The Frustrating Partnership: Honor, Status, and Emotions in Russia’s Discourses of the
West
Andrei P. Tsygankov
San Francisco State University
E-mail: andrei@sfsu.edu
Abstract:
This paper analyzes Russia’s presidential discourses and emotions of the West from
March 2008 to December 2012. By studying the languages of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in
annual addresses to the Federation Council and public statements, I identify several distinct
stages in the Kremlin’s emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the initial fear
(March 2008-June 2009), hope (September 2009-the late 2010), and frustration (since the early
2011). The Russia’s emotional shifts are shaped by the country’s historically established social
relations with the West and are not to be reduced to the dynamics of power and prestige/status.
Russia’s deep emotional connection to the West as well as Russia’s own concept of national
honor are the two factors that drive the nation’s leaders’ complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric.
Russia displays emotions of hope each time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of
frustration, fear and anger when in the eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized.
Keywords: emotions, foreign policy, honor, Medvedev, Putin, Russia, status
Introduction
Russia and the Western nations continue to feel uneasy about each other’s intentions.
From issues of stabilizing Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe to those of
1
strategic stability and human rights, Russian and Western leaders frequently disagree and that
disagreement is partly shaped by different beliefs and emotions regarding what they view as a
“good” and “virtuous” course of action vis-à-vis each other.1 What further complicates the
picture is that Russia’s actions and emotions fluctuate – and not necessarily in response to
changes in Russia’s material capabilities or structure of the international system, as some
scholars would expect. Understanding the formation of Russia’s actions and emotions behind
them therefore remains an important challenge to scholars and policy-makers.
This paper selects for an investigation discourses and emotions of the West as displayed
by Russia’s presidents from March 2008 to December 2012. This period is important for both
methodological and political reasons. Methodologically, selecting it for a closer investigation
assists us in establishing a broader pattern of Russia’s emotional shifts as reflected in the
country’s history – from hope to frustration and fear and back to hope. Politically, the period is
also important. Despite some expectations associated with the rise of Dmitri Medvedev, this rise
did not produce a stable emotional or political environment for Russia-West relationships. As the
paper shows, despite the common perception of Medvedev as more pro-Western and liberal than
his patron Vladimir Putin, Medvedev’s rhetoric reflected largely the same emotional dispositions
and therefore need to be understood in terms of historically enduring social patterns in the
Russia-West relations. The Medvedev-putinist and frustrated critic of the West may be viewed as
1
For a short sample of scholarship on identity, beliefs and emotions in international politics, see Clunan
(2009), Crawford (2000), Fattah and Fierke (2009), Haas (2005), Harkavy (2000), Hopf (2002), Klein
(1991), Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Lebow (2003), Löwenheim and Heimann (2008), Mercer (2010),
Saurette (2006), Steinberg (1991), Tsygankov (2012b), Wolf (2011). My knowledge on relationships
between emotions and Russia’s foreign policy has been enhanced by participation in the workshop on
“The subjective dimension of Russia’s Partnership with the West: Filling Theoretical and Empirical
Voids,” organized by Regina Heller, Tuomas Forsberg and Reinhart Wolf, Institute for Peace Research
and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, September 15-16, 2011.
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a crucial case for establishing a theoretical potent interpretation of Russia’s international
discourse.
My main basis for studying Russia’s official discourses of the West includes annual
presidential addresses to the Federation Council and public statements on prominent foreign
policy issues. Among those issues, three suggest themselves as especially visible and important:
European security, Missile Defense System, and, more recently, instability in the Middle East.
When studied across time and issues, public speeches and statements are helpful in capturing
underlying emotions of state leaders. By studying the relative prominence of languages of
inclusiveness versus exclusiveness in Russia’s discourses of the West, I have identified several
distinct stages in Russia’s presidents’ emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the
initial fear (March 2008-June 2009), hope (September 2009-the late 2010), and frustration (the
early 2011-December 2012). Historical examples, metaphors, ethical lessons, predicates, and
adjectives used by Russian presidents show their emotional dispositions.
I argue that these emotions have roots in Russia’s historically peculiar relations with
Europe or the West as its significant other. Russia’s deep emotional connection to the West as
well as Russia’s own concept of national honor are the two factors that continue to drive the
country’s leaders’ complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each
time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when in the
eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized, other factors being equal.
The following three sections address the formation of Russia’s emotions of the West, the
Kremlin’s discourses from fear to hope and frustration, and their explanation from a socially
constructivist perspective, respectively. Conclusion summarizes the findings and implications.
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Honor and Emotions in Russia’s Foreign Policy
Emotional Patterns in Russia’s Westpolitik
Scholars of Russia’s foreign policy often observe the Kremlin’s emotional swings and
intensity of Russia’s public rhetoric regarding its relations with the West. Across history, the
Russians initiated multiple projects of cooperation with Western nations from Alexander I’s
Holy Alliance in the early 19th century to Mikhail Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Boris
Yeltsin’s Integration in the late 20th century and Vladimir Putin’s War on Terror and Dmitri
Medvedev’s Modernization Alliances in the early 21st century. Emotionally, each of these
projects involved hope on part of the Russians to engage the West in projects of common
significance and build lasting institutions of international peace. However, hope frequently
turned into frustration with what Russia saw as the other side’s unwillingness to reciprocate and,
ultimately, mistrust and fear that the Western nations indeed aim to undermine Russia’s
sovereignty and security. Sustained fear and mistrust on occasions turned into anger2 and angershaped policies of abandoning cooperative initiatives and adopting patterns of defensive or
assertive behavior (Tsygankov, 2012a). On other occasions fear and mistrust subsided,
generating new feelings of hope and new attempts at cooperation (this emotional cycle is
presented in table 1).
Table 1. The Emotional Cycle of Russia-West Relations
HOPE  FRUSTRATION  FEAR & ANGER  HOPE
Emotions of hope and frustration are identifiable through Russia’s public statements. In
Gorbachev’s missionary language, “We are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we
2
Anger results from a sustained build-up of frustration and fear that produce the perception of
mistreatment by others. Lasting perception of threat may further turn anger into hate. As Master Yoda
famously put it to Anakin Skywalker, “Fear leads to anger. Anger leads to hate. Hate leads to suffering.”
(Star War 1977)
4
must not allow it to be wrecked. There will be no second Noah’s Ark” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 12).
To Yeltsin, hope was tied to Russia’s integration with Western economic and political
institutions, which the Russian leader presented in dramatic tones – either there will be a success
or the West too will suffer greatly. For instance, in addressing a joint session of the United States
Congress in June 1992, Yeltsin expressed hope for a massive external assistance by directly
linking it to success of Russia’s reforms: “There will be no second try … If we [that is, you
Americans] do not take measures now to support Russia, this will not be a collapse of Russia
only, it will be a collapse of the United States, because it will mean new trillions of dollars for
the arms race” (as cited in Breslauer, 2002, p. 157). To Putin (2002), hope served as the
emotional basis for engaging the West in fighting with terrorism and preserving global stability,
for which, he believed, “Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility.” Finally,
Medvedev’s main hopes were in getting the United States and Europe interested in modernizing
Russia’s economy and improving Russia-NATO security relations.
However, each time the Kremlin’s hopes failed to be validated, its public language
describing relations with the West visibly changed from hope to frustration, fear, and anger.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin could not hide their disappointment with lack of Western assistance and,
later, with the decision to expand NATO. For example, Yeltsin’s foreign minister Andrei
Kozyrev reported his frustration by warning in the early 1994 of “the chauvinistic new banners
that flap in the Washington wind”
“I must say, sadly, that in these confused days sometimes we are neither
understood nor adequately supported by our natural friends and allies in
the West. Even at this critical moment in Moscow, when democracy needs
all the help it can get, we hear Western threats to reduce economic
cooperation with Russia … it appears that some Western politicians, in
Washington and elsewhere, envision Russia not as an equal partner but as
5
a junior partner. In this view a ‘good Russian’ is always a follower, never
a leader” (Kozyrev, 1994).
Putin’s transformation is even more instructive. From someone who courted president
George W. Bush in the early 2000s hoping to strengthen relations with the United States, he
evolved into a frustrated and occasionally angry politician convinced that the other side is
primarily interested in undermining Russia. On one occasion, he responded to accusations of
those experts “who do not understand what is happening in our country” by saying “To hell with
you” (As cited in Foglesong, 2007, p. 227). In his Address to the State Duma in May 2006, Putin
(2006) spoke of "Comrade Wolf" who "knows whom to eat" and doesn't listen to anyone else, a
clear reference to the US attempts to put pressure on Russia. He objected to the American
democracy promotion rhetoric by saying that it resembled to him the way colonialists had talked
a hundred years earlier about how the white man needed to “civilize ‘primitive peoples’” (Myers
and Kramer, 2006). In January 2007, Putin delivered his strongest critique of American
“unipolarity” at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Such criticisms of the United States
as seeking to preserve global hegemony became common in Putin’s public statements especially
when delivered for a non-American audience.
Approaches to Russia’s Emotions
There are at least two approaches to Russia’s emotions. The first approach tends to view
emotions as a generally adequate public display of the leaders’ objectives and a signal of their
intentions. The second approach presents emotional statements as deployed strategically to
pressure other nations for concessions. Both versions agree that emotions should be read in the
6
context of international competition for power, status, and prestige. In this respect Russians are
no different from Chinese or other rising powers seeking to improve their political standing in
the world. Their public display of hope or frustration should be interpreted in terms of their
ability to achieve progress or fail to accomplish expected political outcomes. We should then
expect that emotions of hope will be sustained so long as Russia improves its political standing
and that emotions of frustration and fear will surface each time Russia’s political standing fails to
improve.
In practice, however, emotional patterns and changes in standing are difficult to match.
There are examples, when Russian leaders are hopeful even when Russia’s political standing
doesn’t improve or doesn’t come close to matching that of the other side. For instance, before
2005, Putin sought to avoid challenging the United States and its dominance in the world. He
remained hopeful for improving ties with the U.S. even after the latter unilaterally withdrew
from the ABM treaty. The key emphasis of Russia’s National Security Concept was then not on
resisting “unipolarity”, but on fighting economic decline, organized crime, corruption, terrorism
and separatism. On the other hand, the Kremlin may be sometimes visibly frustrated and angry
with the West even though Russia’s status and prestige are not challenged. Suffice is to recall
Russia’s emergence from the Second World War as an essential member of the coalition which
defeated Hitler. Such status did not satisfy Stalin who insisted on the Western nations respecting
Soviet sphere of influence and ultimately on ideologically converting Eastern European states
into “socialism.” As Martin Malia (1999, p. 360) wrote, from a realpolitik perspective, the
Kremlin should have been satisfied with “a reasonable security alliance of East European states
with the Soviet Union” without demanding that these states adopt a communist “social system.”
7
In addition to Russia’s special emotional patterns, it frequently demonstrates intense,
even heated rhetoric in its relations with the West. Whereas China prefers to hide its emotions,
Russian leaders tend to express their hopes and frustrations loudly and openly. To scholars of
emotions, this aspect of Russia presents another challenge. How should we understand why
Russia frequently uses a strong language by presenting Western nations as “brothers” and
“friends” or, alternatively, castigating them as “betraying” established principles and
agreements?
Motivating Factors Behind Russia’s Emotions: Status versus Honor
Scholars of status study emotions as following country’s gains and losses in international
prestige and deference. While gains are associated with satisfaction and generally positive
sentiments, losses may lead to negative emotions such as anger, vengefulness, or shame.3 This
perspective moves us beyond considerations of material power and security and is helpful in
highlighting factors of external recognition and prestige. For example, it helps us understand
motivations and dynamics behind rising powers’ assertive international policies. However, the
perspective may not be sufficient for explaining nuances of individual countries’ behavior and
emotions because each of them has its own set of local values and culturally-specific relations
with the outside world. Russia’s identity or sense of honor is not limited to protection of state
international status/prestige in the eyes of other states, but also includes a distinctive idea of
national self, or a system of nationally held meaningful beliefs. The latter consists of a distinctive
concept of spiritual freedom, the notion of a socially paternalistic state, and commitment to
protecting cultural allies from abuses at home and from abroad. For instance, as the largest
3
Contribution by Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko in this issue.
8
Orthodox Christian power, Russia felt responsible for the livelihood of those co-religionists who
resided outside the Russian state (Tsygankov, 2012a, chap. 3).
While holding these special values, Russia expects acceptance by the West as one of its
own. Unlike China or other rising powers, Russia and its rulers identify with the Europe or the
West as its significant other. Russian rulers view Europe as a unity in diversity regime, in which
Russia’s locally specific values would not be seen as undermining the continent-wide beliefs,
such as Christian origins, respect for sovereignty, and socially responsible state. For example,
even while being critical of the European states’ policies, Putin (2012b) commonly presents
Russia as “an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe.” The West has created the
meaningful environment in which Russia’s rulers defended their visions of national honor and
interests.4 Russia has historically sought to be recognized by the Western Other and to modernize
following the West’s lead. Russia’s claims to be a part of the Western world reflected a
domestically strong motivating force in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s divided political class
has contained a vocal pro-Western group which seeks to shape the country’s foreign policy. The
strength of identification with Western civilization explains why historically Russia has sought to
achieve its objectives in cooperation with Western, especially European, nations. Russia has
always been responsive to the behavior of the West and – with progressive leaders in the
Kremlin – prepared to mend fences and pursue cooperation, rather than confrontation. This
identity connection explains Russia’s deep emotional engagement with the West and the
identified emotional swings and rhetorical intensity frequently displayed by the Kremlin.
The identity/honor perspective differs from that of status and prestige in allowing more
room for a culturally-specific interpretation of a country’s actions and display of emotions. It
4
For a development of this argument, see Neumann (1996), English (2000).
9
highlights two, rather than one, motivating factors – external recognition and internal values/
idea of the self. Both factors require external/Western validation, but in a different way. Whereas
the prestige aspect requires the external validation of Russia’s power, the internal values aspect
demands that Russia’s actions be validated by external and domestic audiences as morally
legitimate. Other differences between honor and status involve value judgment and hierarchy
(see table 2 for a summary). Honor claims rest on explicit moral judgment of self-other
interaction – “honorable” behavior as opposed to “dishonorable” one or “insulting” – and, like
“face”, require full recognition or rejection by the significant other. Unlike China, Russia cannot
be satisfied with symmetrical gain in economic, political, or military areas of development. In its
relations with Europe, Russia also wants integration and recognition of values. On the other
hand, status depends on discourse of equality and does not require recognition of special values.
Status is also hierarchical or competitive in the sense that one state may attain more status than
another.5
Table 2 Status and Honor Compared
Motivating factors
STATUS
HONOR
External recognition of status
External recognition of the self’s
identity & values
5
Introduction to this issue by Tuomas Forsberg, Regina Heller, and Reinhard Wolf. See also Larson, Paul
and Wohlforth 2014.
10
Moral reasoning
Demand for equality
Demand for recognition of values
Social hierarchy
Competitive (more/less)
Not competitive (Yes/No)
Because of the domestic honor dimension, Russia cannot act only on the basis of external
recognition. Although Moscow needs such recognition, it also depends on domestic support and
displays emotions of hope when it feels positive reactions at home and abroad. On the other
hand, it is possible for Russia to display emotions of frustration, fear and anger even when the
external recognition of status is in place.
Russia’s Discourses of the West: Hope, Frustration, and Fear
Russia’s emotional evolution toward the West includes the familiar expressions of fear, hope,
and frustration. Although these emotional developments are not sharply separated in time and
often coexist and overlap, distinct historical periods may be associated with dominance a
particular emotion. On three prominent issues – European security (ES), Missile Defense System
(MDS), and instability in the Middle East – an emotional trajectory of Russia’s presidents has
been similar. The language used by Russia’s presidents in their annual addresses to the
Federation Council and other statements signals change from hope and frustration. This language
evolved through stages of the initial fear (March 2008-June 2009), hope (September 2009-the
late 2010), and frustration (the early 2011-December 2012).
Fear
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Medvedev’s initial emotional disposition after assuming power is difficult to separate
from that of Putin. Around 2005 – partly in response to Russia’s fear of the United States’ policy
of regime change in Iraq and the former Soviet region – Russia adopted a more assertive stance.
The Kremlin also introduced the concept of energy superpower to capitalize on Russia’s natural
resource advantage and position the country as a global player and a maker of new global rules.
Fear and frustration also materialized in Russia’s criticism of the United States’ unilateralism
and hegemony in international relations. In response, the Kremlin did not call for any concerted
effort to undermine the U.S. global position, but instead defended the notion of collective
leadership and multilateral diplomacy (Review, 2007).
The attitude of external fear and vulnerability was accompanied by display of internal
confidence. Even the deep economic crisis did not initially alter the generally optimistic
assessment of Russia’s position by the country’s officials. In Medvedev’s own words, "Russia is
totally different now and it has gone through a transitional period, it is developing confidently
and steadily, and it has reached a qualitatively new level of long-term, strategic development"
(Interfax, 2009). Russia's new National Security Strategy to the year 2020 published in May
2009 has provided a long list of potential threats to the country’s security, but it has stated in its
preamble confidence in the country’s ability "to reliably prevent internal and external threats to
national security and to dynamically develop the Russian Federation and to turn it into a leading
power in terms of technological progress, people's quality of life and influence on global
processes."6
Medvedev’s first address to the Federation Council was delivered in November 2008 and
captured the described combination of external fear and internal confidence. He assured his
6
The full Russian text of the strategy is published on the website of the Russian Security Council at the
address http://www.scrf.gov.ru.
12
fellow Russians that the global financial crisis will not affect their living standards and economic
and political rights. The foreign policy part of the speech was devoted to explaining Russia’s
position on the military conflict with Georgia in August 2008 and blaming the United States for
not listening to Russia’s security concerns. The emotion of fear was on display when Medvedev
(2008) expressed his belief that the other side is: “testing” Russia’s strength and confidence. “…
from what we have encountered in the last years - i.e. the construction of a global air defence
system, the encirclement of Russia with military bases, NATO's unstoppable expansion and
other "presents" to Russia - one can get a firm impression that our strength is being tested.”
To counter the identified “threat”, Medvedev announced that Russia would keep three
regiments of the missile division deployed in the Western part of the country on combat duty and
may deploy short-range nuclear missiles Iskander in the western region Kaliningrad. He also
promised not to be drawn into an arms race, but instead rely on developing multilateral
organizations and diplomacy. He further explained that Russia is “forced to take these measures”
(Medvedev, 2008).
“We have told all our partners on more than one occasion that we are
interested in positive cooperation, we want to act against common threats,
we want to take part in joint action. But they, unfortunately, do not wish to
listen to us … I would like to stress: we have no problems with the
American people. We have no innate anti-Americanism. And we hope that
our partners - the new US administration - will make a choice in favor of
fully fledged relations with Russia” (Medvedev, 2008).
The emotion of hope was also present, although not dominant in the speech. The
president expressed hope in development of multilateral institutions and Russia’s advanced
participation in G-8, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRIC, APEC, and other organizations.
It is in this context of finding new solutions and creating new security institutions that the
13
president mentioned his initiative to sign a treaty on ES in order to “create absolutely clear rules
of behaviour that are understandable to all, to put in place a single approach for solving problems
and to come to agreed positions for creating reliable instruments for control over armaments”
(Medvedev, 2008).7 In the same paragraph, Medvedev spoke of the importance of uniting the
“Euro-Atlantic space” with Russia, the European Union and the USA as members.
Hope
An emotional disposition of Russia’s president changed after his summit with the U.S.
President Barak Obama in Moscow, July 2009. By the time Obama travelled to Russia, he had
already proclaimed his desire to “reset” relations with Moscow and establish a new security
framework between the two countries. In the meantime, Russia had woken up to the global
financial crisis’s negative effects and rediscovered its insufficiently diversified economic
structure. In September 2009, Medvedev (2009a) published the article “Go, Russia!” with a
highly critical assessment of the country’s domestic conditions. By pointing to “a primitive
economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption”, “semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile
democracy, harmful demographic trends, and unstable Caucasus”, the new president posed a
rhetorical question “if Russia cannot relieve itself from these burdens, can it really find its own
path for the future?" His proposed solutions included the modernization of the economic and the
political system, technological changes, and strengthening the judiciary to fight corruption.
Such was the context in which Medvedev (2009b) delivered his second address to the
Federation Council in November 2009 which marked an emotional shift from fear to hope in
relations with the West. There is a striking absence of any criticism toward the United States and
The treaty was proposed in Berlin in June 2008 when Medvedev gave a speech on Europe “from
Vancouver to Vladivostok.”
14
7
Western countries. There is no mentioning of the MDS problem separating Russia from the U.S.
On NATO and ES, there is the statement that although Russia is not the alliance’s member, “we
need to take decisions jointly to strengthen Europe's security. We need a joint reliable platform."
The entire tone of the address is one of hope and adaptation, rather than frustration and fear.
Medvedev continued with the task of modernizing the country he set out earlier and he planned
to dedicate his foreign policy to modernization as well. "Our relations with other countries
should be focused on the task of modernizing Russia. We mustn't, as they say, puff out our
chests … We are interested in the flow of capital, new technologies and modern ideas"
(Medvedev, 2009b). He further insisted that the effectiveness of the entire foreign policy must be
"judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?" (Medvedev,
2009b).
The similar disposition of hope persisted throughout much of 2010 and generally colored
Medvedev’s third address to the Federation Council in November of the same year. The
president makes no mention of lacking progress on solving the MDS issue and continues to
emphasize Russia’s readiness to proceed jointly with the Western partners. To clarify his
position, he refers to his participation in a summit with NATO, Lisbon, in which he presented his
ideas on forming a joint MDS. In addition to Lisbon, Medvedev appealed to the European
audience with his vision of a new comprehensive security treaty during the Munich Security
Conference in October 2010 and expressing hope to have a “worthy global response” to his idea
(Bennhold, 2010). At home, the president further highlighted the need to establish
“modernization alliances” with the United States and other Western nations (Medvedev, 2010b).
Official documents too began to reflect the new vision. The Foreign Ministry document prepared
for the President in February 2010 sought to strengthen Russia’s economic position. By
15
reflecting the realities of the global financial crisis, the document builds on Medvedev’s notion
of “modernization alliances” and provides detailed recommendations for attracting Western
investments and creating favorable conditions for Russia’s technological modernization
(Programma, 2010).
At the same time, in the second half of 2010 the context of Russia-West relations begun
to change. In his third address to the Federation Council, Medvedev (2010b) first issued a
warning that a new arms race may take place should Russia and the Western nations fail to agree
on a “full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation” on MDS. By the end of the year, the
president also showed signs of frustration with lack of acceptance of his initiative on ES.
Although Western nations welcomed Russia’s efforts to reach out to Europe, they offered only
general support and remained wary of Medvedev’s initiative.8 At the end of 2010 addressing the
participants of the OSCE summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, Medvedev expressed disappointment
with the lack of international support and acknowledged that two and half years of discussions
did not lead to any breakthrough. Citing the power of stereotypes, he said his initiative may have
appeared ahead of its time and would have to wait before being considered in the future (RIA
Novosti, 2010).9 Russia’s hopes to move the Georgia issue to the back burner and engage the
Western nations in a joint security policy proved futile.
Frustration
For more on Russia’s European policy and European reactions, see Kanet and Freire (2012), Moshes
(2012), DeBardeleben (2012), Kropatcheva (2012).
9
Already in September, speaking at Yaroslavl forum, Medvedev said that the attitude to the very idea of
European Security treaty has changed in the past two years and unfortunately not for the better. He
attributed the main reason for such pessimism to European countries’ satisfaction with the status quo and
“jealousy” on part of the United States (Bessonov, 2010).
16
8
Since 2011 the Kremlin’s frustration with the West became more visible. In Medvedev’s
(2011b) forth address to the Federation Council in December, he describes foreign policy
objectives differently than before. Although the president credited Russia’s international efforts
with conclusion of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the United States and continuing
dialogue on the establishment of a new ES architecture, he also pointed to a new “geopolitical
situation.” His tone on MDS was visibly less hopeful than before. Medvedev referred to audience
to his statement on the issue delivered on November 23, 2011 and he stated that “we are open for
a constructive dialogue and specific work with our partners if they learn to listen to us”
(emphasis is mine – AT) (Medvedev, 2011b).10
The statement on MDS to which the president referred was the toughest to date in
assessment and most detailed in proposed response to the U.S./NATO plans. After recalling all
his proposals to create a joint MDS, Medvedev (2011a) expressed his frustration with the other
side.
Regrettably, the USA and other NATO partners have not showed enough
willingness to move in this direction. Rather than showing themselves
willing to hear and understand our concerns over the European missile
defence system at this stage, they simply repeat that these plans are not
directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be concerned.
That is the position of the executive authorities, but legislators in some
countries openly state, the whole system is against Russia.
But our requests that they set this out on paper in the form of clear
legal obligations are firmly rejected. We do hold a reasonable position.
We are willing to discuss the status and content of these obligations, but
our colleagues should understand that these obligations must have
substance and not be just empty words. They must be worded not as
promises and reassurances, but as specific military-technical criteria that
will enable Russia to judge to what extent US and NATO action in the
missile defence area correspond to their declarations and steps, whether
our interests are being impinged on, and to what extent the strategic
It is important to note that this sentence and any references to “geopolitical situation” and Medvedev’s
previous statement on MDS were not included in English translation of the address.
17
10
nuclear balance is still intact. This is the foundation of the present-day
security.”
Medvedev therefore returned to the notion of strategic balance and expressed his
frustration with the West not understanding the Kremlin’s concerns. In response, he revived the
threat of deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region and promised a series of other steps
including possible discontinuing further arms control measures and withdrawing from the
concluded START treaty (Medvedev, 2011a).
Throughout 2012 and especially after his return to presidency, Putin placed the emphasis
on Russia’s insecurity as a result of the West’s actions. In October 2012, he announced that
Russia would not renew the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which experts
viewed as a response to the U.S. insistence on continuing with its MDS program. Although Putin
expressed willingness to cooperate on non-proliferation issues, he said that a more pressing
priority was to address the U.S. MDS plans in Europe (Herszenhorn, 2012). In his December
2012 presidential address, Putin (2012) insisted on Russia’s “geopolitical relevance” which the
country must increase further.
“Russia must not only preserve its geopolitical relevance - it must multiply
it, it must generate demand among our neighbours and partners. I
emphasise that this is in our own interest. This applies to our economy,
culture, science and education, as well as our diplomacy, particularly the
ability to mobilise collective actions at the international level. Last but not
least it applies to our military might that guarantees Russia's security and
independence.”
Putin (2012) further insisted on preservation of a “new balance of economic,
civilizational and military forces” and instructed the government to pay more attention to
development of patriotic and military education.
18
In addition to ES and MDS, Russia and the West opened a new front of tensions and
disagreements over the Middle East. The trajectory of Medvedev’s emotional evolution on this
issue was similar to those on ES and MDS, although the timing was different. In February 2011,
he described the Arab revolutions as “instigated by outside forces” and alerted the Russian
government to the threat: “Let’s face the truth. They have been preparing such a scenario for us,
and now they will try even harder to implement it” (Freedman, 2011). However, in March 2011
Medvedev instructed the Russia Ambassador to the United Nations to abstain on the UN Security
Council Resolution (No. 1973) on Libya allowing the no-fly zone to take place. The president
even publicly reprimanded Putin who called the resolution “defective and flawed” and “allowing
everything.” Medvedev called Putin’s statement (without calling his name) “unacceptable”
(Freedman, 2011).11 Yet in several months, in another reversal, Medvedev opposed Libya-style
resolution on Syria. By explaining his position in public, the president referred to the Libya
resolution and said he was “convinced that a good resolution has been turned into a piece of
paper to cover a senseless military operation …If my colleagues asked me to abstain from voting
so that they could bomb targets [in Libya], I would have certainly instructed [Russian] officials
at the UN differently," Medvedev said (Astakhov, 2011).
In February 2012 Russia acting jointly with China, vetoed the Syria resolution in the
UNSC out of fear that such resolution would lead to a military intervention and regime change in
Syria, as it happened in Libya. Instead, the Kremlin pushed for negotiations between Bashar alAssad and the military opposition. In May 2012, the Kremlin moved closer to accepting a
possible removal of Assad, but not at the cost of dismantling the Syrian regime (Tisdall, 2012).
Medvedev also recalled Russia’s Lybia Ambassador for criticizing Moscow’s decision (Zavtra
2011).
11
19
In his meetings with president of the United States and president of Turkey in June and
December, respectively, Putin, again, expressed concern about instability in the country and the
wider region after Assad. Russia also strengthened ties with those within the Syrian opposition
interested to work with the Kremlin (Brooke, 2012). As Western nations and several Syrian
neighbors moved to support Syrian military opposition, Russia held them responsible for
reneging on the earlier deal (Kostin, 2012) and instigating instability in the world. As Putin said
commenting on the Middle Eastern changes, “Our partners just can't stop. They have already
created chaos in many territories, and now they are continuing the same policy in other countries,
including Syria. … We did warn that prudent action was needed and that it would be wrong to
try to achieve anything by force, otherwise chaos would ensue. And what do we see today?
Chaos prevails” (RT, 2012).
Table 3 provides examples of Medvedev’s contrasting emotions and statements.
Table 3. Examples of Russia’s Contrasting Statements and Emotions
FEAR
HOPE
FRUSTRATION
“Our strength is being tested” Russia expects a “worthy “They, unfortunately, do
(Medvedev)
global
response” not wish to listen to us”
(Medvedev)
“They have been preparing [a “we
are
20
(Medvedev)
open
for
a “We did warn that … it
revolution] for us, and now they dialogue” (Putin)
would be wrong to try to
will try even harder to implement
achieve
it” (Medvedev)
force, otherwise chaos
anything
by
would ensue” (Putin)
Explaining the Kremlin’s Emotional Shifts: Inferiority Complex or Sibling Rivalry?
Some observers assess Russia’s emotions and behavior in terms of their relations to the
country’s ability to meet its international objectives of power and status. For instance, some of
these observers presented Medvedev’s rhetoric and proposals regarding Europe and MDS as a
tactics to drive a wedge between Western countries and undermining cohesiveness of existing
Western institutions (Bugajski, 2010; Kulhanek, 2010; Stratfor, 2011; Weitz, 2012). In this
interpretation, Russia continued its traditional diplomacy to divide the European continent by
practicing selective deals and coercive diplomacy toward its members. The underlying motive
behind this divide-and-conquer policy is to catch up with Western powers or even beat them at
their power/status game. In psychological terms, this suggests that Russia is driven by inferiority
complex and seeks to address its insecurity by competing with the strongest (the West).
This approach is valid yet insufficient. In particular, it omits from consideration Russia’s
desire to be recognized by the West not only as a power but as a legitimate system of values and
institutions. In Medvedev’s words, Russia and the West shared the same values but they have to
assure that the “values [were] understood in the same way” (ITAR-TASS, 2008). Although the
notion of great power is a part of Russia’s honor/identity complex, it only comes into play when
Russia and the Western nations begin to mistrust each other and diverge from their attempts to
21
cooperate. Each time, Russia and the West engage in common international projects, Russian
leaders depend on the Western nations’ recognition for continuing with movement toward the
West. The fact that Russia’s identity has powerful Western roots is proven by presence of a
strong and vibrant pro-Western group (Westernizers) within the Russian political class.
However, statist and nationalist groups are at least as powerful in influencing the leadership. In
this domestic identity competition between pro-Western and independent groups, the state needs
all the external support it can get. To preserve power, the politically savvy leadership will only
support Westernizers and pro-Western international agenda so long as it feels a sufficient support
from the Western nations. As soon as that support begins to decline, the discourse of hope will
begin to be replaced by those of frustration, fear, and anger. Given Russia’s perception of the
West as its significant other, the discourses of fear may become especially intense and bitter by
appearing entirely irrational and resembling sibling rivalry. The underlying motive for the latter
is sense of betrayal, rather than merely humiliation as in the case of inferiority complex.
Table 4 summarizes the relationships between external recognition of Russia’s
concerns/aspirations and its emotional developments.
Table 4. Western Recognition and Russia’s Emotional Dispositions
Western Support / Influence at Home
Russia’s Emotional Disposition
Low
Rising
Declining
Fear
Hope
Frustration
22
In order to demonstrate the honor/identity expectations behind Russia’s discourses, we
therefore need to match the Kremlin’s emotional and linguistic shifts to the amount of support its
concerns and aspirations receive abroad (West) and at home.
Low Western Support  Russia’s Fear
Immediately after his arrival to power, Medvedev got little support from the Western
nations. The conventional wisdom in Western capitals was that the new president will continue
in Putin’s locksteps and will not initiate a serious movement toward the West. Europe and
especially the United States were engaged in active efforts to promote democracy across the
globe, which Russia predominantly viewed as a threatening and destabilizing development. In
the United States the presidential candidate Senator John McCain campaigned on the platform of
putting additional pressures on Russia for its non-compliance with Western policies and human
rights standards.
Against Western critics’ expectations, such external environment served to undermine
pro-Western voices inside Russia and strengthen the discourses of fear, anger, and frustration.
Kremlin’s ideologists and theorists sympathetic to the official agenda have developed the
concept of “sovereign democracy” insisting on need for Russia to protect its path of development
and resources. The discourse of sovereign democracy became dominant even though Medvedev
(2006) indicated his lack of support for it. In the context of a booming economy, fear translated
into assertive foreign policy which culminated in Putin’s speech in Munich in February 2007 and
Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Within the foreign policy community, a new
consensus emerged that an assertive style suited Russia well at the moment (Review, 2007).
Russia sought to actively shape the international relations by challenging actions of others,
23
particularly the United States, if they were “unilateral” and disrespectful of international law. At
the same time, Russia insisted that its claims and aspirations were not inconsistent with Western
values and that, by upholding values of sovereignty and law, Russia was in fact a better member
of the Western community than others (Tsygankov, 2007).
Rising Western Support  Russia’s Hope
Russia’s new hopes for improving relations with the West may be linked to attempts by
Western nations to recognize Russia. Medvedev’s emphasis on building ES and MDS jointly
with the West emerged and developed in the context of the latter’s cautious support. Both
European leaders and the newly elected president of the United States indicated their desire to
improve security relations with Russia. Medvedev’s own attempts to reach out to the Western
leaders can be traced at least to his speech in Berlin in June 2008 when he first proposed a new
pan-European security treaty.
In the international context of rising Western support, Medvedev’s discourse of hope
found a stronger support at home. It particular, it resonated with Westernizers, who supported the
president’s ES initiative as helpful for integrating Russia with European institutions. For
example, the Institute of Contemporary Development, a liberal think-tank headed by Igor
Yurgens, issued a wide-ranging report describing Russia’s aspired future in the 21st century
(Rossiya XXI veka, 2010).The report presented the country as bound to the European Union by
shared values, security interests, and visions of world order. Westernizers also challenged the
traditional discourse of fear by arguing that neither MDS nor Middle Eastern revolutions threaten
Russia. Instead, they advocated a strong cooperation with the West based on a joint
understanding of security threats (Anisimov and Siletsky, 2011; Golts, 2011). Many Statists also
24
supported Medvedev on the ground of strengthening strategic ties with the West in the context of
Russia’s internal weakness and the rising China problem (Khramchikhin, 2009; Suslov, 2010).
Some of those who had previously been behind Putin’s assertive stance now embraced
Medvedev, whom they viewed as someone with sufficient support of Putin.
Declining Western Support  Russia’s Frustration
Finally, the Kremlin’s growing frustration reflected in various speeches and public
statements after the second half of 2010 and cannot be separated from the West’s declining
support for Medvedev’s policy initiatives. Germany and France agreed with the need to address
the vacuum of European security, but did not find Russia’s proposals satisfactory. NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he saw no need for the new legally binding
security treaty "because we do have a framework already" (Bridge, 2010). The United States was
equally dismissive. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton found that a new European treaty was
unnecessary – the position that Medvedev was described as reflecting “a certain envy” among
“our American partners” (RIA Novosti, 2010). Washington expressed full confidence in the
NATO-centered security system in Europe and pressed ahead with building MDS separately
from Russia. In the late 2012, the U.S.-Russia relationship suffered from a crisis over
the Magnitsky Act. While repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the U.S. Congress passed
the Magnitsky Act, which denies visas to Russian officials presumed responsible for human
rights violations and freezes their assets. The Russia’s State Duma retaliated by passing
the "Anti-Magnitsky Act," which targets U.S. citizens who Russia considers to be violators
of human rights, and banning the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.
25
In this international environment, the domestic influence of Westernizers begun to
decline. As the Kremlin grew critical of the West’s handling of security issues and the Middle
Eastern crisis, even Westernizers expressed criticisms of Western policies. As Dmitry Trenin
(2011) noted, “Beyond Afghanistan, and to some extent Iran, the United States … it is basically
ignoring Russia, whose presence and influence there are considered negligible.” The assessment
by Statists was even harsher. “Russia considers the reset to have fostered significant concessions
to the United States, - wrote Andranik Migranyan (2011). - These include the compromise on
Libya, the help in Afghanistan and the pressure on Iran.” “What did Russia get in return [for its
concessions]? – echoed Alexei Pushkov (2011). - Nothing but changes in nuances of the
dialogue. There are more smiles and handshakes now than there were before.” The discourse of
frustration and fear was back.
Conclusion
The Russia’s emotional shifts, as demonstrated by Russia’s presidential discourses during
2008-2012 – from fear to hope and frustration – are therefore largely shaped by the country’s
historically established social relations with the West and are not to be reduced to dynamics of
power and prestige. Behind these relations are the persistent factors of Russia’s honor and
identity/recognition by the Western nations. The Russians have not defined their system of
values as anti-Western and want to be included within the West as a community of values.
However, in their foreign policies, they have had to simultaneously relate to Western nations and
domestic/local population. The difficulty of bridging this external/internal divide explains both
the complexity of Russia’s emotions toward the West and their frequent intensity.
26
Such explanation suggests the difficulty of finding an emotional balance in Russia’s
relations with the West and even the tendency of these relations’ progression toward an
especially bitter escalation. As it is known from psychological research on relations among
relatives, family quarrels may be particularly difficult to resolve or contain. What psychologists
call sibling rivalry has a tendency of escalating into intense and bitter conflict or even siblicide.
Scholars of Russia-West relations must therefore consider the possibility of such escalation. The
Russia-West confrontation over Ukraine is an example of it. In response to Ukrainian revolution
in February 2014 backed by the United States and the European Union, Russia annexed Crimea
and engaged in supporting military resistance in eastern Ukraine. The language of Russia’s
officials toward the United States and NATO betrays deepening frustration and controlled anger.
For example, in his Crimea speech on March 18, 2014, Putin (2014) directly accused Western
nations of “constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position,
because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy.
But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line,
playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.”
If sibling rivalry is a useful metaphor for describing Russia-West relations, then it
suggests a different behavioral responses than the one from the inferiority complex perspective.
The latter – consistently with the logic of defensive realism – proposes that Russia, much like
China, should be given more stakes in the international system to satisfy its claims of status and
persuade it to act as a responsible, not a revisionist, power. To counter this logic, aggressive
realists have argued that Russia would simply pocket such “concessions” and emerge as even
more revisionist than before. The sibling rivalry perspective suggests, however, that sharing
power/status may not be sufficient – what’s required is a process of extending Russia a social
27
recognition and including it as an equal participant in various economic, political, and security
projects. The family quarrel metaphor implies that Russia and Europe are culturally
interdependent and may only progress in their relationships if they learn to respect each other’s
values..
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