We chose to analyze Ralph V. Turner’s article entitled The Problem of Survival for the
Angevin “Empire”: Henry II’s and His Sons’ Vision versus Late Twelfth-Century Realities. We
chose this article because Turner expresses a strong, and tightly argued, point of view. As with
all strong points of view, it opens itself up nicely to counterpoints of critique.
Summary of Author’s Thesis and Arguments
Turner’s primary thesis is that Henry II, in particular, and his sons, lacked the vision to
create a coherent political entity that could be considered a true territorial empire, in the modern
sense of a state, versus a hegemonic collection of disparate territories. Some of Turner’s
supporting arguments for his thesis are: 1) the Angevin empire lacked a central core; 2) within
the empire, the king’s power was widely variable; 3) the concept of empires in the modern sense
of a state were anachronistic in the 12th and 13th centuries; and 4) Henry II’s succession plans
indicated that he did not view his lands as more than a collection of territories: in his mind, they
were never meant to be strictly unified or centrally controlled.
The Angevin empire’s lack of a central core was most notable in the imbalance between
its economic center and its geographic center. The economic center of the empire was in the
Anglo-Norman holdings, while the geographic center was near Anjou. Short term, this was an
imbalance; long term, it was untenable. Given the realities of 12th century vassalage, it was
virtually impossible that English and Norman lords would continue indefinitely to bankroll
responses to unrest in the southern dominions.
The imbalance of the empire could also be argued to be a function of the king’s variable
influence in his own territories. In the North, Henry had power that could be said to be “intense
and authoritarian”; in the South, however, his power was often “diffused and occasional.” Even
in areas such as Gascony, where his continental power was less affected by divided feudal
loyalties, he often had loyalty when he presented himself and rebellion when he departed.
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Turner argues that during the 12th and 13th century the concept of empire itself was
understood to mean hegemony, rather than direct and centralized control. This is supported by
the fact that the Angevins never had a single name for the lands they controlled. In fact, their
seal feigned to no higher glory than Rex Anglorum, Dux Normannorum et Aquitanorum et comes
Andegavorum. Further, the empire did not have a single currency; nor did Henry II impose a
uniform set of laws.
Turner’s most crucial point is one of vision. Did Henry II perceive his dominions as
more than a collection of territories, some subject to the Plantagenets’ full sovereignty, some
not? Turner argues no. His key support for this argument is the process by which Henry II
created a succession strategy for his dominions. The choice of parage (where eldest son is given
preference while the junior sons are also provided for) over primogeniture is seen by Turner as
prima facie evidence that Henry II intended his lands to be a confederation, at best, rather than a
single, centralized entity.
Critical Analysis
I would suggest that Henry II’s vision could easily have been to create a true centralized
empire. It can be argued that Henry II, and later his sons, did not lack the vision to create a true
empire; but rather, they lacked the ability and/or the opportunity. For a cunning ruler such as
Henry II, his choices – particularly as related to succession – could be interpreted as calculated
approaches to gain a chance at long-term empire while dealing with extreme, immediate-term
political realities.
Given the mixed bag of holdings that formed the Angevin empire, Henry II was not
necessarily in a position to create a unified empire over a short period of time, even if he had
such a vision. The interference of the French crown between Henry and many of his continental
lords (including his own sons), Henry’s own vassalage to the French monarch for most of his
continental posessions, and the pernicious effects of his own wife’s political maneuvering, all
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made for extreme complications. He could not wish these away by royal fiat. If he wanted to
create a unified empire he would need to do it by roundabout means.
In a situation where a ruler lacks the power to fulfill his vision in his lifetime, I would
suggest that Henry II’s vision could have been generational. His sons, united behind the eldest
brother, could have wielded the power to unify the empire and challenge the French king’s
feudal status. Maybe it just didn’t turn out that way. As Turner himself points out, Henry II
insisted in 1183 that his son Richard do homage, as Duke of Aquitaine, to his older brother
Henry, the young king. Richard ultimately refused, but this can be a seen as a sign that Henry’s
avoidance of primogeniture did not preclude a vision of a unified feudal command of his
domains. This request for homage was potentially a very clever tactic, dropping Richard (and
perhaps later, other sons) one level in the feudal pecking order, which would ensure that all of
Henry’s dominions had the potential to owe vassalage to one son, thereby avoiding the dilution
of direct homage to the king of France. Complications of inheritance, created by Henry II’s later
attempts to create an inheritance for John, may have had less to do with an altruistic love for
John and more to do with a king biding his time in a battle of wills between his vision of empire
and those of his wife, and Philip Augustus, who had both become so influential with his children.
Politically, John may have been no more than a new horse to back to help fulfill Henry’s vision –
or save what little was left of it. A specific criticism can also be made of Turner here, for his
lack of emphasis on the role that Eleanor’s psychological – and actual – warfare played in
forcing changes in Henry’s tactics, succession and otherwise.
Turner himself suggests that the Henry’s and his sons’ vision for their lands were grander
than a loose confederation, and that perhaps, had they had more time and better opportunities, a
more unified empire might have been possible. He indicates this in numerous passages:
“Not only Henry II but the entire Plantagenet line believed that the Angevin ‘empire’ was
worth preserving as a family enterprise possessing some measure of political cohesion.”
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“Time might have permitted Henry II and his successors to construct political
institutions, a cosmopolitan ruling class, and patterns of commerce to foster a sense of
unity among their subjects…Neither Henry nor his two sons would have time to complete
the task.”
“The two sons who succeeded him [Henry II] saw the Angevin empire as more than a
temporary collection of scattered territories.”
“Richard the Lionheart and his brother, King John, both concentrated their energies and
resources on preserving this nameless empire assembled by their father.”
The second quote above is particularly interesting because Turner does give credit to Henry for
having the vision to attempt to install a cosmopolitan, as opposed to a local-provincial, ruling
class in his dominions; and because it indicates that time, rather than intent, might have
conspired against a more unified empire.
Turner also notes that the Angevin empire is seen by two British historians, John
Gillingham and John La Patourel, as having the potential to become a permanent maritime
empire. Turner dismisses them out of hand as being “almost alone.” However, if we are remiss
to look at empire in terms of large, unified, modern states, versus hegemonic 12th and 13th
century realities, then perhaps he is remiss to not see that control of both sides of the English
channel and access to the Atlantic as far south as the Pyrenees, had the potential to become
another kind of empire: one that Britain would prove hundreds of years later to be exceedingly
powerful and lucrative.
In the end, Turner has the results on his side: there is no disputing that the Angevin
empire lacked the cohesive elements that we would call today “unified” or “centralized.” And,
as Turner notes: “the Angevins had no ideology to counter the Capetian claims [to feudal
overlordship].” Lack of a better ideology does not preclude, however, a vision of unified empire.
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