and body. The reason for this is because “if everything is possible,
then not only what I clearly and distinctly perceive is possible, but also whatever I perceive
confusedly and obscurely is possible”.13 In other words, Descartes would be “ridiculously
understating his position in the real distinction argument if he in fact held ‘Universal
Possibilism’”.1415 A very simple version of this objection against “Universal Possibilism”
would be as follows:
(a) If Descartes held “Universal Possibilism” to be true, then the real distinction
argument does not require the “truth rule.”
(b) The real distinction argument does require the “truth rule.”
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
30.
13
Ibid, 30.
14
Ibid, 30.
15
Jonathan Bennett, ‘Descartes’ Theory of Modality’, Philosophical Review 103 (1994), p. 644.
12
9
(c) Therefore, it is not the case that Descartes held “Universal Possibilism” to be true.
This objection can be applied to any of Descartes’ important arguments that rely on
the “truth rule.” It seems then that we must reject the position of “Universal Possibilism”
because “it is a disaster for the cogito, the truth rule, the a priori physics, the ontological
argument, the argument for the real distinction between mind and body, and even the
argument that God is not a deceiver”.16 To put it another way, almost every single positive
step that is made in the Meditations is put at risk if the “Creation Doctrine” entails “Universal
Possibilism”.17 For these reasons, and more, we should reject the “Universal Possibilism”
interpretation of Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine.”
A slightly less “extreme” reading of Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine” would be the
interpretation often called “Limited Possibilism.” According to the “Limited Possibilism”
reading of Descartes, “for any proposition P, it is possible that P is possible”.18 “Limited
Possibilism” seeks to understand (3) of “Universal Possibilism” (For any eternal truth P, God
could have willed that not-P is true) in such a way that Descartes can coherently hold (1) and
(2) (the two central tenets of Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine” that were discussed in the
introduction). A prominent advocate of this position is Curley in his article “Descartes on the
Creation of the Eternal Truths” (1984), where he bases his interpretation on the following
passage primarily:
[T]he power of God cannot have any limits, and…our mind is finite and so created as to
be able to conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in fact possible, but not be
able to conceive as possible things which God could have made possible, but which he
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
30.
17
Ibid, 30.
18
Ibid, 30.
16
10
nevertheless wished to make impossible…And even though God has willed that some truths
should be necessary, this does not mean that he willed them necessarily, for it is one thing to will
that they be necessary, and quite another to will this necessarily, or to be necessitated to will it
(CSMK, 235).
This passage seems to be making two important claims. First, God wills that the
eternal truths are necessary. In other words, there is a grounding for the necessity of the
eternal truths. Secondly, it’s making the claim that God is not necessitated to will the
eternal truths to be necessary. The reason the second claim is important is because to say
that God was necessitated to will the eternal truths to be necessary would be to limit
God’s freedom, which would be to contradict one of the central motivations for the
“Creation Doctrine.” Those who adhere to “Limited Possibilism” take this passage as
evidence that Descartes’ eternal truths are necessary, but only contingently so. As Peter
Geach states:
[the eternal truths] are necessary in our world, and in giving us our mental endowments
God gave us the right sort of clear and distinct ideas to see the necessity. But though they are
necessary, they are not necessarily necessary; God could have freely chosen to make a different
sort of world, in which other things would have been necessary truths.19
So, while “Universal Possibilism” denies that there are any necessary truths,
“Limited Possibilism” admits that there are, but that they are not necessarily necessary.
The advantage that “Limited Possibilism” has over “Universal Possibilism” is that it
interprets (3) as entailing (4*):
(4*) For any eternal truth P, it is possible that not-P is possible.20
Peter Geach, ‘Omnipotence’, Philosophy 48 (1973), p. 10.
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
31.
19
20
11
This interpretation seems to be better because, as Curley states, “Descartes wants
to allow that there are some propositions which are in fact impossible, but which might
have been possible, and that others are in fact necessary, but might, nevertheless, not
have been necessary”.21 Curley also offers a proof to show that Descartes is committed to
“Limited Possibilism,”22 and that “even a contingent act of willing can have a necessary
truth as its object”.23
However, even though it seems that “Limited Possibilism” is a slightly more
accurate reading of Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine,” numerous problems can be pointed
out concerning this interpretation. Most notable among these problems seems to be that
“Limited Possibilism” places constraints on God’s power.24 To understand this, we must
look to understand how Descartes viewed God’s omnipotence. As Kaufman says “It is
reasonable to suppose that Descartes held a Thomistic view of God’s omnipotence. That
is, Descartes held T:
T: God can bring about any possible state of affairs.25
Evidence that Descartes holds T can be found when he says:
We should note that even though the rule ‘Whatever we can conceive of can exist,’ is my
own, it is true only so long as we are dealing with a conception which is clear and distinct, a
conception which embraces the possibility of the thing in question, since God can bring about
whatever we clearly perceive to be possible (CSM I, 299).
Based on this passage, it is reasonable to say that, for Descartes, if God could not
bring about a possible state of affairs, then he would not be omnipotent. However, this is
E.M. Curley, ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’, Philosophical Review 93 (1984), pp. 582-3.
Ibid., 580-1.
23
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
32.
24
Ibid., 33.
25
Ibid., 33.
21
22
12
exactly what happens if we allow that Descartes held “Limited Possibilism” (provided that T
is a necessary condition for God’s omnipotence). To see how this would be the case, take any
eternal truth P. According to “Limited Possibilism,” it is not possible that not-P, although it
is possible that not-P is possible. Without looking too much further, we can see already that
“Limited Possibilism” restricts God’s power insofar as he cannot will that P is true. But so
far, this isn’t necessarily a problem. Kaufman tells us that “The implication of LP that there
are some necessary eternal truths makes it the case that God cannot bring about the negation
of P, despite his ability to bring about the possibility of the negation of P.26 As such, an
adherent of “Limited Possibilism” would hold the following:
LP1: For any eternal truth P, God could have made it possible that not-P is true.
So, this is where we start to run into difficulties with “Limited Possibilism” because
let’s imagine that God chooses to will that it is possible that not-P is true. So, according to
LP, “God can perform the incredibly difficult task of willing a necessary truth to be possibly
false, but (and here is the rub) he cannot perform the relatively simple task of willing that
possibly false proposition to be actually false”.27 As such, this case violates T, which was
already a relatively weak condition for God’s omnipotence, and one that Descartes held.
With this in mind, we can see that both “Universal Possibilism” and “Limited
Possibilism” have shortcomings which cannot be overcome while staying consistent with the
rest of Descartes’ philosophy. Therefore, we will have to examine another attempt at
reconciling the alleged incompatibility between (1) and (2).
One such attempt at reconciling (1) and (2) is discussed by Gusbert Van Den Brink, and
is attributed, by some, to Curley. Essentially, the argument claims that the eternal truths are
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
33.
27
Ibid., 33.
26
13
necessary because they are products of God’s immutable will. Curley says “So his creation of
them is a genuine act of will (not necessitated), and yet it does provide a foundation of their
necessity, because his will is immutable”.28 A general reconstruction of this argument can be
seen as follows29:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
God wills the eternal truths.
God’s will is immutable.
Therefore, the eternal truths are immutable.
Therefore, the eternal truths are necessary.
The main passage used in support of this interpretation is taken from a letter Descartes wrote to
Mersenne where he says:
It will be said that if God had established these truths he could change them as a king changes his
laws. To this the answer is: Yes, he can, if his will can change. ‘But I understand them to be
eternal and immutable.’ –I make the same judgment about God. ‘But his will is free.’ Yes, but his
power is incomprehensible (CSMK, 23).
There are numerous problems with this argument, insofar as it seeks to establish the
necessity of the eternal truths. In an article on the subject, Kaufman points out several of the
problems. The first problem he points out is that there are a number of unstated principles which
must be the case if this interpretation is to work. One such principle would be the Transfer of
Immutability Principle. This principle would state the following:
Transfer of Immutability Principle: For any x, if x is willed by an omnipotent and immutable will,
then x is immutable.30
This principle is needed so that (1) and (2) of the Immutability Interpretation necessarily
entail (3). As Kaufman points us, there is evidence for this view.31 Descartes says, in support of
E.M. Curley, ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’, Philosophical Review 93 (1984), p. 588.
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), p. 6.
30
Ibid., 6.
31
Ibid., 6.
28
29
14
this stipulation, that “God is immutable and always acting in the same ways, he always produces
the same effect” (CSM I, 96). And again, Descartes says “For we understand that God’s
perfection involves not only his being immutable in himself, but also in operating in a manner
that is always utterly constant and immutable” (CSM I, 240). So, (1) and (2) seem to entail (3),
but the argument is not quite sound yet. We need to find a way that (3) entails (4). For this to
happen, Kaufman says that another unstated principle must be had. This second principle is
called the Immutability-Necessity Principle, and it states the following:
Immutability-Necessity Principle: For any x, if x is immutable, then x is necessary.32
Unlike the Transfer of Immutability Principle, the Immutability-Necessity Principle is not
supported in any of the Cartesian texts. If Descartes held both the Transfer of Immutability
Principle and the Immutability-Necessity Principle, he would be committed to unwanted
consequences, which we shall now discuss.
Descartes’ theory of modality, like all good theories, has to allow for a distinction
between “necessary” and “contingent” truths. Descartes clearly held “that there are some
propositions that, while true, are not necessarily so, i.e., they are contingent”.33 Furthermore,
Descartes holds that all things are the product of God’s immutable will, including not only
eternal truths, but contingent truths as well. Evidence for this view can be found when Descartes
says “if God exists, it is a contradiction that anything else should exist which was not created by
him” (CSM II, 132). And in Principles I.23, Descartes states that “there is always a single
identical and perfectly simple act by means of which he simultaneously understands, wills, and
accomplishes everything. When I say ‘everything’ I mean all things” (CSM I, 201). Going even
further, Descartes claims that even the free actions of creatures come from God:
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), p. 7.
33
Ibid., 8.
32
15
[A]ll the reasons that prove that God exists and is the first and immutable cause of all effects that do not
depend on human free will prove similarly, I think, that he is also the cause of all the effects that do so
depend…and he would not be supremely perfect if anything could happen in the world without coming
entirely from him…[P]hilosophy by itself is able to discover that the slightest thought could not enter into
a person’s mind without God’s willing and having willed from all eternity that it should so enter (CSMK,
272).
So, even though the free actions of God’s creatures “come entirely” from God as an
“immutable cause,” Descartes wants to hold that these actions are still contingent. However,
“from a premise stating that God wills contingent truths, it follows, via the Transfer of
Immutability Principle, that contingent truths are immutable. And via the Immutability-Necessity
Principle, it follows that contingent truths are necessary”.34 There are two reasons this
consequence must be avoided. First, it doesn’t allow for a distinction between “necessary” and
“contingent” truths, which, as stated before, all theories of modality should. Secondly, it commits
Descartes to a particularly strong version of necessitarianism. The reason that Descartes must
avoid a necessitarian view is because he clearly wants to say that there are contingent acts. Based
on this, we must say that Descartes does not hold the Immutability-Necessity Principle. Without
the Immutability-Necessity Principle, the most we can say, using this argument, is that the
eternal truths are immutable, but not necessary.
So how are the eternal truths necessary? To answer this question, we must first look at a
problem yet to be discussed that plagues both “Universal Possibilism” and “Limited
Possibilism.” The problem that these two arguments share is that they both understand (3) (For
any eternal truth P, God could have willed that not-P is true) as entailing the possibility of the
eternal truths being otherwise.35 The problem with this is that one of the main points of the
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), p. 9.
35
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
35.
34
16
“Creation Doctrine” is that nothing is true or possible prior to God’s willing it to be so.36 For
example, take any eternal truth P willed by God to be (necessarily) true. Descartes thinks that
God could have willed not-P to be true, that is, he does hold (3). However, from (3), we cannot
infer that not-P is possible, which is what both “Universal Possibilism” and “Limited
Possibilism” would hold. The reason for this is that “a prominent feature (indeed the
characteristic feature) of the “Creation Doctrine” is that a proposition is true only if God wills it
to be true”.37 Furthermore, Descartes believes that this holds equally for modal propositions.
Descartes says we can “conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in fact
possible” (CSMK, 235), and more explicitly in Principles I. 24, he states “God alone is the true
cause of everything which is or can be” (CSM I, 201). So, we can see that (3) does not entail (4)
because God never willed that it is possible that not-P or that it is possible that not-P is possible.
We know this because Descartes says that the eternal truths are willed to be necessarily true from
eternity, i.e., there is no time at which they are not true (CSMK, 25-6). So, “because God never
willed that it is possible that not-P or it is possible that not-P is possible, those propositions are
not true, nor were they ever true.38 Thus, Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine” entails neither
“Universal Possibilism” nor “Limited Possibilism,” because to do so would be to allow modal
propositions prior to God’s creative will, which is clearly not allowed by the “Creation
Doctrine”.39 So, in order to see how the eternal truths are necessary, we must find a way to
understand (3) within the confines of the “Creation Doctrine,” that is, in a way that doesn’t
presuppose possibilities independent of God’s will.
36
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 36.
38
Ibid., 37.
39
Ibid., 37.
37
17
One such way to do this is to understand the “could” in the following passage in terms of
indifference:
God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictions cannot be true
together, and therefore…he could have done the opposite (CSMK, 235).
To understand this in terms of indifference, we must understand Descartes’ conception of
God’s freedom. Descartes says:
As for the freedom of the will, the way in which it exists in God is quite different from
the way in which it exists in us. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God
was not indifferent from eternity with respect to everything which has happened or will
ever happen because it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine
intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action, or omission, prior to the decision
of the divine will to make it so. I am not speaking here of temporal priority; I mean that
there is not even any priority of order, or nature, or of ‘rationally determined reason’ as
they call it, such that God’s idea of the good impelled him to choose one thing rather than
another. For example, God did not will…that the three angles of a triangle should be
equal to two right angles because he recognized that it could not be otherwise, and so on.
On the contrary,…it is because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should
necessarily equal two right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise…Thus, the
supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme indication of his omnipotence
(CSM II, 291-2).
This lengthy quote is saying that absolute indifference is a necessary condition of divine
freedom, even though Descartes holds that indifference is the “lowest grade of human freedom”
(CSM II, 40). If it were the case that God was not supremely indifferent in his willing, he would
have been impelled or determined to will those things which are good and true (CSM II, 293-4).
And according to Descartes, the only way God’s will can be absolutely indifferent is if there is
nothing true prior to his decree to make it so. As Descartes says, if someone “always saw clearly
what was true…it would be impossible…ever to be in a state of indifference (CSM II, 40). As
Kaufman says, because “Descartes’ ‘Creation Doctrine’ is not primarily a thesis about modality,
but rather about the dependence of everything, including the eternal truths, on God’s independent
18
and indifferent will, we can now see how Descartes understood (3) in such a way that he
consistently held (1) and (2)”.40 Descartes held the following version of (3):
(3*) For any eternal truth P, it is not the case that there were any independent factors preventing
God from willing not-P or impelling him to will P.41
(3*) seems to be a better interpretation of Descartes because it says nothing about the
possibility (or possible possibility) of not-P. (3*) is also strongly supported by the Cartesian
texts. For example, in the previously quoted long passage, Descartes says that God’s will cannot
be impelled or determined by something independent of his will. Also, evidence is found in the
1630 letters to Mersenne and the 1644 letter to Mesland, where Descartes says that God was not
necessitated or determined to will what he willed (CSMK, 25; CSMK, 235).
So, we now have an answer as to how the eternal truths are necessary. Simply put, God
willed the eternal truths to be necessary. This may seem anti-climactic, but this is precisely what
we should expect Descartes to say. This interpretation is offered by Kaufman, and I think it is
sufficient to explain the necessity of the eternal truths.42 In support of this position, Kaufman
offers the following passages:
I do not think that the essences of things, and the mathematical truths which we can know
concerning them, are independent of God. Nevertheless, I do think that they are immutable and
eternal, because the will and decree of God willed and decreed that they should be so (CSM II,
261)
and it is because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily equal two right
angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise (CSM II, 291).
At first glance, it may seem that this interpretation is very similar to the Immutability
Interpretation, but an important distinction must be made. The Immutability Interpretation holds
Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes’s Creation Doctrine and Modality’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), p.
38.
41
Ibid., 38.
42
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), pp. 16-17.
40
19
that the eternal truths are necessary because they are a product of God’s immutable will, while
this interpretation by Kaufman holds that God’s immutable will wills that the eternal truths be
necessary.43
Kaufman offers a couple of reasons why this interpretation is a good one to accept. First,
it allows for Descartes to distinguish between a necessary and contingent truth. Simply put, God
wills that some truths be necessary, and that some truths be contingent. It is God’s will that is
responsible for both.44 Secondly, Kaufman says that this is exactly what we should expect
Descartes to say. Kaufman says:
Because everything depends on God’s will, if there are eternal truths at all, then their necessity
will be the result of God’s will. And Descartes does think that the eternal truths are necessary; so,
their necessity depends on God’s will…It is exactly what Descartes should say.45
It’s my hope that this paper has pointed out and made clearer a number of different
interpretations of Descartes’ “Creation Doctrine.” Not only do I hope to have made things
43
Intuitively, we have an idea that in order for a truth to be necessary, it must be necessarily necessary. On this
interpretation then, one can still make the claim that the eternal truths are not necessary because God could have
willed otherwise, which means that the eternal truths seem to be only contingently necessary. There are a number of
responses available to this criticism. The first response would be to say that the eternal truths could not have been
otherwise. The reason for this, as discussed before, would be because the “could have” that people discuss does not
entail possibility. However, this interpretation may not work. Here’s why:
1. It is the case that 2+2=5 cannot possibly true.
2. It is also the case that God could have willed 2+2=5 is true.
The reason for (1) is because God never willed that it be possible that 2+2=5 is true. The reason for (2), however, is
that God could have willed that 2+2=5 is true. As such, it still seems that the eternal truths are contingently
necessary. In response to this, one must show how it is that a contingently necessary truth can still be considered
necessary in a robust sense. For this, we must show that there is a consistent system of modal logic that allows this
to be the case: See G.E. Hughes and Max Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic (London and New
York:Routledge, 1996), pp. 62-4. Another way to validate the idea that contingently necessary truths are necessary
in a robust sense is to show that to deny such a claim would lead to unwanted consequences: See Nathan Salmon,
‘Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox: A Reply to David Over’, Analytic Philosophy 25 (1984), pp. 7-11.
44
Dan Kaufman, ‘God’s Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 43 (2005), p
45
Ibid., 17-8.
20
clearer, but I hope that I’ve shown, adequately enough, how it is that Descartes can hold a
position that seems, to many, to be so problematic.